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LETTER DATED 5 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith answers by a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to questions put by the Korean Central News Agency on 3 May 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Answers by a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to questions put by the Korean Central
News Agency on 3 May 1994

We have recently exchanged telex messages several times with the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning the replacement of the fuel rods at the 5-megawatt experimental nuclear power station.

We decided to place the fuel-rod replacement strictly under the surveillance of IAEA, out of the consistent position to show the honesty of our nuclear activities, despite our unique status after a temporary suspension of the effectuation of our declared withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Hence, we decided to allow the IAEA inspectors to be present at the place of the fuel-rod replacement and verify the non-diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes.

The activities of IAEA that we allowed include the observation of the fuel-rod replacement, containment and surveillance over all replaced fuel and other sufficient inspections needed for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.

And we did not delay the issue of entry visas to five inspectors selected by the IAEA side.

Thus, we have done all we can to prove the transparency of our nuclear activities despite our unique status.

This notwithstanding, the IAEA secretariat is raising an unreasonable demand for selecting, preserving and measuring some fuel at the time of the fuel-rod replacement.

The selective measurement of the fuel rod can never be allowed because it means routine and ad hoc inspections that ignore our unique status following the temporary suspension of the effectuation of our declared withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The inspection activities we can allow in our voluntary measure of good will at this moment are only inspections to confirm that there is no diversion of nuclear material to other purposes, so as to maintain the continuity of safeguards in conformity with our unique status.

It is, truth to tell, the expression of our best will that we decided this time to place all the replaced fuel rods under the containment and surveillance of IAEA and allow the inspectors to verify non-diversion of nuclear material.

Yet the Agency secretariat is persisting in its untenable demand, openly ignoring our unique status. This is an indication that it is still taking a

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partial attitude, remaining blindly "suspicious" of us. This is patent proof that the partiality of the Agency continues expanding.

The demand for selective measurement of the fuel rods on the part of the Agency secretariat, which faked up "inconsistency" in the past even by destroying its judging sample, is in the final analysis proof that it is intending to resort to pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by inventing another "inconsistency".

It must not go unnoticed that the Agency has not yet sent its inspectors group, although we allowed an inspection for the continuity of safeguards and even the so-called "unfinished inspection activities" that were raised at the time of the inspection in March.

This clearly proves that the Agency secretariat sought an insidious political purpose when it raised our "nuclear problem" at the meeting of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council.

This being the situation, it is crystal clear that, if we allow the selective measurement of the fuel rods, the Agency secretariat will find a new pretext to put pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

We can no longer allow the Agency secretariat to use our "nuclear problem" as a political expedient.

If the Agency secretariat refuses to accept our reasonable proposal and persists in its unreasonable demand, we will have no other alternative but to replace the fuel rods according to our operation plan.

The replacement of fuel rods is an urgent issue that can be delayed no longer either from the technical point of view or for the sake of security.

Whether the inspectors are present or not, the spent fuel-rod counter, the thermo-luminescence detector and monitoring apparatuses, installed by IAEA at the experimental nuclear power station are operating continuously, and this means that our fuel-rod replacement is carried out strictly under the surveillance of IAEA.

We will place all the replaced fuel under the control of IAEA and allow its measurement when the nuclear issue is resolved in a package deal at the future Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America talks.

If the IAEA secretariat carries the situation to extremes despite our utmost magnanimity and good will, we will resolutely counter it.

The IAEA secretariat must ponder it over at this crucial moment in the settlement of the nuclear issue.
