



## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERALS/26927  
30 December 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, by which the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months, subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement.
2. By the same resolution, the Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's proposal that the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), established by Council resolution 486 (1993), should be integrated within UNAMIR. Finally, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to report on the progress of UNAMIR following its initial deployment, and resolved to review as appropriate, on the basis of that report, the requirement for further deployments in the scale and composition recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488).
3. The Arusha peace agreement, signed on 4 August 1993, called on the United Nations to play a major support role during a 22-month transitional period, beginning with the installation of a broad-based transitional government and ending with the holding of national elections. The Security Council in resolution 872 (1993) authorized UNAMIR, *inter alia*, to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali through the establishment of a weapons-secure area; to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, including cantonment, demobilization and integration of the armed forces of the parties; to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate; to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes; to investigate, at the request of the parties or on its own initiative, instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement; to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons; to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations; and to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the Gendarmerie and police.

## I. POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. My Special Representative, appointed in pursuance of paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 872 (1993), arrived in Kigali on 23 November 1993 and established his headquarters in the Rwandese capital. Since his arrival, my Special Representative has established contacts and working relations with the parties signatories to the Arusha peace agreement as well as with the diplomatic missions accredited to the Rwandese Government and the religious and traditional leaders of the country. Pursuant to resolution 872 (1993), my Special Representative will help in bringing about the appropriate political environment to promote and enhance a dialogue between the parties to the Arusha peace agreement.

5. In his meetings with representatives of concerned Governments and diplomats, my Special Representative stressed the need to harmonize their efforts and activities with those of UNAMIR in order to reach a successful conclusion of the Arusha peace agreement. Following a series of violent incidents in the months of November and December 1993, which caused the death of some 40 persons, my Special Representative undertook several initiatives in order to help defuse the tension prevalent in the country and to get the parties signatories to the Arusha peace agreement to renew their commitment to implement the peace plan.

6. Those initiatives included the convening of a meeting between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) at Kinyihira, 80 kilometres from Kigali. At that meeting, the two parties issued a joint declaration in which they reaffirmed their commitment to do their utmost in order to achieve the goals set by the Arusha peace agreement, namely peace and national reconciliation. They agreed to set up a broad-based transitional government before 31 December 1993. During that meeting, the Chairman of RPF reaffirmed that the Front was more willing than ever to respect all its commitments, especially the one relating to the cantonment of its security battalion in Kigali.

## II. MILITARY ASPECTS

7. By paragraph 12 of resolution 872 (1993), the Security Council requested me to conclude expeditiously an agreement on the status of UNAMIR and its personnel in Rwanda. The Council requested that this agreement come into force as near as possible to the outset of the operation and no later than 30 days after the adoption of the resolution. Following the adoption of resolution 872 (1993), a draft status of forces agreement was presented to the Government of Rwanda. After consultations with the Government, the agreement was signed on 5 November 1993. A copy of the agreement was then forwarded to RPF, which confirmed its readiness to cooperate in the implementation of its provisions.

8. It will be recalled that in my report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488) I had proposed, and the Council had approved, a concept of operations with an implementation schedule comprising four phases. Phase I commenced on 5 October 1993 with the adoption by the Council of resolution 872 (1993). During this phase, preparations for the establishment of a secure area in Kigali

/...

....

were to be made, the monitoring of the cease-fire between the two parties in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) was to be undertaken by UNAMIR and the foreign forces stationed in Kigali were to depart. This phase was to last approximately 90 days, until the establishment of the broad-based transitional government in Kigali. Phase II would begin the day after the transitional government was installed and would end when the preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces and Gendarmerie were completed. It was estimated that this phase would also last about 90 days. Phase III would comprise the actual disengagement, demobilization and integration process. The duration of this phase was estimated at about 9 months. Finally, during phase IV, which would last 10 months, UNAMIR would assist in maintaining a secure environment and creating conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections.

9. As stated in my report of 24 September, it was foreseen that the strength of military personnel required for the implementation of UNAMIR's mandate would stand at 1,428 all ranks by the end of phase I and that it would reach a peak at the end of phase II, with a total of 2,548 military personnel. A process of gradual reduction would begin during phase III, leading to a residual strength of some 930 military personnel by the beginning of phase IV.

10. In my implementation plan, I had indicated that the mission's operations would be divided into five sectors, including a Kigali sector and a demilitarized zone sector. Two other sectors would be located with the Rwandese Government forces (RGF) and the forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) respectively (see attached map). For internal administrative purposes, UNOMUR would be considered as the fifth sector.

11. The Force Commander of UNAMIR, General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993, followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October 1993. On 1 November, as foreseen in my report, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II), which had been monitoring the cease-fire in the DMZ, was integrated into UNAMIR. UNAMIR's headquarters were formally inaugurated on 17 November in the presence of General Juvenal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda. The Force headquarters has been able to fulfil most of its projected tasks for phase I, though under certain logistic constraints due to delays in the arrival of vehicles, communications equipment and other supplies.

12. The Kigali sector headquarters has developed a calendar and operational plans for the establishment of the weapons-secure area, for the movement of an RPF security battalion to Kigali and for the conduct of other tasks in the area, as foreseen in my previous report. The Kigali weapons-secure area was established on 24 December and the RPF security battalion arrived in Kigali on 28 December 1993. Intensive discussions are being held with the parties with a view to facilitating the installation of the transitional government by the end of the month.

13. The demilitarized zone sector headquarters was established upon the arrival of the advance party and became operational on 1 November 1993 when the NMOG II elements were absorbed into UNAMIR. Until now it has not been possible, in the absence of the necessary logistic support, to deploy personnel to Byumba.

/...

However, the deployment of the required equipment is expected to take place in January 1994.

14. The Military Observer Group headquarters was established from elements of the advance party and NMOG II and became operational on 7 November. It has been commanding and administering all deployed military observers. It has also been conducting valuable reconnaissance of both parties' sector headquarters locations, as well as liaison tasks and investigations.

15. In addition, the Military Observer Group has been given the task of following the situation which developed on the southern border of Rwanda following the coup d'état of 21 October 1993 in Burundi. The unexpected flow of Burundese refugees into Rwanda, as well as allegations of cross-border military movement, have taxed the operations of the observers. In this connection, I instructed Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah, who was in Burundi to attend the funeral of President Ndadaye, to visit the southern border area of Rwanda in order to assess the situation. Mr. Jonah travelled from Bujumbura to Kigali by road on 7 December and was thus able to observe the impact of the sudden flow of Burundese refugees in that area. While in Kigali, Mr. Jonah discussed the Burundese crisis with President Habyarimana and urged his assistance in reducing tensions in Burundi.

16. Although the southern region is at present reasonably quiet, the relative ease of access to considerable arms and the ethnic tensions amongst and around the refugees have created a potentially destabilizing situation which had not been foreseen in my initial assessment of requirements for the mission. For the time being, the Force Commander is attempting to reallocate personnel within the overall resources projected in my report of 24 September. This solution may be acceptable for the near term if the flow of observers planned for phase II is deployed on an urgent basis. If, however, experience and circumstances were to require additional observers, I would bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council for its consideration.

17. The RGF and RPF sector headquarters are in the process of being established. A small liaison office was opened in Milindi, within the RPF sector, following tensions in the north-western part of the country. The Military Observer Group is performing the necessary liaison and reconnaissance functions in the RGF zone.

18. It will be recalled that in paragraph 8 of resolution 872 (1993) the Security Council invited me to report on the requirements for further deployments, especially in the demilitarized zone. During the month of November, two separate incidents, in which some 60 civilians were brutally killed, took place in the vicinity of Ruhengeri. The nature of these attacks, directed against civilians primarily in and around the DMZ, has underscored the need for UNAMIR promptly to acquire the capability to monitor the area effectively. The investigations conducted into these killings by UNAMIR observers have revealed that a well-armed and reportedly ruthless group was operating in the area, with a view to disrupting or even derailing the peace process. The precarious security situation in that region confirms the need for a fully equipped infantry battalion, to enable UNAMIR to monitor the

/...

demilitarized zone and provide a safe environment for the large population living in the area.

19. The deployment of the Kigali battalion, composed of contingents from Belgium and Bangladesh, was completed in the first part of December. As a result, the foreign troops stationed in Kigali were able to complete their withdrawal on 15 December 1993. Regarding other elements of UNAMIR, 26 of the 50 members of the projected Medical Platoon have been deployed. Pending completion of the deployment of this unit, the Belgian contingent has agreed to allow the use of its Hercules aircraft for air evacuation in emergency cases. The 20 members of the movement control platoon and the 5 members of the military police group have also been deployed.

20. On 27 December 1993, the composition of UNAMIR consisted of a total of 1,260 military personnel, from Austria (5), Bangladesh (564), Belgium (424), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Canada (2), the Congo (25), Fiji (1), Ghana (37), Hungary (4), Mali (10), the Netherlands (10), Poland (5), Senegal (39), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61), Uruguay (21) and Zimbabwe (10). These figures include the 81 military observers serving with UNOMUR (see S/26878).

21. The composition of the military component of UNAMIR has revealed a need for interpreters/translators which had not been anticipated in my report of 24 September. A small number of interpreters/translators will therefore be put at the disposal of UNAMIR to assist its military personnel in the performance of their mandated tasks. I intend to reflect the financial impact in my next report to the General Assembly on the financing of UNAMIR.

### III. CIVILIAN POLICE

22. The Arusha peace agreement called on the United Nations to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and communal police. In my report of 24 September, I had indicated that in order to verify that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, a small United Nations civilian police unit consisting of 60 police officers would be required by UNAMIR. It has not so far been possible to deploy this personnel. However, some Member States have recently agreed to make civilian police officers available for this operation and it is anticipated that they will be deployed in January 1994.

### IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

23. Since my report of 24 September (S/26488), emergency and rehabilitation efforts for the displaced persons have continued, but new difficulties have arisen as a result of a massive influx of Burundese refugees caused by ethnic violence in neighbouring Burundi as well as by an increasingly serious drought. Of an estimated 685,000 Burundese refugees, some 375,000 have fled to Rwanda. The revised budget of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other United Nations agencies to meet emergency needs of Burundese refugees in the region until May 1994 amounts to \$52 million.

/...

24. UNAMIR, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system, will continue to provide all necessary assistance to facilitate the safe return of refugees as well as the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies to the needy populations. The continued cooperation of the parties with the international community is essential for the successful implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. I hope that the international community will continue to extend sufficient assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in Rwanda, so as to support the unimpeded implementation of the Arusha peace agreement.

#### V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

25. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments not exceeding \$4.6 million for the initial requirements of UNAMIR, for the period from 5 October to 30 November 1993, under the provision of General Assembly resolution 46/187 of 20 December 1991 on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses.

26. The total cost of UNAMIR for the six-month period from 5 October 1993 to 30 April 1994, including the amount of \$4.6 million previously authorized by the Advisory Committee, has been estimated at \$51,120,000 gross (\$50,478,000 net). The Advisory Committee recently recommended that the General Assembly authorize further commitments of up to \$46.5 million gross (\$45.9 million net). A detailed budget showing the breakdown of the estimated amount of \$51.120 million will be submitted to the General Assembly shortly.

#### VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

27. In my previous report, I stressed that two essential conditions had to be met to enable the United Nations to discharge its mandate in Rwanda successfully and effectively. First, the parties had to cooperate fully with one another and with the United Nations in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha agreement. Secondly, the United Nations had to be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources.

28. Despite recent signs of mutual intransigence, the parties have continued to show good will and cooperation in their contacts with each other and with the United Nations. They have also managed to weather some tense and potentially disruptive moments in the wake of the events in Burundi. In addition, the fact that the cease-fire has generally been respected demonstrates that the parties remain committed to the peace and reconciliation process initiated by the Arusha agreement.

29. For their part, Member States have responded positively to my appeals for the provision of personnel at relatively short notice. As can be seen from section II above, the initial deployment of UNAMIR has proceeded largely on schedule. Although the logistic support capabilities of UNAMIR are for the time being inadequate, there is on the ground a minimum viable force which can respond to the most pressing needs in Kigali. However, the situation in the DMZ and in the north-west of the country remains unstable. Moreover, the situation

/...

in Burundi has created a new source of tension in the south. The deployment of the personnel required for the second phase of the operation should therefore be undertaken on an urgent basis.

30. In the light of the above, I recommend that the Security Council, in carrying out its review of the activities of UNAMIR, agree that this operation should continue to implement the mandate entrusted to it under resolution 872 (1993). In this regard, I intend to proceed with the implementation plan as outlined in my previous report, including the early deployment of the second battalion in the DMZ. I am aware that the Council had asked me to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR. I will continue to seek economies through the phased deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR personnel, in accordance with the timetable set out in my implementation plan. I am however convinced that, under the present circumstances, a reduction in the projected resource levels would negatively affect the performance and credibility of UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate. It could also jeopardize the peace process in Rwanda.

