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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 July 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. José Pérez Novoa (Cuba)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 657th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On personally taking office as President of the Conference for the period assigned to my country, I would like to reiterate once again our readiness to cooperate closely with all delegations in the discharge of our duties. As you know, for professional reasons related to an official mission outside this city, which could not be postponed, I was not able to make my opening statement when our presidency began on 22 June last. Consequently, I shall now proceed to make this statement.

On 26 July I took up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, which for me is a dual source of satisfaction because of the simultaneous commemoration of one more anniversary of the assault on the Moncada barracks, a date that marks the Day of National Rebellion in Cuba.

Before proceeding with my statement I should like to congratulate my colleague, the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, who preceded me in the Chair, on the excellent way in which he discharged his duties, and to extend my best wishes for success to the Ambassador of Egypt, who will succeed me in this seat during the complicated forthcoming period. I would also like to thank all the delegations that have conveyed kind words to us and have extended their cooperation in discharging our current responsibilities.

My country attaches great importance to this forum and we trust that new disarmament agreements will emerge from it, contributing to consolidating international peace and security. For Cuba, which is currently experiencing a difficult period and whose fundamental priority is to preserve, despite the adversities it faces, the fair social system its people enjoy as a result of the revolution that triumphed in 1959, it is more important than ever to respect the rules and principles of international law and the correct application of the propositions enshrined in the United Nations Charter, to which this forum can make some singular contributions. Refraining from the threat of force and the actual use of force, either unilaterally or collectively, could have been and should be the guiding principles of the international conduct of States in the post-cold-war period. It is therefore regrettable that instead of understanding and dialogue prevailing in all areas, acts of violence have begun to occur with dangerous frequency, which have to do not only with the fratricidal wars that we are witnessing and the violent fragmentation of some States, but also interventionism and interference stemming from the deterioration of the attitude of respect for the principles of national sovereignty. All this creates a growing situation of precariousness for international security and, in particular, that of third world countries. It is no accident that it is the thinking of that illustrious Mexican, Benito Juárez, "Respect for the rights of others is peace", which guards the entry to the hall of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the supreme body - under the United Nations Charter - even though there is currently a temptation to ignore it. It is necessary to think about this in contemplating some of the principal developments of our times, including, inter alia, hostile practices that have not spared my people, which, while subjected to the extension and strengthening of the economic and

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commercial blockade that has been oppressing it for over 30 years, cannot understand that the plans for the dismantling of foreign military installations reported by the international press should fail to apply to the obsolete foreign military base that usurps part of its territory.

This forum is renewing itself. Not only are distinguished colleagues leaving for new duties, for which we wish them success in their new tasks and their personal lives, while others are joining us, but also consultations are being carried out to expand our current membership and modify our agenda. Both matters are in the excellent hands of the Ambassadors of Australia and Mexico and we urge that the new membership of the Conference should be balanced and representative.

The expectations regarding the first item on our agenda, that of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, marked the beginning of the work of the Conference this year. Recent developments prompt us to think that steps are being taken in the right direction, which we assess at its proper value and we hope that the objective set will be achieved and that this forum will include in the list of its achievements the conclusion of a multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also hope that possibilities will open up for other "nuclear" items on our agenda, among which that of negative security assurances for non-nuclear States is of special interest. We recognize the importance of the arms control negotiations carried out by the nuclear Powers as a step towards what should be the final objective of any efforts in this regard - the total elimination of this class of weapon through a multilaterally negotiated and verifiable agreement. For our part, we will only reiterate Cuba's decision in respect of its accession, once the rest of the Latin American countries do so, to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whereby nuclear weapons are banned in our region.

Another item on which delegations in the Conference are focusing is that of transparency in armaments. Many proposals have been made which will be considered in the course of the present meeting. A topic with an important connection with this item is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in which my country will participate with the information that in the course of 1992 it neither imported nor exported any of the armaments included therein. As the Minister of Armed Forces of Cuba declared publicly last April, the Ministry is engaged in reducing troop numbers by 30 per cent, which will ensure that Cuba's armed forces are appropriate to its current situation.

The exercise now being carried out in respect of transparency in armaments is of importance within the context of efforts to move forward the process of disarmament and arms control at all levels. Transparency in armaments, it has often been said, is not an end in itself. From our standpoint it should contribute to eliminating the scope for aggression by one State against another, placing emphasis on armaments of an offensive and destabilizing nature which might be used in rapid operations. If transparency and the United Nations register do not bring about a reduction in exports of

(The President)

armaments by the main exporters, the value of the exercise will always be limited. The same reasoning applies to the issues of upgrading and development, especially of weapons of mass destruction.

There is no doubt that this Conference has hard work to do to achieve the objectives set out in its agenda. The disappearance of the confrontation between two political and military blocs and what is known as "deideologization", though some view them as positive elements, are by no means guarantees of real worldwide disarmament and the elimination of the risks facing mankind. Military unipolarity, the present lack of control over nuclear armaments, the continuous sale of arms and transfer of military technology and the growth in new military conflicts - these are all factors that continue to threaten international peace and security.

In conclusion I should like to reiterate that during the period of our presidency we shall remain available to delegations in order to expedite our work and assure them that, as always, we are prompted by the best of intentions.

Thus concludes my opening statement. On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Chile, the United States of America, Viet Nam, Japan, Australia, Romania, France, Germany, Belarus, India, Mexico and Brazil. I now call on the representative of Chile, Ambassador Tironi.

Mr. TIRONI (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I am pleased to be taking the floor at this first plenary meeting of the third 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament under your chairmanship.

Firstly, my delegation is pleased to see a representative of a Latin American country with which we are linked by age-old bonds serving as President of the Conference. Furthermore, your professional qualities and diplomatic experience offer us assurances of major progress in this concluding phase of the work of the CD, when important decisions are to be taken, including, inter alia, a decision concerning the subject of expansion. Consequently, we wish to congratulate you and wish you every success in your high office.

I have asked for the floor this morning so as to convey the contents of the following official statement made by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 July of this year.

"The Government of Chile has welcomed, with great satisfaction, the recent announcement by the President of the United States of America of an extension of at least 15 months in the moratorium on underground nuclear testing, as well as the statements made along the same lines by the Governments of France and the Russian Federation. It is confident that all the nuclear States will work together to strengthen this agreement and enhance its influence over time. In this way, in addition to constituting an important step forward towards a worldwide ban on atomic testing, this will favour the creation of a more favourable international climate which will promote confidence among States and

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

permit sustainable, balanced and peaceful development in all regions of the world. The decision of the United States Government considerably eases the task of the 1995 review conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly because of the impetus it can give to improving the present nuclear non-proliferation regime with a view to enhancing the possibility of extending the NPT well beyond 1995 and ensuring that its provisions are implemented in a more universal scale.

"The Government of Chile trusts that henceforward the agenda of international forums will give greater priority to negotiations designed to lead to the signing of a treaty banning all nuclear testing. It will therefore continue its endeavours to ensure that the United Nations Conference on Disarmament gives priority to consideration of a new treaty as an aspiration which is absolutely realistic and in keeping with the changes that have taken place on the international scene."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank my esteemed friend the Ambassador of Chile for his statement and the undeserved remarks addressed to us concerning our presidency. Many thanks to the Ambassador of Chile. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I have already had occasion to express my delegation's best wishes to the delegation of Cuba for the successful discharge of its responsibilities in the office of the President of the Conference. However, I would like to add or to express my own welcome to our new Belgian colleague who arrived in Geneva after we last met in June. Ambassador Guillaume, you have joined the CD at an important and interesting juncture in its work.

In this regard, President Clinton made a radio address on 3 July to announce that the United States Government had completed an extensive review of its policy on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban. As a result of the review, the President decided that the United States will extend the current moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September 1994, as long as no other nation tests. He has called on other nuclear-weapon States also to refrain from nuclear testing. We believe that this decision will improve the atmosphere for negotiations on a CTBT and discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

In this regard, President Clinton has placed high priority on beginning negotiations toward a multilateral comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear weapons. We are already undertaking consultations with the other declared nuclear-weapon States as well as other interested States in anticipation that negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty can begin as soon as possible. With the support of other interested States, we hope we can conclude a multilateral CTBT in a timely fashion. Our support for a CTBT reflects the ending of the cold war, as well as our deep concerns about emerging new threats to international security, stemming from proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The major changes that have occurred in the world have highlighted the need to do our utmost to strengthen international measures against proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. President Clinton believes that a CTBT could make an important contribution to this effort. In this connection, we are also urging all countries that have not yet become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to do so, as non-nuclear-weapon States.

The United States believes the nuclear-weapon States have a unique responsibility to establish a new international norm in regard to nuclear testing that would apply equally to all countries, and a special role in negotiations on a CTBT. If we are to achieve a CTBT, all of the nuclear-weapon States need to support this goal on testing. The United States has this in mind, particularly as we consult with the other nuclear-weapon States. At the same time we are also considering how to move toward a multilateral process that will command broad support for a CTBT. We believe the Conference on Disarmament will have an important role to play in this effort.

Let me make clear a few additional points. President Clinton wants to negotiate a multilateral ban on all nuclear-weapons tests. We do not seek another threshold test-ban Treaty. The President considered and rejected the option of proposing a one-kiloton threshold. We are seeking a comprehensive test ban, not a limited or threshold test ban.

On verification, we believe the treaty should include verification measures that ensure confidence without imposing unreasonable burdens or risks for the parties.

This week and next, the CD's Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is again meeting here in Geneva. Many CD members and non-member participants have been very active in the work of the GSE, developing concepts for an international seismic data exchange. We see an important role for the GSE and its work in the formation of an international CTBT verification regime.

With the full support of the Governments represented in this chamber, and of other interested States, we hope we can conclude a CTBT as quickly as possible. We want to work together to pursue this objective.

I would note that we have circulated as a CD document (CD/1205) the text of President Clinton's 3 July radio address.

Finally, I would like to note for the record the accession by Belarus to the non-proliferation Treaty which occurred on 22 July. This is indeed a welcome event.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his important statement, which undoubtedly offers hope for the work of this Conference on Disarmament at its forthcoming meetings. I now give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen.

Mr. NGUYEN (Viet Nam): Mr. President, speaking for the first time before the Conference this year, at the outset, on behalf of the Vietnamese delegation, I would like to extend to you my warmest congratulations for your assumption of the high post of President of this important Conference for the month of July. I am fully confident that with your experience and diplomatic skills, you will conduct the Conference's deliberations to a most successful conclusion. I sincerely wish to thank your predecessors for the excellent work done, to you and to all members of the Conference for allowing me to take the floor here today.

The interest and demand for disarmament is deep-rooted in the international community's aspirations for peace and security which are prerequisites for and indispensable to the success of the development endeavours of all nations. The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament specifies the principal goals of disarmament as being "to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life". With those specified goals in mind, looking back to the realities of the past few years, considering those of today, we cannot help seeing both the bright side and the dark side of the disarmament picture in its every dimension. We also cannot help realizing that much remains to be done.

In the recent past the world still witnessed the tension between the two super-Powers, between East and West. With intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in both East and West Europe, the danger of an annihilating war was just minutes away. The sword of Damocles was still hanging over the head of mankind. However, the signing of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States changed the nuclear disarmament picture by a large measure. Going beyond arms control and arms regulation, the INF Treaty, by providing for the elimination of a whole class of weapons, more importantly nuclear weapons, for the first time made the notion of a disarming world, regarded just years before as a Utopia, a political reality of our times. The conclusion of the START agreements respectively in 1991 and 1992 between the Soviet Union, then Russia, and the United States added bright colour to the picture. With those agreements fully implemented by the year 2003, the numbers of deployed nuclear warheads will be reduced to 3,000-3,500 on each side compared with a total of 50,000 on both sides by the late 1980s. The number of nuclear tests has also decreased substantially with testing moratoriums still in effect in the former Soviet Union, the United States and France. In this connection, the statements of the Russian Federation and the United States on the prolongation of the nuclear test moratorium were indeed another positive step forward in the right direction. All these are positive developments that we have on more than one occasion welcomed and highly

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appraised. However, I have only described the bright side of the nuclear disarmament picture. The other side of the coin remains. For all the reductions that have been made or are to be made, the world still has to live with thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying our entire civilization many times over. The danger of an annihilating war has been reduced but not yet eliminated. After all, less insecurity and more security are two different concepts. The nuclear weapon is not just one among many types of weapons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki remind us that we do not have and cannot have security having only thousands of nuclear weapons instead of tens of thousands. Putting aside the effects of radiation, we do not need even 1,000 nuclear weapons to create a "nuclear winter". With transformations in international relations and in the concept of security, it is high time we must get answers to the questions what nuclear deterrence is all about and whether the possession of nuclear weapons does really help protect one's legitimate security interests. Forgetting for now the question of who are right and who are wrong, keeping in mind the highest priority that we continue to attach to nuclear disarmament and to the prevention of nuclear war, the impasse prevailing in the work of the Conference on nuclear issues is depressing. While the reestablishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban constitutes a positive step this year, it is urgent that the Conference start serious negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, conclude the negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and give serious consideration to the need to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, my delegation deeply regrets that the draft decision of the Group of 21 calling for a start to negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the CD has not gained consensus. I believe that any achievement of our deliberations in this connection will have a good impact on the proceedings of the 1995 review and extension conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which we all want to be a success.

The rapid progress in science and technology, while promising us greater opportunities for cooperation in exploring and using outer space for peaceful purposes, makes our task of preventing an arms race in outer space all the more urgent. The existing legal regime governing activities in outer space is inadequate in forestalling an arms race in outer space and in checking the militarization of outer space. We urge the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space be given a mandate to negotiate further legal instruments to reinforce the regime.

In the field of conventional disarmament, the signing of the Treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe by the countries members of the former Warsaw Pact and NATO, together with unilateral reductions of forces and armaments made by various countries, have been positive developments. However, with tensions still existing or emerging in many parts of the world, much remains to be overcome. That is why Viet Nam completely shares the view expressed by the leaders of the non-aligned countries in the final document of their tenth summit stressing inter alia "the urgency of the need to curb the development and excessive build-up of conventional armaments and all other kinds of armaments, taking into account the legitimate security needs of

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States". We believe that success in the prevention of excessive military build-ups and the destabilizing accumulation of arms depends more on overall confidence in inter-State relations, not just on the provision of information.

If anything has proved the indispensable role of multilateral disarmament endeavours in the post-cold-war period, it is the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. We believe that the Convention is a great contribution to international peace, security and the global disarmament process. We do hope that efforts will be made to ensure the Convention is implemented in an effective and fair manner.

Turning to the question of expansion of the membership of the Conference, this question has been on the agenda for more than a decade. Today, with the need for and the trend of globalization of the disarmament process, this question demands an urgent solution. Viet Nam has been on the list of candidates from the beginning and was among the first few. Given its sincere desire to contribute to the work of the Conference and its serious intention, I hope that when the time comes for consideration, Viet Nam will enjoy the strong support of all countries concerned and appropriate priority due to it.

Today the concept of security is a comprehensive one, in which non-military factors such as global economic and trade growth and cooperation, national economic stability and development, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation and so on are assuming more and more decisive roles. The disarmament policy of Viet Nam is based on this approach and understanding. Within the framework of our all-sided renovation process, and in order to release resources for economic and social development during the past three years, we have cut by nearly half the size of our standing army and reduced substantially our defence budget. With half of our former soldiers now able to live with their families and participate in economic activities, our economic security as well as our social security are enhanced. We have been also pursuing our policy of peace, friendship and cooperation with our neighbours. Besides the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, our relations with ASEAN member countries are excellent. If mutual confidence and cooperation are a prerequisite for regional security and prosperity, which in turn contribute to the realization of regional disarmament measures conducive to attaining the final goal of general and complete disarmament, Viet Nam is and will be committed to that end.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Viet Nam for his interesting statement, as well as the kind words addressed to the Chair. Before calling on the next speaker, I wish to correct an omission at the beginning of our work and welcome our colleague from Belgium who has just joined the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are sure that his extensive diplomatic experience will be a major contribution to our work. We will certainly be in contact, we will enjoy close cooperation. Welcome to the CD. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, let me, at the outset, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on

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Disarmament and assure you of our full cooperation. I also wish to join other colleagues in welcoming Ambassador Guillaume, the new Belgian representative.

Japan regards the nuclear-test-ban issue as one of the major priorities of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, I feel much honoured to be chairing the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and pleased with the progress the Committee is making, thanks to the active cooperation rendered by the delegations.

I have taken the floor today to register Japan's appreciation of the decision made by President Clinton of the United States of America to extend its moratorium on nuclear testing at least through September of next year, as long as no other nation tests. The Japanese Government has already announced that it welcomes the United States decision, which contributes to strengthening the international trend toward a comprehensive test ban, and has stated that Japan strongly expects that all other nuclear-weapon States will also exercise self-restraint in nuclear testing. In this context, we welcome the decision by France and the Russian Federation to renew their commitments to the moratoria and their support for a CTB. Indeed we appreciate various initiatives which led to the extended moratoria of today, and would welcome any further positive decisions to be made by other nuclear-weapon States.

As it is Japan's long-standing objective to achieve a comprehensive test ban, the Japanese delegation which is currently in the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is prepared to make every effort, with the cooperation of our colleagues here, for the Conference on Disarmament to make a timely and important contribution to the accomplishment of a comprehensive test ban. For the purpose of facilitating this process, Japan is planning to host a workshop on NTB verification towards March 1994. Furthermore, I, speaking in my national capacity, should like to propose that the Conference on Disarmament should now consider giving a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in a timely manner.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, may I join others this morning in welcoming you to the presidency and congratulating you and your delegation on your assumption of your duties and assure you that you will have the full support of my delegation? I would also like at the outset to pay a particular word of welcome to my colleague of former years and now alphabetical neighbour, Ambassador Baron Guillaume of Belgium.

The past three years have introduced profound changes in the political order that was put in place after the end of World War II. Those revolutions of political choice by the people in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere have led, inevitably, to profound changes in strategic perceptions. Former enemies have become welcomed partners in the search for more peaceful and cooperative international arrangements.

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Not surprisingly the full implications of such far-reaching and thoroughgoing changes take time to mature. The process of absorbing, appreciating, evaluating and understanding the consequences of those resolutions in political choice is still making its way through the international system. But some consequences are already clear. It is clear that with the change of strategic assumptions goes a change in military doctrine. For instance, the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact and the reorientation of NATO are fully consistent with this changed approach. By extension, the removal of former threats and threat perception is being codified in new and breathtaking agreements that contribute to a more peaceful world at lower levels of armaments: such are the START I and START II agreements and the various associated unilateral decisions of the two major nuclear-weapon States. Australia unambiguously welcomes these developments and extends its congratulations to the United States of America and Russia for the way they have moved in these years to halt the arms race and to embark on an active programme of nuclear disarmament.

Just as the changes in political choices have permitted these major changes in politico-military relations, so they also have their consequences at more precise levels. The question of the utility of nuclear weapons for instance seems ready for reconsideration. So does the argument that nuclear weapons forces need to be modernized. If we are at the start for the first time of a real programme of nuclear disarmament, the idea that a new generation of nuclear weapons should be produced seems particularly bizarre. The question also naturally arises in these circumstances as to the need for any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Since the existing amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are apparently more than adequate for the declining numbers of nuclear weapons, would it not be possible now to codify the cessation of such production in a legally binding instrument that, by including adequate verification arrangements, also reassures the international community that such material is not being covertly produced or acquired?

And most interestingly and importantly, we have the recent extensions of the previously existing moratoria on the testing of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia and France, and by extension, by the United Kingdom. We note also that although China has not formally announced a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, it has not tested in fact since September 1992. We hope China will soon take the opportunity to join other nuclear-weapon States in formalizing a testing moratorium, and to confirm that it too will adopt a "no first test" policy. Thus, the scene is set for early commencement of negotiations to convert the existing moratoria - whether formally announced or not - into a permanent ban via a treaty of unlimited duration, and in so doing to garner additional non-proliferation benefits for the whole international community.

Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, has publicly welcomed the decisions of Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Mitterrand to continue their existing restraint. Together with the decisions of the United Kingdom and China, this restraint holds out the prospect that 1993 will be the first for

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many years when there has been no testing of nuclear weapons. This is a result which will be heartily welcomed in Australia and around the world.

I should note in passing that the political climate for the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty will be considerably enhanced by the ending of nuclear testing and by the commencement of negotiations for a legally binding, effectively verifiable, universally applicable, multilaterally supported and enduring comprehensive test-ban treaty. Thus, in our view, a CTBT offers significant disarmament and non-proliferation benefits that should be promptly realized.

In this effort, we believe the CD has an essential role. We do not mean to exclude a separate caucussing by the P5. On the contrary we understand why it will be necessary for the former testing Powers to consider together aspects of a test ban, and we acknowledge the significant contribution that will be required from them. We therefore welcome the French proposal for such parallel discussions here in Geneva. But we cannot accept the model of the past when the CD or its predecessors were simply used as the delivery point for a treaty negotiated elsewhere. We see the CTBT as having major benefits because it will stop the continuous evolution of new generations of nuclear weapons - so it will be an effective disarmament measure, and because it will provide effective mechanisms to ensure that States parties are not clandestinely undertaking tests or preparation for testing of nuclear explosive devices - hence it will be an effective instrument and a concrete and symbolic measure of non-proliferation. To obtain these dual benefits, only a multilateral negotiation representing a broad spectrum of international opinion would be a credible forum. Of course, it could in theory be done somewhere else other than in the CD. But the time and effort to create an alternative forum would be onerous, and the result, in our view, unlikely to be better than the CD and quite possibly worse.

In the successful conclusion of the CWC, the CD demonstrated it had the capacity to deliver a high-quality, complex, politically sensitive package which met the declared needs of the international community. Why should we assume it cannot do the same for a CTBT which, after all may not be as technically complex in some respects as was the CWC? For Australia, we think the Conference on Disarmament needs to get down promptly to its work of negotiating a CTBT. We should move expeditiously - I mean during this session - to transform the Group of Scientific Experts into a more active collaborator with us, the negotiators, or if that is not possible to find other appropriate structures. On 24 June, in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Cole of our delegation offered some precise options about how that could be done. We do not have an inflexible or prescriptive approach, but we do want results: we want to draw the useful scientific preparatory work which has been going on patiently for so long into a negotiating context.

We believe preparations should now commence for the formal start of negotiations. I note in passing the comment just made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that Japan also favours the formal start of such negotiations, and we endorse the Chairman's comments. As I mentioned, we recognize that preparation will be needed by the P5, and we urge them to

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expedite their internal reflection and discussions so that we can all get on with our collective effort. It would also send a useful signal about our determination to make the CD an active negotiating body if we could decide promptly on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee. We would then be in a position to commence negotiations forthwith. We hope that this year's Ad Hoc Committee might continue its work during the available slots between September 1993 and January 1994. Depending on progress, it could work further on developing the integration of seismic and non-seismic verification techniques. We could consider establishing a working group of the AHC on verification, along the model successfully utilized over a number of years in the CWC negotiations. We could also consider a working group on legal and institutional issues. We think that there could be some consideration of who might serve as next year's Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee.

We think that we should set ourselves the deadline of completing a CTBT by the end of the 1995 CD session, sending the completed text to the UNGA that year and having the treaty open for signature early in 1996. In any event the aim for 1994 should be to produce a largely concluded treaty framework with a largely completed verification package. Such a result would give confidence to the international community that a CTBT could indeed be concluded by the end of the 1995 session, as I have suggested.

After thousands of nuclear tests it seems 1993 will see a decisive break with the pattern of the past 47 years. It is time to codify this long-desired and highly favourable development, to link it to strategically stabilizing benefits and to embody it in an indefinite legal instrument that gives credible assurances of compliance. Such a treaty will be a further demonstration of multilateral cooperation by all those who want a world based on mutual respect, proper regard for legal norms and the increased flow of technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Many thanks to the Ambassador of Australia for the important assessment he made in his statement. In turn I also thank him for his kind words concerning our presidency. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to take the floor under your chairmanship. We all know and appreciate your abilities as a diplomat and skilful negotiator, which will be an important asset for the progress of our endeavours at the Conference. May I use this opportunity to appreciate the diligence with which the distinguished Ambassador of China has conducted the work of the CD in the previous month? I also would like to welcome Ambassador Baron Guillaume, the new representative of Belgium at the Conference.

Romania welcomes the decision of President Clinton of the United States to extend the moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September of next year as long as no other nation tests. We are happy to note that the response of other nuclear-weapon States is, in general, prompt and positive. The new American initiative gives the long-expected by the international community answer to ensure the cessation with a view to ban

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their nuclear tests. We are especially appreciative of the pledge "to negotiate a comprehensive test ban". The extension of the current moratorium and the organization of consultations and negotiations aimed at concluding a comprehensive treaty of universal vocation open a new vista for the efforts that are made to halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons and strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and the missiles than can deliver them. This will greatly ease the task of the NPT review conference in 1995 to attain the objective of unconditional and indefinite prolongation of the non-proliferation Treaty. The new American initiative represents also an important contribution to the stimulation of the positive processes in international relations, to the consolidation of stability, security and peace in the world. My country and my delegation at the Conference on Disarmament are ready to join immediately the efforts aimed at negotiating a treaty on the comprehensive cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): As you take up the presidency of the Conference, I wish you every success in your important task and, naturally, assure you of my delegation's full support. I should also like to pay tribute on this occasion to the exemplary fashion in which the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China discharged his duties earlier. Lastly I should like to welcome the Ambassador of Belgium, Ambassador Alain Guillaume, to whom I address my warmest and most friendly wishes for success.

Last 4 July, in a communiqué from the office of the President of the Republic, France stated that it was in favour of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty provided that it was universal and verifiable. It also declared its willingness to participate actively in negotiations to this end. The same communiqué stated that France would at the same time ensure that its deterrent capability would be preserved in the context of progress in technology, and would also see to it that its partners complied with the commitments they had entered into. Today I should like to explain the meaning and the implications of this initiative.

Firstly, it bears witness to France's unswerving resolve to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons; to guarantee at the same time credibility for its deterrent force while complying with the principle of strict sufficiency that it has always abided by. On these two points, France intends to shoulder the responsibilities incumbent on it. As the United Nations Security Council emphasized at its summit meeting on 31 January 1992, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, like the proliferation of the other weapons of mass destruction, constitutes a threat for international peace and security. France is all the more determined to avert this risk since its security, and that of Europe, is particularly concerned. It was with this major concern in mind, and taking into account the incipient process of reductions in the American and Russian arsenals, that France decided in April 1992 to suspend its nuclear testing temporarily and is now ready to negotiate a test-ban treaty. In so doing France is mindful of its security interests. These remain unchanged: today as in the past, the aim is to

(Mr. Errera, France)

guarantee the credibility of its nuclear capability, with the constraints that this involves. For this reason a high-level group of experts was instructed to check that the suspension of testing was not detrimental to our deterrent force. France must take into account simultaneously the level of nuclear capabilities which in any event will remain in the world beyond the year 2000, the risks of proliferation in various parts of the world, and the ability of certain nuclear Powers to exploit their technological lead in order to gain a strategic advantage.

Secondly, it is with these various considerations in mind that France is now addressing the issue of negotiating a nuclear-test-ban treaty. In order to be acceptable, such a treaty should in our view be universal and internationally verifiable. Such a treaty should in the first place be universal: today the only justification for a halt to nuclear testing is to prevent certain countries from making progress in the ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. Consequently, any constraints imposed on the nuclear Powers would be justifiable only if they were applied at one and the same time to everyone, and primarily to the threshold countries. Otherwise - as I have already said in another forum - the legitimate nuclear Powers would find themselves in the absurd position of having to give up their rights while the proliferating countries would continue to pursue their clandestine programmes freely. This treaty should also be internationally verifiable: for the same reason, it is essential that the definitive cessation of testing should be subject to an internationally effective verification regime forming an integral part of the treaty, so as to offer the parties a guarantee that it will be respected. These two reasons make it necessary, in our view, to give the negotiating process a multilateral character from the outset, in order to involve the entire international community in it. The Conference on Disarmament is, in our view, the only possible negotiating forum. It already has this issue before it. It is the repository of expertise in disarmament issues. The five nuclear Powers are represented here. Lastly, it is based on the rule of consensus: as was shown by the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention, this rule, far from preventing the conclusion of an agreement, facilitates compromise and paves the way to universality. Obviously it will still be possible, as we ourselves had suggested, as the Ambassador of Australia reminded us, for the representatives of the Five in Geneva to consult closely, and for a satisfactory relationship to be sought between the Conference on Disarmament - which will negotiate the treaty - and the five nuclear Powers, consultations among whom, in parallel to the multilateral negotiations, are undoubtedly useful. What is vital in our view is that there should be no separation, either in space or in time, between these two processes which in our view are inseparable. It would be incomprehensible for the nuclear Powers to negotiate a test-ban treaty among themselves alone if the real objective of such a treaty, as we were reminded recently by the representative of Sweden, is no longer so much to put an end to the arms race between two over-armed Powers as to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

For the same reason it would not be any more acceptable or reasonable to delink the negotiation of a treaty from its verification regime, otherwise

(Mr. Errera, France)

verification might become a secondary element, whereas, if our real concern is indeed the risk of proliferation, it must be the key element. It is no insult to anyone to say that we are no longer in 1963, when two States could take the liberty of negotiating the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty and then submitting it to the international community for acceptance. Who can believe that after 146 States have signed the chemical weapons Convention negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament, the international community would agree to be excluded from the negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty which it has been demanding for so many years? How could one justify the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, not being the central body for such negotiations?

Thirdly and lastly, it should be clear to all that in the view of my country any future agreement on a halt to testing would make sense and would be acceptable only if the basic conditions which would make it possible were not altered. This means among other things that the undertakings entered into by all concerned should be fully respected, whether we are talking about disarmament or non-proliferation. We have particularly in mind the main instruments which determine and will determine our assessment of the strategic situation, inter alia the ABM Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the START process and of course the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It has frequently been said in recent months that the Conference on Disarmament was at a crossroads. It would be an understatement to say that this is more true than ever today. The choice is clear. Either the Conference, the only negotiating body on disarmament matters which represents the entire international community, decides now to take on this negotiating process, on the principle of which there is now consensus for the first time, or else the Conference resigns itself to seeing the substance of the negotiations fall outside its grasp, however this may be dressed up. Everyone must weigh the consequences of the decision carefully. France for its part has chosen. It has chosen multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament. It is aware that these negotiations affect its vital interests and it will, you may be assured, be mindful of the need to defend them and it considers that it will be able to defend them in this forum. France is also aware of how much is at stake - the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - and will shoulder its responsibilities in this respect.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Errera of France for his interesting statement. I give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, as this is the first time the German delegation takes the floor under your presidency, I should not miss this opportunity to congratulate you upon the assumption of your important task and to wish you good luck and success. We have always appreciated the active role your delegation plays in this Conference. I am convinced that you will lead us efficiently through the beginning of the last part of this year's session, when important decisions on multilateral arms control and the future of the Conference on Disarmament are emerging. I should also like to thank

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

your predecessor, the Chinese Ambassador, for the excellent work he did for this Conference. I would like to wholeheartedly welcome Ambassador Guillaume in our Conference as Belgium has assumed the presidency of the European Community for the second half of this year. I think he will have a lively time with us, especially in New York.

My delegation takes the floor today in order to express the satisfaction of my Government with regard to the recent developments on the issue of a nuclear test ban. We welcome the decision of the United States Government, as explained by my distinguished American colleague just a few minutes ago, to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing, and to commit itself to multilateral negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

It is with equal satisfaction that the German Government takes note of the statements of other nuclear-weapon States on the same issue. In our understanding, none of the nuclear Powers will resume testing first in the foreseeable future, a situation which will create a positive environment for multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The German Government attaches great importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which will have a considerable impact in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. It is our goal to achieve a universally applicable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty within the near future. This treaty must be internationally verifiable and its verification provisions should be negotiated together with the substance of the nuclear test ban. We are convinced that the only possible and appropriate forum for negotiating such a treaty is the Conference on Disarmament. The five nuclear Powers carry a special responsibility in the field of nuclear testing. However, in view of the universality of a future treaty we are striving for, all aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be negotiated in this forum. I therefore agree with the statement of my French colleague we just heard.

The German Government acknowledges the fact that promising future negotiations need solid and substantive preparations. Nevertheless, we think that official negotiations should start in this forum as soon as possible. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for the time being, should continue its successful work along the lines decided upon earlier this year. However, before the end of this session the Ad Hoc Committee should be in a position to discuss the mandate for future negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I call on the representative of Belarus, Mr. Sannikov.

Mr. SANNIKOV (Belarus) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome extended to you in the statements by other delegations and wish you success in this crucial period of the Conference's 1993 session.

(Mr. Sannikov, Belarus)

My delegation has taken the floor at today's plenary meeting in order to make a brief informative announcement. But before doing so, I should like to welcome the decision of the Governments of Russia, the United States and France in extending the moratorium on nuclear testing and express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be the forum that draws up arrangements for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

A week ago, on 22 July, the Republic of Belarus submitted its instruments of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to representatives of the three depositary States of the Treaty: the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States. As you know, the decision on accession to the Treaty was taken by the Belarusian Parliament on 4 February 1993. In this way Belarus was the first of the new independent States of the former USSR to fully discharge its responsibilities under the Lisbon Protocol signed on 23 May 1992. In submitting to the depositaries its instruments of accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, Belarus caused this Treaty to enter into force in respect of its territory. I cannot say that the decisions finally enshrining the nuclear-free status of the Republic were adopted automatically. They were preceded by lively debate and arguments in Parliament and in the press. Various ideas were expressed, including such novel ideas as the establishment of a transitional period as a nuclear-weapon State or the declaration of the status of a "temporary" nuclear State. However, the Republic of Belarus realized that this is first and foremost not a matter of the internal affairs of a State but a fundamental issue of international relations. It was precisely its responsibility for the fate of the Treaty, which is the basis for the international non-proliferation regime, and the understanding of the complex nature of the present period of the Treaty's application and the need to give it unconditional support, that enabled Belarus to take the decisions that I have the honour to communicate to the Conference on Disarmament today.

The President of the United States, B. Clinton, to whom President Shushkevich of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus submitted its instruments of accession in Washington, called the decision of the Belarusian Parliament a courageous step and pointed out that Belarus is at the forefront of global efforts to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Two days ago the Republic of Belarus celebrated the third anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty. The key provisions of this document concerned the goal of building a non-nuclear, neutral State. The most recent decisions taken by Belarus confirm the consistency of the Republic's policy in pursuing these goals. In this connection I should like to refer to the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. Belarus submitted its official application for membership of the Conference while still a republic of the former Soviet Union. Since then Belarus has demonstrated its commitment to disarmament goals in its practical actions as an independent State. Today, the Republic is a party to all the major international disarmament treaties, including the nuclear treaties signed by the former USSR and the United States. Despite the very difficult period of transformation being experienced by the Republic and serious economic

(Mr. Sannikov, Belarus)

problems, Belarus steadfastly observes the obligations it has assumed. We believe that the concrete contribution made by Belarus to international disarmament efforts gives the Republic every reason to hope to become a fully-fledged member of the Conference in the very near future. We subscribe to the view that in determining the future membership of the Conference various criteria have to be taken into account. However, we believe that the greatest support is due to those States which take a responsible approach to the very complex issues of security and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Belarus for the information contained in his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

On the list of speakers I have four countries - India, Mexico, Brazil and Poland. However, I have received a request from the delegation of Russia to make a brief statement with relation to the statement made by the representative of Belarus. If these speakers have no objection, we could call on the delegation of Russia to make its statement. If I hear no objection I shall call on the delegation of Russia.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President, for your kindness to us. I hope to take exactly two minutes of your time. I must say the following. We welcome the announcement by the Government of the Republic of Belarus of the accession of that State to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State. The Russian State and its leadership see in this step an important contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, a useful and timely example to a number of other States which have yet to make their choice, a choice, we hope, in favour of commonsense and a dependable peace. We are proud that Russia and Belarus closely cooperate with each other, which is already producing positive results in the context of the steps we are taking in the field of nuclear disarmament. We believe that this process is going to continue and develop, thus creating greater certainty among our neighbours, near and far, a predictable and stable strategic situation throughout the Eurasian territory of the former USSR.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, on behalf of the Indian delegation, permit me at the outset to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that under your wise, capable and dynamic leadership, the Conference will further advance its work. I assure you of the full support of my delegation in accomplishing your duties.

I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, for the exemplary manner in which he presided over the earlier meetings of the Conference. I would also like to thank Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, Ambassador Servais of Belgium and Ambassador Batsanov of the Russian Federation, who have left, for their contributions in the CD and to wish them the very best in their new assignments. May I also

(Mr. Chandra, India)

avail of this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria, Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Saboia of Brazil and Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium?

I would like to confine my remarks today to the comprehensive test-ban treaty. President Clinton's recent announcement extending the United States moratorium on nuclear testing to 30 September 1994 and placing priority on commencing negotiations towards a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty has been welcomed by my Government. A comprehensive test-ban treaty has a very important place among all the measures envisaged in the context of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, as one commentator put it, a CTBT is "the most sought-after and most elusive of arms control measures of the nuclear age". In this context, it is also not irrelevant to recall that the first initiative for a ban on nuclear testing was taken by India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, as early as 1954. Since then, India has repeatedly called for cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, called for a moratorium on testing of all nuclear weapons and initiation of negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the first stage for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. Unfortunately, these calls were ignored and the opportunity to cap the proliferation of nuclear weapons was missed.

It has been said that the history of disarmament negotiations is a history of missed opportunities. This is certainly true of the proposal for a ban on all nuclear-weapon test explosions. On at least three occasions during the past 30 years, a test-ban treaty seemed to be imminent: in 1958 when an East-West conference produced a report on the feasibility of detecting nuclear explosions; in 1962-1963, when lack of agreement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the number of mandatory on-site inspections per year was alleged to be the sole obstacle to a test-ban treaty; and in 1979-1980, when the United Kingdom, United States of America and the former USSR appeared to be making progress towards conclusion of a treaty in their trilateral negotiations. The international political climate today presents a golden opportunity to the international community to put once and for all an end to nuclear-weapon testing. Let it not be said that we have once again failed to seize it. I would therefore like to fully support the proposal made this morning by Ambassadors Tanaka and O'Sullivan that the CD give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty we should aim at has been clearly spelt out in the preamble of the PTBT of 1963, which recognized that its objective was to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons for all times. In our view, therefore, a treaty on nuclear test ban, which would be comprehensive in character, should have three essential characteristics, namely, (i) It should cover all States including the five nuclear-weapon States; (ii) It should extend the prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons to the underground environment as well; (iii) It should do so for all time. The verification system to be developed must be non-discriminatory in character in the sense of providing equal rights and obligations to the States parties to the proposed treaty including equal

(Mr. Chandra, India)

access. The aim of the CTBT and consequently its scope should be to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit in a non-discriminatory way proliferation of nuclear weapons in their horizontal as well as vertical dimension. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress or to perpetuate the division of the world into two categories of nations. In the promotion of achievement of a nuclear test ban, the interests of the nuclear-weapon States must be taken into account on the basis of complete equality with the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

A compelling reason why CTBT has become a matter of high priority is to prevent the development of "third generation" nuclear weapons. It would, of course, at the same time help reduce the chances of horizontal proliferation. In our view, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would go a long way in arresting the nuclear arms race and bringing to an end the development of more lethal warheads. We hope that all the nuclear-weapon States will respond positively to President Clinton's announcement and engage purposefully in multilateral negotiations for an effective and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has long been a goal of international disarmament community. Any limited bilateral or regional approach to this issue which concerns all States would be inappropriate, and, accordingly, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be negotiated multilaterally.

The START-II agreement signed between the United States and Russia at the beginning of this year, and now the possibility of beginning negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, demonstrates that it is possible to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament. We believe that movement towards such an objective would be facilitated if in future all nuclear-weapon States could also agree to a universal freeze on future development and deployment of nuclear weapons. We also urge all nuclear-weapon States to simultaneously commence negotiations for an agreement to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We shall continue to work together with other like-minded countries towards establishing a cooperative world order based on a truly non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime on disarmament with the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Chandra of India for his interesting statement. I now call on my esteemed friend Ambassador Marín of Mexico.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): For the delegation of Mexico and for myself personally, it is a source of special satisfaction to see you presiding over this segment of our work. I will not venture to add anything further, since anything I might attempt to say about the historical and current links between Cuba and Mexico would be extremely inadequate. If I attempted to describe the esteem in which we hold you and your delegation, I would also fall short. We are grateful to Ambassador Hou Zhitong for the

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

efforts he made in the previous segment of the work of the CD and we welcome our new colleague from Belgium. We also send his predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais, every good wish.

On behalf of the member countries of the Group of 21 of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to make the following statement.

(continued in English)

The G-21 welcomes the statements made by France, the Russian Federation and the United States regarding the extension of their nuclear-testing moratoria. Those announcements, together with the statements made today, are encouraging. The Group of 21 reiterates its readiness to begin at once here, in the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTB) that will attract universal adherence and be internationally verifiable.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Many thanks to Ambassador Marín for his kind words addressed to myself and to our delegation and especially for the important statement on behalf of the Group of 21. I now call on Ambassador Saboia of Brazil.

Mr. SABOIA (Brazil): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to address the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament for the first time. Before delivering my statement, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference in this important period of our work. Please accept my best wishes, and the assurance of the full support and cooperation of the delegation of Brazil. I would also like to thank the Ambassador of China for the excellent work done as Chairman of the previous session of the Conference. Let me also join other delegations in extending a welcome to the Ambassadors of Belgium, Bulgaria and the Russian Federation who have recently joined the work of the Conference.

I have been instructed to make a statement with regard to the positive development we have witnessed in the past few weeks in relation to the suspension of nuclear tests in certain nuclear-weapon States. While fully endorsing the statement just made by the Ambassador of Mexico on behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to inform the Conference on Disarmament regarding the official reaction of the Brazilian Government to the recent announcement by the United States of America that the nuclear tests would remain suspended in that country at least until September 1994. The following text has been released to the press:

"The Brazilian Government welcomes with special satisfaction the announcement by President Clinton that the United States of America will extend at least until September 1994 the present moratorium on nuclear tests. Brazil urges the other nuclear-weapon States to do likewise and keep the tests suspended. In this sense, the positive steps taken by France and the Russian Federation are also welcome. President Clinton's initiative is an important step in the direction of the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Saboia, Brazil)

This treaty will be a crucial phase in the process leading to total nuclear disarmament, which remains a permanent goal of Brazilian foreign policy."

Let me also put on record that my Government saw with pleasure the confidence expressed by the American Government on the possibility of an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - a point which has been further elaborated in a statement made at the present meeting by Ambassador Ledogar. For Brazil, the Conference on Disarmament has a central role to play in the negotiation of a CTBT, which should contain indisputable and reliable verification mechanisms. It is the position of the Brazilian Government that the early conclusion of a new international instrument on nuclear tests, equally binding on all countries, will represent an important step towards universality in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I note with appreciation the positive statements made by previous speakers to the same effect.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Saboia of Brazil for his important statement and his words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, let me first extend to you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. You will have my delegation's full cooperation. We also wish to express appreciation to the outgoing President, the Ambassador of China, for the exemplary manner in which he performed his duties. May I also add my welcome to the new representatives, Ambassador Baron Guillaume of Belgium, Ambassador Saboia of Brazil and Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation?

I have asked for the floor to put on record the profound satisfaction of the Republic of Poland over the further extension of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. President Bill Clinton's decision to "extend the current moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September of next year, as long as no other nation tests", President Boris Yeltsin's announcement that "Russia's moratorium will now remain in force as long as the moratoria declared by other nuclear-weapon States are observed", the joint communiqué of President François Mitterrand and M. Balladur that for the time being France would not resume its testing and the concurring positions of China and the United Kingdom - they all indicate the onset of fair weather for the efforts pursued in the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The window of opportunity thus created to make yet another, perhaps decisive step to buttress the non-proliferation regime must not be missed by the international community, in the first place by this body.

In the view of my delegation, owing to the determined efforts of the Conference's subsidiary body - the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban - we are now better prepared than ever to embark on informed, constructive and purpose-oriented efforts toward our long-elusive goal. The series of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee with the participation of experts, the benefit we all

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

had of their learned presentations on diverse aspects of seismic and non-seismic verification techniques and their mutual interrelationship have played an invaluable educational role in better preparing us to deal effectively with the verification issue. We owe gratitude both to the experts and to the delegations which made their expertise available to the Ad Hoc Committee.

In conclusion, let me place on record that my delegation welcomes the important statement of the representatives of the United States and France in which they have expressed their commitment to actively engage in a negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament leading to early achievement of a CTBT.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The list of speakers I had before me has been completed. However, I wish to ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor. I call on the Ambassador of Belgium.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, as you and a number of my colleagues here have been kind enough to welcome me on my arrival in this forum, I would like to thank you for this warm reception. I avail myself of this opportunity to associate myself with all those who have congratulated you on your election to the presidency of this assembly and I wish to assure you of the support of our delegation. For my own part I should like to add that I am well aware of the crucial stage that the Conference on Disarmament has now reached, and I shall do my utmost to make a useful contribution.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Many thanks to the Ambassador of Belgium and we are sure that his contribution will be very important for the work of the Conference, particularly at this time. As there are no further speakers I should like to turn to another matter. The secretariat has distributed today a request from Cameroon to take part in the work of the Conference. The request appears as an annex to working paper CD/WP.444. No objection has been received to this request. Therefore I suggest that we take it up directly in plenary, on the understanding that this does not signify a precedent in other cases, when requests from non-member States must first be considered in an informal meeting. I note that this arrangement is acceptable and therefore put the request received from Cameroon before the Conference for a decision. If there are no comments I shall take it that the Conference will go along with the recommendation contained in the working paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The secretariat has also distributed today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the second week of the third part of the Conference's annual session. The timetable is prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and is merely indicative, and is subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the timetable is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to inform the members of the Conference that during the informal consultations held on Monday it was agreed that the presidency would get in touch with the Swiss authorities so as to clarify the practical scope of the host country's decision to grant heads of delegation of the Conference on Disarmament the same privileges, immunities and facilities as those granted to the permanent representatives accredited to the United Nations Office at Geneva. I have already been in touch with the authorities and I shall keep the Conference informed of the results of the steps that I shall be taking starting in the next few days.

I have no other matters to deal with and I shall therefore proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.