

UNITED NATIONS



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THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

**2106<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 8 DECEMBER 1978

NEW YORK

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## NOTE

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## 2106th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 8 December 1978, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Rüdiger von WECHMAR  
(Federal Republic of Germany).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2106)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in the Middle East:  
Interim report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 434 (1978) concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/12929)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in the Middle East:

Interim report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 434 (1978) concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/12929)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Lebanon in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, and with the consent of the Council, I would propose to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tuéni (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: The Secretary-General wishes to make a statement at this stage and I now call on him.

3. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Members of the Council have before them my report of 18 November [S/12929], which the Council requested when it renewed the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in September. That report gives an account of the current

situation in UNIFIL and in particular of the difficulties which UNIFIL is experiencing in fulfilling the mandate entrusted to it by the Council.

4. Since my report was issued there have been no significant improvements either in the situation or as a whole or in the deployment of UNIFIL, although our efforts both at United Nations Headquarters and in the area are continuing through contacts with the parties principally concerned.

5. I have already had occasion to inform the members of the Council in some detail of specific aspects of UNIFIL's current situation, and I do not wish to go over the same ground again. The main points are, in any case, included in the observations contained in my report which is now before the Council.

6. I am confident that the formal discussion of my report by the Council will contribute to the effectiveness of UNIFIL, to the morale of the Force and to the confidence of the Lebanese Government in the United Nations. I welcome this opportunity for the Council to take note of the present situation and to discuss how best to proceed with the task of fully implementing resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). I do not think that any of us had any illusions in March of this year when UNIFIL was established as to the difficulties which the Force would certainly encounter. It is those difficulties which are now under consideration. I remain convinced, however, that in the long run the only durable and reliable means by which peace and security can return to Southern Lebanon is by the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government. Obviously, the successful implementation of UNIFIL's mandate is an essential part of this process. The fact that this objective is so difficult to achieve is certainly no reason for failing to make the maximum possible effort to achieve it. I therefore welcome the opportunity which this meeting provides for the Council to discuss this problem. I hope very much that, with the co-operation of the Council and with the results of its deliberations here, we shall be able to enter a new chapter in the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and the carrying out of the mandate of UNIFIL.

7. The PRESIDENT: In connexion with the interim report of the Secretary-General, I should like to read out the following statement [S/12958], which has been prepared in the course of consultations among members of the Council:

"The Security Council has studied the Secretary-General's report contained in document S/12929, sub-

mitted in pursuance of resolution 434 (1978). The Council associates itself with the views of the Secretary-General set forth in the report regarding the obstacles placed against the full deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and against the total implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

“The Council expresses its deepest concern over the grave situation in Southern Lebanon.

“The Council is convinced that these obstacles constitute a challenge to its authority and a defiance of its resolutions. The Council therefore demands the removal of these obstacles, specifically described and referred to in the Secretary-General’s report under consideration, as well as in his previous reports submitted to the Council.

“The Council believes that the unimpeded deployment of the Force in all parts of Southern Lebanon will contribute significantly to the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty within Lebanon’s internationally recognized boundaries.

“The Council therefore calls upon all those not fully co-operating with the Force, particularly Israel, to desist forthwith from interfering with the operations of the Force in Southern Lebanon and demands that they comply fully without any delay with the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

“The Council also calls upon Member States that are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear on those concerned so that the Force may discharge its responsibilities unimpeded.

“The Council notes with appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General and the United Nations staff, and the commanders and soldiers of the Force for the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). It also takes this opportunity to express its particular appreciation to the countries that have contributed troops or are assisting in the deployment and facilitating the task of the Force.

“The Council decides to remain seized of the problem, and to review the situation if and when necessary, before 19 January 1979, so as to consider practical ways and means that will secure the full implementation of its resolutions.”

8. It is my understanding that the members of the Council are ready to approve the text of the statement which I have just read out by consensus.

*It was so decided.*

9. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): Mr. President, first of all, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I wish to congratulate you warmly upon your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Council for this month.

10. The development of the situation in Southern Lebanon causes widespread concern. Last March, the Israeli

Zionists flagrantly launched a massive invasion of Southern Lebanon. Subsequently, they repeatedly sent aircraft for indiscriminate bombing of several areas in Lebanon. On 5 October, the Israeli Zionists again sent war vessels to bombard the Beirut area, slaughtering innocent people there. Meanwhile, they have tried by every possible means to obstruct the Lebanese Government from exercising its sovereign right in Southern Lebanon. Israel’s serious crimes of continued aggression against Lebanon have met with firm resistance on the part of the Lebanese Government and people, and these crimes have been unanimously condemned by the Palestinian and other Arab people as well as all the countries and peoples that uphold justice.

11. The Chinese Government and people have consistently given resolute support to the Lebanese, Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against Zionism and super-Power hegemonism for the recovery of their lost territories and the restoration of their national rights. We maintain that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon must be respected scrupulously. We strongly condemn Israel for its continued aggression against Lebanon and its obstruction of the exercise of sovereign rights by the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon.

12. Based on the above position, we are in favour of the paragraphs condemning Israel, as contained in the statement just read out by the President of the Council. But it is not satisfactory that the statement has failed to pronounce a stern condemnation befitting Israel. Moreover, in view of the different position which the Chinese delegation has always held in principle on the question of the dispatch of United Nations forces, we dissociate ourselves from all the contents of the statement concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

13. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): Mr. President, we are grateful to you for your efforts to arrive at a consensus on the document you have just read out. To our satisfaction, you read it out in the famous traditional German firm tone.

14. Today my delegation learned of the death of Mrs. Meir. It is a pity that she did not live long enough to see the triumph of the people of Palestine about whom she once observed cynically: “Where are the people of Palestine? They do not exist.”

15. Coming to the substance of today’s debate, I should like to express our satisfaction with the supplementary information just given by the Secretary-General. Let me begin by quoting from the important report of the Secretary-General [S/12929].

16. In its resolution 434 (1978), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation in two months. The Secretary-General submitted his report on 18 November, in fulfilment of the Council’s request. In the same resolution, the Council decided that it would meet in two months “to allow it to assess the situation and to examine what further measures should be taken” for the fulfilment of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

17. The delegation of Kuwait is therefore very grateful to the Secretary-General and to his colleagues for their

unflagging efforts towards the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). My delegation is extremely happy with the report, as it very frankly places the blame on Israel, which has been obstructing the implementation of the Council's resolutions. The document is unique in its frankness and shows signs of the frustration from which the United Nations has been suffering.

18. In paragraph 5, the report states: "there has been no significant improvement in the deployment of the Force since the last report of the Secretary-General" and "despite the efforts of UNIFIL, little progress has been achieved".

19. In paragraph 8 the report says:

"In the area under the control of the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups",—that is Haddad and his collaborators— "UNIFIL, which had previously secured limited freedom of movement there, was subject to periodic harassment."

20. In paragraph 9 it states:

"UNIFIL installations were also harassed by the *de facto* armed groups. . . . UNIFIL officers identified three personnel of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in plain clothes."

This paragraph also narrates the tragic lawlessness of the episode of 25 October when the rebels and their masters, the Israelis, entered UNIFIL quarters and stabbed an Irish soldier. Israeli soldiers, in complete contempt of United Nations authority, ran amok and criminally ransacked UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura.

21. In paragraph 12 the report says that UNIFIL has observed the presence of IDF personnel in Southern Lebanon. A group of 30 Israelis were seen laying mines some 300 metres inside Lebanon.

22. In paragraph 13 the Secretary-General states, in obvious exasperation and frustration: "To my regret I have to report that, in spite of these efforts, little progress has been made."

23. It is obvious that the Secretary-General felt compelled to express his frustration at the lack of Israeli co-operation in the full deployment of UNIFIL. In paragraph 15 the report unequivocally goes on to say:

"An essential precondition for UNIFIL's success is the co-operation of all concerned, especially those armed elements and groups in and around its area of operation. In the present circumstances, this particularly applies to the Lebanese *de facto* forces in the area and to the Government of Israel. I regret to have to inform the Council that at the present time the necessary co-operation is still lacking in these quarters and the complete deployment of UNIFIL and the progressive re-establishment of Lebanese authority in the area is therefore blocked."

24. The Secretary-General continues, in paragraph 17:

"The relationship between the Israel Defence Forces and the Lebanese *de facto* forces is a major factor in the

present situation. . . . it has not been denied that they provide them with logistic and other forms of support."

25. In paragraph 19 the Secretary-General adds: "the indefinite continuation of such a situation is obviously unacceptable"

26. In paragraph 20 the Secretary-General says:

"It is therefore essential that the Lebanese *de facto* forces and those who support them should come to terms with certain realities. . . . Continued military resistance to this effort can only be regarded as a deliberate defiance both of the legitimate authority of the Lebanese Government and of the decisions of the Security Council."

In the same paragraph the report says that: "the present state of affairs, if continued, will inevitably lead to the erosion of UNIFIL".

27. Our sincerest thanks must go to the Secretary-General for his unequivocal frankness. The crux of the matter is Israel's defiance of the Council's authority. This is characteristic of Israel, not only on UNIFIL, but also on other issues, be they on the Syrian territory, the West Bank or Gaza. For how long can we tolerate this blatant defiance of the authority of the Council? Which part of resolution 425 (1978) has been implemented? That resolution called for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces, for the restoration of Lebanese authority and for full UNIFIL deployment in Southern Lebanon. UNIFIL deployment in the South has been blocked by Israel, as the Secretary-General clearly stated. Consequently Lebanon has not been able to restore its authority in Southern Lebanon. The gangsters who rely on Israel are opposing UNIFIL advancement to the South. So there is no implementation of resolution 425 (1978) but there is defiance. There is no co-operation by Israel with United Nations forces but there is a blatant challenge. There is no restoration of Lebanese authority in the South but there is an erosion of this authority and a noticeable erosion of UNIFIL prestige. Who is to blame in this unbelievable confusion? Undoubtedly, Israel, first and foremost, and it is the only culprit in this tragic quagmire.

28. The implementation of resolution 425 (1978) requires the co-operation of the Palestinians, who have displayed enviable patience in the most provocative circumstances. But for how long will the Palestinians be so co-operative, especially when they see the advantage of trickery and ill-will which Israel so greatly enjoys? It also requires the co-operation of the Lebanese Government, which has tried, in the most confusing circumstances, to send some of its troops in order to assert its authority. On the Arab side, so to speak, the obligation has been fulfilled. But the problem is with the Israeli side. Israel does not want UNIFIL success. It is enjoying the benefit of the whole confusion. *The Times* of London of 27 November wrote:

"It seems obvious, however, that Israel is not going to countenance a United Nations presence along its border. This would, after all, lose it the pro-Israeli security zone in Southern Lebanon which the Christians maintain for them. At the same time, the intensity of the shooting

suggests that the Israelis also want to demonstrate to the United Nations that any move further South will be met with force. Perhaps they also want to prove the United Nations' impotence."

In the same report, it stated:

"The Israelis claim that they do not exercise 'control' over the Christian militias but most United Nations soldiers have come to regard this with considerable cynicism. An official recalled how one junior officer—not with the Irish battalion—received a radio call from an Israeli soldier to 'warn' him that the Christians were about to fire their artillery and that the Israelis could not be held responsible."

29. Major-General Erskine, UNIFIL Commander, said in an interview published in *The Times* of London of 20 November that his 5,600 men "have not been able to make any substantial progress at all".

30. The report of the Secretary-General which was discussed in September hit the nail on the head when it stated:

"The fact that the Israel Defence Forces handed over control of the border area to *de facto* armed groups rather than to UNIFIL has continued to make impossible the full deployment of UNIFIL and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in the whole area of operation." [S/12845, para. 61.]

31. Therefore, the whole fiasco in Southern Lebanon is due to Israel's action in handing over territories under its occupation to the illegal rebels who seek control of the area, in order to ensure complete calm for Israel. *The New York Times* of 3 December reported that these servile agents of Israel intended to build an airport and a port in Southern Lebanon. This is a joke in bad taste, for we know that these subservient elements are not only on the payroll of their Israeli masters but that they do not dare to think of so blatant a mutilation of Lebanese sovereignty without Israel's backing. The Secretary-General unequivocally accuses Israel of obstructing UNIFIL deployment. There is no room for Israeli attempts to whitewash this accusation. These agents who project the image of daring heroism against their fellow countrymen are in fact a bunch of lily-livered and misguided Lebanese who subsist on Israeli military and political support. Had it not been for the treacherous Israeli designs, they would have fallen under the feet of their Lebanese compatriots.

32. My delegation is admittedly sick and tired of the velvet-glove treatment which the United States accords to Israel. When the Council's authority is at stake, the spoiled brats of some of our colleagues should be prevailed upon. For how long will the Council tolerate this shambles created by Israel? There is a moral decline in the authority of the Council, and Israel is the main contributor to that decline. We see it always go scot-free with its spoils with enviable impunity.

33. It is no secret that some members of the Council accepted this debate on UNIFIL most reluctantly, notwithstanding the indicting report of the Secretary-General

against Israel. When we speak about Israel's involvement in Southern Lebanon, they become ruffled and rattled, although they know the facts better than we do. And yet we talk about the restoration of international peace and security in Southern Lebanon as provided for in resolution 425 (1978). Where is this peace and security? Where has it been restored? Who is responsible for its absence? What have we done to see it restored?

34. My Government is involved in the two peace-keeping operations in Lebanon. My Government is playing a vital role in the Arab peace-keeping force, not only in terms of finance but more so in terms of political participation. My Government was instrumental in the recent meeting of some Arab Foreign Ministers held on the supervision of the cease-fire. My Government also follows the role of UNIFIL with keen interest, as this role complements the efforts of the Arab deterrent force. But the effect of our efforts in connexion with the Arab deterrent force will remain limited and incomplete as long as UNIFIL is not allowed to be deployed in Southern Lebanon.

35. The Council's authority is at stake. It is not fair to "pass the buck" to the Secretary-General, who cannot act without the authorization of the Council. Here we cannot shirk our responsibility, which is the full implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). This abnormal situation which prevails in Southern Lebanon has to be dealt with one way or another. If UNIFIL cannot shoot its way down—and apparently it cannot—then we have to think of other alternatives. Surely the present situation serves the best interests of Israel, which is protected by its surrogates in the south, and to the north by UNIFIL and then, further north, by the Litani river. How can we accept this anomalous situation which is a threat to international peace and security? This abnormal situation tempts others, who have so far shown remarkable restraint, to make the best of the prevalent confusion. Southern Lebanon is saddled with thorny problems which the Government of Lebanon is incapable of handling and UNIFIL is in no position to confront. There is lawlessness created by Israel, from which only Israel benefits, and the continuation of which satisfies Israel alone. The Council is prisoner of power politics, and in the full knowledge of its limitations, particularly at this juncture, the delegation of Kuwait supports the President's statement, which, we believe, contains essential elements. We know that this statement will not resolve the ordeal in Southern Lebanon but it could provide the required pressure which usually accompanies the Council's decisions.

36. We have shown considerable sense of co-operation in our desire to accommodate rather than exacerbate the feelings of those who always urge us to place our faith in their efforts. In January we will have an opportunity to examine the situation and, if things remain as they are, my delegation may ask for either the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter against Israel or the termination of UNIFIL's mandate.

37. I should like now to speak briefly about what we call "the Metullah connexion".

38. Last August, a Lebanese army unit attempted to move into the area, a necessary part of the fulfillment of

UNIFIL's mandate in assisting the Lebanese Government to restore its authority in Southern Lebanon. That courageous move by the Government of Lebanon, given its great problems in the north of the country, had been advocated by all of us and by all countries contributing to UNIFIL. What happened? Haddad, with modern artillery, fired for four days, not only on the Lebanese unit but also on UNIFIL, especially the Nepalese contingent. Shells landed within a few yards of the Nepalese and some close to the Norwegians. The move by the Lebanese army unit—representing the legitimate authority recognized by all Council members—was stopped.

39. How was that possible? First, the renegade forces of Majors Haddad and Chidias had been allowed, during Israeli occupation, to expand their control over an area one to six kilometres inside Lebanon along the Israeli border. They expanded their control by bringing Christian militia into an area predominantly Moslem, not controlled by the Christian militia before the Israeli invasion. Naqoura, the headquarters of UNIFIL, is in a Moslem area, behind the lines of the renegade majors and completely at their mercy. Before the Israeli invasion, none of the troops of the renegades has been into that area. During the Israeli invasion, the Israelis built about 15 new roads from Israel into that one to six-kilometre border zone to supply the renegades. Supplies via what is called the "good fence" go in—artillery, other heavy weapons, shells and the like. The "good fence" was good for Major Haddad. It is very good for Israel. What was very good for Israel was that it created a buffer zone in Lebanon, leading to what is today a virtual annexation.

40. But what made it possible for Major Haddad, who commands no more than 800 troops, to hold off both UNIFIL and the legitimate Lebanese army? The answer is: supplies, advice and logistic support from Israel. The key is the town of Metulla, on the border, with direct links to Marajou, the headquarters of Haddad. A road goes directly across the border. United Nations spokesmen have reported that Israeli officers have been seen in demonstrations inside Lebanon, at Naqoura, UNIFIL headquarters, ostensibly led by Haddad. Where do they come from? Metulla. Where does Haddad get his military supplies from? Metulla. Where are the computers backing up Haddad's guns, guns firing not just on the Lebanese army but also on UNIFIL, a United Nations force representing all members of the Council? At Metulla. What is blocking the movement of UNIFIL into that area of Lebanon, an area which the Lebanese Government wants UNIFIL to enter? Metulla. And Metulla is in Israel. Metulla is manned by Israeli troops. Metulla is supplying Haddad with Israeli guns. Metulla is sending over Israeli advisers. Metulla gives the advice, the encouragement and the logistics. Metulla is Haddad's survival. Haddad works for Metulla, not for Lebanon and not for the United Nations.

41. That, then, is the answer to our problem: block off Metulla and let Southern Lebanon be Lebanese, not Israeli. It is the lifeline of the rebels and, therefore, we must shut it off. But that is the past and the present. What about the future?

42. The reason for insisting on UNIFIL's freedom of movement throughout Southern Lebanon is not academic or polemical. It is not just a question of implementing Security Council resolutions or a hope for restoration of the sovereignty—the legitimate sovereignty—and authority of a Member State. The fundamental reason is the need to assist the people of Lebanon, bind up their wounds and have their country rise again.

43. Hundreds, thousands of Lebanese have returned to their homes in Southern Lebanon since UNIFIL went there. The only part of Southern Lebanon where there is conflict, actual and potential, is that buffer zone virtually annexed by Israel. Let UNIFIL operate throughout the area and Southern Lebanon can be a model for all Lebanon. Only Israel, through Metulla, prevents that.

44. Israel has been telling the United Nations that it has already complied with resolution 425 (1978). That has been said tongue in cheek, with insincerity, and with the intention of deceiving the international community. Fortunately, the United Nations and Member States know the dismal circumstances of the situation. Because of Israel's obstruction of UNIFIL deployment we meet here in order to consider what can be done to take the bull by the horns. Too much is at stake. Those who have so far shown self-imposed restraint may be tempted to take advantage of the present lawlessness created by Israel.

45. The delegation of Kuwait is indeed aware of the complexity faced in the efforts that are being made to secure Israel's co-operation. It is for that reason that my delegation preferred a statement by the President of the Council, on behalf of its members, instead of a resolution. Our aim was unanimity; our objective was and still is the promotion of normalcy in Southern Lebanon. We want to avoid acrimony, recrimination or linguistic confrontation. We understand the difficulties which some Member States have with a resolution and we appreciate their understanding of our own difficulties. What interests us is the contents rather than the form, and we believe that the statement which the President read out so affirmatively covers all the points that we wanted emphasized, bearing in mind of course the difficulties of the present circumstances.

46. Condemnation, deploring and admonition give satisfaction to the psychology, but they rarely contribute to the betterment of those whose future we care for and care about. It is in this spirit that my delegation thanks the members of the Council for their understanding and co-operation. Some, indeed, are dissatisfied with the inadequacy of the language of the statement and some think that they accepted elements which were difficult for them to accept. To both we are grateful for this understanding.

47. Lebanon has placed its faith in the Security Council and in its ability to enforce the implementation of its resolutions. That is why we should live up to the challenge posed by Israel, and in doing so we will satisfy the yearnings of the Lebanese people for tranquillity, harmony and peace.

48. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Three months ago, when we all met to discuss the renewal of the mandate of

UNIFIL, I pointed out [2085th meeting] my Government's concern at the interference and the obstruction that the Force had met from armed groups receiving "support from outside" in the implementation of this mandate in Southern Lebanon. We appealed, in the resolution which emerged from that debate, to Israel and Lebanon and all others involved to co-operate fully and urgently with the United Nations in the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). It is with no little concern therefore that we learn from the Secretary-General's report that some have not acknowledged that appeal, that the attitude of the *de facto* armed groups has markedly hardened and that tension in and near the UNIFIL area of operation has increased. Far from the commanders of the Force being able to achieve an improvement in the deployment of the Force in areas of Southern Lebanon hitherto inaccessible to them, various contingents of the Force have come under fire from elements of the *de facto* forces.

49. We believe that the Government of Israel has considerable influence over those forces in the South. We also believe that the Government of Israel should cease furnishing supplies and military equipment to them which enable them more effectively to frustrate UNIFIL's performance of its tasks. Indeed, as the Secretary-General has pointed out, the presence of Israel Defence Forces personnel has been observed in Southern Lebanon on a number of occasions. The Secretary-General has confirmed again today that these incursions continue. Those and other actions give my Government great cause for concern. As we said in the earlier debate to which I referred, there can be no excuse for this lack of co-operation with a peace-keeping force of the United Nations.

50. In the few weeks remaining prior to the time when we are asked to review the mandate of the Force, we look forward to hearing of a marked improvement in both attitude and degree of co-operation received by the Force from all concerned. I hope particularly that the Government of Israel will use its influence more constructively to enable UNIFIL to achieve its task. I would add in this connexion that any country which undermines the position of UNIFIL must itself bear a heavy responsibility for any subsequent increase in tension and violence in the area. Failure to co-operate with UNIFIL, thus in effect defying the Security Council, must also cast doubt upon that country's readiness to accept in good faith the role of United Nations peace-keeping forces in sustaining a wider settlement in the Middle East. It must also undermine the willingness of contributor countries to participate in such forces.

51. I note that relations, on the other hand, with other armed elements in the area have not created major problems, although there have been occasional clashes with armed personnel attempting to enter UNIFIL's area of operation from the north. But these clashes have remained for the most part minor. The situation is, however, clearly brittle; all the more important, therefore, for us not to jeopardize the co-operation so far received by failing to achieve significant progress throughout the area mandated to UNIFIL. Her Majesty's Government will continue, therefore, to use every opportunity to emphasize the need

to all parties to co-operate with the United Nations Force in Lebanon.

52. We have had, and we will have again next month, an opportunity to praise the performance of Major-General Erskine and the officers and men of UNIFIL. The physical danger facing the contingents remains regrettably undiminished, if not increased, and we can but admire the way in which they seek to perform under these pressures the task which the Council has allotted to them. We admire equally the determined and devoted efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff to secure the effective implementation of the Council's resolutions in respect of Southern Lebanon. The Council owes it to them all to seek to do what it can to assist them and to secure improvement in the difficult political climate in which they have to operate. It is in that spirit that my delegation approaches the present discussions in the Council, which we consider timely.

53. Mr BARTON (Canada): In March this year the Council decided, in response to the urgent request of the Government of Lebanon, to deploy the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in Southern Lebanon. The Council has also called upon the parties and on all others concerned to facilitate the operation of the Force.

54. The latest report of the Secretary-General informs us that, notwithstanding the Council's directions to all concerned, United Nations peace-keeping forces are being fired upon, restricted in carrying out their mission and harassed. That is an unacceptable situation. The report clearly indicates that the major offenders in the cases described are what he refers to as *de facto* forces. He also reports that Israeli authorities do not deny providing these forces with logistic and other forms of support and that, notwithstanding the reported withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from Southern Lebanon, UNIFIL has occasionally identified members of the forces still in the area. The report also mentions incidents with Palestinian armed elements in the UNIFIL area of operation.

55. As the Secretary-General has said, the restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government is the only durable and reliable means by which normality and security can return to Southern Lebanon. Unless there is a return to normality and security in Lebanon there is bound to remain a threat to the security and peace of the Middle East as a whole.

56. Moreover, the authority of the Council is also at stake. We must not permit our decisions to be ignored nor the good name of United Nations peace keeping to be tarnished. Canada is no longer a participant in UNIFIL, but we continue to believe that the decision to authorize its establishment was the right one and we have been impressed by the Force's performance in very difficult conditions. But, as we have often said, peacekeeping is a means to an end. If the end is not being achieved, it is reasonable to reconsider the means at our disposal.



57. Sir, it is for this reason that we support your statement and in particular the call to all those not fully co-operating with UNIFIL, particularly Israel, to desist forthwith from interfering with UNIFIL's operations in Southern Lebanon.

58. Mr. HULINSKÝ (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): Already at the time of the diplomatic preparation for the separate talks with Egypt, Israel had committed an aggression against a peace-loving State, Lebanon. Despite the sharp criticism which these actions aroused in the whole world, including the United Nations, Israel needed three whole months to respond to the decision of the Security Council on the withdrawal of its troops from the occupied southern part of Lebanon. Moreover, as shown by the facts mentioned in the reports of the Secretary-General published in documents S/12845 and S/12929, Israel has not transferred control over several regions it had evacuated to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon but has handed it over to the illegal armed groups which have refused to this day to submit to the authority of the Government of Lebanon.

59. In the period from last June, when the Security Council was informed that Israel had completed the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon, the Israeli army has undertaken, with the assistance of local reactionary forces which receive moral, financial and military support from Tel Aviv, a whole series of acts of provocation aimed at producing a split in Lebanon. As shown in the last report of the Secretary-General, the situation has not changed in the two months that have elapsed since the adoption, last September, of resolution 434 (1978), which

“Calls upon Israel . . . to co-operate fully and urgently with the United Nations in the implementation of . . . resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).”

As in the past, Israel continues to interfere in the domestic affairs of Lebanon and continues to co-operate actively with the illegal armed groups in its frontier zone. This, as the report of the Secretary-General indicates, is the main factor which impedes the restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon in the south of the country.

60. Such a situation can only cause the deepest concern to the members of the Security Council, a situation which has in the past impeded the restoration of peace in Lebanon and which creates a threat to the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the whole question of the Middle East. In the joint communiqué which was published at the conclusion of the visit of the President of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the Republic of Iraq from 26 to 29 November 1978, it was stated:

“Both parties support the consolidation of the lawful authority of the Government of Lebanon over the whole of the territory of that State. They support respect for the legitimate interests of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon. Both parties condemn the interference of Israel in the domestic affairs of Lebanon and its attempt to aggravate tensions and to achieve a partition of the Lebanese State.”

61. The Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, together with the other members of the Security Council, condemns the arrogant conduct and actions of Israel, undertaken in disregard and violation of the decisions of the Council and considers the statement by the President on this matter fully warranted and necessary. That statement should be a serious warning to the Israeli authorities, because their actions are contrary to the decisions of the Council, clearly aimed against the restoration of the full sovereignty of Lebanon over the whole of its territory and continue to be a threat to peace in the region.

62. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union believes that the submission to the Security Council of the interim report of the Secretary-General concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon is very timely, correct and indeed indispensable. More than eight months has elapsed since Israel committed a direct aggression against Lebanon, a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. This barbaric attack by Israel, which led to great losses of life among the civilian population of Lebanon, including women and children, was yet another link in the chain of aggressive Israeli actions aimed at the neighbouring Arab States.

63. In its resolution 425 (1978), the Security Council demanded that Israel should immediately cease its military action against Lebanon and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory and it called on Israel scrupulously to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. However, the whole course of subsequent events has clearly shown that Israel, despite the demands of the Council, in fact continues its infringements of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and has not ceased its crude interference in the domestic affairs of that State. Such actions cannot be viewed as other than deliberate sabotage of the decisions of the Council and direct defiance of the Council and the United Nations as a whole.

64. The report of the Secretary-General clearly indicates that, as in the past, Israel is continuing to maintain its military presence in Southern Lebanon and to provide military and other types of assistance to the anti-government groups in Lebanon and that it impedes the restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon. These actions by Israel are properly qualified in the report of the Secretary-General as deliberate flouting of the legitimate authority of the Government of Lebanon and of the decisions of the Security Council.

65. Israel is carrying out against Lebanon a policy of threat and military provocation. Maintaining under its control essential areas of Lebanon along the Israeli-Lebanese border, it endeavours always to keep open the door to a new and massive incursion in that country. The deepest concern must be aroused by the information indicating that Israel is engaged in active work to create a new harbour in Southern Lebanon and that it intends to begin shortly the building of an airport in the region. It is clear that all this is designed to strengthen Israel's control over the *de facto* occupied frontier zone of Lebanon.

66. The actions of Israel in Lebanon are aggravating the already dangerous situation in the Middle East, which is a threat to peace, and the unfolding of events in that region has again confirmed how well founded were the repeated warnings of the Soviet Union that the lack of a settlement of the Middle East conflict, the occupation by Israel of Arab lands and the violations of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine were creating a situation fraught with serious consequences for international peace and security.

67. The Soviet Union has always been and continues to be a supporter of a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East which, because of its very substance and character can be achieved only by the collective efforts of all the interested parties. As regards the policy of separate deals, that can only lead to further complication of the situation. It encourages Israel to attempt to consolidate the results of its aggression, including the aggression in Lebanon, and to proceed to further expansion through the seizure of Arab lands.

68. The position of the Soviet Union in support of ending the interference by Israel in the affairs of Lebanon and in favour of normalization of the situation in Lebanon was recently reconfirmed in the joint communiqué of 2 November this year issued on the occasion of the visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by the Chairman of its Executive Committee, Mr. Arafat. It states:

“Both parties expressed serious concern over the situation in Lebanon in connexion with the continuing interference by Israel in the domestic affairs of that country and its attempts to aggravate tension and to cause a partitioning of the Lebanese State. The parties declared their intention to co-operate in bringing about a normalization of the situation in Lebanon on the basis of ensuring its sovereignty, its independence and its territorial integrity. They also advocated the strengthening of the legitimate authority of the Lebanese Government over the whole of the territory of that country and expressed themselves in favour of respect for the legitimate interests of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon.”

69. The delegation of the Soviet Union believes that the members of the Security Council cannot and must not tolerate the inadmissible situation in which Israel openly sabotages the decisions of the Council in regard to an immediate ending of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the demands of the Council for strict respect for the sovereign rights of that country.

70. In the light of these considerations, the Soviet delegation joined in the consensus of the members of the Council regarding the statement just read out by the President. In doing so, my delegation has noted that in that statement responsibility for the very serious situation in Lebanon is clearly placed on Israel. The non-implementation by Israel of the decisions of the Council has been very justly described as a challenge to the authority of the Council and a defiance of its resolutions.

71. The Council clearly demands that Israel and also other elements which fail to co-operate fully with the United Nations forces, that is, the elements now under Israeli control, the armed groups in Southern Lebanon, should put an end to their obstacles to the activities of the United Nations forces. This demand must be considered by Israel very seriously, and it must without any delay implement the resolutions of the Council demanding the complete cessation of interference by Israel in the domestic affairs of Lebanon.

72. At the same time, we want to express regret at the fact that in the present decision of the Council there is no proper condemnation of Israel in view of its sabotaging of the decisions of the Council, its continuing aggressive actions against Lebanon and its gross interference in the domestic affairs of that country. We also believe that it is high time for the Council to move towards more energetic and effective measures to ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted by it in connexion with Israel's aggression against Lebanon.

73. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria): My delegation would like to express its profound appreciation to the Secretary-General for his helpful interim report concerning UNIFIL. I am, of course, aware that the ritual of renewal of UNIFIL's mandate is more than a month away. Nevertheless, recent developments in Southern Lebanon have now rendered the present report necessary.

74. We note with satisfaction that, during the period under review, the Secretary-General, the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East and the Force Commander, General Erskine, maintained contact with the Lebanese authorities as well as with the Israelis regarding the steps to be taken to further the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 434 (1978). We equally note that UNIFIL maintained its contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization throughout this period. And in order to facilitate an early implementation of its mandate, UNIFIL has been compelled, by circumstances beyond its control but which continue to hamper its work, to deal on an *ad hoc* basis with the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups in Southern Lebanon.

75. We are gratified that the Secretary-General has been able to report that UNIFIL has continued to use its best efforts to ensure that its area of operation will not be used for hostile activities of any kind. In the area where UNIFIL exercises full control effective action continues to be taken not only to prevent the entry of armed personnel but also to promote progressive normalization of life.

76. But then there are other aspects of the report of the Secretary-General which have given considerable cause for anxiety. In spite of the good faith underlying UNIFIL's contacts with the so-called *de facto* armed groups of Major Haddad—contacts made through Major Haddad's political mentor, the State of Israel—UNIFIL is still experiencing considerable difficulty on the vital issue of effective deployment of its units and control in its area of operation, not to speak of having to restore the Lebanese national forces in the area.

77. One matter of considerable concern to my delegation is the escalation of defiance on the part of the *de facto* armed groups and the menacing challenge they pose to the authority of UNIFIL in its legal area of operation. We are indignant that these lawless groups now have the audacity to bring heavy artillery into the area and to use it against UNIFIL units, which, like traditional United Nations peace-keeping troops, have only light weapons for the purpose of self-defence.

78. We feel no less indignant at the revelation that UNIFIL installations have become targets of harassment by those same *de facto* armed groups. In this regard, there can be no better illustration of such lawlessness or contempt for the authority and power of the Security Council than the incident involving 300 demonstrators at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura on 16 October. The demonstrators were reported to have severely damaged a Lebanese army helicopter used by the Lebanese liaison team. That was not all. The unruly bands had the effrontery to abduct four Lebanese liaison personnel in broad daylight. In view of the proved links between the militia and the State of Israel, my delegation finds it strange that Israel claims not to have been aware of such a mass demonstration and of its consequences.

79. As we consider this report, the so-called *de facto* armed groups are having a field day in UNIFIL's area of operation. Civilians have been routinely harassed by the same groups and mortar shells have been fired and freely used against peaceful villages. The incident on 30 October at Brashit even resulted in the killing of at least one woman.

80. And, as if the Israelis had not found the depredations and atrocities of the armed groups disquieting enough, we now have concrete proof of the presence in Southern Lebanon of Israeli armed personnel who, in full view of the world, lay mines some 300 metres deep inside Lebanese territory in violation of the country's territorial integrity and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. One begins to wonder from where the source of Israel's fear emanates and why it lays these mines in this particular area?

81. We cannot but endorse the assessment of the Secretary-General to the effect that the relationship between the Israel Defence Forces and the *de facto* Lebanese armed forces of Major Haddad is a major factor in the problems confronting UNIFIL in the implementation of its mandate in Southern Lebanon. UNIFIL has, from time to time, requested the Israeli authorities to use their good offices and influence in efforts to control or moderate the extreme actions of Major Haddad and his militiamen. While the Israelis continue to disclaim any control over them, they have not denied—and, indeed, cannot deny—having given the Major and his group considerable logistic and other material support. Thus, the Israelis have more or less succeeded in maintaining their presence in Lebanon by proxy in violation of resolution 425 (1978).

82. The issue as we see it, and as we have seen it all these years, is whether the Security Council will continue to fold its arms and allow Israel to persist in its brazen acts of defiance and intransigence. The Council must now act—and

act fast and firmly—if it is to arrest the continuing erosion of its authority by Israel. This might be the very motive of Israel, which has been restrained as far as has been possible in its expansionist designs in the Middle East. UNIFIL cannot be expected to fulfil its mandate if the armed groups of Major Haddad persist in their present criminal activities with the active support of the Israelis.

83. We must not lose sight of the fact that UNIFIL is mandated to provide protection to all sectors of the population and its record so far has proved conclusively that it is not a partisan force in the area. The Security Council, in the view of my delegation, seems left with no other option but to start, as a matter of urgency, earnest consideration of effective measures designed to compel the strict compliance of all parties with its resolutions. In this instance it is obvious that the State of Israel provides support and succour for Haddad and his group. It will no longer be enough to condemn the State for its continuing defiance. We may now have to serve notice of the Council's determination to apply more serious measures if the current unacceptable situation persists.

84. Israel must realize that a strong and stable Lebanon is both desirable and essential to its own security. An unstable Lebanon, which it seems bent on creating, must of necessity have destabilizing effects on Israel's northern front. I only hope that Israel will fully co-operate with the United Nations to ensure the stability and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

85. In conclusion, my delegation would like to reaffirm its solidarity with the people of Lebanon in their quest to regain and preserve the territorial integrity of their State. We also wish to seize this opportunity to salute the men and officers of UNIFIL for their valour and level-headedness in the face of provocation and harassment from the unruly militia in their area of operation. Finally, we highly commend Major-General Erskine and his staff for their steadfastness, courage and sense of responsibility in the extraordinarily difficult and volatile atmosphere in which they have had to operate. We only hope that the sacrifices they have made in the past and which they may have to make in the future will not be in vain.

86. I might end by adding that I regret that the powerful members of the Council which afford Israel the logistic support enabling it to defy the United Nations in the Middle East generally cannot utilize their leverage to restore the territorial integrity of Lebanon, which has offended nobody. It is the hope of my delegation that the call on Israel by the Council, through the President, to desist from interfering with UNIFIL's operations in Southern Lebanon will be followed by pressure on Israel to be less belligerent, not only in Lebanon but throughout the Middle East.

87. Mr. LEPRETTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): On 18 November the Secretary-General issued an interim report under resolution 434 (1978) concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. My Government wishes to congratulate him and to thank him for the skilful and objective manner in which he has once again carried out his task. We see from his analysis that in the last two months UNIFIL's commanders have spared no effort,

within the framework in which we had placed their task, to achieve progress with respect to the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 434 (1978). Those efforts, however, have not led to any marked improvement in UNIFIL's deployment, nor have they enabled the Force to take up positions throughout the area from which the Israeli army withdrew in June 1978 to make way for the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups. It is obvious, in fact, that it was precisely in that sector that UNIFIL elements were the object of acts of harassment some of which, on 16 and 25 October, assumed a serious character.

88. The report shows unambiguously that the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups responsible for those incidents enjoy the support of Israel. The Secretary-General has informed us that he awaits replies to the detailed suggestions he made concerning a new deployment of the Force in the area, in accordance with the objectives and tasks which the Council has entrusted to it. We also await those replies with interest. We shall follow very closely the measures that may be taken which would enlighten us on the degree of hope with which we can envisage the future role of the peace-keeping forces in the Middle East.

89. The French authorities address a further pressing appeal to the interested parties to heed at last the voice of reason and to abide by the decisions of the Council. That is why my delegation gave its full support to the statement read out by the President of the Council.

90. The relative calm that has reigned at Beirut since the implementation of the cease-fire on 7 October has permitted the Lebanese Government concomitantly to undertake efforts to reassert its authority. My delegation wishes to stress the importance it attaches to ensuring that no faction, no party and no country shall hinder that essential action. It is in fact the only action likely to preserve Lebanon from the outbreak of new bloody confrontations which would again impose untold sufferings on the civilian population. That action is moreover essential to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over the entire territory. My Government reiterates today its support of the Lebanese authorities in that long and difficult task.

91. The French Government wishes to pay an especially warm tribute to the Commander of the Force, Major-General Erskine, as well as to the officers, men and civilian personnel of UNIFIL. They are all fulfilling their task in an exemplary manner in conditions which, as we know, have at times been difficult. For this we thank them.

92. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): Only two months ago, in renewing UNIFIL's mandate, we expressed concern that the mandate had not been fulfilled in all its aspects and we noted in particular that the restoration of effective Lebanese governmental authority in Southern Lebanon had not yet been accomplished. My Government shares the concern of other members of the Council that, as is indicated in the Secretary-General's report, little progress has been made in this regard. Once again, we join in the call for co-operation with UNIFIL by all involved. This co-operation is vital in order to ensure that the relative stability now existing in the UNIFIL area, brought about by the outstanding performance of UNIFIL's men and

officers, will be able to be consolidated, and to make it possible for the authority of the Government of Lebanon to be extended to Southern Lebanon. By "all involved", we mean all the organized Lebanese and Palestinian groups in the area and all Governments having influence on the situation there.

93. While sharing the concern for the lack of progress in UNIFIL's area of operation, my Government believes it worthy of note that UNIFIL has been successful in making possible the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. It has done much to promote stability and security there. To achieve these objectives requires full co-operation. They cannot be achieved when the *de facto* forces mentioned by the Secretary-General cause so much interference with UNIFIL's operations, ignoring the fact that UNIFIL is in Lebanon in the interests of Lebanese citizens and ignoring UNIFIL's clear record of accomplishment in this respect.

94. It is clear that Israel has influence on these groups and the ability to exercise greater influence than it has done so far. We believe that Israel has a duty, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, to assist UNIFIL in fulfilling its mandate.

95. In this connexion, I would note that several of those who have spoken here today—and perhaps this may become true also of several of those who have not yet spoken but will shortly address the Council—have used language and expressed ideas and judgements with which the United States definitely does not associate itself. In particular, several have used the words "condemn" or "condemnation" and various parallel phrases to characterize the consensus statement today. These words appear nowhere in the statement, and that is not accidental. Rather, the Council has expressed deepest concern and has called upon all concerned, particularly Israel, to extend full co-operation to UNIFIL. The significance of this call by the Council is clear enough and it serves no good purpose for representatives here to escalate the rhetoric and thus misstate the import of today's action by the Council. This is a serious question, and I am confident that all concerned will take seriously the carefully measured language pronounced here today by you, Mr. President.

96. It would not, of course, be fair or accurate to ascribe current problems solely to Israel's action or inaction, for Southern Lebanon represents but one aspect of Lebanon's plight. The situation in Lebanon is complex and difficult. Other Governments, which are friends of Lebanon, also bear responsibility for co-operating in finding a solution to that country's difficulties. The Council, which only a few months ago acted to promote a cease-fire and an end to the bloodshed in central Lebanon, has acknowledged that fact, as have those countries which are supporting an important resolution in the General Assembly designed to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian and developmental assistance to Lebanon. We are gratified that the cease-fire in central Lebanon is holding. We believe it will continue to do so as long as the Maronite militia and the Syrian elements of the Arab deterrent force, which were in a bloody confrontation prior to the cease-fire, continue to exercise restraint. The Secretary-General's report makes it clear that firm peace

will come to all of Lebanon only when its Government is able to operate independently, effectively and free from civil strife. Efforts are now under way towards that objective, and we are encouraged by the sense of purpose with which President Sarkis and his colleagues, working with others, are attempting to rebuild the nation and promote national reconciliation. My Government will do all it can to assist in this important effort and we urge all involved to continue this work with persistence, vigour and strength of will. I emphasize the importance of this effort, because it is directly relevant to our discussion of UNIFIL today and to the ability of the central Government to re-establish its authority in the South.

97. While this effort proceeds, it is incumbent upon all involved to assist UNIFIL in preparing the way for the extension of central governmental authority into the area. UNIFIL, as its name indicates, is only an interim force; it cannot supplant the Lebanese Government, and progress towards fulfilment of the third part of its mandate must surely be made—and quickly. There are numerous ways of promoting this progress. Certainly, UNIFIL's area of operation must be expanded in the South, and its freedom of movement must be assured. At the same time, an increasing Lebanese governmental presence should be developed in the area, whether through units of the Lebanese Army, which is now being reconstructed, through increased Lebanese police authority in the area, through greater numbers of Lebanese civil authorities dealing directly with the population, or by a combination of all these steps.

98. This development will require resolve on Lebanon's part and maximum co-operation and assistance from all those interested in advancing Lebanon's stability. This will also be the kind of progress which, together with the strengthening of a central Government acting purposefully to unite the country, can bring about the advancement of a strong and united Lebanon. Members of the Security Council, Lebanon's friends and neighbours and all factions in Lebanon itself have a grave responsibility in this endeavour, and we call upon all to join together to achieve this goal.

99. I should like now to turn briefly to another matter which has already been noted today in, I am afraid, a very tasteless and regrettable manner. Several hours ago, we learned of the death of the former Prime Minister of Israel, Golda Meir. We take the occasion of this meeting to express our profound regrets on the passing of that international stateswoman.

100. As Prime Minister, Golda Meir led Israel through many of its most trying years. Addressing the General Assembly on 9 October 1962, she said:

“My Government rejects war as a means of settling disputes.

“... ”

“... As long as negotiation is sought, there is hope. Those who rule out negotiation in the Middle East... should know that their attitude is irrelevant to the basic theme of the international community and can have no

echo in an Organization which has proclaimed peace to be synonymous with human survival.”<sup>1</sup>

Her words are more timely today than before. We extend our condolences to the people of Israel for their sad loss.

101. Mr. CHADERTON (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): When Venezuela voted in favour of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 434 (1978), it did so in the conviction that the presence of a United Nations interim force in Southern Lebanon would prevent a deterioration of the already delicate situation in the area. Unfortunately, the objectives for which UNIFIL was set up have not been fully achieved, and we are witnessing its transformation from an interim measure into an almost permanent one, if we bear in mind the fact that nine months have elapsed since its establishment and that less than a month remains before its mandate expires. It thus has less than one month in which to accomplish its task.

102. The delegation of Venezuela wishes to make its position clear. UNIFIL has not fully accomplished the task entrusted to it by the Security Council because it has lacked the necessary co-operation of all the parties and Governments involved, particularly as the result of the obstacles placed in the way of its full deployment in the area covered by the mandate and owing to the emergence of new elements which hamper its task. We consider that that co-operation, especially on the part of Israel, is indispensable for the achievement of the full deployment of the Force and the gradual restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government in the area of operation, in conformity with the aforementioned resolutions.

103. For the present, we are comforted by the thought that, as stated in the Secretary-General's report, particular attention is being paid to efforts to improve UNIFIL's ability to protect all elements of the civilian population, among which, as noted by the Secretary-General, there could be a loss of confidence in UNIFIL. This would be regrettable, since in such situations it is the civilian population and its property that are generally hit the hardest.

104. Anything that may be said in the debates in the Council will avail us very little unless UNIFIL obtains the support we demand. If it is denied, the Lebanese people would be inexorably condemned to live in a permanent situation of tension and suffering, a state of affairs which our Organization must prevent.

105. The Venezuelan delegation wishes to associate itself with those who have paid tribute to UNIFIL's civilian and military personnel for the courage and devotion with which they are endeavouring to fulfil their mandate, as well as to those States providing contingents or some other form of co-operation to UNIFIL.

106. Similarly, we wish to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his continued endeavours to bring

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1148th meeting, paras. 168 and 209.*

about a change for the better in the situation in Lebanon and for keeping a watchful eye over events in the area.

107. Lastly, we also wish to express the hope that Lebanon—the cradle and example of culture and civilization—may recover the peace to which it is entitled and rebuild its life, free from outside interference, in prosperity, democracy and freedom throughout its territory.

108. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the members-of-the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Israel in which he asks to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice and with the consent of the Council, I propose to invite the representative of Israel to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Blum (Israel) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

109. Mr. JAIPAL (India): I would begin by expressing our appreciation of the frank and objective report of the Secretary-General and extend our full support to him and his dedicated officers for their determined and patient efforts to fulfil the difficult mandate of the Council.

110. I would also place on record my delegation's tribute to the splendid work done by the Commander, officers and men of UNIFIL in a situation that is increasingly hostile to them.

111. It needs to be brought home once again to Israel that it had freely accepted the induction of the Force into Lebanon, as well as its mandate, and therefore the United Nations has every right to expect Israel to co-operate fully with UNIFIL in the achievement of the objectives laid down in resolution 425 (1978). But such co-operation has not been forthcoming.

112. After a lapse of more than six months the United Nations Force is still being harassed, fired upon, abducted and generally prevented from deploying fully in Southern Lebanon. If that sort of thing is going to continue, there is no reason why we should allow the United Nations peace-keeping force to remain there. UNIFIL should either be withdrawn or strengthened and converted into an enforcement group under Chapter VII of the Charter. We should naturally prefer the former course of action, that is, the withdrawal of UNIFIL. There is a limit beyond which the Council should not permit a poorly equipped United Nations peace-keeping force to be subjected to attacks by better equipped forces with little respect for the authority of the United Nations.

113. There is at present a more or less stable deadlock. The Secretary-General has said that the full deployment of UNIFIL and the restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon have been blocked by superior forces. Those forces are able to block the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) only because they enjoy a special relationship with the Israeli

Army—a somewhat strange relationship, if I may say so, whereby Israel provides logistic and other forms of support to them but claims inability to control or influence them. That claim is obviously unacceptable. Israel does not need lessons in the not-so-gentle art of applying pressure.

114. The Secretary-General's report states bluntly that an essential precondition for the success of UNIFIL is the co-operation in particular of the *de facto* armed groups and the Government of Israel. Resolution 425 (1978) has prescribed the role for UNIFIL in the wake of Israeli withdrawal, a role which was agreed to by Israel but which could not be fulfilled because Israel handed over the areas vacated by it to the so-called *de facto* armed groups. Perhaps the resolution should have clearly called upon Israel to hand over to UNIFIL the areas vacated by it. The absence of such a clear directive is obviously being exploited by Israel.

115. However, the Council did not authorize Israel to hand over the vacated areas to local armed groups of its own choice. The fact that Israel did so is surely not a very responsible act, because it nullifies the very act of withdrawal. Israel's presence is now masked by the so-called *de facto* armed groups, and that surely constitutes a clear violation of the spirit of resolution 425 (1978). Israel cannot possibly make a virtue of its withdrawal by perpetuating the occupation of parts of Southern Lebanon by its friends or allies.

116. In our view, it is necessary for the Council to clarify its intention by calling upon Israel to facilitate the taking over of Southern Lebanon by UNIFIL and also to cease its support and assistance to the *de facto* armed groups. Nothing less would enable UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate in peace and with honour. But it would seem that Lebanon is being regarded by some as just another piece on the chessboard of the Middle East—a piece that is not yet ready to be moved. Meanwhile, the Council and UNIFIL remain inactive in the face of blatant violations of resolution 425 (1978). The Council surely cannot afford to jeopardize either the presence or the credibility of UNIFIL. The Council should warn Israel and other parties concerned that unless their co-operation is forthcoming for implementing resolution 425 (1978) UNIFIL's mandate will not be renewed and the Force will be withdrawn.

117. My delegation reluctantly agreed to the consensus statement read out by the President. While we are duly impressed by the firmness of the President's English voice, we are not as impressed by the content of the statement. For one thing we would have preferred the form of a resolution; for another thing the statement should have included a clear call to Israel to do two things: first, to cease such logistic and other forms of support to the *de facto* Lebanese armed groups and, secondly, to facilitate the taking over by UNIFIL of Southern Lebanon from those armed groups.

118. In making these observations, we are not unaware of the incidents caused by other parties which have been termed by the Secretary-General's report relatively minor. However, a beginning has to be made somewhere and, in our opinion, it has to be made in Southern Lebanon. Israel

has the major role to play in reversing the situation caused by its invasion of Lebanon, and Israel's good faith is now being put to the test.

119. Our principal concern is the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and we should like to see the elimination from Lebanon of all forms of foreign interference so that national reconciliation becomes feasible in conditions of relative peace and stability.

120. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Lebanon, on whom I now call.

121. Mr. TUÉNI (Lebanon): Security Council meetings on Lebanon seem to be in the process of becoming a periodic feature of the Organization and they also seem somehow to become repetitious. Yet, we are particularly rewarded by the fact that the present meeting is held under your chairmanship, Mr. President, while you also preside over the European Economic Community group. I shall not dwell on the relationship of Europe to Lebanon or Lebanon to Europe—named after our Phoenician goddess Europa. My reference to history is merely intended to place our debate in what may, today, be a most significant context. Lebanon, along with other States, was privileged to sponsor the European group's resolution on peace keeping. We were thus emphasizing our confidence in the capability of soldiers from all over the world, particularly from Europe, and more particularly from France, to promote with us—in Lebanon, the Middle East or Africa—a new dimension of United Nations partnership in establishing international law, order and security.

122. But what value will resolutions have if, while we are here engaged in voting, the very credibility of "our soldiers for peace" is being subjected to systematic erosion and decisions of the Council are challenged as never before?

123. I submit that what is at stake here today is indeed the credibility of peace keeping. My first reference to the interim report of the Secretary-General now under consideration by the Council will therefore be to the very clear and unequivocal warning—and I repeat "warning"—that the report delivers. Are we not told in so many words—and I quote *inter alia*—that non-compliance with resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 434 (1978), the non-deployment of UNIFIL and further escalation of the conflict will not only imperil human lives, both civilian and military, but will also have most serious consequences and lead to grave dangers?

124. I need not quote any further from the interim report, nor do I wish to burden your debate with additional facts, figures and dates which will duplicate those which some representatives here have already given. Every hour of every day of every month there has been proof after proof that Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on 13 June was only a fiction and that Lebanese territorial integrity and sovereignty is subject to constant violation. Through what UNIFIL calls so diplomatically the "Lebanese *de facto* forces" Israel has in fact achieved one of two things, or probably both: pushed its real border further north into our country and established through occupation by proxy a shadow client mini-State. That, and nothing else, is the real

meaning of what the Secretary-General confronts us with in unprecedented clarity and accuracy.

125. When resolution 434 (1978) was adopted in this chamber over two months ago, the general sentiment was precisely that no loss of confidence in UNIFIL should be allowed. The term of the renewed mandate was shortened to four months only and we all agreed that we should convene again in mid-term to assess and evaluate what would have already been achieved and to decide further what best should be done.

126. We now know the facts. We also know beyond question that one Member State, the State of Israel, is defying peace-keeping, the Security Council, the forces of the United Nations, the countries which have contributed their men to those forces and all those who have made this whole enterprise possible by putting both their resources and their political prestige at the disposal of the Council and the Secretary-General.

127. So, we are compelled to ask in all candour and responsibility, how much longer can we all, and the world, tolerate this situation, sitting here almost helplessly, renewing the mandate of international forces that we thus condemn to becoming gradually the tacit accomplices of aggression? In the report of the Secretary-General there seems to be a very simple yet determined reply which I beg to underline:

"Nor should UNIFIL's attitude of restraint be mistaken for lack of determination to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council." [S/12929, para. 19.]

128. UNIFIL, the Security Council and peace-keeping alone are not at stake. There is also at stake the fate of a country, my country, another State Member of the United Nations, peace-loving Lebanon, its land and its people.

129. I know what many will say, not only the sceptical, the pharisees, and the sophists, but also some of those who, while meaning well, cannot grasp the full implications of what is happening today in the South. Hence, we are gratified and reassured that the Secretary-General should, in his present and past reports, have taken into consideration the effect of "the tragic developments at Beirut" on "the situation in Southern Lebanon which . . . is closely linked to the situation in Lebanon as a whole" [*ibid.*, para. 14].

130. Yet it is also clear by the mere description of the facts that responsibility for obstruction, even when done by and through the "*de facto* armed groups", lies with Israel and Israel alone.

131. Let me be still more explicit. It is my Government's clear understanding, shared by our numerous friends who have observed the scene and many of whom have testified here, that, were it not for Israel, the situation in Southern Lebanon both *de facto* and *de jure* would be very different indeed. Israel seems to have opted for continued war in Lebanon while appearing to seek peace elsewhere. Through Southern Lebanon and its organic "link" with the Lebanese tragedy, Israel seems to be determined to maintain my

country in a state of perpetual division, strife and instability.

132. Though I am not tempted here to restate the so-often debated grand designs of Israel in the Middle East, I cannot fail to note with the greatest concern that because of the situation in the South, Lebanon's natural position in the Arab world has been gravely shattered, as has the confidence of its closest, most sincere and natural allies.

133. I do not propose to discuss today the question of Lebanon as a whole. I have done so sufficiently where and when it was appropriate. My Government is clear on that and the people of Lebanon have now expressed beyond any question their genuine, irrevocable and unanimous determination to restore peace, to reconcile, to preserve Lebanon's unity, its independence and sovereignty, to search for a new national compact, and to reconstruct both our cities and our democratic institutions.

134. Through nearly five years of continued warfare where each and all, internally and externally, have their share of responsibility, the values and the ideals that were our *raison d'être* were as imperilled as our land, let alone our very existence. Even our history seemed questionable in the eyes of the world, let alone our future. Yet we are determined to survive: so, give us back our land!

135. These are very difficult days for us in Lebanon, probably the most difficult days since we regained our independence 35 years ago. We know and we admit in all candour and honesty that there are still problems that may justify the very special concern expressed by the Secretary-General in his report for the "civilian population" in some parts of Southern Lebanon. Yet we do not think that these problems can or will ever be solved in say, Marjayoun. So Marjayoun will have to come to Beirut with its problems, rather than expect to become a capital of its own to which Beirut will have to go.

136. Therefore I hope to be understood and excused if I use this unique and solemn occasion to address an appeal to my brethren and fellow countrymen in the South: none should be further misled or lured into false expectations and prejudices. There can be no security for any, Christian or Moslem, save in the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and authority; and there can be no such restoration of sovereignty or authority as long as Israeli destabilization, in the South and through the South, continues to disrupt Lebanon's unity, to destroy its national character and to prejudice its chances of international concern, love and assistance.

137. So I say to those who seek illusory protection and reassurances, moved by an understandable obsessional fear for their security: trust Lebanon, and Lebanon alone, for therein also lie all the guarantees—the real and truthful and practical guarantees—that our unity and determination carry in the world community. Indeed, what greater and more effective assurances can they find outside the magnificent consensus that Lebanon has always found in the Security Council, the General Assembly and everywhere else in the United Nations? Could they, could we be so blinded, so spell-bound, as to think that the soldiers of

peace standing bravely with us in Southern Lebanon could be a lesser protection than those who carry with them bloodshed and destruction and devastation?

138. On 19 September, when the Council last met to discuss Southern Lebanon, I gave my Government's solemn assurance that "we do not look upon UNIFIL as a permanent engagement" [2086th meeting, para. 33] and that "we have no intention of maintaining the United Nations Interim Force permanently on our borders or inside our land" [*ibid.*, para. 41]. My Government is gratified that the Secretary-General, in his report, should have found it possible to echo our commitment and express the hope that "in the relative calm which now prevails at Beirut, efforts to rebuild the Lebanese Army will be able to go forward" [S/12929, para. 14].

139. My delegation is empowered to inform the Council and the Secretary-General that, in a modest way, the Lebanese Army is now prepared to start assuming limited responsibilities, in conjunction with UNIFIL, and within the terms of reference approved in resolution 426 (1978). A joint plan must be carefully worked out between the commanders of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army, probably through a permanent working group at an appropriate military level. We welcome any proposals from General Erskine in this direction.

140. We sincerely hope that a new and fresh start can now be tried, in which we shall all avoid the tragic consequences of the army's movement towards Tibnin in August. Some may have not been altogether displeased by the fact that the army then successfully tested its unity and cohesion, quite apart from testing Israel's real intentions. But times have now changed, and so must our scale of priorities and norms of judgement.

141. It may be relevant to remember that the question of Lebanon was started by war in Southern Lebanon. Peace also, I am confident, will come from the South.

142. The General Assembly has been concerned this past week with a debate on the question of Palestine. Nowhere more than in Southern Lebanon does it appear how closely the two questions are interrelated. Greatly as we have been disturbed by the incidents between Palestinian armed elements and UNIFIL reported to the Council, we are pleased that the United Nations should have been able to find satisfactory solutions and prevent infiltration of armed personnel into the area under its control, thus maintaining the peaceful character dictated by resolution 426 (1978).

143. If we choose to stress this success of UNIFIL, it is to give further proof that United Nations peace-keeping can be successful, that there can be adequate protection of human lives and property in the peace zones and that confidence in the determination of the United Nations and the world community to maintain peace can be rewarding.

144. While hoping that the Palestinians—all the Palestinians, both in the area controlled by UNIFIL and beyond—will not be led to a change of attitude, we wish to reiterate in this chamber previous Lebanese appeals that Lebanon should not again be the substitute arena for a



substitute war. We think this message should be clear to all. We think further that the greater the response from the Palestinians to this role of partners in peace, the greater will be the chances of peace, all chances of peace: peace with Southern Lebanon, peace in Lebanon as an independent State restored to its unity and sovereignty, and, above all, peace in the Middle East.

145. Before concluding, allow me to express once more to the Council, to the Secretary-General and to the commanders and soldiers of UNIFIL, Lebanon's feeling of profound gratitude.

146. My final remarks will include another quotation from the report of the Secretary-General:

“... the restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon is in the long run the only durable and reliable means by which normality and security for all can return to that strife-torn area. It is therefore vital that all concerned should co-operate to this end. Continued military resistance to this effort can only be regarded as a deliberate defiance both of the legitimate authority of the Lebanese Government and of the decisions of the Security Council.” [*Ibid.* para. 20.]

147. Mr. President, the statement in which you embodied the consensus of the Council is primarily an endorsement of this appeal. It is also a challenge to us all, for it asks each and all of us to bear our share of responsibility. I earnestly hope that when the Council next meets on this subject, before 19 January 1979, this appeal will have been answered, and that the need will not then arise for a decision to carry peace keeping a step further, in other ways provided for in the Charter.

148. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Israel to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

149. Mr. BLUM (Israel): Mr. President, let me begin by paying my warmest respects to you as President of the Security Council for this month. We are confident that you will conduct the business of the Council with absolute fairness, propriety and wisdom, reflecting your outstanding diplomatic skills, so much appreciated by all of us at the United Nations.

150. The Government and people of Israel deeply appreciate the words of sympathy and condolence which the representative of the United States addressed to them on the passing of Mrs. Golda Meir, one of the great leaders of Israel and the Jewish people and one of the towering personalities of our time. I will refrain from commenting on the tasteless remark made in this connexion by the representative of Kuwait. Members can judge for themselves its propriety.

151. Israel views with grave concern the present situation in Lebanon. That concern, which goes well beyond the area of operation of the UNIFIL mandate, stems both from our own vital security considerations and from the real threat

which is posed to the very existence of a large segment of the Lebanese population.

152. In recognition of those facts, the Security Council, more than eight months ago, entrusted the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon with a broad three-part mandate, designed principally to restore “the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries”.

153. With regard to Israel, UNIFIL's mandate was specific and limited. It was no more and no less than to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces. That part of UNIFIL's mandate has been fulfilled, and so far it is the only part of the mandate which has been fulfilled. The complete withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from Southern Lebanon was confirmed by the Commander of UNIFIL on 13 June 1978, and recorded in the progress report of the Secretary-General of the same day [*S/12620/Add.5*]. As the Secretary-General's spokesman stated on that day, and I quote from the Office of Public Information press release UNIFIL/8:

“The fourth and last phase of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon took place today, 13 June 1978. The withdrawal process was verified by United Nations military observers. By 1700 hours GMT all Israeli positions were evacuated and the Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Major-General E. A. Erskine, confirmed to the Secretary-General that the Israeli forces had completely withdrawn from Southern Lebanon as called for by Security Council resolution 425 (1978).”

154. However, it remains a matter for regret and indeed grave concern that the other two parts of UNIFIL's mandate, as set out in resolution 425 (1978), have not been fulfilled, namely, “restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area”.

155. The problem of Southern Lebanon cannot be detached from the political tragedy of Lebanon over the last few years. To try to do so is short-sighted and in practical terms unproductive, because a solution to the problem will only be found when it is seen in its proper perspective.

156. The roots of that tragedy are well known. They were vividly described in the General Assembly, in October 1976, by the former representative of Lebanon, and I feel obliged to remind the Council of Ambassador Ghorra's words, because we cannot afford to forget them. He put the blame squarely where it belongs, with the so-called PLO. I shall quote from his statement of 14 October 1976:

“... the origins of the tragic... events [in Lebanon] ... are to be found in the ... Arab rivalries and the assaults perpetrated by Palestinians against ... Lebanon and ... its people.

“[There has been] constant Palestinian intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon and intolerable encroachment on its sovereignty.

"[In 1973] President Franjeh . . . denounced the illegal occupation of parts of Lebanese territory by Palestinian elements.

" . . .

" . . . [The Palestinians] increased the influx of arms into Lebanon . . . They transformed most—if not all—of the refugee camps into military bastions.

" . . . common-law criminals fleeing from Lebanese justice found shelter and protection in the camps . . . Those camps in fact became centres for the training of mercenaries who were sent and financed by some other Arab States . . . Palestinian elements belonging to various . . . organizations resorted to kidnapping Lebanese—and sometimes foreigners—holding them prisoners, questioning them, torturing them and sometimes even killing them . . . They committed all sorts of crimes in Lebanon . . . They smuggled goods . . . They went so far as to demand 'protection' money.

"It is difficult to enumerate all the illegal activities committed by those Palestinian elements.

" . . . Whatever grievances the Lebanese may have had amongst themselves or in their relationship with their Government, the Palestinians had neither the right nor the justification to become a party to any internal dispute.

" . . . [There are]"—this was said two years ago—"50,000 dead, 100,000 injured, 1 million Lebanese refugees in Syria, the Arab world, Europe and America; . . . all that could not be justified by any objective of the Palestinian revolution.

" . . . it became apparent that the Palestinians had designs on becoming a major factor in the battle for political power in Lebanon. They openly allied themselves, and continue to do so to this very hour, with one group of Lebanese against another."<sup>2</sup>

157. As Ambassador Ghorra indicated, from the early 1970s onwards, Lebanon lost much of its sovereignty over its own territory to the so-called PLO. But, in the bitter and brutal war in Lebanon between 1974 and 1976, the country also lost its independence to Syria. During the war, Syrian allegiances jockeyed and changed for reasons of political expediency to suit Syrian purposes. At one stage the Syrians represented themselves as protectors of the Christians against the PLO, and did not hesitate at that stage to bombard and demolish PLO strongholds such as Tel el-Zaatar. Later, roles reversed, and they turned mercilessly on the Christians, with horrifying results on which I need not elaborate.

158. Just as it is impossible to detach the situation in Southern Lebanon from the political circumstances of Lebanon as a whole, so it is impossible to detach artificially the situation in the south from the situation in the north of

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 32nd meeting, paras. 60-68.

the country. However, for reasons which are well understood by the members of the Council, but are far from comprehensible to world opinion, the Council has been unable to discuss the situation in the north in any depth whatsoever. Throughout the long and tragic civil war in Lebanon the Council did not conduct a single formal debate on the subject, even though, by any yardstick, foreign intervention and threats to international peace and security were involved. When, on 6 October of this year, the Council finally brought itself to adopt a resolution on the situation in Beirut and its surroundings [*resolution 436 (1978)*], it did so without any open debate on the subject, and nervously avoiding even indirect reference to the outside State involved in the massive bombardment and destruction of civilian quarters of Beirut.

159. However, the Christian villagers of the south do not suffer from any such inhibitions or illusions. They are all aware of what has gone on in the north. They are all too aware of the massacre of hundreds of their brethren and of the continued devastation of Beirut since the last renewal of UNIFIL's mandate in September. After all, what seems to be forgotten is that the Christians in the south are Lebanese, and that their perceptions and responses are conditioned in the context of Lebanon as a whole. They are in continual contact with the north. Day by day, they receive detailed reports about what is happening there. That is what influences and determines their actions. Failure to recognize this point constitutes a failure to grasp the objective and psychological realities of the situation in Southern Lebanon. For the present, the local Lebanese forces defending the Christian and Shiah areas in the south represent what they see, with good reason, as their only defence and, incidentally, operate in the only area in all of Lebanon where Lebanese authority has been maintained.

160. The Secretary-General has taken cognizance of this fact in his last reports. In his report of 18 November, he correctly states:

"Inevitably, the tragic developments at Beirut, which escalated towards the end of September, had their effect on the situation in Southern Lebanon which, as I noted in my last report, is closely linked to the situation in Lebanon as a whole. It is my hope that, in the relative calm which now prevails at Beirut, efforts to rebuild the Lebanese Army will be able to go forward. Progress in this field would certainly facilitate the fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL." [*S/12929, para. 14.*]

161. It is certainly the view of the Government of Israel that the problem of Southern Lebanon is directly linked to the situation in the country as a whole and that any discussion of Lebanon must aim at creating a permanent peace, and at restoring full Lebanese sovereignty, not only in the south, but throughout the whole country, including Beirut.

162. It is painfully clear to all observers that the problems of the Lebanese Government in reasserting its authority over its territory are not confined to certain marginal areas of Southern Lebanon.

163. The sad but undeniable fact is that the country of Lebanon is still under foreign occupation. Syrian forces,

ostensibly there to keep the peace, dominate everywhere and in every sphere of political life. The Council must recognize that effective control by the Lebanese Government will be frustrated as long as it functions in the gunights of foreign artillery and tanks. As to the so-called PLO, it still constitutes a virtual State within a State in Lebanon, and the continued presence of its armed terrorists constitutes a serious threat both to the authority of the Lebanese Government and to the prospects for peace throughout the region.

164. Perhaps the most salient fact in connexion with the present debate is that PLO armed elements have been able to infiltrate back and been allowed to exercise control over certain areas in Southern Lebanon, which continue to be barred to the Lebanese Army. It is a fact that in trying to reach Southern Lebanon, units of the Lebanese Army did not dare to advance through the coastal sector of Tyre or through PLO-dominated areas in the central sector of UNIFIL's area of operation.

165. In the light of their own experience, the villagers in the south know that their own Government does not possess at present the means to guarantee their security. Their apprehensions have been exacerbated by the fact that hundreds of members of the PLO remain in UNIFIL's area of operation. It is their well-founded fear that foreign forces and more armed elements of the PLO will enter the south in the wake of UNIFIL that has prompted the villagers there to depend on themselves and to adopt the positions they have taken. According to Radio Cairo last Wednesday, 6 December, local residents have reported that a clash took place in the western sector of Southern Lebanon between UNIFIL and Palestinian terrorists. The clash occurred when the UNIFIL unit tried to prevent the terrorists from moving into villages controlled by UNIFIL and setting up positions there.

166. Whosoever wishes to suggest that the villagers' fears are out of place is taking on a grave responsibility. There is nothing in the recent record of the area which should lead them to expect otherwise.

167. Certainly, no one can seriously advise the villagers in the south not to regard the threats to their existence seriously so long as the Lebanese Government is unable, for the reasons I have described, to reassert its sovereignty in the south.

168. While Israel has made it clear that it cannot be indifferent to the fate of the villagers in the south, it cannot assume responsibility for their actions. They act in accordance with what they judge to be a matter of their own survival, and very often in accordance with instructions that they receive from Beirut.

169. In the course of this debate the allegation has been made that the *de facto* forces in the south are building an airstrip and port facilities with the help of Israel. I should like to make it clear that these allegations are absolutely without foundation. Israel can only express its surprise that some representatives here are prepared to base themselves on and give currency to malicious rumours about activities that are complete fabrications. I wish to bring to the

attention of members of the Council the following report carried by the Associated Press yesterday, 7 December:

"Major-General Emmanuel Erskine, Commander of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Southern Lebanon, was quoted Thursday as denying that an airfield was being built by Israeli-backed right-wing Christian militia in the south.

"I am puzzled by the fuss raised over this airport business', Erskine was quoted as telling the correspondent of the independent Beirut newspaper, *An Nahar*.

"The Ghanaian General also said the airfield in question was 'a grass and tree covered strip left by British and French forces since World War II'.

"Erskine said he flew several times by helicopter over the area of Khiam, two miles north of the Israeli border, and 'I saw no activity to repair the strip or make it operational. There is no equipment in the area either'."

170. Israel will continue to co-operate with UNIFIL, as it has done since the establishment of the Force. It is just a pity that once again no room was found in the Secretary-General's report to acknowledge the considerable assistance and tangible aid provided by Israel to UNIFIL, facilitating its entry into its area of operation, installing facilities and assisting with communications, supplies and logistics. Space was found in the report to lavish praise in other directions, but the fact is that UNIFIL could not function without the co-operation it enjoys from Israel.

171. Israel appreciates the job that the commanders and men of UNIFIL have been doing since spring of this year in very difficult circumstances. Israel also believes that UNIFIL is adequately equipped to fulfil its mandate. Israel trusts that it will live up to all its responsibilities. At the same time, Israel recognizes that, given the dimensions of these problems, the task of UNIFIL, with its geographically limited mandate and its politically defined scope, remains awesome.

172. Moreover, let us have no illusions about the fact that over the last two months a further dimension has been added to the problems of the Force. The peace process in the Middle East has been making demonstrable progress and, in witness thereof, Syria and the PLO have taken the lead, both in the Middle East and in the current session of the General Assembly, in the attempts to sabotage the ongoing peace negotiations. Since the PLO and Syria are present and active throughout Lebanon, they will have few inhibitions about exploiting the situation there, both in the north and in the south, to their own nefarious ends. If UNIFIL continues in the next few months to be as unsuccessful as it has been in its attempts to fulfil the second and third parts of its mandate, the Council is surely duty bound to lay responsibility squarely where it belongs, namely, at the foot of those elements so implacably committed to the frustration of peace in the Middle East.

173. To detach the question of Southern Lebanon from the situation in Lebanon as a whole will not enhance the cause of peace, and to refuse to discuss in complete

candour the massacres which have been perpetrated in the north will do the Council no credit. Certainly the disingenuousness of resolution 436 (1978), concerning the deteriorating situation at Beirut and its surroundings, is preposterous in comparison with the heavy-handed, unbalanced and one-sided nature of the Presidential statement which was read out at the beginning of this meeting.

174. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in which he asks to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with usual practice, and with the consent of the Council, I propose to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. El-Choufi (Syrian Arab Republic) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

175. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

176. Mr. EL-CHOUI (Syrian Arab Republic): Mr. President, I thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to speak before this important body which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and order, with the defence of the victims of aggression and with the task of acting in the best interests of humanity, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations.

177. Notwithstanding the allegations, distortions and fabrications that we have heard from the representative of Israel, I should like to state the position of my Government regarding the situation in Lebanon in general and the obstacles facing the full deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in particular.

178. It is an established fact that Syria and Lebanon have always been sister countries. Since the independence of both, they have agreed not to exchange ambassadors since they regarded their relations as very special and their bilateral relations as so important that they consequently decided that those relations would always be handled directly by their respective Governments. For the last 30 years, Syria and Lebanon have maintained that tradition. We believe that the close friendly relations between Syria and Lebanon should always be handled exclusively in that way. We oppose any disruption of this state of affairs and especially if we are to be lectured by the representative of Israel about non-intervention and the like. The sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon are as important to Syria as its own sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity.

179. We think, furthermore, that Lebanon is threatened by Israeli expansionist schemes, exactly as we are threatened. As a matter of fact, we believe that the whole Arab world, and consequently international peace, are threatened by this Zionist expansionism.

180. Syria is committed to one Lebanon, to the Lebanon which we have always been proud of, to the Lebanon that has always played and can indeed continue to play a significant role in the Arab world, the role of the cradle of Arab civilization and its openness to the world at large.

181. As the Council will realize, the burden we are shouldering in Lebanon is enormous. We responded to an appeal by the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese people. We are more than ready to leave Lebanon; in fact, we are doing all we can to enable the Lebanese authorities once more to exercise their authority over their whole territory.

182. We appreciate indeed any help extended to Lebanon to this effect in order to help it regain complete control over its territory, especially in Southern Lebanon, where Israeli arrogance is infringing not only on Lebanese authority but also on the authority of the Security Council, as was said today by many members of the Council.

183. My Government does realize that the future of Lebanon depends on the imminent reconciliation among the different parties in Lebanon. We fully support the efforts of President Sarkis and his Government to achieve such a vital reconciliation. We solemnly appeal to all factions in Lebanon to engage in a true reconciliation amongst themselves so that peace and tranquillity can prevail anew. We solemnly state before this highly respected Council that we shall help in good faith all of the Lebanese factions—and I repeat: all of the Lebanese factions—to achieve their reconciliation, which, in our view, is a prerequisite for building a new Lebanon, an aim that we cherish and look forward to.

184. We appreciate the fact that the world has indeed shown keen interest in maintaining the hope of Lebanese reconciliation and trying to promote that. But we cannot fail to observe that Israel is actively involved in trying to prevent Lebanon from achieving this goal. Reconciliation of Lebanon and in Lebanon cannot be accomplished unless the Lebanese Government can exercise its authority over all Lebanese territory, and I think that the Security Council is holding this meeting in order to help the Lebanese Government to do so, in the face of Israeli defiance of the directives of the Council, let alone Israel's stated intentions to dictate its will to the Lebanese Government.

185. As many speakers have said today, Israel has indeed been guilty of impeding the efforts of UNIFIL, and I think that it will persist in doing so unless the Council can act promptly and effectively to face its expansionist schemes.

186. The Syrian Government, while appreciating the statement that was just made by the President and the report of the Secretary-General, cannot but state that the Security Council should have acted in a more positive, effective and thorough manner. The Council in our view, should have taken a decision and not been satisfied with the statement of its President—notwithstanding our deep respect for you personally, Mr. President. The Council should have ordered Israel to desist from creating more trouble in our already troubled area.

187. Having heard the statement of the representative of the United States, I cannot but draw the attention of the Council to the fact that, through such encouragement to the aggressor, Israel can persist in its present policies of aggression, expansion and arrogance.

188. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): When we asked for a meeting of the Council on the implementation of its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), we opted for a statement by the President. My delegation was the prime mover behind that, and our concern was to avoid any polemics or acrimonious confrontation. As I said in my earlier statement, that sort of verbiage and linguistic confrontation will not help the plight or the cause of the Lebanese people, for whom we are gathered here to seek a better future.

189. I heard the emotional statement by the representative of Lebanon—emotional in the sense that it stemmed from a genuine feeling of the fiasco in the southern part of his ravaged country. Indeed, he said that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon was, to use his word, a “fiction”—in other words, phoney, non-existent, a sham. On the contrary, there are Israeli forces in Lebanon which come during the day and disappear during the evening. I will come to that later.

190. The representative of Israel referred to the port and the airport, as I did in my statement. But I qualified it by saying “according to *The New York Times* of 3 December”. I did not invent that. *The New York Times* is not an Arab paper; it is not a socialist paper, and it is not noted for its special liking for the Arabs. So I qualified that and introduced the source of my quotation. This is for the sake of honesty and intellectual probity.

191. Having listened to the long statement of the representative of Israel—since tastelessness has become the watch-word today—I would qualify it merely as tastelessly confusing and mischievously evasive. We came here to discuss what? The implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and to examine the reasons behind the obstacles to full deployment of UNIFIL. All members of the Council subscribe to the statement you so strongly and powerfully read out, Mr. President, in which they call upon all those involved—particularly Israel—to assist, and not to oppose, the full deployment of UNIFIL. It is very significant that the delegation of the United States subscribed to this, having full knowledge and information about the situation along the Israel-Lebanon border.

192. The two major points in Southern Lebanon are the presence of Israeli military personnel and the continuous, uninterrupted logistic support and other assistance given to the rebels.

193. As to the presence of Israeli personnel in Southern Lebanon, the report of the Secretary-General states that:

“UNIFIL officers identified three personnel of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in plain clothes on the scene. . . . The Israeli authorities disclaimed all responsibility for this demonstration [that is, the tragic episode of 16 October]. The four Lebanese liaison personnel were

eventually released with IDF assistance.” [S/12929, para. 9.]

That shows the power which the Israeli Government and the Israel Army have on these rebels.

194. The Secretary-General also states:

“The relationship between the Israel Defence Forces and the Lebanese *de facto* forces is a major factor in the present situation. UNIFIL has from time to time requested the Israeli authorities to use their good offices and influence in efforts to control or moderate the actions of Major Haddad and his militia. The Israeli authorities have indicated that they do not control the Lebanese *de facto* forces. However, it has not been denied that they provide them with logistic and other forms of support. During the period under review, IDF personnel were been observed on several occasions in Southern Lebanon.” [Ibid., para. 17.]

195. Now, what are we to believe: the Israeli statement, or the documents submitted by the Secretary-General on the basis of on-the-spot information? The Israeli representative states that the Israeli forces have withdrawn. Yet, here in this document, the opposite has been confirmed: they come and go and are having a “fling”—a Roman holiday—in Southern Lebanon.

196. It is not my intention to engage any further in unnecessary linguistic confrontation. We came here not to discuss the Syrian or PLO presence in Lebanon but to discuss the impediments and obstacles raised by Israeli forces against UNIFIL deployment in Southern Lebanon. That has not been touched upon by the Israeli representative. He spoke of the Syrian involvement and the PLO presence in Southern Lebanon. He used the same hackneyed, worn-out arguments that we have heard in plenary and in every committee at every session of the General Assembly. He said nothing new.

197. There are really two important questions which are relevant to the present debate. One of them is: will Israel genuinely, constructively, allow unimpeded deployment by UNIFIL in order that the Force may carry out its mandate and fulfil resolution 425 (1978)? The second is: will Israel stop its logistic and other supplies to those rebels? We are waiting for the answers to those two questions.

198. That is the crux of the matter—not the Syrian presence or PLO misbehaviour, as the representative of Israel has said. Let us hear the answers from the Israeli representative as to whether Israel accepts the unimpeded deployment of UNIFIL along the internationally recognized boundaries, as mentioned in the statement read out by the President; and, also, will it put an end to its uninterrupted supply of logistic and other military assistance to those rebels? Those rebels are not an independent group; they are dependent, as I said in my earlier statement, on their notorious Metulla connexion. The city of Metulla is the lifeline for those rebels. Once Israel stops supplying them they will fall like autumn leaves.

199. I should like to hear the answers to those questions.

200. The PRESIDENT: There are no other names on the speakers' list. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

201. My delegation notes with considerable concern that the Government of Lebanon is still facing serious obstacles in its efforts to restore its authority in the southern part of the country. In his report, the Secretary-General outlined a number of difficulties confronting UNIFIL in its efforts to carry out its difficult and responsible mandate. Unimpeded freedom of movement is absolutely necessary for the Force. The Federal Republic of Germany therefore calls upon all parties involved, including Israel, to comply with resolutions 425 (1978) and 434 (1978) and to co-operate with the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL so that the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders can be preserved.

202. My Government has repeatedly stressed its commitment to those principles. On 30 November 1978 the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, in addressing the Federal Parliament, reaffirmed the statements which the Foreign Ministers of the nine countries of the European Community made on 6 July and 23 October that each and every group in Lebanon should lend its support to President Sarkis and the legitimate Government of the country in an effort to create a situation in which all citizens can live peacefully side by side.

203. Only if all communities in Lebanon seriously adopt a course of reconciliation will it be possible for the people of that country to pursue, under the roof of the Republic of Lebanon, their political, economic, social, cultural and religious aspirations.

204. We have noted with satisfaction that the cease-fire at Beirut which was agreed upon on 7 October—not least as a result of the efforts of the Security Council—has been maintained during recent weeks. We are convinced that stability and peace in Lebanon are an important factor for progress towards an over-all solution of the Middle East conflict.

205. My statement would be incomplete without a tribute of appreciation and gratitude to the Secretary-General and his staff for their untiring efforts. The troops of UNIFIL, which, despite serious obstacles, fulfil their task in an exemplary manner, deserve our admiration.

206. I now resume my function as PRESIDENT of the Council.

207. The representative of Israel has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and I call on him.

208. Mr. BLUM (Israel): There can be no one in this chamber who has not been appalled and outraged by Syrian excesses in Lebanon, both before and since the last renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL. Beirut has not yet recovered from the murderous bombardment rained upon it by Syrian artillery just two months ago. Hundreds of Lebanese

civilians still mourn their loved ones killed when Syrian gunners poured 5,000 shells a day into heavily populated areas.

209. Our memories are sometimes short in this Organization, but no one here has forgotten the desperate appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross on 5 October 1978 for

“an end to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people in Lebanon. The civilian population, hospitals, dispensaries, public shelters and homes—none have been spared.

“On behalf of humanity, on behalf of . . . human rights, on behalf of the children, women and old people who are dying by the hundreds, we beg you [the President of Lebanon, world Powers, the United Nations and others] to act.” [S/12879, annex.]

Indeed, the Red Cross, usually most reticent about issuing protests, nevertheless issued an official statement, which

“vigorously protested against the use in a densely populated town of weapons causing considerable loss of life among the civilian population”.

210. The sense of outrage at Syrian atrocities was shared even by Syria's erstwhile allies. On 4 October, Radio Cairo reported the Acting Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations vehemently attacking the President of Syria for misusing the Syrian troops in Lebanon to crush his brother Arabs, while they were ostensibly there to keep peace.

211. On 10 October, the Voice of Lebanon Radio reported:

“The Syrians used poison gas rounds in shelling various areas. The symptoms of these cases are high temperature, vomiting, diarrhoea and convulsions.”

212. Beirut will not quickly forget that barbarity, for its eastern sector remains a moonscape, its once tall buildings still gutted and blackened, its shell-cratered streets still cluttered with the rubble of toppled houses and burnt-out cars.

213. *The Economist* of London reported at the time, on 7 October 1978, that the Syrian strategy was deliberate, a methodical attempt “to pulverize the buildings in such a way that they cannot be easily repopulated”. The paper went on:

“Hence the significant fact that the Syrians have been using a high proportion of phosphorus shells to cause fires.

“ . . .

“ . . . This coldly cruel type of warfare involves the application of military power against civilians to achieve non-military objectives. It is intended to cause as much

disruption and suffering as possible by shattering the structure of organized social life.

“... ”

“... most of the people killed have been civilians.”

214. Is this a peace-keeping force? My delegation submits that Syria's record of brutality in Lebanon disqualifies that country from making any comment on today's proceedings. Indeed, the agony suffered by the Lebanese population is only compounded by the cynicism of the motives of their assailants.

215. When Syria, under the guise of regional peace-keeping, massacres civilians in order to expand its control over Lebanon, its true character and intentions are revealed. Syria has never established diplomatic relations with Lebanon, since that would prejudice its long-standing claim to hegemony over that country. When I first referred to this bizarre fact in the General Assembly on 13 October, the Syrian representative replied somewhat lamely that “the fraternal relations between our two countries were special relations that made an exchange of diplomatic missions unnecessary”.<sup>3</sup> A statement to this effect was also made by the Syrian representative here tonight. If that is how Syria interprets fraternal relations, I should hate to be its brother.

216. Until the present Syrian leadership is disabused of its outdated expansionist designs which, according to official Syrian statements, also include Jordan and Israel, that régime will continue to stir up trouble throughout Lebanon. Moreover, so long as that régime is implacably opposed to the current peace process in the Middle East, it will continue to exploit the situation in Lebanon in order to try to torpedo any movement towards peace in the Middle East.

217. Israel continues to respect the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and wishes nothing other than to see the legitimate Government of Lebanon assume full and effective authority throughout its territory. That cannot happen while the Syrian occupation army remains on Lebanese soil.

218. One of the representatives who has had some of the hardest things to say about Israel in the deliberations of the Council this afternoon represents a country which has equipped those responsible for the tragedy of Lebanon and for the consistent attempts to frustrate the cause of peace in the Middle East. Who, one may ask, supplied the guns, tanks and artillery pieces which have devastated large parts of Beirut? Who, one may ask, has supplied the PLO terrorists operating throughout Lebanon with their Katyushas, Kalashnikovs and other playthings? The answer is painfully clear, it is the Soviet Union.

219. The larger Soviet design, as I have had occasion to point out during the current session of the General Assembly, is even more ominous. It is, as Soviet representatives have made clear both in the General Assembly

and in the Security Council, to torpedo what they choose to call “separate deals”. Members of the Council will understand that what Soviet representatives really mean is that they are fundamentally opposed to the Camp David peace process, even though they know full well that the peace treaty with Egypt is only the first step in the search for a peace settlement in the entire Middle East.

220. The situation in Lebanon may possibly be seen by the Soviet Union as an opening through which it can disrupt the peace process by proxy, through its agents operating there. Members of the Council should entertain no illusions on this point and should not be taken in by the misplaced bluster of the Soviet representatives here.

221. In his attempt to subvert the peace process in the Middle East and the spirit of Camp David, the Soviet representative has once again seen fit to rail against the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks which constitute, as I have said before, the first step towards a peace settlement in the entire Middle East. May I ask, does the Soviet Union's constant obsession with what it terms “a separate peace” stem perhaps from the fact that the Soviet Union began its diplomatic history with a separate peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918? Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

222. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

223. Mr. EL-CHOUFI (Syrian Arab Republic): In the first place, I did not intend to make any statement at this meeting until I had heard the statement of the representative of Israel. I noticed, as indeed everybody noticed, that he tried to evade the main issue that the Council is considering, the issue of the Israeli “occupation by proxy” of Southern Lebanon, as the representative of Lebanon described it. In fact one wonders how it is that the representative of Israel is always so well armed with quotations to prove any distortion he chooses to offer. I appreciate the patience shown by you, Mr. President, and by the Security Council in listening to such a long and eloquent statement by the representative of Israel without its replying to the main question, the question of Israeli guilt in disrupting the task of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, preventing its deployment in Southern Lebanon and preventing the Government of Lebanon from exercising its authority over its own territory. The questions put by the representative of Kuwait have not been answered by the representative of Israel.

224. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Kuwait, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

225. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): I am not really speaking in exercise of the right of reply as such, but I have listened to the representative of Israel, and again I say, in all honesty, that his was a distasteful statement—distasteful in the sense that it was out of order.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 34th meeting, para. 190.

226. We have been talking here about the mandate of UNIFIL and the obstacles facing the implementation of the mandate—and obstacles exist because of the Christian militia, supported by Israel. I directed two questions to the representative of Israel. He evaded them, in his characteristic manner. Apparently he was, as the English say, barking up the wrong tree. Instead of confining his remarks to UNIFIL, to the substance of this debate, he continued to talk about the Soviet Union and about the role of the Arab deterrent force in Lebanon. What really captured my attention were the tears he shed so profusely over the sovereignty of Lebanon. Lebanon is wounded. Lebanon is a mass of wounds, no doubt, but its sovereignty has been mutilated and amputated by none other than the Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon, by the Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon, by Israeli collaboration with the rebels in Southern Lebanon. Yet the representative of Israel

comes here and sheds tears over the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. That is all I wanted to say.

227. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Lebanon.

228. Mr. TUÉNI (Lebanon): I have really nothing to add to my statement, and I refuse to be drawn into distracting the Council from the precise issue that is at stake here.

229. Mr. President, the magnificent consensus that you expressed so well, with the co-operation and the unanimity of the members present here, in support of the report of the Secretary-General should remain the main focus for our attention and concern. I want to urge once more, let us not create in Lebanon a substitute arena for a substitute war.

*The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.*