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LETTER DATED 18 MAY 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report, which was addressed to me on 17 May 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in Security Council resolution 988 (1995).

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Operations of the International Conference on the Former  
Yugoslavia's Mission to the Federal Republic of  
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 988 (1995), adopted on 21 April 1995. In paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Security Council underlined the importance it attached to the work of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia's Mission, expressed its concern that a shortage of resources hampered the effectiveness of that work and requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution on measures to increase the effectiveness of the work of the Mission, including on the question of helicopter flights. The Security Council also requested Member States to make available the necessary resources to strengthen the Mission's capacity to carry out its task. The report on a special inquiry into helicopter flights was submitted to the Security Council on 11 May 1995 (S/1995/385). The question of measures to increase the effectiveness of the Mission is dealt with in section IV below. In paragraph 13 of its resolution, the Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Developments during the past 30 days are dealt with in the present report.

2. In paragraph 16 of its resolution, the Security Council, furthermore, encouraged the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee to ensure that the Mission kept the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) fully informed about the findings of the Mission. Pursuant to this provision, the Co-Chairmen have instructed the Head of the Mission to bring to their attention any findings of special concern to any of the three countries so that the Co-Chairmen can transmit it to them. In this regard, they have written to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia to report in more detail about the Sremska Raca border crossing-point earlier in May.

3. It will be recalled that, on 4 August 1994, the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

- (a) "To break off political and economic relations with the 'Republika Srpska'";
- (b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the 'Republika Srpska' (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia";

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- (c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the 'Republica Srpska', except food, clothing and medicine".

4. On 19 September, 3 October, 2 November and 5 December 1994, 5 January, 3 February, 2 and 31 March and 13 April 1995, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures (S/1994/1074; S/1994/1124; S/1994/1246; S/1994/1372; S/1995/6; S/1995/104; S/1995/175; S/1995/255 and S/1995/302). The report dated 13 April 1995 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen.

"In the light of the foregoing developments based on the Mission's on-site observation, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, and aside from the reported tracking of possible helicopters crossing the border, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the land border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the period covered by this report there have been no commercial transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

5. Developments in the past 30 days are reported below.

## II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

6. The legislation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) closing the border with the Bosnian Serbs continues to be in effect.

7. In accordance with federal government law, the border crossings will be open for passenger traffic during May, June and July from 4 a.m. to 8 p.m. The border crossings at Sremska Raca and Vilusi will be open for passenger and freight traffic 24 hours a day.

8. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have provided the Mission with the following list of confiscations conducted along its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina for April 1995:

Petrol	11.5 tons
Diesel	11.1 tons
Cigarettes	1 ton
Construction material	472 kilograms
Wood	61 cubic metres
Alcohol	2,838 litres
Food	32 tons

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Textiles, clothing, footwear	460 kilograms
Motor vehicles	6
Electrical gadgets	13
Coffee	21 kilograms
Other goods	4.1 tons

9. There were 102 customs offence procedures initiated during the month and 84 were finalized. Fines and penalties amounted to 438,500 dinars. Confiscations during the month have gained momentum. The number of new offence cases was well above the average of the previous eight months and there was a substantial increase in the amount of penalties of the adjudicated cases, which almost doubled those of March.

10. After fighting started in Sector West on 1 May, a difficult situation developed at Sremska Raca border crossing. Customs authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) informed the Mission on 5 May that 100 trucks said to be carrying livestock, perishable and other goods and timber were waiting on the road leading to Sremska Raca. The circumstances surrounding the incident were forwarded for consideration of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991). On 10 May that Committee gave permission for only livestock and perishable goods to transmit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into "Sector East" in a convoy. The Mission sought to implement the decision of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) scrupulously and, in the end, only two trucks carrying perishable goods were allowed to cross the border at Sremska Raca by 12 May. They were escorted by Mission personnel and authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into "Sector East". Having regard to the provisions of paragraph 16 of resolution 988 (1995), the Co-Chairmen have written to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) giving them a more detailed report on this matter.

11. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding on the control of Yugoslav Red Cross consignments, substantial quantities of concealed goods were found and refused because they could be considered as trade. Under the rules of the memorandum of understanding on buses, the scrutiny of long-distance unscheduled buses was intensified. Buses transporting commercial quantities of goods and hidden fuel were regularly denied entry. In Sector Alpha, the performance of customs officers at the four crossing-points improved considerably.

### III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

12. As of 15 May 1995, 154 international Mission personnel are on duty with the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

13. The number of international Mission personnel is still too low to staff all existing border crossing-points and fell below the absolute minimum level of 150 monitors at the end of April and the beginning of May. Owing to the persistent shortage of personnel and the necessity of having two international monitors at each border crossing-point, the Mission Coordinator ordered a temporary withdrawal of personnel from three border crossing-points. From 1 to 21 May, Mission monitors were no longer positioned at the following border crossing-points:

Sector Bajina Basta: BCP Skelani (staffed only intermittently)  
Sector Bravo: BCP Sula  
Sector Charlie: BCP Krstac

14. Withdrawal from these border crossing-points was considered by the Mission Coordinator to be low-risk because of their remote location and the paucity of traffic crossing the border. They were staffed by the local authorities, visited regularly by Mission mobile patrols, and were restaffed by the Mission as soon as resources permitted. An updated list of the border crossing-points in the Mission is attached in appendix A\* of this report.

15. Following the submission of the final report on the Inquiry into unexplained radar traces between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/1995/385), the Mission Coordinator has appointed a member of the Mission to be air operations officer. He is a qualified fighter (aircraft) controller and is suited to this important position. Working within the Mission's Operations Sector, he will endeavour to develop the means of monitoring the airspace above the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Initially, he will establish approved links between the Mission, the United Nations, NATO and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This will assist in the timely investigation of alleged infringements, should they occur. Also using existing resources, both human and material, he will seek ways of improving visual detection from the ground. This can be achieved by improving real-time communications and alerting procedures among the Missions's monitors. Finally, he will propose means to enhance future surveillance.

#### IV. MEASURES TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WORK OF THE MISSION

16. In paragraph 5 of resolution 988 (1995), the Security Council underlined the importance it attached to the work of the Mission, expressed its concern that a shortage of resources hampered the effectiveness of that work and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within 30 days on measures to increase the effectiveness of the work of the Mission, including on the question of helicopter flights.

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\* The appendix is available for consultation with the Secretariat (Department of Political Affairs, Europe Division, room 3755A).

17. Unfortunately, the Mission has been facing a stringent financial situation, even though the position has, in the last few days, improved and, as of 16 May 1995, the Mission had a cash balance of US\$ 900,000 and liabilities totalling US\$ 150,000. A voluntary contribution of US\$ 256,000 has been promised but has not yet arrived, and the Mission is currently owed approximately US\$ 3 million. It should be mentioned in this regard that some Governments have taken the position that they are not obliged to pay assessed contributions and make only voluntary contributions.

18. The precarious financial situation of the Mission has existed since the beginning of March 1995. Owing to non-payment of contributions, all new arrivals to the Mission were stopped as of 6 March 1995. At that time the Mission had 194 international members covering 19 border crossing-points. A special meeting of the Steering Committee of the International Conference was convened on 10 March to discuss the financial crisis. Following that meeting, a new six-month budget was drawn up for the Mission with effect from 1 April 1995. That budget provided for contributions in the amount of US\$ 3.66 million and, if met, would have enabled the complement of international personnel to be increased to 250.

19. Unfortunately, payments of contributions to this six-month budget have been considerably delayed, with the result that by 16 May 1995 the Mission had decreased to 152 international members. The Mission has also been obliged to take a number of measures to reduce operating costs. Telephone charges were cut substantially and the number of rented vehicles at Mission headquarters was cut by two thirds. This cut has subsequently been offset by voluntary contributions of 60 vehicles. Other voluntary contributions have included a radio equipment network, office equipment and visual aids. Despite these savings, the Mission has still run into difficulties and had temporarily to stop staffing the three border control points referred to in section III above.

20. The Mission continues to be in acute need of additional contributions if it is to be able to expand to 250 and to enhance the effectiveness of its work. Every team of two international observers means the Mission must pay for a translator and a vehicle. Each team needs a weatherproof presence on the border in the form of one portacabin for each border crossing-point. The holiday caravans, used at present, cannot withstand the constant wear and do not provide the shelter, or the security, necessary for the team, translators and drivers.

21. With the recent payments that have been made, and promised, it has been decided to start increasing the number of international members initially to 165, with the hope that, if Member States pay their contributions, the number can be increased to 250. The view has been expressed in some quarters that the Mission should be further expanded to 400 international members. In order to make this possible, a much more secure financial basis would be needed.

22. On the question of an aerial capacity for the Mission, it will be recalled that, in the report transmitted to the Security Council on 2 March 1995 (S/1995/175), reference was made to equipment that would be needed should it be decided that the Mission should have such a capacity to detect possible cross-border helicopter flights. The need for mobile radars and the tasking of dedicated observers to watch over the airspace at the border was referred to.

Unfortunately, the finances of the Mission at the present stage would not allow for such possibilities.

23. The Mission Coordinator has submitted to the Co-Chairmen various suggestions that he considers could contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the Mission, including the following:

(a) UNPROFOR should loan the Mission the portacabins it needs;

(b) More customs officers should be recruited to bolster the Mission's expertise at truck-loading and border crossing-points;

(c) Each border control point should be provided with either CAPSAT or satellite telephone equipment for contact with Mission headquarters and other border control points;

(d) Efforts should be made to provide basic amenities at border control points such as toilet facilities, clean drinking water, heat for winter and shade or cooling for the living quarters, refrigeration, cooking and basic washing facilities;

(e) Dedicated helicopter support (up to three helicopters) should be provided to the Mission to allow it to respond more promptly to border violation reports. Contributing countries could provide helicopter assets (equipment and crews) and the Mission could arrange the necessary base support and flight authorizations within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

24. If the Mission is to be able to expand to the extent desired and to increase the effectiveness of its work on land and in the air, considerably increased resources would be required, going well beyond the present capacity of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The Co-Chairmen have informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the European Union and the Contact Group that they believe one should be moving towards transferring the work of the International Conference Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Co-Chairmen took this responsibility last September on behalf of the International Conference because it was the only international body that could carry out that essential task, but they always saw it as a temporary arrangement. Now, as the months have passed and the difficulties of arranging proper financial support for the Mission have grown, they believe it would be preferable for these responsibilities to be conducted by a regional organization that has the confidence of all parties and could ensure that the Mission is properly funded with the necessary levels of staff, who can then work and plan without having to live from week to week without assurance that there will be sufficient funds to carry on their operations.

#### V. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE MISSION

25. The Mission continues to enjoy full freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

26. On 13 April, Sector Alpha reported that a demonstration by the "Serbian Radical Party" had taken place near border crossing-point Trbusnica. As a precautionary measure, Mission caravans were withdrawn from the border crossing-point at 1040 hours and were placed in a secure area at the Loznica Red Cross. At 1600 hours, 300 fully equipped policemen with riot gear were positioned near the border crossing-point; at 1625 hours the Head of Sector withdrew Mission monitors from the border crossing-point; at 1700 hours a crowd of 400 arrived at the bridge followed by additional police reinforcements; at 1730 hours the crowd moved to the Bosnian side across the bridge; and at 1800 hours the demonstrators returned to the side of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and proceeded to the town of Loznica while the situation at the bridge returned to normal. No violent actions or damage were reported. Mission personnel returned to the border crossing-point at 1830 hours.

27. On 21 April, border crossing-point Vracenovici (Sector Charlie) reported that 10 rounds of small arms fire were heard in the vicinity of the border crossing-point during the night. One round impacted very close to the border crossing-point. On 25 April, local police completed the investigation into the shooting incident. The Head of Sector was informed that it was a local celebration with habitual shooting in the air. The locals were warned afterwards to cease such celebrations in the vicinity of the border crossing-point. This incident was assessed as not a direct targeting of Mission personnel.

28. On 2 May, the association "Orthodox Unity" sent a letter to the Mission demanding that "all the controllers who control crossings of the Serb people and transport communications should leave within the next five days from all checkpoints on the Drina and one on the Zagreb highway". This association is known to the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which do not consider it a threat to the Mission.

29. On 6 May, Mission members were once again targeted. Another shooting incident occurred at a river ford 4 kilometres north of Uvac (Sector Bravo), in spite of the assurances of the local chief of police that he had warned the perpetrator of a previous shooting on 6 April and that it was now safe to visit the area again. The Mission Coordinator has subsequently instructed that no further patrolling be done in that area until confirmation was received that the individual concerned had been removed. On 7 May, the Mission Coordinator met with senior authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which offered an apology for the incident and promised to take all necessary measures to apprehend the perpetrator.

30. On 10 May, Sector Alpha reported that an incoming artillery shell from the Bosnian side impacted in the vicinity of border crossing-point Stari Most Zvornik. No casualties were sustained by the Mission personnel since they were not there at that time.



VI. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

31. Cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be good.

32. In the opinion of the Mission Coordinator, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are effectively implementing their border closure measures. The so-called "ant trade" (small quantities carried by individuals) is not significant. The Mission's daily reports show a consistent and regular pattern of refusals and confiscations of excess goods (including fuel) from cars, buses, trucks and tractors. There are very high vehicle search rates at the border crossings. The level of cooperation has especially improved between the regional heads of the customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Mission sector commanders.

VII. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

33. The operating principle of the Mission is to base its reporting and evaluations on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator has maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide it with information relevant to its mandate.

34. On 14 April, the Mission received information from unevaluated sources, alleging that large quantities of weapons and military supplies were being transported nightly by trucks that crossed the River Drina near Raca, usually over pontoon bridges or ferries. It was further alleged that around 15 March an estimated 50 to 60 trucks with rocket launchers and other heavy weapons crossed into Bosnia near this location from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Mission has received no reports from Sremska Raca (described as Raca in the information) about any such incident. This border crossing-point is monitored by Mission observers 24 hours a day, every day. Furthermore, Sector Belgrade has been deploying foot and mobile patrols along the Sava river from Sremska Raca to the closed ferry crossing in Jamena. Nothing of the kind was reported nor were there any traces of suspicious activity around the closed ferry crossing on the side of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

35. In the course of the last two weeks of April, the Mission received information from unspecified sources with the following allegations:

(a) A pontoon bridge, which crosses the Drina river south of Janja (Bosnia) and west of Batar (Serbia), near the town of Loznica, located in a 1-kilometre prohibited zone, has been used since December 1994 to circumvent the "inter-Serbian embargo", and that trucks carrying fuel, weapons, ammunition and troops go across this bridge, which is open to traffic every day;

(b) Several helicopters enter Bosnia daily, usually alone, but sometimes in formations of four to six, at the point where the river Lim enters the

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Drina river near the town of Priboj (Serbia), and they fly mostly at night from Niksic (Montenegro);

(c) A submerged pontoon bridge exists 10 kilometres downstream of the Drina river at Palovica, near Ljubovica and Dubravica;

(d) A secret crossing is operated by boats at night-time in Fakovici, between Bratunac and Skelani on the Drina river;

(e) A submerged oil pipeline exists and was operative in December 1994 and January 1995 across the Drina river between Zvornik and the road bridge at border crossing-point Ljubovija.

All allegations have been thoroughly investigated by the Sector's special mobile patrols, comprised of senior staff members and monitors from the nearby border crossing-points. Random checks and sky monitoring were conducted at alleged locations day and night. The level of the Drina river was still high and the stream was assessed as too fast for pontoon bridges. Mission monitors found no evidence to substantiate the above-mentioned allegations.

#### VIII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

36. Throughout the month, all Sectors randomly monitored the sky and found no evidence of helicopter activity, even though air surveillance strictly goes beyond the responsibility of the Mission. These observations will continue under the guidance of the designated Air Operations Officer in the Mission's headquarters. After the Mission Coordinator's meeting with President Milosevic on 11 April, and to this date, air traffic Controllers of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) have registered only one unexplained radar contact.

37. The Mission has a lingering problem with the police at the border crossing-point Metaljka (Sector Bravo). This relates to the discovery by the Mission monitors of the pedestrian bypass, which is located just behind the border crossing-point and which is not visible owing to a curve in the road. Since then Mission monitors witnessed trucks stopping at this bypass and being unloaded by persons who carried the goods (for example, beer) by hand through the bypass. The matter was reported to the local police several times, but despite assurances that action will be taken, the situation remains unacceptable. At Metaljka (B18) a yellow Volkswagen Buggy crossed at 1545 hours into territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. It was allowed to pass by the police before the customs officer could check it. The police officer in question refused to give his name to our observers. The observers did not manage to write the registration number down as another car was blocking their view.

38. On 17 April and 12 May, the Mission Coordinator raised the issue of uniformed personnel crossing the border with the Director-General of the Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. Kertes. In the reporting period, the total number of uniformed, but unarmed personnel, crossing the border in both directions reached 771. Eighteen of them were

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prevented from crossing because of possession of firearms. The movement of uniformed personnel peaked somewhere around the Easter holiday celebrations and dwindled recently to insignificant numbers. The explanation given by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was that personnel crossing the border regularly visit relatives on both sides of the border for celebrations but no one is allowed to cross wearing sidearms. Another explanation is that not every person in a military outfit is necessarily a soldier or policeman on active service. Many males on both sides of the boundary wear military garments or are unable to afford civilian clothes. Those explanations were accepted as satisfactory by the Mission because they coincided with what was reported from the sectors and assessed by the Mission monitors. Nevertheless, it was underscored again that uniformed and armed personnel crossing the border would constitute a violation and would be registered as such.

39. From 10 to 16 April signs of activity on the Bosnian side of the Jamena ferry crossing were reported by mobile patrols. Boats, pontoons and a tug plus two or three military personnel have been regularly observed. Nevertheless, no traces of landing on the side of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were evident and the barriers' seals have remained intact.

40. In the same period, the volume of confiscations increased considerably in the port of Belgrade with the implementation of the recent memorandum of understanding. Now all vehicles transporting packaged goods are required to unload and be reloaded in the presence of the Mission's monitors. Good customs performance is noted.

41. On 29 April it was reported from the port of Belgrade that the monitors had discovered a "trade invoice", within the papers of the consignor, endorsed by the Yugoslav Red Cross. This truckload was rejected, and the matter is under investigation.

42. On 4 May, at Sremska Raca, Mission observers found, when checking the canopy wires of a Yugoslav Red Cross truck and trailer before removing the seals, that the wire had been cut and rejoined. The customs officers inspected the load, with Mission observers, and found it was cement instead of flour, as was indicated in the documentation. The driver admitted that, after leaving Novi Sad, where the truck and trailer had been sealed by customs and Mission monitors, he went to another warehouse where the wire was cut and 25 tons of cement were loaded in place of the flour. The vehicle and contents have been impounded and moved to Novi Sad for further investigation.

43. On 14 April, a mobile patrol reported that the Special Police, based on information from the Mission, established a 24-hour surveillance of a Bosnian fuel depot near Cutline, as mentioned in a previous report. All approaches to the Serbian side of the river opposite the Bosnian fuel depot are being covered by the police.

44. On 17 April, a mobile patrol reported from Cutline that a boat with two fuel barrels was observed crossing the Drina from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Local police and the Yugoslav Army Liaison Officer were notified immediately.

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On 19 April, a mobile patrol reported from the same place that a rubber boat was observed unloading barrels on the side of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and crossing back empty to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again the local police and the Yugoslav Army Liaison Officers were alerted immediately.

45. On 22 April, it was reported from border crossing-point Ljubovija that a police vehicle of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with two uniformed and armed (sidearm) policemen crossed into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was considered a violation and local authorities were notified accordingly.

46. In the early morning of 3 May, near border crossing-point Badovinci, a customs/police mobile patrol seized 1,500 litres of fuel from a boat on the Drina. On 4 May the police confiscated 2,000 litres of fuel from smugglers at a small boat crossing on the Drina, 3 kilometres north of Badovinci.

47. On 10 May, it was reported from border crossing-point Badovinci that a Yugoslav Army patrol captured a boat with 10 empty barrels (200 litres each) trying to cross the River Drina. The matter is being investigated by the police. On 11 May, it was reported from the same border crossing-point that a Yugoslav Army patrol brought two persons with a tractor and trailer full of empty fuel containers (around 2,000 litres capacity) to the police at the border crossing-point. The matter is being investigated as well.

48. On 4 May, at Trbusnica a car previously denied entry by a customs officer for carrying commercial goods was permitted to cross by the order of the Chief Customs Officer.

49. On 10 April, a mobile patrol reported from Backa Pec, near Krstac, that a stone barrier was partly dismantled and some truck traces were evident beyond the barrier. The Yugoslav Army Liaison Officer was notified immediately and, on 13 April, the restoration of this barrier was completed. It is now 2 metres high. Since then the Yugoslav Army has established a 24-hour presence on the majority of the bypasses in the Sector. On 11 May, there were traces that the barricade had been bypassed again. The matter was raised immediately with the Yugoslav Army Liaison Officer.

50. On 11 April, it was reported from Vracenovici that the customs seized three trucks with large belly tanks attempting to cross into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Customs officers believed that the drivers were trying to fill up in Niksic to go back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

51. On 18 April, near Vracenovici, the barrier on the bypass was again found partly dismantled and vehicle tracks were visible around it. The Yugoslav Army Liaison Officer and police were informed and the barricade was restored, although insufficiently. On 22 April the barricade was bypassed again by a vehicle. Police managed to identify and arrest some perpetrators of those smuggling attempts, according to the report of the police chief.

52. On 22 April, in Vracenovici the police allowed a truck with approximately 40 crates of beer to cross into Bosnia and Herzegovina. The matter was reported to the Chief of Police and this police shift was severely reprimanded.

53. On 20 April, at border crossing-point Scepan Polje, it was reported that customs confiscated one gun from a driver of a vehicle entering Bosnia and Herzegovina.

54. On 20 April, a mobile patrol reported from Nudo and Vilusi bypasses that the barricades were partially dismantled and traces of use were visible. Local police were notified and the Police Chief promised to establish a permanent police presence on all bypasses.

55. On 21 April, the Yugoslav Army Liaison Officer informed Sector Charlie headquarters that the Yugoslav Army had arrested four trucks for illegally crossing into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) near Crkvice. A police investigation is under way and the drivers are being detained for a customs offence.

56. On 26 April, police arrested in Vilusi a person attempting to smuggle 120 litres of petrol into Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the same day a mobile patrol reported from Vilusi bypass that between 0330 and 0700 hours the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia seal was removed from the gate. It was resealed again. On 28 April a mobile patrol discovered that the gates on the above-mentioned bypass were broken and unsealable. A Yugoslav Army unit was working to erect a barricade instead of the gates. New barriers are also under construction at Nudo and Vilusi bypasses.

57. On 26 April, the mobile patrol was informed, by the Yugoslav Army Liaison Officer, that a Yugoslav Army patrol had apprehended three trucks loaded with timber. They were attempting to cross illegally the border from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) via Crkvice bypass. The matter is being investigated by the police.

58. On 28 April, a mobile patrol discovered that the barricades at two bypasses near Crkvice were passable and there were traces of vehicles crossing them. No Yugoslav Army patrols or police were present there at the time. The matter will be discussed again at a meeting between the Head of Sector and local authorities in the near future.

#### IX. CERTIFICATION

59. In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, either from the airborne reconnaissance system of NATO or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the period

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covered by the present report there have been no commercial transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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