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President: Mr. Freitas do Amaral (Portugal)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Peerthum (Mauritius), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

Agenda item 14 (continued)

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency (A/50/360)

Draft resolution (A/50/L.11)

Amendment (A/50/L.12)

Mr. Kharrazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran notes with satisfaction the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the General Assembly for the year 1994, which summarizes the significant achievements of the Agency during that year. We thank Mr. Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, for his thorough and informative statement, which also featured the main developments in the Agency's activities during 1995. Director-General Blix and the IAEA secretariat are to be commended for the commitment and dedication with which they carry out their responsibilities.

As international society draws closer, through a web of regional and international treaties, the roles of international organizations such as the IAEA that implement

those treaties become more relevant. Thus, efforts aimed at strengthening the IAEA's authority and functions in accordance with its statute should be supported and further encouraged. In this context we welcome the relevant decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concerning the activities of the IAEA, which are reflected, *inter alia*, in draft resolution A/50/L.11, "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". In this respect the 1995 NPT Review Conference recognized that the IAEA is the competent authority for verifying and assuring that the Treaty obligations of States Parties to the NPT are being fulfilled and that nothing should be done to undermine the Agency's authority in that regard. We also welcome, in principle, the proposals that have been put forward in the Conference on Disarmament to entrust the IAEA with the task of verifying the future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We have given serious consideration to the Agency's report for the year 1994. It is very unfortunate that the Agency continues to operate under financial constraints, which in turn have had adverse effects on some of its important programmes. We urge member States to take their financial obligations more seriously and to make their payments in a timely manner. At the same time, in view of the present budgetary constraints, we believe that the key objective should be cost-effectiveness.

Another issue in the Agency's activities during this period has been the development of a strengthened safeguards regime. We welcome the measures and

decisions taken by the Agency to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the safeguards system. Iran, as an original signatory of the NPT, has always adhered to the Agency's safeguards system and will continue to support its effectiveness. Our Government has pursued an open and transparent policy in this respect and, based on that policy, took the initiative to invite the Agency on two occasions to visit the nuclear facilities in Iran and verify their peaceful utilization. Subsequently, the IAEA missions visited Iran in February 1992 and November 1993, and verifications were established to the satisfaction of the Agency. These two visits were in addition to routine inspections that are conducted regularly by the IAEA.

We commend the Agency's efforts to enhance nuclear safety and radiation protection, particularly in the countries of the former USSR. We firmly believe that the scope of such measures should be expanded to all regions that operate nuclear installations, for the risks to life, health, environment and security emanating from such installations are not confined to national boundaries. In this regard, a matter of great concern to Middle East countries is the continued operation of the un-safeguarded, antiquated and entirely non-peaceful Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel. We call upon the international community, and the IAEA in particular, to address this problem urgently and effectively.

It should be recalled that only South Africa's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system made the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone a reality. A parallel exists in the case of the Middle East. So long as Israel, with the full support of certain Powers, refuses to join the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system, a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone will remain a distant goal. In this respect, the decision of the General Conference of the IAEA at its thirty-eighth session to restore technical assistance to Israel is nothing but a reward to a nuclear proliferator and tacit approval of that regime's access to nuclear weapons. Iran, the country that in 1974 initiated the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, continues to support this initiative and is prepared to consider any constructive idea for its realization under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to international cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and has pursued with great interest the promotional role of the Agency in this field. My delegation appreciates the useful technical cooperation the Agency extends to member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy in the fields of agriculture, industry and medicine and other related areas such as water desalination. In this regard, one cannot but stress the importance of sustained funding, particularly through voluntary contributions for the Agency's technical assistance programmes.

However, exceptional cases of the violation of the IAEA safeguards in the recent past have provided an excuse for certain nuclear-weapon States and some other industrialized countries to undermine the statutory tasks and obligations of the Agency and infringe more than before the inalienable rights of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as stipulated in that Treaty, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose modest, peaceful nuclear activities have always been approved by the Agency.

In conclusion, allow me once again to express our appreciation and support to the IAEA for its efforts in the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

Mr. Tsepkala (Belarus): The delegation of the Republic of Belarus has carefully studied the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the period under review and notes with satisfaction that it was prepared with a high degree of professionalism. We are grateful to the Director General of the Agency for his presentation of the report to the General Assembly.

As is mentioned in the report, the Agency's contribution to international security through its verification activities and to the transfer of nuclear technology — in other words, to the fulfilment of the Agency's functions related to nuclear non-proliferation — continued to be major focal points of its work in 1994. The Republic of Belarus, as a country which strictly adheres to the principles of non-proliferation and makes a considerable contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, attaches particular importance to this activity of the Agency.

Having attained its independence, Belarus took the decision to become a non-nuclear State. That decision was reflected in the Constitution of the Republic. Ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and simultaneous accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as a non-nuclear State, constituted further steps in this direction.

As representatives of the Republic of Belarus have already mentioned in their statements at this session, Belarus signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 14 April 1995 and it entered into force on 31 July 1995.

The report points out that:

“The credibility of commitments made by States not to acquire nuclear weapons has become increasingly important, particularly as States which do possess nuclear weapons move to reduce their arsenals”. (*IAEA Annual Report for 1994, GC(39)/3, p. 1*)

In this connection, I would like to emphasize that all the actions of our State are fully in conformity with its commitments. In late April 1992 — in other words, ahead of time — Belarus withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from its territory and worked out a schedule of withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons, a schedule which it is consistently carrying out. We also intend to strictly follow our obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

It should be noted that it is not at all easy for a newly independent State undergoing a severe economic crisis to keep to these commitments. In these circumstances, we greatly appreciate the assistance rendered by international organizations, and by some countries. The Belarusian delegation stresses the positive role of the IAEA as coordinator in the strengthening of the infrastructure of radiation and nuclear safety in newly independent States. Preparations by the Agency for the implementation of safeguards, for the identification of safeguards requirements, and for the exposition of the need for support by donor States, coordinated by the Agency, were extremely useful for Belarus. Without any doubt, training in nuclear material accountancy and training provided to facilities personnel and organized by the Agency are also important.

We believe that the IAEA should continue to play a special role in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held in May 1995, all but confirm this conclusion.

Illicit trafficking in nuclear material may constitute a serious threat to the security of States. Belarus is striving to strictly fulfil its obligations under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. At present, a

project envisaging the creation of a reliable system of physical protection of nuclear material is being worked out in Belarus. We would be very grateful for assistance in the implementation of this project.

In 1996, we shall mark the tenth anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which was the biggest radiation catastrophe in the history of mankind. In this Hall, we have spoken more than once about this dreadful catastrophe, which turned out to be a calamity for the Belarusian people, and about the immeasurable damage to the economy of the country.

Our delegation is grateful to the IAEA for its continued support of the United Nations International Cooperation on Chernobyl. As is stated in the report,

“a major effort was undertaken to collect precise information on the increased incidence of thyroid cancers among children in Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.” (*GC(39)/3, p. 147*)

Unfortunately, the report does not contain any information on the results of this effort. Apparently, such information had not been processed when the report was issued.

A number of international conferences aimed at consideration of problems caused by the catastrophe will be held next year. One such conference will take place in March 1996 in Minsk, the capital of Belarus. It will be the first joint conference of the European Union, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine on the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. We are interested in the broad participation of the representatives of United Nations Member States, the IAEA and other international organizations in this conference and will be ready to welcome all those who would like to take part in it. Belarus will participate actively in the international conferences on Chernobyl issues to be held in Geneva and Vienna.

The organization of technical cooperation is one of the main focuses of the IAEA activities. We support the recommendations of the Third Technical Cooperation Policy Review Seminar, in particular on the elaboration of country programmes for the recipients of technical assistance. Last June Belarus was visited by an IAEA technical-cooperation mission that, together with the representatives of national institutions, worked out proposals on a country programme for Belarus. We hope that the Agency will adopt and implement this programme.

We note with satisfaction that technical assistance to Belarus from the IAEA substantially increased in years past. However, we consider that the Agency, which is called on to promote development and peaceful uses of atomic energy, should provide more considerable assistance to a State that does not have any nuclear-energy facilities in its territory and whose people were the victims of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear power plant belonging to another State. We give priority to the cooperation projects aimed at minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and strengthening national infrastructure for radiation and nuclear safety.

In conclusion, the Belarusian delegation would like to emphasize that our evaluation of the Agency's work in 1994 is positive. We agree with the priorities the Agency has set for the future and hope for close cooperation with the Agency in resolving all problems related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Mr. Maneka (Pakistan): At the outset, I would like to express, on behalf of the Pakistan delegation, our profound appreciation to Dr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his statement on the Agency's performance during 1994. The widening scope of the programmes and activities of the IAEA bear witness to the dedication of Dr. Blix and his colleagues at the Agency.

Pakistan has always reposed great confidence in the IAEA as an instrument both to promote nuclear cooperation and to regulate the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

We welcome the Agency's annual report for 1994. This comprehensive document deals with a number of complex and technical issues in a manner that will facilitate meaningful discussions on the Agency's major areas of activity.

One central activity, or objective, of the IAEA is the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Despite the negative public perceptions created in some countries and the fears aroused about the danger of nuclear proliferation, nuclear energy remains a viable and attractive energy option for many countries, particularly fossil-fuel-deficient developing countries. The conventional means of generating electricity — thermal, oil, gas and coal-fired plants — not only impose a heavy financial burden on such countries but also constitute serious threats to the environment. Nuclear power, on the other hand, offers a

resource-conserving, environmentally benign and financially feasible source of energy.

In view of its multiple benefits, Pakistan deeply appreciates the Director General's continued interest in and support for nuclear power and welcomes his reference to a strengthened programme on the comparative assessment of energy sources for electricity generation. In this regard, the assistance the Agency has rendered to several countries in providing advanced methodologies, such as Model for Analysis of Energy Demand (MAED) and Wien Automatic System Planning Package (WASP), for an integrated approach towards energy and nuclear-power planning is commendable. These methodologies should continue to be made available and should not be constrained by extraneous considerations.

Another area of vital concern to the majority of the members of the Agency is technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is indeed a source of great satisfaction that in 1994 the ratio of target achievement in the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme was the highest ever in the history of the IAEA. Of the 12 model projects approved for 1994, 11 have been launched successfully. We wish to express our sincere appreciation to the Department of Technical Cooperation for its dedicated work and innovative approaches, which brought about this unprecedented success. It is hoped that the establishment of the standing advisory group on technical assistance and cooperation will help in further strengthening the planning and implementation of cooperation programmes. While there was widespread support for the model-project approach and new directions in the Technical Cooperation Programme, contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund (TACF) dropped to 72.5 per cent, as compared with 76.5 per cent in 1993. The target for voluntary contributions to the TACF in 1994 was set at \$58.5 million, of which \$42.4 million was pledged by Member States.

Although contributions to the TACF are voluntary, they support an activity that is the primary statutory responsibility of the Agency. Pakistan has always paid its contribution in full and on time. We are also providing free training to the developing countries, through the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We urge all member States to pay their contributions to the TACF in full and on time in order to facilitate the implementation of the Agency's Programme.

Pakistan has consistently adhered to and will continue to lend its fullest support to the Agency's safeguards. This is in conformity with our commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While we fully agree that the possibility of non-compliance should be minimized or completely eliminated, it is our view that any changes in the present system should remain within the existing legal instruments. Also, the proposed measures to strengthen the safeguards should be technologically feasible, cost-effective and non-intrusive. In this context, we appreciate the work done by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) and the secretariat on Programme "93+2", but we believe that this important issue should be thoroughly examined and extensively discussed with member States to achieve consensus on its legal, technical and economic aspects.

Pakistan has always supported activities related to the enhancement of nuclear safety. We have actively participated in various technical committee meetings held for the preparation and finalization of the new International Basic Safety Standards. Pakistan was also active in the drafting and adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and signed the Convention as an original signatory. The success of the Nuclear Safety Convention will depend in large measure on the implementation of provisions relating to cooperation between the industrially advanced countries and the developing countries. It is through continued and unimpeded supply of safety-related information and equipment that the safety of nuclear facilities can be assured and enhanced. Such measures for nuclear safety would be reinforced by an international agreement prohibiting attacks against all nuclear facilities. Pakistan has endeavoured to promote such an agreement. The Agency can play an important role in its realization.

We are greatly encouraged by the passage of the IAEA General Conference resolutions relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pakistan has also made a sincere endeavour to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. In this regard, a number of proposals have been made and we continue to hope that these proposals will evoke a positive response.

The regulatory responsibility of the Agency should not lead to the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, restrictions have been imposed even when it is evident that no proliferation dangers are involved. At times even safety-related information has been refused. This approach is not conducive to the evolution of safer techniques and methods or to the promotion of greater

openness and transparency in the field of nuclear technology. Since these are key objectives of the Agency we hope that it will redouble its efforts for their achievement. The IAEA should strive to remove all impediments to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Finally, I would like to address an important organizational matter. A review of Article VI of the statute relating to the expansion of the Board has been under consideration for a long time. We believe that an increased representation of the member States in the Board will improve transparency and effectiveness. We hope that the open-ended consultative group will be able to submit concrete proposals on this issue.

Mr. Butler (Australia): I should like to begin this statement by thanking the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his comprehensive statement given to the Assembly. That statement underlined with great clarity the vital role of the IAEA in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We would also like to thank Mr. Blix for his continuing outstanding stewardship of the Organization.

Australia's record of support for the IAEA is long and, we would like to think, second to none. That is why we have always attached importance to the Assembly's consideration of the Agency's annual report to the United Nations and to the General Assembly's resolution with respect to that report. We place great value on the IAEA's international safeguards and technical cooperation activities. These activities in both fields underpin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The importance accorded to them by the international community was reaffirmed in the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely at the historic 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the NPT in April/May of this year and in the accompanying documents on that occasion entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty".

The draft resolution before us today highlights the important work being carried out by the Agency in a number of fields — safeguards, technical assistance, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, to name just a few of them. In all the fields of its work, the IAEA makes a manifest contribution to international security and non-proliferation,

and to social and economic development. The Agency's activities in these fields deserve our continuing and strong support. The draft resolution also highlights the important measures and decisions the Agency has taken to strengthen the safeguards system. This was an important element of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Australia has been actively involved in, and strongly supports, the Agency's Programme "93+2" and we hope that the second phase of that programme, including those parts relating to short-notice inspections and environmental monitoring, will soon be taken forward further.

We very much regret that it has been necessary again this year for the draft resolution to record the continuing non-compliance of two States with their safeguards agreements under the NPT. We urge those States — Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — to cooperate fully with the Agency in returning to full compliance. These cases of non-compliance underline again the importance of strengthening the safeguards system, particularly in relation to the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

Technical cooperation is also a central element of the Agency's activities. It is an important means of enabling developing countries to have access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards, in keeping with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as set out in the Agency's statute. This too was recognized in the decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Australia has long been a supporter of the Agency's technical cooperation activities, and we welcome the measures being introduced to improve and strengthen their effectiveness.

On this occasion there is special significance in our receiving the Agency's annual report. Last week, in this Hall, we celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. For almost 40 years the International Atomic Energy Agency has also been a central part of international life and cooperation. As we look back on those 40 or 50 years, it is surely a source of agreement amongst us all that two of the burning problems we have faced — the crucial issues on which we have worked together through the years since the end of the Second World War and since the end of colonization — are those of development and the atom. These are amongst the crucial challenges of our time, and they will remain so. It is in this context that one of the closest, most devoted and most effective partners of us all

is the International Atomic Energy Agency, with its mandate to ensure that we work together on development and on the atom in a world that is productive and safe.

On this occasion Australia is therefore very pleased to be one of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/50/L.11. We note that, traditionally — at least until recent years — parallel draft resolutions have attracted the consensus support of the General Assembly as ones that take note of and endorse the activities of a truly important international Agency. We hope that on this special occasion — after 50 years of the United Nations and 40 years of the Agency — the draft resolution before the Assembly will also attract consensus support.

Mr. Mazilu (Romania): We are pleased to start our statement by expressing my country's recognition of the work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency during 1994 and 1995. We sincerely appreciate the efforts of the Agency's Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, and its secretariat to promote and implement the programme of work approved by the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

Our general views on the activity of the Agency have already been expressed by the delegation of Spain in its statement on behalf of the European Union and associated countries. For this reason I shall make only a few specific comments on the Agency's report.

First, my delegation, like others, appreciates the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the fields of non-proliferation, the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the strengthening of international cooperation in respect of nuclear safety, radiological protection and waste management. The Agency has continued to play an important role in the implementation of the various initiatives relating to the technical cooperation programme and in the introduction of a new programme to enhance the security of nuclear and radioactive material. There is no doubt that the decision on principles and objectives, adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference, is extremely important for the activity of the Agency because it refers to the IAEA's contribution in the fields of safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Secondly, in our view, one of the most important tasks of the Agency remains the strengthening of the safeguards system. Certainly the Agency's system for verifying that nuclear energy is used exclusively for

peaceful purposes has a vital role to play in enhancing its credibility. My country supports the measures introduced in recent years by the Agency to improve the safeguards system — in particular, through Programme “93+2”, which, as delegations know very well, is aimed at increasing the cost-effectiveness of safeguards relating to declared nuclear material and at increasing the assurance of the completeness of information on nuclear activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Romania hopes for timely implementation of the measures contained in the Programme and will cooperate fully to that end.

Thirdly, in the period under consideration the Agency successfully promoted important measures in the area of nuclear safety. There is no doubt that the major accomplishment in this area was the adoption, in June 1994, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, after three years of careful preparation and serious negotiations. In addition, the Board of Governors approved the new Basic Safety Standards in September last year. These documents contain guidelines on responsibility for the control and safety of radiation sources, as well as for the protection of workers, the general public and medical patients, together with guidelines for intervention levels in emergency situations. Both the Convention and the new Basic Safety Standards supplement the existing extensive framework of safety guidelines. It is a great pleasure for me to inform the General Assembly that my country — aware of the importance of this Convention — has already ratified it.

Of greatest importance now is full implementation of the guidelines in these major documents. The Agency has great responsibilities in this field. In particular, it must do much more in our region, where the sad Chernobyl accident occurred. Every effort should be made to enhance the safety of the existing reactors and to implement new power plants in safe conditions.

It is our duty to do everything in our power to guarantee the full protection of members of the public from exposure to radioactive materials and to prevent every possible incident giving rise to potential exposure.

We would like to underline once again the importance of regional and international cooperation in carrying out the work of the Agency pursuant to its statute, in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to life, health and environment, and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system of the Agency.

Mr. Adekanye (Nigeria): On behalf of the Delegation of Nigeria, I wish to express our appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his statement highlighting the activities of the Agency in the past year. Nigeria has followed with interest those activities as enumerated in the annual report (GC(39)/3) and notes the progress made in pursuit of the goals and objectives of the Agency. Those achievements reflect the widespread support of the international community as a whole for the Agency in a changing world, which would require of the secretariat of the Agency continuing commitment and of its member States stronger political resolve to make the Agency truly serve the cause of peace and development.

One of the major challenges for the Agency today is the expansion of its contribution to global solutions to the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in our world. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria stated in his address at the Special Commemorative Meeting for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations:

“Development is a question of the human condition, and for many countries it is indeed a question of survival.” (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 38th meeting, p. 24*)

The Agency’s research and technical cooperation activities, aimed at assisting member States to achieve self-reliance in nuclear science and technology, would therefore contribute to the focus on development.

It is reassuring that the Agency’s 1995-1996 Technical Cooperation Programme, approved by the Board of Governors in 1994, included 11 new model projects formulated to address the national priorities of recipient States in the areas covered by the Agency’s research efforts at its Seibersdorf laboratory. The incorporation in the Technical Cooperation Programme of the conclusions of the Third Review Seminar endorsing the model project concept, more end-use orientation and a broad human-needs approach to transfer of nuclear technology is a manifestation of the Agency’s capacity to adapt its machinery and policies to meet the needs of its members.

This new partnership with recipient countries, based on productive dialogue and exploiting the new country programme framework in the design of projects by member States, should be vigorously pursued even as the model project concept is extended to many more

developing countries. We believe that this would enhance the impact of projects and increase public awareness of the benefits of non-military applications of nuclear energy. In the same vein, the delegation of Nigeria welcomes the new initiatives to use the institutions of developing countries, considered centres of excellence, in the implementation of selected technical cooperation projects. The primary goal should remain the strengthening of member States' capacity, regional development and cooperation among developing countries themselves.

The cooperation of member States in providing the Agency the wherewithal to implement identified projects is essential to the future of the new, better-focused Technical Cooperation Programme. Undoubtedly, the agreement reached among member States at last September's General Conference on new levels of funding for the Programme under the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund for the 1996-1998 period represents an important signal of that cooperation. However, that decision can only have the desired practical effect on the Agency's technical cooperation activities if it is backed by a firm commitment to provide the requisite resources.

Such support is particularly essential to the countries in the African region which cooperate under the aegis of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement (AFRA) as a vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology through relevant region-wide projects. Nigeria's decision to agree to an extension of that Agreement for another five-year period is an affirmation of our country's continuing commitment to regional cooperation and of the important contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency to that process. We believe that such cooperation will be further enhanced when the 7th meeting of AFRA is hosted by Nigeria next year. Simultaneously, we in Nigeria are determined to expand technical cooperation and have taken steps to strengthen the regulatory and institutional framework.

Nigeria reposes great faith in the Agency's safeguards system and has therefore always placed a high premium on its efficiency and effectiveness in strengthening confidence and trust in the non-proliferation regime. A credible, non-discriminatory verification system, implemented with vigour and professionalism, is invaluable to the peace and security of our world. The increase in the past year in the number of safeguards agreements in force in member States, as well as the high degree of compliance with the spirit and letter of these agreements, reflect positively on the safeguards system. Its integrity and continuing efficacy require not solely an assertion of the Agency's rights under safeguards agreements, as variously affirmed by the Board of

Governors in the recent past, but also maximum cooperation from member States and the parties to those agreements in facilitating the work of Agency inspectors, including access to relevant data, sites and facilities.

That cooperation has contributed to the General Conference's approval of the first part of the new safeguards approaches under the so-called Programme "93+2", as well as the agreement on a new funding formula covering the next five years. We trust that member States will maintain the current momentum for reform and improvement so as to retain the confidence of the international community in the safeguards system as a whole. Moreover, this would justify the Agency's assumption of additional safeguards duties under future verification agreements, including a new comprehensive test-ban treaty and a new fissile material cut-off convention.

For the countries in the Africa region, whose firm commitment to non-proliferation is now reflected in the treaty on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone endorsed by the Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers in June 1995, the Agency's role in verifying treaty undertakings will be invaluable.

The contribution of the Agency towards the development of a culture of safety in the nuclear industry world-wide and the strengthening of institutional mechanisms towards that end provide another basis for my country's confidence in the organization. We note that member States have continued to grapple with the issue of establishing an international regime on liability for nuclear damage as a complement to the Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted last year. Together with the proposed convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, that agreement should create a strong legal framework for nuclear safety.

However, the international community's determination to confront the new menace of illicit trafficking in nuclear material, on which the Agency is now developing a valuable database, should not distract attention from the continuing need to maintain vigilance over the dumping of radioactive wastes and other highly toxic substances in the territories of developing countries. We should continue to require the effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste to strengthen further international cooperation in this important area.

Finally, it has always been the view of my country that the Agency needs to increase representation of its member States on the Board of Governors, as part of the process of reform and democratization. Such a reform, in our view, should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution, transparency, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency. In particular, it should address the current underrepresentation of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia. We urge Member States not to let slip the opportunity to make the Board of Governors truly responsive to the interests of developing and developed countries as the Agency confronts the challenges of the next millennium.

Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all, the Russian delegation, like other delegations, expresses its gratitude to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for the submission of the report of the Agency, which provides a broad and varied picture of the activity of the IAEA.

During the past year, events of truly historic significance have been the adoption by consensus, at the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of a decision on an indefinite extension of that Treaty without any conditions whatever. By making this a standing Treaty, in the interest of further consolidation of the international non-proliferation regime, the participants in the Conference demonstrated a great sense of responsibility for the destiny of the world, international stability and nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation intends to make all possible efforts to implement the decisions adopted by the NPT Conference.

The Conference emphasized the significance of the role of the IAEA in ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the efforts it has been exerting to improve the safeguards system. The Conference devoted intense attention to the most urgent problems in the disarmament field. We note that the nuclear arms race has been stopped and reversed, and in 1991 an entire class of nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States were eliminated — more than 2,500 medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. The START I Treaty, which entered into force in December 1994, decreases by nearly half two major nuclear arsenals. Next we have the forthcoming ratification of the START II Treaty, and in its framework Russia and the United States will reduce their strategic offensive weapons to one third.

Russia has consistently favoured the drawing up speedily, and no later than 1996, at the Conference on Disarmament, of a non-discriminatory comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, subject to effective international verification. Such a treaty will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and will prevent its qualitative further development. It should also be emphasized that the new, democratic Russia has not carried out a single nuclear explosion and has firmly abided by the moratorium it has declared.

Russia reaffirms its dedication to the drawing up at the Conference on Disarmament of a multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. This would be an important contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

An initiative put forward by the President of Russia, Mr. Yeltsin, has received broad international backing — that is, the initiative on the holding in the spring of 1996 of a summit meeting on issues of nuclear security, to consider pressing problems in this area and define ways to solve them, in both the short and the long term. Such problems include ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy throughout the world and the dumping of radioactive wastes, international safeguards, and the use of nuclear materials released during the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In our view the IAEA could make a significant contribution to the preparations for such a meeting.

We continue to support the multifaceted activity of the Agency in such areas as halting illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, enhancing the level of their physical protection, and preparing an international convention to deal with radioactive wastes. A clear example of effective cooperation within the framework of the IAEA is the success of the international seminar held in May by the Agency, on the initiative of the Northern countries, on enhancing reliability and security in dealing with radioactive wastes.

Russia has unswervingly given priority to one of the major areas of the work of the Agency: control over the peaceful use of atomic energy and constant enhancement of the IAEA safeguards system. We note with satisfaction that the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had a positive view of the Agency's activity in enhancing the effectiveness of the safeguards system. Russia will continue to cooperate closely with the Agency

and will render its assistance in this work within the framework of the national Russian programme of support for the IAEA safeguards.

Attaching great significance to the activities of the IAEA and the development of scientific and technical cooperation between Member States, our country actively supports those programmes in which all countries are interested. Among such programmes highest priority should be given here to present and future technology for nuclear energy and its fuel cycle. The development of programmes to produce and promote new nuclear technologies and a new generation of reactors, which are promising from the point of view of security, ecology, economics and non-proliferation, must be one of the most important areas of the Agency's activity. It would be useful to begin the drafting of a comprehensive international programme for the development of nuclear energy, as a basis for solving energy, ecological and economic problems.

We attach great importance to the Agency's activities in rendering technical assistance to the developing countries. Despite the economic difficulties it has experienced, the Russian Government has found it possible to allocate to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund in 1995 the sum of 5.7 billion roubles. These means are earmarked for supplying developing countries members of the Agency with Russian equipment, apparatus and facilities and also for organizing training courses and other activities in Russia.

We also support the Agency's activity in improving the security of existing nuclear power stations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A source of satisfaction is the work of the secretariat of the IAEA in implementing that programme. An analysis of the safety of such nuclear power stations has been successfully carried out and intensive work lies ahead to eliminate the problems which have come to light.

Of course economic difficulties are slowing down the rate of implementation of these programmes. Our country favours a broad international exchange of experience and achievements in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Today more than 30 countries are Russia's partners, and it is cooperating with them on the basis of more than 100 intergovernmental and inter-Agency agreements in force.

The most important activity of Russia's nuclear complex at the present stage is the problem of the

elimination of nuclear weapons. The developing process of the reduction of nuclear weapons inevitably has required a transformation to peaceful areas of a significant part of the scientific, technical defence potential. An important step aimed at ensuring the viability of defence enterprises and their conversion and the retraining of experts is the establishment of the International Scientific Technical Centre in Moscow through the efforts of Russia, the United States, Japan and the European Union.

The Russian delegation associates itself with the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/50/L.11 on the report of the IAEA for 1994.

Mr. Pak Gil Yon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): It is regrettable to note that the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) makes reference once again to the so-called nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula in a biased, subjective and unjustified manner, disregarding the reality.

As we have clarified our position repeatedly on the so-called nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, it is not a matter to be considered at the United Nations either in regard to its substance or in the light of its character, but is a serious political and military issue to be settled bilaterally between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

It is a well-known fact that the unjust discussions of the so-called nuclear issue held in the past at the United Nations have never facilitated its resolution but, on the contrary, have introduced complexity and obstacles into the process of resolving the issue.

Recently, the so-called nuclear issue is being efficiently resolved between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States in accordance with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework of October 1994.

It has been stipulated in the DPRK-US Agreed Framework that the United States should provide the light water reactor project in return for the DPRK's freeze of nuclear facilities, and the DPRK is to implement the safeguards agreement only when provision of the light water reactors is complete.

Accordingly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has frozen the nuclear facilities and also stopped the construction of 50 megawatt and 200 megawatt reactors, subject to the Agreed Framework.

Along with this, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accepted the 10 additional inspector designations and their continuous presence in the country as suggested by the IAEA, thus ensuring the monitoring of nuclear facilities covered by the freeze. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea also permitted verification activities of the IAEA such as containment and surveillance measures which the Agency needs to carry out so as to verify the freeze.

This clearly indicates that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea fully implements the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, which in fact goes far beyond the obligations under the safeguards agreement to be fulfilled by the DPRK, which has a special status under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

There will be no complicated problems that cannot be resolved smoothly if all international commitments are implemented as sincerely as the DPRK has implemented its commitments.

At the talks held last June in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States with respect to the implementation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the United States reaffirmed its commitments to take full responsibility for providing the DPRK with the light water reactors on a turnkey basis and interim energy alternatives in return for the DPRK's freeze of nuclear facilities.

The working negotiations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) relating to the provision of the light water reactors are now actively under way.

Despite positive developments towards a final resolution of the so-called nuclear issue, certain member States and officials of the IAEA secretariat are still resorting to meaningless argument about this so-called nuclear issue of ours. Indeed they are attempting, in a disguised manner, to use the so-called nuclear issue to create an atmosphere of pressure against the DPRK, deliberately turning their faces away from the reality that the issue is being resolved smoothly.

We are very concerned that these kinds of unjust acts by certain forces hostile to us could cast a dark shadow over the ongoing negotiations between the DPRK and KEDO. As has been proved by the whole process of resolving the so-called nuclear issue between the DPRK and the United States, no issue can be resolved if one side puts

pressure on the other. Fear of pressure exerted against us has never made us give up doing what we are supposed to do.

Complete implementation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework is a precondition for the implementation of the safeguards agreement. Therefore, urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the safeguards agreement at this stage, in total disregard of the reality, will only reveal the true colour of camouflaged attempts by certain forces to abuse the so-called nuclear issue in order to realize their political purposes.

We hope that the people of the world will have a correct understanding of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and will contribute to the implementation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, which will eventually lead to the final resolution of the nuclear issue.

Mr. de Icaza (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation has listened with close attention to the report presented by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the activities of the Agency for the year 1994. The detailed information on the activities carried out over the past year are an indication of the praiseworthy leadership of the Agency by its Director General, and we extend to him once again our gratitude and congratulations and reiterate our firm support.

My country has always supported the Agency's work to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear power as a way of achieving cooperation for economic and social development of countries. Similarly, we recognize the importance of improving programmes for the protection and safety of nuclear facilities — a fundamental element in assuring non-proliferation.

The report presented today contains a detailed account of the activities of the Agency in different fields. However, we have noted that, as in previous years, a marked priority would seem to be given to the application of safeguards and verification, to the detriment of cooperation and technical assistance activities. The desire to strengthen the effectiveness and to expand the safeguards system should not relegate these activities to a secondary role.

We consider that international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear power and technologies continues to be the principal objective of the Agency. A better

balance in its activities is indispensable today, in the face of the urgent needs of a majority of the developing countries in such varied areas as energy, human health, the environment and agriculture.

This year, with the signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Tlatelolco Treaty, by the Government of Cuba, the full accession of Saint Lucia, and ratification by Saint Kitts and Nevis the international non-proliferation regime has been strengthened, thus consolidating the intention of my country and other countries of the region to make Latin America and the Caribbean the first region of the world free of nuclear weapons.

Mexico hopes that all Member States will fulfil their obligations emanating from the United Nations Charter, the statute of the IAEA and the agreements arising therefrom. Thus, my country was among those that signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety when it was opened for signature, and is on the point of concluding the internal process leading to ratification.

In this forum, we would like to appeal to countries to sign and ratify this international juridical instrument, the full entry into force of which will guarantee the trustworthy use of nuclear power. Similarly, we consider that exchanges of equipment and nuclear material should be the subject of negotiations within the framework of the Agency, with a view to ensuring that the commitments entered into are duly reflected in international instruments with clear-cut and precise rules.

My delegation welcomes the beginning of preparations in the Agency for the development of a convention on the management of radioactive wastes, and the establishment of a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation to advise the Director General of the IAEA on technical cooperation policy and on measures to strengthen the efficiency of the Agency's programme.

My delegation is firmly convinced that for the binding, universal and non-discriminatory nature of the measures contemplated in the so-called Programme "93+2" to constitute a fundamental prerequisite in the success of this process, we need to define the terms and scope of the Agency's cooperation in this matter. In this context, my Government wishes to express its support for the decision adopted by the Board of Governors last June in approving the application of measures for the execution of which the Agency enjoys sufficient legal authority, emanating from

the safeguards agreements, in order to put them into practice. We hope for an early definition of the necessary machinery to put into effect those measures for which the Agency requires additional authority.

For the Board of Governors to be really effective and representative, it should reflect the level of development achieved by member States in the nuclear area, and the increase in the number of members of the Agency as a consequence of political changes across the world and the emergence of new countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. A more transparent process for the appointment of member States to the Board is essential.

Another question which we believe to be important is the careful examination by the IAEA of the possible verification functions that it could develop in the area of disarmament — particularly as we are now beginning to see significant advances towards the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Negotiations are starting, with a view to an agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Full advantage should of course be taken of the long experience and recognized competence of the Agency so ably led by Mr. Hans Blix.

Ms. Diseko (South Africa): My delegation, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/50/L.11, would like to urge its adoption.

At the landmark NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York earlier this year, the review process for the Treaty was strengthened, and a set of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was adopted by consensus. This led to a consensus on the indefinite extension of the NPT. South Africa, having rolled back its own nuclear-weapons programme, was keen to ensure that the Treaty was strengthened for the benefit of all humanity so as to advance to a nuclear-weapon-free world. We regard the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying and assessing compliance with safeguards agreements as a vital component of the success of the Treaty.

Flowing logically from the NPT Conference will be a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), with 1996 as the target date for its conclusion. The NPT Conference, after extensive consultations, including consultations with the nuclear-weapon States, called on all the parties concerned to exercise "utmost restraint",

pending the entry into force of a CTBT. My Government, therefore, strongly supported and co-sponsored a resolution at the IAEA General Conference in September which expressed grave concern at the resumption and continuation of nuclear testing by certain countries. I would like to repeat that concern here today, and call on the parties involved to cease nuclear testing immediately.

As the Assembly will be aware, South Africa is once again the designated member for Africa on the Board of Governors of the IAEA, after an absence of 17 years, and we are looking forward to playing an active role in the work of this important Agency. My delegation would like to commend the work of the Director General and the IAEA over the past year, as reflected in the report before us today.

In particular, we fully support the programme to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. Given developments in Iraq, in particular over the past year, it has become only too apparent that strengthening of the safeguards system is essential if similar situations are to be avoided in future and the objectives of non-proliferation achieved.

At the same time, I wish to emphasize our desire that the Agency continue to devote all available resources to the provision of technical assistance to the developing world, thereby bringing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology to all nations. It is vital that this role be perceived by all as being of equal importance to the Agency as its safeguards role. We in South Africa are hoping to play a useful role in ensuring that this objective is met.

The Acting President: I now call on the representative of Iraq to introduce the amendment to draft resolution A/50/L.11 contained in document A/50/L.12.

Mr. Hasan (Iraq): It is my pleasure to introduce my delegation's amendment, circulated in document A/50/L.12, to the draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" (A/50/L.11).

First of all, I should like to reiterate our position on the draft resolutions that have been presented under this item. My delegation thinks — and many delegations share our view — that draft resolutions under this item should avoid controversial political issues and assessments. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in the last few years, and in particular it is not the case with the draft resolution presented this year.

Concerning operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, which deals with Iraq's implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and 715 (1991), my delegation considers that this paragraph does not reflect in a fair and objective manner the cooperative relationship between Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or the real stage of advancement of the IAEA's work under relevant Security Council resolutions. We are aware of the fact that political motivations are behind this attempt. The first of these is to prolong the comprehensive regime of sanctions imposed on my country, if not to change it to an open-ended one.

Our first amendment to this paragraph refers to the IAEA's assessment of the advancement of its work. The amendment puts the question of the information provided by Iraq this year in its real and exact context. This means, as has been stated in the IAEA's report to the Security Council, that this information did not change the IAEA's conclusion that Iraq's nuclear-weapon programme has been, for all practical purposes, destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. Furthermore, this morning Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, in his address to this Assembly, reiterated this fact, saying:

"As I reported to the General Assembly last year, it is our conclusion that the essential components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme have been identified and destroyed, removed or rendered harmless". (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 46th meeting, p. 4*).

Mr. Blix added that

"This assessment was not based on faith in Iraqi statements, but on data gathered during inspection, on information provided by the suppliers and Member States and, to a great extent, on analysis of the large number of original documents which were obtained in Iraq early in the inspection process". (*ibid.*, p. 4).

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning in this context that the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "Verification in all its aspects" (A/50/377) stated in the paragraph on the experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA in Iraq, that

“withholding of some of the data by Iraq was overcome, in large part, by the extraordinary inspection rights of UNSCOM and the IAEA on a short- or no-notice basis”. (*A/50/377, para. 197*).

Based on these facts and assessments, it is clear that the exaggerations about the issue of information are not logical, fair or factual and should not be taken out of context — as has happened in the draft resolution — bearing in mind that Iraq provided all the information needed by the IAEA and expresses willingness to provide further details needed by the IAEA.

For these reasons, my delegation has presented our amendment — a paragraph from the IAEA’s report to the Security Council — in order to introduce balance into operative paragraph 7.

Our second amendment would replace the words “stresses the need for Iraq to cooperate fully with the Agency” with the words “stresses the need for Iraq to continue its cooperation with the Agency”. I should like to remind representatives that Iraq proposed the same amendment last year, and it was adopted by a vote in this Assembly. My delegation expresses its deep regret that some of the sponsors of the draft resolution did not take into consideration the will of the General Assembly in this matter. Nevertheless, my delegation noted with satisfaction the statement made this morning by His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain on behalf of the European Union. He said that

“long-term success can be ensured only if Iraq continues to cooperate fully with the IAEA” (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 46th meeting, p. 10*).

I should like on this occasion to reiterate our commitment to continue our cooperation with the IAEA in the fulfilment of its mandate.

Finally, my delegation hopes that the Assembly will consider positively our factual and fair amendment.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on this item.

I should like to announce that the following countries have become co-sponsors of draft resolution A/50/L.11: El Salvador, Latvia and the Russian Federation.

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/50/L.11 and the amendments thereto contained in document A/50/L.12.

I shall now call on representatives who wish to make statements in explanation of vote before the voting.

May I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Ladsous (France) (*interpretation from French*): The penultimate preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/50/L.11 contains a reference to the resolution GC(39)/RES/23, which was adopted on 22 September 1995 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and which deals with nuclear testing.

When that text was adopted at Vienna the French delegation pointed out that it did not feel it could associate itself with the statements or judgements contained in the resolution, above and beyond the problem of the competence of the General Conference. For that reason the French delegation will abstain in the voting on the penultimate preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. This is also why, this year, France has not been a sponsor of the draft resolution.

In this connection, however, the French delegation wishes to reaffirm in forceful terms its full support for the action of the International Atomic Energy Agency and for its Director General, Mr. Blix.

Mr. Kumar (India): As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its inception in 1957, India has consistently attached the highest importance to its objectives. We actively participate in the activities of the Agency. Since draft resolution A/50/L.11 pertains to the activities of the IAEA as a whole, to which we attach great value, we would go along with the draft resolution. However, we have considerable difficulty with the fourth preambular paragraph.

The language of the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution indicates a linkage between adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the freedom to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. I quote article II of the IAEA statute, which reads:

“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.”

Furthermore, article IV C states:

“The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members ...”.

The purpose of these articles in the IAEA statute is obviously to encourage unfettered access by member States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any discrimination whatsoever, since any perceived discrimination will have an inevitable consequence on the response of member States to their obligations to the Agency. The NPT is a separate instrument and cannot be used to create a differential between members of the Agency.

By inferring that adherence to the NPT, on which my Government's views are well known, has a bearing on access to peaceful uses of atomic energy, the draft resolution deviates from the objectives enshrined in the statute.

We have, therefore, been constrained to call for a separate vote on the fourth preambular paragraph.

Mr. Pak Gil Yon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is a political and military one, in terms of its origin and nature, which can be resolved only by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. In the past, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have handled the issue unreasonably, hindering rather than helping its settlement.

The draft resolution before us, sponsored by certain countries, again refers to us unfairly. The sponsors of the draft resolution have attempted to turn their faces away from the realities by urging us to comply with the safeguards agreement, and by trying to disregard the DPRK-US Agreed Framework. How could we fully comply with the safeguards agreement when the DPRK-US Agreed Framework has not been implemented?

The DPRK-US Agreed Framework stipulates the obligations to be carried out by the DPRK and the United States, respectively, for the final resolution of the nuclear

issue. It especially identifies the stage at which the DPRK should comply fully with the safeguards agreement.

Draft resolution A/50/L.11 reveals the ulterior intentions of certain co-sponsors to abuse the name of the United Nations as a means of pressure on us. They should bear in mind that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a dignified country that regards independence as its life, and any attempt whatsoever to put pressure upon us is completely unacceptable.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly rejects draft resolution A/50/L.11 as an attempt of indecent forces to create an atmosphere unfavourable to us and to dilute the significance of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework in order to lay obstacles in the way of a resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula.

Actually, the draft resolution gives us the impression that the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA are opposed to the DPRK-US Agreed Framework. Therefore, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will vote against draft resolution A/50/L.11.

Mr. Kirkland (United States of America): The Iraqi amendment, particularly the second part of it, attempts to turn around completely the facts about Iraq's programme. Last year, the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iraq's nuclear programme did speak about Iraq's cooperation in one particular area, the establishment of the monitoring programme. This year, the words “cooperation” and “cooperate” do not appear a single time in the IAEA report. The reason why should be obvious. Iraq has been forced to admit that it concealed huge amounts of information, including the fact that it had repeatedly violated Security Council resolutions, and it is continuing this concealment today. Iraq is not “cooperating”, and thus it is not “continuing to cooperate,” and to include such a phrase in the draft resolution would be simply contrary to fact.

The first part of the amendment selects the only passage from the IAEA report which is not completely negative about Iraq. This selection does not serve the truth. It is not new news, and it is not acceptable to the co-sponsors.

We urge all delegations to vote against this amendment and to support the draft resolution as it stands.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote before the voting.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/50/L.11 and on the amendment thereto contained in document A/50/L.12.

In accordance with rule 90 of the rules of procedure, the amendment is voted on first. The Assembly will therefore take a decision first on the amendment circulated in document A/50/L.12.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Sudan

Against:

Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia

Abstaining:

Bangladesh, Botswana, Burundi, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Mauritius, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe

The amendment was rejected by 95 votes to 8, with 22 abstentions.

The Acting President: the Assembly will now turn to draft resolution A/50/L.11.

Separate votes have been requested on the fourth and eleventh preambular paragraphs and on operative paragraph 7.

Is there any objection to those requests?

Since there is none, I shall put those paragraphs to the vote separately.

I put to the vote first the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/50/L.11. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia

Against:

India, Israel, Saudi Arabia

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Pakistan, Sudan,
United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe

*The fourth preambular paragraph was adopted by 128
votes to 3, with 7 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Saudi Arabia advised
the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Acting President: I next put to the vote the
eleventh preambular paragraph of draft resolution
A/50/L.11.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Cambodia, China, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Gabon,
Monaco, Sudan, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania,
Viet Nam

*The eleventh preambular paragraph was adopted by
121 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of the Lao People's
Democratic Republic, advised the Secretariat that it
had intended to abstain.]

The Acting President: I now put to the vote
operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/50/L.11.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa,
San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

China, Cuba, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe

Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by 128 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.

The Acting President: I shall now put to the vote draft resolution A/50/L.11 as a whole.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname,

Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Abstaining:

China, Cuba, Ghana, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam

Draft resolution A/50/L.11 as a whole was adopted by 144 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions (resolution 50/9).

[Subsequently, the delegations of Dominica and the United Republic of Tanzania advised the Secretariat that they intended to vote in favour.]

The Acting President: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

May I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Wu Chengjiang (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/50/L.11, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). China is of the view that the General Assembly's draft resolution on the report of the IAEA should not include negative references to specific countries, for such a pressure tactic will not only fail to contribute to the solution of problems but may also complicate matters even further. The Chinese delegation has reservations on some of the resolutions of the Board of Governors and of the General Conference of the IAEA that are mentioned in the draft resolution. For these reasons the Chinese delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

This, however, is without prejudice to China's views on the Agency's activities. In his statement this morning the Chinese representative offered a comprehensive and positive assessment of the Agency's work in the year under review.

Mr. Hasan (Iraq): My delegation lost its right to vote in the General Assembly for reasons beyond its control — namely, the comprehensive embargo imposed by Security Council resolutions and the freezing of its assets abroad.

However, if we did have the right to vote, my delegation would have abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 7 and on the draft resolution as a whole.

Mr. Serme (Burkina Faso) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of Burkina Faso voted against the amendment to draft resolution A/50/L.11 submitted by Iraq and contained in document A/50/L.12. Our delegation wishes to stress that if there had been a separate vote on each of the two paragraphs of the amendment, it would have voted in favour of paragraph (a) because of its factual nature. That paragraph reproduces the terms of the Agency's report submitted to the Security Council on 6 October 1995 and is also in keeping with the conclusions described by the Director General of the Agency in his presentation of the report this morning. My delegation would have voted against paragraph (b) of the proposed amendment because the original version reproduced the terms of the resolution referred to in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution.

Mr. Yativ (Israel): Israel supported the draft resolution as a whole. However, it is our firm position that the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be conducted, as prescribed by the Agency's statute, on a basis of equality, regardless of whether or not a State member of the Agency is a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Therefore, Israel opposed the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution and voted against it.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to make statements in exercise of the right of reply.

May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Pak Gil Yon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): This morning the South Korean representative spoke about our "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement, and he also defined the DPRK-US Agreed Framework as a complementary device to induce us to

comply with the safeguards agreement. Unless it is South Korea's ulterior intention to impede the implementation of the Agreed Framework, I think he may be ignorant of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. I therefore think it useful to take this opportunity to educate him on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

The DPRK-US Agreed Framework, which was welcomed by the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), clearly stipulates the obligations to be implemented by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, respectively, and identifies explicitly a certain stage at which the DPRK is to cooperate fully with the IAEA. The DPRK-US Agreed Framework is for the final resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

I advise the representative of South Korea to read carefully the statement made this morning by the representative of the United States. We are not fools to be induced into something by false documents — if that is what the Agreed Framework is. We therefore suspect that the representative of South Korea may be an ignorant person who cannot even understand clearly the Agreed Framework, one of the important international documents of our times.

Only today South Korea revealed its sinister intention to lay obstacles in the path of implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and thus save face since it could not intervene in the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. What South Korea should bear in mind is that the dogs may bark but the train moves on.

Mr. Chon (Republic of Korea): North Korea put forward the Agreed Framework as an excuse for non-compliance with the safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). North Korea is, of course, obligated to implement the Agreed Framework, just as it is obligated to abide by the South/North joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed in December 1991.

We have no doubt that these bilateral arrangements are important for the ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. However, from the multilateral perspective of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), these bilateral arrangements have relevance and significance by virtue of the way in which they can strengthen the global non-

proliferation regime. As such, the Agreed Framework can be a supplementary step, in support of multilateral efforts under the auspices of the Security Council and the IAEA, towards resolving the North Korean nuclear issue; it cannot replace, supersede or detract from North Korea's multilateral obligations to all States parties to the NPT.

Acting upon the Agreed Framework, the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 4 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/64), underlined that the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains binding and in force. As long as the safeguards agreement remains binding and in force, it is clear that North Korea has the legal obligation to comply fully with the terms of an agreement it entered into of its own free will. When it does not, that constitutes an act of non-compliance.

Given the important responsibility of this world body to monitor and ensure compliance by States parties with their commitments under the NPT and safeguard agreements, we feel we can take it for granted that the Assembly registers due concern over North Korea's continuing non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, and urges North Korea to come promptly into full compliance.

The IAEA General Conference sent an unmistakable message to this effect when, at its thirty-ninth session, last September, it adopted the resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue without a single vote against. We are pleased that this world body has just endorsed the resolution by the General Conference on the IAEA on the non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement.

Mr. Pak Gil Yon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The South Korean representative has once again revealed his ignorance. I should like to advise him to read carefully the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Agreed Framework was welcomed by the Security Council and the IAEA. It stipulates when we should cooperate fully with the IAEA, and I wish to state clearly, once again, that any resolution in any organization is worthless if the Agreed Framework is not implemented.

The Acting President: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 14?

It was so decided.

Agenda item 156 (*continued*)

Multilingualism

Draft resolution (A/50/L.6/Rev.1)

Amendments (A/50/L.8 and A/50/L.9)

The Acting President: I call on the representative of France to introduce the revised draft resolution contained in document A/50/L.6/Rev.1.

Mr. Ladsous (France) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to introduce the revised version of draft resolution A/50/L.6/Rev.1, which was distributed as an official document yesterday and on which we will be taking a vote.

The only paragraph of the draft which differs from the version of the text distributed previously is operative paragraph 3, and I should say right away that the sponsors have striven in this paragraph to take as much account as possible of the legitimate concerns expressed by some delegations, in particular within the Asian Group.

These delegations have asked us to show some sympathy for the situation of nationals of countries which do not commonly use one of the official languages of the United Nations. It seemed to them too much to ask that on recruitment, all United Nations staff members should speak two of the official languages, at least one of which must be a working language. This, they said, imposed on them a need to acquire two languages in order to join the Organization, which could be discriminatory in favour of the nationals of countries which use one of the official languages and who would thus have to acquire only one more language in order to enter the Organization.

However, some of the Asian representatives told us they saw no obstacle to the practice of a second official language being encouraged strongly within the Organization and that account should be taken of the efforts in this regard by officials who, during their careers, acquire a degree of linguistic competence which no one can deny is of great importance for an Organization such as ours.

The sponsors agreed entirely with this point of view and therefore took a major step towards the position of the countries which had made that comment. This was not a matter of course: it meant giving up an element

introduced in draft resolution A/50/L.6 — the requirement for a second official language on recruitment, which was new. In this regard, the revised draft reverts to the legal status quo going back to resolution 2480 B (XXIII) of 21 December 1968.

I would stress that there is no difference between new paragraph 3 and what derives from the set of provisions in resolution 2480 B (XXIII): the recruitment requirement of proficiency in at least one of the working languages of the Secretariat reproduces subparagraph 1 (a) (i) of the 1968 resolution and the fact that it is nevertheless possible to recruit, on contracts of under two years, people who speak one of the working languages of an organ of the United Nations to fill posts in services working for those organs reproduces the next subparagraph of subparagraph 1 (a).

The request that the use of a second official language be taken into account when promotions and incremental steps are under consideration is precisely what emerges from the two subparagraphs of subparagraph 1 (b) and paragraph 3. The provisions of the resolution of 1968 make it clear that promotions are subject to

“Adequate and confirmed knowledge of a second language”. (*resolution 2480 B (XXIII), para. 1 (b) (ii)*)

When we say, in our text, that due account must be taken of such knowledge we are not going beyond the 1968 text — quite the contrary. We stick to reaffirming the 1968 text, without any addition. Also, the notion of linguistic balance within the Organization is itself drawn from the *chapeau* to paragraph 1 of resolution 2480 B (XXIII).

This being the case, I ask all delegations here to please understand that the sponsors went as far as they possibly could while still staying true to their own draft. As I said when I presented it almost a fortnight ago, this draft is in no way a modification of the law in force in the United Nations: rather, it is an appeal for the fundamental provisions governing United Nations practice with regard to languages to be better observed, accorded more respect and more fully applied.

I believe that this is a very strong imperative on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, at a time when a regrettable drift towards monolingualism is becoming more widespread and more entrenched. Hence, the sponsors, though they would like to see the text adopted by consensus, are determined not to give in to manoeuvres that are all-too-obviously designed to intimidate. The proposed amendments that have been circulated to Member States by

one delegation are totally unacceptable in this connection because they would all have the effect of reducing the scope of the text to nothing and of causing a regression in current United Nations practice towards impoverishment, towards discrimination in favour of a single Secretariat language, and towards the death of any United Nations action to promote cultural diversity. That is why France, in solidarity with all the other sponsors of the draft resolution — and I should point out in this connection that the following countries have been added to the list: Afghanistan, Cape Verde, China, Kazakhstan and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic — feels that the draft resolutions, in its revised form, is a compromise that should be acceptable to all delegations of good will that do not want to depart from the rules on these matters that the Organization has built up over the course of its history.

I therefore commend this text to all our colleagues and ask them not to accept without substantiation the allegations on its supposed content that have been made by one delegation and thus demonstrate their commitment to a living and effective United Nations that truly works in diversity, to the benefit of the Member States.

Mr. Deineko (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): As has been noted by the General Assembly on many occasions, the use of different languages in the United Nations enriches the Organization and is a means of achieving the purposes set out in the Charter. On many occasions, the General Assembly has reaffirmed the need to ensure equal treatment of the official and working languages of the Organization, in accordance with the Assembly’s rules of procedure. The fact that there are both official and working languages and the status accorded them under the rules of procedure reflect the universal nature of the Organization and, in a mediated form, of the cultural diversity of the international community.

The political importance of this question is obvious right now, just as the results of the Organization’s first 50 years’ work are being reviewed. The experience acquired over those years shows that the United Nations has succeeded in striking an extremely successful balance between the need for the fullest possible reflection of the world’s linguistic and cultural diversity and considerations of ensuring the viability of the Organization’s machinery. It is precisely this factor which, of all others, has made possible the harmonious integration of new countries into the practical activities of the United Nations — and the current membership exceeds by far the number of

founding States. Of course, this all has to do with the events of the past few years and the accession to active participation of new, independent States that can use, within the Organization, a language that a majority of their citizens know.

Naturally, the legally backed principle of the equality of the official and working languages — a principle that has stood the test of time — ought to be reaffirmed by the Assembly. Nor is it any less important to adopt measures that would make it possible to avoid violations of that principle. Here, the important thing is to ensure that Member States are simultaneously provided with equal services — equal in terms of both volume and quality — in all languages, official and working.

In that light, the Russian delegation joined the sponsors of the original draft resolution on multilingualism, and guided by the spirit of compromise and having tried to ensure that the comments expressed at previous meetings were taken into account as fully as possible, is prepared to support the draft in its revised form.

Mr. Shongwe (Swaziland): My delegation has a problem with regard to this draft resolution, which seeks to outlaw some bona fide Members of the United Nations. Let it be said that in the past 50 years the question of language has never been in any way responsible for either the failures or the successes of the Organization.

Instead, unity of purpose and political will have been the paramount factor in the strength and operation of the United Nations, and it is on this that the Organization is entirely dependent. This draft resolution will tend to create a split among the Member States at a time when unity among them is a prerequisite for the success of the Organization.

My delegation, through you, Sir, appeals to the Assembly to spend its energy, time and effort on those issues that pertain to development, especially of the developing nations. This draft resolution, if adopted, will have negative financial implications for the developing nations. It will also require that budgets be set aside by both the United Nations and the Member States towards manpower development for purposes of meeting the demands of the draft resolution.

My delegation therefore urges the Assembly to reject this draft resolution or defer the voting for further consultations.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on this item.

I call on the representative of the United States, who has asked to speak on a point of order.

Mr. Birenbaum (United States of America): The United States believes that further time is needed for discussions with the co-sponsors of the text contained in document A/50/L.6/Rev.1 in order to seek to achieve consensus on the draft resolution.

As a multicultural society, the United States fully appreciates and respects the value of multilingualism. For this reason, we attach considerable importance to adopting a forward-looking resolution under this item and doing that by consensus. Unfortunately, the text we have before us contains ambiguities and inconsistencies. We regret that there has not been adequate opportunity to discuss the provisions of draft resolution A/50/L.6/Rev.1 with its co-sponsors, although that would surely be the appropriate way to proceed.

As a result, portions of the text remain unacceptable. Our principal concern is that operative paragraph 3, even as revised, deviates from the current rules contained in General Assembly resolution 2480 (XXIII) B. Operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/50/L.6/Rev.1, for example, does not conform to that earlier resolution. Provisions in that resolution relating to promotions apply only to professional-level positions. Any revision of the rules must first be given due consideration by the appropriate committee of the General Assembly. That important step has been skipped in formulating this draft resolution. We believe that this concern can be met by appropriate consultations that could result in a consensus text.

If we are required to consider this draft resolution today, we, along with other delegations, will have no choice other than to vote against it. That is not a desirable way to deal with this important matter and that is not the way we would prefer. We would strongly prefer that a reasonable time be allowed for those of us who have problems with the draft resolution to consult with the co-sponsors with a view to reaching consensus. If the objective of the co-sponsors is to reaffirm our shared commitment to multilingualism at the United Nations, and not to change the relevant rules, I can assure them that there should be no difficulty in achieving consensus after appropriate consultation.

There is no compelling reason why the draft resolution before us must be adopted today. Why not take the time necessary to bring the world together on this text so that we can all join in adopting by consensus a resolution on the subject of multilingualism?

I move, under rule 74 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to defer consideration of this item to a future meeting later this month, after the conclusion of consultations. We would hope that we can look to the President's good offices to organize these consultations.

The Acting President: The representative of the United States has moved, within the terms of rule 74 of the rules of procedure, the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion until later this month.

According to rule 74 of the rules of procedure:

“During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. In addition to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak in favour of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.”

I call on the representative of Japan.

Mr. Kumamaru (Japan): The draft resolution before us is of great interest and great importance to my delegation as well as to many others. My delegation supports the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity in this Organization. It believes that multilingualism is one important factor in doing this.

However, we should all be aware that there are numerous cultures not associated with the six official languages. Personnel who come from those cultures should not be penalized and unduly discriminated against. Fairer treatment of these people would serve the overall objectives of cultural diversity.

The second part of paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/50/L.6/Rev.1 would give advantage to personnel whose mother tongue is one of the six languages and would penalize those whose mother tongue is not one of those six. The latter deserve due consideration and fair competition. Unfortunately, therefore, paragraph 3, as revised, does not meet our modest request.

In the view of my delegation, this draft resolution is too important for us to deal with in a hasty manner. Careful consideration by as many delegations as possible would contribute to the improvement of the draft resolution and to its successful adoption by consensus. Unfortunately, no real consultation has taken place so far.

My delegation seconds the proposal put forward by the United States delegation to defer action on a resolution so that the resolution will be blessed with adoption by consensus.

The Acting President: I now call on the representative of Fiji.

Mr. Bune (Fiji): My country also attaches great importance to this item and we therefore support the motion that a decision on this draft resolution be deferred until we have had further consultations with a view to adopting a resolution by consensus.

We understand the preoccupation of those who are concerned that the proceedings of the Organization be conducted in all the official languages and that the documentation of the Organization be made available simultaneously. However, that is different from trying to impose additional foreign languages on nationals of States whose mother tongue is not one of the six official languages of the Organization. It is difficult enough for them to communicate in one of these official languages.

We recognize that there are two working languages of the Secretariat and that these should be used as far as practicable. The Secretariat has worked quite well for the past 50 years. Perhaps its use of languages should be improved, but to create conditions for recruitment and promotion within the Secretariat of the kind envisaged in the draft resolution contained in document A/50/L.6/Rev.1 is deliberately to discriminate against nationals of States whose mother tongue is not one of the official languages of the Organization or of the Secretariat.

There is in fact nothing wrong with the present rules regarding language. The problem is that the Organization does not provide enough resources in the form of interpretation, translation and other aspects of document services. This cannot be resolved by imposing the discriminatory conditions contained in the draft resolution.

Since the purpose of this draft resolution is to change the Secretariat's recruitment and promotion rules, we believe that this matter should first be considered in

the administrative and budgetary Committee, since there are both administrative and budgetary implications. In any case, a decision on this draft resolution should be deferred until we have had further consultations and I therefore support the motion made by the representative of the United States of America.

The Acting President: I call on the representative of Argentina.

Mrs. Fernández de Gurmendi (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): A proposal has been made to defer the debate on the draft resolution on multilingualism. However, this draft resolution which we are considering today is practically identical to the one which has been considered by delegations for two weeks, since 20 October, when we met in this Hall to deal with this item.

Since that day, some delegations have expressed to us their concerns on one of the paragraphs of the draft resolution, operative paragraph 3. It was pointed out to us that this paragraph would result in a modification of the system of recruitment and promotion of staff.

In response to those concerns, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution began a process of consultations, which led to the revised version now before the Assembly. In the new version, operative paragraph 3 has been modified in such a way that it is limited to summarizing the existing rules in the matter contained in Assembly resolution 2480 B (XXIII) of 1968 which relates to the linguistic abilities of personnel.

With this modification, the draft resolution we are considering is in its totality confined to reaffirming resolutions and other provisions which are in force with regard to the use of the Organization's official and working languages, and to highlighting the need to strictly respect these provisions. There has been no modification of any of the existing provisions; there has been no amendment of the system of recruitment and promotion of staff.

In the light of what I have said and of the process of consultations which has taken place since 20 October, it does not seem reasonable for delegations and the Organization to continue to allocate time and attention to the consideration of a question which in no way changes the existing system.

In those circumstances, we consider that the process of consultations has been concluded and that the motion to

defer the adoption of a decision on this question should be rejected. We hope a decision can be adopted today.

The Acting President: I call on the representative of France.

Mr. Ladsous (France) (*interpretation from French*): I am speaking in order to request members of the Assembly not to vote in favour of this motion for adjournment that has just been presented under rule 74 of the rules of procedure.

I should like to say first of all that France, with all the co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly, has engaged in extremely broad consultations on this text since this item was inscribed as a new item on the agenda of this session. In this connection, I should like to respond to my colleague from Japan by saying that he should take into account the fact that these consultations took place. All the requested amendments which were based on important and legitimate concerns of some States, and which could be included without distorting the text, have been included in our revised draft that members of the Assembly have before them.

Hence, we have reached the conclusion that additional consultations would not at this stage be likely to improve the draft resolution. We think that the proposal made by the delegation which presented the motion for adjournment is not, in fact, designed to improve the text, but, rather, would deprive it of any practical effect, and render it totally meaningless.

I regret that I have to say this, but the motion does not seem to us to be made in good faith. It seems to us that it is nothing but a delaying tactic designed to bury this draft resolution, or defer it *sine die*, indeed to bury it in the sand, from which it may emerge only in an unrecognizable form, if that.

I think that no one here is deceived by the deep meaning of this operation. In fact, the idea is to have us endorse a monolingual trend, which is only too obvious in the Secretariat and in the United Nations organ as a whole.

We also had hoped that this text could be adopted by consensus, and we believe we have done all in our power to achieve that goal. But if an effort is being made to force us to move backwards, and to stop championing the linguistic principles of the Organization, then we

believe it is our duty not to yield, regardless of the source of the pressures.

That is why, Sir, through you I should like to request all delegations to vote against the motion for adjournment presented under rule 74.

The Acting President: We have heard two speakers in favour of and two against the motion. In accordance with rule 74 of the rules of procedure I shall now put to the vote immediately the motion to adjourn the debate on the item under discussion until later in the month.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Croatia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname,

Swaziland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam

Abstaining:

Belgium, Czech Republic, Kazakstan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Yemen

The motion was rejected by 75 votes to 70, with 6 abstentions.

The Acting President: The Assembly will continue consideration of agenda item 156, "Multilingualism", as the second item tomorrow morning.

The meeting rose at 6:20 p.m.