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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 26 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 663rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and in my own personal capacity, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Paul Lever, who will be the first speaker at this plenary meeting, and who is visiting us in the CD for the first time. The British Assistant Under-Secretary of State is the person responsible for disarmament affairs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He took up his present post last year. I am certain that all the members of the CD will follow his statement with keen interest.

I wish to inform you that, as announced at the previous plenary meeting, I intend to propose to the Conference that it should consider taking action at the end of the meeting on the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as well as the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been circulated as document CD/WP.446.

As agreed last week, the Conference will hold today, immediately following the plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report on the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/WP.445).

I have on my list of speakers for today the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, as I stated earlier, as well as the representatives of Indonesia and the Czech Republic, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the representatives of Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, and the Special Coordinator on the question of the expansion of the Conference's membership. I now give the floor to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, His Excellency, Paul Lever, CMG.

Mr. LEVER (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome. As you have said, although much of my own professional career has been spent dealing with security, defence and arms control issues, this is the first opportunity I have had to take part myself directly in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I am delighted to be able to do so. This body and its predecessor have a distinguished history. It is due to them that we have the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention, and, most recently, the chemical weapons Convention. These are three key treaties in the field of arms control and disarmament. They show that a body of this kind can indeed, when it applies itself to real issues, achieve real negotiating results; and that there is more to arms control at the global level than just the passage of endless United Nations resolutions.

(Mr. Lever, United Kingdom)

For my own country, the establishment, maintenance and improvement of all three of these regimes is central to our security. The United Kingdom continues to give unstinting support to the preparations for the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention, and to the work of the verification experts in relation to the biological weapons Convention. But the gravest of all the threats we consider we face is the threat of nuclear proliferation. I therefore make no apology for concentrating today on the non-proliferation Treaty and the reasons why we believe it should be extended indefinitely in 1995.

We recognize, of course, that the NPT has not yet fulfilled all the hopes of its creators. Among the parties to the Treaty four main types of criticism are sometimes heard: that the Treaty still has not attracted universal support; that it has suffered from compliance problems; that it has not done enough to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; that not enough has been done to make progress towards its aspirations for nuclear and general disarmament. As we approach 1995, it is important to face up to these criticisms. But it is important also to remember the enormous amount that has been achieved by almost a generation of patient and constructive diplomacy.

Let me turn to the question of universality first. The NPT is the most widely supported arms control treaty there has ever been. One hundred and sixty States are now party to it. And it continues to gain new adherents - the most recent being the welcome accession of Belarus. Moreover, because the Treaty has established an international norm against nuclear proliferation, its influence extends even beyond its parties. We welcome, for example, the recent moves by Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force. We hope this will eventually lead to all Latin American countries becoming parties to the NPT itself.

The fact is that before the NPT was negotiated there were widespread expectations that by now there would be some 20 or so nuclear-weapon States. This has not happened, and that is a measure of the NPT's success. Of course, there are important absentees. The refusal of India, Pakistan, Israel and others to accede, and the question mark over the willingness of Ukraine to do so, is a source of weakness. It is sometimes argued by representatives of these countries that until the security situation of their particular region of the world improves, they do not feel able to renounce the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly the political problems in the Middle East and South Asia are acute and deep-rooted; and we recognize that the break-up of the former Soviet Union has created new uncertainties in that region. Solutions can only be found through regional negotiations, supported as necessary by the international community. But, as part of that process, it is reasonable to ask whether the nuclear option, which some of the States concerned seek to retain, genuinely enhances their security, or whether it aggravates the problem and threatens the stability which they wish to achieve.

As for compliance problems, the scale of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme has been a salutary shock for all of us. But the international community has responded to that shock. Under the terms of the cease-fire resolution, Security Council resolution 687, work is in hand to

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eliminate all Iraq's significant nuclear, biological, chemical and missile capabilities, and to place their remaining activities under a strict long-term monitoring regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also adopted a wide range of additional measures which should help deter any similar breaches of Treaty obligations in future.

North Korea also presented us with a challenge when it announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT after refusing to accept inspections requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But once again the international community has responded and has made clear its determination that Treaty commitments should be respected. We have welcomed the subsequent announcement that North Korea has suspended its intended withdrawal. And we hope that further dialogue with IAEA, South Korea and with the United States will soon lead to North Korea complying fully with its safeguards agreement and permanently reaffirming its commitment to the NPT.

These compliance problems are of course very serious matters. We do not underestimate them. If we cannot ensure compliance, faith in the NPT risks being eroded. It is therefore vital that the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency should continue their invaluable work in Iraq. We also continue to support the Agency in relation to North Korea and in strengthening the safeguards system as a whole. We must ensure too that the Agency continues to receive all the support it requires for its work from the United Nations Security Council. The Presidential statement after the Security Council summit in January 1992 was an important step in this respect. But we should not despair of the NPT because of these compliance problems. The large mass of parties are fulfilling their obligations in good faith. The international community is taking firm action both to deal with the compliance problems that do exist and to lessen the prospects of similar problems occurring again. This is only possible because of the NPT and the framework it provides for pursuing these matters. The answer to the problems of compliance is not to decry the utility of the NPT; it is to strengthen its monitoring and verification regime, and to support the work of IAEA in implementing it.

A third type of criticism of the NPT is that it has not done enough to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is of course undeniable that the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has not proved to be the panacea which some believed, in the 1960s, that it might be. But it is hardly fair to place the blame for this at the door of the Treaty. It reflects a reappraisal of the economic case for nuclear power. What the Treaty, and associated Agency safeguards, has done is to provide the framework of reassurance which is essential to the international trade in nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. Without this framework international cooperation in this area would be far more difficult than it is today. Indeed it is hard to see how it would exist at all. Nor do the safeguards required by the Treaty in any way hamper the legitimate use of nuclear energy. The example of many highly industrialized countries demonstrate that safeguards do not stand in the way of thriving nuclear power programmes. Nor are they expensive; on the contrary, they are a very small price to pay for the reassurance they provide.

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The fourth criticism of the Treaty by some of its adherents is that there has been inadequate progress towards the NPT's aspirations for nuclear and general disarmament; and, in particular, that the nuclear Powers have been tardy in implementing their obligations under article VI of the Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

The truth, surely, is that it was the NPT which created the political framework for all the arms control efforts of the last 25 years, particularly the nuclear arms control efforts. It was no accident, for example, that the United States and the then Soviet Union announced their intention to begin bilateral talks about their nuclear weaponry on the very day the NPT was opened for signature. Despite many alarms and excursions in their wider relationship, they persisted with such talks over many years. And now, at last, we are witnessing the fruits of those efforts and of the cold war's end.

By comparison with the situation which applied in 1968 when the NPT was signed, the changes in the nuclear balance in recent years have been truly astonishing. The 1987 INF Treaty brought about the elimination of a whole category of United States and former Soviet nuclear weapons. The START I and START II treaties, once in force, will mean the disappearance of a further entire category of American and Russian strategic systems, namely MIRVed land-based missiles, and the reduction of the stockpiles of these two countries to 3,000 warheads each, a fraction of what they were in recent years. Can it really be argued that this is not substantial progress? Or that it would have been possible without the NPT itself?

The United Kingdom, for its part, has always maintained only the minimum strategic nuclear deterrent required for our security needs. We did not depart from that policy at the height of the cold war, and we shall not depart from it now. We have however adjusted the level of our deterrent to reflect the improvements in the international security environment. We have withdrawn from service all our maritime nuclear weapons, and we are halving the number of our air-delivered weapons. And of course we have for many years offered firm assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States about the circumstances in which we will not use our nuclear weapons. We remain committed to these assurances.

In addition to concrete achievement in the field of nuclear arms control there is also the prospect of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. The preamble of the NPT recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the limited test-ban treaty to seek an end to all nuclear tests. Momentum is now gathering towards the realization of this goal, a process in which the United Kingdom is ready to play a full and constructive part. We welcome the recent decision to give the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a new mandate in preparation for these negotiations. We hope that the membership of the Conference on Disarmament can be expanded before substantive negotiations begin in the New Year. A carefully negotiated comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which all CD members are parties, will reinforce efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We look forward to adding such a treaty to the list of achievements of the Conference

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on Disarmament itself. But our commitment to work constructively for a comprehensive test-ban treaty reflects our assumption that the non-proliferation Treaty will remain in force as well.

I have mentioned some of the criticisms made of the NPT by its adherents. But it would be wrong perhaps, not to mention one that is made by some of the countries who decided not to accede to it: namely that the Treaty was fundamentally discriminatory since it established a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States, the haves and the have-nots.

Indeed it did. But for the objective reasons. Nuclear weapons have been invented; they had been used; and they had come to play a crucial role in the uneasy East-West security balance during the time of the cold war. My own Government is unapologetic about the part Britain itself played in these events. In the circumstances of the Second World War we were right, we believe, to encourage British scientists to play their important role in helping invent the atom bomb. In the circumstances of the cold war we were right, we believe, to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons of our own and not to rely purely on conventional military capabilities for our security.

But the cold war was a unique phenomenon. The security situation in other parts of the world was not in the past, and is not now, clouded by the same pervasive threat of ideological confrontation and political division. The acknowledgement in the non-proliferation Treaty of the reality of the five existing nuclear Powers can indeed be called discriminatory. But these Powers were at that time central players in a security relationship of extreme fragility and potentially disastrous consequences if mistakes were made. Not necessarily a condition to be envied by the rest of the world.

But the cold war is over. The question which I suggest can reasonably be asked of the nuclear Powers today should not be based on a perception of discrimination as a result of history, but on their current policies. For example: are the nuclear Powers adjusting their concept of deterrence and their reliance on nuclear weapons to reflect the improved security environment? In the case of the United Kingdom, we believe we are. Are the nuclear Powers exercising responsible stewardship of their nuclear stockpiles during the period of adjustment to new conditions? Again, in the case of the United Kingdom, we believe we are. Are the nuclear Powers exploiting the fact that their possession of nuclear weapons to the detriment of the security of non-nuclear States? In the case of the United Kingdom, we do not believe that this is so.

The conclusions therefore that the United Kingdom draws for the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty are the following. We will continue to work for universal, or as near universal as possible, adherence to it. Where compliance problems exist, they can most readily be resolved by working to strengthen the Treaty rather than by despairing of it. The Treaty creates an indispensable framework of reassurance for the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Treaty has also provided a framework for

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startlingly successful recent results in the fields of nuclear arms control disarmament. Without a durable non-proliferation Treaty it is questionable whether these results could be sustained.

We believe therefore that the non-proliferation Treaty continues to reflect the common interest of all of us. Its value and its credibility are higher now than when it was signed in 1968. Future events are unlikely to diminish its importance. We hope therefore that in 1995 it can be extended indefinitely.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his important statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, speaking toward the end of our 1993 session, my delegation would just like to briefly address some issues which have been subject to growing attention from the Conference on Disarmament. But before doing so, let me first say how privileged I am to speak in this plenary under your brilliant presidency. Indeed it cannot be more fitting that a seasoned diplomat of your calibre should be presiding over the crucial closing phase of the Conference's work for 1993. My gratitude also goes to your predecessor, Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba, for his exemplary presidency. May I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to our departing colleagues, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco and Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, with whom I have enjoyed the best of relationships both at official and personal levels? I wish both of them every success in the continuation of their outstanding career.

One of the most topical issues to date is, without doubt, that of the comprehensive test ban. In this regard, let me, at the outset, join other delegations in welcoming the decision taken by the Governments of the United States of America, France and the Russian Federation to prolong the moratoria on their nuclear testing. We further hope that the other nuclear-weapon States will soon join this beautiful concert of silence on the nuclear-testing sites, and thus open the window of opportunity even wider for a definite CTBT. Consistent with its fundamental policy towards the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, to which a CTBT would certainly contribute, Indonesia has always been active in any collective efforts undertaken by the international community with a view to concluding the treaty. During the cold war era, when attempts toward this end through the Conference on Disarmament were stalemated by the super-Powers' rivalry and bloc politics, six non-nuclear-weapons States members of the Conference on Disarmament, namely Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and the former Yugoslavia, launched the initiative to achieve a CTBT through the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty (PTBT), which was eventually held in 1991. Unfortunately, this road too was prevented from reaching its final destination.

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To date, with the positive change in the international political climate, a fresh momentum is gathering for renewed and, hopefully, more serious efforts toward the conclusion of a CTBT. Therefore, alongside the initiative taken in the Conference on Disarmament, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in his capacity as President of the PTBT amendment conference, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 47/46, called a special meeting of the States parties to the PTBT on 10 and 11 August 1993 in New York, for the express purpose of examining the feasibility of reconvening the amendment conference later this year. The following are the conclusions drawn by the President at the end of the special meeting. Firstly, the special meeting of the States parties to the PTBT directed their attention to the fact that consideration of a CTBT has been under way on three tracks, namely at the Conference on Disarmament, at the amendment conference and in the consultations among the nuclear Powers. Secondly, some delegations attending the meeting expressed their own preference as to the forum in which a CTBT should be pursued. There was none the less a general consensus that the work on a CTBT in the three different forums should be mutually supportive and complementary. Thirdly, the special meeting also welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT. Fourthly, the States parties entrusted further the President of the amendment conference with the task of continuing his consultations with the State parties as well as the non-States parties to the PTBT and holding another special meeting early in 1994, in order to review developments and assess the situation regarding a CTBT and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the amendment Conference later that year. As far as my delegation is concerned, in view of the capital importance that we attach to a CTBT, we would prefer to keep all options open, particularly at a time when a CTBT has assumed added urgency in relation to the approaching 1995 NPT conference. In my delegation's view, the conclusion of a CTBT will certainly strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime, in particular the vertical aspect of proliferation. It could also serve as a litmus test of the nuclear-weapon States' commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Let me now move to the question of transparency in armaments. From the very beginning, my delegation has seen the merit in the establishment of an international code of conduct on arms transfers as well as military holdings in order to promote confidence among nations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in this era of uncertainty. Hence Indonesia was among those who voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L regarding transparency in armaments, in which the Member States agreed inter alia to establish a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In order to contribute to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, the Indonesian Government is now in the process of collecting armament data and military information as required by the resolution. As soon as this exercise is completed, we shall not fail to submit the relevant data on international arms transfers, military holdings, procurement through national production and any other relevant policies to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We believe that once all United Nations Member States have submitted the information required, the Register will constitute an important instrument for confidence-building among States, especially those in areas of high tension.

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We have, however, to be consistent in addressing the question of transparency in armaments. Any efforts to purposely dilute the aim and arbitrarily reduce the scope of transparency in armaments would run the risk of adversely creating another discriminatory non-proliferation regime, and thus would not be acceptable to my delegation. The same consideration applies to any action to misuse the instrument which would abusively hamper the legitimate access of all countries, especially the developing countries, to advanced technology urgently needed for development purposes. It is within this context that my delegation would like, at this juncture, to reiterate its full support to the statement made on behalf of the majority of the Group of 21 countries, as contained in document CD/TIA/WP.16, which stated that the Conference on Disarmament should address the matter in a non-discriminatory and comprehensive manner, so as to cover all categories and types of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. By the same token, it is our considered opinion that transparency in armaments should not be treated over-simplistically, but instead should be addressed in such a manner as to take into account the specific characteristics of a given State and its regional environment, as well as its legitimate right to self-defence in conformity with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Being a spread-out archipelagic State consisting of more than 13,000 islands with a population of nearly 200 million, for example, Indonesia's requirements for protecting its territorial integrity and national sovereignty would be necessarily different from those of landlocked countries or more compact States with smaller populations. Furthermore, bearing in mind the complex issues that remain unaddressed surrounding the subject of transparency in armaments, it would be appropriate for us to underline the recommendation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments that the said Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Turning to the subject of regional disarmament, first of all I would like to share with the Conference the information that during the 26th ASEAN ministerial meeting held in Singapore last month, the ASEAN countries endorsed a programme of action for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, aimed at maintaining and strengthening such conditions in the new geo-political environment. The meeting also recommended that work on the draft treaty on a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone be intensified. The ASEAN countries will pursue and intensify their consultations with the other regional States, especially with the major Powers, in trying to convince them of the continuing relevance of these concepts, even under the presently changed circumstances, as the only viable framework for greater peace, security and common prosperity, as well as for more harmonious and mutually beneficial relations in the Asia-Pacific region. After taking stock of the growing political and security cooperation in South-East Asia and the strengthened dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN countries have taken another important decision to establish an ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss political and security issues in the area. The ASEAN Regional Forum will, for the first time, invite China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Russia and

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Viet Nam to meet ASEAN and its dialogue partners in Bangkok in 1994, in an attempt to find ways and means to promote consultations on regional political and security issues.

Another important issue in the context of our regional security is that of the South China Sea. The South China Sea with its immense strategic importance, the long history of endemic conflicts among its littoral States, the conflicting sovereignty and jurisdictional claims of States, compounded by unresolved questions of the delimitation of territorial seas, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones, and the anticipation of vast mineral and living marine resources in the area, poses a real challenge to our regional security. We therefore consider that the South China Sea could become the next flashpoint in our region. In order to facilitate the concerned and involved States to manage that conflict potential, and thus to contribute to the achievement of a new regional security equilibrium in the post-cold-war era, Indonesia has for quite some time taken the initiative to organize workshops on the South China Sea. The fourth such workshop is now taking place in Surabaya, where remarkable progress since the beginning of the exercise, less than four years ago, has been recorded. In view of this progress, a recommendation has been presented for the possible inclusion in the workshop process of participants from non-regional States that feel they have a vital stake in the South China Sea. For its part, Indonesia hopes that, given the positive trends, the Governments concerned may soon deem it desirable and timely to upgrade the present informal workshop format and engage in a more formal government-to-government dialogue on the matter.

Lastly, allow me to say a few words regarding the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to place on record its sincere appreciation of the painstaking efforts made by Ambassador O'Sullivan, especially considering that the issue involved is extremely delicate. Nevertheless, it would be less than candid on our part not to say that Ambassador O'Sullivan's recommendation is not entirely satisfactory to us. Even though we do not have any major problem with the countries recommended for membership, we honestly believe that the resulting overall composition is somewhat lacking in equitable geographical balance. Therefore, while ready to go along with the emerging consensus, we deem it necessary to stress the importance of dynamically reviewing the question and approaching it gradually, in order to make it more balanced and thus to command an even broader consensus in our future undertaking.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to Mr. Venera, the representative of the Czech Republic.

Mr. VENERA (Czech Republic): Mr. President, it is an honour for me to address this central body of multilateral negotiations on disarmament which works this month under your distinguished and brilliant presidency. Allow me to thank on this occasion Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he presided over our Conference during the past weeks. The Czech Republic attaches great importance to its deliberations which in the past led to the conclusion of such important disarmament treaties as the

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non-proliferation Treaty, the partial test-ban Treaty or quite recently the Convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia participated actively in the elaboration of these agreements and in their application. As one of the successor States to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic we therefore feel associated with what the Conference on Disarmament has achieved so far.

As the Conference concentrated in the past years on the elaboration of the chemical weapons Convention, it should also in the nearest future focus on one or two "promising" issues so that it does not take another decade before new agreements are delivered. The arms race of the cold war period assured a lot of work to be accomplished by institutions like this Conference and it should be accomplished without undue delay. All agenda items should be addressed with equal responsibility. However, some will require longer-term efforts while other tasks seem both urgent as well as achievable in the foreseeable future. A nuclear test ban is an urgent issue since continued nuclear-weapon testing could hardly contribute to the success of the NPT review conference and the required prolongation of the functioning of the Treaty already in 1995. It also seems achievable in view of the constructive approach of the nuclear-weapon States embodied in the ongoing moratorium on nuclear tests. We are looking forward to the early opening of multilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban. They will not need to start from scratch; a number of verification issues of the future test ban have been usefully discussed both in the GSE as well as in the relevant working group. The Czech Republic intends to assure an active participation of its experts in the GSE and its share in the future transmission of seismic data which will be essential for CTB verification.

We share widely expressed views concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons and their delivery vehicles, arms transfers, transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures. The Czech Republic is actively participating in a number of groups aimed at relevant export control and we consider joining those multilateral arrangements of which we are not yet full members, like, for instance, the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Australia Group. In this connection we cannot but welcome the enhanced attention the CD is paying to transparency in armaments. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important step in the right direction and the Czech Republic has decided to participate in the first exchange of relevant data in spite of the fact that the separation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic caused us some difficulties in completing the required information. Transparency in armaments may be considered one of the longer-term tasks for the Conference on Disarmament. This, however, does not make it less important. If the right decisions are taken on this path we shall be rewarded in future by enhanced security for all.

Expansion of the CD is one of the issues which had been considered for some 15 years and, as it seems, a number of new CD members are proposed. It apparently comes as no surprise that the Czech Republic is also interested in becoming a CD member State in spite of the fact that we did not hurry with a formal application in this regard. This was the result of the joint proposal

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that Slovakia should become a successor to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the Conference on Disarmament. The Czech application for CD membership was postponed precisely in order to create favourable conditions for early admission of the Slovak Republic. We would very much appreciate if this could be taken into account and the Czech Republic offered a possibility to continue to contribute to CD endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Czech Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Hoffmann, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Ambassador Hoffmann will introduce to us the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which has been already circulated in document CD/1217.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, under your able guidance, we are reaching important achievements in the CD. On this, the German delegation congratulates you wholeheartedly. As you have already pointed out, I have the honour today to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The report, circulated as document CD/1217 dated 19 August 1993, which is in front of you, covers the activity of the Committee during this year's session. We did our best to keep in line with the IEF guidelines gently prescribed by Ambassador Kamal. In accordance with the mandate given to it by the Conference, the Committee has continued to examine and to identify through substantive consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this context existing agreements as well as relevant proposals, initiatives and developments since the establishment of the Committee in 1985 were taken into account.

Plenary debates and informal consultations were held in an atmosphere of cooperation, for which I want to thank all participating delegations - member States as well as non-member States. Especially I would like to thank the group coordinators: Mr. Henryk Pac for the Eastern European Group, Mr. Carlo Selvaggi for the Western Group, Mr. Farouque for the Group of 21, as well as the representatives of China and Sweden. A special tribute I would like to pay to the Friends of the Chair, Colonels Diachenko, Novosadov and Sukharev of the delegation of the Russian Federation and Mr. Rafael Grossi of the delegation of Argentina, who respectively conducted open-ended consultations on the following important subjects: Confidence-building measures in outer space and terminology and other relevant aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Committee, as in previous years, also benefited from the scientific and technical contributions of experts from the delegations of Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United States of America, to whom I want to express my sincere appreciation. Furthermore I thank Mr. Bogomolov for his impeccable work as Secretary of the Committee and his good advice given under the masterful guidance of Ambassador Berasategui.

As expected during our deliberations, different, sometimes rather opposing views were expressed. The Committee succeeded, however, in its efforts to identify areas of convergence suitable for future work in order to achieve the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The report, therefore,

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

recommends that at the beginning of the 1994 session, the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an appropriate mandate, taking into account the work undertaken since 1985.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Hoffmann, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, for the presentation of his report and congratulate him on behalf of the members of the Conference. I also thank him for the kind words addressed to me. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Ambassador Hoffmann for having brought to a successful conclusion the work of the Ad Hoc Committee devoted to this important subject. I now give the floor to Ambassador Tanaka, the representative of Japan.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I already took the floor under your presidency last week to make a short intervention, but I did not avail myself of that opportunity to properly greet you. Therefore, let me, at the outset, extend my delegation's heartfelt congratulation to Your Excellency on your assumption of the presidency and assure you of our continued cooperation.

I have taken the floor today to introduce to the Conference the statement relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament made by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan in his first policy speech in the Diet on 23 August 1993. The provisional translation of the relevant part of his statement reads as follows:

"The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an urgent security imperative for Japan and the whole of the global community, and I intend to support the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Going beyond that, I believe world peace depends upon the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth and global disarmament, and I intend to engage in more active foreign policy efforts to that end."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Tanaka, the representative of Japan, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me as President of this Conference. I now give the floor to Ambassador Ri Cheul, the representative of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, my delegation cordially congratulates you on taking up the Chair at this very important stage in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and is sure that, thanks to your competent and devoted efforts, this year's session will be crowned with success.

At the present session there have been marked accomplishments as regards the improvement of the work and the enhancement of the role of the Conference on Disarmament, taking as the starting-point the needs of the international situation and the Conference's own mission.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The decision taken this year, marking the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the partial nuclear test-ban-Treaty by the Conference on Disarmament, to begin negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), may be described as historic. Its scope is very vast, even though this is but a first step, given the time and efforts devoted to the achievement of this objective. It is common knowledge that nuclear testing involves many politico-military dimensions and immeasurable risks. Nuclear tests themselves represent a most dangerous arms race among the nuclear Powers and constitute a principal source of nuclear arms proliferation. If we do not achieve a halt to all nuclear tests, it will not be possible to avoid nuclear multipolarization, which would enable each of the nuclear Powers to become a pole, and the race for nuclear superiority among a number of poles would lead to a danger incomparable to the era of the bi-polar cold war. Then the moratoriums on nuclear testing announced last year and the decisions to extend the moratoriums on nuclear testing, taken respectively by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, prompted the support and active encouragement of the international community, the States possessing nuclear weapons must certainly have become resigned to the imminence of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the present time certain countries have become very active to become permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. When we note that the five countries which are currently permanent members of the Security Council are all nuclear-weapon States, the intentions and the efforts of a country which is already adequately endowed with nuclear facilities and has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at any time in seeking membership pose a serious problem for the international community. My delegation fully supports the initiative taken by a number of representatives to begin without delay the negotiation of a CTBT, now that conditions and the climate are favourable, and to conclude it in 1995.

For the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the peoples of regions and countries which face a direct nuclear threat, the elimination of such a threat is vital. Even though their demand for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances is properly reflected in a number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the nuclear threat against them still persists. The present environment, with the existence of ultra modern war matériel that is subject to no geographical, temporal or spatial restrictions, clearly underscores the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral conventions and agreements which are much more legally binding. My Government and people have done everything within their power to ward off the nuclear threat, which has constantly been weighing on us for several decades from a distance of a few dozen kilometres within the same territory, and also from far off, from the sea and the air. In this connection I should like to mention talks which were held recently between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America regarding the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsular. At the spring session we referred to the pressures exerted on the pretext of an imaginary "nuclear doubt" concerning my country, and the possibility of finding a solution to this exclusively between our country and the United States, on the basis of the circumstances connected with the origin of the nuclear issue in the Korean

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

peninsular. The historic DPRK-United States negotiations and the joint communiques that were issued demonstrate, explain and underscore many things. Those of the first round in New York last June set out the principles for the solution of the nuclear issue and others pending between the two sides, and the joint declaration which was published constituted a promise of great importance, the first of its kind in the annals of relations between the two countries. This joint communique consists essentially of a promise on the part of the United States regarding assurances against the threat or use of force, including nuclear weapons, against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsular, the preservation of peace and security, mutual respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

During the second round of talks, held in Geneva last July, the discussions revolved around practical measures to implement the principles set out in the above-mentioned declaration. One of the significant aspects of the talks in Geneva, as far as we are concerned, is that they proposed the replacement of the existing nuclear facilities using the graphite system by light-water reactors (LWR). This proposal reaffirms and brings out further the policy of the Government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea as regards the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It also constitutes a testimony of the greatest possible determination to eliminate once and for all the "nuclear suspicion" that exists as far as we are concerned. The attitude to the clear proposal made by my Government, which has for a long time devoted so much effort to resolving the national energy issue on the basis of our own technology and our own resources, this is, more than a technical and financial issue, a political problem relating to the intention really to solve or not to solve the nuclear problem. In the framework of the definitive solution of the nuclear problem and on the assumption that a solution through the provision of light-water reactors is feasible, the United States has declared itself prepared to support the introduction of light-water reactors and to seek the related resources together with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The two sides agreed that the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards is essential to establish a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has been our experience that if an international organization jeopardizes the national sovereignty of one of its member countries by violating an agreement concluded with it, if it applies a double standard and if it selects the option of resorting to threats and pressures and turns its back on the possibility of negotiations to resolve the problems that have arisen, it is inevitable that a grave and serious incident will take place which will jeopardize its supreme interests. Our position in favour of a negotiated solution is unchanging now as in the past. The question of partiality will be at the heart of discussions and other related problems will also be raised at our forthcoming consultations with IAEA. We have already received an inspection team from the international agency from the 3rd to the 10th of this month, and an IAEA delegation has been invited to Pyongyang for negotiations scheduled for 31 August.

The implementation of the joint declaration on denuclearization between the North and the South of Korea is one of the fundamental problems to be

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

tackled if we are to resolve the nuclear issue, and this can only be undertaken through dialogue. The breaking off of the North-South talks in this area demonstrates that the desired result cannot be attained unless the political factors impeding the negotiations are fully eliminated. Hence my Government's proposal to replace the special envoys by the North-South summit conference and to enter into the core of the subject to be discussed at the political level, including the nuclear issue. Our partner in the Geneva talks has understood our proposal on this North-South dialogue and has supported it; the two parties have reaffirmed the importance of applying the North-South joint declaration.

The Korean-American talks have opened up prospects for a radical and definitive solution to the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula and have laid the foundation for improvements in DPRK-United States relations. In this way they have made it possible to alleviate the tense situation in this part of the world where the degree of tension and the risk of conflict were extremely grave, thus contributing appreciably to peace and security in Asia and throughout the rest of our world. If each of the two sides sincerely fulfils its duties, the negotiations will of course be more progressive and productive. The consequences of the cold war will be eliminated once and for all in the Korean peninsula if commitments such as negative security assurances on the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the threat of armed force, including the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, etc., are put into practice. My delegation hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to support and encourage unreservedly the talks at a high governmental level between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, Since this is the first time that I am taking the floor during your presidency, please accept my congratulations and that of my delegation. The Conference is indeed fortunate to be in such capable hands as yours. You have my assurances that the United States delegation stands ready to cooperate fully with your efforts during this important part of the conference, as well as during the period before the 1994 session begins.

I am taking the floor to acknowledge the excellent report that Dr. Ola Dahlman introduced last week, and that we are approving today, on the recent meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). My Government is pleased that preparations for GSETT-3 are well under way. Like others, we attach great importance to this seismic experiment, and the recent GSE report provides important details about the experiment's schedule and preparation. I would like to take this opportunity, as we have done in the past, to stress the importance of wide participation in the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment. Delegations in this room can contribute to its success, but participation across each hemisphere is extremely important.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

My delegation was gratified that the recent GSE session saw many opportunities for valuable exchanges between GSE and the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. These exchanges continued to show that both bodies have much to gain by interaction and discussion. Accordingly, we believe that it would be worth while for CD delegations to gain a better insight and understanding of the GSE international data centre located in Arlington, Virginia, near Washington D.C. This centre will be used during the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment.

To that end, I have the pleasure to announce that the United States Government is inviting interested heads of CD delegations or their representatives to visit this centre during the upcoming United Nations First Committee session. The United States GSE delegation will host this event, and my Government is looking at the time frame of between 1 November and 4 November. The United States currently envisions that this will be a one-day affair, with CD delegates travelling from New York and returning, at their own expense, for briefings and demonstrations of the capabilities of the international data centre.

The United States delegation believes that such an event will help to go a long way in understanding technical seismic capabilities in the GSETT-3 context, and their possible application to the verification of an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty. I am happy to extend this verbal invitation and I will follow up with details at a later stage.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Ledogar for his statement, for his invitation to visit the GSE centre and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Next on my list is Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, Special Coordinator of the CD on the question of the expansion of its membership.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, since I have already had the occasion to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you preside over us, I will simply reiterate our support for your activities and our gratitude for the leadership that you are showing.

I take the floor to clarify some elements of the report I presented on 12 August as the Special Coordinator of the CD for the expansion of its membership. I do so because I understand that with these clarifications a number of delegations would be able to satisfy themselves about the report.

In the report I emphasized that the expansion I proposed should be dynamic and part of a phased approach. The expansion proposed represents consensus on what can be achieved as a first step at present. It follows logically from the concept of a dynamic and phased approach which I proposed that my recommendation is not meant to be exclusionary or static. It would be useful therefore if the concept of expansion of membership continued to be addressed particularly with reference to States whose presence would be significant for the work of the Conference. I recommend, therefore, that the CD would keep the expansion of its membership under review beginning in 1994. In order to do this on as comprehensive a basis as possible, and taking into

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

account those who are already applicants, any other country interested in membership in the CD may apply as soon as possible. Efforts should be made to address these cases as a follow-up to the present expansion. I would also suggest the Conference review its membership at regular intervals, say every 5 or 10 years, in the light of its experience with its initial enlargement and in accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure. This would give an assurance that the dynamic approach would continue. As I said on 12 August, my recommendation represents a very delicately balanced package. I hope the foregoing statement will help make it acceptable to all. I request that this statement be included as an integral part of my report on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador O'Sullivan, Special Coordinator for the expansion of the membership of the CD, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. We have taken note of his request that his statement should be considered an integral part of the report already submitted on this subject.

We have now completed the list of speakers for today. I would like to know if any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. I now call on the representative of the Republic of Tunisia.

Mr. BAATI (Tunisia) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, my delegation has previously extended its congratulations to you on taking up the lofty position of President. We are confident that the present session will achieve a very positive outcome under your leadership. Allow me now to make a short statement in French in connection with the kind exposé by the representative of Australia.

(continued in French)

I would like to thank the Ambassador of Australia, Special Coordinator for the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, for his exposé and in part for his answers to the questions that I raised in plenary on 12 August 1993. First of all I should like to say that my delegation has noted that the membership of the Conference will be periodically reviewed starting in 1994 in order to add new countries which I am sure are all guided solely by the wish to participate in this collective endeavour to create peace and security in the world. It is in that spirit that my country put forward its candidature more than 11 years ago. It was among the first to express its interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and in strengthening it as a multilateral negotiating instrument in the field of disarmament on behalf of peace and security. Our candidature falls within the framework of the principles which inspire and guide our diplomacy, principles based on a constant search for negotiated solutions to conflicts and the desire to reduce and eliminate all sources of tension and conflicts.

Our attachment to peace and security has on many occasions been reflected in the prompt signature and swift adoption of the international instruments negotiated in the field of disarmament. Tunisia's participation in the Paris

(Mr. Baati, Tunisia)

Conference and its prompt signing of the Convention on chemical weapons offer further signs of its faith in the effectiveness and solidity of the commitments negotiated in the transparent and multilateral forum of the Conference on Disarmament. This signature corroborates our commitment to work with others for a further reduction in chemical weapons and weapons which represent a source of danger and our desire to promote the establishment of lasting peace and security in the world. At a time when we welcome the latest initiatives by President Clinton followed by those of Presidents Yeltsin and Mitterrand on the extension of the moratorium on nuclear tests and the decision taken by consensus in this Conference to initiate the process aiming at the negotiation of a treaty relating to the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, we cannot conceal our disappointment at seeing Tunisia deprived of the possibility of contributing in a full and proper manner to this collective endeavour as a full member of the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, I should like to add that this matter will continue to be the subject of consultations between Tunisia and certain members of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Tunisia for that statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. We have taken note of the statement. I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take the floor in accordance with his own request.

Mr. BAIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, from the very outset I would like to extend my sincere congratulations to you on the assumption of this responsibility at this very juncture. I assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation. I would like also to thank Ambassador Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he presided over our Conference.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has carefully considered the statement which was made by Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan on 12 August in his capacity as Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament for the issue of expansion of its membership. I should really thank Ambassador O'Sullivan for his tireless efforts in this regard. He discharged the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Conference in an effective manner. Having now considered the proposed list annexed to the report, my Government finds that it can go along with the list in its entirety except for one candidate, which is Israel. We believe that its membership can be of no use for our Conference until there would be some changes in its policy, particularly as regards nuclear weapons. In concluding the statement I stress that in our view the concept of expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is a very logical process towards the enhancement of the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body and enables it to reflect appropriately the new international requirements.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. We have taken due note of his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, representative of Pakistan, has asked to speak.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, in the light of the statement that we have just heard, which appears to imply the possible absence of a consensus on the package approach assumption contained in the report of the Special Coordinator on the important issue of the expansion of the CD, I would suggest that you might like to consider calling an informal plenary meeting of the CD as early as possible so that we can either all reassure ourselves about a satisfactory outcome to this important issue at our final meetings of next week or, if that is not the case, to find some way out within the very short period of time that remains between now and the end of this year's session of the CD, at which we hope a satisfactory solution will be sought to this issue of expansion.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, representative of Pakistan, for his statement, and I now give the floor to Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria.

Mr. SEMICHI (Algeria) (translated from French): The delegation of Algeria supports the proposal just made by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan that the present plenary session should end forthwith to be followed by an informal session of the Conference on Disarmament. I do not want to go into the substance of the consultations to be conducted during the informal session, but I think that they are absolutely essential if we wish to complete all the activities of the Conference on Disarmament on the matter of the expansion of membership of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the Ambassador of Algeria for his statement. I have taken note of the content of the statements made by the Ambassador of Pakistan and by yourself. We still have other items on our agenda to pursue this morning, and we will be considering the request that has been made in a short while.

Now from what I understood, Ambassador O'Sullivan's statement was drawn up as a result of intensive consultations in which all members of the Conference on Disarmament participated, and it therefore reflects the spirit of the dialogue that took place and the way in which our work should proceed on the matter of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. While thanking the Conference for the constructive way in which it has addressed this sensitive matter of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, I would like to comment that there is no solution that is going to be 100 per cent satisfactory to every delegation, but I have the impression that the package we have in front of us is generally acceptable with the exception of some comments that we have just heard, and that therefore the Conference should consider that report at the next plenary meeting - I beg your pardon, I mean at the meeting on 2 September. I realize that there are many sensitivities in connection with the concept of expansion, but the international community has expressed a clear interest in seeing the Conference on Disarmament move along with the developments that have taken place, and expansion represents a concrete attempt to meet this trend. I therefore believe that it is to the common good that we should proceed in the way I have described, and that we should return to this matter at our plenary meeting on 2 September. In the meantime we will continue with our consultations.

(The President)

I now invite the Conference to proceed to the adoption of the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-sixth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, as indicated in document CD/1211, which has been circulated. In accordance with that recommendation, the Ad Hoc Group will be convened from 7 to 18 February 1994 in Geneva, or at any other date that might be most appropriate to the needs and the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is of course also understood that, depending on the activities of the Conference, it may become necessary for the Ad Hoc Group to meet more frequently than in the past. Accordingly, the proposed dates are subject to adjustment or change whenever the Conference deems necessary. We may also convene the Ad Hoc Group for additional sessions if necessary, and if there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference so decides.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I now invite Ambassador Gerard Errera, representative of France, to take the floor.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to tell you how happy my delegation is to see you presiding over our work at a time that is so critical for the future of the Conference on Disarmament, whether as regards the expansion of the membership or the forthcoming negotiation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We wish you all the best in your mission and naturally assure you of the full support of our delegation.

The Conference on Disarmament has just adopted by consensus, paragraph 13 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/1211). On this occasion my delegation would like to stress the following points. As the Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) himself said at our last plenary meeting, this Group was set up in 1976 and over the last few years has been working on the basis of a project which dates back to that time. As all of us will remember, the nuclear-test-ban treaty envisaged at that time by three countries, provided only for a lightweight, national verification regime. That is why under the seismological network as designed at present the detected data will be retransmitted only to participating States to be analysed by each of them for purposes of national verification.

Today we find ourselves in a new context: the Conference on Disarmament in its recent decision CD/1212, undertook to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which is global and internationally and effectively verifiable, in order to contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

We therefore believe that it is important for the Conference to review the present concept of a seismological network in the light of these criteria and adopt the necessary decisions to ensure that this network can meet the requirements of negotiations on the future treaty. My delegation has taken note of the readiness of the Group of Scientific Experts to change the pace of work it has followed hitherto. But it is not just a matter of the pace at which the Group works - it is the whole of its task which is now indissolubly

(Mr. Errera, France)

linked to the future negotiations. Therefore, in the eyes of my delegation the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has adopted paragraph 13 of the report of the GSE today can in no way prejudice the overall concept of the verification regime for a future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, nor the arrangements for its implementation, which can stem only from the negotiation of such a treaty by the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France for his statement concerning the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and its relationship with the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as he mentioned, and in that connection I would like to thank the Ambassador of France for the kind words he was good enough to address to the Chair.

(continued in Arabic)

We shall now proceed to discuss the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference which was circulated as document CD/WP.446. In accordance with our practice, we shall take note of that report and those sections in Ambassador Ahmad Kamal's report containing areas of agreement will be adopted as an integral part of the technical sections of the annual report. May I take it that the Conference takes note with appreciation of the report?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): As members know, we have been informed by the delegation of the Russian Federation that His Excellency Andrei Kozyrev, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wishes to address the Conference on Disarmament on Wednesday, 1 September. As you will recall, there are precedents for the Conference holding special meetings to receive high-level visitors on Wednesdays. It is understood that the plenary meeting of the Conference in this case will be devoted exclusively to the statement by the visiting Minister. I am sure that all members are looking forward to the visit by the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and to listening to his statement. It is suggested that His Excellency will address the Conference at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 1 September. The group meetings will be held later during the same morning, and I am sure that I am expressing the opinion of the whole Conference that this is acceptable to us.

It was so decided.*

* The plenary meeting scheduled for Wednesday, 1 September was later cancelled as other unavoidable commitments prevented the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from attending.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): Having said this, I would like to invite you to be available at exactly 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 1 September so that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation may deliver his statement without any delay on that day.

May I now turn to another subject? We have not circulated a timetable of meetings to be held next week because we think it is premature to do so now. For the moment, however, in addition to the plenary meeting to be held on Wednesday, on which we have just taken a decision, we shall hold a regular plenary meeting on Thursday, 2 September and a third plenary meeting on Friday, 3 September for the adoption of the annual report and the reports of the subsidiary bodies. We shall see later whether this last meeting, i.e. the meeting on 3 September, will be held in the morning or the afternoon, depending on the progress we make during next week.

As announced earlier the Conference will hold an informal meeting for the consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report immediately - let us say five minutes after the conclusion of this present plenary. The next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, as we agreed, will be held at 10 a.m on Wednesday, 1 September.

This plenary meeting stands adjourned and we shall meet in an informal meeting in five minutes.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.