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**President: Mr. Rüdiger von WECHMAR**  
(Federal Republic of Germany).

**AGENDA ITEM 97**

**Scale of Assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions (*concluded*)\***

1. The PRESIDENT: Before we proceed with the agenda for this morning I should like to invite the attention of the Assembly to document A/35/792/Add.3, which contains a letter of 2 March 1981 addressed to me by the Secretary-General. This letter transmits a communication from the Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic to the United Nations, which contains in particular the following request:

"In view of this situation, which is due to circumstances beyond my country's control, I would request you to make an exception to the application of Article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations and authorize the delegation of the Central African Republic to participate in all votes taken at the resumed thirty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly and any other sessions which may be held in 1981."

In this regard I would point out that rule 160 of the rules of procedure stipulates that the Committee on Contributions shall advise the General Assembly "on the action to be taken with regard to the application of Article 19 of the Charter".

2. In view of the nature of the request I would suggest that the Committee on Contributions be invited to consider this matter as expeditiously as possible.

*It was so decided.*

\* Resumed from the 102nd meeting.

**AGENDA ITEM 27**

**Question of Namibia (*continued*):**

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- (b) Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia

3. Mr. BEDJAOUI (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): This renewed examination of the question of Namibia today offers the General Assembly another opportunity to open the file concerning the South African régime. The frequency with which the various bodies of the United Nations have considered the problems involving South Africa has rarely been equalled and is eloquent proof of the grave concern of the international community over the unacceptable situation created by the South African régime.

4. With its sophisticated system of racial oppression, a phenomenon of colonialist exploitation and a permanent hotbed of tension and aggression, South Africa has exalted and perpetuated the historical defects of a human community, the last seeds of which must be eradicated through increased determination.

5. Thus, any consideration by United Nations bodies of the tragedy rending southern Africa must inevitably lead to an international trial of the South African régime.

6. In debates on *apartheid*, or on the repeated acts of aggression against the States of the area, or on Namibia, no meeting of the Security Council or the General Assembly, because of the obvious link between the various problems, has failed to stress the gravity of the precarious political situation in which South Africa has maintained all southern Africa.

7. Thus, in facing once again one of the many facets of the vile policy of the Pretoria régime, the Assembly must not hesitate in expressing anew the will of the United Nations fully to discharge its special responsibility in conducting the process of decolonization for Namibia. In that context, the attitude of South Africa toward the question of Namibia only becomes intelligible if it is analysed as an integral part of Pretoria's global strategy vis-à-vis the whole of southern.

8. By persisting in its illegal presence in Namibia, South Africa has maintained an infectious hotbed, dooming the entire region to permanent insecurity and instability. International law thus remains flouted, world consensus on the need for Namibia to become independent is thus scorned and, more generally speaking, international morality and law are violated.

9. Of all the questions of decolonization, that of Namibia, which has been correctly defined both by

the General Assembly and by the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, clearly contains all the elements of a settlement. The illegality of South Africa's occupation, which has been legally established, the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people, which has solemnly been proclaimed, the representativeness of the South West Africa People's Organization [SWAPO], which has been duly recognized, all seemed to indicate that the United Nations intended to guarantee the genuine independence of the Territory and to work resolutely towards that end.

10. However, defying this genuine consensus of the international community, the Pretoria régime, directly after the proclamation in the Charter of the principle of the equality of peoples and their right to self-determination, flaunted its decision to turn Namibia into a "fifth province" and since then has pursued, with implacable logic, a policy of annexation of the Territory. Obsessed by that unchanging design, the Pretoria régime has at all times mobilized its juridical arsenal and its political and military apparatus in Namibia to that end.

11. It is that context which reveals the full significance of the setting up of a so-called "Council of Ministers" which emerged from the sham elections that the Security Council has duly declared null and void.

12. Together with this search for a so-called "internal" settlement, which gives the appearance of a change but which in fact maintains South Africa's control over Namibia, South Africa is intensifying its repression of the Namibian people as well as its acts of aggression against neighbouring countries to force them to make room for the foreign body situated in Windhoek.

13. It has, moreover, finely honed the technique of procrastination which, by the pretence of constant practical difficulties, has allowed it to question basic established facts and has shrouded in uncertainty a clear objective laid down by the international community, that is, the genuine independence of Namibia.

14. It is precisely that attitude of duplicity on the part of South Africa that found its most complete expression at the meeting in Geneva in January of this year.

15. It is a fact that the Geneva meeting was a total failure, and South Africa bears exclusive responsibility for that. As far as SWAPO was concerned, it undeniably showed a responsible and open attitude and a lofty sense of its national and international duties.

16. But, in truth, the failure of the Geneva meeting should have surprised no one. The settlement plan itself, which was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978), bore within it substantial shortcomings both in its general approach and the manner in which it was to be implemented. It could easily be manipulated and lent itself to delaying tactics so that its very viability could be questioned. Right from the start Algeria expressed its apprehensions and scepticism.

17. The undoubted failure of the Geneva meeting then requires that today we take careful stock of the situation. Neither the problem of determining the purpose of the meeting nor that of identifying parties had been previously and clearly resolved. A great deal of ambiguity enveloped the meeting.

18. It was supposed to have a specific purpose which alone could confer meaning on it: negotiations to define the means for achieving a cease-fire and for implementation of the Security Council settlement plan. But South Africa had never accepted, either formally or implicitly, such a purpose. It had no intention of discussing either this plan or any other peace plan with SWAPO, and this created a rather strange situation and aroused legitimate apprehension. What dark design was South Africa really once again pursuing with a meeting whose purpose it refused to accept, while still refusing to reveal the goal it intended unilaterally to set for it?

19. As regards the decision on who should participate in the meeting, it quickly became clear that South Africa wished to carry out a machiavellian plan with two complementary aspects. It wished first of all to confer some kind of international standing on the puppets of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [DTA] and to try to reduce accordingly the audience for SWAPO. South Africa wanted to appear to be not a party but a mere observer, thereby relieving itself of its responsibility, denying the existence of a decolonization problem in Namibia and strengthening the role of the DTA as interlocutor. Putting the puppets on stage, it wished to disappear into the wings and portray SWAPO as a mere phantom without body or soul. That was the scenario in poor taste that South Africa wished to stage in a theatre it had, moreover, caused the United Nations itself to erect. The Geneva meeting was not one on peace, but one of dupery. It was not a meeting about the independence of Namibia, but a trial of SWAPO and its legitimate status as the sole genuine representative of the Namibian people.

20. The objective of South Africa at Geneva was more than just to attempt to destroy any chance for peace. It tried to ruin the results obtained through 40 years of struggle on the part of the Namibian people, of SWAPO and of the international community. South Africa wanted nothing more nor less than to oppose the international community with the absurd logic it tried to present at Geneva in portraying the decolonization of Namibia as a matter that was no longer relevant or that had already been achieved portraying the colonialist Power as an unconcerned party and the representatives of the courageous Namibian people pathetic puppets.

21. Let us say right away to South Africa that what it attempted at Geneva will simply not work. No one can stand in the way of the independence of the Namibian homeland. South Africa, speaking through the DTA puppets, actually instituted proceedings against the United Nations, which it claimed was biased as regards the Namibian liberation movement. And so South Africa, taking the offensive, became more arrogant than ever in four decades of taking a defensive position. The United Nations therefore had to experience at Geneva the humiliation of seeing the Pretoria régime and its toadies speaking out in

favour of democracy and the genuine representation of peoples.

22. The United Nations was taught a strange lesson of impartiality that it certainly could have been spared. How could the United Nations be asked to be impartial in allowing abject slavery in Namibia? How can there be cool-headed impartiality in the face of the hideous colonialism, monstrous oppression, implacable exploitation and barbarous cruelty of South Africa and its lackeys in Namibia? No denunciation can ever be strong enough to brand the unacceptable, repugnant situation imposed on the Namibian people and its authentic representatives in SWAPO.

23. How can the United Nations be forced to recognize these ridiculous little groups, these cheap puppets, these lost men who barter the honour of their suffering people and their enslaved homeland? One cannot, on the pretext of impartiality, establish equality between individuals who represent nothing and other individuals who have fallen in honourable combat. One cannot, on the pretext of impartiality, establish equality between the oppressors and the oppressed.

24. In truth, to admit that the DTA was in the least degree representative would be to legitimize and legalize colonialism and *apartheid*, in which these small and insignificant South African groups have taken part. It would be to rehabilitate a crime against mankind that has been declared as such by the United Nations.

25. Everybody is aware of this, South Africa first and foremost. In fact it thought that it could get us endlessly bogged down in a false debate, and it has applied its efforts to that end. A new far-ranging, all-encompassing and pernicious tactic emerged at Geneva. South Africa has thus refined to perfection its obstructionist policy, although the problem is quite simple.

26. Since South Africa and its counterpart, the DTA, grimacing under the mask of *apartheid*, challenge the representativeness of SWAPO and are so sure of that of the DTA, why not allow the Namibian people to speak out? Why should they have refused at Geneva to prepare the conditions for free elections in Namibia? SWAPO, for its part, was ready to do so, sure of itself and of its people, whose verdict it does not fear.

27. The failure of the Geneva meeting made it necessary to take stock and to unmask South Africa's perilous manoeuvres against the Namibian people, whose political future is more than ever in jeopardy. The Geneva failure, by the same token, prompts us to ponder the lessons to be drawn from the present impasse, in terms both of the general prospects for a settlement of the problem in Namibia and of the alternative which must be defined.

28. From the standpoint of the general prospects for a settlement of the Namibian problem, the failure at Geneva, in all its stark reality, teaches the following lessons.

29. First, the Geneva meeting has provided irrefutable proof that South Africa is not prepared to allow the process of accession to genuine independence for Namibia to run its course. This became glaringly

clear when South Africa unveiled its diabolical strategy of putting forward the "representatives of the internal parties" as direct interlocutors with the United Nations, considering itself a mere observer.

30. Secondly, the Geneva meeting made it abundantly clear that at the very time when the United Nations was doing a great deal to meet South Africa's demands, South Africa was becoming doubly intransigent. Not satisfied with having imposed the participation, in a meeting held under United Nations auspices, of pseudo-representatives who had emerged from phony elections that had been declared null and void by the Security Council itself, South Africa made new demands.

31. Pretoria's intransigence was first expressed in the absurd demand for the revocation of the status as sole, legitimate representative of the Namibian people which had been conferred on SWAPO by the United Nations. It was also expressed in this no less absurd "demand for United Nations impartiality" and for the restoration of what it called a "climate of confidence" between the United Nations and South Africa.

32. Those dual demands, smacking very much of blackmail, aimed at nothing less than extortion to recover a seat in the United Nations of which the international community had justly deprived the racist régime of Pretoria, it having been found fundamentally unfit to represent the very people it has kept under the infernal yoke of slavery. After South Africa had deliberately sabotaged the Geneva meeting, yesterday's incident, in which spokesmen of *apartheid* tried to impose their presence on us, appears even more indecent and shameless.

33. Thirdly, the Geneva meeting, moreover, provided South Africa with the opportunity to attempt to impose a solution widely tested elsewhere—and everyone knows with what results—by all colonial régimes in their death throes: that of neo-colonial third forces. The challenge to the representativeness of SWAPO clearly reveals the outline of its plan, the ultimate goal of which is to maintain Namibia under South African influence. It also confirms Pretoria's determination to establish, by means of a puppet constitutional system, an administration beholden to it, a vigilant guardian of its economic and geo-political interests.

34. Fourthly, the Geneva meeting has finally illustrated the obvious lack of political will on the part of the Western Powers to bring the necessary pressure to bear on South Africa. Even as the five Western Powers, members of the contact group, committed themselves to using whatever influence they had with South Africa to implement the settlement plan, which was their brainchild, it became flagrantly obvious in Geneva that they were not politically prepared to contribute to peace in southern Africa, to independence in Namibia or to the eradication of *apartheid*.

35. The contact group had always been successful in getting the United Nations to make gestures of goodwill. Security Council meetings on Namibia and on *apartheid*, as well as General Assembly meetings on Namibia, were postponed. Such a great readiness to exert pressure on the United Nations, together

with the refusal to act on South Africa, can only encourage the Pretoria régime's intransigence and bring about the definitive failure of the United Nations settlement plan.

36. It is time that those who have direct responsibility in the matter—not only by virtue of their role in the establishment of the settlement plan but also because of the many forms of aid that they continue to give to the Pretoria régime—reacted to South Africa's nonchalant but machiavellian antics in Geneva.

37. It has been said that comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa would not be the most appropriate course of action, and that dialogue alone must be pursued. But for four decades the United Nations has vainly engaged in dialogue—if not a desperate soliloquy—in the face of South Africa's persistent defiance. Have the authorities in Pretoria ever wished to engage in dialogue? Never. And recent events in Geneva bear this out once again.

38. South Africa wants nothing to do with dialogue, and Africa is nearly alone in fighting the colonialist South African hydra in Namibia. The disloyalty of those who have some share of historic responsibility in the situation which has been created and perpetuated in Namibia is deeply resented by Africa and SWAPO. It is more unacceptable than ever that Africa should have to struggle directly against South Africa's allies, which are helping it to perpetuate its régime of terror and exploitation. We call on them to look beyond their immediate interests so as to preserve in a more lasting manner the higher interests, those of international peace first of all, the freedom of a people, human rights and, indeed, even their own long-term interests, which cannot be guaranteed indefinitely by a dying colonial régime.

39. We hope that Africa will no longer be fighting alone and that the Security Council, at the request of the General Assembly, will finally agree to decide on the adoption of global economic sanctions against South Africa.

40. Regarding the alternative, the failure of the Geneva meeting requires also that certain important lessons be taken into account.

41. First, calls for realism, repeated appeals for patience, exaggeration of the advantages of a dialogue, and glorification of the persuasive qualities of negotiation can no longer have any relevance when we are considering South Africa. The Namibian people, which has had personal experience of the joint evils of repression and exile, understands this all too well: its only alternative to the conditions imposed on it, armed struggle is also the sole guarantee of true liberation. There is no viable choice other than a war of national liberation in the face of the oppressive violence of the Pretoria régime.

42. Secondly, as a result of the failure at Geneva, we must seek an alternative that would not depend on a single factor, namely, the supposed willingness of South Africa to co-operate, as it has been put. Illusions about a dialogue with Pretoria having been dispelled, and hope of negotiated settlement endlessly deferred, all the international community can do is to support the national liberation struggle of the Namibian

people by imposing mandatory comprehensive sanctions on South Africa.

43. Thirdly, the failure at Geneva requires that the United Nations reaffirm more forcefully than ever the unique and legitimate representativeness of SWAPO and that the international community intensify and diversify its support, in both political and material terms.

44. Having devoted all the time that was needed, offered every possible opportunity and taken every step that seemed to be required by a certain approach to the solution of the problem of the decolonization of Namibia, the international community is now fully justified in seeking new alternatives. It is also, justified in seeking more appropriate means to restore international legality in Namibia. In carrying out an in-depth political evaluation of the Geneva meeting, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Non-Aligned Countries, held from 9 to 13 February at New Delhi, emphasized the need for two kinds of urgent action.

45. First, it immediately called on the Security Council urgently to impose mandatory comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter, so as to force the Pretoria régime to put an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia. Furthermore, should the Security Council fail to carry out its obligations in the area of economic sanctions, the Conference recommended that the General Assembly be convened in emergency special session, at the Foreign Minister level, to reconsider the question of Namibia and to take appropriate action in accordance with the Charter.

46. Secondly, while welcoming the intensification of the struggle of the Namibian people for the triumph of its right to freedom and dignity, the New Delhi Conference also decided that a special meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries should be convened to make an assessment of the situation and to take concrete measures to increase all forms of support for the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of its sole legitimate representative, SWAPO.

47. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity [OAU] made the same analysis and came to the same conclusions. Echoing the concern and impatience of all Africa, the Council also endorsed the recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, which met at Arusha from 19 to 23 January 1981 and which called for increased assistance to SWAPO with a view to the intensification of its armed struggle.

48. The racist régime of Pretoria is doubly guilty, of a crime against humanity and of rebelling against international law. This has been a slap in the face for anyone who still had any lingering hopes of a positive change in its attitude. Thus the international community, and the United Nations in particular, have been called upon to respond to the challenge of the persistent refusal of Pretoria to comply with its injunctions.

49. The time has passed for half measures and verbal condemnation. The authority and the credibility of the United Nations require us to take a firm

stand and vigorous action to bring justice to the Namibian people and restore morality and the rule of international law to southern Africa. As watchdog of the principles and purposes of the Charter, and as the body responsible for the exercise by the Namibian people of its right to self-determination and independence, the General Assembly, having received additional proof of the impossibility of communicating with the Pretoria régime, must reiterate that the South African occupation of Namibia is unlawful and must draw all the political conclusions required by the gravity of what is at stake.

50. First of all, it is necessary to reaffirm the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence and the responsibility of the United Nations in carrying out the process of Namibia's accession to independence, in strict respect for its territorial integrity. Then the agents of Windhoek must be denied any authority to deal with the United Nations on the future of Namibia. Finally, the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, its sole, legitimate representative, must be strengthened by many types of assistance and supported by comprehensive sanctions against the Pretoria régime under Chapter VII of the Charter.

51. But there will be no awareness of the real dangers posed by South Africa, there will be no collective will to deal with them if those who have the means to bring decisive pressure to bear on the racist régime of Pretoria remain indulgent or indifferent to it.

52. In more general terms, there is an overriding need for organized collective action to force South Africa to come to its senses. There is no need to recall here that the rebellious attitude of the Pretoria régime has drawn sustenance from the indecisiveness of the United Nations and that its aggressiveness has sprung from the passivity of the Security Council. However, there is reason for us to ponder the past and to remember the tragic consequences of the unwillingness of the international community in the not very distant past to act in the face of the global threats posed by some Fascist régimes whose arguments Pretoria has adopted and whose methods it has improved upon.

53. As far as the free future of the Namibian people is concerned, we cannot cherish freedom in a selective manner, as though good for some but bad for others, necessary here, but superfluous there. That is why I am quite sure that I shall not be challenged if I apply to Namibia what Mrs. Thatcher, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, said only the day before yesterday: "Freedom is the most contagious of ideas and the most destructive of tyranny."

54. Mr. SAMHAN (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The question of Namibia is an old one which has been debated in the United Nations since 1946. Although many years have elapsed since that time, we see that so far the United Nations has not succeeded in finding any solution to this problem, in spite of the many resolutions which have been adopted on this subject. This shows that the international community has not succeeded in countering the policy of defiance and illegality adopted by the racist Government of South Africa. The Members of the Organization have officially undertaken to help the people of Namibia, to defend its interests

and to guarantee the exercise of its essential rights as laid down in the Charter. This commitment is just as binding today as it was in 1966.

55. My delegation believes that it is necessary to face up to our commitments, and not in words alone. It is necessary today not just to repeat and reaffirm our total, support for the people of Namibia, but to demonstrate much more vigorously than in the past our unshakable will to achieve a solution that would end the tragic situation, halt the bloodshed, fulfil the legitimate aspirations of that people, terminate the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia and make it possible for the people of Namibia to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence by means of democratic elections under the supervision of the United Nations in Namibia as an integrated political entity.

56. My delegation condemns South Africa's refusal to withdraw from Namibia, particularly because of the intransigence of that country and its manoeuvrings at the meeting in Geneva regarding the implementation of the United Nations plan for the granting of independence to Namibia, which led to the failure of that meeting. That is why we call on all countries in the world, and particularly the Western countries, to adopt a firm and positive position in the General Assembly and the Security Council, to condemn South Africa and to apply Chapter VII of the Charter. We call also for their continued material, moral and political assistance to the people of Namibia in its struggle against the illegal occupation of the region by South Africa.

57. It appears that South Africa believes it can pursue with impunity its policy of defiance of the will of the international community. As long as South Africa receives assistance and support from certain countries, we shall have no choice but to call on those countries to halt their political and economic assistance to South Africa so as to bring it into line with the international will.

58. The decision of the General Assembly to refuse the presence of the delegation of South Africa shows that it is abiding by the will of the international community to apply international principles and rules.

59. The report of the United Nations Council for Namibia [A/35/24 and Corr.1 and 2], the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [see A/35/23/Rev.1] concerning Namibia, and the various reports submitted by the Secretary-General relating to measures taken in accordance with Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) provide a positive framework for the efforts of the international community to support the right of the Namibian people to achieve independence. We support all the recommendations in those reports.

60. The United Arab Emirates condemns South Africa and its occupation of Namibia. We condemn it because it refuses to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We also condemn all South Africa's manoeuvres aimed at imposing an internal settlement in Namibia not in keeping with the principles and objectives of the



United Nations or with the wishes of SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

61. We also condemn acts of armed aggression committed by the Government of South Africa against neighbouring African countries, particularly Zambia and Angola.

62. My country's position on this question is firm and unalterable. We have reiterated it many times in international conferences and bodies, and it can be summed up as follows. First, the political solution to the question of Namibia must lead to an end to the illegal occupation by the Government of South Africa and must force that Government to withdraw its armed forces from Namibia so that that country may exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Secondly, free elections under the control of the United Nations must be held in Namibia, including Walvis Bay, in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976). Thirdly, SWAPO is the sole lawful representative of the people of Namibia, and we are deeply convinced that a solution to the problem of Namibia cannot be found without its participation. Fourthly, the United Nations must shoulder its direct responsibilities for the people of Namibia so long as it has not achieved self-determination and national independence.

63. Finally, I should like to reaffirm that the United Arab Emirates will continue its political, material and moral support for the people of Namibia and its sole lawful representative, SWAPO, until final victory leads to the establishment of a free and sovereign State.

64. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): Ever since it was first established, the United Nations has had to deal with the question of Namibia, or South West Africa, as the Territory was then called. Although the Territory has not yet gained its independence, as a result of three decades of continuous and tireless efforts in this world body the international community has reached a consensus on a number of points which could provide the basis for a just and lasting solution to this question. There is general agreement, for example, on the illegality of the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia and that consequently all acts by the Government of South Africa concerning Namibia are illegal and null and void. Further, there is a consensus on the need to hold free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations so that all the people of Namibia, as a single political entity, can freely determine their own future. These elements are embodied in Security Council resolution 385 (1976).

65. In April 1978 the five Western countries then serving on the Security Council announced a settlement proposal in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which raised the expectation that Namibia would at long last achieve independence. This proposal was the product of lengthy discussions with both South Africa and SWAPO, as well as with other parties concerned, in particular, the front-line States. In September of that year the Security Council, with its resolution 435 (1978), endorsed the Secretary-General's implementation plan for the settlement proposal and decided to

establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group [UNTAG]. However, although South Africa announced its acceptance of the settlement proposal of the five Western countries in April 1978, it rejected the implementation plan of the Secretary-General, and thus a seemingly endless round of questions and answers has followed.

66. My Government finds it particularly deplorable that South Africa continues to prevent the establishment of UNTAG for Namibian independence. In spite of the ongoing efforts and numerous suggestions of the international community, including the concept of a demilitarized zone proposed by President Neto of the People's Republic of Angola, this question remains unsolved simply because South Africa has refused to co-operate with the United Nations and the international community.

67. We remind the Government of South Africa once again of the fact that it declared its readiness to respect the territorial integrity of Namibia and to allow the Namibian people to exercise their right to self-determination and gain their independence. Further, South Africa accepted the proposal of the five Western countries which prescribes the modality of the peaceful transition to independence under the supervision and control of the United Nations. Regrettably, the Government of South Africa has not proceeded to an early solution of the question.

68. As part of the latest round of efforts to break this deadlock, in October 1980 the Secretary-General once again dispatched a team to South Africa; his report is contained in document S/14266.<sup>1</sup> My delegation unreservedly supports this report, which contains a well-balanced consideration of the conflicting interests. Also, the report proposed a pre-implementation meeting, which was recently convened at Geneva, as a means of facilitating an agreement on a date for a cease-fire and implementing the settlement proposal, and of creating the necessary climate of confidence and understanding.

69. I should like to express my delegation's deep appreciation of the efforts exerted by the Secretary-General and the team led by Mr. Brian Urquhart in preparing and conducting the meeting. Recognition should also be given to SWAPO, the front-line States, Nigeria, the OAU and the countries of the Western contact group for the invaluable efforts they made to achieve the objectives of the meeting.

70. In spite of these serious efforts, as well as the expectation that Namibia would certainly achieve independence by the end of this year in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978), the meeting at Geneva failed to attain its objectives. A detailed description of the pre-implementation meeting is included in the report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), of 19 January 1981.<sup>2</sup> My Government examined this report with great interest and utmost care.

71. Regardless of the over-all outcome of the meeting, we should not overlook the fact that it provided all

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid., Thirty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1981, document S/14333.*

the parties concerned with the first opportunity in the long history of struggle for Namibian independence to exchange views at a variety of levels. It may thus be said that the meeting contributed to the creation of a spirit of co-operation and understanding among the parties concerned.

72. Unfortunately, however, because of the intransigent attitude of South Africa, the meeting had to be adjourned without reaching an agreement on a date for a cease-fire. Thus we are confronted with the regrettable situation whereby yet another round of endeavour is required before a peaceful and internationally acceptable solution of the Namibian question can be achieved.

73. My delegation strongly deplores the position of South Africa and would like to know under what conditions or circumstances it would finally agree to set a date for a cease-fire. If the South African authorities are trying to buy more time in order to consolidate the position of the so-called internal parties in Namibia, it must be pointed out that such an attempt not only diminishes chances for a peaceful solution but also seriously exacerbates the difficulties.

74. As the Secretary-General has pointed out in his report, the outcome of the meeting at Geneva must give rise to the most serious international concern. Once again my delegation joins him in urging the Government of South Africa to review as soon as possible the implications of the meeting and to reconsider its position with regard to resolution 435 (1978) so that this precious opportunity to achieve a long-awaited an internationally acceptable solution will not be lost.

75. Japan has consistently supported and highly valued the efforts of the five Western countries in seeking a solution to this problem, as demonstrated in particular by their settlement proposal, the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and their initiatives for conciliation and mediation. Japan earnestly hopes that such efforts will be continued. In the deliberations at this resumed session, constructive efforts should be made to achieve our common goal of the early realization of independence through peaceful means by avoiding unnecessary conflicts and disagreement among Member States. My delegation would encourage those parties closely concerned to renew their efforts in the hope of breaking the current deadlock so that an early implementation of resolution 435 (1978) may be secured. As a member of the Security Council, Japan intends to co-operate to the maximum extent with every effort towards the earliest possible achievement of Namibian independence.

76. Indeed, the Government of Japan has been co-operating to the best of its ability with the joint efforts of the international community. I wish at this time to reiterate some of the measures which the Government of Japan has taken in this regard.

77. First, Japan has prohibited direct investment in Namibia by Japanese nationals or corporate bodies under its jurisdiction, and it will continue to do so. No Japanese national is participating in the management of any enterprise in Namibia.

78. Secondly, the Government of Japan has brought to the attention of all companies concerned Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia [*A/35/24, vol. I, annex II*] by publishing it in an official Japanese bulletin, and no Japanese national or enterprise has a mining concession in Namibia.

79. Thirdly, as a part of our contribution to the United Nations efforts to ensure Namibia's peaceful transition to independence, my country has made it clear that when UNTAG is established, Japan will take an active part in its operations by providing civilian experts to supervise elections as well as to join in the necessary logistic support. It is our earnest hope that UNTAG will be established and start functioning in the near future.

80. Fourthly, as regards our support of the Namibian people both in their ongoing struggle for independence and in their preparations for nation-building once independence is achieved, Japan has made voluntary contributions to the United Nations Fund for Namibia, the Trust Fund for the United Nations Institute for Namibia and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. Japan's contributions to those funds have steadily increased, with last year's contribution amounting to \$US360,000. In view of the crucial importance of human resources development in preparing for independence, my Government will increase its voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund for the United Nations Institute for Namibia by more than 25 per cent in fiscal year 1981, subject to the approval of the national Diet.

81. My delegation reaffirms its intention to continue to co-operate with the United Nations in pursuing our common goal of the early realization of Namibia's independence through peaceful means. Japan will make every possible effort to extend, through the United Nations, its co-operation to the people of Namibia and will continue to extend co-operation throughout the period of nation-building following the achievement of Namibia's independence.

82. In this connexion I should like to make some comments on the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which its President very ably and eloquently introduced at the 103rd meeting and which well describes the active role the Council plays in administering various programmes relating to Namibia and in mobilizing world opinion. My delegation attaches great importance to the United Nations Council for Namibia and commends its efforts towards the early realization of Namibian independence. However, my delegation has reservations on some parts of the report, in particular those related to support for armed struggle. It is Japan's steadfast conviction that any international conflict and dispute must be resolved not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means. Therefore we cannot support any armed struggle even in the settlement of the Namibian question.

83. I have just presented the position which Japan has consistently upheld in regard to Namibia. I can only add that if the intransigent attitude of South Africa results in the failure of the international community's efforts, the international community will

have no alternative but to consider further measures to ensure South Africa's compliance. My delegation hopes that the Government of South Africa correctly understands the present situation and the growing indignation of the world community and that it will not stymie efforts for a peaceful solution of this problem.

84. Mr. RAHMAN (Bangladesh): Once again the question of Namibia is before the Assembly; it is a saga of oppression and deprivation, of unkept promises and broken dates.

85. The position of Bangladesh on the question of Namibia is founded on our constitutional commitment to support oppressed people throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism. It is also backed by our unswerving adherence to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which contains the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The basic question in the case of Namibia is how expeditiously we can achieve this end so that the people of Namibia can rightfully pursue their destiny without any further bloodshed.

86. The convening of the Geneva pre-implementation talks rekindled our hopes that the decolonization of Namibia could be achieved through peaceful means. It is unfortunate that the racist leadership of South Africa chose the path of intransigence and missed a great opportunity to bring about a peaceful transition to the freedom of Namibia. It has been correctly observed by Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, during a press conference at Geneva on 12 January 1981, that the South African régime has in the course of more than three years of negotiations deliberately placed one obstacle after another in the way of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It has raised innumerable objections to every one of the Secretary-General's reports, and as each of its demands has been met it has raised a new one, every time injecting issues that are extraneous to the negotiations.

87. We congratulate the far-sighted leadership of SWAPO for its readiness to sign a cease-fire and to agree to a target date for the arrival of UNTAG in Namibia, but we also share the frustrations of all peace-loving nations over South Africa's failure to make a similar commitment regarding its willingness to sign a peace treaty and to agree to a firm date for the beginning of the process of the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

88. My delegation deeply appreciates the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring an end to the tragedy which is Namibia. We cannot but put on record our appreciation also of the patient efforts of the front-line States and Nigeria.

89. It is unfortunate that South Africa continues illegally to occupy Namibia, in defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the opinions of the International Court of Justice. South Africa has persistently refused to recognize the United Nations Council for Namibia and has prevented the Council, which is in fact the legal Administering Authority of the Territory until independence, from entering the Territory. It is a paradox that today South Africa questions the "impartiality" of the

United Nations, despite the fact that the past history of the Territory is a grim chronicle of repression and brutality accompanied by the indiscriminate pillage and plunder of the area's natural resources. To this must be added the policy of systematic fragmentation of the Territory, exemplified by the system of bantustanization. South Africa has continuously violated the wishes of the international community by its policy of "divide and rule", by staging sham elections and by the appointment of the so-called Council of Ministers. Namibians are denied the Territory's economic wealth as the result of indiscriminate exploitation of its natural resources, in callous violation of Decree No. 1. It is against that background that we must reappraise the situation arising out of the failure of the Geneva pre-implementation talks.

90. Bangladesh is convinced of the inevitability of ultimately achieving the independence of Namibia. It is the cost in terms of human lives and material damage that is the fundamental issue. We strongly advocate and support peaceful alternatives through the speedy implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), but we are equally committed to the support of the liberation struggle of SWAPO by every possible means.

91. President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh, in his message on 27 October 1980 on the occasion of the observance of a week of solidarity with the people of Namibia and their liberation movement, deplored the fact that South Africa had frustrated every effort by the international community to secure the inalienable right of the people of Namibia and the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal military and administrative presence.<sup>3</sup> The Bangladesh President declared that Bangladesh believed in a just solution to the problem, which could be achieved only through implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Algiers Programme of Action, adopted in June 1980 [*ibid.*, vol. I, para. 91]. In that connexion, I should also like to recall the Declaration on Namibia adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries in New Delhi.

92. We deplore the failure of the Geneva pre-implementation talks, which could have paved the way towards democratic elections and the peaceful transition of Namibia from colonial domination to freedom. In the aftermath of the failure of the Geneva talks, Bangladesh believes that a new course must be charted and concerted international pressure must be brought to bear on South Africa. The time has now come to give serious consideration to the question of adopting other means to force South Africa to heed international opinion, including comprehensive mandatory sanctions.

93. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the fact that the General Assembly has finally embarked upon a consideration of one of the most important items on the agenda of the thirty-fifth session, that of Namibia. The discussion of the problem of ensuring the independence of Namibia is now particularly urgent and acute, as we see it, for two reasons. First of all, the year 1980 was marked by further success

<sup>3</sup> See A/AC.131/L.163.



on the part of the national liberation movement of the African peoples. In his report to the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, just concluded in Moscow, the head of the Soviet State, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, stressed that "The birth of the Republic of Zimbabwe, the mounting intensity of the liberation struggle in Namibia and now also in the Republic of South Africa are graphic evidence that the rule of the 'classic' colonialists and racists is approaching its end." In other words, the struggle of the Namibian people for their independence is one of the decisive stages of the imminent total collapse of the shameful system of colonialism.

94. For the first time in many years, at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the question of Southern Rhodesia did not appear on the agenda. We must do everything in our power to remove from the agenda of the next session, the thirty-sixth, the question of Namibia as well.

95. At the same time, a particular feature of the present stage of the development of events in southern Africa is that the formation of independent Africa is taking place in circumstances of ever-increasing struggle. The forces of national liberation and progress are being resisted by the forces of colonialism, racism and imperialism, which are striving to curb this irreversible process and even to reverse the course of history. In his report Mr. Brezhnev made the following point with regard to these forces of social retrogression:

"With utter contempt for the rights and aspirations of nations, they are trying to portray the liberation struggle of the masses as 'terrorism'. Indeed, they have set out to achieve the unachievable—to set up a barrier to the progressive changes in the world and once again to become the rulers of peoples' destiny."

96. This, then, is the context in which we should today view the problem of Namibia, a context of a sharp and fundamental clash between two tendencies—the anti-colonialist and the neo-colonialist.

97. It is in Namibia and, indeed, in South Africa itself that we find the quintessence of the inhuman system of exploiting and oppressing the indigenous population, and operating in defence of that system we find the whole machinery of repression, armed to the teeth and relying on all the military might of the Western world.

98. For scores of years of their illegal occupation, the South African racists have been converting Namibia into a preserve of colonialism and *apartheid*. On the one hand, we have a handful of white exploiters prospering through plunder and violence, and, on the other hand, we have the African majority languishing in poverty and stripped of their rights.

99. The United Nations Council for Namibia, under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Zambia, Mr. Lusaka, has done a great deal of important work in exposing the crimes committed by the South African racists and the Western monopolies in Namibia and has done a great deal to rally world public opinion to the side of the struggle against these crimes and the

attainment by Namibia of full independence. The speeches of many representative, in particular the representatives of the Namibian people—and especially the Permanent Observer of SWAPO, Mr. Theoben Gurirab—have frequently provided us with shocking examples of the humiliation and oppression to which the indigenous inhabitants of this Territory are subjected.

100. Even the Western press has been compelled to acknowledge that more than a million of the black people of Namibia live in a state of acute poverty and exploitation. As was reported in *Le Monde diplomatique*, about 6,000 white farmers own the best grazing land, while the black population is herded into tribal reservations like the South African bantustans, which are over-populated and lack means of subsistence. As a result of this, the Namibians have been forced to sell their labour extremely cheaply in the mines and factories owned by the whites in their own country or in South Africa. The wages of the black workers of Namibia, as we know, are many times lower than the wages of the white workers.

101. In order to maintain the inhumanly exploited population of Namibia in a state of obedience, the Pretoria régime brutally mistreats the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory on a massive scale, especially the patriots who oppose the colonial racist régime.

102. The breaking up of rallies and demonstrations, firing upon participants in them, imprisonments without trial, the use of hired killers and the incitement of tribal enmities, the encouragement and installation of inhuman régimes obedient to the Pretoria régime—this is the policy by means of which South Africa is keeping its grip on Namibia.

103. In recent years there has been a sharp intensification of the military occupation of Namibia: more than 70,000 South African soldiers and police are now in that Territory, and this army is waging a veritable war against the indigenous inhabitants of Namibia.

104. The colonialist racist régime established in Namibia has attracted there many Western companies which are plundering the rich mineral resources of the Territory and earning unprecedented profits, which they take out of the country. In spite of the decisions of the United Nations, foreign companies are continuing to widen their exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia.

105. In this barbarous exploitation of the natural and human resources of Namibia by transnational monopolies, we find one of the reasons that a number of Western Powers, although in words they sometimes censure the actions and policy of the Government of South Africa in Namibia, in practice support the racist régime of Pretoria and co-operate closely with it. South Africa has been and remains for them a close and valuable ally politically, economically and militarily. They view South Africa as a bastion of the West in the fight against the national liberation movement and as a base for neo-colonialist operations against independent Africa.

106. Thanks to the broad and comprehensive support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]

countries, the economic and military potential of South Africa is growing. As a result of co-operation with NATO countries, South Africa has had access to the technology for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

107. However, neither the cruel exploitation by the colonialists nor the latest weapons used by its tormentors can break the will of the Namibian people to attain genuine independence.

108. The colonialist policy of the South African racists is encountering ever more vigorous resistance from the people of Namibia, which has no intention of resigning itself to oppression. Having assumed leadership of the liberation struggle of the Namibian people, SWAPO has won trust and widespread support from the population of the country and from many far beyond its borders. SWAPO has become the acknowledged leader of the Namibian people, capable of assuming responsibility for solving any problems related to the attainment of independence and to leadership of the country. The international authority of SWAPO has been consolidated; it is recognized by the United Nations and the OAU as the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

109. In condemning the cruel punitive operations of South Africa within Namibia, we wanted to stress particularly the fact that the rulers in Pretoria are making wide use of the Territory of Namibia as a military springboard for aggression and acts of provocation against neighbouring independent African States. They are trying to intimidate the peoples of those countries, to compel them to give up their assistance to the national liberation movements in southern Africa.

110. The aggressive actions of the Pretoria racists against neighbouring countries have been repeatedly condemned by the Security Council as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African States and as a direct threat to international peace and security. However, despite all United Nations decisions and the urgent demands of the international community, the *apartheid* régime is continuing these acts of armed aggression. And this is demonstrated by the continuation, in the most recent weeks and days, indeed, of acts of banditry by the racist military clique against Angola and Mozambique, and also against other front-line States. But by acting in this fashion, the South African racists are playing with fire, and this is something that must be made absolutely and abundantly clear today.

111. The United Nations—its Security Council and General Assembly—has adopted quite a few highly authoritative decisions on the question of Namibia. These decisions have confirmed that South Africa is illegally occupying the Territory of Namibia. The military actions of Pretoria against the people of Namibia and neighbouring States are viewed by the United Nations as acts of aggression. The inalienable right of the people of Namibia to fight for freedom, independence and self-determination by all the means at its disposal, including armed struggle, has also been repeatedly recognized by the OAU and the United Nations. The United Nations in its decisions has recognized and repeatedly confirmed that the

presence of the Administration and troops of the Republic of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and in contradiction to elementary norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

112. The United Nations has repeatedly stressed in its decisions that the policy pursued in Namibia by the racist South African régime has created a serious threat to peace and security. This threat becomes ever more ominous in the light of the fact that at the present time South Africa possesses the potential for creating its own nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a vastly greater threat is posed, not only to the security of the countries of the African continent, but, indeed, to the cause of international security as a whole.

113. The specific situation in which the present discussion of the question of Namibia is going on is the following. Over the two and a half years that have elapsed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), the Pretoria régime has been imposing endless talks on the United Nations—or, rather, the appearance of talks. It has kept on imposing new conditions, with the clear aim of playing for time, in order to consolidate the puppet régime it has set up in Namibia and to thwart implementation of United Nations demands for the granting of genuine independence for Namibia. In pursuing this course, the South African racists have been relying—let us not mince words, and we must not do that today—have been relying on the position of Western countries which, in response to the appeals of African countries for them to exert pressure on their South African partner, have been getting away with empty talk. The culmination of these manoeuvres and this procrastination by South Africa and the Western Powers was the convening at Geneva of the so-called pre-implementation meeting. And, as was to be expected, it was a total failure. The same South African racists are continuing their dilatory policy in order to play for time and to guarantee a neo-colonialist solution to the Namibian problem. And here again they are being supported by the very same Western countries from which we hear appeals for patience and reflection. However, we should not wait any longer, which is why all those who truly favour genuine independence for Namibia are now proposing the earliest possible implementation of effective measures to force South Africa to comply with United Nations resolutions on the granting of genuine independence to Namibia. To that end there is, in particular, the demand that the Security Council apply against South Africa comprehensive and binding sanctions, under Chapter VII of the Charter. That decision was taken by the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa at the meeting at Arusha in January of this year, and the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries said more or less the same thing, at the New Delhi Conference in February this year.

114. The Soviet Union has always been, and remains, a faithful ally of the African States, which, having thrown off the shackles of colonial oppression, are continuing to wage a fierce struggle for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in order to overcome the consequences of colonialism and in order to consolidate their independence and develop their national economies and cultures. It is appropriate to point out in this regard that in his report to

the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev stressed that no one should entertain the slightest doubt that "the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will continue consistently to pursue the course of developing co-operation between the USSR and the liberated countries and of consolidating the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement."

115. The Soviet Union has always been in favour of guaranteeing to the people of Namibia its inalienable right to self-determination and independence on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of that country, including Walvis Bay. We are in favour of an immediate and total withdrawal of South African troops and administration from Namibia, including Walvis Bay, without any conditions whatsoever. We are in favour of the transfer of power in its entirety to the people of Namibia, as embodied by SWAPO, which is recognized by the OAU and the United Nations as the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

116. The Soviet Union wishes to express its solidarity with the people of Namibia and firmly supports it in its struggle, under the leadership of SWAPO, for freedom and genuine independence. It has rendered and will continue to render to that people comprehensive—yes, comprehensive—assistance and support in this just struggle, in compliance with the decisions of the United Nations on this subject.

117. We earnestly favour the adoption by the General Assembly at this session of a decision aimed at ensuring genuine independence for Namibia as early as possible.

118. In the view of the Soviet delegation the draft resolutions prepared by the United Nations Council for Namibia, of which the USSR is a member, have outlined the proper course for further action on the part of the Security Council and other United Nations organs in order to halt the racist occupation of Namibia and to grant that country genuine independence as soon as possible. The application by the Security Council of comprehensive and binding sanctions against South Africa, pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, would be an extremely effective step in that direction, and the Soviet delegation fully supports that proposal.

119. Mr. SORENSEN MOSQUERA (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Venezuela, in participating once again in the consideration of the question of Namibia, is fully convinced that to continue to support the cause of the Namibian people is to continue to support the cause of the United Nations. Venezuela is once again participating in the consideration of the question of Namibia with an even greater commitment to the early exercise of self-determination, freedom and independence by the people of Namibia.

120. As a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia my delegation has followed closely and with unflagging interest and concern the efforts of the international community to bring about a negotiated solution of the problem.

121. We should therefore like to express our profound disappointment at the recent failure of the Ge-

neva meeting, convened under the auspices of the Organization to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia provided for in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The racist régime of South Africa attended the meeting in order deliberately to sabotage it, demonstrating anew its intransigence and disdain for the international community. Yesterday we were able to confirm once again the intentions of the South African racists in presenting themselves in this Hall with premeditated plans to find new and unacceptable excuses for prolonging their illegal presence in Namibia. The conduct of the disgraceful racist régime of South Africa came as no surprise to the Venezuelan delegation, since we have had occasion to observe over many years that that attitude is consistent with the criminal nature of the régime.

122. On the other hand, the delegation of Venezuela would like to express its appreciation of the responsible and constructive attitude of SWAPO, which has shown itself ready to negotiate at all times, despite the provocations to which it was subjected during the Geneva meeting by the South African racists. We should like to extend our expression of gratitude to the front-line States and Nigeria, which attended the meeting as observers.

123. It is of course also true that the failure is not the sole responsibility of the racist régime of South Africa, since we all know that it could not persist in its sinister actions without the support of some of the countries that we have repeatedly denounced in the past, which share in the profits of the illegal exploitation of the human and natural resources of Namibia. Some of those countries have also disregarded the mandatory arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the Security Council and are continuing to supply weapons and military equipment, which have been used ruthlessly against the people of Namibia to deny it its rights to self-determination, freedom and independence.

124. In the meantime, the racist régime of Pretoria is continuing to launch unprovoked attacks and other acts of aggression against independent African countries, thus posing a serious threat to international peace and security.

125. An opportunity was lost in Geneva, perhaps the very last, to bring about a negotiated settlement of the problem. Since the Geneva meeting the Namibian people have no option other than to step up its armed struggle and pursue it to the end. Our delegation believes that the patience of the international community is also at an end. We believe that the United Nations should spare neither determination nor resources to bring about the independence of Namibia. We regret that reason did not prevail in resolving the situation in Namibia. With those efforts at an end, the international community is morally obliged to seek the urgent convening of the Security Council to impose broad and binding sanctions on the racist régime of South Africa, pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to ensure compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations on Namibia and to put an end to the illegal colonial occupation by South Africa of the Territory.

126. We deeply deplore the fact that the resources available to it the international community has not been able to solve the problem of Namibia and that in fact even more bloodshed and sacrifice is being demanded of the Namibian people.

127. In conclusion, we should like to express the conviction of Venezuela that the international community will be able to shoulder its responsibility to the people of Namibia and to history at this extremely critical time, which is of such great political significance.

128. Mr. DJIGO (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): The failure of the Geneva meeting—the primary objective of which, as stated by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council, was to set a precise date for a cease-fire and for proceeding with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978)—has certainly proved that those who all along had been sceptical about the Western initiative were surely right. Indeed, it will be recalled that that initiative was met with a variety of reactions.

129. Some States, like mine, appreciated the constructive efforts, both individual and collective, of States Members of the Organization to produce a solution to the distressing problem on the basis of the relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

130. Others, on the other hand, questioned whether South Africa really intended to make any fundamental change in its position on Namibia, in view of the failure of all earlier United Nations initiatives to bring about an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia.

131. And yet the international community acknowledged that the Western initiative to solve the Namibian problem was at least unprecedented. Indeed, it was the first time that the five Western Powers with a special responsibility in the matter decided to take collective action. A consensus could then emerge in support of the efforts which led in 1978 to the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

132. However, we must now admit that from the start certain events foreshadowed the failure of the Geneva meeting.

133. We need only recall that two days before the resumption of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly to consider the question of Namibia, South Africa, as usual, issued another challenge to the international community, and in particular to the Western Powers which along with it were seeking a negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem, by deciding unilaterally to transform the so-called Constituent Assembly of Windhoek into a national assembly and by conferring executive powers on certain members, thus putting an end to any hope that the settlement plan adopted by the Security Council would be implemented. Next, it adopted a range of repressive measures and appointed a general administrator for the Territory. In addition, according to Judge Steyn, on 21 May 1977 it led Namibia “into the promised land of total responsibility”.

134. The assurances that we received from the five Western Powers set our minds at rest somewhat.

135. Speaking in the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany stated:

“We cannot believe that the Government of South Africa will now leave a road on which it has gone a long way with us and thus decide against a peaceful settlement under international control... No one in the Republic of South Africa should overlook the consequences such a step would be bound to have.

“... We shall never accept this resolution being ignored by anyone.”<sup>4</sup>

136. Thus, we were reassured, especially since the American Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, said that the initiative of the five Western Powers should be understood as “a commitment by the international community to the implementation of the programme contained in the Secretary-General’s report”.

137. The Security Council’s settlement plan was the end result of efforts sustained by an unmistakable political will to bring about justice and put an end to the situation so often condemned by the whole international community.

138. Senegal, consistent with its traditional position, welcomed constructive efforts to bring about an acceptable solution in keeping with the relevant resolutions of the Organization. Even today my country still believes that the conditions for the self-determination of a united Namibia are clearly set forth in Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

139. But the political settlement of the problem of Namibia requires the withdrawal of South African armed forces from the Territory of Namibia, respect for the unity and territorial integrity of the country and, finally, the holding of free elections under international control.

140. Inevitably, the document could not be perfect. The discordant positions which it tried to reconcile could not, in our view, produce better results. We must be realistic. Whether or not we wish to admit it, the illegal and persistent occupation of the Territory is an existing situation that the most intransigent attitudes have been powerless to modify.

141. But the situation today is both grave and exceptional. It is grave, because the South African Government is pursuing its internal settlement plan, trying to introduce new elements into the settlement process by laying down demands which it says must be met if it is to adhere to the proposals that it had accepted earlier. Representatives will recall how the Secretary-General’s objectivity was impugned last September. Thus, it was not surprising that at Geneva South Africa sought refuge behind those same shoddy pretexts.

142. My country, through the statement made by its Foreign Minister in the general debate [20th meeting], condemned such conduct.

143. The situation is exceptional, because the credibility of the Organization has never before been so seriously called into question. Therefore, my country believes it is time for the international community to discharge its responsibilities. The United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, being responsible at the highest level for international peace and

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, 2087th meeting.*

security, must no longer allow anything to stand in the way of Namibia's accession to genuine independence.

144. The elimination of the policy of domination and oppression requires the joint efforts of all the members of the international community, without exception. Unfortunately, all efforts to enact binding sanctions against South Africa, including those under Chapter VII of the Charter, have always encountered a veto.

145. If the United Nations has so far failed to adopt appropriate sanctions against South Africa, it is because some States, invoking the pressure of their own public opinion, have always postponed the adoption of such measures, claiming that they can make South Africa change its mind and get it to conform to international law.

146. Now the question is to know what assurances the Western countries can give to break the current impasse in the negotiations after the failure of the Geneva meeting.

147. Now that South Africa has clearly rejected the efforts of the five Western Powers to bring about peace, inasmuch as, according to paragraph 19 of the report of the Secretary-General, "the South African Government was not yet prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement and proceed with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978)",<sup>2</sup> now that South Africa has failed to take into account the constructive efforts of the international community which had supported the Western initiative, an initiative that, after the failure of the mission of good offices of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1950, the Carpio mission in 1970, the Escher mission in 1972 and now the Ahtisaari mission, undeniably marks a turning-point in the history of the decolonization of Namibia; now that the front-line African countries have demonstrated political will by facilitating the holding of the Geneva meeting and thereby respecting their commitments vis-à-vis the Western countries; now that South Africa has clearly taken the risk of a bloody racial war, which is the only option left for the oppressed people of Namibia to recover its basic rights; now that South Africa, in so doing, has replied to the concerns expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany at the 2087th meeting of the Security Council, we are curious, along with the rest of Africa, to know what the attitude of the Western Powers will be.

148. Hence the statement of the five Western Powers on the current events will be of special interest in our debate. After all, it is their credibility more than that of the Organization which this time is directly at stake.

149. For its part, Senegal believes that the General Assembly now has the duty to consider any measure

aimed at isolating South Africa in the international arena, all the more so since Article 25 of the Charter requires all States to accept and carry out Security Council decisions and since this is, moreover, in keeping with the interpretation handed down by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of June 1971.<sup>5</sup>

150. In Senegal's view, we have to strengthen the powers of the United Nations Council for Namibia. That Council remains the legal Administering Authority in Namibia so long as Namibia has not attained genuine independence. It is working strenuously to strip the Government of South Africa of the illegal representation of the Territory which it is trying to assume. In this connexion the Council deserves the complete support of all the Members of the Organization.

151. We also have to give SWAPO, the sole and genuine liberation movement of the Namibian people, in accordance with the decisions of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, all material, moral, diplomatic and military assistance to allow it effectively to achieve the aspirations of the Namibian people to genuine independence within a united Namibia. It is fitting here to welcome the spirit of initiative, open-mindedness, co-operation and conciliation—in a word, the political maturity—demonstrated by SWAPO throughout the exercise that led to the settlement plan adopted by the Security Council and, more recently, at Geneva, where it agreed to sign a cease-fire and promote the work of UNTAG in Namibia.

152. Senegal, along with the OAU, supports the appeal made by the non-aligned countries to the Security Council to consider mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter, for constant violations by the South African régime of the principles set forth in the Charter justify the taking of forceful measures against it in order to compel it to abide by the Charter.

153. The resumption of the thirty-fifth session comes at a time when the United Nations is celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in resolution 1514 (XV). Senegal hopes that the decisions we shall adopt at the current session will at last meet the hopes that the valiant Namibian people have placed in us, "the peoples of the United Nations".

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*

<sup>5</sup> Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.