

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF THE DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SUMMIT, ISSUED IN MOSCOW ON 10 MAY 1995, NAMELY: JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JOINT STATEMENT ON DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABM SYSTEMS AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, JOINT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND JOINT STATEMENT ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIME

We have the honour to forward to you the texts of the documents of the Russian-American Summit, issued in Moscow on 10 May 1995, namely: Joint Statement on Nonproliferation, Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, Joint Statement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, Joint Statement on European security, Joint Statement on a new international export control regime.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to issue these documents jointly as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to distribute it to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States of
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(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
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JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION

The President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, and the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, at their meeting in Moscow, 9-10 May 1995, expressed the strong view that the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference under way in New York should decide to make the Treaty permanent. The two leaders pledged that the United States and Russia will continue to work to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty. In particular, they reaffirmed the commitments by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, under article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains their ultimate goal.

The two Presidents also reaffirmed that the United States and the Russian Federation will continue to work together closely to promote broad nonproliferation goals. They agreed that, in the newly-established bilateral working group on nonproliferation, the two sides would consult in a timely manner on issues of mutual concern, including how best to fulfil their responsibility to cooperate with other NPT parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time fulfilling their responsibility to avoid risks of proliferation. The leaders recognized the importance of a responsible approach to the transfer of nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology and to training. In this connection, they reaffirmed their commitments to the NPT and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, and in particular to the principles that nuclear transfers should take place only under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and only when a supplier is satisfied that such transfers to any non-nuclear weapon State would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The leaders directed the working group on nonproliferation to prepare assessments of proliferation threats in various regions of the world, to consider practical means of addressing those threats, to assess evidence regarding possible non-compliance with nonproliferation commitments, and to report to them periodically on its progress.

The two Presidents strongly supported the concrete progress recently made in their two countries' cooperation in ensuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that can be used in such weapons. They reiterated their call for broad and expanded cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, consistent with their international obligations, to strengthen national and international regimes of control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials, and to prevent illegal traffic in nuclear materials. They directed all relevant agencies and organizations in their respective countries to facilitate in a coordinated manner, effective cooperation to this end.

They directed that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission prepare a joint report on steps that have been accomplished and additional steps that should be taken to ensure the security of nuclear materials.

The leaders reaffirmed their strong support for the IAEA and reiterated their view that its safeguards programme plays a fundamental role in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. They stressed the importance of

enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and to provide increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities, in particular through the effort currently under way to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system.

The Presidents agreed that the formal participation of the Russian Federation in the multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes would significantly strengthen those regimes as well as broaden the basis for cooperation between the two countries on nonproliferation. They agreed to direct officials in their respective Governments to address expeditiously the issues affecting Russian membership in the various regimes, with a view to ensuring active United States support for Russian admission to each of the regimes at the earliest possible date.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE
PROCESS OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation,

After examining the exchange of views which took place during the December 1994 meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in regard to the aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, stocks of fissile materials, and their safety and security, as well as a discussion of the Joint Working Group on Nuclear Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility of further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons,

Reaffirm the commitment of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to the goal of nuclear disarmament and their desire to pursue further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction, as they agreed in January and September 1994,

Reaffirm the desire of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security and to develop a process for exchange of this information on a regular basis; and

Express the desire of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to establish as soon as possible concrete arrangements for enhancing transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction.

Taking into account the proposal by President B.N. Yeltsin for a treaty on nuclear safety and strategic stability among the five nuclear Powers, they declare that:

- Fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons being eliminated and excess to national security requirement will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons;
- No newly produced fissile materials will be used in nuclear weapons; and
- Fissile materials from or within civil nuclear programs will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will negotiate agreements to increase the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction that, inter alia, establish:

- An exchange on a regular basis of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security;

- A cooperative arrangement for reciprocal monitoring at storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements to help confirm the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, recognizing that progress in this area is linked to progress in implementing the joint United States-Russian program for the fissile material storage facility at Mayak; and
- Other cooperative measures, as necessary to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will strive to conclude as soon as possible agreements which are based on these principles.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will also examine and seek to define further measures to increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, including intergovernmental arrangements to extend cooperation to further phases of the process of eliminating nuclear weapons declared excess to national security requirements as a result of nuclear arms reduction.

The Presidents urged progress in implementing current agreements affecting the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons such as the 23 June 1994 agreement concerning the shutdown of plutonium production reactors and the cessation of use of newly produced plutonium for nuclear weapons, in all its interrelated provisions, including, inter alia, cooperation in creation of alternative energy sources, shutdown of plutonium production reactors mentioned above, and development of respective compliance procedures.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will seek to conclude in the shortest possible time an agreement for cooperation between their Governments enabling the exchange of information as necessary to implement the arrangements called for above, by providing for the protection of that information. No information will be exchanged until the respective arrangements enter into force.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation, taking into account the threat posed by worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology and the necessity of counteracting this threat, agreed on the following basic principles to serve as a basis for further discussions in order to reach agreement in the field of demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems.

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

The scale of deployment - in number and geographic scope - of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In the spirit of partnership, the Presidents undertook to promote reciprocal openness in activities of the sides in theater missile defense systems and in the exchange of corresponding information.

The Presidents confirmed the interest of the sides in the development and fielding of effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The sides will make every effort toward the goal of broadening bilateral cooperation in the area of defense against ballistic missiles. They will consider expanding cooperative efforts in theater missile defense technology and exercises, study ways of sharing data obtained through early warning systems, discuss theater missile defense architecture concepts, and seek opportunities for joint research and development in theater missile defense.

The Presidents undertook to continue a broad exchange of views and consultations on the question of theater missile defense at various levels.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin conducted a thorough review of progress toward their shared goal of a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. They agreed that the end of military confrontation, ideological conflict, and division of the Euro-Atlantic region into opposing blocs has created an historic opportunity for all of its peoples. They emphasized their determination to cooperate closely to ensure that in the future, all peoples of the Euro-Atlantic region shall enjoy the benefits of a stable, just and peaceful order.

The Presidents note that the task of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security now requires dealing with challenges very different from those of the Cold War era. Aggressive nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unresolved territorial disputes, and violations in the area of human rights present serious threats to stability, peace and prosperity. The Presidents agreed that the effort to deal with these challenges must be based on respect for the principles and commitments of the OSCE, particularly concerning democracy, political pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, free market economies and strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination.

The Presidents reviewed prospects for Euro-Atlantic structures in response to the opportunities and challenges posed by the new era. They agreed that the central element of a lasting peace must be the integration of all of Europe into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships which ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. The evolution of European structures should be directed toward the overall goal of integration. President Clinton stressed that the process should be transparent, inclusive and based on an integral relationship between the security of Europe and that of North America.

The Presidents note the historic task of working closely together toward fuller participation of democratic Russia and the United States of America in the range of worldwide political, economic, and security institutions of the 21st century. It was in this spirit that the two Presidents reviewed steps in the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system through the further development of relevant organizations and bilateral and regional cooperation. This includes the decision of Russia to proceed with its individual Partnership Program for the Partnership for Peace and with the document on a broad, enhanced Russia-NATO dialogue and cooperation.

President Clinton supported Russia's efforts to develop further its partnership and cooperation with the EU. He stressed United States' support for Russia's participation in the WTO, GATT and other institutions important to European and global economic and security architecture, as appropriate.

The Presidents agree that the OSCE's commitments in the areas of human rights economics, and security provide a foundation for their effort to build a stable and integrated Europe. In this regard, special attention should be devoted to strengthening the peacekeeping capabilities of the OSCE and to its potential in the sphere of preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Presidents recalled the decision of the December 1994 OSCE Summit in Budapest to develop a model for ensuring comprehensive security for Europe in the 21st century. The United States and Russia believe that such a model should aim to build an undivided Europe, a common space of security and stability and a system that ensures the widest cooperation and coordination among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. In this system, all States will have, as stated in Budapest, the inherent right of all States freely to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

The President of the Russian Federation welcomes the reaffirmation of the commitment of the United States to support the Russian Federation's participation as a founding member in the multilateral negotiations on elaborating a new international export control regime for the control of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

The President of the United States welcomes the Russian Federation's reaffirmation of its commitment made during the September 1994 Summit to undertake no new contracts or other agreements to transfer arms to Iran. This commitment is comprehensive and covers both arms and associated items.

The Presidents asked Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to record the details in an agreement no later than their meeting in June.
