

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss C.B. Onyoni (Kenya)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 706th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As you may be aware, the head of my delegation is unable to chair this meeting today and, therefore, in accordance with rule 10 of the Conference's rules of procedure, I will be replacing him. I am sure I can count on your cooperation and indulgence.

I should like, first of all, to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the newly appointed representatives of Finland, Ambassador Ekblom; of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer; Ambassador Icaza of Mexico; and Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia. I wish to assure them of our full support and cooperation in their new duties.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Japan, Romania, Argentina, the Islamic Republic of Iran, New Zealand and Belgium. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Ekblom.

Mr. EKBLÖM (Finland): Madam President, thank you for your kind words of welcome.

The CD is starting its second round of this year's session in the aftermath of the review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Finland welcomes the historic decision to make the NPT permanent. Despite differences in the political and security perspectives between States parties, the Conference was able to reach a consensus decision. The States parties demonstrated their shared interest in the benefits of the Treaty. The global norm was further strengthened. I would like to pay a special tribute in this connection to South Africa. South Africa's innovative ideas for improving the future implementation of the NPT laid the basis for a consensus decision on indefinite extension.

The fact that the NPT is now permanent has thoroughly changed the normative environment in which nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are pursued. This is a new departure. A need to look forward was underlined by the decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as on the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty. Finland supports these decisions as a framework for future non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

We hope that the new environment in multilateral disarmament will encourage a process of regeneration that makes it more responsive to today's - and tomorrow's - needs. That would create better prospects for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Much rests upon the CD, as the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Finland looks forward to rapid progress in a number of areas and is ready to contribute to that end. I would therefore like to take up the following areas that, in our view, deserve immediate attention.

First, review of the agenda and programme of work of the CD. The annual debate about the traditional agenda of the CD should be finally laid to rest.

(Mr. Ekblom, Finland)

Instead, the Conference should concentrate, on an annual basis, on operational priorities. This year, the process of establishing ad hoc committees has been far from exemplary. In our view, discussion on this subject should not be prolonged any further. Of the ad hoc committees that have been under discussion, the Committee on Transparency in Armaments is the one that offers new ground for multilateral work. Regrettably, the same cannot be said of the committees dealing with security assurances and outer space. However, new possibilities for a fresh approach could perhaps be found in the discussion of security assurances after the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 - a resolution which we certainly welcome.

We urge the CD to launch the committees now. Above all, we hope that the Committee on the cut-off negotiations could start immediately.

Secondly, review of the procedures of the CD. More efforts should be made to streamline the procedures of the Conference. The value of increased flexibility has become obvious. In this context, I want to raise two specific issues. We believe that all interested States that participate in the work of the Conference, even if not members, should be more effectively involved in the informal work of the Conference, including Presidential consultations and consultations relating to committees as well as - on a case-by-case basis - in group consultations. This would facilitate the participation and the commitment of these countries in the work of the Conference as well as enhance the cooperation between all the participating States in pursuit of global disarmament objectives.

In addition, the practice by which each year several weeks are spent on report-writing should be critically reviewed. In our view, a brief technical report could well replace the existing CD report to the General Assembly. Substantive positions are already reflected in official documents and recorded statements.

Thirdly, review of the composition of the CD. The Conference should finally conclude the endless discussion on the expansion of its membership. Inconclusive talk begins to reflect upon the CD's credibility as a whole. It is simply unacceptable that an objection to one candidate prevents the entry of the rest, including Finland. In our view the Conference could move on this issue by adopting a solution with a qualifying statement to the effect that, for reasons relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security, one new member is subject to international action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Alternatively, the Conference could agree to replace that one country in the proposed list with one or more other candidate countries.

Fourthly, the cut-off negotiations. We hope that the cut-off negotiations will start without further delay. We regard the questions relating to fissile material stockpiles as being of major importance. Nevertheless, calls for inclusion of stockpiles in the negotiations are clearly counterproductive, if the consequence is that the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes is thereby delayed.

(Mr. Ekblom, Finland)

In the context of the cut-off, a much closer relationship needs to be developed with the expertise available in Vienna than is the case with the CTBT negotiations.

Fifthly, the CTBT negotiations. The success of the NPT Conference should facilitate the CTBT negotiations. A clear objective has now been established. The CD should complete the negotiations no later than 1996. This clearly means that the participating States must continue intensive negotiations throughout the second half of 1995. Skipping extensive report-writing is a good idea in this context as well.

Finland urges all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from test explosions. It was with deep disappointment that we learned of yet another Chinese nuclear explosion, and only days after the nuclear-weapon States, including China, had pledged to exercise utmost restraint in this regard. Continued nuclear testing does not fit anyone's definition of utmost restraint. It certainly does not fit ours.

A universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT is now within reach. Let us all now work together to finally put an end to the era of nuclear-test explosions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Madam President, at the outset, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Nanjira, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, and his delegation for the devoted efforts toward good and effective management of the Conference which were amply demonstrated during the previous plenary meetings. I am confident that under your able guidance the Conference will be able to work productively and I assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation to that end.

Today I wish to present brief observations on some disarmament issues, in view, in particular, of the achievements of the NPT review and extension Conference held during our inter-sessional period.

Japan is satisfied that there exists a general will in support of the stabilization and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As was stated by Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, immediately after their adoption, Japan welcomes wholeheartedly the decisions taken without a vote at the NPT Conference; namely, a decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, as well as decisions on "strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Minister Kono, who had attended the Conference, had re-emphasized Japan's position to seek the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, based on Japan's experience as a country that suffered the consequences of nuclear bombs, and at the same time, from the stand of clearly renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, had

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

expressed Japan's support for the indefinite extension of the NPT, which played an important role in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, he had expressed his hope that as many States parties as possible share this basic view of Japan, which, it may be argued, turned out to be true.

The document "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" lists in paragraph 4 as the important measures in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty (a) the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996, (b) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention, and (c) the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

With respect to reductions of nuclear weapons, Japan sincerely hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will take it upon themselves to pursue, with determination, systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their elimination, in response to the trust placed in them by non-nuclear-weapon States.

As for the cut-off negotiations, my delegation fully agrees that the negotiations should be commenced immediately here in the CD and efforts should be made for an early conclusion of the negotiations. In this connection, Japan supports Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on this subject.

As is envisaged in the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", we, the CD collectively, should spare no efforts to have the CTBT negotiations concluded as soon as possible but no later than 1996. The work on a CTBT in this second part has already been started. Japan, for its part, is ready to make all possible efforts to that end.

In this connection, the "Principles and objectives" also state that "pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint".

It is extremely regrettable that the People's Republic of China conducted another nuclear test on 15 May, in addition to those in June and October last year, immediately after the NPT Conference had decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely and to strengthen the NPT regime, thereby giving a new hope to the international community on steady promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Japan once again strongly urges China not to repeat nuclear testing, and also appeals to other nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should endeavour to achieve steady progress on arms control and disarmament, so that the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world may come closer to reality.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): It is a great pleasure for me to speak before the Conference on Disarmament in the aftermath of the historic decision taken by the NPT review and extension Conference to make the non-proliferation Treaty permanent. This decision, together with that on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the resolution endorsing the Middle East peace process objectives, including the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, are indeed a valuable outcome and strong foundation for future achievements in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament, an important contribution to the strengthening of international security and stability.

Thus reinforced, the NPT is called to play an improved pivotal role in consolidating nuclear stability, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the disarmament process, as well as in deepening international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Yet we owe ourselves further, unabated work for ensuring the universality the NPT needs in order to achieve its generally commendable goals.

The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely is a crucial event not only for the non-proliferation regime but also because it opened a new, challenging chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. It is now high time for us all to redouble efforts aimed at ridding the world of the threat of mass destruction and to build up a more secure international environment.

Under the permanent NPT the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to play an enhanced role in - at the very least - finalizing the comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996, launching substantive and productive negotiations on a cut-off treaty, and deepening the dialogue on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The first part of this year's session registered encouraging progress in important areas of negotiation on a CTBT. Yet major issues remain to be solved, such as the scope of the treaty and basic obligations, the shape of the international monitoring system, the financing of verification activities, the future CTBT organization.

Romania shares the view that the CTBT must ban all nuclear tests, everywhere and forever. At the same time, it would be unrealistic for the treaty to apply to activities which are not practically verifiable, such as computer simulations and laboratory experiments. What we need is a credible, effective instrument that serves indeed the non-proliferation goals.

The Romanian Government highly appreciates the recent decision taken by the United Kingdom and France to give up the proposal intended to allow test explosions in exceptional circumstances as a major breakthrough in moving towards agreement on the scope article.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

We also welcome the progress made so far in the drafting of the treaty articles on the international monitoring system. Such a system, supported by efficient on-site inspections, consultations and clarification procedures, will be able to accurately deter suspect events and possible non-compliance.

Signing the CTB treaty next year is a bold but attainable aim. The accomplishment of this aim requires consistent endeavours by all participating States for preserving and improving the international climate of mutual confidence. We welcome and appreciate the commitment of all the five nuclear-weapon States to embrace a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1996.

Romania was among those countries who have resolutely been supporting the early starting of negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. My Government maintains the view that codifying the cessation of the production of weapons-grade materials in a legally binding instrument would reassure the world community that these materials are not being secretly produced or procured. Furthermore, it would help to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda and constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In our view, at this initial stage the cut-off negotiations should focus mainly on the question of treaty scope and effective verification. We should aim at ensuring its non-discriminatory character and universal adherence to it. The Romanian delegation will be pleased to elaborate further on these important topics in the framework of the respective Ad Hoc Committee, which we hope will start working soon.

Turning to another important issue, namely NSA, I would like to reiterate my country's satisfaction at the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 984 on 11 April 1995 and the individual declarations of the five nuclear-weapon Powers on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and assistance in cases of aggression with such arms. We consider this a major achievement which mirrors the ever-growing international spirit of mutual understanding, as a dividend of the post-cold-war era. This encouraging trend must continue and improve qualitatively. The discussions among the P5 and, perhaps, in the broader framework of the Conference on Disarmament should create the necessary conditions for eventually starting negotiation on a legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States - a long-awaited goal in the overall peace and stability process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): We have asked for the floor merely to draw the Conference's attention to document CD/1314, by means of which we have conveyed to this Conference a statement made on the 23rd of this month by the Argentine Government on the nuclear explosion carried out by the People's Republic of China on 15 May last.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): I am taking the floor this morning to report to this Conference the response of the New Zealand Government and people to the underground nuclear-weapon test conducted by China on 15 May at Lop Nor.

The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement the following day in which he conveyed the sense of extreme shock felt by all New Zealanders at the news of the test. The Minister added that the action should be "strongly condemned" coming as it did immediately after the decision in New York to make the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty permanent.

The New Zealand Government believes that China's failure to declare a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme runs counter to China's responsibility as a major Power and permanent member of the Security Council. There can be no justification for any testing, especially now that China and the other nuclear-weapons States have agreed to a deadline for completion of this Conference's CTBT negotiations no later than 1996.

The strong protest of the New Zealand Government and people has been conveyed directly to the Chinese authorities in both Beijing and Wellington. We urge China to heed the many calls made in relation to this latest test and to announce a permanent moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the conclusion of the CTBT and its entry into force.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wish first to extend my sincere congratulations to Ambassador D.D.C. Don Nanjira for assuming the post of the presidency of this august body. I wish him all success and assure him of the full cooperation of my delegation. I would also thank Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, the outgoing President of the Conference who guided the Conference very efficiently and skilfully during the previous month. I would further express my sincere appreciation to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, for their very valuable contribution to the work of the Conference.

The NPT review and extension Conference and hesitation about its possible outcome had been a major preoccupation for many States for sometime, and lack of consensus on the form of the future life of the Treaty had cast a shadow on disarmament negotiations in various areas.

We were faced with a divided camp. A group including some of the nuclear-weapon States argued that the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and a limited life-span would weaken the resolve to pursue nuclear disarmament. Others had major concern about the selective

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

implementation of the NPT and considered it very difficult to agree on its unconditional and unlimited extension under those circumstances.

This wide and seemingly unbridgeable gap was eventually closed through a renewal of commitments on principles and actions originated from the Treaty and increased accountability through strengthening the review mechanism in exchange for avoiding a vote on an indefinite extension.

Those of us who have been in the Conference would agree, I am sure, that the negotiations in New York were arduous, and at times frustrating; at the same time they were serious and business-like. As the result we had, at the end, a Declaration that enjoyed full consensus with no reservation or variations of interpretations. Some, including us, may have desired, of course, the declaration to be more far-reaching, particularly on nuclear disarmament. But we decided to maintain what we all fully shared and agreed to and avoid what could be subject to further contention and controversy.

It was understood, therefore, that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and those who pursued fervently a permanent treaty, were fully committed to all the principles and actions in the declaration and its faithful implementation. That we should consider a significant achievement. We should also expect that the sense of positiveness that prevailed at the end should now illuminate negotiations in various fields of disarmament.

Here at the Conference on Disarmament we recognize that we have not been off to a good start. The first part of the session has been overwhelmed by disagreement on procedures and organization of work. Despite substantial and devoted efforts of the current and previous Presidents, we were unable to commence or continue negotiations on the issues that we should deal with.

I believe that the commitments in New York should now help the Conference on Disarmament to come to an agreement on its activities for the remainder of the session.

Aside from important agreements on peaceful use, compliance and universality, that relate directly to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, a programme of action was decided at the NPT Conference. That programme includes the conclusion of the CTBT, no later than 1996, immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations on cut-off and systematic and progressive efforts towards reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. A decision was also made to take further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

On this basis, we must pursue, more vigorously, the negotiations on CTBT in order to conclude the treaty before 1996. This requires that we zero in on basic issues involved such as the scope and the verification system and agree on them during this session.

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

On cut-off we ought to be able now to move quickly to convene the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator under item 2 of our agenda.

On nuclear disarmament we should strive to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. In the case that it does not meet the consensus at this stage, then, as the minimum, a Special Coordinator should be appointed to consult with the members with a view to reaching agreement on the manner in which the determined pursuit and the systematic efforts for nuclear disarmament may be structured.

On negative security assurances the agreement that such assurances could be included in the treaty should now open the way for renewed negotiations at the Ad Hoc Committee leading to a more definite outcome.

It must also be noted that on the important issue of transparency in nuclear armaments, a major point of concern for non-nuclear-weapon States, it was understood that the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA is the most appropriate setting for its consideration. This understanding should now help us in agreeing to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee with an adjusted mandate that will include this issue.

We believe that the agreement on organization of the work could quickly be complemented by agreement on other matters of procedure including the appointment of the chairmen and setting the timetable of the committees, etc.

The Conference on Disarmament is charged with additional responsibility now in the aftermath of the NPT. Its deliberations, and its failures and successes, would be closely examined, inter alia, at the 1997 NPT review and the upcoming 1997 fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Time is short - we need to act quickly. We need to appear and behave, more than ever before, as a united camp. That, I contend, is the earnest desire and the solid resolve of all of us here.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Madam President, allow me first of all to tell you how pleased my country is to see Kenya taking up the Chair of this Conference. We are sure that under your authority we will make clear progress. In any event you can be assured of the full cooperation of my delegation.

On the occasion of the resumption of the work of the CD, my Government would like to say how pleased it is at the success of the review and extension Conference for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has just taken place in New York. We believe that above and beyond the decision taken there to extend the Treaty indefinitely - thus securing the foundations of international security in the future - its success is due to the fact that the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were also adopted. These are designed to serve as guidelines for all our future activities and they also specify that the nuclear Powers should exercise "utmost restraint" with respect to nuclear tests. In the light of these

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

principles, the fact that - on the very day after they were adopted by consensus - China proceeded to conduct a new nuclear test is absolutely shocking and indeed provocative, and my Government cannot but deplore this fact, for it runs truly counter to the spirit of our negotiations. At the same time, I would say that paradoxically this event, far from slowing down negotiations on the CTBT, underlines the urgent need for their completion. While regretting the event, let us therefore at the same time draw the lesson from it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer.

Mr. LAFER (Brazil): Madam President, in its intervention during the 30 April plenary meeting, my delegation had occasion to voice its satisfaction to have a representative of friendly Kenya in the high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am glad to renew these expressions to you today.

I take the floor mainly to thank you for the kind words of welcome you have addressed to me on my assumption of the leadership of the Brazilian delegation to the CD.

Disarmament is a subject I have followed closely and made contributions on both in my academic and in my political life. My dealings with disarmament-related activities at the United Nations have, for instance, included participation in the 1991 Group of Experts that advised then Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on the potential uses of resources allocated to military activities in favour of civilian efforts to promote the environment.

In 1992, as Minister of External Relations of Brazil, I had the pleasure to initiate, in close coordination with other Latin American nations, the amendment process of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which paved the way for the full participation of my country and others in that Treaty's regime and in effect rendering Latin America the first populated nuclear-weapon-free zone of our planet.

Recent international developments and my own previous experience seem to indicate that I have arrived at a particularly critical juncture for the CD, one that encompasses both great difficulties as well as unique opportunities. Important steps could be taken in a fundamental dimension of peace-building - instrumental pacifism - which involves the control and reduction of armaments as the instruments and technical means of war. I am sure this forum will rise to the challenge. Let me assure you that Brazil is ready to carry on giving its contribution to all efforts towards a world progressively deprived of the means to annihilate human civilization and to inflict pain and suffering to peoples, as a country whose credentials in this area include having renounced the possession of nuclear weapons; not having been involved in any armed conflict - with the exception of World War II - in more than a century; maintaining relations of

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

friendship and cooperation with all of its 10 neighbours; and having one of the world's lowest military expenditures in terms of GNP.

Mr. WANG (China) (translated from Chinese): Madam President, I am most pleased to see you presiding over the CD's work. The Chinese delegation would like to assure you of its full cooperation. At the same time, it would also take this opportunity to welcome other new representatives. In view of the contents of the statements made previously on behalf of the Chinese delegation I would like to make the following statement.

The Chinese Government has always exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing. The number of nuclear tests conducted by China is extremely limited.

On 15 May, China conducted an underground nuclear test. Thereafter, a spokesman from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, elaborating once again the consistent position of the Chinese Government on the issues of nuclear tests and security assurances.

Here I would like to reiterate that China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and favours an early conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear test ban within that framework. With this objective in mind, China has given its active support to the CD for its negotiations on the CTBT and has actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the CTBT with a serious, pragmatic and responsible approach. The international community, including China, has generally expressed the hope that the treaty will be concluded at an early date, but no later than 1996. The Chinese Government has stated on many occasions that upon the entry into force of the CTBT, China will abide by the treaty and stop nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: As you are aware, there are still a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session which are still the subject of ongoing consultations. It was my hope that progress could have been achieved on some of these issues during the inter-sessional period, which would have allowed us to make an effective start to the second part of our session. However, it appears that further consultations are needed to overcome remaining difficulties. I therefore urge all delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

At my request, the secretariat has circulated a tentative timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 June 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.