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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 12 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

GE.93-62001 (E)

<u>The PRESIDENT</u> (<u>translated from Arabic</u>): I declare open the 660th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I shall now make my opening statement in my capacity as the new President of the Conference on Disarmament.

Both I personally and my country, Egypt, are happy and honoured that I am assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this final stage of its plenary session in 1993. During the last few weeks of our work we will naturally be devoting ourselves to an important and difficult task. However, the cooperation of all will facilitate this task of drafting the report of the Conference on its plenary session in 1993. This period will also allow us to review the serious work that we have diligently carried out since January. We will be motivated by a desire to evaluate whatever progress we may have achieved. I am confident that, with the support of the secretariat under the Wise leadership of Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and his efficient staff, the final phase of the work of the Conference will be crowned with success.

At the outset I wish to thank Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he has presided over our Conference during the past weeks. I look forward to ongoing fruitful cooperation with him during our weekly presidential consultations.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to warmly welcome our new colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Ambassadors Valentin Dobrev of Bulgaria, José Urrutia of Peru, Grigory Berdennikov of the Russian Federation and Baron Alain Guillaume of Belgium. I also wish to bid farewell and express my appreciation for the contributions made to the Conference on Disarmament by colleagues who have left us to take up new duties and responsibilities. I refer in particular to Ambassadors Michel Servais of Belgium, Serguei Batsanov of the Russian Federation and Celso Amorim of Brazil.

During the period from 28 to 30 June 1993, Cairo hosted the twenty-ninth regular session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, under the chairmanship of Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, for the second time in four years. At that meeting the 1993 Cairo Declaration on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity was adopted. The Heads of State and Government of States members of the OAU noted in paragraph 14 of the Declaration that:

"Security and stability have always been our priority concern at the national and regional levels for the achievement of development and integration in the socio-economic and cultural fields, in accordance with the aspirations of our Governments and peoples so that Africa could become a safe continent, free of weapons of mass destruction and free of all threats and pressures".

The Declaration further noted that "The establishment of peace and security ... will lead to the reduction of defence expenditure".

(The President)

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU also issued a Declaration in which a mechanism for conflicts prevention, management and resolution was set up. Such a mechanism will have a direct bearing on disarmament efforts in Africa, and falls within the context of the Secretary-General's agenda for peace issued by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as it is a mechanism of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Also in the African context is the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. You are well aware of the fact that a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa is at an advanced stage of preparation, as a result of the constructive work carried out by a group of experts which was designated by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, and which held its last meeting at Harare in April 1993. The report of the group of experts will be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/76. We hope that the draft treaty will be finalized during 1994, with a view to paving the way for its signature and for the implementation of its provisions.

I wish to remind the Conference, on this occasion, of President Hosni Mubarak's 1990 proposal to establish in the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. This proposal remains a matter of high priority and we hope that tangible steps will be taken for its early implementation. I also wish to remind the Conference of the previous proposal which was submitted in 1974 to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free It is also important to recall, on this occasion, the final document of zone. the Tenth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Jakarta in September 1992, in which the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement expressed the hope that the new global environment would lead to "the renunciation of strategic doctrines based on the use of nuclear weapons and to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction". The leaders also noted that "the rational option is to seek security for all through total nuclear disarmament, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and through the balanced and progressive reductions of conventional armaments at the global and regional levels". The Jakarta Final Document also deplored "the lack of progress on measures to provide assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, while welcoming the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, gave priority to negotiations and other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, such as a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear wars, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They emphasized the need to reinvigorate multilateral disarmament endeavours and, in this context, they called for broader and more active participation by non-aligned countries in the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

In this respect, it is worth quoting the Jakarta Message of the Tenth Non-Aligned Summit, which expressed deep concern at the negative impact of global military expenditure on the world economy:

"Resources released through disarmament and arms reduction should be rechannelled towards the economic and social development of all countries and especially of the developing countries. This will at the same time facilitate the attainment of security at lower levels of armaments".

The conclusions of the Tenth Non-Aligned Summit in this regard were confirmed by the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly in its resolution 47/52 F, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", which was adopted in the General Assembly without a vote.

You will recall that, at the beginning of our session for this year, we adopted a nine-item agenda and we agreed to establish four ad hoc committees covering four priority items. The active and vigorous way in which the work of our Conference began this year was indeed encouraging under the wise presidency of Ambassador Celso Amorim, the former Ambassador of Brazil. It is worthwhile to recall here that, at the beginning of our session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. Amre Moussa, made a statement in the plenary of the Conference on 28 January 1993 in which he noted two fundamental criteria which should remain at the forefront of our concerns, firstly that security be achieved at lower levels of armament, and secondly that States have equal obligations and should make equal commitments in the field of disarmament.

The historic developments which we have recently witnessed with respect to the nuclear test ban are highly encouraging and welcome. They are a source of hope for us. I would like in this connection to congratulate the Governments of the United States, France and the Russian Federation for their decision to extend their voluntary nuclear testing moratoria and for their support for the early commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I also wish in this respect to express Egypt's full satisfaction at the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament, at the last meeting on 10 August held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Cuba, of a decision calling upon the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct consultations during the inter-sessional period, that is from 3 September next to 17 January 1994, on the specific mandate for, and the organization of the negotiations for a CTBT. We hope that these consultations will yield positive results. Here I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, who has shown remarkable foresight in choosing to dedicate much of this year's time in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to expert presentations on the various aspects of verification of a CTBT. These presentations have helped us all to understand the benefits and drawbacks of each specific verification technique, be it seismic or non-seismic. We are now in a much better position to embark on an active negotiating process in the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 47/76.

(<u>The President</u>)

For its part, Egypt hopes that we can rapidly proceed to the adoption of a specific negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee and then go on to the negotiating phase on the basis of already existing drafts. In this respect we express our appreciation to the delegation of Sweden for the updated version of a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty contained in document CD/1202 and we will carefully study this draft. Egypt is prepared to make full use of the inter-sessional period so as to proceed as expeditiously as possible to that end.

With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Egypt continues to hold the view that those States which have voluntarily rejected the nuclear option must be given comprehensive assurances against their being exposed to, or threatened by a nuclear attack. Such assurances, contained in an international legally-binding treaty, must be unconditional and in no way limited in scope, framework or duration. Furthermore, they must be negotiated multilaterally in conformity with General Assembly resolution 47/50 and, in particular, operative paragraph 7 of that resolution. Here I would like to make specific reference, with appreciation, to the proposal submitted by the delegation of Nigeria in document CD/768. I also wish to pay tribute to the efforts of Ambassador Neagu of Romania for the efforts he exerted during his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee and during its deliberations on this very important item.

On this same question, I would simply like to add that we continue to believe that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) falls short of providing comprehensive security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States. It needs to be supplemented and we should try to cover this in the draft treaty referred to above. There is no doubt that the achievement of speedy progress in regard to a comprehensive nuclear test ban and full-scope nuclear security assurances in favour of the non-nuclear States would pave the way for the success of the review and extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the conference which is to be held for this purpose in the year 1995.

In our view, this treaty should be universal and so far it has not yet achieved its objective which, according to article 6 of the Treaty, is complete nuclear disarmament. It is worthy of mention that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, emphasized in his statement before this Conference on 28 January 1993, the question "how to ensure that the NPT, or the non-proliferation regime which has the NPT as its cornerstone, truly acquire a universal character. NPT parties and non-parties alike must find ways and means to achieve the objective of preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons". The 1995 NPT Conference provides us with an opportunity to come together and develop a new nuclear non-proliferation contract for the twenty-first century.

The Ad Hoc Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under the able guidance of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, has focused its attention this year on the issue of confidence-building measures. This trend is also reflected in the work of the friend of the Chairman on the legal and

(The President)

terminological matters as well as in the work of the three rounds of talks on confidence-building measures conducted by the three successive friends of the Chairman from the Russian Federation. Within this framework I would like to refer to the presentation made before this Ad Hoc Committee last week by the Egyptian expert, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Hadi, Chairman of the National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences in Egypt. This presentation made before the Ad Hoc Committee dealt with verification through the use of satellites as a confidence-building measure in the field of disarmament. He stressed, in particular, the need for developing countries to benefit from that technology in this vital sphere. Although we have always emphasized the usefulness of confidence-building measures, we nevertheless firmly believe that the discussion of those measures should in no way detract from the essential raison d'être of the establishment of this Committee; nor should the Committee's discussions be confined to confidence-building measures. In our view, the most effective confidence-building measure would be an overall negotiating mandate, which would allow us to ban all military activities in outer space.

This year the Conference on Disarmament has for the first time established an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, in response to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, operative paragraphs 12 to 15. During the second and third parts of the session, over which I had the honour to preside, the Committee has held substantive discussions on various aspects of transparency in armaments and numerous working papers and constructive proposals have been submitted on this important issue. The challenge still facing the Committee is to ensure the timely and successful completion of its work through fruitful discussions and an exchange of views on this issue.

Finally, I wish to pay a special tribute to my colleagues Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, for the excellent work that they have diligently carried out in connection with non-proliferation, enhancement of the Conference's effectiveness and expansion of its membership.

In concluding my statement on my assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to express my confidence that your cooperation will provide us with opportunities to succeed on the conclusion of this session on 6 September next.

<u>Mr. BENHIMA</u> (Morocco) (<u>translated from French</u>): Mr. President, your rich and diverse experience, your many different titles and your commitment to such an international, universal and humanitarian cause as disarmament strengthen our belief that with your idealism and realism you will have a successful term of office.

Tribute is due to the competence and efficiency with which your predecessors in the chair, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba and Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, directed our work.

Having had the privilege of representing Morocco in the Conference on Disarmament for eight years and having felt the frustration born of the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

paralysis which afflicted it and of the peripheral role to which it was relegated because the code of conduct imposed by the cold war left the Conference in the inglorious position of taking note of matters concluded elsewhere and barred it from taking up the mandate it had been given, I am heartened, as my term of duty reaches its close, to be able to note how much progress has been made recently, progress that can be seen first and foremost in the change in attitudes. True, the upheavals on the world stage have played a large part in this.

The conclusion last year of the Chemical Weapons Convention enhanced the Conference's credibility and opened up new horizons for its work. The transitional phase it is now going through gives the Conference an opportunity to strengthen its structure, improve its functioning and go into matters more thoroughly, with a view to negotiating and concluding new agreements.

Continuing with this train of thought, my delegation is of the view that it is time to come up with appropriate answers to the issues of expanding the membership of the Conference and revising its agenda. My delegation, recognizing the added riches that diversity brings and the need for the Conference to adopt a political configuration better suited to the new realities, is in principle in favour of expansion provided that it does not denature the Conference's mandate as a negotiating body.

Revision of the agenda is also becoming necessary, the better to respond to priority concerns which require special attention. Concentration on a reduced number of topics where substantial progress is possible should not, however, divert us from subjects which could be revived at the right moment.

Here, two points seem to us to require attention: the nuclear test ban and security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The conditions are now to hand for furnishing the Conference with the instruments needed to begin negotiations in these two areas of fundamental importance for the maintenance and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime.

In this regard, my delegation welcomes the positive attitude of the major nuclear Powers, which say they are ready to take part in negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear tests of all kinds. The impact such a treaty would have on the success of efforts to stop the qualitative improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons is undeniable. My delegation hails the recent decision by the United States, France and Russia to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing. This decision will help to create a climate of confidence favourable to the opening of negotiations. The Conference, as the only multilateral body, is clearly the appropriate forum in which to conduct such negotiations. Hence my delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Conference on 10 August and hopes that the talks that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee will hold during the inter-sessional period to hammer out the details of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate will be successful.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Besides dispelling all the concerns about environmental damage, a nuclear test ban would undoubtedly increase the chances of success at the NPT Review Conference for which preparations are already under way; the NPT is, in the eyes of the international community, an essential tool for the maintenance of peace and security. The ban would also illustrate the will of all nuclear Powers to embark upon general and complete nuclear disarmament, which alone can free humanity from this terrifying weapon whose use is a denial of the highest values of civilization.

Pending the attainment of this object, the non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to demand and obtain suitable assurances against the threat or use of such weapons. For this reason we favour the swift adoption of a legally binding international instrument.

In addressing this Conference for the last time, its senior, that is to say, longest-standing member cannot resist the temptation to proffer some personal comments.

Disarmament in the sense we understand it should, it seems to me, illustrate the conjunction of two kinds of intellectual process: action and deliberation. All of us, despite the individual styles we follow, seek to reconcile needs and aspirations, conventions and intellectual rules.

The Conference is not just a gathering of major Powers ever ready to ordain and dispose in matters of war and peace without regard for the rest. Interdependence must stop being regarded as an intellectual truism, because, for a global destiny in a world future from which no country can escape, the sharing of responsibility by all seems to be the only option that is convincing, credible and capable of promoting and preserving peace.

People have often tried to persuade themselves that discussions on disarmament were for nuclear-weapon States only, and this has led to forces being evaluated in terms of vectors and megatons and technology, in other words, to accounting in terms of death and destruction. Has there not been, because of efforts to ward off the possibility of a nuclear confrontation as an isolated event, a failure to analyse the situation on the planet, where there continue to be confrontations, involving more traditional means which lead just as surely to wasteful over-armament at the expense of development and to the formation of foci of tension that make the defences of peace very shaky.

Peace today is peace through disarmament, and disarmament is a serious and arduous undertaking that will remain apocryphal until the specific problem of verification has been resolved.

Peace and disarmament today represent the solution to a complex equation involving a multitude of variables from domains as different as science, patience and conscience. They require, too, an enabling spirit which I would describe as a particular kind of diplomacy which gives multilateral negotiations every chance.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

I would not like to close without welcoming our new colleagues, Ambassadors Valentin Dobrev of Bulgaria, José Urrutia of Peru, Grigory Berdennikov of the Russian Federation and Alain Guillaume of Belgium. They will, we are sure, make their contribution within this body towards the mobilization of consciences in the service of the clearest imperative of our age: making disarmament a reality deriving from a global policy in the service of peace and the survival of culture, in other words the survival of mankind. As an Arabic saying has it, if man wills, fate must needs respond.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Benhima, Morocco's representative in the Conference on Disarmament, for his valuable comments, his kind words concerning the presidency and his farewell statement, which we followed with great interest. Ambassador El Ghali Benhima is endowed with diplomatic skill and experience and remarkable qualities which we have all appreciated during the eight years in which he has represented his country at Geneva, especially in the Conference on Disarmament. He participated in the Conference for the first time in early February 1986 and I personally had the opportunity to realize the extent of his excellent qualities much earlier, since we made each other's acquaintance when I was serving as my country's ambassador to His Majesty's Government at Rabat.

One of the greatest experiences of my professional life was my period of service at Rabat and I have retained the best of memories of Morocco since that time. Ambassador Benhima is the dean of ambassadors accredited to the Conference on Disarmament. Although his influence on our work has certainly extended beyond that, it is worthwhile mentioning that his contribution to the work of the Conference was outstanding when he presided over the Conference at one of the most difficult and trying periods of its work. That is the mission I am assuming today.

We shall miss Ambassador Benhima, not only for his valuable contribution to the work of the Conference but also for his kind and warm personality which, together with his superb diplomatic abilities, will carry him far in the service of his country. On behalf of all of you, I should like to wish Ambassador and Mrs. Benhima every success and happiness in their future life.

<u>Mr. WAGENMAKERS</u> (Netherlands): Mr. President, as this is the first occasion I am taking the floor under your presidency, let me congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency and assure you of my delegation's full support. You are the son of a great nation, representing one of the oldest civilizations, cultures and bureaucracies in the world. The Egyptian contributions to the work of the Conference on Disarmament stand out for their quality and eminence. The Netherlands enjoys excellent relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt. I hope that in my modest way I will be able to contribute under your presidency to the success of our Conference on Disarmament.

I would also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba. It is with sadness that I listened to the farewell address of my long time neighbour, Ambassador El Ghani Benhima of Morocco. My best wishes accompany him for

(<u>Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands</u>)

both his personal and professional future. At the same time I avail myself of this opportunity to welcome warmly the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium, our Benelux-partner, Ambassador Alain Baron Guillaume, as well as Ambassador Valentin Dobrev of Bulgaria and Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov of the Russian Federation.

Last Tuesday, 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament achieved a genuine breakthrough. The Conference on Disarmament decided to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Furthermore, the Conference requested the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to make the necessary arrangements to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September and 17 January on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation.

The breakthrough on the test-ban negotiations has to be perceived in the broader context of general political developments outside the Conference, especially those that recently occurred. Inside the Conference the breakthrough was greatly facilitated by the recent initiative taken by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria to introduce a pertinent draft decision. I would be remiss if I did not pay tribute to those three delegations, as well as to the then President, Ambassador Pérez Novoa, who availed himself in a most professional way of the opportunity offered.

This is an achievement by itself. Let us take advantage of this window of opportunity and not lose time on trivial procedures. Allow me, to present briefly the Netherlands' conceptualization of the test ban as an arms-control measure. Secondly, I would like to map out the views of my delegation on the specific modalities for our future negotiations.

First, the place of a test ban as an arms-control measure. We did at the time welcome the declaration of Vancouver of 4 April 1993 in which Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date. Looking at this decision in perspective, one could say that it was a landmark in a process: both a political one which saw a major transformation of the situation in Europe; and a corresponding evolutionary process in the notion of security: from nuclear forces becoming weapons of last resort in 1990, to important arms-control agreements (START-I, the Lisbon Protocol and START-II), to increased attention to non-proliferation in a diffuse and volatile world.

The recent decisions of the Presidents of France, Russia and the United States of 2 July to extend the moratoria on nuclear testing and thus to seek an end to nuclear testing altogether are another landmark in that process. Nuclear arms control and disarmament and the different security equation in the 1990s have thus greatly facilitated opportunities for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

According to the Netherlands, an end to nuclear testing fits into the broad picture of international security related to nuclear weapons, both nuclear arms control and disarmament and the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of

(<u>Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands</u>)

immediate relevance to worldwide security. The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, as indicated by the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A nuclear test ban would contribute to ongoing efforts to prevent States from developing a nuclear weapon programme.

A nuclear test ban remains therefore of paramount importance and my Government welcomes the prospects of early negotiations on a nuclear test ban in our Conference on Disarmament. These negotiations would <u>inter alia</u> enable the international community to witness the realization of the goals set out in both the PTBT and the NPT: a discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This would no doubt further strengthen the international norm against non-proliferation as embodied in the NPT, the future of which will be discussed and decided not too long from now.

Now, some considerations on the specific modalities of our future negotiations. My Government looks forward to the early conclusion of a treaty banning <u>all</u> nuclear tests, that is, not just nuclear weapons tests, but also the so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions". A total ban would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and complement the nuclear disarmament process.

Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be on the full set of issues relevant to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and not be limited to partial issues like verification. The ban must be negotiated here in Geneva, in the CD. It must subsequently have universal coverage: all States should abide by it. It should also be internationally and effectively verifiable. It is only thus that the goals of non-proliferation, to which we all profess to subscribe one way or another, can be served.

The issue of verification of a nuclear test ban has received attention in the CD since the 1970s. Extensive work on the seismic component, the core of the verification of a future test ban, has already been done. All along the Netherlands has gladly contributed to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We are grateful for the promising results obtained so far. Preparations to test the full seismic component of the future verification system are well under way. In that respect the GSETT-3 exercise is of eminent importance. Other than seismic technologies will also be required, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Tanaka, for having guided us through a successful session concentrated on non-seismic techniques from which my delegation has drawn great benefit.

I am sure that Ambassador Tanaka's inter-sessional consultations - the new task entrusted to him by the Conference - will lay a sound foundation for the CD's work in 1994. I gladly pledge my delegation's complete and unreserved support for Ambassador Tanaka's efforts. I am confident the CD will be able to negotiate successfully a multi-faceted verification regime for a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

It is encouraging to note that the five declared nuclear-weapon States have stated that they will engage in consultations here in Geneva parallel to the work in the CD and on the same subjects as addressed by the CD. In the CD, such consultations could well result in a coordinated effort and input in the CD negotiations, allowing these to move swiftly and expeditiously. Although setting precise time-frames for the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament does not seem appropriate today, we would expect them to be brought to fruition in not too distant a future.

Through its breakthrough of 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament reached a landmark. We witness the beginning of a new process which will, within a short period of time, lead to full-fledged negotiations, unconditional if you prefer that qualification, on a nuclear test ban. We are at a starting point. Let us not make a false start!!

<u>The PRESIDENT</u>: I thank Ambassador Wagenmakers, the representative of the Netherlands, for his statement and for the warm words he addressed to the Chair and the kind words addressed to my country.

<u>Mr. SEMICHI</u> (Algeria) (<u>translated from French</u>): Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I take the floor as you take the presidency of this Conference. It is certainly a good omen that our session in 1993 will conclude under your authority as the representative of Egypt. Your talents as a diplomat and your skills as a negotiator will ensure that the Conference is successful in its deliberations and will unquestionably be of effective and decisive help in the preparation of the final report on the 1993 session.

Allow me also to express my delegation's thanks and to renew the expression of its esteem to the Cuban delegation for its exemplary discharge of its task during the preceding presidency of the Conference.

I am taking the floor to express my delegation's views on the results of the work of the Conference this year. I should also like to take the opportunity, since my mission in Geneva is coming to an end, to make some practical comments inspired by my years of work in the Conference on Disarmament.

When it took over the presidency of this body last year, the Algerian delegation, through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a fairly exhaustive statement on all matters concerning disarmament. Thus it was able to raise its main concerns, which are, basically, those of all the non-aligned countries. Even if we believe today that the reaffirmation of positions of principle often yields little progress in the Conference's negotiations, we do think that reminders of some questions that were included in the agenda this year precisely because all member States felt them to be urgent can be useful.

I will begin by expressing the relief felt by the entire international community at the agreement just reached on the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreement made possible by the nuclear Powers' courageous decisions to extend the moratoriums on nuclear tests. The urgency of concluding a test-ban treaty is becoming ever greater with the approach of the

deadline of 1995, a date that will undoubtedly bring a clarification of many countries' nuclear options, and that precisely in the light of the results of the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In this respect I would like to remind the Conference that in recent years the international community has on several occasions spelt out the philosophical basis for a comprehensive test ban by describing such a ban as the first step towards a totally denuclearized world. It has never been a matter of giving legal sanction to a situation by definitively dividing the world into countries which have nuclear weapons and countries which do not. My country is anxious that this aspect of the negotiations should not be overlooked, particularly now that, after years of shilly-shallying and after having described the halting of tests as an ideal, the representatives of certain nuclear Powers seem to wish to convince us that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has created a special category of subjects of international law, what the nuclear Powers call "legitimate" nuclear Powers, as opposed to other Powers or States that they designate by the strongly negative term "proliferators".

That is not merely a rhetorical device, but, just as it would be unrealistic to think that States that have expended huge amounts of effort and money in the context of nuclear rivalry will unilaterally get rid of their arsenals, so it would be unrealistic to think that the current non-nuclear-weapon States, some of which suffered from foreign domination for centuries, will agree to the perpetual minimization of their status as subjects of international law and grant a limited group of Powers the option of nuclear blackmail. That is why, in our view, real deterrence, deterrence that is politically legitimate and acceptable from the humanitarian point of view, is deterrence that, drawing on the principle of the equality of the rights of States and peoples, is founded on the idea that no State should possess categories of weapons that are, as a matter of principle, prohibited for other States. At this stage of international relations, that may seem utopian. None the less, humanity must work to that end in order to preserve international peace and security.

Like the majority of the members of the international community, we do not subscribe to the idea that adherence to a convention that limits or prohibits in itself constitutes good international conduct. On the contrary, we are convinced that it is practical and voluntary respect in good faith of both the letter and the spirit of such a convention - even if scruples of principle may momentarily prevent formal adherence - which establishes the proper norm of international conduct. In the same way, we believe that the value of agreements to reduce or ban weapons should not be undermined by a purely formal legalism which, based on the idea that anything that is not formally prohibited is permitted, would lead to a never-ending race between technology and international security arrangements. When we see that there was an interval of nearly 50 years between the beginning of nuclear testing and the emergence of consensus to end it, or when we know that it took a century from the time of their first use for chemical weapons to be formally

banned by an international convention, it is tempting to agree with the sceptics who feel that the world will never be safe from weapons of mass destruction.

The dominant powers long interpreted multilateral treaties so as to legitimize their preeminence, which was often only that of their weapons. At the same time they refused to admit that the continuation of a race to develop ever more sophisticated arms with ever more "surgical" accuracy was less a reflection of real security or defence needs than of their inability to undertake the necessary conversion of their cumbersome arms industries. The pretext of the cold war no longer being valid, those with direct interests in the military-industrial complexes are now seeking among the upheavals of all sorts shaking the countries of the South elements which might serve as an excuse for their Governments to apply the old policies, either by intervention in the internal disputes of the weaker countries or by maintenance of a frantic rate of renewal of the military technologies that destabilize the balances needed for peace, revive the climate of uncertainty and suspicion and swallow up the funds needed for development. In this respect, my country feels that the excessive arms manufacturing capacity in certain countries and those same countries' propensity systematically to seek military uses for all the fruits of human genius fundamentally discredit their professed commitments to transparency or disarmament. Transparency must not, we feel, be used to distract attention from the need to put an end to the arms race and to undertake the conversion of the tools of arms production.

Furthermore, while there is general agreement that, to be lasting, arms limitation measures should be taken in parallel with the settlement of regional disputes, there is also a need for consensus on the idea that such measures should not serve as a cover for a desire to dismantle the defence potential of countries designated as culprits in advance or the objective of protecting one of the protagonists in situations of regional rivalry. It is obvious that international disputes often have an effect on the internal affairs of neighbouring countries that are not direct parties to them. More precisely, we believe that there is a lesson to be learnt from this for us all, so that there is no recurrence of the process of over armament and destruction of which a country in the Middle East has been subject, a process of which, in the final analysis, the only beneficiaries have been arms industries. Similarly, we must ask ourselves whether it is right to provide a State party to a regional conflict with the means to enable it to perpetrate an avowed policy of hegemony and domination.

I would now like to draw your attention to the concern we feel at the lack of progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. It is, candidly, deplorable that 14 years after its foundation this Committee should still be reporting at the end of each session what can only be termed an inability to overcome the challenge facing it because of the refusal of certain nuclear Powers to guarantee their due to States that have voluntarily forsworn the nuclear option.

Our concern also extends to the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space and the misunderstanding that characterizes the discussions in it, a misunderstanding which has become even more evident this year. Having now been in existence for nine years, this Committee has, we feel, accumulated sufficient expertise to move on to a more specific stage in the definition of its future tasks. Although our position is clearly reflected in the declaration of the Group of 21 made in the Ad Hoc Committee on 3 August, we feel that, once the Committee has a sound negotiating mandate, the current efforts to explore the means of reaching agreement on confidence-building measures should be separated from the question that led to the establishment of this Committee, that is, preventing the militarization of outer space by drawing up a multilateral treaty. In our view, the two items are neither competitors, nor mutually exclusive or interdependent and we can perfectly well deal with them in separate working groups providing there is consensus that neither of them should be given priority over the other.

Permit me now to share with you a few thoughts on the question of the enlargement of the Conference. We have often heard here the argument that the composition, the agenda and the methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament are based on cold-war criteria and should, for that precise reason, be radically transformed because the world has become multipolar and is therefore more open to democratization of international relations. It must be said, however, that that democratization is not yet visible in practice and that the international community's inability to overcome some of its most serious problems, despite the willingness of the majority of States, is striking proof that the real centres of decision-making in world affairs are still in the hands of a limited number of Powers.

That said, and even if we are definitely in favour of the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament, we do not think that the current composition of the Conference no longer reflects the state of the world. Furthermore, we do not think that the Conference's decisions that might, even in the event of perpetuation of the current situation, fail to take sufficiently into account the interests of States which are not represented here. The Conference on Disarmament is not a club of States that have co-opted each other, but the result of long negotiations held in Geneva and New York to ensure the most equitable representation of the various groups of States in the world. In this sense, the Conference on Disarmament as now composed represents a fairly full sample of the various trends.

It is, indeed, diversity of expression and views that have characterized the activities of the Conference on Disarmament from the outset and that explains the interest shown by the community of nations in those activities, an interest demonstrated by the requests for admission as members or observers, by the welcome given to, <u>inter alia</u>, the Convention on Chemical Weapons recently produced by the CD, or again, by the unanimity with which the participants in the special session of the First Committee acknowledged that the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament is a matter for the Conference itself to deal with. These elements show that the Conference on Disarmament is not an institution at risk of disaffection by an international community deprived of truly multilateral negotiating organs.

Every possible comment has already been made about the ideal composition of the Conference on Disarmament. I will therefore simply review the points that, to our way of thinking, should prevail in dealing with this question, the greatest of our concerns being to preserve the general characteristics of the Conference today. That is because experience has amply shown the shortcomings, not to say the paralysis, that affect negotiating bodies which are too open-ended, particularly when they have to take their decisions on a consensus basis. To expand the CD without maintaining its efficiency would be to block its work and empty it of its substance.

On the other hand expansion of the membership of the Conference is now an urgent concern, particularly as a result of the legitimate pressure by States which applied for admission years ago, thereby showing their will to strengthen the intellectual, moral and political potential of this body.

My delegation does not think that expansion should be based on the particular capacities of the candidate to contribute to the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. Such an approach, by penalizing the States whose political will is constrained only by material factors, would risk increasing the already substantial share of the countries of the North in the membership of the Conference, or indeed of transforming the Conference into an offshoot of the CSCE. Nor can we accept the suggestion that only States which have a certain military capacity should be admitted and that members considered insufficiently active should be excluded. Such a departure would be tantamount to transforming the Conference into a forum that would discuss only the concerns of the most powerful States, an instrument of which we do not see how or why it would be sensitive to the security needs of the rest of the international community.

However, we firmly believe that the enlargement of the Conference should be undertaken immediately, taking into account the requirements of balance between regions and cultures - political conduct and solidarity being, as a general rule, based on such considerations - and candidates' usual conduct with regard to the concerns of the international community, conduct that can readily be verified from the respect those States show for the decisions and resolutions of United Nations organs.

In our view, the Conference needs neither chosen nations nor States that set themselves outside the international community.

Before concluding, I would like to stress that if the idea that we should have a Conference with 60 members is accepted, we think that the decision proposing such a change that is submitted to the General Assembly should contain a provision opening the way to the subsequent periodic, regular and limited enlargement of the Conference. That would dedramatize the question of the participation of candidates not chosen in this first phase of enlargement and spare us a repetition of the difficulties we have encountered on this point since the creation of this body.

At all events, the delegations which have expressed their desire to become full members of the Conference have already found in the person of

Ambassador O'Sullivan their best advocate and the best negotiator for the honourable settlement of this problem. The Algerian delegation supports the action of this special rapporteur and wishes him every success in his efforts to reconcile the many concerns that have been communicated to him by delegations and that, we are sure, he will reflect in his conclusions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi, the Permanent Representative of Algeria, for his statement, which we followed with interest. I also thank him for his kind words addressed to me. We have heard that Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi will soon be leaving us. The Conference on Disarmament will thereby lose not only a kind friend but also an experienced and able diplomat who, throughout his period of service at Geneva, where he has represented his country in the Conference on Disarmament, has been eager to establish friendly relations with us all. He assumed the presidency of the Conference in 1992 and bore that responsibility with his outstanding diplomatic ability and superb personal qualities. He made a diligent contribution on numerous issues and substantive matters raised at the Conference and, when he leaves Geneva in a few weeks' time, he will have left his mark on our work through the endeavours that he has made representing his country in the Conference. I wish him and his wife every success in their personal and professional life.

<u>Mr. GOONETILLEKE</u> (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to felicitate you on your assumption of the presidency of this august forum at a time of crucial importance. It is important because we are in the process of taking stock of our achievements for this year, and crucial because we have been presented with an excellent opportunity in the sphere of disarmament that should not be allowed to slip away from us. We repose the fullest confidence in your ability of steering the work of the Conference towards the realization of our long-awaited goals. My delegation assures you of its full cooperation in fulfilling your responsibilities.

May I also take this opportunity to convey our sincere appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba and his delegation for the excellent manner in which they guided the work of the Conference. My delegation joins the previous speakers in warmly welcoming our new colleagues Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria, Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Saboia of Brazil, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, and Ambassador Urrutia of Peru.

President Clinton's recent announcement extending the United States moratorium on nuclear testing has generated a worldwide response rekindling the long felt need to commence concrete negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime on a solid footing. This is a welcome sign in the field of disarmament. The Government of Sri Lanka welcomed the United States initiative with enthusiasm. Similarly, Sri Lanka is further encouraged by the announcements made by the Russian Federation and France, which reinforce international endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation sincerely welcomes similar commitments from the remaining two nuclear Powers, which will no doubt further consolidate the nuclear disarmament initiatives, including the conclusion of a CTB.

(<u>Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka</u>)

We are convinced that a multilaterally-negotiated CTB will constitute one of the main universal instruments to hold back nuclear-weapons proliferation, both vertical as well as horizontal, and to reverse the nuclear arms race in this post-cold-war era.

My delegation is heartened by the decision of the Conference to initiate the negotiation to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has long been a goal of the international community in this regard, I wish to register my delegation's sincere appreciation to the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria who jointly put forward the original proposal, thus enabling us to take the above decision. Sri Lanka fully shares the thrust and the main objective of this proposal, namely to give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to undertake multilateral negotiation to conclude a universally applicable and internationally verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The draft mandate presented by Australia in keeping with the spirit of the above proposal equally deserves the support of the member States.

As the Chairman of the G-21 stated, I wish to underline the desirability of commencing consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee, beginning in the inter-sessional period this year, with a view to concluding negotiation of a CTB by the end of 1994.

My delegation recognizes the considerable preparatory inputs so far contributed by the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and his predecessors. We also note with satisfaction the valuable contribution of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and other experts who presented various non-seismic verification methods. My delegation associates itself with the views of many other delegations that the verification regime, being one of the most important aspects of the CTB, should be an internationally verifiable one. In this context, the seismic methods should constitute the core of such a verification regime, due to the fact that the international community in general has wider accessibility to such standard techniques and in view of their cost-effectiveness in comparison to non-seismic techniques.

My delegation also appreciated the valuable contribution of the Swedish delegation, particularly by presenting its revised draft proposal for a CTB which is now being studied in our capital. While awaiting observations from relevant national authorities, we hope that this draft proposal will receive the consideration it merits when the Ad Hoc Committee commences its negotiations.

Another area of great concern to non-nuclear-weapon States such as mine is the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the potential use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The question that remains so far unanswered is about the price the non-nuclear-weapon States have to pay for their voluntary option not to acquire nuclear weapons. The present system as it prevails unfairly narrows the scope of international guarantees for security of

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

non-nuclear-weapons States. It should also be emphasized that for any collective international security assurance to be non-discriminatory, such an arrangement should essentially be premised upon a universal, and legally binding international treaty providing negative as well as positive security assurances. In this regard my delegation shares the view of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States that, with the exception of the one declared by China, the unilateral declarations of security assurances against potential use of nuclear weapons are inherently flawed due to the fact that such assurances are limited in scope and are conditional. In view of their very unilateral nature, which does not warrant any international accountability, they are legally non-binding.

My delegation sincerely appreciates the work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances under the able leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Neagu of Romania. The exploratory and determined efforts by Ambassador Neagu and the concern echoed time and again by the majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States have highlighted the urgent need for legally binding, universally applicable non-discriminatory and comprehensive security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is the sincere view of my delegation that the time is now ripe for us to address this issue of utmost importance in a concrete manner.

The States parties to the NPT are passing through a preparatory process for the 1995 NPT Conference. Conclusion of a CTB as well as concrete and positive measures to conclude a multilaterally negotiated universal treaty for negative and positive security assurances until such time the existing nuclear arsenals are completely eliminated and the nuclear arms race put to an end will strengthen our hands to consider the question of indefinite extension of the NPT when we face the 1995 Review Conference. In these disarmament endeavours my delegation will continue to cooperate with this Conference as well as with other fora. Success in such international disarmament endeavours, including nuclear disarmament, will be one of the main pillars of a stable new world order, to which we have been aspiring all along.

In conclusion my delegation wishes to convey its appreciation to Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, who during the past several months conducted exhaustive consultations with a view to submitting his recommendations as to how the CD should be expanded in keeping with the geopolitical realities of today. My delegation will give its serious consideration to his report and express our views on the matter in due course. I would be failing in my duty if I did not seize this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere gratitude to Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for their valuable inputs to our work on the issues relating to non-proliferation and improved and effective functioning of the CD respectively. Finally, Mr. President, I wish to join you and previous speakers in wishing Ambassador Benhima of Morocco who actively participated in the work of the CD and shared his wisdom with all of us. My delegation extends its best wishes for his personal happiness and success. May we also extend our best wishes to Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, who is also leaving us in the near future.

<u>The PRESIDENT</u>: I thank Ambassador Goonetilleke, the representative of Sri Lanka, for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I am particularly glad to take the floor under your chairmanship in view of the very good bilateral relations between Australia and Egypt, in view also of the very happy memories that I have of working with you in Cairo when I had the privilege of a posting there and especially in view of your great personal standing in our Conference. I assure you of the full support of my delegation, which I hope you will know goes without saying. I would also like to thank Ambassador Pérez Novoa for the very energetic and very effective work that went on under his presidency. I should also like to express the thanks of my delegation to Ambassador Benhima of Morocco for his service and for his leadership and not least for his wise comments earlier this morning. Similarly, I would like to express my disappointment at the forthcoming conclusion of Ambassador Semichi's assignment here. Our Conference will be diminished by his absence. I trust, however, this will not be the conclusion of his service to the international community which, in my view, he is uniquely well positioned to make.

On 28 January this year, the Conference appointed me as its Special Coordinator for the issue of expanding its membership. This decision to appoint a Special Coordinator came in the light of the report presented on 18 January by the former President of the Conference, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, who in conjunction with Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, had held consultations in the second half of 1992 on this matter. At an earlier point there had also been an effort to have a small expansion of the Conference, but that effort was ultimately unsuccessful.

The view that the time has come for the Conference to expand its membership has been sharpened by the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That outcome has been widely applauded internationally and has undoubtedly stimulated interest in membership of the Conference, not least amongst those who have been waiting for many years to have their applications considered.

It is also the case that, with the ending of the cold war, there are many new opportunities for the international community to address the politico-military challenges in new and hopefully more effective ways. In the new environment it is clear that many governments see an enhanced role for the Conference on Disarmament.

Thus the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post cold war era" received a ready response from the Conference on Disarmament, and many representatives from here participated in the resumed First Committee in March this year. At that resumed session there were many expressions of support for the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to review its membership and its agenda in the new circumstances.

(<u>Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia</u>)

With this background in mind, I held bilateral discussions with each of my colleagues on several occasions, and also with each of the CD groups. I thus obtained first hand a sense of what outcome could be tolerable to all, at the same time registering what were the sensitivities and aspirations of each CD member. I circulated a survey which was designed to allow any comments that members wished to have recorded. I considered holding informal open-ended consultations on this matter but at the request of a number of delegations who wished me not to proceed in that way, I decided to proceed in the way that I have described.

It quickly became apparent that a discussion of criteria for membership would lead only to indefinite delay. Attempts to define in some "objective" way the criteria for membership flew in the face of the history of previous efforts at expansion of the Conference which had not previously been able to define such criteria, of its current composition and of the widely varying views about what such criteria might be, how they could be defined and in what way they might be applied. I decided a more practical course was to try to find an acceptable outcome.

Finding an acceptable outcome was made easier by the fact that there seemed to be very broad acceptance that the CD should remain a negotiating body and thus of limited composition, that its rule of consensus should remain, and that it should concentrate on developing agreements and treaties in the field of security, arms control and disarmament. Thus it was possible to pose the question "given the things that we agree the Conference should do, and given the expressions of interest by those who are willing to participate in its work, who is not currently a member who ought to be included?" This formulation also had the advantage of drawing attention to the tasks to be done rather than any artificial criteria.

In seeking to find a proposal that would be acceptable to all members of the Conference, there were three particular problems that needed to be overcome. Firstly there was the question of procedure: was the Conference entirely autonomous in its decision over its own membership? Some in the Conference answered unambiguously yes; others had a more nuanced approach, others said no. The conclusion I drew was that in its process of considering the recommendation for expansion, the Conference should follow procedures that avoided raising the in-principle question of its status <u>vis-à-vis</u> the General Assembly. I outline some suggestions at the end of this report which follow precisely the precedent established in 1978.

Secondly, there was considerable hesitation about the addition of new members which raised particularly sensitive issues for some countries. While those sensitivities remain, I believe that they will not be such as to prevent the adoption of the recommendation for a new CD composition attached to this report.

Thirdly there was naturally considerable interest in the overall balance that might emerge from any expansion. Here several aspects are worth recording. While a number of countries preferred a relatively small expansion - by say 10-12 - it quickly became clear that within such a small

(<u>Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia</u>)

expansion it would be impossible to satisfy the competing regional, political, geostrategic and other claims. Equally it also became clear that a large expansion - including the idea that all who applied should be admitted - could not attract consensus. It emerged that between these contending views, common ground might be found around an expansion to about 60 members. This number had the additional benefit of representing about one third of United Nations members, which is approximately the same proportion of the United Nations membership that the original CD represented when it was established.

An additional benefit of an expansion to about 60 is that it creates enough manoeuvrability to accommodate a wide variety of applicant countries. In considering the question of expansion, I reluctantly came to the view that I would not recommend for inclusion countries which had chosen not to apply: this despite the fact that several countries who are not applicants would seem to have strong credentials.

Thus I came to the conclusion that the only way forward at this stage was to recommend a limited expansion from amongst the current applicants in a way that leads overall to a Conference capable of addressing the problems and opportunities before it.

In considering how to strike a balance in the context of the expansion, I also had to take account of the fact that the Conference had a very particular origin and that within its original groupings there were some unusual features. Nor was I given the task of changing the current composition or of reconstructing the Conference. I asked if any current members wished to withdraw but none did. My recommendation preserves closely the balance in the CD at present if the current members were considered from a United Nations General Assembly regional perspective. It is also balanced in overall geostrategic terms.

On the last page of this report and an integral part of it is my recommendation for a composition for the Conference, with the new members representing the expansion being underlined. I would like to emphasize that this recommendation is part of a phased approach, since the extension of the composition of the Conference is a dynamic process, and will no doubt be subject to periodic reviews in the future. It may be argued that there are other possible ways of achieving this result. I can only say that my recommendation represents my best estimate of an approach which is likely to attract consensus.

Mr. President, I assume that in due course you will ask the Conference to decide on this report. If the Conference is willing to accept this recommendation, in line with the practice established in 1978 when the Conference itself was constituted, I suggest that the CD President inform the President of the General Assembly of the agreement reached following appropriate consultations in the Conference on Disarmament, and in line with document A/S-10/24 of 19 September 1978 invite the President of the Assembly to so inform the States Members of the United Nations. The new members would then assume their membership at the start of the 1994 session.

(<u>Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia</u>)

I ask that this report be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. President, I would like to add a couple of words after this conclusion of the presentation of my report. I should just like to emphasize that the report and its attached recommendation represents a very delicate package. It contains inevitably a series of balances and, of course, it will be very easy to unravel. I hope, however, that delegates and officials in capitals will study the report carefully and objectively. If an expansion is to be achieved, a degree of self-respect, mutual respect and restraint will be required. I would like to conclude, therefore, by thanking the many colleagues for their expressions of support and solidarity.

<u>The PRESIDENT</u>: I thank Ambassador O'Sullivan, the representative of Australia, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. In introducing his report on this subject of the expansion of the Conference, Ambassador O'Sullivan asked that his report be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and I think we have to act accordingly.

It was so decided.

<u>The PRESIDENT</u>: We shall return to that report in due course in view of the last portion of the statement of Ambassador O'Sullivan, that this matter will be considered and we will come back to it at a later stage.

<u>Mr. KAMAL</u> (Pakistan): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I take the floor in plenary under your chairmanship, let me join previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of your office, in thanking your predecessor, Ambassador Pérez Novoa for the enormously significant results achieved during his own presidency, and in expressing the greatest sadness at the impending departures of Ambassadors El Ghali Benhima and Abdelhamid Semichi. I will have the occasion of welcoming our new colleagues in the later statement.

I intend to react briefly to the interesting statement we have just heard from Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, the contents of which have caught my delegation and most other delegations with some surprise. The question of the essential need for the expansion of the CD in an effort to increase the effectiveness and representativity of this negotiating body in the face of a rapidly changing world is one of the most important and far-reaching decisions that this body will consider and hopefully take this year. That is why one of the most prominent and responsible members of the Conference was charged with the onerous and thankless task of conducting consultations on the criteria to be followed in suggesting an expanded membership and on identifying prospective candidates whose presence in our midst would give our work and negotiations even better chances of objective oriented success. You must allow me, therefore, to express some surprise at the sudden tabling of the results of the consultations with individual members directly in plenary, without going through the normal procedures which we have always tried to follow, of transparent discussions in subsequent open-ended consultations,

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

or through Group Coordinators in the first place and thereafter in informal plenaries before the actual tabling of drafts which must perforce command ultimate consensus. We will now have the very difficult task of attempting to decipher the criteria which have been used, the balances which exist or which may be missing and the implications of a package draft which may become a "take-it-or-leave-it" package merely because no open-ended consultations have taken place on its constituent elements. I say that because, at first view, at least one State with nuclear weapons on its soil is not on this list. We are thus being asked to evaluate a prepackaged basket without having the opportunity of participating fully in the choice of its contents through open discussions. Those discussions on evaluation will now have to take place <u>ex post facto</u>. My delegation believes that is most unfortunate on an issue of such importance, but, having said that, I assure you that we will, of course, participate fully and with an open mind in the hope that the CD will see an expanded membership before this year is out.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kamal for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair and, as we have agreed, we shall return to that report in due course.

That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

I give the floor to the representative of Tunisia.

<u>Mr. BAATI</u> (Tunisia) (<u>translated from French</u>): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference. Thanks to your eminent diplomatic qualities and abilities, the Conference is assured of success in this decisive phase when it is about to begin producing its report to the General Assembly.

I would also thank Ambassador Berasategui and his staff for their untiring efforts to facilitate our work.

I would also like to congratulate Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, on his efforts and on the report he has just presented to us. I have taken note of its contents and I will not fail to transmit it to my authorities. Obviously, that report is for us a source of frustration and surprise, as the Ambassador of Pakistan so well put it. My authorities will scrutinize the report and will note that my country, which was one of the first to apply for admission, is not on the list compiled by Ambassador O'Sullivan.

I would like through you, Mr. President, to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan a few questions to assist my authorities in studying the report. I would like to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan to tell me, since you said that we could come back to this topic, whether he can reply now or later. Firstly, how far does he feel his report takes account of the views expressed by my country on several occasions, in particular during the consultations organized by Ambassadors Servais and Amorim? I would like at this stage to pay tribute to them and wish them every success in their new functions. I would also like to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan how far he took into account the criterion of

(Mr. Baati, Tunisia)

chronology, that is to say the order in which requests for admission were submitted, in drawing up his report. Those are the questions and comments brought to my mind by the statement we have just heard.

<u>The PRESIDENT</u>: I would like to ask Ambassador O'Sullivan, the representative of Australia, if he has any reaction to the queries or questions put by the representative of Tunisia at this stage, or if he prefers to react later on, as we have agreed that we will come back to this question at a later stage.

<u>Mr. O'SULLIVAN</u> (Australia): I thank the delegations which have given early reactions. It probably would suit everyone's convenience to have a little bit of time to consider the matter and then to hear views, and I would be happy to participate, of course, in any such discussions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador O'Sullivan for his reaction and may we now proceed with our remaining business for today.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

<u>The PRESIDENT</u>: That concludes our work for today. Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I would recall that, as announced earlier today, immediately after this meeting the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal, on the optical disk system being developed by the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 August, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.