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of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 27 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS,
ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND TO THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH
PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

Article III: State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3)

1. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) introduced the working paper on State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3), which was based on the consensus language adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 but also incorporated developments since 1990, in particular with regard to "Programme 93 + 2" and related activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part I). The aim of the working paper was to ensure that the Conference recognized the importance of State systems of accounting and control and of existing regional safeguards systems.

2. Paragraph 1 of the working paper included a reference to the New Partnership approach developed between IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement between IAEA, Brazil, Argentina and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). In paragraph 2 of the working paper, the Conference noted the further efforts of IAEA to strengthen cooperation and enhance the cost-effectiveness of safeguards in the States of the European Union, and in paragraph 3 it called upon States to take safeguards requirements into account when planning, designing and constructing new nuclear facilities, thereby facilitating the work of IAEA and the establishment of a State system of safeguards.

3. Ms. DELPECH (France) emphasized that the fact that EURATOM had nearly four decades of experience should be reflected in the working paper. Therefore her delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 1 by inserting at the end of the second sentence, following the word "EURATOM", the words "which enables both agencies to benefit to the fullest possible extent from their lengthy experience".

4. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) endorsed the amendment proposed by France and said that his delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 2 by inserting the words "the Agency's" in the second sentence so that it read "enhancing the cost-effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards in the States of the European Union", in order to avoid confusion with EURATOM safeguards, which were also mentioned in the working paper.

5. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) welcomed the implementation of the New Partnership approach between IAEA and EURATOM and asked whether either agency could provide further details regarding specific actions to implement the partnership and clarify whether the approach could be extended to other regions. He suggested that the second sentence in paragraph 2 of the working paper was not emphatic

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enough in urging intensified collaboration between States and IAEA with regard to the establishment of new State or regional systems.

6. Mr. PAPANIMITROPOULOS (Greece) endorsed the amendment proposed by France, but did not agree with that of Germany, since he believed the reference was to safeguards in general, and not just those applied by IAEA.

7. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) endorsed the amendments proposed by France and Germany and believed that the reference in paragraph 2 to the efforts to establish new or improved State or regional systems was sufficient.

8. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that increased cooperation between IAEA and EURATOM would lead to greater cost-effectiveness on the part of IAEA, and he endorsed the amendment proposed by Germany.

9. Mr. HAMEL (IAEA) said in reply to the representative of Malaysia that the New Partnership between IAEA and EURATOM was well under way and was making use of the capabilities of both agencies while avoiding duplication of efforts. The New Partnership approach was a concept that had also been incorporated into "Programme 93 + 2" which relied on the development of cooperation between IAEA and State systems - and, where they existed, regional systems - of accounting and control.

10. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that he endorsed the French amendment to paragraph 1. He also proposed that, in the last line of that paragraph, the word "improving" should be replaced by the word "extending", so that the wording would be "... as a positive development in extending regional systems." The existing language gave the inaccurate impression that ABACC took the concept of regional development even further than EURATOM.

11. His delegation agreed with the Malaysian delegation that the important question was not the further development of the New Partnership approach and the efficiency of safeguards in the States of the European Union, but rather the need to explore the possibility of extending regional systems and increasing collaboration among them and IAEA world wide. He therefore suggested that the whole second sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted.

12. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that he supported the amendments proposed by France and Germany, which helped clarify the text. With regard to the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2, he would need more time to consider it.

13. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States) said that his delegation supported IAEA efforts to work with States and regional systems to improve them, but felt that cooperation between States was also important. He therefore proposed that in the last sentence of paragraph 2, the words "and among States" should be added after "IAEA". The text would then read "... collaboration between States and IAEA and among States with regard to ...".

14. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, in the first line of paragraph 1, the words "and regional" should be added after the word "State", so that it would read "... the importance of State and regional systems of

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accounting ...". Also, at the end of paragraph 1, the words "in improving regional systems" should be deleted.

15. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that his delegation endorsed the amendments proposed by France, Russia and Germany. His delegation did not, however, agree with the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2. As the IAEA representative had mentioned, the final report on the partnership had not yet been issued; work on the matter was still in progress. His delegation therefore wished to retain that sentence, with the change proposed by the delegation of Germany.

16. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that he agreed with the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that he intended to prepare an updated draft of working paper 3 to reflect the various changes proposed and to submit it to the open-ended informal working group.

Article III: Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5)

18. Mr. WALKER (Australia) introduced the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5), which was based on the consensus language adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 but had been updated to take into account events since 1990. In paragraph 1, the Conference underlined the importance of international verification of the transfer to peaceful or non-proscribed military utilization of nuclear-weapon materials that had been withdrawn from weapons use. The Conference supported unilateral offers to place excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards and urged all nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification any nuclear materials and nuclear installations that were transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities. Furthermore, the Conference strongly supported negotiation of a fissile material cut-off convention. In paragraph 2 of the working paper, the Conference called for substantial progress without delay towards the separation of the peaceful and the military nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, noting that it strongly believed that supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject to the safeguards agreements concluded between the nuclear-weapon States and IAEA.

19. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation supported negotiation of a fissile material cut-off convention, as mentioned in paragraph 1. However, to mention the convention in that specific paragraph, which concerned safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, would narrow and change the meaning of those negotiations. The reference to a cut-off convention should be placed in the preamble or in some other part of the document, and in a more general form. In any case, it should be deleted from paragraph 1 of working paper 5.

20. Turning to paragraph 2, he noted that much of the wording of the Final Document of the 1990 Review Conference was repeated in the text of working paper 5. He wished to stress, however, that at that Conference, the whole issue of separating peaceful and military uses had been stated much more appropriately. The issue was a technical rather than a political one;

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therefore, not only time but also a great deal of money was required to address it. The words "without delay" in the first sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted. It would not be right to take on commitments which, for technical reasons, could not be physically fulfilled within a short period of time. The words "safeguards in nuclear-weapon States should bear in mind the available resources within the Agency" should also be included in the text.

21. Ms. DELPECH (France) said that, although her delegation was willing to accept language regarding a fissile-material cut-off convention, it did not agree with the placing of the reference to such a convention. In the view of her delegation, and probably many other delegations, the cut-off convention was particularly aimed at drawing in those States which were not parties to the Treaty and which were not, as far as she knew, nuclear-weapon States. The sentence should therefore be moved to another place in the final document.

22. Turning to paragraph 2, she said that the first sentence should be deleted. The wording in the 1990 Final Document was different in very substantial ways, inasmuch as it invited nuclear-weapon States to submit all their peaceful nuclear facilities to safeguards. The new text, on the other hand, spoke of substantial progress. Her delegation did not see how any substantial progress could be made in that area. The words "without delay" were also inappropriate.

23. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation agreed that the reference to the cut-off convention did not belong in the section pertaining to safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. In fact, the matter did not even fall within the scope of Main Committee II, as it had been discussed at length in Main Committee I.

24. With regard to paragraph 2, he said that Italy would very much like to see the separation of peaceful and military nuclear facilities implemented; however, as Russia and France had pointed out, the issue was a technical one. To call for something that everyone knew could not happen soon was self-defeating. His delegation was not opposed to the wording, but felt that it would be more appropriate to replace the words "substantial progress" by the words "further progress", and to replace the words "without delay" by the words "as soon as possible". His delegation would not go so far as to delete the sentence altogether.

25. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 might be amended to read: "The Conference calls on all States which have not yet done so to place their sensitive civilian materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) as a first step under international safeguards." That language had been accepted by the European Union in 1994. Such an amendment would also replace part of paragraph 2, and help to streamline working paper 5 in general.

26. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that the German proposal, although useful, departed too much from the reference to excess military material, which was the main point of paragraph 1, and went into the question of the possible extension of safeguards to all separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium, whether or not of military origin. He therefore suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1, the text following the words "urges all nuclear-weapon States" should be amended to read: "to bring separated plutonium and highly

enriched uranium no longer required for military purposes under international safeguards."

27. With regard to the first sentence of paragraph 2, his delegation agreed with the comments made by the French delegation, since the United Kingdom would also have difficulty with making "substantial progress" towards the separation of peaceful and military nuclear facilities, and was not convinced that delay had anything to do with it. In a spirit of compromise, he would suggest replacing the words "substantial progress" by the words "further progress".

28. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, he suggested that, after the words "nuclear supplies", the words "delivered to them" should be inserted in order to reflect the fact that the text was not intended as a call to nuclear-weapon States to control exports more strictly, but rather to give non-nuclear-weapon States certain formal commitments.

29. Lastly, his delegation questioned the use of the word "strongly" in the last sentence of both paragraphs. That word was not used in any of the other working papers, and it was not clear why it was used in working paper 5.

30. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that he supported the German proposal. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, the wording should read "... the recent unilateral offer ...", since, as far as he knew, only one country, the United States, had made such an offer.

31. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said he had no objection to the idea of transferring the reference to the cut-off convention to the text being drafted by Main Committee I or to some other location.

32. His delegation was prepared to accept the change in paragraph 1 proposed by the United Kingdom. However, the first sentence of the paragraph created some difficulty, partly because of the lack of clarity regarding the intention of the paragraph and partly because the verification of transfers was a very complex issue. His delegation had consulted informally with some other delegations, and wished to suggest that the sentence should be deleted. An addition to the second sentence of paragraph 1 might accomplish the objective sought in the first sentence. He therefore suggested that the following words should be added at the end of the language proposed by the United Kingdom: "in order to demonstrate the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear-arms reductions".

33. Turning to the last sentence in paragraph 2, he noted that the words "these supplies" referred to the supplies mentioned in the second sentence, i.e., the supplies delivered to nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes. It further stated that those supplies should be subject to safeguards agreements. The safeguards agreement between the United States and IAEA provided for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material and all nuclear facilities except those of direct national-security significance. Because of the character of the agreement, his Government would be unable to do what was asked for in that sentence. He therefore suggested that the beginning of the sentence should be replaced by the words: "The Conference believes that nuclear-material supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject ...".

34. With regard to the amendment proposed by Germany, he said that his delegation needed more time to consider it.

35. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that, in the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the word "offer", the words "on a voluntary basis" should be added. He agreed with the proposal to delete the last sentence of paragraph 1, for the same reasons already mentioned by other delegations. The Chinese Government supported the negotiation and conclusion of the cut-off convention; however, to discuss, in connection with safeguards, a convention that had yet to come into being was inappropriate and might even be misleading.

36. With regard to the German proposal, he said that it lacked clarity on many points. For instance, whether plutonium and highly enriched uranium could be regarded as civilian material or sensitive civilian material was still not clear to his delegation.

37. In the first sentence of paragraph 2, his delegation agreed that the word "substantial" should be replaced by "further" and the words "without delay" should be deleted. After that sentence, a new sentence should be added, reading: "The Conference recognizes the value of the voluntary safeguards agreements of the five nuclear-weapon States in strengthening the non-proliferation regime." In fact, that wording reflected the consensus reached in 1990. That could be followed by the words "with respect to those nuclear supplies". As to whether they should be under IAEA safeguards, his delegation shared the view of the United Kingdom that separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium no longer required for military purposes should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

38. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that, in the last sentence of paragraph 1, the Conference might wish to note that the conclusion of a cut-off convention would result in a significant extension of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States. The drafters of working paper 5 would attempt to accommodate all the concerns that had been expressed by delegations.

Article III: Financing safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4)

39. Mr. SIERLA (Finland) introduced the working paper on the financing of safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4), which called upon States parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty. The Conference requested IAEA to continue to identify all resources needed to meet its safeguards responsibilities and urged all States to ensure that the Agency was provided with those resources. In paragraph 2, the Conference encouraged significant contributions by States parties to the safeguards development programme by facilitating and assisting the application of safeguards and in supporting research and development to strengthen and advance the application of effective and efficient safeguards.

40. Ms. DRDAKOVÁ (Czech Republic) said that the first sentence of paragraph 1 should be replaced by the corresponding wording of the 1990 Final Document, in which the Conference called upon States parties to continue their political,

technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to ensure that IAEA was able to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty and its increasing safeguards responsibilities.

41. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) said that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded to reflect the Agency's other important functions. In the third sentence of paragraph 1, the Conference should also take account of the ways in which the IAEA Statute guided the Agency on safeguards financing. The guiding principle should be that contained in the Statute and in document INFCIRC/153. The Conference should also take account of the nuclear-weapon States' voluntary offer to IAEA.

42. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the representative of Malaysia should submit his proposals in writing.

43. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) proposed that, after the first sentence of paragraph 1, a new sentence should be added, reading: "The Conference notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system has had to function."

44. He also proposed the addition, at the end of paragraph 2, of the words "and that additional States extend their cooperation and support".

45. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) said that, in the last sentence of paragraph 1, the order of the words "lasting" and "equitable" should be reversed, since it was more important that the solution should be equitable.

46. Mr. CHEBO (Cameroon) said that his delegation supported the United States representative's proposal to add a new sentence in paragraph 1. However, in the view of his delegation, the new sentence should be the first sentence of the paragraph and not the second.

47. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that his delegation accepted the proposal made by the representative of Cameroon.

Article III: Plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9)

48. Mr. BOJER (Denmark) introduced the working paper on plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9), in which the Conference recognized that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes was expected to increase over the next several years and expressed satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and the storage of separated plutonium. In paragraph 2, the Conference called for greater transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It encouraged the relevant States to use restraint when stockpiling such materials and reaffirmed that all such excess fissile material should be under IAEA safeguards. Finally, the Conference encouraged States to continue to examine long-term arrangements for the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

49. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said that working paper 9 took up a discussion that had long been held between IAEA and the plutonium-producing or plutonium-using countries. The paper should reflect the development of that discussion in different forums, in particular the group established by the Director General of IAEA, which met regularly in Vienna. Since the last two sentences of paragraph 2 dealt with outdated ideas, they should be deleted.

50. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that the last sentence of paragraph 1 should be amended to read:

"The Conference welcomes the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and to the storage of separated plutonium, and urges that it continue."

51. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation did not agree with the representative of Germany that the ideas expressed in the last two sentences of paragraph 2 were outdated. Those ideas were "dormant" and could still be revived. Consequently, his delegation was in favour of retaining the last two sentences of paragraph 2.

52. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) said that the projected increase in the use of separated plutonium presented a number of problems, since small quantities of plutonium could be used for the construction of nuclear weapons and therefore required stringent measures to ensure their physical protection and security. The Agency had made a considerable effort to ensure that special difficulties in safeguarding such materials were overcome and that safeguards on reprocessing and storage facilities for plutonium were fully effective. At the same time, the projected increase in separated plutonium would place a heavy burden on the Agency's safeguards resources. The text should also mention that there were concerns about the safety of shipping plutonium by sea.

53. His delegation strongly supported the forthcoming negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons as a further contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. However, since, from a technical point of view, there was no difference between military and civilian weapons-grade material, a cut-off convention should be supplemented by concrete measures to provide greater international confidence in plutonium management. The Conference's endorsement of the points in the proposed text would represent a step forward.

54. Further consideration should be given to the long-term management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which should include the possibility of the Agency's making the necessary arrangements for the deposit of such material. The establishment of regional nuclear-fuel centres under IAEA administration should also be considered. Unlike the representative of Germany, his delegation felt that the last two sentences of paragraph 2 should be retained.

55. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Italy. There was no harm in retaining the last two sentences of paragraph 2, and it might perhaps be useful to add a reference to article XII (A) (5) of the IAEA Statute.

56. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Germany. Further, he proposed that the word "excess" should be deleted from the third sentence of paragraph 2, since States parties to the Treaty already had all their fissile material under IAEA safeguards. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the word "reprocessing", the word "handling" should be inserted.

57. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that the words "for civil purposes" should be added at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2.

58. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation supported the arguments forwarded by the German representative, since there was considerable doubt as to whether an international plutonium-storage centre or a regional nuclear-fuel centre owned and managed by IAEA was a feasible concept for the foreseeable future, if only because of the enormous capital investment involved.

59. With regard to the reference in the second sentence in paragraph 2 to "excess" stockpiles, he noted that ordinary working stocks needed just as much safeguarding and protection as "excess" stocks. The very definition of the word "excess" posed a considerable problem. He proposed that paragraph 2 should be reformulated to read:

"The Conference calls for greater transparency on matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for civil purposes. The Conference notes the existence of substantial stocks of separated plutonium and reaffirms that all such stocks should be under international safeguards. The Conference urges users and producers of plutonium to continue to examine long-term arrangements for the management and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These arrangements could include consideration of arrangements for deposit with IAEA, as envisaged in its Statute, of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium as an additional precaution against diversion of direct-use materials to nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as the possibility of regional fuel centres."

60. Mrs. COLL (Ireland) said that her delegation hoped that the last two sentences of paragraph 2 would be retained in some form. In the light of the progress achieved since the end of the cold war, it was not the time to renounce ideas that had been put forward when the likelihood of their realization had been minimal. While the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom appeared promising, it should be examined more closely.

61. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that his delegation looked forward to the new text that would be issued on the basis of the proposals made by various delegations. The extensive reformulation of paragraph 2 proposed by the United Kingdom representative seemed to suggest that future work should be reserved for producers and users of plutonium; that was not the view of his delegation.

62. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation supported the Chinese representative's amendment of the first sentence of paragraph 2. The current language of the last two sentences of paragraph 2 was appropriate and did not require the radical reformulation proposed by the representative of the United

Kingdom. His delegation supported the proposal made by the Australian representative.

63. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) said that his delegation supported the two amendments proposed by the Belgian representative. In the second sentence of paragraph 1 he suggested that the words "of fuel" should be inserted after the word "reprocessing" in order to ensure that the word "reprocessing" was not construed as referring to separated plutonium. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, the words "such material" should be replaced by "fissile material", which was more likely to be stockpiled than nuclear material.

Article III: Physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8)

64. Mr. POTUYT (Netherlands) introduced the working paper on physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8), in which the Conference noted the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially that usable for military purposes, and called on nuclear-weapon States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear-weapon systems and materials. Furthermore, the Conference expressed grave concern at reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since the last Review Conference and noted the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. In paragraph 2, the Conference urged all States that had not done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date. In paragraph 3, the Conference recognized the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium and recommended that international cooperation to facilitate such conversion should be continued.

65. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation), referring to the first sentence of the first paragraph, said that if the material referred to was direct-use material, then the call should be addressed to all States using that material. He suggested that the second part of the first sentence should read: "and calls on all States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of direct-use materials." He also proposed that the end of the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the words "to protect", should be amended to read: "and ensure the security of such material." In addition, at the end of paragraph 2, the words "including separated plutonium" should be deleted.

66. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said he felt that the responsibility of States for such material should be emphasized more strongly. He therefore proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be moved to the beginning of paragraph 2. The latter would read: "The Conference notes the responsibility of all States to protect and ensure the security of material that may be used for nuclear weapons. It expresses grave concern at reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since the last Review Conference. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection, and in this respect welcomes the work being conducted under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on this issue." He also supported the proposal by the representative of the Russian Federation to delete the last three words of paragraph 2.

67. His delegation felt strongly that the second sentence of paragraph 3 should be deleted, since it called for restrictions on technological development which the German Government could not accept.

68. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that the new wording proposed by the German delegation for paragraph 2 was an improvement, as was the text proposed by the Russian Federation for paragraph 1.

69. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) supported the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3; each State had the right to choose whatever fuel cycles it considered appropriate.

70. Mr. ROSU (Romania) proposed that, in the last sentence of the first paragraph, after the words "physical protection", the words "and prevention of illicit trafficking" should be inserted.

71. Ms. KUROKOCHI (Japan), Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) and Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) supported the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3.

72. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be amended in order to call upon States to ensure the security of all nuclear materials, not only those that could contribute to the construction of nuclear weapons; and in the last line of paragraph 2, the words "enriched uranium" should be added before "separated plutonium". He also concurred with the proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3.

73. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that, while he understood the concern of the German delegation regarding the second sentence of paragraph 3, he felt that rather than deleting it, it should be amended to read: "It recommends that the use of high-enriched uranium in new civilian reactors be avoided to the extent possible."

74. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that the figure 53, the number of States which had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, should be inserted at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2.

75. Mr. AYETOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had no problem with the amendments that had been proposed. However, in the fifth line of paragraph 1, the word "reports" was inappropriate. While it was indeed necessary to put a stop to any trafficking of nuclear materials if and when it occurred, he wondered about the reliability of the reports referred to. It was important to avoid overdramatization in the final document; the Committee should avoid referring to those unconfirmed reports in such a way as to give the impression that they were necessarily all true.

76. The CHAIRMAN, speaking in his personal capacity, supported by Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation), suggested that the use of the word "reports" was intended to avoid precisely that overdramatization.

77. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that, since some of the reports had proved to be well-founded, the word "reports" should be replaced by "evidence".

78. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria), speaking as one of the drafters of the working paper, said that the word "reports" had been chosen because it was precisely the fact that the trafficking had been reported which had alerted the international community to the problem.

79. Mr. AYETOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that any overdramatized version of the facts would be reflected in the media, whose exaggerated account of the trafficking would lead to further alarm in the international community; it could become a vicious circle. The Committee should take only verified facts into account.

80. The CHAIRMAN considered that all delegations were in agreement on the fact that the trafficking really existed, and on the need to avoid overstating the situation.

81. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said that Germany was doing all that was possible and scientifically advisable to convert research reactors from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. He could not accept the suggestion of the United States delegation to retain the second sentence of paragraph 3 in an amended form; the first and third sentences of that paragraph stated the case sufficiently well.

82. He also suggested that it would be more appropriate for the subject of the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian reactors to be discussed in Main Committee III, under the heading of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

83. Mr. WALKER (Australia), referring to the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3, said that it would be strange if the Conference called for the conversion of existing resources to low-enriched uranium while remaining silent on the question of construction of new research reactors.

84. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) agreed with the Australian delegation. He also concurred with the point made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the second sentence of paragraph 1, and proposed that the word "instances" should be substituted for the word "reports".

85. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) concurred with the remarks made by the United States and Australian delegations. He proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 3 should read: "It recommends that new civilian reactors minimize as much as possible the use of high-enriched uranium as fuel."

86. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom), regarding paragraph 3, said that the first protection against proliferation risks must be the commitment of the States involved, coupled with international safeguards. The Conference should be extremely cautious about seeking to proscribe, or strongly to discourage, a legitimate form of peaceful nuclear activity pursued by a responsible State.

87. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) supported the suggestion made by the United States delegation. He suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should refer to "reported instances of illicit trafficking".

88. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) concurred with the wording proposed by the United States.

89. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, to avoid spending too much time on minor drafting matters, the Committee should accept the wording for paragraph 1 proposed by the representative of the United States.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.