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2081st MEETING: 16 JUNE 1978

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2081)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Cyprus: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12723 and Add.1)	1

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2081st MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 16 June 1978, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Mario ROLON ANAYA (Bolivia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2081)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12723 and Add.1)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12723 and Add.1)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its 2080th meeting, I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rolandis (Cyprus), Mr. Papoulias (Greece) and Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) took places at the Security Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Rolandis, and I now call on him.

3. Mr. ROLANDIS (Cyprus): Mr. President, first of all I should like warmly to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of this august body. We are confident that under your wise leadership and guidance the Council will have fruitful deliberations. My delegation and I are particularly happy to see that the representative of Bolivia, a country with which Cyprus maintains close relations, is presiding over this debate.

4. I wish further to express, on behalf of my Government, our warm feelings of gratitude and appreciation to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, for his tireless

efforts to promote a just and durable solution of the Cyprus problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions. His task is extremely difficult and subtle, but he has been carrying it out with excellence and distinction.

5. We would also commend the significant contribution in this respect of the Under-Secretaries-General, Mr. Roberto Guyer and Mr. Brian Urquhart, and that of their able collaborators in the Secretariat.

6. I would also register our appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Galindo Pohl, and his deputy, Mr. Rémy Gorgé, for pursuing their difficult and delicate task in Cyprus with dedication and devotion.

7. I wish also to express our appreciation and highly commend the efforts of Major-General James Quinn, Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the officers and men serving under his command for the exemplary manner in which they carry out their duties.

8. Last but not least, we are indeed grateful to the Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, enable the Force to continue carrying out its important mission of advancing the cause of peace in Cyprus and, by projection, in the world.

9. Of course, before concluding my thanks, I should like to express to all members of the Council my appreciation and my gratitude for staying so late last night until it was possible to adopt a resolution on Cyprus [*resolution 430 (1978)*].

10. The Security Council is meeting today, after having adopted a resolution this morning, in order to consider the operation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus on the basis of the Secretary-General's report of 31 May. These six-monthly meetings have in practice provided the occasion, apart from the renewal of the mandate as proposed by the Secretary-General and as required by the circumstances, for a review of the situation with regard to the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem in the light of the developments set out in the report. While this practice has been both useful and legitimate, certain misgivings have been expressed by members of the Council as to the appropriateness of making the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate dependent on the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. For my part, I see the validity of these misgivings. I believe that these substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem, which is in its essence an international

problem constituting a threat to international peace and security and therefore, under the Charter, fully within the jurisdiction of the Council, should be fully considered and dealt with at a separate meeting of the Council. During such a meeting, decisions should be taken to meet the requirements of the situation in the light of the recommendation of the General Assembly for the adoption of all practical means to enforce the implementation of the United Nations resolutions with regard to Cyprus. Provided that points of substance are satisfactorily resolved by such a meeting, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter for the effective implementation of the resolutions as stipulated under Chapter VII, we may accept the above new procedures. Thus, in view of the fact that Turkey has been treating those resolutions with defiance and contempt, my Government reserves the right to come before the Council at the appropriate time and to ask that effective measures should be taken by it under the relevant provisions of the Charter, including enforcement measures under Chapter VII, for the implementation of its own resolutions.

11. In order to put the matter into perspective, I should like to deal briefly with the main developments that have occurred since 1974, and especially since the last renewal of the UNFICYP mandate and immediately before, which directly affect the issue now before the Security Council.

12. It may be recalled that, following the atrocious invasion of my country by Turkey in July and August 1974, 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus was occupied and continues to be occupied by the Turkish army and 200,000 indigenous Greek Cypriot inhabitants—approximately one third of the island's total population—became and still are refugees in their own country.

13. Fierce bombing of undefended cities and villages, massive executions of unarmed civilians and prisoners, desecration of places of worship, looting and usurpation of properties, acts of rape, the colonization of the occupied area by tens of thousands of Turks from Turkey and many other crimes have characterized the Turkish invasion and occupation.

14. I need not really enlarge on a subject whose tragic dimensions have been brought to the Council's attention on many occasions in the past. I need not enlarge on the crimes of invasion and occupation which have been repeatedly condemned under the domes of this sacred shrine of justice. I simply remind the Council, because we have to be reminded of the past if we are to look forward to a better future.

15. Since the final part of last year, we have had three main developments with regard to the Cyprus problem.

16. The first development was the adoption by the General Assembly last November of resolution 32/15, by an overwhelming majority. I would remind the Council that in this resolution the General Assembly, recognizing that the situation in Cyprus endangers international peace and security, recommended that the Security Council should keep the question of Cyprus under constant review and adopt all practical means to promote the effective implementation of its relevant resolutions in all their aspects. I

would also recall that the main aspects of these resolutions, which have remained unimplemented as a result of Turkey's contemptuous disregard, are the withdrawal of the foreign troops, the return of all the refugees to their homes, the cessation of foreign intervention and the holding of free negotiations between the two communities on the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus.

17. The second development was the submission by the Turkish side [*S/12723, annex*] of their already notorious proposals of 13 April 1978. These long anticipated proposals, that even countries closely connected with Turkey have described as being equivalent to partition, which constitute a clever but thinly-veiled attempt to legalize the *faits accomplis* of the invasion and which ignore the basic rules of international conduct and ethics, have served only one purpose: to reveal the abyss separating the two sides to the dispute, which is equal to the abyss separating justice from injustice. The "Turkish Cypriot side wants nothing more in Cyprus than its right to exist as an equal partner" [*2054th meeting, para. 95*]. That was the modest message of Mr. Çelik on 15 December 1977 when he appeared before the Council. In April 1978, this message was slightly altered when the proposals were handed over. The partnership this time was a partitionist partnership. The share was the same modest share: 50 per cent for 18 per cent of the population—a new system of modern mathematics where 18 equals 82.

18. We are at a point where the negotiations between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have come to a standstill as a result of the Turkish proposals. These proposals, by running counter to the agreed basis of a federal constitution duly preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, have led the intercommunal negotiations to an impasse. These proposals have necessarily placed in question the validity of such negotiations when the two sides are now obviously at cross purposes. They are sharply at cross purposes when one side aims at the preservation of the independence of Cyprus as a State Member of the United Nations and the other side looks for its dismemberment and partition.

19. The Government and people of Cyprus as a whole will never consent to the dismemberment of their island and the destruction of its independent existence and of their own identity as a people. We therefore repeat here and now that we cannot go into any form of talks and negotiations based on partitionist proposals.

20. The intercommunal negotiations, as clearly provided in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), are for the solution of the internal constitutional problems of Cyprus. By contrast, the international issue of the aggressive occupation by Turkey of Cypriot territory is not a subject of negotiation, nor do the United Nations resolutions refer to any negotiation regarding the territorial aspect. The resolutions simply demand the speedy withdrawal of the foreign forces of occupation, the cessation of outside intervention and the return of the refugees to their homes in safety. Negotiations are placed by the resolutions within their appropriate province, namely, the internal constitutional issue. As expressly stipulated in the resolutions, such negotiations shall be freely conducted. This would mean

that Cyprus must first be relieved of the foreign occupation army. Its very presence and its criminal activities in faits accomplis—to change the demography of Cyprus—have all along been undermining and destroying the very purpose of the negotiations.

21. The procedure and priorities adopted in resolution 3212 (XXIX) follow the Charter. Chapter VI of the Charter speaks of negotiations for the pacific settlement of disputes, in order to forestall or prevent aggression. Once aggression has taken place, the Charter no longer refers to negotiations but calls, under Chapter VII, for decisions by the Security Council and demands the implementation of such decisions through appropriate action as provided in the Charter. Aggression is not a subject of negotiations. Aggression must be stopped by resolution and the situation restored to its pre-aggression state.

22. Despite the foregoing very clear-cut positions, the Government of Cyprus, showing flexibility and goodwill, agreed to negotiate the future of the invaded and semi-occupied country at gunpoint. But the gesture was not appreciated. We were next asked to negotiate the sell-out of our country. We were asked to negotiate our funeral. And we were called intransigent when we refused to do so. We were called intransigent when we indicated that partition cannot become unity by negotiations, in view of the qualitative distance between these two concepts.

23. In this connexion, I think I should refer to the further gesture of President Kyprianou: his expression of willingness to meet the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, in an effort to explore the possibility of common ground for the resumption of the negotiations. President Kyprianou, who is recognized as the President of the Republic of Cyprus by the United Nations and all the countries in the world, with the solitary exception of Turkey, even agreed to meet Mr. Ecevit as a private individual, in an effort to make things easier. This suggestion was rejected by Mr. Ecevit.

24. The third development was the proposals of the President of Cyprus regarding steps within the framework of the United Nations and on the basis of paragraph 6 of the basic General Assembly resolution, 3212 (XXIX), to take the Cyprus problem out of its present impasse—most notably the proposal for the full demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus, whereby internal security would be the responsibility of a mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police force under the permanent guidance and control of an international United Nations police force. This proposal, which is fully reflected in paragraph 57 of the Secretary-General's report, constitutes a bold and imaginative initiative going beyond the already established United Nations position for the withdrawal of the foreign troops from the Republic of Cyprus and could prove to be not only a major development towards the just solution of the Cyprus problem but also a catalyst and an innovation of wider application in the context of the establishment of peace zones within the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament currently being dealt with by the special session of the General Assembly.

25. In our submission, it would have been appropriate for the Security Council at this juncture, together with

renewing the UNFICYP mandate, as proposed by the Secretary-General and as done this morning, and reaffirming its previous resolutions, to take into account also these three important developments, namely, the need for measures to implement the United Nations resolutions, the fact that the nature of the Turkish proposals, unless drastically changed, makes impossible the resumption of intercommunal negotiations, and the bold new proposal for demilitarization within the framework of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. At the same time, I should like to underline the need for a full and substantive debate on all the international aspects of the Cyprus problem at the appropriate time and the taking by this body of all the necessary measures to enforce its own decisions. The Government of Cyprus firmly believes it is eminently advisable and necessary, in the true interest of all concerned and of world peace, that the resolutions of the Security Council should be implemented through the collective action provided for in the Charter in Articles 41 to 43.

26. Before concluding, I should like to refer to paragraph 70 of the report now before us, which relates to enclaved persons. It is stated:

“The situation in the north . . . improved during the period under review. . . . There has been a relative improvement in the living conditions and the economic situation of the Greek Cypriots in the north”.

The reality, however, is that the situation in the north remains essentially unchanged. Not only have none of the conditions of the agreement of 2 August 1975 [S/11789, annex] been complied with by the Turkish side—which completely reneged on its commitments after having received its benefits from the agreement—but all the harassment continues on the same pattern as previously. This is shown by a series of detailed and authentic reports and statements giving an accurate description of the situation in the north during the period in question. This includes seizure of property, larceny, burglary, rape, arson, looting, destruction of churches and cemeteries and the exercise of all kinds of pressures, aside from the continuing withholding of all medical care and essential freedom of movement, in violation of the aforesaid agreement.

27. We the Government and the people of Cyprus place very high hopes in the Organization and in all it stands for. We are not naïve. We have first-hand experience of the realities. We know that your voice and my voice and the voice of all those in this building cannot be heard very far outside the precincts of this chamber. We know that the muscles of this establishment are crippled by the arrogance of those who have learned to defy its decisions. But we still believe. If we abandoned our faith in the future of the United Nations, we might as well lose faith in the future of mankind.

28. We shall do our utmost and we shall co-operate very closely with the Secretary-General in his search for a just and lasting solution of our problem. We shall exhibit goodwill, good faith, flexibility, reason and fairness of mind. But we shall not abandon our principles or our dignity. In this building we have sought and found justice. We wish that this kind of justice could become enforceable in the whole world, and we trust that it will.

29. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

30. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to extend to you my warm and sincere congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council for this month. Your authority and prestige as well as your high qualifications constitute the best guarantee that the debate on this important item will be concluded successfully. It is particularly gratifying to my delegation that you represent a country which is linked with my country by traditional ties of friendship and culture. I would also thank you and the members of the Council for having allowed me to participate in the discussion.

31. The Security Council has, on the proposal of the Secretary-General, decided to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months. That resolution, to which the Government of Cyprus has agreed, has the support of my Government. We certainly agree with the statement contained in paragraph 81 of his report of 31 May, that the continued presence of UNFICYP remains indispensable in keeping the potentially dangerous situation in the island under control and in facilitating the search for a peaceful settlement.

32. I take this opportunity to express on behalf of the Government of Greece our profound appreciation to the Member States that are providing contingents to UNFICYP at a considerable cost to themselves as well as to those Governments that are making voluntary contributions for the maintenance of the Force. Further, we express our sincere thanks to the Commander, Major-General Quinn, and to the officers and men of UNFICYP who are carrying out with exemplary devotion and efficiency their difficult responsibilities and their humanitarian task. Finally, I wish to extend our warmest congratulations to the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, who has recently taken up his duties. I can assure him that he will have our full co-operation and assistance for the success of his important mission.

33. In considering the report of the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Rolandis, has so ably and convincingly dealt with the wider implications and aspects of the Cyprus problem that I do not think it is necessary for me to elaborate at length on the question. I wish, however, to put on record that the Greek Government supports the proposal made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament¹ and repeated today by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus as regards the full demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and of a just solution to the problem.

34. I should now like to make a few observations on the question under discussion: from the Secretary-General's

report now before us, we have once again to note with regret that no progress whatsoever has been made as regards the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

35. Thus, a third of the island's population, some 200,000 people, are still refugees in their own country and are kept by force from returning to their ancestral homes, which in itself is a gross violation of human rights. To that is added the usurpation of their properties for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of colonizers, which is again in itself a flagrant violation of basic international legal norms and of the fourth Geneva Convention, concerning the treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territories. Further, a substantial part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, about 40 per cent, continues to be under foreign military occupation and control, in spite of the principles of the Charter, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), Security Council resolution 365 (1974) endorsing resolution 3212 (XXIX), and subsequent Council and Assembly resolutions, *inter alia*, resolutions 3395 (XXX), 31/12 and 32/15.

36. Concerning, specifically, the contents of the Secretary-General's report, we note once again with regret that the freedom of movement of UNFICYP is still limited [*S/12723, para. 15*], that the situation in the north is still not consonant with the agreements reached at Vienna on 2 August 1975 [*ibid., para. 70*], that appreciable quantities of commodities and other movable properties have been looted in the new town of Famagusta (Varosha) [*ibid., para. 24*] and that no progress has been made on the question of missing persons [*ibid., para. 71*], thus perpetuating the agony of their families.

37. The report reveals also that the Greek Cypriot population in the north has been further reduced to a mere 1,731 persons [*ibid., para. 42*]. A comparison with the Secretary-General's report of 7 June 1977, when the Greek Cypriot population in the north was shown as 2,000 persons [*S/12342, para. 20*], proves that the actual level represents a reduction of about 14 per cent in one year.

38. Chapter V of the report, on the good offices of the Secretary-General, and Chapter VII, containing his observations, are again a cause of disappointment and of concern, which I am sure the Council share. Indeed, despite the great and painstaking efforts of our esteemed Secretary-General to reactivate—in pursuance of his mission of good offices—the intercommunal talks, it has not proved possible to create the proper basis for meaningful negotiations. I should like on this occasion to convey to Mr. Waldheim as well as to his colleagues, the Under-Secretaries-General, Mr. Roberto Guyer and Mr. Brian Urquhart, my Government's sincere thanks and deep appreciation.

39. The Security Council which, over the past four years, has examined the Secretary-General's reports on the outcome of six rounds of intercommunal talks at Vienna under his auspices, is fully aware of the reasons behind the stalemate. Under various pretexts, the other side has persistently avoided coming forward with proposals that would be in keeping with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and would facilitate the resumption of

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 2nd meeting.

a serious and meaningful dialogue. The latest efforts made by the Secretary-General have unfortunately not spared him from the frustrations of the past, as is eloquently reflected in his observations.

40. Since much has been said recently on the Turkish Cypriot proposals and a lot of confusion has been deliberately created, for purposes the Council is fully aware of, I should like to clarify, for the benefit of the Council, certain important points.

41. As the Prime Minister of Greece has stated, it is not enough for proposals to be concrete, they have also to be reasonable in order to constitute the basis for a renewal of the intercommunal dialogue leading to a just solution of the problem. Certainly we do not wish to give our own subjective interpretation as to what is reasonable. There is, fortunately, in the Security Council, in the United Nations and in world public opinion a common measure as to what is just and reasonable that can objectively guide our judgement.

42. Is it reasonable that a minority community of 18 per cent of the total population should insist on keeping for itself a territory representing practically twice that percentage? Is it reasonable to deprive the refugees of any hope of returning to their homes and to their properties? Is it reasonable to ask the Secretary-General to preside over the dismemberment of a Member State as would inevitably result from proposals which provide for nothing other than the constitutional partition of the island? Is it reasonable to ask for negotiations to be carried out on the basis of proposals that do not respect the elementary requirements of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, as the United Nations has expressly demanded through all relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions?

43. We have time and again stated that the negotiating process should not be used as a delaying tactic in order to perpetuate *faits accomplis* or to create notorious irreversible situations which the aggrieved party would be called upon to legalize. Such an attempt would in any case be futile. The United Nations and mankind have bitter experience of similar methods utilized in other parts of the world.

44. If, therefore, the other side is willing to arrive at a negotiated settlement through intercommunal talks, instead of simply talking about "flexibility", it should, rather, respond with goodwill and reasonable proposals which would constitute an acceptable basis for the Cyprus Government.

45. I would assure the Council that the Greek Government will continue as in the past to lend its full support to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and will give him every assistance in his efforts to clear the way for genuine negotiations on all aspects of the Cyprus problem. We believe that a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem can be found only through serious, sincere and meaningful negotiations, in conformity with the basic principles of the Charter and through the implementation of General Assem-

bly and Security Council resolutions. As the Secretary-General rightly points out in his report:

"the *status quo* must not be assumed to constitute an available viable alternative, since potentially dangerous elements of instability are inherent in the prevailing situation" [S/12723, para. 77].

46. There can be no doubt that a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem is most urgently needed, as only this would eliminate the potentially explosive situation and the danger that threatens international peace and security as stated in General Assembly resolution 31/12. The Security Council has a special responsibility in this regard.

47. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is Mr. Denктаş, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

48. Mr. DENKTAŞ: Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to all the members of the Council for giving me this opportunity to make a statement.

49. The last time I made such a statement to the Council in person was in February 1964 [1099th meeting]. I had come from a bleeding Cyprus, where my community had been attacked by secret armies formed by the Greek Cypriot leaders in accordance with a plan which they had prepared in advance and which aimed at the disruption of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus in order to unite the island with Greece. My people had evacuated 103 villages in order to find security in better areas; a quarter of the Turkish community had become refugees and death was all around; it was on the roads and it was in our houses; everywhere we had to defend ourselves. There was no UNFICYP in Cyprus, there was no one to help or protect us, and the order of the day was that the attack which had started on 21 December 1963 should culminate in victory so that the Greek Cypriots could celebrate a double Christmas, as stated by Archbishop Makarios, in view of this victory.

50. I came here, and after great difficulty I was allowed to speak. I explained the real position; I made no false statements in what I said; I drew a picture of what was happening in Cyprus, and even at that moment attacks were continuing on my people and the Greek radio and Greek information offices were circulating the news that a rebellion within the Turkish community was being put down by the security forces of the Government.

51. When the Council adopted its resolution of 4 March 1964 [resolution 186 (1964)], I left this room crying because I knew how that resolution would be interpreted by the other side, but we were assured by members of the Council that its interpretation was in the hands of the Council and that what we feared would not come about. What we feared was that the Greek Cypriots—who had staged a coup against their own Government just because it was a bi-communal Government, had ejected us *in toto* from the Government, had put us outside the protection of the Constitution and the laws and were hunting us as rebels

not entitled to any rights in Cyprus—would interpret that resolution as a further authority for them to cleanse Cyprus of the Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately, that attempt continued. In spite of Security Council resolutions to the contrary, arms and armaments were brought into Cyprus. In spite of Council resolutions to the contrary, Greek soldiers from Greece were clandestinely imported into Cyprus and joined 43,000 Greek Cypriots to rout us out. Heavy arms and armaments from Greece were imported to destroy the Turkish community, or at least to prevent its salvation under the Treaty of Guarantee.

52. We lived through those years. From month to month the Security Council received reports from the Secretary-General which indicated the plight of the Turkish people. UNFICYP was sent there to prevent a blood-bath for the Turks, and we are grateful for the impartial way in which they defended us for 11 years until 1974.

53. In the course of all those years repeated statements were made by the Greek Cypriot leaders that the aim was to unite Cyprus with Greece. Among the resolutions of the Greek House of Representatives resolutions still stand which indicate that the aim is union with Greece and that no setback will prevent them from achieving that aim.

54. My community lived in little clusters of villages called Turkish areas, defending themselves against the unconstitutional rule of the Greek Cypriots. Thirty thousand Turks continued to be refugees for 11 years. The Turkish community continued to be one for which the budget of Cyprus made no provision and its members were treated as permanent tourists in Cyprus who had to import foreign currency and spend all the money on the Greek market.

55. This is the background of the Cyprus problem. I had to repeat it because I had to pinch myself to realize that I had not come here from the moon and that the members of the Council were not here from the moon. Having listened to Mr. Rolandis, one would have to know nothing about Cyprus in order to believe that he was telling the truth.

56. In consequence of my exertions here last time, in 1964, on my way back to Cyprus I was prevented from entering my own country. Those who called themselves the Government had decided that I had talked too much here, that I had hurt them too much, and I was not wanted in Cyprus; and like many other Turkish Cypriots I was prevented from entering my country for four and a half years. Today, when I address the Council, I have no feeling of fear that I may be stopped again, thanks to our present position, thanks to the liberation which came to my community as a godsend after the terrible coup of 1974. We have been liberated. Turkish Cypriots who were living in clusters of villages spread all over Cyprus and were treated relentlessly and mercilessly for years as political hostages, after an agreement with the Greek Cypriots at the third round of intercommunal talks at Vienna, were moved to the north with the help of UNFICYP. Today we have heard two speakers claim that all those Turks should go back to being hostages again under Greek rule so that all the Greeks who moved south in accordance with the agreement and prior to it can go back to their homes. An arrangement, an exchange of population, which had to be made in order to

bring safety and security to the Turks, an arrangement which was effected bilaterally, with the other side, is now disregarded, and those who are doing this ask that it should be done in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

57. We have suffered a lot in a bi-communal country like Cyprus, where one national community was aiming at uniting the island with another country, and the other national community refused to accept what it regarded as recolonization; the latter defended its rights at the cost of great sacrifices, the result of which was the establishment of a bi-communal republic, and we are now asked to consider the future in the light of majority and minority proportions.

58. Those arguments refer to the past. The Republic of Cyprus is the creation, by agreement, of two national communities. In the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus the Turkish Cypriots have undeniable inalienable rights, just as the Greeks have: no less and no more.

59. Today Mr. Rolandis said that one side is trying to destroy the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and he pointed his finger at me, or at the Turkish community which I represent, or at the Government of the Federated State which they formed of their own will. This is untrue. Turks of Cyprus died in order to save the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. They were killed by the Greek side, who wanted to destroy that independence and unite with Greece. The arrangement made at the third round of talks at Vienna—namely, the exchange of population as a basis for the formation of a bi-zonal republic—was in furtherance of the saving of that independence and sovereignty.

60. From 1963 to 1974, the top Greek leader refused to meet and talk to his Turkish Cypriot counterpart. The lack of such dialogue did not help to solve the Cyprus problem. The intercommunal negotiations started in 1968 at a lower level. That dialogue led to near agreement several times, but from 1968 to 1974 the Turkish Cypriot side was indicted through propaganda for being intransigent and not wanting to solve the problem. It took a coup and its aftermath to reveal the truth. Mr. Clerides, who was the Greek Cypriot negotiator, later disclosed that several times there had been near agreement with the Turkish side but that the Greek Cypriot Council had rejected it. Then Archbishop Makarios had to speak, and he spoke in this room to the Council after the coup, saying that there could be no agreement through the intercommunal talks because the junta was interfering all the time, a double-faced junta was not allowing them to settle the Cyprus problem on the basis of independence.

61. In my view these two statements are in themselves sufficient to show that, through dialogue, through negotiations, the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish, can find a settlement. It has been said that while the Turkish army is in Cyprus it will not be possible for negotiations to be conducted freely. The presence of the Turkish army is precisely for the purpose of providing the Turkish Cypriots with security and equality so that negotiations can be meaningful. When the Greek army of occupation, which had been clandestinely imported into Cyprus in defiance of

the Security Council, was there from 1968 to 1974 and the armed Greek Cypriots were there, the negotiations continued, but there was no balance between the two sides.

62. Today I meant to speak only about our proposals for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Those proposals are based on these realities, and their aim is to prevent a recurrence of the tragedy of the past. However, the way in which the Greek side has thrown them out indicates that they are not willing to negotiate with us at this stage. Is that really because, as they say, our proposals are not worth considering at all? We have said that we are ready to meet without an agenda. We are ready to consider counter proposals. Indeed, we are ready to meet anywhere to start the dialogue. However, the answer has been a deliberate "no".

63. The reason which the other side gave for not coming to the table with us between 1974 and 1977 was that we were not making concrete and substantial proposals. We sought and, with the consent of the other side, obtained the Secretary-General's agreement to have a prior look at our papers in order to establish whether our proposals were concrete and substantial. We briefed the Secretary-General for three days, and the meetings were not easy. He wanted to satisfy himself that we were being flexible, and I am sure he wanted to satisfy himself that he could take to the Greeks something which was not futile. Having examined our proposals, he said that he found them to be concrete and substantial. He came from Vienna to Cyprus and spoke to the Greek side, but the answer—and we have heard the same argument today—was that, while the proposals might be concrete and substantial, that was not enough. They must be reasonable, and the philosophy behind them must be such that the Greek side would regard them as being reasonable.

64. That was a new approach. I came to New York hoping that Mr. Kyprianou and the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers would be here so that we would all have an opportunity of meeting one another in order to probe and investigate the situation and to conclude that dialogue was possible. I saw this as an opportunity which no one in need of peace would discard or disregard. The Turkish community is in need of peace. We do not have a governmental tag here; we are not treated as members of the Organization because we have not asked to be recognized as a separate State, and our reason for not making such a request is that we believe in unity; we believe in re-establishing, with the Greeks, a bi-communal republic. However, because we do not have a governmental tag, we are suffering economically, socially and politically. The Greek Cypriots, who treat themselves and are treated as the Government of Cyprus, are misusing their authority and using it against us. They are continuing their aggression against us in the international community and denying us our rights. Since 1963 one quarter of the population of Cyprus has been treated as a stateless, gypsy community with no passports and no right to anything. The Greek Cypriots think that they can afford to allow this situation to continue indefinitely while, as the Secretary-General has indicated in his report, looking elsewhere for redemption. They do not need peace; they have it.

65. The Greek Cypriots speak about their 200,000 refugees. That is a round figure which sounds very good when used for propaganda purposes. The Greek Cypriots never mention the fact that 65,000 Turkish Cypriots—nearly half of the Turkish community—had to move in order to free themselves from 11 years of misuse at the hands of the Greeks. That, supposedly, is irrelevant. Those Turkish Cypriots left valuable farms, lands and buildings in the south. The Greeks, rightly, occupied that property and are using it. But Greek propaganda refers only to the property which the Turkish Cypriots have occupied in the north. The oranges which we are cultivating proclaim their origin; everyone who eats them knows that they are Greek oranges. However, half of all the vineyards in Cyprus are in the south; they are all exploited by the Greeks and their produce is being exported by the Greeks. But our grapes and wines seem to be incapable of proclaiming their origins.

66. I will not go into any more detail because I have no right to do so. Yesterday I saw how much time was wasted and with what good will and patience the Council responded. For what purpose? It was for the renewal of the mandate of the peace-keeping force in Cyprus. It took hours and hours to arrive at a solution on that issue. As I stated last night, you have my sympathy. I hope that members, having endured that gruelling exercise last night, imposed for the sole purpose of breaking up the machinery for intercommunal talks, and having seen how that end was achieved, I hope that their sympathies will lie with us.

67. As I was saying, dialogue is a must if we are to settle the Cyprus problem. After a period of 14 years, I had two meetings with Archbishop Makarios. Those meetings resulted in a breakthrough and in the very full guidelines on which our proposals are based. I regret to say that the Greek Cypriot side is now doing its best to destroy those guidelines. That is why they speak of minorities and majorities. If minorities and majorities are going to play an important part in the future of Cyprus, then Yugoslavia, to refer only to one country, must break up into minority-majority groups and must cease to be a federal system composed of equal members irrespective of numerical composition.

68. Mr. Kyprianou is reported to have opposed Archbishop Makarios when the four guidelines were drawn up. It is unfortunate that he carried his opposition to this extent. We stand by those agreements. We are open to discussion and counter-proposals. We aim at re-establishing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic with the Greeks. Every aspect of our proposals is open to discussion, negotiation and bargaining. Except for one thing: enosis will continue to be prohibited as effectively as it was in the past. Otherwise, we shall never trust them and the Cyprus problem will never be settled. Greece can do a lot by telling the people in Cyprus who look to Athens as the centre of Hellenism that it is in the interest of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the area that enosis should be effectively barred and not considered as an opening to future adventures in the hands of the new leaders.

69. I shall reverse the procedure so far followed here in extending my thanks to you all, starting with you, Mr. President. To the members of the Council I have

already extended my sympathy, and now I extend to them my heartfelt thanks for the patient, impartial and understanding way in which they all tried to help us.

70. On behalf of the government in the north, and on my own behalf personally, I extend our sincere and deepest appreciation and warmest feelings of gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, for his dedicated and untiring efforts to achieve a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. I also thank him for trying to bring us all together in New York during the last few weeks, when he so kindly offered a luncheon, a dinner or a tea party for me, Mr. Kyprianou, Mr. Ecevit and Mr. Karamanlis to attend. Unfortunately, Mr. Kyprianou chose to reject the invitation because my name was mentioned as one of the participants. I assure him that I would not have taken anything of the beautiful meals that would have been supplied which was not on my plate. But we did not meet. An opportunity was lost. I regret it. I have nothing against him. I am still willing to have a meeting and I hope the Secretary-General will manage to bring us together. I know it will help, because I know there is no way other than a dialogue for settling the Cyprus problem.

71. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Galindo Pohl, with whom my community is already on very good terms. He has started to do a very good job. I assure him that he will have our fullest co-operation in his endeavours for peace.

72. Our warm thanks and appreciation go also to the Secretariat, in particular to Mr. Guyer, Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Sherry, for their untiring and dedicated efforts, especially in connexion with the recent Cyprus question in its latest form.

73. Finally, I should like to express our gratitude to the Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General Quinn, to the senior political adviser, Mr. Gorgé, to all the officers and members of UNFICYP and its civilian staff, and to all those Governments which have contributed men and funds for UNFICYP.

74. I hope that within the next six months, when we come here again, we shall be able to report the establishment of the bi-zonal, bi-communal Republic of Cyprus, and that your exercise will end and our exercise will begin—an exercise for promoting trust between the two communities. In view of the past history of the communities, this will not be an easy task. It will need great leadership, magnanimous hearts, courage and a lot of forgetting. But before we come to that, let us not pretend, for heaven's sake, that 1963 to 1974, the 11 years during which my community suffered hell, never happened. Let us not do that because that does not show goodwill to the other side.

75. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

76. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I should like to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation upon your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. In doing so, I wish to

underline the satisfaction we feel in seeing as President of the Council a representative of a country with which Turkey has friendly relations. I would also add how grateful we are to you for the discretion, objectivity and wisdom you have displayed during the consultations.

77. In the fulfilment of his mission of good offices, the Secretary-General has been extremely active since the last Council meeting in December. We deeply appreciate his tireless and dedicated efforts to promote the negotiating process. He has explained in his report the difficulties he has encountered in this endeavour. But we maintain the hope that he will be able to overcome the obstacles and give a new impetus to the search for a just and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. Such a solution has eluded us for too long to the detriment of the genuine and long-term interests of all the parties concerned, and primarily of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

78. I wish to reiterate that we appreciate highly the efforts of the Under-Secretaries-General, Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Guyer, and of the Force Commander, Major-General Quinn.

79. My Government has welcomed the appointment of Ambassador Galindo Pohl as Special Representative of the Secretary-General. We know that he has distinguished himself both as a diplomat and as a lawyer and we are confident that he will fulfil his mission with success.

80. Finally, I wish to renew our gratitude to the officers and men of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and to all the contributing countries.

81. Concerning the intercommunal talks, we face an incredible situation in which, because one of the parties has been more forthcoming than ever, the other party adamantly refuses to come to the negotiating table. Only six months ago, Ambassador Rossides had this to say in the Security Council:

“In the progress of negotiations there must, however, be concrete proposals from both sides on the constitutional and territorial aspects.” [2054th meeting, para. 37.]

At the same meeting, the representative of Greece said:

“For our part, we wish again to stress that, in order to have a chance of success, these negotiations must be carried out in a substantive way on the basis of concrete proposals covering all major aspects of the problem, including territorial and constitutional questions. I need not remind the Council that the concrete proposals made by the Greek Cypriot negotiator on those questions are still awaiting a reply from the other side. . . . Therefore we share the Secretary-General's concern about the need for him to obtain assurances that the parties are prepared to negotiate concretely and substantively on all major aspects of the problem before initiating a new round of talks.” [Ibid., para. 72.]

82. The question we should now ask is: what has happened since these expressions of concern? The reply is

that the Turkish Cypriots have done exactly what was expected of them. They have submitted concrete and substantial proposals covering both the territorial and constitutional aspects of the problem. The prerequisite so insistently requested by the Greek side was therefore met. But, to our dismay, the Greek Cypriots took the position that the proposals were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks. They are in fact rejecting the negotiating process as established by the Security Council resolution. Last night's discussions before the adoption of resolution 430 (1978) and the Greek Cypriot insistence on the deletion of any reference to the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General vividly demonstrate this point.

83. The Secretary-General in his report recapitulates the numerous contacts which he has had with all the parties in pursuance of his mission of good offices. In January he visited Ankara, where he had extensive talks with Prime Minister Ecevit, who assured him that he would encourage the Turkish Cypriot community to submit concrete proposals regarding the territorial aspect and to revise its previous constitutional proposals. On 13 April at Vienna, the representatives of President Denktaş submitted to the Secretary-General the document setting forth the main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position. The Secretary-General personally transmitted the Turkish Cypriot proposals to Mr. Kyprianou at Nicosia on 19 April. The Secretary-General described the reaction of Mr. Kyprianou in his report in these words:

"He informed me that these proposals were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks. In the course of our conversation and also publicly later the same day, Mr. Kyprianou emphasized that, since the philosophy and concept of the Turkish Cypriot proposals were 'totally unacceptable' to his side, neither their substance nor their basis was capable of being improved to the point of becoming negotiable." [S/12723, para. 53.]

84. Mr. Kyprianou has apparently discovered a new method of negotiation. He wishes to be the sole judge of the acceptability of the proposals submitted by the other side and to act both as a negotiating party and arbiter at the same time. But, besides being presumptuous, Mr. Kyprianou's approach is also utterly irrational. How can he indeed say that the philosophy and concept of the Turkish Cypriots proposals are unacceptable, since they merely reflect the guidelines agreed upon by Archbishop Makarios and President Denktaş at their meeting in February 1977 for the establishment in Cyprus of a sovereign, independent, bi-communal and bi-zonal State.

85. *The New York Times*, in its editorial on 12 May, has in particular underlined this inconsistency:

"That some kind of shared authority would be necessary was recognized even by the late Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios. He formally conceded a few months before his death that Cyprus would have to become both bi-communal and federal. The Turkish proposal builds on this by proposing the maximum amount of separateness. A minimal federal government

would manage foreign policy and defence, a common currency and the coordination of island-wide programs and businesses like tourism; all other functions would be left to the . . . federated states and each would retain a veto over federal decisions through a process of equal representation.

"Though they agree to federation in principle, it is this veto, above all, that the Greek Cypriots find unacceptable. They still count on the weight of numbers. But it is hard to see how a federation of only two elements could work without a veto, at least while mistrust runs so deep. If they are to work . . . at all, the two communities will have to have political equality despite the great disparity in their populations.

"The Turkish Cypriots say that everything about their proposal is negotiable. But it is unlikely that they can be moved very far from the outlines of their proposed constitution. Nor should they be. There is no reason, however, why they should not be pressed to yield more territory. The Greek Cypriots will never know how much more until they engage the Turks in serious discussions. Those discussions should proceed, and if the American embargo now gets in the way, it should be removed."

86. Despite the extremely negative stand of Mr. Kyprianou, as recognized by the international press, the Turkish Cypriot community continues to maintain a most conciliatory attitude. President Denktaş came to New York to reconfirm to the Secretary-General the position of the Turkish Cypriot community regarding the intercommunal talks. In a statement issued on 22 May [S/12715, annex], he stressed that the Turkish Cypriot proposals represented a negotiating position that could provide a starting point for discussions, that the Turkish side had made a commitment to the Secretary-General to engage in negotiations with an open mind and in a spirit of conciliation and flexibility. He reiterated that the future political framework of Varosha was open to negotiations. President Denktaş, in his moving address which reminded the Council of the historical perspective of the Cyprus tragedy, again elaborated on all these points.

87. That there is no alternative to intercommunal negotiations has been repeatedly stated by all members in all the debates on Cyprus at the United Nations. The Secretary-General underlines this point again in paragraph 76 of his report: "As regards the procedural aspects, there may in fact be no alternative to the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities."

88. Mr. Kyprianou, in an effort to divert attention from his intransigent position has come up with the proposal to meet Prime Minister Ecevit. But such a meeting would be both unnecessary and meaningless. The negotiating parties are the two communities and not Turkey and the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Government has repeatedly expressed its readiness to accept whatever agreement emerged from the intercommunal talks and pledged that as soon as a settlement was reached all Turkish military forces would be withdrawn from the island except those whose continued presence was authorized under the terms of the settlement. Turkey has already withdrawn 16,000 troops

from Cyprus and indicated that it will make further reductions as the intercommunal negotiations progress. A meeting between Prime Minister Ecevit and Mr. Kyprianou, besides being incompatible with the principled position of Turkey regarding the constitutional situation in Cyprus, will therefore serve no useful purpose. Nevertheless, the Turkish Prime Minister, in his desire to explore all avenues for the promotion of the intercommunal talks, has suggested a meeting or an informal gathering in which he himself, the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Denktas and Mr. Kyprianou would take part. There were even suggestions, as Mr. Denktas reminded us, of some social functions to make such an encounter possible. But Mr. Kyprianou indicated that he could under no circumstances participate in a function with Mr. Denktas.

89. This aversion to being together with Mr. Denktas is surprising since Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas attended a luncheon given by the Secretary-General at Nicosia on 15 January. In a more serious vein, it shows that Mr. Kyprianou is determined to obstruct the intercommunal dialogue permanently by refusing to meet his counterpart. He has apparently set his eyes on the extraneous factors to which the Secretary-General alludes in paragraph 73 of his report. But he will be gravely deluding himself if he thinks that these extraneous factors, in whatever direction they evolve, would in any way alter the basic position of the Turkish Government or of the Turkish Cypriot community. By delaying the search for a solution on the basis of false and mischievous hopes, the only result he will achieve will be further to erode the atmosphere of mistrust between the two communities and diminish the chances of a compromise.

90. I am deeply disappointed by the statement of the representative of Greece. I had expected that he would at least discreetly urge the resumption of the intercommunal talks, that he would do some justice to the spirit of conciliation and accommodation of the Turkish Cypriot community and of the Turkish Government. But he only echoed the unfounded allegations proffered by the Greek Cypriot representative. Conveniently forgetting the responsibility assumed by Greece as a result of the military coup initiated by its Government in 1974 in order to destroy the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, he claimed the prerogative of deciding whether the proposals put forward by the Turkish Cypriot side were reasonable or not.

91. The report of the Secretary-General provides us once again with an assessment of the situation prevailing in Cyprus at the present time. The Secretary-General reports that the situation among the cease-fire lines has remained quiet. In his previous two reports, presented in June [S/12342] and December 1977 [S/12463], he had also described the situation as being quiet. It is obvious, therefore, that the trend towards tranquillity appears to be an enduring one. In paragraph 70 of the present report, the Secretary-General, referring to UNFICYP movements reported:

“UNFICYP now enjoys increased freedom of movement and UNFICYP personnel have been given the opportunity to speak in privacy to Greek Cypriots in the

area. There has been a relative improvement in the living conditions and the economic situation of the Greek Cypriots in the north. I have every hope that this trend will continue.”

In paragraph 71, the Secretary-General points out:

“it has not . . . been possible to establish the investigatory body for tracing and accounting for missing persons of both communities”.

92. There has been a development in this respect which should be clarified. The Turkish side has recently accepted the latest proposals submitted to it by third parties on this question and indicated its readiness to meet the Greek side in order to finalize the necessary arrangements. I have to call the attention of the Council again to the fact that the arrangements which were being negotiated on the stationing, deployment and functioning of UNFICYP in the territory under the authority of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus have not been completed. The lack of an agreement on the functions of UNFICYP in northern Cyprus is a factor which has an important bearing on the mandate of the Force as originally defined in resolution 186 (1964).

93. I should like now to state briefly the position of my Government on resolution 430 (1978) which the Council adopted earlier this morning. In the third preambular paragraph there is, as in previous resolutions, the irrelevant reference to a Government of Cyprus. Our position in that respect is well known. This entity does not exist in law or in practice. The events precipitated by the Greek military coup in July 1974, for the purpose of annexing Cyprus to Greece, resulted in the setting up of two distinct administrations in the island. This reality was recognized by the three guaranteeing Powers—Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom—at the first Geneva conference in July 1974. On the other hand, the framework agreement worked out between Archbishop Makarios and President Denktas on 12 February 1977 established the basis of a federal and bi-communal republic and provided for the merging of the two separate Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot administrations. For these reasons, in view of the reference contained in the third preambular paragraph, the Turkish delegation is not in a position to accept the resolution just adopted *in toto*.

94. The resolution contains two operative elements. In paragraph 1, the Council extends the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months. We concur in that extension, having heard President Denktas inform the Council of the consent of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. In paragraph 2, the Council reaffirms the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General in the intercommunal negotiations, as established by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975). I have already stated in detail the position of my Government in that respect. We resolutely support that mission and are determined to do all we can to make a resumption of intercommunal talks possible. As a matter of fact, we think that we did all that was possible. The Turkish community as well has given ample proof of its willingness to negotiate in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. If the other party can reciprocate this spirit, a solution to the tragic problem of Cyprus will be within reach.

95. Mr. BARTON (Canada): Mr. President, first, I should like to join others who have spoken in congratulating you upon taking the high office of President of the Security Council. I must say that you have been given a baptism of fire that is not normally accorded to new presidents and shown remarkable skill and diplomacy; I compliment you on your distinguished chairmanship. Secondly, I should like to acknowledge also the distinguished chairmanship of your predecessor, the representative of Venezuela, who steered us through the stormy month of May with equal success.

96. I suppose it is an indication of an incurable optimism, but it had been our hope that conditions in Cyprus would have made it possible for a substantial reduction of the Force by now. We were, therefore, greatly disappointed to read in the report of the Secretary-General that this was not advisable and that his efforts to facilitate substantial negotiation had not been successful.

97. As a troop contributor, we are of course particularly concerned by the implications of this situation for the possibilities of bringing to an end the need for the Force, and I might say in this respect that our concern would be in some measure alleviated if we could point to an increase in the number and size of voluntary contributions to the Special Account for maintaining the Force. But here, too, there has been little progress.

98. However, we have noted in the report several positive aspects of the operational situation over the last six months. The Secretary-General has noted that the situation is quiet and that there have been no serious breaches of the cease-fire. There has been improved freedom of movement for UNFICYP in the Karpas peninsula. Co-operation and clear channels of communication continue to exist between the Commander of UNFICYP and both the National Guard and the Turkish forces.

99. The Secretary-General has noted two areas where there may be some prospect of dealing with the existing stalemate on the ground, in order to create an opening for further significant steps. These are at Varosha, where the United Nations may be able to provide assistance so that it need not remain empty, and at the Nicosia International Airport, which is under UNFICYP control but not yet open for traffic. We hope that progress may be possible in both those areas.

100. In closing, I should like to express our appreciation of the distinguished efforts of the Secretary-General to extend his good offices in an effort to assist the peace process. During the past six months he has been called upon to devote a very considerable amount of time to the subject. We commend his determination to continue his efforts to bring the parties closer together. In this connexion, I wish to reiterate our conviction that a just and peaceful solution can be achieved only by negotiations between the two communities. We call upon both parties to make the effort necessary to resolve their differences and to resume negotiations to achieve that solution. I also wish at this time to extend our appreciation to the Secretariat, to the Force Commander, Major-General Quinn and to all UNFICYP personnel for persevering in carrying out the functions entrusted to them and for doing so much with

such admirable efficiency. A word of good wishes is also in order for Ambassador Galindo Pohl, who, during May, assumed the position of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus. My own Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Don Jamieson, is looking forward to meeting Major-General Quinn and Ambassador Galindo Pohl in Cyprus next week when he visits the Canadian contingent.

101. Mr. LEPRETTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all I should like to convey my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. It is all the more pleasant for me because you represent in the United Nations a country with which France has always maintained friendly relations, and it is with confidence that I can assure you of the total and whole-hearted support of my delegation. You are discharging your functions as President for the first time. The skill and talent that you have already displayed in our consultations over the past week are a guarantee, in our view, of the success of our future work. Permit me also, before dealing with the subject of this meeting, to convey my congratulations to Mr. Carpio Castillo, the representative of Venezuela, who conducted our meetings most competently and effectively in May. I should like to thank him and also his delegation.

102. The Secretary-General, in the detailed report that he submitted to us on 31 May, highlighted the need to prolong the mandate of the United Nations Force stationed in Cyprus in order to contain the potentially dangerous situation which persists in the island. Having been consulted by the Secretary-General and by you, Mr. President, the parties concerned have indicated for their part that they agree to this prolongation. In deciding to renew the mandate of the Force for a further six-month period, the Security Council was thus giving a positive response to an urgent recommendation that had been addressed to it. It did so by adopting a brief resolution. Because of the delay in the taking of this decision, we wish to stress the great importance that we should attach in future to respecting the time-limits established for the renewal of the mandates of peace-keeping forces. Failure to respect those time-limits is a matter of concern that should receive the attention of us all.

103. Furthermore, the fact that France finally agreed to the consensus that emerged on this point does not mean that the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus can be allowed to become a mere technical operation or an automatic decision to prolong every six months a situation that it would be wrong for certain parties to believe could take the place of a solution. The decision of the Council, let us not forget, is designed to create conditions favourable for the search for a settlement, in the light of the positions and the conduct of the parties involved, as well as in the light of analyses and assessments made by the Secretary-General in his report on events that have occurred since our last meeting on the subject.

104. Among these comments, we should particularly like to highlight that, short of recourse to violence and force, there is no approach to the search for a settlement other than through the organization of negotiations between the

representatives of the two communities. This requirement is a matter of urgency because we cannot accept, even in a period of relative calm, the ordeals that the present situation inflicts on the peoples. It also means, as was quite rightly pointed out by the Secretary-General, that each party must be ready to conduct serious negotiations on a basis acceptable to the other. If none of the developments that have occurred over the last few months has fallen within this definition, our disappointment at this should not, however, cause us to call into question the very principle of negotiation. This principle does not prevent certain parties from seeking new approaches that may promote the resumption of contacts. President Kyprianou, in the statement that he recently made in the General Assembly,² indicated a few such approaches.

105. I should now like very briefly to make a few comments on the report of the Secretary-General.

106. We have noted with satisfaction that no serious incident occurred during the period under review and that the cease-fire was respected. My delegation also realizes the improvements that have been made in the conditions in which the officers of the Force discharge their humanitarian and social functions. It is a positive fact, in particular, that their freedom of movement has increased in the north of the island. We hope that the many efforts that have been made with regard to missing persons will make it possible finally to come to an agreement.

107. In expressing once again our confidence in the Secretary-General, who has devoted so much time and effort over the last six months in the attempt to bring about a rapprochement between the two parties, we should like to include in our expressions of gratitude to him his Special Representative, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, whom we wish every success in the performance of his task. We should also like to thank Major-General James Quinn, as well as the officers, soldiers and civilian personnel of the Force. All have been contributing with outstanding devotion to the work of peace of the United Nations.

108. Mr. VON HASSELL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, before I address myself to the item on our agenda, I should like to say how pleased my delegation is to see you presiding over the deliberations of the Security Council this month. You have picked—as we are all acutely aware—a month with a rather difficult question on the Council's agenda. Having witnessed your tireless and diligent efforts during these past few days, I can only congratulate you on your having discharged your difficult task in the most sovereign and impartial manner, worthy indeed of the great tradition of your country. I should like also on this occasion to congratulate the representative of Venezuela on his term last month as your predecessor in presiding over the Council—an office which he performed in an outstanding manner, bringing into the limelight another important country of the Latin American region.

109. Following the recommendation of the Secretary-General, contained in his detailed and thoughtful report of 31 May, my delegation has once again voted in favour of

renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for another period of six months. All of us who have cast an affirmative vote have done so, as on previous occasions, in the common conviction that UNFICYP's objective is by no means restricted to mere peace-keeping—that is, the prevention of armed hostilities. We are, on the contrary, firmly convinced that UNFICYP's objective is directed, even more importantly, to peace-making—that is, to the process of finding a just and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.

110. The Secretary-General has pointed out that during the 14 years that UNFICYP has been with us, it has been able to fulfil only the objective of peace-keeping whereas, for reasons outside its control, it has failed to advance the progress of peace-making in any significant way. This is all the more disappointing as numerous efforts have been made and various kinds of encouragement have been given to the parties to advance on the path of serious negotiations. This is true especially of the Secretary-General, who has done his utmost, within his mission of good offices, to bring the parties together for concrete and substantive negotiations. Unfortunately, the parties have so far not availed themselves fully of the opportunities offered to them by the international community. They have instead continued to blame each other for their common failure, an attitude clearly not conducive to bridging existing gaps and establishing a climate of mutual goodwill and confidence so necessary for any negotiations to be successful.

111. My delegation holds that the Security Council and the international community, which is paying heavily not only in financial but also in political terms for this failure, have a right to ask both sides for more serious and committed efforts to overcome their mutual enmity and distrust by adopting a conciliatory attitude that would include the willingness to reach an agreement through mutual concessions. The Council has indeed a right to urge the parties, in the words of the Secretary-General, to show a willingness “to acknowledge the reality of the needs and aspirations of the other [side], and the necessity for concessions” [S/12723, para. 80]. Only in that way can an agreed basis for the resumption of meaningful intercommunal talks be found. Such an agreed basis would—again in the words of the Secretary-General—“have to encompass the positions and fundamental interests of both parties” [ibid., para. 77].

112. The lack of progress in this direction is all the more astounding, if not incomprehensible, as the respective leaders of both parties were able, as a result of the dedicated and imaginative efforts of the Secretary-General, not only to sit together in February 1977 and talk to each other, but also to agree on “Substantive guidelines” [ibid., para. 75] for the further conduct of intercommunal talks by their representatives. The Secretary-General, whom I have just quoted again, is correct in calling these guidelines “substantive”. They not only include arrangements on procedure but also deal with questions of basic constitutional importance. In the opinion of my delegation, it is on this basis that the parties should renew their endeavours. My delegation finds itself encouraged in this respect by the observation of the Secretary-General that “both parties have stressed that they continue to accept this procedure”

² Ibid.

[*ibid.*, para. 76]. It seems to me that there is indeed no alternative to direct negotiations between the parties concerned. We therefore completely agree with the Secretary-General when he states:

“Whatever the format or venue, the same substantive decisions will eventually have to be faced by the same parties, since they are the ones that will have to live with whatever solutions to these problems may be devised.”
[*Ibid.*]

113. To recreate the momentum apparently so much needed for a resumption of the intercommunal talks on a sound and constructive basis, my delegation fully supports the suggestion of the Secretary-General that an attempt should be made to achieve progress at least on “some important aspects of the existing stalemate . . . , thus creating an opening for further significant steps” [*ibid.*, para. 78]. The situation at Varosha and at Nicosia International Airport may indeed lend itself to such steps. My delegation has, in this respect, taken careful note of some encouraging remarks of both Prime Minister Ecevit and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktaş. The Federal Republic of Germany is ready to assist in any such steps, if called upon to do so by both parties.

114. Having said that, I should like to add the following remarks. While fully recognizing the concerns and preoccupations of the parties in a matter of prime importance to them, my delegation feels also that the Security Council should not be subjected every six months to the kind of procedure that has almost become an unsalutary tradition. We have noted that the parties concerned share these misgivings. The course of events that the Council witnessed last night and early this morning clearly jeopardizes the proper continuity of the mandate and puts an undue strain on the Council members. We all have to give thought to this. In this connexion, I should like to add a few words of appreciation to the members of the Council, and in particular to the representative of the United Kingdom for the assistance he provided the Council in finally arriving at an agreed text for the extension of the UNFICYP mandate.

115. I should like to conclude my statement by again extending my country's appreciation and gratitude to the Force Commander, Major-General Quinn of Ireland, as well as to the officers and men of UNFICYP and its civilian staff for their outstanding efficiency and dedication in discharging an important and difficult task. In this connexion, I should like also to express again our special thanks to the countries which continue to provide troops to UNFICYP. My delegation's particular tribute goes to the Secretary-General and his representative in Cyprus, Ambassador Galindo Pohl, and to his deputy, Mr. Gorgé, as well as to Under-Secretaries-General Urquhart and Guyer and their excellent staff for their persistent and skilful work.

116. Mr. CARPIO CASTILLO (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I should like to express to you and to other members of the Council my gratitude for your very kind words to me in the course of this debate.

117. My country is bound to Bolivia by fraternal ties and by a common history of more than four centuries,

enhanced during our struggle for independence and strengthened by understanding and growing solidarity. I should also like to congratulate you as you begin your presidency for the month of June. I am confident that you will conduct our debate with great wisdom, exercising your characteristic good judgement and bringing to bear your long experience which I am sure will be of great benefit to us in the course of our deliberations. The very difficult and delicate representations which you have made in such a short period of time confirm your good judgement and your status as an experienced diplomat.

118. We have read document S/12723 with interest. Once again we wish to thank the Secretary-General for his report and the detailed description which it contains of the situation in Cyprus, as well as for his tireless efforts to bring about an agreement on the complex problem of the island. It is our hope that the problem of Cyprus will be solved once and for all, that each side will be prepared to yield in whatever way it can in order to offer the Cypriot people the minimal stability which is required if they are to develop properly. If no one makes any concessions then it will be the Cypriot people themselves who will lose out.

119. The new report before us and the characteristics of this debate have reinforced our belief that the measures and recommendations set forth in earlier resolutions continue to offer general guidelines for a solution to the problem. We repeat our belief that the factors which can lead to a settlement of the problem once again under consideration have already been defined and reiterated in various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Any solution must be based on the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Peace and security for the Cypriot people must be the primary aim of any solution. Any alteration in or departure from the course of action laid down in the relevant provisions of those resolutions would make the possibility of an agreement much more remote.

120. Consistent with our position we wish to help the two communities on the island come together and we wish to make an appeal that unilateral acts should be eschewed and efforts continued to achieve a final solution based on mutual respect for the fundamental and legitimate rights of the parties living together in Cyprus. Should the opportunity present itself, we shall be prepared to promote a more detailed consideration of the problem in the Security Council, with a view to clarifying the complex aspects of the conflict in Cyprus and helping to bring about a just settlement.

121. The delegation of Venezuela considers that the meetings of the Council devoted to merely renewing the mandate of the United Nations forces, both in Cyprus and in other areas of the world where peace and security are affected, make the Council lose credibility and we hope that in the future problems which constitute a genuine threat to peace and security will be dealt with in this body in greater depth. We also hope that effective measures will be adopted to condemn the guilty and induce them to adopt a more rational approach.

122. We should like to take this opportunity to say that we regard as very constructive the proposal by the President

of Cyprus to demilitarize the country, which would doubtless contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the problem and also represent progress in the very field of disarmament to which Latin America, and in particular, Venezuela, attributes vital importance.

123. I do not wish to conclude my statement without mentioning Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, who has recently taken up his functions. We know him and we are familiar with his proven diplomatic skill. We wish him every success as he assumes the difficult responsibilities of his mission in Cyprus.

124. Mr. CHOU Nan (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): With regard to the question of Cyprus, the Chinese delegation has expounded its consistent position at a number of meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Chinese Government and people cherish profound friendly feelings towards the people of Cyprus and we are deeply concerned about the development of the situation there. We firmly maintain that the national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be respected; we strongly condemn the super-Powers' interference in the affairs of Cyprus; we are in favour of a settlement of the Cyprus question through the intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It is our sincere hope that the two Cypriot communities and the States directly concerned will take into account the over-all situation, bear in mind the fundamental interests of the people of Cyprus and the region, strengthen their unity, heighten their vigilance and gradually eliminate their differences through patient negotiations in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, that they will do away with the super-Powers' interference and meddling and, in particular, will avoid giving any openings for exploitation by that super-Power which is fickle and changeable and is bent on playing fast and loose in a deliberate attempt to aggravate the situation to its own benefit. It is our hope that, by so doing, a fair and reasonable solution to the Cyprus question may be attained at an early date, thus contributing to the common cause of the world people against imperialism and hegemonism.

125. In view of the fact that the draft resolution contained in document S/12739 mainly concerns the question of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, the Chinese delegation, based on its oft-repeated consistent position on the matter, did not participate in the vote on the draft.

126. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): Mr. President, the delegation of Kuwait derives great pleasure from seeing you as President of the Council for the month of June. I should like to place on record the appreciation of the Government of Kuwait and its delegation for the manner in which you have conducted the proceedings of the Council, particularly during the last gruelling 24 hours. I should also like to thank the representative of Venezuela, the retiring President, for the efforts which he made during the period when he was President last month.

127. The delegation of Kuwait would like to express its most sincere thanks to the Secretary-General for his

unflagging efforts towards the attainment of a just and peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus. We note with concern that, in his report, he stated that the results of his efforts had remained disappointing and that he was deeply concerned about the situation. We share his concern. The situation in Cyprus remains fraught with danger not only to the area of the Mediterranean but also to Europe, the Middle East and the world at large. Without going into details, we believe that the problem will remain unresolved as long as the parties concerned remain captives of their public positions. For the solution of the problem, there is no alternative to flexibility and accommodation, without which positions will harden with the passage of time.

128. There are fundamental elements which my Government thinks are indispensable to the solution of the problem in Cyprus, all of which, incidentally, are embodied in Security Council resolution 365 (1974). Any solution must be based on the preservation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity and non-alignment of Cyprus. We also think that the withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of military bases have to be undertaken so as to maintain the non-aligned character of Cyprus.

129. We note with approval the remark of the Secretary-General that

"the cause of a just and peaceful settlement in Cyprus cannot be served by calling for talks when there is no agreement on the negotiating basis and when one or other party is not willing to proceed with meaningful negotiations" [S/12723, para. 73].

The Secretary-General then mentioned that he was "undertaking further consultations in an effort to establish a basis of negotiations acceptable to both sides" [*ibid.*]. We praise his drive to surmount the obstacles, but we also believe that the Council should not be satisfied with the role of a spectator in resolving this problem and must use its political and moral authority to prevail on the parties concerned, acting as a catalyst in bringing their views closer to each other. There is a lot of suspicion and mistrust and there are many old bruises in Cyprus. None of those destructive elements will be eliminated by the continuation of the *status quo*. The Secretary-General warned the Council against being under any illusion about the nature of the present situation when he said:

"the *status quo* must not be assumed to constitute an available viable alternative, since potentially dangerous elements of instability are inherent in the prevailing situation" [*ibid.*, para. 77].

130. The problem of Cyprus arises from the fact that there are two communities; one seeks protection from the outside while the other feels secure by virtue of being in the majority in the island. Co-existence is indispensable to the attainment of a peaceful settlement, but this very co-existence will remain elusive as long as the minority has no faith in the assurances of the majority, and as long as the Greek majority believes that the Turkish minority will always turn to Turkey for protection.

131. It is a human tragedy and, in the present circumstances, it is necessary to encourage negotiations among the

parties concerned. The danger becomes greater if any side assumes that it can get what it wants by sheer reliance on military force, whether it comes from within or without. The role of the Council is to encourage the Greek Cypriots to accept that their interests will be better ensured if the Turkish minority is given assurances on equality and participation in the development of the island commensurate with its number. It is also true to say that Greek Cypriots should be given guarantees that they will not be subjected to military operations from outside and that accommodation between the two communities is essential for a peaceful settlement of the issue.

132. The Government of Kuwait agrees with the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the Council should extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. My Government hopes that this period will be employed for fruitful negotiations between the parties concerned. Kuwait is a regular contributor to UNFICYP. However, we share the view that United Nations troops sometimes unwittingly provide a shelter behind which the parties concerned find comfort; instead of providing a catalyst for negotiation and for peaceful settlement of disputes, the United Nations troops introduce a sense of complacency which is temporarily satisfactory but inherently dangerous. There is undeniable truth in the argument that United Nations troops tend to perpetuate the *status quo* in dangerous situations. The case of Cyprus is no different. In Cyprus one party found protection in the presence of United Nations troops while the other found another type of comfort in the continuation of privileges. Therefore, the situation of Cyprus has become painfully tragic. Without the political will of both parties to negotiate on behalf of their respective communities, the Security Council cannot effectively contribute to the solution of the problem.

133. It is distressing that the Council could not reach an agreement before midnight last night on the extension of the mandate of the Force. It is more than distressing that the Council, after hours of agony, adopted a resolution for the extension of the mandate five hours after its expiry. It was an unpleasant experience, yet that unpleasant experience has advantages. It has underlined the futility of being caught in a linguistic entanglement which has no bearing on the substance. It brings home to me how sometimes we tend to lose sight of the fundamentals when we unduly stress new linguistic answers that cater for the satisfaction of the local constituencies.

134. Our major concern on this occasion is to emphasize the fact that the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP is not a periodic ritual or seasonal routine which must automatically take place once every six months. It is vitally necessary to reaffirm that UNFICYP is merely a temporary measure designed to give the parties the opportunity to settle their differences in an atmosphere of calm and free from pressure or coercion. Our attention will continue to be focused on the process of negotiation and reconciliation which should lead to a settlement that safeguards the basic rights and legitimate interests of the two communities. Neither party should use UNFICYP as a pretext for perpetuating the *status quo* or thwarting the craving and yearnings of the other for harmony and reconciliation

based on all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

135. My delegation is heartened by the observation of the Secretary-General that he is undertaking further consultations in an effort to establish a basis of negotiations acceptable to both sides. The Secretary-General intends to pursue this course with vigour because, in his own words, "potentially dangerous elements of instability are inherent in the prevailing situation". We wish him good luck in his efforts to bring the parties closer together with a view to working out an approach to negotiations that would make it possible to convene another round of intercommunal talks. We should also like to join the Secretary-General in his appeal to each side to show willingness to acknowledge the reality of the needs and aspirations of the other.

136. Finally, Kuwait's concern is to see peace-making replace peace-keeping and amity supersede conflict and strife. The outcome, however, must be a just and peaceful settlement based on the legitimate interests of both communities.

137. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council. As we all realize, you have already found the challenges that lie in that office and we are very pleased with the manner in which you have already, in the brief time you have occupied the position, met those challenges. We particularly admire the diplomatic skill and patience—I might even say extreme patience—with which you have handled our affairs over the past several days. I should like also to congratulate your predecessor on his conduct of the presidency during the preceding month. He also took us through some difficult moments in a very skilful and successful fashion, and we are grateful to him as well.

138. The Council's renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force for another six-month period testifies to our firm belief that the maintenance of peace and stability in Cyprus will enable the two communities to resume the negotiating process on a constructive basis in the near future.

139. Over the past six months, UNFICYP has continued to carry out its mandate with quiet efficiency. With the United Nations operations in the Middle East, it shares the reputation for impartiality and integrity which has made United Nations peace-keeping the major force for world peace that it is today.

140. In recent weeks, the Secretary-General and others have met separately with President Kyprianou, Prime Minister Ecevit and Mr. Denktas, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. Those discussions have not yet resulted in sufficient progress to permit the Secretary-General to resume the intercommunal talks. He has nevertheless stated in his lucid report that he is determined to continue his efforts to bring the parties closer together so that negotiations looking towards a permanent settlement can be resumed. We strongly support the Secretary-General's efforts.

141. On 22 May [S/12715, annex] Mr. Denktaş issued a statement which clarified and to a certain extent reformulated the Turkish Cypriot position. It was in many respects a positive and encouraging statement. We think it should be possible to build on the ideas he expressed and on the proposals put forward by the two sides to move towards an early resumption of the talks and the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

142. It is my Government's conviction that this is a crucial moment in the history of Cyprus. If talks are not resumed at an early date, opportunities for progress on this issue may well be delayed for some time to come and, as a consequence, the unfortunate *de facto* division of the island could further solidify. It is for this reason that every effort must be made now to bring the parties together for sustained and productive negotiations carried out in good faith.

143. I wish to emphasize that the Secretary-General has special authority and responsibility for helping the parties reach an agreed settlement. Under Security Council resolution 367 (1975), he is requested, among other things:

"to undertake a new mission of good offices and to that end to convene the parties under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their disposal".

Mr. Waldheim has scrupulously implemented this resolution and we have no doubt that he will continue his mission since it remains the will of the Council.

144. The connexion between peace-keeping and peace-making is perhaps closer and more intentional in the Cyprus question than in any other area of United Nations involvement. In my Government's view this connexion is inextricable. The United States bears a heavy burden in support of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, along with one other permanent member and several non-permanent members of the Council. Only the demonstrated will and determination of the parties to engage in serious, constructive intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General can justify this burden.

145. We note with satisfaction that there has been a slight decline in the deficit of UNFICYP to \$53.6 million. The reduction, however, is largely due to a reduction in costs and not to a more equitable sharing of the costs of the Force. The troop-contributing countries bear a particularly heavy burden. We regret that more countries have not heeded the appeal of the Secretary-General of 23 March [S/12624] to contribute to UNFICYP and thereby give concrete evidence of their commitment to international peace and security.

146. In closing, I should like to express to the Secretary-General my Government's sincere appreciation of his continuing efforts to promote a lasting settlement of the Cyprus dispute. We welcome his appointing Ambassador Reynaldo Galindo Pohl his Special Representative in Cyprus. I wish, finally, to extend our thanks and admiration to Under-Secretaries-General Urquhart and Guyer and their able staff, to Mr. Rémy Gorgé, who served for a considerable period as Acting Special Representative, and

to the officers and men of UNFICYP for the highly professional manner in which they have discharged their duties.

147. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): There is an air, I suppose inevitably, of somnolent, almost soporific, reluctance about the Security Council this afternoon, and I suppose we are all reluctant at still being here considering a matter which we should have finished at midnight last night, and we are all a bit somnolent because of the hour at which we actually adopted the resolution this morning. I must say that as I was sitting here I was reminded of an incident in the course of an all-night session in the House of Commons when an older and wiser Member of Parliament than I, as we sat watching the sun come up over the Thames, looked at me and said, "You know, there is nothing like staying up all night to concentrate the mind on ways to avoid having to repeat the experience". It may be that that will be one of the desirable effects of last night's efforts.

148. Mr. President, although the Council has met in closed session under your presidency already this month, I have not had the occasion previously to congratulate you publicly on your assumption of the office of the presidency. Having admired the firmness and wisdom with which you have handled this particularly thorny problem, I am confident that the Council's business this month will be conducted with efficiency and skill. I would also take this opportunity to congratulate your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Venezuela, for his handling of last month's Council affairs.

149. Turning now to today's agenda, I should like to thank the Secretary-General and his staff for yet another comprehensive and lucid report covering the six-month period which concludes today. My Government accepts without reservation the Secretary-General's recommendation that the UNFICYP mandate should be extended by a further six months, and I was happy—not to say relieved—to vote for resolution 430 (1978) earlier today. I think perhaps I should say a little about the delay in renewing the mandate. It is of no small concern that the Force was on the island of Cyprus for five hours today without the necessary legal authority for its being there. I am sure that all troop contributors would agree that such a situation is unacceptable and must not be allowed to occur again. Let us hope that the new form of resolution will enable us to avoid such delays in future renewals, should they prove necessary.

150. The British Government hopes to maintain its contingent of the Force at its present strength for the next six months, and we shall continue to meet its full cost, as well as the cost of the logistic support we supply to UNFICYP.

151. Mention of costs reminds me yet again of the disproportionate burden borne by relatively few countries in supporting a force which, it is generally agreed I believe, plays an essential part in maintaining peace in Cyprus. In paragraph 82 of his report, the Secretary-General has pointed out that the troop-contributing Governments look to the United Nations for much less than the actual cost of maintaining their contingents, and in some cases—my own

country is only one example—for only a fraction of their actual costs. Yet despite this, the UNFICYP deficit continues to run at more than \$50 million. I make no apology for drawing attention again to the fact that many countries, some of which are closely concerned with the Cyprus problem, continue to fail to respond to the Secretary-General's appeals for voluntary contributions. In my view, it is a reflection on the collective reputation of the Members of the Organization that sufficient funds cannot be provided to match the splendid efforts in the field of Major-General Quinn and the officers and men of UNFICYP.

152. In last December's debate I paid tribute to the retiring Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. Today I should like publicly to congratulate and welcome his replacement as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Galindo Pohl. Our thanks are due also to Mr. Rémy Gorgé, the Deputy Special Representative, who bore the whole burden prior to Mr. Galindo Pohl's arrival.

153. Finally, I should like, on behalf of my Government, to express gratitude to and sympathy with the Secretary-General in his untiring efforts to achieve progress in what must be one of his most frustrating tasks. We agree wholeheartedly with his view that the problems are not inherently insoluble but that their resolution does require a willingness from each side to make concessions and to acknowledge the needs and aspirations of the other. For this reason, my Government continues to urge the parties to adopt a constructive and flexible approach to the intercommunal negotiations, which we consider to be the most likely vehicle for arriving at a satisfactory outcome.

154. Mr. HULINSKÝ (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like, first of all, to thank the representative of Venezuela, Mr. Carpio Castillo, for his effective and impartial guidance of the work of the Security Council last month. I wish also to congratulate you, Mr. President, the distinguished representative of friendly Bolivia, on your assumption of that post for the month of June. Relations between your country and mine are based on a rich tradition of many years. They began to develop in a particularly favourable manner in the 1970s, and are based on mutually beneficial economic links, as was demonstrated by the visit to Czechoslovakia of your country's Minister for Mining and Metallurgy, General José Zelaya Salinas.

155. The Czechoslovak delegation associated itself with other Council members in voting in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations troops in Cyprus for a further six months. An important factor in that decision was agreement to the extension by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, on whose territory the troops are stationed.

156. We have taken note of the report which the Secretary-General submitted to us. It characterizes the situation in the island as being difficult and as causing deep concern. Since the very beginning of the Cyprus crisis, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has advocated that non-aligned State's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We have stressed consistently that, in order to

resolve the crisis, it is important to comply strictly with the letter and the spirit of Security Council resolution 365 (1974), as well as of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, including that of the last session. As is well known, those resolutions also call for respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and foreign military staff from the territory and the cessation of any interference whatsoever in the island's internal affairs.

157. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has always emphasized the need to resolve the Cyprus problem by peaceful means. Today, as four years ago, we state that a just solution can be achieved only if the fate of Cyprus is charted not by foreign interests but by the people of Cyprus themselves. The Cyprus crisis has more far-reaching causes and interrelationships than just the internal problems of Cyprus itself. One such problem is that of nationalities. We have never underestimated the complexity of Cyprus's nationality problem. We are firmly convinced that the people of Cyprus will be able to resolve that problem on the basis of the equality of both nationalities, Greek and Turkish. If, throughout this protracted crisis, the problem has remained unresolved, despite all the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, it is mainly because the powers which, in the summer of 1974, hoped to take advantage of the Fascist *putsch* of the Athens Colonels in an effort to alter not only the situation in the island but also the strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean, have not renounced their plans to gain control over Cyprus and its key position in relation to the Middle East in order to turn it into a NATO military base.

158. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has in all circumstances resolutely opposed any encroachment on the Republic of Cyprus from any quarter. It has done so in the face of the efforts to divide and annex the island. The Cyprus question can be resolved in a just manner only when conditions are created in the island which will allow both communities to act realistically, making possible the creation of a peaceful situation in which all questions concerning the constitutional organization of the State can be resolved compatibly, with reasonable consideration for the interests and rights of the two nationalities in a united Republic of Cyprus.

159. A prerequisite for the positive internal political development of the country remains the elimination of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, without exception. In passing, we would note in this respect the important statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, on 24 May last, to the tenth special session of the General Assembly³ in which, in particular, he said he was in favour of the complete demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and also of the implementation of United Nations resolutions.

160. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic consistently favours the implementation of United Nations resolutions,

³ *Ibid.*

which contain all the necessary elements for a solution of the crisis. However, there are constant attempts to conduct negotiations on the fate of Cyprus without the participation of the United Nations. These attempts circumvent the well-known decisions of the United Nations and are not aimed at resolving the problem in accordance with the interests of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. The legitimate Government of Cyprus has stated several times that it cannot agree with a solution which runs counter to United Nations resolutions.

161. The Czechoslovak delegation once again emphasizes that any negotiations for a really reliable settlement of the problem of Cyprus can be held only on the basis of the well-known resolutions of the United Nations and only within their framework. In this respect, the Czechoslovak delegation expresses its conviction that the proposal to call for an international conference within the framework of the United Nations to discuss the problems connected with the strengthening of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus remains valid.

162. The settlement of the international aspects of the Cyprus crisis corresponds to the urgent interests in strengthening peace and international security. It would doubtless help the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus also in their attempts to resolve the internal aspects of that problem by political means. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to express the sincere hope that the parties directly concerned will make use of the renewed mandate of UNFICYP and will show their devotion to the principles of a settlement which could be endorsed and supported by the international community.

163. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Sir, first of all, on behalf of the delegation of the USSR, I should like sincerely to welcome you, an eminent diplomat from Bolivia, and wish you every success in fulfilling the lofty and responsible functions of President of the Security Council. My delegation also expresses its gratitude to your predecessor, the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Carpio Castillo, under whose able guidance in May the Council discussed a number of important questions connected with the situation in the Middle East.

164. A few hours ago the Council adopted a resolution on a further extension of the stationing of United Nations troops in Cyprus. But it is obvious to all, however, that this question cannot be examined in isolation from the nature of the present situation which remains in Cyprus and in the area. Unfortunately, we must take note of the fact that, despite all attempts made by the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly to resolve that important and acute international problem, no real progress has been made. A tense situation still prevails in Cyprus, the basic elements of the Cyprus problem remain unresolved and the basic resolutions of the United Nations on the Cyprus question remain unfulfilled. The strivings of certain circles to resolve the Cyprus problem within a narrow circle of States members of NATO and to try to turn Cyprus into a military bridgehead of that bloc in the eastern Mediterranean, are becoming even more obvious.

165. The Soviet Union resolutely supports the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the Republic of Cyprus and its status as a non-aligned State. The Soviet Union is a consistent champion of a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem, taking into account the interests of the entire Cyprus people and with due consideration for the interests and rights both of the Greek and Turkish communities. We consider that the inalienable right must be ensured for the Cyprus people, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to resolve the problems of the internal organization of their State themselves. It is important, in this respect, to make further efforts aimed at restoring the spirit of mutual trust and co-operation between the two communities in Cyprus. It is a matter of great urgency to put an end to any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus, to remove all foreign troops from the island and to eliminate the foreign military bases.

166. The Soviet Union advocates the immediate and comprehensive implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. Resolving the Cyprus problem on the basis of these resolutions would be furthered, we feel, by convening a representative international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations.

167. The delegation of the USSR voted in favour of the Council resolution on extending the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for another six months, bearing in mind that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus endorsed such an extension. The delegation of the USSR believes that the financing of the Force will be carried out on a voluntary basis as heretofore.

168. In conclusion, the delegation of the USSR would like to stress that the extension of the stationing of United Nations troops in Cyprus should not be used to postpone a just and peaceful solution of the problem of Cyprus.

169. Mr. GEORGE (Nigeria): Mr. President, my delegation would like to place on record our good wishes to you on your assumption of the office of President of the Council for the month of June. In the same breath, I wish to offer my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador Carpio Castillo of Venezuela, the President of the Council during the month of May, for the excellent way in which he conducted the affairs of the Council.

170. My delegation has noted the efforts being made by the Secretary-General, particularly the skilful consultations he has been carrying out, and the use of his good offices in the search for an agreeable accommodation for the resolution of the problem of Cyprus. These have been fully reflected in the report before the Council. We very much appreciate the dedicated interest of the Secretary-General in the cause of peace in the world.

171. Council members in the past few days have gone through numerous hours of painful consultations before arriving at the adoption of resolution 430 (1978) at about 5 o'clock this morning. In voting in favour of the resolution, my delegation was mindful of the history of the problem of Cyprus, the plight of the people of Cyprus and the portent of the prolonged process of consultations and

negotiations which we have just gone through for the future of the Republic of Cyprus and the welfare of all its people. It is our hope that due and judicious advantage will be taken by all parties to the dispute in Cyprus of the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force, with the result that more vigorous efforts will be made towards finding a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus, a problem which is recognized by all for what it actually is—a constitutional problem.

172. The problem facing Cyprus, a Member of the United Nations since 1960, is a reflection of how seriously we take the Charter of the United Nations and how the Charter is disregarded when the so-called national interests of certain Powers are considered by them to be at stake. The key question of mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Member States, in order to avoid war and maintain international peace and security, is well enshrined in the Charter. It is therefore a matter of deep regret to my delegation that the Security Council, as the world's custodian of international peace and security, seems powerless in the face of such brazen violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a Member State. Is it because Cyprus has no minerals and raw materials and the economy of the Western world is not threatened and those who shore up certain other régimes have not found it necessary to prevent the dismemberment of Cyprus?

173. If the fear, expressed in 1965 by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, that "the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government . . . would . . . inevitably lead to partition and thus risk creating a new national frontier between Greece and Turkey . . . of a highly provocative nature" [*see S/6253 of 26 March 1965, para. 154*] is justified, the support being given to the Turkish Cypriots by Turkey might be looked upon as an attempt to break Cyprus into two separate States based on ethnic lines. My Government cannot but deplore such a plot. We oppose secession and secessionist movements under any cover. The Turkish and Greek Governments are active parties in this problem. They are not geographically contiguous. And in all the wars that have ensued over Cyprus, it is the people of Cyprus who have suffered the brunt of war and worn its scars. But the Governments that supply arms to these Governments reap the profits.

174. In the recent meeting of the NATO countries in Washington, the Prime Ministers of both Turkey and Greece were present. It is inauspicious that those Powers responsible for the creation of the problem of Cyprus and those that profess every day to be peace-lovers were unable to make use of their political leverage to bring about a political solution to this problem. Instead, they devoted their energy to the formulation of strategy for recolonizing and subjugating the continent of Africa and its people with a view to serving their self-centred economic interest, and all this with an arrogant disregard of the sovereign Governments of Africa and their regional organization.

175. The Security Council is a very important arm of the United Nations. It is the organ which has the power and the machinery to act and which can act decisively to defuse situations that are considered to be dangerous to inter-

national peace and security. The failure of the Council to resolve any issue affects the credibility of the Council and, by implication, that of the United Nations itself. We have now witnessed a full 15 years of maintaining United Nations forces in Cyprus, which, until June 1971, had cost the Organization the staggering sum of \$128.5 million. And I am very sure that, taking into consideration the armament-industry-fueled inflation in the world today, the cost of this operation must have gone up quite considerably.

176. The United Nations cannot stand idly by and see much needed money for development wasted on peace-keeping operations whilst political leaders fail to take or shy away from the requisite political decisions to resolve the problems that have plagued the international community for so long. Furthermore, my delegation would like to place on record that peace-keeping operations are not supposed to be a permanent feature in an area of conflict and should therefore not be a substitute for durable political solutions. We should work assiduously to nurse enduring peace between peoples in the spirit of the Charter.

177. In the recent General Assembly debate on disarmament, the President of Cyprus proposed that Cyprus should be demilitarized and disarmed. This is a very significant statement from the leader of a nation which, we are told, is at war and wants to subjugate or oppress people. The Cypriots are a peace-loving people; they deserve peace and should be allowed to have it. But peace will never be attained so long as outside parties choose to meddle in their internal affairs.

178. In my delegation's view, the Security Council should act further. The aggressor State must be bluntly told to remove its army of occupation. The territorial integrity of Cyprus must be restored and respected. The people of Cyprus have suffered, and enough is indeed enough.

179. My delegation and my Government, while represented on the Council, will continue to give support to the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices in the search for a durable and lasting peace for the Republic of Cyprus.

180. Mr. JAIPAL (India): Mr. President, my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for this month and assures you of our co-operation. We gave you practical evidence of such co-operation last night.

181. We are glad also to welcome among us the new Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and Mr. Denktaş, the leader of the community of Cypriots of Turkish origin.

182. The question before the Council is "The situation in Cyprus". We have before us the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General covering the last six months, in which he has recommended that we should extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus by another six months. This we have done by adopting a resolution which contains the basic elements necessary for that purpose, and they are the concurrence of the parties concerned, especially the consent of the Government of

Cyprus, on whose territory the Force is stationed and operates, reaffirmation of the relevant resolutions of the Council and, lastly, a request to the Secretary-General to persist in his mission of good offices.

183. It is a simple resolution devoid of controversial elements so far as the Council members are concerned, and it should prove to be a good precedent. And yet the 15 members of the Council took some 17 hours to reach that simple conclusion at 5 o'clock this morning. This extraordinary demonstration of ineptitude must have undoubtedly diminished the Council's prestige and authority. The reason for this, of course, is the fact that the Council was the virtual hostage of the parties concerned, which, having agreed to the extension of the mandate of the Force, insisted on prior approval of every single word and punctuation mark in the draft resolution.

184. It is not clear to me why or how the Council surrendered its authority and its powers in this manner to the parties concerned. In such a situation, why should not the parties concerned draft a consensus resolution themselves and bring it to the Council for rubber-stamping? Even that was not possible, because the parties concerned are apparently not on speaking terms.

185. And so the Council had to resort to strange procedures and work through the night like the veritable mountain labouring long and hard to produce the proverbial mouse. Before that mouse appeared in the early hours of this morning, one delegation was asked to withdraw its draft resolution in order to facilitate the arrival of the mouse. Another ancient draft resolution was updated, but was rejected because it was patently out of date. Finally, the present draft resolution was born, largely due to the efforts of a French midwife and the threat of a possible Russian veto which somehow hastened the labours of the mountain. My delegation takes this opportunity to record its thanks to the representatives of France and the Soviet Union for their helpful and objective role.

186. Surely, there is a moral in all of this and in our view it is simply that the Council should resume the power that it seems to have surrendered to the parties concerned and live up to the rightful role entrusted to it by the Charter. If it does not do so, it should throw open its informal meetings to the public in the expectation that public exposure might improve its performance. So much for the extension of the mandate of the Force.

187. The Secretary-General's report has also made it abundantly clear that the intercommunal talks are now hopelessly deadlocked and that the time may be ripe for dealing with the present stalemate. We believe that the time is ripe for the Council itself to examine the deadlock and the situation in Cyprus in depth. If the stalemate should be of a permanent character, there is no valid reason, in our opinion, for indefinitely continuing the stationing of a United Nations Force in Cyprus at enormous cost.

188. It is unrealistic to keep on calling for resumption of negotiations between the two communities without first discovering and establishing an appropriate and realistic basis for the negotiations. May I also say that the mandate

of the Force, stipulated in paragraph 5 of resolution 186 (1964) is clearly no longer relevant in terms of the present situation. We have grave doubts also about United Nations involvement in the internal problems of any Member State.

189. Lastly, my delegation congratulates the President of Cyprus for his far-reaching and imaginative proposal to demilitarize his country. This is a unique proposal and I should have thought that it was worthy of being taken note of by the Council, an action which, unfortunately, the Council has failed to take.

190. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): There are no further speakers on the list. I should like to convey to my colleagues my heartfelt thanks for the great assistance given me by each and all in the very difficult hours we have just passed through and especially to the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France.

191. Speaking now in my capacity as representative of BOLIVIA, I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to the Secretary-General not only for his tireless work of peace in Cyprus, recognized by all my colleagues, but also for his very valuable assistance and constant encouragement in our recent long hours of work. I should like to congratulate Mr. Galindo Pohl, who assumed the role of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus. I should also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Guyer, Major-General James Joseph Quinn, the Commander of UNFICYP, and the Secretariat personnel, for their valuable contribution during the negotiations.

192. The urgent search for a non-aggressive and reasonable means of extending the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, through the resolution just adopted, has left us with a feeling of uneasiness. We felt ourselves somewhat weary, finding that we were unable to deal with the substantive problem because of the lack of time. In order to help lay the groundwork for a lasting solution, beyond the provisional measures necessary to preserve the peace in an important region of the world, I should like to stress three aspects which in the view of the Bolivian delegation are important.

193. First, that my country has a firm position of principle in favour of the integration of peoples, as a means of achieving development, in keeping with one of the major present-day objectives of Latin America.

194. We are deeply disturbed at the contrast between the dispersion of peoples and human communities still affected by age-old regional injustices which form part of a colonialism which has not yet disappeared, in contrast to the great supranational concentration of ever more powerful entities such as the so-called transnational corporations, whose hypertrophy, which leaves on the sidelines the small and poor nations of the world, increasingly weakened and dispersed, has quite rightly been of concern to the United Nations.

195. There is a universal enemy of peace—which is not highly visible but which is everywhere—sometimes pre-

venting practical progress towards the establishment of a new international economic order, sometimes providing those weapons which, as we learned at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, are not produced by anyone but which nevertheless inundate the world, sometimes acting as the direct or indirect cause of regional and local conflicts, many of which have been smouldering for centuries without a solution in sight.

196. Because of this, my delegation is strongly in favour of any form of political unity and social integration of communities and of nations as a means to achieve the development of the peoples of the third world. Those who cause divisions and pit people against people, even in the belief that they serve their own cause of freedom, are doing what is counterproductive, apart from being anti-human.

197. Secondly, in respect of negotiations hedged about with inflexible preconditions which make any negotiation impossible, Bolivia has very recently had bitter experience of this in its search for peaceful means for the restoration of its original natural outlet to the sea, which is absolutely vital for its development within a framework of peace and integration which we shall not renounce.

198. Any genuine agreement, in order to deserve that name, must be reached through reciprocal concessions and not decisions imposed unilaterally. Faithful to the doctrine of peace of the Charter of the United Nations, the Bolivian delegation firmly believes in the fruitfulness of understanding reached through mutual concessions in order to overcome long-standing problems of the developing countries, and by so doing to make it possible, together and united, to overcome the backwardness and poverty which stem from dependence. That is why we are so concerned by the disunity of communities affected by the same situation which, rather than dividing them, should unite them in a common struggle against the same economic and social ills.

199. Thirdly, I should like to highlight the resolute contemporary defeat of an isolated, individualistically medieval approach to the problems of the peoples of the world in this era in which we all aspire to a universal and even ecumenical human race.

200. A striking lesson at this time, among the many that can be taught by the United Nations, is that there are no longer problems of concern only to one country or even exclusively to two countries as though they were isolated from the rest of the world. The fate of each country is of interest to all. Thus, we should all work sincerely and resolutely to provide a better destiny for mankind within the peace and security so painstakingly sought by the United Nations. Bolivia sincerely hopes that, as soon as possible, a lasting solution will be found for Cyprus, protecting its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and its human rights.

201. Acting again in my capacity as PRESIDENT of the Council, I shall give the floor to those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

202. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): The representative of Turkey, in giving his explanations for rejecting *in toto*, as

he said, resolution 430 (1978), made some references to my country. I wish to place on record that I, too, reject *in toto* what he said about the Government of Greece and about recognition of the Government of Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus is recognized by all Member States. The fact that Turkey is the only country that makes an exception to this general rule makes it entirely unnecessary for me to answer in detail, at this late hour, the arguments advanced by Ambassador Türkmen.

203. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I am indeed very grateful to all the members of the Council for having devoted so much time last night, so much energy and loss of sleep over the question of Cyprus. I know that most of them must have felt that they were wasting their time on small details of something that could have been resolved in a very short time, and they must have been placing the blame on one side or the other and probably were getting excited over that blame. I apologize to them all for whatever responsibility we bear for having kept them so late.

204. I must also thank all the members for the interest they showed by their statements in this hall, and I wish, in particular, to mention the statements of the representatives of Nigeria, the Soviet Union and India, as well as all the others who have spoken. I wish, in particular, to address you, Mr. President, and to thank you for having brought to the fore certain aspects that should not be overlooked in the Security Council.

205. Now we have heard Mr. Denktaş speak in dramatic tones and say that he has not come from the moon and that the people here are not from the moon. But I would merely say this: what he said was entirely "moonshine" and contains no particle of truth. I do not want to offend him at all, because he is carrying out a mission in doing this, and the mission is to try to cover up, as the agent of Ankara, the atrocious crimes committed and still being committed by Turkey against Cyprus in full view of the international community and with the full knowledge, in particular, of the Security Council, which had adopted unanimously resolutions calling for a halt to the aggression against Cyprus and to the expulsion of its population after an aggression and invasion unprecedented in recent times. Two hundred thousand refugees are the result of a genocidal expulsion. Over 2,000 persons are missing who were in the hands of the Turkish army, who were seen and heard, even from radios in Turkey, who were transported to Turkey bound up as prisoners and then disappeared. Now we are told that "there is no information about them; we can give you no information about these missing persons". Attempts were made to establish committees with representatives on both the Turkish side and the Greek Cypriot side to try to trace them, but at every step before those committees were formed there was obstruction—surely understandable because any effort would show that those people have been massacred or are in slave camps where they remain unseen.

206. Now Mr. Denktaş—and I do not want to offend him at all—spoke of the great violations of human rights during the 11 years before the invasion and said that the invasion that caused the genocidal expulsion of 200,000 persons was really a benevolent invasion. In fact, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, who also happens to be Prime Minister

today, had broadcast to the world on 20 July that he was going to carry out a peaceful operation in Cyprus for the good of both the Greek and the Turkish peoples. But, hardly one hour after that announcement, there took place the napalm bombing of open cities and villages, bringing agonizing death to hundreds of people, for no reason, and creating forest fires, in order to terrorize the people and get them out of a part of Cyprus that the Turks wanted to occupy and make part of Turkey.

207. I am sorry if I have to keep the Council members on a night which will not result in a resolution, but it is necessary to do so, particularly after what Mr. Denktas said here. And why did he speak after the Foreign Minister of Cyprus? The latter made a charge against Turkey for its invasion of Cyprus and continuing occupation of 40 per cent of its territory as well as for the crimes committed there, and instead of a representative of Turkey coming to answer—if Turkey had an answer—that country tries to put forth Mr. Denktas to answer, in order to cover up the situation and to present it as being merely a difference between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

208. It is well known that the problem of Cyprus is one of the most serious problems today. This was stated first by President Carter of the United States, who said that there were three most serious problems today: the problem of the Middle East, the problem of southern Africa and the problem of Cyprus. The same was stated and written also by the Secretary-General. Before the invasion, we never heard that, although there was a Cyprus problem, it was a problem of such serious dimensions as to be one of the gravest problems, and that problem is one not only of Cyprus but also of the whole international community and of the United Nations: it is the problem of a small country that is invaded by a bigger country with defensive weapons in its hands used for aggression. And what happened after the invasion? It was not merely an invasion, but the destruction of the country and its people, and, as I said, the creation of 200,000 refugees. Mr. Denktas, speaking on behalf of Turkey, as its agent—and as I said before it should have been the representative of Ankara who spoke—tried to speak as if it were not true that there were 200,000 refugees. But the last report of the Secretary-General gives an accurate account and says that there are 182,000. We have other more accurate statements which say 186,000, and I think there are figures arriving at 196,000 or 200,000. However, the figure of 182,000 appears in the report of the Secretary-General. Therefore Mr. Denktas has no cause to come and say, "Nonsense, there is no such thing as 200,000 refugees".

209. In the same tone he denies the truth and takes an air of such persuasiveness that, as it were, he does not need to produce evidence. In fact he has produced no evidence about anything he has said here.

210. I shall take a little of your time to produce concrete evidence that everything he said is false. But why should Mr. Denktas come here and tell untruths? After all, why should Turkey take this trouble caused to itself by invading Cyprus? There must be some cause and reason for it. Let us look at the situation and we shall find the cause and perhaps once and for all we will deal with this problem effectively.

211. When did Turkey become involved in the problem of Cyprus? I shall tell you when it became involved—in the middle 1950s. I do not need to say why it became involved. Since that time, Turkey's very thinly veiled aim has been the partition of the island with an eye to annexation. The indications of that are numerous and now they are more and more open and manifest. The Turks tried to promote a far-fetched objective at the time of partition in an island whose population lived mixed together in all parts and could not be separated. That was stated in the report of the constitutional authority, Lord Radcliffe, in 1956, the same authority that went to India and arranged for the partition between India and Pakistan. That same authority was asked to deal with the situation in Cyprus and Turkey was eagerly looking to see if it would get a share of Cyprus. But regrettably for Turkey, and perhaps for subsequent developments, Lord Radcliffe's report said that partition was excluded from Cyprus because the population was so scattered that it could not be properly partitioned. Then, a suggestion was made for a federation but it was said that a federation was impossible because again that required a geographic separation and there could not be a federation without a geographic separation. What happened then? The report said that Cyprus should be a unitary State. The British Government which sent Lord Radcliffe said that that was what should be done and that Cyprus should be a unitary State.

212. But Turkey wanted to continue its idea and from that time on it has tried by all means—legal, illegal and now by aggression—to divide the population. Hence the expulsion of the 200,000 refugees in order to create an area where the population would be Turkish. Hence also the fact that they have been feverishly transporting all kinds of people from Turkey—crude, uncouth, uncivilized, Anatolian or whatever it was—and putting them into Cyprus to fill the gap that was created by the expulsion of the 200,000 Cypriots. Those 200,000 represent one third of the total population of Cyprus, Turks and Greeks included. One third have been uprooted from their homes, expelled and they are still in tents. Mr. Denktas puts on dramatic airs and calls himself the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. But what is the territory of this audacious claim of a State within a State? It is a territory from which the population has been genocidally expelled within the last two or three years, a territory which has been invaded and is still under the heel of the occupation army. That is his State and he is very proud of it. He is the President.

213. Here then we have a State with that territory. The original population in that area totals 18 per cent. The other 82 per cent was thrown out and 50,000 or so have been imported to fill that gap and to make it a State. Of course, no Member of the United Nations nor the United Nations itself recognizes that State. Yet, the representative of Turkey speaks without any qualms again of the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. If those words "Turkish Federated State" are a lie how can one expect there to be no lies in what he says? Where is the Federation? Ask him if the territory of which he claims now to be President is not the territory which was invaded and is still under the occupation of the invasion army? Is he siding with the aggressor? Is he a Cypriot or what is he? Ask him. I asked him that question when he spoke here in

1964. I asked him in a letter I sent to him at the time. The letter is here. I asked him why he was siding with the aggressor if he was a Cypriot. Here is the letter and you can see how old it is. It is as old as the wounds of Cyprus. He came here and he was crying. This is a letter of 2 March 1964 circulated by the Secretary-General:

“The voice the Council has heard from Mr. Denktaş was not the voice of the Turkish Cypriots. It was the voice of Ankara through another channel, but with the same concepts and even in identical words. His statement has in this sense been revealing in its implications. He has confirmed in a vivid way that he does not think or feel as a Cypriot at all, but as a Turk from Turkey ‘projected into Cyprus’, to use his own words. He has made it apparent that his allegiance is not to the country of which he is a citizen, but to a foreign State, Turkey; and that when his country of citizenship is threatened from Turkey with aggression and invasion, he sides with the aggressor.” [See S/5573.]

214. I need not enter into what else he said. But he did say that he was thrown out of Cyprus and that he could not return, although he was not truthful enough to say why he was sent out of Cyprus—because of rebellious activities. However, we will leave that alone. It raises a question to which he would reply in the negative, but why does he not say that he came to Cyprus armed, illegally and clandestinely, and was found by the police, arrested and put into prison? He was in terrible fear for his life, but he did not know that the mentality of those who had him under arrest was not the same as some other mentalities. He was not hurt at all. He was there under a charge punishable by very heavy punishment and imprisonment—the charge of coming clandestinely into the country, which he will not deny—but he was forgiven. He was given every attention and sent back to his beloved Turkey in complete safety. Why is he not sincere enough to thank us for saving his life, or at least for saving him years of imprisonment? Why does he simply come here pointing an accusing finger and citing all the evils they have suffered?

215. These matters cannot be left there. It may be late, but since he comes here and uses such language then I must say—with all due respect, because as a man I respect him—that he is carrying out a mission which he should not have accepted. He says that they were suffering. Let us see how much they were suffering. The trouble began on 23 December 1963. And why did the trouble begin? I will tell the Council immediately why it began. In trying to promote the far-fetched objective of partition in the island, Turkey adopted a systematic policy of increasing the division of the people by breaking by force and through underground Turkish organizations the existing links of harmony between the two communities. That was attested to here in this chamber by Lord Caradon, the then Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who was the Governor in Cyprus for a number of years and also previously the Colonial Secretary there, when he said that he knew very well that the people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks, had lived over the years in the country in peace, harmony and amity. What broke up that relationship? The intervention of Ankara. For what purpose? To partition the island.

216. The cause of all these troubles, the reason we have a United Nations force, and the reason for last night’s vigil, is the partitionist policy of Ankara, which goes on relentlessly. That is the situation. It started with troubles in the 1950s. The Turks would go—as they do now—into the buffer zone and set alight Greek Cypriot property; friction ensued, which brought about fighting. This was before independence. Eventually, there was an agreement to form an independent Cyprus. But in the London and Zurich agreements, Ankara insisted on such divisive provisions that the State could not function. It functioned for three years, but with great difficulty because the Turkish Cypriots, acting under the direction of Ankara, were obstructing its functioning. How were they obstructing it? They already had certain rights and privileges in excess of the normal rights and they used them to obstruct the State. As a result, the income tax law could not be made to work and there was an economic crisis; and all that was in the hope of disrupting the State and creating a reason for the invasion. So things went on for two years or so until 1962. Then there was trouble, which was systematically promoted by Ankara, and only five days after the trouble began the ships were ready to invade Cyprus from Turkey. The invasion was prevented by the Security Council, but in a few months they started again and then on 5 June 1964 President Johnson sent a letter—and it is very characteristic—to the then Prime Minister, Mr. İnönü, telling him:

“It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960.”

—the same excuse that they give today for their actual invasion—

“I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed invasion by Turkey would be not for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots but for the purpose of effecting a formal partition of the island.”

217. So in 1964 President Johnson had warned of what happened now. Now it has come into full bloom in the partition proposal made for the solution of the problem of Cyprus, in which it is suggested that almost 40 per cent of the island should remain in the hands of its present “government”. They call it an administration. They have set up a bogus administration and, with a population made up of imported Turks and an army to whom they have given Cypriot citizenship illegally, they propose that this “population” and this “country” should now become recognized and legitimized by our signature. They want negotiations for that purpose, and they say that we are intransigent in not entering into negotiations aimed at legitimizing the invasion, the occupation, the expulsions and the transportation of the population from Turkey.

218. Because of that situation this problem is recurring in the Security Council and, because it continues to recur, the Council has the trouble of renewing the mandate. Therefore it is very pertinent to the whole question of the mandate to ask why it is necessary and who is responsible. But the effort is to conceal everything. Mr. Denktaş said that, for no reason, we refused to attend negotiations, although they had made concrete and substantial proposals. He did not

dare to tell the truth and say that the reason that had been given was that the proposals were not for a united State, although he spoke of unity, and not for a State with a single structure, but for division and partition. Mr. Denktas does not say that. Why should he not be sincere enough to say: "The President of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, says that our proposals are for partition, but I shall prove that they are not"? He avoids the issue. He says that Mr. Kyprianou says the proposals are unacceptable, but he does not say why. Again the truth is not allowed to come out, but is hidden.

219. We see in the latest report that the Secretary-General says:

"My talks at Nicosia with Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas centred on the negotiating process." [S/12723, para. 49.]

Mr. Denktas says that Mr. Kyprianou does not want to meet him, but he did meet him, and what was the consequence? The Council will see why he does not want to meet him again:

"It was agreed that the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the main aspects of the problem would be submitted to the Secretary-General so that I might study them and consult the parties on . . . resuming the intercommunal talks in a meaningful and effective way." [Ibid.]

220. Then, Mr. Denktas says that the reason we gave for not accepting the proposals as a basis was that they were not reasonable. But it was not because they were not reasonable; it was because they were at cross purposes; they were for partition, and I will prove to the Council immediately that they were for partition by many things. Mr. Denktas mentioned Yugoslavia. If Yugoslavia—or even Mr. Denktas—is asked, is there a central government, the answer will be yes. Does it function in Yugoslavia? Yes. Is a citizen a citizen of Yugoslavia and does he have a passport issued by the Yugoslav central Government? Yes. But the proposal of Ankara is for two separate States each issuing completely separate passports, with separate registers, and everything separate. Is there any federation in the world where there is no central authority which gives citizenship and the federation's passport? No.

221. I cannot go into all the details—there are too many—of the division of sovereignty in every respect, with the central government having no authority at all but being admitted in the constitution to be merely ceremonial. The representative of Turkey does not say these things. Why try to conceal everything and present a situation which is unnatural and untrue? Because the crimes in Cyprus have to be concealed. And the crimes are there for what purpose? To make way for partition. And what is the purpose of partition? It is annexation. Why do I say annexation? Because already they forbid anyone in the territory which has been occupied to say it is Cyprus; they call it Turkey, the province of Mersin in Turkey. That is what they call the north of Cyprus now. The currency says Turkey, the stamps say Turkey and the address of the new bank which was established in Cyprus is the Turkish Bank, Mersin, Turkey. The citizens are forbidden to say on their

papers that where they are is Cyprus; they must put "Mersin, Turkey".

222. So we have ample proof from their own acts that the purpose was and continues to be partition, because Cyprus is not partitioned yet. That is what we are struggling for here, to save Cyprus from partition. And the purpose of partition is annexation. That is the reality.

223. Let us look at the facts here. Why is there so much about our not wanting these negotiations? There was the meeting of President Makarios and Mr. Denktas in 1977, when they came to agree on a federation with a functioning central government, with the unity of the State. The word "unity" has been used here by Mr. Denktas. He says that they want a State with unity. He says that here, but what does he present? Partition. So he admits that unity was the purpose, and he destroys that unity—not he, it is not his fault at all, but Ankara. The proposals were made at Ankara by Professor Soysal; Mr. Denktas and the rest of the so-called Turkish Cypriot leadership were merely the messengers of Ankara, and here he is the messenger of Ankara. For that reason the representative of Turkey says Mr. Denktas will speak, because he speaks with the voice of Ankara, of course, and it is very much better to let him speak to show that this is a problem between the Greeks and the Turks.

224. There had been a constitutional problem in Cyprus, but it was not a world problem. It arose from the difficulties of the functioning of the Zurich and London agreements, which were divisive because of the influence of Ankara. That is where the trouble began, and they could not function, and then the President of Cyprus invited the Turkish Vice-President to find ways and means of making them function and making them viable. The offer was that more rights should be given in the normal sense to the Turkish community and that the divisive ones should be taken away. For instance, it was proposed to abolish the right of separate majority, which meant a veto by the Turkish minority on the functioning of the State, and allow the Turkish Vice-President to substitute for and succeed the President if he was ill or absent, whereas under the divisive constitution it was a Greek who would take the place of the President if he was away, absent, ill, and so on. The proposal was to abolish that and give the Turkish Vice-President all the rights of a Vice-President.

225. The Vice-President at the time was thinking about this and studying it, but Ankara intervened immediately and said it was not acceptable, which meant they did not want to conciliate and get people to work together, or to have the Turks given rights that would conciliate them. They wanted division. From that moment the trouble started. Immediately after the proposals were made to the Turkish side, the fighting began. It was, of course, fighting between the two sides, in which no doubt there were excesses, but that was nothing. It was stopped immediately; we had the United Nations Force and it is well known that with the presence of the Force the human rights of the Turkish Cypriots were fully protected. If they were not and they were suffering in any way, why is it that the Turkish Cypriots, or Ankara, did not go to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations or the European Commission of Human Rights?

226. On the other hand, with regard to the violation of human rights in Cyprus by Ankara, we have the report of the European Commission of Human Rights, which has now been circulated in full. It was described by *The Sunday Times* of London as a "massive indictment of the Ankara Government [which] could result in the withdrawal or expulsion of Turkey from the Council of Europe". Why is there no report about the violation of the human rights of the Turkish Cypriots? There is none; they never went to the Commission on Human Rights because there had been no violations.

227. What do the reports of the Secretary-General say about this situation? There is a whole volume of these reports starting in 1964 and continuing through 1965, 1966, 1970 and so on. I shall not take the time to go through them all, but there they are with all the dates, and I shall give the Council some examples.

228. They said they were put in enclaves and deprived of their freedom of movement, and that they became refugees. Let us look at what is stated in the Secretary-General's report of 15 June 1964: "lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose" [S/5764, para. 113]. They were put in enclaves in order to create a pattern of separation. It is true that 40 or 50 or 1,000—I do not know how many—were put in enclaves, but by whom? By their own leadership, to make a pattern of separation. Taking advantage of the troubles, they said, they are in danger, let us put them in enclaves. But there was a political purpose, as the report says, namely "to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation" [*ibid.*]. This was the geographical separation that Turkey wanted for the purpose of partition, while pretending that it was necessary for security purposes. Then the report goes on:

"The Force has provided a degree of security by temporarily escorting Turkish Cypriots and their goods to their destinations, a practice which has been recently replaced by increased UNFICYP patrols and check-points in sensitive areas." [*Ibid.*]

229. The Secretary-General's report of 10 June 1965 says:

"The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together." [S/6426, para. 106.]

So the fact that they were in enclaves was not because they were suffering from danger to their security, or suffering in any other way, but because they had to adhere to rigid orders from their leaders, who wanted to keep them from associating with the Greek Cypriots. The Secretary-General's report continues:

"The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots." [*Ibid.*]

It goes on to say:

"Turkish Cypriot leaders continue to exercise effective control over the free movement of members of their own

community. Permits have to be obtained by Turkish Cypriots who wish to travel outside the Walled City of Nicosia . . ."

—and they must return within a certain time—

"... Turkish Cypriots are likely to find themselves in serious difficulty with members of their community if they fail to confine contacts with their Greek Cypriot compatriots to a strict minimum." [*Ibid.*, para. 115.]

230. In other words, the whole effort was aimed at dividing the two communities and making them strangers to one another. Mr. Denktaş said that the houses of Turkish Cypriots had been taken. That is not the case at all. They left their houses, which then fell into a state of ruin. The Government offered to rebuild them and invited the people back but they refused to come, not because they did not want to, but because their leaders, inspired from Ankara, would not allow them to do so. The Secretary-General's report of 8 December 1967 states:

"For a considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes . . ., it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses. . . . It is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their former homes located in Government-controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the major reasons for its attitude is a political one." [S/8286, para. 127.]

Therefore this pretence that the Turkish Cypriots were suffering and that they had lost their security, as I have said from the very beginning, was a political pretence for the purpose of partitioning and eventually, annexing the island. The report continues:

"the maximum possible number of Turkish Cypriots must remain outside the Government's authority" [*ibid.*].

That was the political purpose and the political policy, yet they are now lamenting the loss of their freedom and their security.

231. The Secretary-General, in his report of 10 June 1965, said:

"The Turkish Cypriots continue rigidly to deny freedom of movement to Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia." [S/6426, para. 112.]

That was said despite the fact that Turkish Cypriots had complete freedom of movement all over the island. In many areas the Greek Cypriots were denied freedom of movement. They were held in enclaves by Turkish Cypriots who had received arms from Turkey and were in rebellion, yet the Turkish Cypriots were regarded as the poor victims. During the negotiations concerning the establishment of the republic, a caïque from Turkey was taken into custody by the British authorities while it was illegally unloading quantities of arms. In other words, the Turkish Cypriots

were getting arms from Turkey in preparation for a war of rebellion, a war of partition. All this is reported in document A/SPC/PV.923.⁴

232. Mr. Denktaş has spoken about the need for conciliation. It is we who yearn for conciliation. The Secretary-General says that the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriot community yearns for conciliation and for the resumption of harmonious relations. But the agents of Ankara will not permit it. I am sorry to have to speak in these terms, but the truth must be told. This discussion is merely an introduction; the matter will have to be discussed in full. Our Foreign Minister has given notice to that effect.

233. On 8 December 1966 the Secretary-General reported in the following terms:

"Except in rare and special cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denies entry into areas under its control to all Greek Cypriots, whether government officials or private individuals. This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle"

—the political principle behind all the acts of the Turkish Cypriot leadership is inspired in and directed from Ankara—

"with little attempt at justification on practical grounds, and, with the exception of the Kyrenia road convoy . . . , entry is usually firmly denied even where Greek Cypriots would be escorted by UNFICYP personnel and security factors could not possibly be at stake." /S/7611, para. 109.]

In other words, the other side disallowed anything which would bring the two communities together. We want conciliation. Our hearts reach out to the Turkish Cypriots, with whom we have lived over the ages, but a wall has been erected by those who adopt the partitionist policy.

234. There is another sad thing which I have to do, but I must do it and be finished with it. In his letter and in his remarks at this meeting, Mr. Denktaş referred to conciliation. Mr. Ecevit spoke of love. He is a poet, and I greatly appreciate his writings about love. Let us consider how love is regarded in Cyprus. On 20 July 1975, there was a Turkish victory parade to celebrate the first anniversary of the invasion of Cyprus. That was a great victory by a strong country against a little country. Among the officials present at the celebration—and I should like this to be noted—was the then Vice-President of the Ankara Government, Mr. Turhan Feyzioglu. Leaflets were distributed at that gathering, and they were lavishly published in the Turkish press. In those leaflets was a poem. The poem was entitled not "Love" but "Hate" and it was recited at that gathering and sung by the Turkish soldiers, *en masse*. The actual wording of the poem is as follows—forgive me for reading it here in an atmosphere like this, but it must be read:

"As long as vengeance fills my veins,
As long as my heart beats for Turkism,
As long as the word 'Greek' exists in dictionaries,

By Allah, this hate will not leave me.

A thousand heads of Greeks will not wash away this hate,
I'll crush with a stone the heads of 10,000 of them,
I'll pull out the teeth of 20,000 of them with my bare hands,
I will throw the corpses of 30,000 of them into the water,
By Allah, this hatred will not leave me . . . A thousand heads of Greeks will not wash away this hate,"

and this was published and circulated under authority, recited and sung in the presence of the Vice-President of Turkey. I continue now with the poem:

"As long as 120,000 hearts can beat together,"

—the Turkish Cypriot population is 120,000, and they are taught this from Ankara—

"As long as 40 million hearts"

—these are the hearts of Turkey—

"Beat with mine,

By Allah, this hate will not leave me,

A thousand heads of the Greeks will not wash away this hate."

Now, this poem was circulated three days prior to the third phase of the intercommunal talks at Vienna. Three days after this official gathering, they went to the intercommunal talks at Vienna.

235. That brings me to what happened in the third phase. Mr. Denktaş mentioned it and I must say a few words about it. He said that we made an agreement for an exchange of population. Not at all. The agreement was not for an exchange of population. Of course, one can distort reality without the documents, but I can offer proof with documents. The agreement which was reached in the presence of the Secretary-General, on 2 August 1975, was as follows:

"1. The Turkish Cypriots at present in the south of the island will be allowed, if they want to do so, to proceed north with their belongings under an organized programme and with the assistance of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus."

Now, that was the advantage that they wanted to get.

"2. Mr. Denktaş reaffirmed, and it was agreed, that the Greek Cypriots at present in the north of the island are free to stay and that they will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the north.

"3. The Greek Cypriots at present in the north who, at their own request and without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move to the south, will be permitted to do so.

"4. The United Nations will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the north." /S/11789, annex.]

⁴ *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Special Political Committee, 923rd meeting.

236. This involved 15,000 Greek Cypriots. As soon as 8,000 went to the north the harassment and atrocities against the Greek Cypriots began and the 15,000 were reduced to 1,700. They had to leave. Others were killed. Those who were not killed had to leave and became destitute refugees, abandoning their property and their houses. That was the agreement, and Mr. Denktaş talks about an exchange of population. Where is the exchange of population? Can one abandon one's property and leave? And now even these 1,700 are sending an SOS: "We want to stay but we cannot. They are killing us."

237. This is the situation today and this explains why we have such difficulties. I am afraid I have to come to the proposals again. As I said, the proposals cannot be a basis for negotiation because they amount to partition. But beyond that, from the moment the proposals came out, it became apparent that we were at cross purposes. You cannot negotiate when you are at cross purposes. One side wants an independent State and the other side wants partition. Therefore, if you are at cross purposes you cannot negotiate. These proposals affect the whole process of the negotiations. If the Greek Cypriot side and the Government are justified, we are not going into negotiations as long as the basis of the negotiations is the partition proposal.

238. The proposal of the President of Cyprus for demilitarization is consistent with the policy of conciliation and understanding. The Turkish Cypriots are willing. If Ankara would allow the Turkish Cypriots to negotiate freely and express their own wishes and feelings, if they were allowed to work together, they would be conciliatory and the problem would be solved. We know very well that the feelings of the rank and file are for conciliation. We have seen it in the many statements of those who are suffering from the invasion from Turkey. To this end, the proposal of the President for demilitarization is a way towards solving the problem too, and it is also an incentive for other small countries to proceed to their demilitarization.

239. Therefore, in order to have fruitful negotiations, there must be good faith and common purpose. For the time being, as I have shown, there is no good faith, judging by what happened with the invasion of Cyprus, proclaimed as being for peaceful purposes, when it was the opposite, judging by what happened with the agreement of 2 August, when contrary to the agreement they made proposals for partition. The moment they express good faith, we are ready for negotiations. The moment we arrive at a common purpose, we are ready for negotiations. But we are not going to have negotiations which are intended to cover crimes, and not to offer any chance of success.

240. Meanwhile, the attitude of Ankara is not only injurious to the people of Cyprus as a whole, the Greeks and the Turks. We know the genuine Turkish Cypriots are suffering from this situation. They have expressed their suffering. But I say that it is an evil to the whole international community which tolerates a situation of aggression and invasion in such a State, because Security Council resolutions are not implemented. We come to the sum total of it. What is responsible for this situation in Cyprus is the failure to implement Council resolutions in

violation of the Charter. In Articles 41, 42 and 43, the Charter provides that the decisions of the Council must be implemented. They are not being implemented in Cyprus and, because they are not being implemented, the situation in Cyprus is deteriorating, and the situation generally in the world is deteriorating, because there is no legal order and no security. Therefore, the problem of Cyprus becomes an important problem from this aspect, too.

241. I apologize for keeping the Council so long, and members will not hear my voice for a very long time, in any case.

242. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey): I merely wish to say the following in reply to two points made by the representative of Greece.

243. Ambassador Türkmen did not say that he rejected *in toto* the resolution adopted early this morning. He said that he did not accept it *in toto*. I am sure that this nuance will not escape Ambassador Papoulias. As a matter of fact, Ambassador Türkmen did not only accept the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP but also supported the continuation of the good offices of the Secretary-General, which are the two main elements in the resolution.

244. As for the rejection by Turkey of the existence of a Government of Cyprus, I am sure that the representative of Greece will allow us to be entitled to our own views on this point.

245. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): What I want mainly to clarify is that I objected to the misinterpretation attributed to Greece with regard to the first Geneva conference, in July, 1974. Turkey may have its opinion on this; we reject its opinion and its inference as regards the existence of the Government of Cyprus.

246. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I am informed that Mr. Denktaş, who was invited by the Council under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, would like to make a further statement. I call on Mr. Denktaş to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

247. Mr. DENKTAŞ: All I intended to do when I asked to speak at this time was to thank you, Mr. President, and all the other members of the Council for having supported the continuation of the intercommunal talks. But, soon afterwards, I heard Mr. Rossides explain why the Greek Cypriots do not want to continue the intercommunal talks. I hope that in the time which the extension of the mandate has now given us they will find new ground, new reasons for changing their minds, because there is no other way. Our flexibility is there; we want to talk; we want peace quickly; and we shall be available when the Secretary-General calls us to start the negotiations.

248. The point was made here that, in the special session devoted to disarmament, Mr. Kyprianou had said that he was ready to have Cyprus disarmed. Our view has been sought. It is this. When we had a dialogue with the Greek Cypriot leader, the late Archbishop Makarios, there were certain factors in the four guidelines on which we agreed to

have the future of Cyprus settled. One of them was the non-alignment of Cyprus. If Cyprus as a whole is to be disarmed, naturally, when the Greek Cypriot leader meets us and we discuss and dialogue begins, and when he brings this question before us, I can assure him that the Turkish co-founder community of Cyprus, the co-founder of the Republic of Cyprus, the co-founder of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus will not hesitate to agree with the Greek Cypriots if the question is put fairly and reasonably to us. It is a question which the future Republic of Cyprus, when it is constituted in its bi-communal form, will take up and decide. We might even decide it before, if the dialogue between the two leaders stands. But Mr. Kyprianou cannot decide on his own for the whole of Cyprus.

249. I shall not try to answer Mr. Rossides on all the points which he raised. I shall not deign to answer him when he chooses to refer to me as the agent of Ankara. Ankara is the centre of the Turkish community in Cyprus, just as Athens is referred to by the Greek Cypriots as the centre of Hellenism. There is no shame in that. The Greek Cypriots, together with the centre of Hellenism, tried to grab Cyprus and to unite it with Greece. That is how the two communities were drawn into conflict, and it was only natural that the centre of our national being, Turkey, would help us. Let us put all that aside. What they tried to do to Cyprus and our resistance to it have brought Cyprus to its present state. Turkey has, by intervening in Cyprus, saved the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus; it is still there. We are ready, extending our hands, to restart the process by agreeing.

250. I shall not, I repeat, take up the Council's time on the questions of refugees, missing persons and of what the Cyprus problem is, because all of that is in the reports.

251. I have known Mr. Rossides for a long time. We have faced each other in court. Whenever he had a case which he saw he was going to lose, he had a tactic. He used to "lullaby" the judges to sleep by referring to all the books available in his library—relevant or irrelevant, new or old—and he would usually get away with it. But this is not a court of law. I see that he has surpassed himself in his tactics, but I am not going to thrust upon the Council old reports of the Secretary-General, old reports of journalists who have witnessed the suffering in Cyprus. That is not the purpose of my being here.

252. He asked: What is the territory on which the so-called Federated State of Cyprus is based? I shall tell him. It is the northern part of Cyprus, where Turks had their properties—and the Turks who had properties in the southern part have left their properties in the south to the Greeks and have come up to the north. We shall discuss all this in the negotiations. We are ready to discuss all this—exchange of populations, exchange of property, compensation. Everything will be discussed. But they must come to the table. It is no use just talking here and making accusations.

253. He referred to my arrest when I tried to go back to my home, to which I was prohibited from returning for four and a half years. He said that I was armed. I had a

revolver; but, because of my political position, I was permitted by their own Minister of the Interior in the old days to carry a revolver. I was caught. He said that I should be glad that I was not killed. Well, of course, I am glad that I was not killed. But I cannot forget those who were killed on arrest; there were many and they are mentioned in the Secretary-General's reports.

254. He has referred—and I shall end my speech at this late hour—to a poem which was read, he says, at one of our celebrations. Yes, the poem was written by a young man in 1963 who had seen his whole family massacred at Limassol. That poem, from 1963 to 1968, unfortunately, was the literature of the Turkish youth who were surrounded, who were attacked, whose rights were denied, and for a great number of whom returning to Cyprus was prohibited. It may look odd to the Council, but there is now in the Turkish sector a martyr children's association—very unfortunate. That association chose to circulate and to read this poem at that parade. Since then we have talked to them—we cannot do more. We have said to them that this is not a good thing, that we should not live on hatred, that we should try to live by normal standards. But the poem is there and it only reflects what I have said here is a fact—that Turks have suffered so much, that this kind of poetry has been forced into the minds of their literary young men. It is unfortunate that it has happened. I can cite a lot of poetry published by the Cyprus broadcasting station—it is even in the reports of the Secretary-General—to which we have complained.

255. But how will all this help us? I look on Mr. Rossides as a wise man. I cannot help the fact that he is still living in the past. As a good diplomat, he can help his leaders to come to the negotiating table by talking, not as he did here today but the way he talks to me when we are face to face in the corridors. I ask him to do that, to have the courage and to have the big-heartedness to say here that they have also been wrong and that we can only do right by coming together. That is what I expect of him, the Mr. Rossides that I know, and expect of him at his age. It is the last service he can do for Cyprus—not to accumulate old papers, pick up the ones that suit him and, from a sea of wrongs that Greeks have done to us, to pick up a few points and try to prove that Turks have been wrong. Let us say that we want to settle, let us say that we have the courage and the determination to overcome the impediments—then and only then shall we arrive at peace.

256. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

257. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I do not want to make a long statement, of course, but I wish to say to the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktas, that I wish what he said were true—but it is not, unfortunately. Because he says that they are ready to conciliate. He says that that poem was merely the anger of a man. But it was publicized; it was promoted by the organization; it was distributed in leaflets; it was not a poem that was found on the table of a young boy who wrote it; it was taken up as a policy. And that is the trouble—they try all the time to poison the good feelings between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

258. The World Council of Churches sent representatives to Cyprus after the invasion; they came out with a report which I circulated. They were astonished to find that, after the invasion and the presence of the Turkish army, Greek Cypriots were seeking to be protected by the Turkish Cypriots from the evils of the army. And what is more astonishing, they said that the Turkish Cypriots were seeking consolidation and protection from Greek Cypriots.

259. This goes to show how much evil comes from a foreign army of invasion. They may be of the same race as the Turkish Cypriots, but a foreign army of invasion is an army of invasion; and a foreign army of occupation is an army of occupation at the expense of the civilian population, whether Greeks or Turks. Of course, the Greeks were the tragic victims to a very great extent. But the Turkish Cypriots are also suffering and I am sure that, in his heart, Mr. Denktaş knows it because so much has come out in the papers, although news was restricted, although those who wrote in the papers were threatened with their very lives if they divulged the secret that the Turkish Cypriots were suffering; and if they are not to suffer, they must be free to negotiate with us.

260. Let Mr. Denktaş follow the line of those who do not favour the invasion and come and conciliate and solve the problems of Cyprus in a spirit of love and understanding. You cannot have love and understanding side by side with guns and fighting. That is why demilitarization is important.

261. Mr. Denktaş thinks that I talk too much—it may be. But that does not mean that what I say is not true. He may not talk as much, but if what he says is not true, it does not become true because he does not talk too much. He says that he will not bother the Council with documents. Where are the documents that prove any of these things? I ask

him: will he be allowed by Ankara or in co-operation with Ankara—I know otherwise, it cannot be done—to make proposals that will make for the unity of Cyprus, not for its partition? And then he will see immediately that there will be a great desire for negotiation. But for this to be done, the Turkish Cypriots must be able freely to act. They are not free agents; they cannot act freely when there is the heel of the Turkish army on the island.

262. The Turkish army affects us as well, because they confront us with faits accomplis and they expel populations. But they cannot affect our feelings, as long as we are on the other side. But the Turkish army in the occupied area rules the occupied area. The people cannot have a voice that is contrary to the Turkish army of occupation—an unofficial voice. You can hear remonstrances, you can hear complaints by the Turkish Cypriots who suffer, but they cannot negotiate.

263. Therefore, it is vitally important that the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly should be implemented. The proposals on which Mr. Denktaş is ready to negotiate, let them be proposals within the framework of the Security Council resolutions—not against them—not by partitionist positions which are against the territorial integrity, independence and unity of Cyprus on which the resolutions are based. They have to make proposals within the concept of the resolutions and within the concept of a federation, uniting the country, not destroying it.

264. Let us hope that new counsel will prevail and probably one day we could meet with Mr. Denktaş, if I am alive, in a new spirit of understanding and love, but in unity, not in division.

The meeting rose at 8.40 p.m.

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