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The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK



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NOTE

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
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EDITORIAL NOTE

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major issues. The series began with the 1976 edition. *The Yearbook* makes no claim to present fully the views of Member States of the Organization. For further information on the official positions of States, readers should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly* and other sources.

General Assembly resolutions and decisions are quoted in *The Yearbook* in the form in which they were adopted by the General Assembly. For the edited texts of these documents, readers should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/47/49)*.

For an overview of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, readers may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: A Short History* (United Nations, 1988). For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization, they may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (E.76.IX.1) and previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, referred to in footnotes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number.



INTRODUCTION

THROUGHOUT 1992, amid kaleidoscopic change, the world moved further away from the environment of the cold war. It was still burdened, however, with problems connected with the legacy of the past. In this situation, the management of the process of change occupied the minds of statesmen everywhere. The major Powers maintained a leading role in that critical process, but at a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out in his report *An Agenda for Peace*, the maintenance of international peace and security was, more than ever, a world-wide common endeavour to be attained by common efforts.

By 1992 there existed a unique opportunity for the international community to give clear direction to the momentum created by the end of the cold war.

The adversarial relationship between East and West—the super-Power rivalry that had dominated an entire era of international relations—was a thing of the past. In Europe determined efforts were made to strengthen institutions for cooperation and peace so as to give new impetus, in spite of some tragic warlike developments and some serious set-backs, to the realization of a community of free and democratic States, in conformity with the principles embodied in the historic agreements of 1990, notably the CFE Treaty and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Events in other parts of the world, while far from uniform, showed that, in spite of widespread turmoil and civil strife, exacerbated by economic privation, the main trend was towards political and economic liberalization and new approaches to peace and security.

This vast process of political and economic adjustment was accompanied by efforts at the highest level to strengthen the United Nations as a guardian of peace, and to make the system of collective security embodied in the Charter more effective. As a result of these developments, the prospect for arms limitation and disarmament and for checking the threat of weapons proliferation improved significantly.

Adjusting to new political realities

In this new environment, disarmament is no longer viewed as an activity operating within a purely technical framework, but has become much more closely linked to the collective political processes on which international peace and security ultimately rest. Consequently, its importance has increased in the overall context of United Nations activities. The United Nations is now dealing, in fact, with political issues on a broader scale and at a higher level than ever before.

Thus, the fact that East and West finally share common political objectives and that ideology no longer drives them apart has had very important consequences for disarmament. While during the years of the cold war disarmament meant in practice the management of the arms race so as to avoid its spinning out of control, since the late 1980s some real and highly significant measures of disarmament have been achieved.

Some of these measures are global, either because they remove a global threat, as in the case of the two START Treaties, or because, through universal adherence, they can provide the means of eliminating an existing threat from anywhere in the world, as in the case of the chemical weapons Convention. Other measures are regional. It is to be noted that the settlement of issues within their regional context in such a way as to take into account the particular characteristics and needs of each region and thereby foster stability and security within the area is increasingly viewed as an effective way for States to contribute to the general arms limitation and disarmament process. To this end, the regional approach should deal with the root causes of conflict, should have resort to preventive diplomacy and all other possible ways of promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and should ensure that the peacemaking process is accompanied by concrete measures for the reduction of armaments.

Three basic post-cold war documents

These broad world trends were reflected and analysed in three basic documents of 1992, which are likely to provide guidance in matters of international security and disarmament for years to come: the statement adopted by the Security Council at its Summit Meeting held on

31 January;¹ the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, known as *An Agenda for Peace*;² and the subsequent report of the Secretary-General on *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*.³ These documents may be viewed as complementary because, as the Secretary-General has stated, the time has come for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda.⁴ The three together provide, for the first time since 1978, when the General Assembly adopted the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, a comprehensive statement on the strengthening of international peace and security and the contribution that arms limitation and disarmament can make to the achievement of that goal.

The meeting of the Security Council of 31 January, at the level of Heads of State and Government, has been greeted from many sides as an unprecedented, historic event. The statement that the Council adopted on that occasion is equally significant because it embodies a solemn recommitment, at the highest political level, to the purposes and principles of the Charter. Indeed, the statement gives concrete expression to the hope of mankind for a safer, more equitable and more humane world and for the achievement, on the basis of the principle of collective security, of the purposes set out in the Charter. In this connection, it recognizes that the international community faces new challenges in its search for peace.

The momentous changes since the end of the 1980s, the Council noted in its statement, have brought new risks for stability and security, and some of the most acute problems are resulting from the weakening of State structures. Non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have also become threats to peace and security.

¹ S/23500.

² A/47/277-S/24111 (issued also as a United Nations publication under the symbol DPI/1247).

³ A/C.1/47/7 (subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8, and hereinafter referred to as *New Dimensions*).

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

The members of the Council further recognized "the crucial contribution" which progress in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and security and expressed their commitment "to take concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in these areas".

In particular, the members of the Council emphasized the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction; to avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of arms; and to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems concerning those matters threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability. They emphasized the importance of the early ratification and implementation by the States concerned of all international and regional arms control arrangements, especially the START and CFE Treaties.

As to the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, the members of the Council committed themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for, or production of, such weapons and to taking appropriate action to that end. Specifically on nuclear proliferation, they noted the importance of the decision of a very large number of countries to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and emphasized the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. The members of the Council would take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by IAEA.

On that same occasion, the members of the Council invited the Secretary-General to prepare, for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July, an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and peace-keeping".

The report of the Secretary-General on this subject, given the terms of the Council's mandate, does not deal directly with the question of disarmament. In it the Secretary-General recognized, however, that post-conflict peace-building may require concrete disarmament measures. In his words, peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts

to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

In his subsequent report *New Dimensions*, the Secretary-General once again took up this subject and reaffirmed that the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace-building could be supported and strengthened by concrete measures of arms regulation and disarmament. Indeed, the integration of weapons-control features into United Nations-brokered settlements could contribute enormously to peace-building activities in countries long plagued by civil strife.

It can be seen from these statements that the report of the Secretary-General is based on the concept that disarmament constitutes an integral part of international efforts to strengthen peace and security, that is, that it should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour which is designed to safeguard the security of all nations. In this connection, the report, while acknowledging that there is a real opportunity to initiate a process of global disarmament, recognizes that there is still much ground to be covered. In the words of the Secretary-General, the world remains a place where the shadows of the weaponry of mass destruction still loom large; the threat of weapons proliferation—be it nuclear, chemical or conventional—still exists; the trade in weapons, after a brief pause, is still growing; and military expenditures in many parts of the world are still excessive in relation to current human needs. Hence the need to address the disarmament problem promptly, flexibly and efficiently, always keeping in sight the links which exist between disarmament and arms regulation, on the one hand, and the political processes that shape international peace and security, on the other. These connections are crucial to progress both in the field of disarmament and in the creation of a new system of international security, a system, that is, based on the principle of “integration”.

The report also emphasizes the need to enhance the multilateral approach, so as to promote the "globalization" of the disarmament process. The goal is to extend disarmament efforts to include not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral agreements in a world-wide process involving all States. The argument advanced by some States that the major military Powers should disarm first is too often used to avoid practical disarmament measures and is no longer valid. Such measures can be safely implemented on different levels—global, regional and subregional.

Finally, progress in the disarmament field must also be sought by building on past achievements ("revitalization"). There are in existence numerous global multilateral and regional multilateral agreements, and equally numerous bilateral agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation, which cover a wide range of issues, from weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons to confidence-building measures. This, the report stresses, provides a solid foundation to build upon, now that the conditions in the field of disarmament have been enhanced.

This is the case, in particular, of the non-proliferation Treaty, which continues to provide an indispensable framework for global non-proliferation efforts. The wide adherence to the Treaty, now including the five nuclear-weapon States, emphasizes its fundamental validity. All States should adhere to the Treaty, the Secretary-General stated in his report, and when the Treaty comes up for extension in 1995, "it should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally".⁵ Over the longer term, it might be possible to achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control, not only of weapons but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies. To be fully effective, controls must be balanced and fair; they must not unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology; and they should not divide the world into the invidious categories of "haves" and "have-nots".

The report also deals with peace enforcement—a domain of conflict resolution in which the use of disarmament measures might be required. Such use is quite distinct from the process of disarmament

⁵ A/C.1/47/7, para. 28.

through negotiation, as regulated by Articles 11, 26 and 47 of the Charter.

Peace enforcement is regulated by Chapter VII of the Charter. Under Article 42, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. While such action should be taken only when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security.

In the case of Iraq, following action by military force under Article 42, disarmament and inspection procedures are playing a concrete role in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). In this connection, the Secretary-General wrote in his report: "I fervently hope that the global community will not have to face again the circumstances of war as recently experienced in the Persian Gulf region. But let us resolve that, in the face of grave violations of disarmament agreements, or of other threats to peace, this Organization will be ready to act in accordance with its responsibilities under its Charter".⁶

Disarmament in the field of weapons of mass destruction

In 1992, the Conference on Disarmament completed, after two decades of effort, the text of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, a landmark agreement built on the principle of overall balance, which provides for a cooperative, non-discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate all means of chemical warfare.

The Convention, which is the product of sustained and intense work by the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, has a number of features that make it an outstanding achievement: it is the result of genuinely multilateral negotiations; it is designed to ensure the elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world; and it provides for unprecedented verification procedures, which are likely to facilitate the development of any future verification system.

The scope of the Convention is also unprecedented. It provides, in fact, for the complete prohibition of an entire category of weapons

⁶ A/C.1/47/7, para. 13.

of mass destruction, which exist in large quantities, are believed to be possessed by some two score countries and could be easily produced by many more, and have, in several cases, been used in combat. The outlawing of only the use of chemical weapons, as provided by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, has proved to be an inadequate measure. Indeed, experience has shown that as long as chemical weapons are developed, produced and stockpiled, there is a risk that they will be used.

The Convention will ban chemical weapons and ensure the destruction of declared stocks under a comprehensive verification regime allowing for on-site inspections, by a new international organization, of any facility suspected of non-compliance. The regime has been carefully constructed to reconcile the objective of ensuring compliance with that of non-interference in the legitimate activities of the chemical industry.

The General Assembly, to which the Convention was submitted as adopted by the Conference on Disarmament, unanimously commended the Convention; requested the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993; and called upon all States to become parties to the Convention at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into force and to the early achievement of universal adherence. The Assembly also called upon all States to ensure the effective implementation of "this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a basis for international peace and security".

Several States have expressed reservations on some aspects of the Convention. However, given the fact that the Convention constitutes a first collective step towards the eradication of weapons of mass destruction, it is hoped that it will enjoy universal adherence.

In the nuclear field, the negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation gained new momentum in 1992. First, on 1 October, the United States Senate consented to ratification of the START I Treaty. On 4 November, the Russian Parliament overwhelmingly also approved the Treaty, with the proviso that the formalities of ratification would not be completed until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had joined the non-proliferation Treaty and the Russian Federation had reached accords with them on all aspects of their nuclear forces. According to the Protocol to the START Treaty, signed in Lisbon on

23 May,⁷ the four States agreed that as successor States of the former USSR in connection with the Treaty, they shall assume the obligations of the former USSR under the Treaty; shall make such arrangements among themselves as required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; and will allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout their respective territories. In addition, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine shall adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the shortest possible time. The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification between all five parties.

Secondly, agreement in principle was reached on 16 June, at the Washington summit meeting between President Bush and President Yeltsin, on further far-reaching reductions in strategic arms by the United States and the Russian Federation. By the end of 1992, a draft treaty—START II—was ready for signature by the two Powers,⁸ calling for the most radical reductions yet in the cold-war nuclear arsenals.

Another very significant development affecting the process of nuclear disarmament took place on 24 September, when the Congress of the United States, in a bipartisan vote, for the first time imposed limitations on nuclear testing and called for the negotiation of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear-test ban by the United States, to be concluded on or before 30 September 1996. By the end of 1992 the main question appeared to be how to create a sufficient sense of urgency to ensure that negotiations on a comprehensive ban would begin at an early date, in earnest, and how to ensure a moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States while negotiations were taking place.

The issue of non-proliferation

“The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” The members of the Security Council, in their statement of 31 January, commented on non-proliferation in these words. As noted above, they committed themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for, or pro-

⁷ The Protocol was signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in appendix II to this volume.

⁸ It was actually signed in Moscow on 3 January 1993.

duction of, such weapons and to taking appropriate action to that end. In fact, on 29 May, the five permanent members of the Security Council adopted Interim Guidelines related to weapons of mass destruction, committing themselves to work together to increase the effectiveness of export controls in the areas of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In the context of these Guidelines, the five Powers also recalled the announcement made by each of them of its commitment to or support for the Missile Technology Control Regime.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report *New Dimensions*, stressed for his part that, at a moment when substantial disarmament was finally beginning to take place, there could be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction, a view which was widely shared by States. The question, he held, was how to turn the logic of non-proliferation into concerted action. Undoubtedly, the non-proliferation Treaty should continue to provide an indispensable framework for global non-proliferation efforts.

Meanwhile, preparations for the 1995 extension conference of the non-proliferation Treaty have begun. On 9 December, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 47/52 A, by which it took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty to form a preparatory committee for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide on its extension.

It is to be hoped that within the next few years further progress will be made in the disarmament process. Nothing can contribute more effectively to the achievement of non-proliferation than the conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements, to be carried out under appropriate measures of international control.

Thus, the chemical weapons Convention, the conclusion of which was finally achieved in 1992, is above all a global non-proliferation measure of the highest significance. By it, the members of the international community have once again recognized the need to reconcile the demands of national security with the interests of general security.

Transparency in armaments

It is generally accepted that transparency reinforces support for international non-proliferation regimes. That is, the sharing of information about military matters enhances confidence, predictability, restraint and, as a result, stability. Hence, transparency can be a basis for verifiable arms limitation and reduction.

The United Nations is actually addressing the opportunities existing in this field, in the post-cold war environment. In 1991 the General Assembly established a Register of Conventional Arms with a view to preventing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, while at the same time recognizing the legitimate security concerns of Member States. The Security Council, at its Summit Meeting of 31 January, underscored the importance of the provision by all States of all the information requested by the General Assembly. By resolution 47/52 L of 15 December, the General Assembly declared its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register.

Given complete implementation and universal participation, the Register could become, through progressive expansion, a far-reaching international arms control mechanism, creating unprecedented transparency in both the international arms trade and national production. Undoubtedly there is a great need to make military behaviour more predictable and to reassure concerned States about the intentions of their neighbours. Thus openness and transparency are crucially important as part of the process of building confidence. They can also be useful as early-warning instruments in the process of preventive diplomacy.

Regional disarmament

In addition to global measures of disarmament, there are measures which necessarily must be envisaged and carried out in a regional context, so as to take into account the characteristics and problems of particular regions and subregions. The approach usually required is that of dealing with the root causes of regional conflict, that is, engaging in a regional process of conflict-resolution. A major aspect of such a process is, of course, the reduction or elimination of weapons, to be accompanied by appropriate steps designed to strengthen the political, non-military aspects of security. Preventive diplomacy, peace-

making and peace-keeping provide important means for such a course of action.

In this connection, it is generally felt that there is increasing need for the international community to devote its attention to the question of the high level of conventional armaments existing in many regions and subregions and to the destabilizing effect that transfers of conventional weapons going beyond the legitimate security needs of States have on regional and subregional security. The events of the early 1990s and the rising of new ethnic forces with the end of the cold war have shown how urgent is the need for bilateral and regional agreements on the renunciation of the use of force in regional and subregional conflicts and for actual measures of arms reduction.

It is encouraging, therefore, to see growing interest among many States in developing regional approaches to arms limitation and confidence-building. This has led, in a number of instances in various parts of the world, to a widening of the scope of existing forums for multilateral discussion on security and cooperation, the exploration of new mechanisms for such dialogue, an intensification of high-level bilateral contacts between countries seeking to lessen tension over territorial disputes, and the development of frameworks for cooperation between former rivals that may serve as useful examples beyond the regions immediately concerned.

Disarmament at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly

The Secretary-General's report *New Dimensions*, and in particular the basic concepts of that document—integration, globalization and revitalization—received due consideration at the session. As a result of a preliminary exchange of views on the ideas and proposals contained in it, and in order to provide for a continued examination of the disarmament agenda in the new international climate, the First Committee decided to reconvene in March 1993.

A highlight of the 1992 session was the unanimous decision to commend the chemical weapons Convention for signature and, thereafter, ratification by all States. In spite of lingering reservations by some States on some of its provisions, a great number expressed or reiterated their intention to become original signatories to the Convention.

Nuclear disarmament measures continued to receive considerable attention. The beginning of the ratification process of START I by the United States and the Russian Federation and further far-reaching reductions of strategic nuclear weapons envisaged by them in START II were warmly welcomed. The commitments undertaken in the Lisbon Protocol by Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in connection with START I also found broad recognition. For the first time, a single draft resolution was adopted on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament. Even more significant was the fact that the draft was adopted without a vote.

On the specific question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban there was a very broad measure of agreement on what should be done, but once again short of consensus. In resolution 47/47, the General Assembly essentially urged the nuclear-weapon States to agree promptly to appropriate verifiable and militarily significant interim measures, with a view to facilitating the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, and it reaffirmed the responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of such a treaty.

As the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty is scheduled to begin in 1993, particular focus was directed to the aspect of nuclear non-proliferation. The fact that all five nuclear-weapon States are now parties to the Treaty—China and France acceded in the course of 1992—was regarded by many as of the utmost importance for the future of the Treaty.

Initiatives aimed at the promotion of regional measures on the whole gained in importance at the session. In addition to the traditional proposals, new developments found their due reflection in the debate. More specifically, the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, the efforts of the Latin American and Caribbean States to achieve the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the endorsement of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, and the establishment of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa received overwhelming support from Member States.

Confidence-building measures, transparency in armaments, and the transfer of technology also gained in importance. Their significance at the regional and subregional levels, especially as useful tools for facilitating non-proliferation efforts, was increasingly recognized.

Restraining the use of force

As is evident from the events described above, 1992 was a year of unprecedented achievements for arms limitation and disarmament, reflecting the broad trends of international politics at a time of global transition towards new solutions to security problems. Undoubtedly, such trends need to be further strengthened because the international community is faced with dangerous new challenges in its search for world order.

It is, therefore, necessary that the existing disarmament agreements be fully implemented and that the process of disarmament, at the regional as well as the global level, be further developed in earnest. The Security Council, at its historic meeting on 31 January, reaffirmed its commitment to deal with threats to the peace and to reverse acts of aggression in accordance with the collective security system of the Charter of the United Nations. Disarmament is, of course, an integral part of collective security. It is essential, therefore, to work with increasing determination for the establishment of an international order free from excessive national armaments and from the use of force.

As the Secretary-General wrote in the concluding paragraph of his report *New Dimensions*: "In today's world, societies can no longer afford to solve problems by the use of force. ... In international politics, one of the most important means of reducing violence in inter-State relations is disarmament. What is required of States is concerted efforts and broad participation."

P A R T O N E

Major trends and developments

CHAPTER I

Chemical weapons

Introduction

THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (biological) weapons date back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which banned the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare, and a separate declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899, which condemned the use of projectiles for the sole purpose of diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Despite these attempts, during the First World War the widespread use of chemical agents caused some 1,300,000 casualties, more than 100,000 of them fatal. Those tragic figures contributed to a new global awareness of the need to prevent chemical warfare and to the emergence of the basic instrument for its elimination, the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.¹ The Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare.²

While the Protocol makes the "use" of chemical or biological weapons illegal, it does not prohibit their development, production and stockpiling, a shortcoming that quickly led to the recognition of the need for a more comprehensive ban. Some 40 States, at the time of ratifying the Protocol, had made reservations to the effect that it would

¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare: League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming).

² As of 31 December 1992, 131 States were parties to the Protocol (see appendix I).

not be binding on them with regard to States that failed to respect its prohibitions. More recently, however, a considerable number of States have withdrawn their reservations.

Chemical and biological weapons were defined by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948 as weapons of mass destruction. The General Assembly adopted its first resolution on the question of chemical weapons in 1966.³ Subsequently the issue of chemical and biological warfare was taken up as a distinct subject by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) and its various successor bodies and in an expert report,⁴ as well as in proposals submitted by a number of Member States.⁵ In 1972, following the submission to the multilateral negotiating body of identical drafts on the prohibition of biological weapons by the Eastern European States, on the one hand, and by the United States, on the other, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was concluded.⁶

For several years the General Assembly has endeavoured to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons. In a series of resolutions,⁷ the first in 1980, it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts, to carry out impartial investigations of cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. Within the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict, experts assigned by the Secretary-

³ Resolution 2162 B (XXI).

⁴ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969* (DC/232), document ENDC/255/Rev.1; see also *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 16. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 104, document A/7655. See also CCD/361; CCD/420; CCD/512; CD/294; and CD/500.

⁶ General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

⁷ General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C of 1980, 39/96 C of 1981, 37/98 E of 1982, 38/187 C of 1983 and 42/37 C of 1987. The reports of the Secretary-General transmitting the reports of experts on particular cases are contained in documents A/36/613 and A/37/259, in response to the resolutions of 1980 and 1981.

General carried out investigations following reports that chemical weapons had been resorted to and concluded that such weapons had been used.⁸ Consequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 620 (1988), by which it condemned the use of chemical weapons and encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to allegations of use. In 1987 and 1988, as a derivation of these investigations and in conjunction with them, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to develop technical guidelines and devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of possible use and to compile lists of experts and laboratories, on the basis of information received from Member States, that could facilitate the investigations.⁹

From the beginning of the 1980s, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva was intensively engaged in the elaboration and conclusion of a convention providing for a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. However, progress in the negotiations was evident only in the late 1980s, when some *rapprochement* occurred with regard to those sensitive issues related to verification of implementation, in particular to on-site inspection on challenge. A conference to consider actions to reverse the "erosion" of the Geneva Protocol was held in Paris in 1989, which, in addition to reaffirming the authority of the Protocol, called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to conclude its negotiations.¹⁰ In September of that year, a conference in Australia affirmed the commitment of Governments and of the world's chemical industry to work together to promote conclusion of the Convention.

⁸ S/16433 (1984); S/17911 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2 (summary of 1985 and 1986); S/18852 and Corr.1 and Add.1 (1987); S/19823 and Corr.1 and Add.1, S/20060 and Add.1, S/20063 and Add. 1 and S/20134 (1988).

⁹ Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 1987, information was received from 21 Member States and transmitted to the Assembly in the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and biological weapons (A/43/690 and Add.1, and annexes). Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 43/74 A of 1988, a report of the Secretary-General was transmitted to the Assembly that contained an expert report on guidelines and procedures for the investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (annex I) and information received from 7 Member States (annex II) (A/44/561 and Add. 1-3).

¹⁰ The text of the Final Declaration is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol.14: 1989, chapter XI, annex I.

In 1991, the multilateral negotiations witnessed a qualitative change. The war in the Persian Gulf and the possibility that chemical weapons might be used added urgency to efforts to rid the world of such weapons. Long-held positions were reviewed and set aside, thereby opening up real opportunities for finalizing work on the Convention in 1992.

The multilateral negotiations were greatly influenced by the bilateral negotiations between the former Soviet Union and the United States, which resulted in 1990 in the signing of the Agreement on the Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons. In 1991, a major obstacle was removed with the commitment of the United States to destroy chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities—a position that was also shared by the Soviet Union—and formally to forswear the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances, including retaliation in kind against any State, as of the Convention's entry into force.¹¹

General developments and trends, 1992

In 1992, after a decade of long and painstaking negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, the negotiators adopted the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (for an outline of the main provisions, see page 29). Thereupon the General Assembly adopted without a vote a resolution commending the Convention, requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as depositary, to open it for signature on 13 January 1993 in Paris, and welcoming the invitation of the President of France to host the signing ceremony.

At the time of the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the Conference on Disarmament and later during the deliberations at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the overwhelming majority of delegations expressed their satis-

¹¹ For details on the historical background of the discussion and negotiations on the issue of chemical weapons at both the multilateral and the bilateral levels, see earlier editions of *The Yearbook*, in particular *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chapter XII. The text of the 1990 Agreement is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, appendix IV.

faction at the successful conclusion of the Convention and stressed the historic significance of that achievement for multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts. They also pointed out that while the draft Convention did not satisfy all concerns, it took into account the security interests of all States and constituted a first significant step in a collective endeavour to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. Hope was expressed that the Convention would become truly universal. Particular reference was made to its unparalleled verification regime and to the comprehensive scope of its prohibitions.

Throughout the year, the determination of States to conclude the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention was very evident. Responding to the progress in the negotiations and in an effort to build confidence, a number of States expressed readiness to withdraw their reservations to the Geneva Protocol. Moreover, declarations of intent to become original signatories to the Convention were made unilaterally and bilaterally and by regional arrangements.

In March, Australia submitted a draft of a model compromise convention¹² designed to identify areas of agreement and possible solutions to the issues that remained unresolved at that time. In presenting the proposal to the Conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia underlined that his delegation was not seeking to establish a parallel negotiating process, but rather an accelerated refinement of the text currently under negotiation. While the proposal did not try to solve specific problems, it provided a framework to facilitate negotiations in the final phase. The presentation of the draft contributed to a new awareness among negotiators that conclusion of the Convention was within reach, and thus to an intensification of the negotiations.

Further progress was also registered in the bilateral consultations between the Russian Federation and the United States with regard to the issue of chemical weapons. In their joint statement of June, they stressed their continuing commitment to the global elimination of chemical weapons. They underscored their support for the joint memorandum signed in Wyoming in 1989¹³ on phased confidence-building measures in the area of chemical weapons destruction, and agreed to implement the new, cooperative provisions for detailed data exchange and inspec-

¹² CD/1143.

¹³ CD/973.

tions included in it. They also agreed to update the bilateral chemical weapons destruction Agreement of 1990 and to bring it into force promptly.¹⁴ Furthermore, both States entered into a weapons destruction and non-proliferation Agreement which, *inter alia*, provides for assistance to the Russian Federation in achieving the following objectives: (a) the destruction of nuclear, chemical and other weapons; (b) the safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and (c) the establishment of additional verification measures against the proliferation of such weapons that pose a risk of proliferation.¹⁵ To accomplish those objectives with regard to chemical weapons, both States signed in July the Agreement on chemical weapons destruction.¹⁶ Its main objective is to assist the Russian Federation in the safe, secure, ecologically sound and expeditious destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with existing or future agreements between the two States.

With respect to the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the technological know-how for their production, particularly as regards chemical weapons, further initiatives were taken. In May, the five permanent members of the Security Council declared that they would observe and consult with each other on issues concerning the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As regards chemical weapons, they declared that they would consult upon the following Guidelines:

—Not assist, directly or indirectly, in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of chemical weapons by any recipient whatsoever.

—Not export equipment, materials, services, or technology which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that

¹⁴ See the Joint Statement on chemical weapons included with a number of other bilateral documents circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1162).

¹⁵ The Agreement concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, signed in Washington on 17 June, was included in document CD/1162.

¹⁶ The Agreement concerning the Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons, signed in Washington on 30 July (CD/1161).

such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of chemical weapons.¹⁷

The issue of export controls for chemical substances and equipment with a potential for use as chemical weapons has constituted a particularly difficult problem in the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. Developing States in particular have, on many occasions, requested that all control mechanisms, which in their view are discriminatory, be abolished for States parties to the Convention, specifically the export control regime established by the Australia Group. In an attempt to help address these concerns, the members of the Australia Group underlined, in a statement in August, their readiness "to review, in the light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention".¹⁸

To further regional understanding of the provisions of the chemical weapons Convention and to prepare for their effective implementation, a third seminar attended by countries of South-east Asia and the South Pacific was sponsored in June by Australia.¹⁹ Other States, too, have indicated interest in hosting similar seminars in their respective regions.

In a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, signed on 19 August, India and Pakistan expressed their commitment never under any circumstances to develop, produce or otherwise acquire chemical weapons; and never to use chemical weapons or to assist, encourage or induce anyone in any way to engage in the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of such weapons. Expressing the hope that the Convention under negotiation would ensure the security of all States and encourage the full utilization of achievements in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes, they reiterated their resolve to become original parties.

At the Tenth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in September in Jakarta, the participants

¹⁷ The text of the Guidelines is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992).

¹⁸ CD/1164.

¹⁹ CD/1157.

welcomed the global Convention and called for its speedy entry into force as a meaningful step forward towards the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in all regions and towards the shared objective of general and complete disarmament. They also called upon all developed countries to adopt measures promoting universal adherence to the Convention through the transfer of technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all existing unilateral, discriminatory and ad hoc restrictions.²⁰

Allegations of the use of chemical weapons were reported to the Secretary-General in January by Mozambique and in June by Azerbaijan. Consequently, the Secretary-General, under his own authority, nominated experts to carry out an investigation. In transmitting to the Security Council the report of the experts on the investigation in Mozambique,²¹ the Secretary-General noted that the experts had determined that Mozambican Government forces had sustained casualties not entirely explicable by the kind of weapons so far used in the conflict. From the material available to the experts, it was not possible to determine whether a chemical weapon had been used. In transmitting to the Security Council the report on the mission dispatched to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons in Azerbaijan,²² the Secretary-General noted that the experts had determined that no evidence of use of chemical weapons had been presented to them.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1992

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany, was established immediately at the beginning of the first part of the session with the clear mandate to continue and intensify, as a priority task, the negotiations on a multilateral Convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction with a view to achieving final agree-

²⁰ A/47/675-S/24816.

²¹ S/24065 (note by the Secretary-General), annex (report of the experts).

²² S/24344 (note by the Secretary-General), annex (report of the experts).

ment on the Convention during 1992.²³

Representatives from 45 States not members of the Conference participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.²⁴

The initial negotiating framework established by the Ad Hoc Committee was designed to concentrate work on the main outstanding issues. Thus a working group on verification in the chemical industry was established; other matters of importance, such as legal and organizational issues, the question of economic and technical development; technical issues; the question of old and abandoned chemical weapons; the seat of the Organization; and the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council were also the subject of intensive consultations conducted by Friends of the Chair. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee undertook negotiations on challenge inspection procedures. As negotiations progressed, the issue of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities was also specifically addressed. To advance the task of preparing for the final editing and drafting of the text of the Convention, an editing group was established as well.²⁵

Following the presentation of a draft convention by Australia in March (see above), the Chairman, upon the request of delegations, presented in May a working paper for the final phase of the negotiations. It contained the non-controversial elements of the rolling text in a reorganized and refined form as well as compromise solutions to the controversial issues, such as domestic riot control and law enforcement agents; prohibition of use of herbicides as a method of warfare; the content of the Schedules of Chemicals (the Schedules are lists of chemicals categorized according to the risk they pose to the objectives of the Convention);

²³ CD/1120.

²⁴ Austria, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

²⁵ Details of the working methods of the Ad Hoc Committee are contained in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly. See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27)*. The report of the Committee is reproduced in paragraphs. 73-74.

financing of the Organization and of its verification activities; old and abandoned chemical weapons; procedures for challenge inspection; verification in the chemical industry; and economic and technical cooperation, including the related problem of the transfer of chemicals listed in the Schedules to States not parties to the Convention. Not addressed at this stage were the proposal by the Russian Federation to convert chemical weapons production facilities to peaceful purposes instead of destroying them and the question of the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council. The draft compromise text submitted by the Chairman was generally well received by delegations. While accepting it as a basis for further work, a number of countries—primarily developing ones—felt that their views on some sensitive issues were not adequately reflected. They therefore submitted specific proposals to be incorporated in the final drafting.

Consequently, a new framework for the negotiations was developed, resulting in a considerable increase in the pace and intensity of work. At the end of the second part of the session, in June, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee presented a further revised text with a view to enabling delegations to finalize work on it by August, pointing out the areas where full or at least tentative agreement had been reached and those where, despite all efforts, consensus remained elusive. The main issues on which acceptable compromise solutions were yet to be found and for which he proposed formulations related to some specific aspects of the verification of the chemical industry, to challenge inspection procedures and to the promotion of economic and technological development. He stressed that the new draft would offer States parties a balanced legal instrument providing, on the one hand, clarity on the fundamental obligations and, on the other, enough subtlety on matters of implementation so that provisions might mature further and evolve in the course of future practice.

At the outset of the third part of the session, a great many delegations expressed their support of the draft presented by the Chairman. In their view, the text represented a reasonable compromise. Nevertheless, a group of developing countries still considered that, on some issues of particular concern to it, further negotiation was needed, and for this reason it presented amendments to the draft text. It believed that there should be further clarification of the definition of chemical weapons; that the use of riot control agents should be confined to domes-

tic law enforcement and riot control purposes; that the use of herbicides as a method of warfare should be prohibited; that any possible abuse of challenge inspection procedures should be prevented; and that existing restrictions on trade in the field of chemistry should be lifted for States parties. In addition, it was concerned over the time-limits for destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, over the possibility of converting the latter to peaceful uses, and over the costs of verification. While it soon became evident that most of the proposed amendments did not command consensus, the Chairman, in an attempt to balance opposing views and to enlarge the areas of consensus, presented a further revision. As a result, the membership of the Executive Council was enlarged by the provision of one additional seat for Africa, and the undertaking to lift restrictions on trade in the field of chemistry among States parties was reinforced by the commitment of the Australia Group, mentioned above, to review its policy. Also included were provisions on the application of a strict export control regime for the transfer of certain chemicals to States not parties to the Convention. When presenting the further revised and edited draft Convention to the Ad Hoc Committee on 19 August, the Chairman expressed his views on the text's overall balance, which are reflected in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and which he reiterated in similar terms in the Conference itself (see below).

At the final meeting of the Committee, the draft Convention met with the support of most delegations, who were of the view that, being a compromise text, it did not necessarily satisfy the negotiating positions of each delegation, but represented a delicate equilibrium balancing many interests. They also underlined the importance of the draft Convention as the first multilateral agreement with an unprecedented verification regime comprehensively banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Although delegations that had presented amendments to the draft text during the final stages of negotiations continued to believe that their concerns (see summary above) were not adequately reflected in the text, the meeting concluded with an agreement to transmit the Committee's report, containing in the appendix the draft Convention and the text on the establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration. The report also incorporated state-

ments of members on their positions regarding the Convention as a whole and on specific provisions.

On 3 September, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. It agreed by consensus to transmit the draft Convention to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. On that occasion, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee stressed that the unique character of the Convention was underlined by the consistent application of two principles: overall balance and adaptability to future needs. He outlined the following key components of the balance:

1. The comprehensive scope of general obligations in article I, which, in an absolutely non-discriminatory way, bans all conceivable actions in contravention of the object and purpose of the treaty and stipulates the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities;

2. The built-in safeguards to deal with situations where the basic obligations had not been respected, in particular article X (Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons) and article XII (Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, including Sanctions);

3. The very clear and unambiguous provisions on the destruction, including its verification, of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities as elaborated in articles IV and V in conjunction with parts IV and V of the Verification Annex;

4. The extremely delicate and equitable balance which has been established in article VIII in the provisions on the Executive Council, its composition, procedure, decision-making, powers and functions;

5. The general verification package beyond the specific provisions for verification of destruction, which consists of challenge inspections in article IX and part X of the Verification Annex and routine verification in chemical industry (article VI and parts VII to IX of the Verification Annex). The political instrument of challenge inspections reconciles the diverging objectives of maximum assurance against non-compliance, protection of the inspected States parties' sovereign rights, and the prevention of abuse. Routine verification in industry balances the objectives of reliable confidence-building, simplicity of administration, and non-interference with perfectly legitimate activities in chemical industry;

6. The evolutionary concept for economic and technological development as contained in article XI and highlighted in the preamble, in conjunction with the equally evolving confidence-building regime of verification in chemical industry, opens the door to expanded international trade and economic cooperation in the chemical sector.

The Chairman emphasized that the result of the collective effort of the Committee spoke for itself. There was "no precedent for this global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement. The chemical weapons Convention provides for a cooperative, non-discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate the spectre of chemical warfare once and for all."

The main provisions of the Convention and its Annexes²⁶

The Convention consists of the preamble, 24 articles and three annexes: Annex on Chemicals, Annex on Implementation and Verification (Verification Annex) and Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (Confidentiality Annex). The annexes form an integral part of the Convention. The Convention, which will be of unlimited duration, will enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is the depositary of the Convention.

To adequately prepare for the effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention, a Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be established.²⁷

The *preamble* of the Convention expresses the determination of States parties to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and recalls the multilateral instruments pertinent to the Convention: the Geneva Protocol and the biological weapons Convention. Furthermore, to address concerns regarding the possible use of herbicides as a method of warfare, the States parties recognize "the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent

²⁶ This outline of the main provisions of the Convention draws upon elements in the articles themselves and upon pertinent sections of the annexes. For the full text of the Convention, see *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (forthcoming).

²⁷ For the text on the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27)*, appendix I, p. 276.

agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare".²⁸

Article I (General Obligations) incorporates the basic undertakings of States parties. Each State party undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer them, directly or indirectly, to anyone; to use chemical weapons; to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; or to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention. Each State party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons and such production facilities as it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as all chemical weapons it has abandoned on the territory of another State party. Each State party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.

The definitions in *article II* (Definitions and Criteria) make clear that the ban envisaged in article I extends not only to chemical warfare agents, but also to the means of delivery and other devices specifically designed for the use of chemical weapons. Article II defines "chemical weapons", "toxic chemicals", "precursor", "key components of binary or multicomponent chemical systems", "old chemical weapons", "abandoned chemical weapons", "riot control agents", "chemical weapons production facility", and "production capacity".

Under *article III* (Declarations), each State party shall submit to the Organization, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, detailed declarations with respect to chemical weapons, to old and abandoned chemical weapons, and to chemical weapons production facilities, specifying their precise location and quantity, and providing a general plan for their destruction. Declarations are also required with respect to other facilities and to riot control agents.

²⁸ One of the agreements to which this preambular paragraph refers is the ENMOD Convention. At the Second Review Conference of that Convention, held in 1992, the understanding was confirmed that the military or other hostile use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party is a method of warfare prohibited by article I if such use upsets the ecological balance of a region. (See chapter IX, pages 223 and 244.)

Article IV (Chemical Weapons) and *article V* (Chemical Weapons Production Facilities), in conjunction with parts IV and V of the Verification Annex, contain detailed provisions governing the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, including verification. Each State party will have to complete destruction not later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention. If, for technological, financial, ecological or other reasons, a State party is not in a position to meet this deadline, the Convention provides for the possibility of extending the time-frame by up to five years. Furthermore, in exceptional cases of compelling need, article V permits States parties to convert to peaceful uses, rather than to destroy, chemical weapons production facilities, but only under strict conditions preventing possible re-conversion. In both cases rigorous additional verification measures would be applied.

Under articles IV and V, on-site inspections at chemical weapons storage sites and chemical weapons production sites as well as the monitoring of chemical weapons production sites would be carried out as follows:

Where a State party has declared an existing chemical weapons stockpile, inspectors shall carry out on-site inspections at the storage site in order to ascertain that the stocks held are in accordance with the declared data.

All chemical weapons production must cease once the Convention enters into force for a State party. Inspectors will seal the equipment and, until destruction of the facility is completed, shall be permitted to visit the site up to four times a year. A chemical weapons production site may also be temporarily converted to a chemical weapons destruction facility or permanently converted to peaceful uses.

Before operation begins at a chemical weapons destruction facility, the Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial visit to the site to familiarize itself with it. Once operation begins, provision must be made at the facility to allow for continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and the physical presence of inspectors. The destruction facility must be appropriately designed. Destruction of chemical weapons by dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning is prohibited.

Article VI (Activities Not Prohibited under This Convention), in conjunction with parts VI to IX of the Verification Annex, sets forth a comprehensive and graduated routine regime for international monitoring through declarations and on-site inspections, in particular in the chemical industry. The forms of inspection relate to each of the Schedules

of Chemicals (see Annex on Chemicals, page 34) as well as to other chemical production facilities deemed relevant to the Convention.

Facilities producing small amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals for certain approved purposes, such as protective or medical research, shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, that is, the most stringent verification measures. Very strict rules will be applied to the transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals between States parties.

Industrial facilities handling chemicals listed in Schedules 2 and 3 are subject to progressively less stringent measures. Accordingly, facilities handling Schedule 2 chemicals shall be inspected to ensure that no Schedule 1 chemical is being produced and that Schedule 2 chemicals are not being diverted for activities prohibited under the Convention. Three years after entry into force of the Convention, Schedule 2 chemicals shall be traded only between States parties. In the interim period, special provisions apply in cases of trade between States parties and non-parties; in such cases, the State party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals shall be used only for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Facilities handling Schedule 3 chemicals shall be randomly selected for inspection, with a limit to the number of inspections each State party must accept. Schedule 3 chemicals shall be traded only under certain conditions between States parties and non-parties; in such cases, the State party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals shall be used only for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Five years after the Convention's entry into force, the Conference of the States Parties shall consider the need to establish other measures regarding such transfers.

Other declared large-scale chemical production facilities fall under limited reporting and conditional verification requirements or may be randomly selected for inspection, with a limit on the number of inspections each State party must accept. Implementation of the verification provisions for those facilities shall start, however, only at the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of the Convention, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the States Parties.

Article VII (National Implementation Measures) relates to the undertaking of States parties to ensure national implementation of the Convention. This includes the designation or establishment of a National Authority

to serve as the focal point for effective liaison with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Article VIII (The Organization) establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with its Headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands. It will comprise a number of organs: a *Conference of the States Parties*, which shall be the principal decision-making body and is expected to meet annually. The *Executive Council*, with a membership of 41 States parties representing five regional groups, will be the executive organ of the Organization and responsible for supervising its activities. The *Technical Secretariat*, headed by a Director-General, will conduct the practical work of the Organization. The principal component of the Secretariat will be its inspectorate, responsible for carrying out the verification provisions of the Convention.

Article IX (Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding), in conjunction with part X of the Verification Annex, provides for short-notice challenge inspections. A State party may request a challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory of another State party for the purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance. The inspected State party must permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the inspection and is obliged to grant the inspection team access. However, provisions are built in that allow an inspected State party to protect activities and installations which it considers unrelated to the inspection request from undue intrusion. The challenge inspection regime constitutes a novelty in the verification of a universally applicable arms control and disarmament treaty. Furthermore, it constitutes a politically sensitive concept which balances carefully the verification interests of both a State party and the international community and the interests of the inspected State party to protect sensitive information not related to the Convention. It also balances the rights of national sovereignty and the rights of the community of States parties as represented by the Executive Council and executed by the Technical Secretariat.

Under *article X* (Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons), States parties have the right to request and receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. The article obliges parties to provide assistance through the Organization by the election of one or more of the following measures: contribution to the voluntary fund to be established by the Conference of the States

Parties; conclusion of agreements with the Organization for procurement of assistance in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons against a State party; and declaration of the kind of assistance to be provided in emergencies.

Article XI (Economic and Technological Development) aims at promoting expanded international trade, economic cooperation and technological development in the field of chemistry. It encourages the progressive removal of existing restrictions, evolving in parallel with the implementation of verification of the chemical industry.

Article XII (Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, including Sanctions) provides the means to remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of the Convention. A State party deemed not to be in full compliance with the Convention may be required to take remedial action, and in the event it fails to do so, would be subject to a number of penalties, including sanctions. Cases of particular gravity could be referred to the Security Council for any further, possibly mandatory, action under the Charter of the United Nations.

The remaining 12 articles of the Convention deal with: its relation to other international agreements; settlement of disputes; amendments; duration and withdrawal; status of the annexes; signature; ratification; accession; entry into force; reservations; depositary; and authentic texts.

The *Annex on Chemicals* contains the Schedules of Chemicals and the Guidelines for those Schedules. The Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the relevant parts of the Verification Annex. The level of control over any individual chemical relates to the level of risk it poses to the object and purpose of the Convention and to the peaceful use of the chemical. According to the Annex:

Schedule 1 chemicals have been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon as defined in article II. They pose a high risk to the object and purpose of the Convention by virtue of their high potential for use in activities prohibited under the Convention because one or more of the following conditions are met: they possess a chemical structure closely related to that of other toxic chemicals under this Schedule; they possess such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as would enable them to be used as chemical weapons; or they may be used as a precursor in the final single technological stage of production of a toxic chemical listed in this Schedule. They have little or no use for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

Schedule 2 chemicals have toxicities that could enable them to be used as chemical weapons, or are immediate precursors to such a chemical or precursors to a *Schedule 1* chemical; they pose a significant risk to the object and purpose of the Convention and are not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

Schedule 3. The following criteria are taken into account in considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor, not listed in other Schedules, should be included in *Schedule 3*: it has been produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon; it possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as would enable it to be used as a chemical weapon; it poses otherwise a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention. Chemicals in this *Schedule* may be produced in large quantities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

The *Verification Annex* consists of 11 parts, most of which refer to the specific verification procedures envisaged for the destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities, routine inspection in the chemical industry and challenge inspections. In addition, it also contains specific measures for investigation in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons.

The *Confidentiality Annex* stipulates the general principles for the handling of confidential information, the employment and conduct of personnel in the Technical Secretariat, measures to protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential data in the course of on-site verification activities, and procedures in case of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

On 7 October, a draft resolution, sponsored in its final form by 145 States²⁹ and entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

²⁹ Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, ./.

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction"; was submitted to the First Committee.

In introducing the draft Convention itself, the representative of Germany, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and later in introducing the relevant draft resolution, underlined that the Convention provided for a cooperative, non-discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate the spectre of chemical warfare once and for all, and that universal adherence to it would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and improve the security of all States. It also urged all delegations to weigh carefully the benefits of joining and the costs of not joining the Convention, stressing that all States, whatever the particular circumstances in their specific region, could only gain by making the Convention a success—gain in terms of building confidence, increasing their security, and enhancing economic opportunity. Germany was convinced that implementation of the Convention would be a means of enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a basis for international peace and security.

The draft text underwent a number of revisions. The seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs, which had originally read:

Convinced that the Convention will improve the security of all States, and therefore merits the strong support of the international community,

Convinced further that the Convention will promote expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in the chemical sector and thereby advance the economic interests of States parties,

Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire and Zambia.

were revised. New paragraphs were added (ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 5), and the actual date for the signing ceremony in Paris was inserted in the appropriate paragraphs.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee without a vote on 12 November. Qatar, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, while stressing their support for the objectives and purposes of the Convention, viewed it in the context of the need to make the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. It elaborated the concerns of the Group, which were reiterated by Egypt at the time of the vote in the General Assembly (see below), and stated that their non-obstruction with respect to consensus should not be interpreted as participation.

Israel noted that its decision to be a sponsor of the draft resolution and to become an original signatory of the Convention was an expression of the importance it attached to the Convention. Israel hoped that all countries of the region would become parties and that the election mechanism for representation in the bodies to be set up under the Convention would guarantee the right of all members to be elected to them. It also stressed the need to prevent abuse in implementing the Convention. Israel hoped that the Convention would be instrumental in eradicating all chemical weapons from the Middle East.

China stated that the Convention, although not free of defects, enjoyed the wide support of the international community because it stood for the fundamentally correct purpose of the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. It hoped that the drawbacks in the Convention—for instance, excessive scope of verification of the chemical industry and undue emphasis on making challenge inspections extremely intrusive—would be resolved by constructive means, thus contributing to the Convention's universality and early realization of its objectives.

Pakistan stated that the future success of the Convention would have to be secured by an intelligent application of its provisions. An enormous burden would be put on the preparatory phase of the Convention, during which some of the outstanding issues would have to be resolved, implementation procedures would have to be worked out, and the temptation to succumb to extraneous considerations that might lead to an unbalanced allocation of seats in the decision-making organs of the Convention would have to be resisted.

On 30 November, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 47/39. On that occasion, Egypt, on behalf of the Group of Arab States, stated that if the draft resolution had been put to a vote, the Arab States would have abstained. Egypt reiterated the position of the Group that had been expressed in the First Committee, underlining the decision taken by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Arab States in September. The Arab States were prepared to address all positive proposals for disarmament which would lead to qualitative and quantitative parity in the military capabilities of all the States of the region and ensure security that would be applied on an equal footing to all States of the region without exception. They were in support of declaring the Middle East a region free of all weapons of mass destruction as the best means of ensuring security for all States of the region. They were prepared to deal with the draft Convention within the context of efforts to establish such a zone and to the extent that Israel responded to international calls to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. In view of the requirements of their national security and their common national interests, the Arab States could not deal with the Convention in isolation from other international efforts aimed at the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, such as the non-proliferation Treaty, the IAEA safeguards and inspection regime and the provision of credible international guarantees.

The United States stated that, by adopting the draft resolution without a vote, the United Nations and all its Member States were sending to the world a positive message of overwhelming support for the chemical weapons Convention. It reaffirmed its commitment to be an original signatory to the Convention and urged all States Members of the United Nations to follow suit. As universal participation was the key to the success and viability of the Convention, no Government should stand apart from the international community's efforts to abolish chemical weapons. It also stressed that only by signing the Convention at an early date could a State gain the right to participate in the Preparatory Commission and thereby play a role in the development of the Convention's operating procedures.

The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 47/39

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

Recalling in particular its resolution 46/35 C of 6 December 1991, in which the Assembly strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of the highest priority, to resolve outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction during its 1992 session,

Bearing in mind the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them,

Determined to make progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of these inhumane weapons,

Welcoming the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and contained in its report dated 3 September 1992, the result of many years of intensive negotiations, which constitutes an historic achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament,

Also convinced that the Convention, particularly as adherence to it approaches universality, will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and improve the security of all States, and that it therefore merits the strong support of the entire international community,

Further convinced that the implementation of the Convention should promote expanded international trade, technological development and economic

cooperation in the chemical sector, in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States parties,

Determined to ensure the efficient and cost-effective implementation of the Convention,

Recalling the support for the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed in the declaration by representatives of the world's chemical industry at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held at Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989,

Bearing in mind the relevant references to the Convention in the final documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,

Welcoming the invitation of the President of the French Republic to participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January 1993,

1. *Commends* the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993;

3. *Calls upon* all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into force and to the early achievement of universal adherence;

4. *Also calls upon* all States to ensure the effective implementation of this unprecedented, global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a basis for international peace and security;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be requested by the signatory States to initiate the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the status of signatures and ratifications of the Convention.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction truly marks an historic achievement in multilateral arms limitation and disarmament efforts. It is the first disarmament

agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Its scope, the obligations assumed by States parties and the system of verification envisaged for its implementation are unprecedented. This breakthrough in the process of disarmament is a sign of a definite evolution—a clearly favourable evolution—of the international situation.

The breadth of sponsorship of the resolution commending the Convention—145 Member States—is unparalleled in the history of disarmament negotiations.

In fact, during the ceremony held from 13 to 15 January 1993 in Paris, some 130 States signed the Convention. Its success will depend, to a large extent, on the degree of adherence that it attains. With the opening for signature, the next stage begins. The implementation of the Convention will require the same degree of perseverance and resourcefulness as did its negotiation. The Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, established in The Hague, will prepare the necessary ground for smooth and effective implementation.

CHAPTER II

Non-proliferation

Introduction

EFFORTS TO CURB THE PROLIFERATION of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have been made, in parallel with disarmament efforts, since 1945. It has been said that the best way of preventing the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would be through their complete destruction and their elimination from the arsenals of States. However, faced with difficulties in its efforts to reach the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts, namely general and complete disarmament, the international community has undertaken a number of measures to prevent the spread of various categories of weapons and weapons systems, together with measures to achieve their reduction and elimination. These efforts have led to the establishment of a number of control regimes with regard to different categories of weapons.

In the nuclear field, the major breakthrough was made with the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹ commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, which entered into force on 5 March 1970. On the basis of the Treaty, a global non-proliferation regime has been established, supported by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities. Under article VIII of the Treaty, four conferences have

¹ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex; the text is also reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*).

been held to review its operation: in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990.² Under article X, a conference is to be held 25 years after the Treaty's entry into force to decide whether it shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

By 31 December 1992, 155 States were parties to the Treaty, including, for the first time, all five nuclear-weapon States. However, following the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991, the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation (which has been accepted as the successor State of the former Soviet Union in regard to the non-proliferation Treaty), Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The last three States have pledged that they will become parties to the Treaty, and thus non-nuclear-weapon States.

In addition, several other States not parties to the Treaty, among them Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel and Pakistan, have extensive nuclear programmes and facilities, the great majority of them, however, subject to non-treaty safeguards agreements with IAEA and with States supplying them with materials and technology. The Minister of External Affairs of India announced on 21 May 1974,³ after his country carried out a nuclear explosion, that it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons and that, in performing its peaceful scientific test, it had not violated any international obligations; India has reaffirmed that position several times.

Since the very beginning of its operation, the Treaty has been criticized because it provides for two categories of parties—nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States—each with specific obligations. The most difficult area of operation, as demonstrated at the four Review Conferences held so far, relates to differences in the assessment of the implementation of article VI, which calls for negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and especially the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Two other questions—security assur-

² For a full discussion of the non-proliferation regime, an outline of the main provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, and an account of the first three Review Conferences, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 14: 1989, chapter VII. For an account of the Fourth Review Conference, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chapter VII.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/425.

ances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the adequacy of technical and other assistance to them for research, development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—have also given rise to different views.

As the question of security assurances was not resolved by the Treaty itself, the Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968) on 9 June 1968, by which it welcomed the expressed intention of certain States, particularly the three nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Council and parties to the Treaty, to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that was a victim of an act or a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons. In addition, all nuclear-weapon States have made unilateral declarations giving assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them; however, only that of China is considered unconditional. The question of security assurances has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and its relevant subsidiary body since 1979, and the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions on the subject.

At the regional level, there are two nuclear non-proliferation regimes: one established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the other in the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga (see chapter V). As far as security assurances are concerned, in these two cases they have been incorporated in internationally binding legal instruments, namely, Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁴ and Protocol 2 to the Treaty of Rarotonga.⁵ In these instances, the assurances benefit the non-nuclear-weapon States in the respective regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, on the one hand, and the South Pacific, on the other. Not all nuclear-weapon States have ratified the Protocols to the Treaty

⁴ The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is registered with the United Nations (*Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068). For the status of adherence to the Treaty as of 31 December 1992, see appendix I of this volume. The text of the Treaty and its Protocols is reproduced in *Status*.

⁵ The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) is registered with the United Nations (Treaty No. 24592). For the status of adherence to the Treaty as of 31 December 1992, see appendix I. The text of the Treaty and its Protocols is reproduced in *Status* and in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

of Rarotonga, however, and some of them have done so with reservations.

The growing concerns over the transfer of high technology for military purposes and of dual-use material have led to the establishment of a number of control regimes.

Since 1975, a number of nuclear-supplier States, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, have been meeting in London with a view to adopting common standards concerning safeguards and related controls associated with nuclear exports. In 1977, this Group, also known as the London Club, accepted export policy guidelines concerning so-called "sensitive technology" that would trigger the application of IAEA safeguards. The regime established by this Group of States has been further elaborated at their regular meetings.⁶

Besides the London Club, which was established to deal with questions arising from the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, seven developed countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) began negotiations in 1983 to limit the export of ballistic-missile technology, fearing the use of missiles to deliver nuclear weapons. The talks culminated in the establishment of the so-called Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1987 and in guidelines for limiting the export of ballistic missiles with a range of at least 300 kilometres and a payload of at least 500 kilograms, and related technology. In the meanwhile, the guidelines adopted have been extended to additional categories and the number of States participating in the MTCR has increased.⁷

The question of further proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and some of the shortcomings of the existing regimes

⁶ For details, see: *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, pp. 132-134. As of 31 December 1992, the following States were members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

⁷ In addition to the seven original members, the following States participate in the MTCR regime (as of 31 December 1992): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The following States, though not members, adhere to the guidelines: Argentina, China (commitment conditional), Israel and Russian Federation.

were highlighted by the war in the Persian Gulf (for details, see chapter X, below). The proliferation aspect of chemical weapons was dealt with in the negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons and at special conferences, such as the Paris and Canberra Conferences; it has been kept under review by the Australia Group,⁸ which initiated informal consultations among producers on harmonizing export control policies in the absence of a global agreement on this subject. The strengthening of the verification mechanism of the biological weapons Convention was discussed at the Second and Third Review Conferences, and the confidence-building measures adopted subsequently are intended to diminish the risk of proliferation of biological weapons and components for their production.

As far as conventional weapons are concerned, it is expected that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1991, will, by increasing transparency and openness in military arsenals of States, contribute to curbing the conventional arms race and especially the export and import of weapons in regions of tension, and to reducing the likelihood of illicit traffic in weapons and weapons systems. (For details see chapter IV, below.)

General developments and trends, 1992

The question of non-proliferation was one of the most prominent questions in the debate on disarmament issues in 1992 at bilateral, regional and global levels.

At the first meeting of the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, held on 31 January, concerns were voiced regarding the danger of further proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as of conventional weapons, and the danger of the spread of military technology. Those concerns found expression in a statement made by the President of the Security Council on that occasion on behalf of the members of the Council in connection with the item entitled "The responsibility of the Security Council in

⁸ The following States are members of the Australia Group: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

the maintenance of international peace and security".⁹ After underlining the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament, and to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction, the statement stressed, *inter alia*, that:

The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.

On nuclear proliferation, they note the importance of the decision of many countries to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and emphasize the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. The members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA.

The question of proliferation was also addressed by the Secretary-General in his report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, in which he stated:

Current international trends should help immeasurably in achieving a priority which is of growing importance to the global community—the non-proliferation of weapons. At a moment when substantial disarmament is finally beginning to occur, there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction. This judgement, I believe, is widely shared by States. ... The question is how to turn the logic of non-proliferation into concerted action.

In the nuclear realm, the non-proliferation Treaty continues to provide an indispensable framework for our global non-proliferation efforts. All of us know all too well that the Treaty has its contentious aspects. And yet the broad adherence, which now includes all the nuclear-weapon States, emphasizes its fundamental validity. It is clear, however, that verification and safeguards arrangements for the Treaty need to be strengthened. When the Treaty itself comes up for extension in 1995, it should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. *All States should adhere to the Treaty.*

Over the longer term, it is my hope that we may achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control, not only of weapons but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies. To be fully effective, such controls must be balanced and fair; they must not

⁹ S/PV.3046.

unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology; and they should not divide the world into the invidious categories of "haves" and "have-nots".¹⁰

In addition, the Secretary-General supported a greater role and involvement of the Security Council in disarmament matters, and in particular, the enforcement of non-proliferation.¹¹

On 29 May, the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed upon Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction.¹² After reaffirming their commitments from the previous meetings in Paris and London, they undertook not to assist in the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear-weapon State; to notify IAEA of the export to a non-nuclear-weapon State of any nuclear materials and to place them under IAEA safeguards; to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, equipment or facilities; not to assist in the development or acquisition of chemical weapons by any recipient whatsoever, or to export material and technology that could be used for the manufacturing of chemical weapons, and similar restrictions concerning biological weapons. In addition, they agreed on some other restrictions regarding their export of items that might be used in the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction.

Although efforts on the part of the international community to curb the proliferation of various categories of weapons have led to the establishment of several control regimes embracing different categories of weapons and weapons systems (nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional) as well as science and technology, it is difficult to classify the developments and trends of 1992 according to the weapons in question, because some regimes took actions pertaining to more than one category of weapons. In the course of the year a variety of actions were taken with a view to strengthening the regimes through expanding their membership and extending their scope.

With regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, the accession of the remaining two nuclear-weapon States—China (on 9 March) and France

¹⁰ A/C.1/47/7 (subsequently issued as United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8), paras. 27, 28 and 29.

¹¹ Ibid., para. 44.

¹² Text published in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992), pp. 156-157.

(on 3 August)—and of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger and Slovenia brought the total number of States parties to 155 as of the end of the year. These accessions, especially those of China and France, were seen as a significant development in the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, in particular in the light of the 1995 Conference of the States parties, at which the future of the Treaty will be decided. A consensus agreement of the States parties to begin preparations for that Conference, as reflected in the relevant General Assembly resolution, is seen as an encouraging sign.

The safeguards system of IAEA is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and of the whole non-proliferation regime. The steps taken in 1991 to strengthen the safeguards system—following the detection of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme—continued. A series of measures were taken by the Board of Governors of the Agency, in particular the reaffirmation of the Agency's right to perform special inspections when there are reasons to believe that installations or material which should have been declared have not been so declared. In addition, safeguards agreements were signed between the Agency and the following parties to the non-proliferation Treaty: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malawi, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Agency carried out a large number of inspections of nuclear facilities in South Africa and found no evidence that the declared inventory was incomplete, nor was IAEA in possession of any other information suggesting the existence of any undeclared facilities or nuclear material.¹³ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA signed a safeguards agreement on 30 January, which entered into force on 10 April. Subsequently, IAEA carried out only three inspection missions and, as of the end of the year, it was unclear how many of its remaining facilities that State would be willing to open to inspection by the Agency.

At the regional level, the ratification by France of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 24 August and the amendments to the Treaty adopted at the meeting of OPANAL that month will lead to the full implementation of the Treaty and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in Latin America and the Caribbean (see page 125). In a joint statement on their common nuclear policy, issued on

¹³ See the report of the Secretary-General on the nuclear capability of South Africa (A/47/533), annexes I and II.

14 February on the occasion of the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation.¹⁴

At their meeting in Warsaw held from 31 March to 3 April, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group took an important step forward by agreeing to a new export regime for nuclear-related dual-use items, imposing restrictions on thousands of items in 65 categories of advanced technologies and products. The Group called on all nuclear-exporters to adhere to the Suppliers' Group guidelines.

In a broader context, it is noteworthy that the MTCR participants reaffirmed at their meeting in Oslo, held from 29 June to 2 July, that the MTCR guidelines of 16 April 1987 for sensitive missile-relevant transfers remained an essential mechanism for preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and they agreed to extend the scope of the regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons. They took note of the fact that a growing number of countries had committed themselves to observe the MTCR guidelines and they appealed to all States to adopt them.¹⁵

The Australia Group, meeting in Paris from 1 to 4 June, expanded its list of controls to 54 chemical weapons precursors, as well as to chemical-weapon-related dual-use equipment. It also adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins and equipment. Later, on 6 August in the Conference on Disarmament, in an effort to address some of the concerns that had been raised pertaining to economic and technological development under the draft Convention on chemical weapons, the members of the Group issued a statement in which they undertook "to review, in the light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention".

¹⁴ A/47/92.

¹⁵ The text of the press release and the joint appeal are reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992), pp. 170-171.

Further strengthening of the biological weapons Convention regime was carried out on the basis of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, in which the States parties agreed to expand the confidence-building measures they had agreed to at the Second Review Conference. Among the measures decided upon under article V is the requirement that parties declare what legislation and other regulations they have enacted both to implement the provisions of the Convention and to control the export or import of pathogenic micro-organisms. By the end of 1992, 36 States parties had submitted reports to the United Nations pursuant to the Final Declaration, including those concerning their export and import of certain biological-weapons-related materials.

Although the question of proliferation of conventional weapons at the global level was not considered as a separate item in disarmament forums, there was an increased awareness of the danger of the transfer of more sophisticated weapons and weapons systems in general, especially to regions of tension. Thus, the technical procedures and adjustments relevant to the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms, elaborated by a panel of governmental experts, through which openness and transparency in the area of international arms transfers are being introduced, represented further progress in efforts to curb transfers of weapons and to reduce the possibility of illicit traffic (for details, see page 95).

At the regional level, the CSCE ministers approved a document on 30 January on non-proliferation and arms transfers,¹⁶ stressing their readiness to support international cooperation in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of missile technology. They also stated that build-ups of conventional weapons beyond legitimate defence needs posed a threat to international peace and security.

In a joint statement¹⁷ made at a meeting held in Helsinki on 4 and 5 May, the foreign ministers of the Nordic countries expressed their strong support for international treaties that ban or limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and for international export control rules for missile technology and products that could be used in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. They also stressed the

¹⁶ A/47/89-S/23576, annex I.

¹⁷ The text of the joint statement is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 3 (1992).

need for progress in limiting and controlling the international trade in conventional weapons through negotiations between exporting countries.

In addition to the traditional approach of export controls, an innovative approach was taken in 1992. In response to the unprecedented weapons-proliferation risk presented by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and as a result of a proposal made at the Summit Meeting of the members of the Security Council in January, steps were taken to establish two technology centres, in Russia and Ukraine. The Centres are intended to provide professionally-rewarding opportunities to scientists and engineers who possess knowledge and skills in advanced military technologies, especially those relating to the design and development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic-missile weapons delivery systems, and to allow the experts to redirect their talents to peaceful activities, thereby reducing the risks of proliferation of militarily sensitive know-how.¹⁸ In the course of the year, an International Science and Technology Centre was set up in Moscow under the auspices of the European Community, Japan, the Russian Federation and the United States, and another was in the process of being established in Kiev under the auspices of Canada, Sweden, Ukraine and the United States.

At the bilateral level, efforts to reduce the risks involved in the process of destruction of different categories of weapons as a result of arms control measures led to a number of agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States. Among them the agreement concerning the safe and secure transportation, storage and destruction of weapons and non-proliferation is the most general.¹⁹ It provides for United States financial and expert assistance to the Russian Federation in achieving the destruction of the latter's nuclear, chemical and other weapons as specified in certain disarmament agreements.

The United Nations continued to investigate incidents of the proliferation of weapons which are prohibited under international law in general or on the basis of treaty obligations. Thus, the UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors carried out inspections in Iraq on the basis of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) regarding nuclear, chemical and biological

¹⁸ See articles by Dieter Bodin and Edward J. Dowdy in *Non-Proliferation and Confidence-building Measures in Asia and the Pacific*, Disarmament Topical Papers 10 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.3).

¹⁹ See CD/1162 for the general agreement and implementing agreements, and CD/1161, which pertains specifically to chemical weapons.

weapons and missiles. While some of these inspections led to destruction of the weapons in question, there were instances in which Iraq denied the inspectors access to certain sites. (For details, see chapter X, below.)

There were also a number of bilateral and unilateral declarations by States on their policies regarding the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and science and technology with military applications.²⁰

Although no specific item concerning non-proliferation in all its aspects appeared on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission and on that of the Conference on Disarmament, the issue was discussed in the debate in both bodies in the context of a number of agenda items.

In the *Disarmament Commission* many States referred to the question of non-proliferation, but differences of approach continued. After stressing that the issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons were now priorities on the international agenda and that these issues had been highlighted at the Security Council Summit Meeting on 31 January, Sweden proposed that a new item be added to the Commission's agenda: "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction".

As regards the non-proliferation Treaty, many States expressed their readiness to seek the broadest possible consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and to strive for the extension of the Treaty for an unlimited period. On the other hand, some States continued to point out that the future of the regime depended on several factors, such as further reduction of existing nuclear arsenals leading to their complete elimination, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Some concerns were also expressed regarding the nuclear weapons under the jurisdiction of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which are not yet parties to the Treaty.

In the debate on the question of science and technology, which included a sub-item on the transfer of high technology with military applications, the differences between developed and developing countries con-

²⁰ For details, see the following documents: A/47/314 and Add.1 (Australia, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fiji, Lithuania, Malta, Niger, Philippines, Poland, Thailand, Togo); A/47/77-S/23486 and Corr.1 and A/47/79-S/23494 (Russian Federation); A/47/92 (Argentina and Brazil); A/47/181 (Argentina); and A/47/183 (Sweden).

tinued, and as a result only modest progress was made in the consideration of this item in the Commission. (See pages 183 to 184.)

Many States, both members and non-members of the *Conference on Disarmament*, raised the question of non-proliferation in the context of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, the chemical weapons Convention, and transparency in armaments, and in the context of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation stated that the Russian Federation was adopting a complex of measures aimed at ensuring that the break-up of the former Soviet Union would not provoke proliferation or the emergence of several nuclear States in place of the USSR. It also intended to become a full-fledged participant in the MTCR; it supported the work of the Australia Group, and it was setting up a State export-control system for dual-purpose materials and technology.

While referring to its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, China reiterated the position of its Government on nuclear proliferation, that is, that the prevention of proliferation was not an end in itself but a step in the process towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Other measures to further the process were: no-first-use pledges, support for nuclear-weapon-free zones, and security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

France noted its determination to participate in the general effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which had become one of the major priorities of the international community, and it was taking an active part in the consultations initiated by the five main arms-exporting Powers with a view to limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and applying rules of restraint to transfers of conventional weapons.

While it shared the concerns with regard to proliferation, India reiterated its view that nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat could not be addressed without a global approach. A new international understanding and consensus on what constituted non-proliferation were urgently required so that the pursuit of an approach which was universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory could be seriously attempted.

The Conference on Disarmament continued its debate on the scope, substance, form and nature of security assurances. While an overwhelming majority of delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, were ready to engage in a substantive discussion of the issue,

differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and the complex issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a "common formula", and therefore no substantive progress was made during the 1992 session.

At the forty-seventh session of the *General Assembly*, the various aspects of the issue of non-proliferation were debated. The need for immediate, concerted action to curb the proliferation of weapons and weapons technology was broadly recognized. It was mainly Western and Eastern European States that favoured a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation, including universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty and its extension for an indefinite period. However, some developing countries linked the question of extension to the solution of other issues, such as that of a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances.

Western and Eastern European States, in general, considered that multilateral export control regimes were a necessary complement to non-proliferation efforts, and they stressed the need to strengthen them further. However, a majority of developing States, in an attempt to bring into the multilateral debate the issue of unhindered access to materials and dual-use technology for peaceful purposes, highlighted what they perceived as the discriminatory character of the so-called "regimes" regulating the transfer of nuclear and other material and specialized equipment.

The point was made that non-proliferation had not been an East-West issue; it is not now, and should not become, a North-South issue. It was further felt that a wide-ranging and in-depth discussion on legitimate military and civilian application of high technology could go a long way towards the development of universally acceptable guidelines for the application and transfer of sensitive technologies—guidelines that would safeguard the security of States and also meet their development needs.

In the course of the general debate, the President of the United States proposed that the Security Council should become a key forum for non-proliferation enforcement, on the one hand, and should provide reassurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States that it would seek immediate action to provide assistance in case a State became an object of aggression involving nuclear weapons, on the other. The United States also proposed the strengthening of the linkages between the Nuclear

Suppliers' Group, the Australia Group, the MTCR and relevant United Nations specialized agencies.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1992

Although the question of non-proliferation was not considered as a separate item in the Conference on Disarmament, it was referred to in many statements made in plenary as well as in informal meetings. However, no action was taken specifically in connection with the question.

In their statements, most States reiterated their views on the nuclear complex and on non-proliferation.

Although the Group of 21 continued to believe that the non-proliferation regime was essential for international peace and security, it felt that the future of the regime depended to a great extent on the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Western Group considered that nuclear disarmament and the questions of non-proliferation demanded the attention and commitment of all members of the Conference. Canada outlined a seven-point plan for nuclear non-proliferation presented by its Prime Minister on 21 May: indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty; strengthening of IAEA; tightening controls on the export of nuclear weapons technologies; halting the "brain drain" of former Soviet scientists to States wishing to develop or strengthen their nuclear-weapon potential; strengthening regional cooperation; confirmation, at the 1995 Conference of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, of the commitment of the nuclear-weapon Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire any such weapons; and security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

France also recalled its initiatives with a view to promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, *inter alia* its decision to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and its suspension of nuclear testing in 1992.

As regards security assurances, the Conference decided on 21 January to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. On 20 February it appointed

Mr. Sirous Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran as its Chairman. The Committee held three formal meetings between 22 June and 3 August. The question was also referred to in plenary meetings throughout the session.

The debate at formal meetings and in informal consultations of the Chairman revealed that an overwhelming majority of States, including nuclear-weapon States, continued to attach importance to the question and were ready to engage in a substantive dialogue. However, the positions of the nuclear-weapon States remained basically the same.

Many States continued to believe that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons were the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that it was imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to assure the security of non-nuclear weapon States against their use. They also reaffirmed the need to find a common approach, acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Stressing the need for negative security assurances, some members of the Group of 21 considered that the existing assurances and unilateral declarations fell short of the credible assurances they sought and that, in order to be effective, these assurances should be unconditional, not subject to divergent interpretations, and unlimited in scope, application and duration, and should take a "common formula" approach. Egypt recalled the responsibility of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, which had prompted the Security Council to adopt resolution 255 (1968); it felt, however, that the resolution needed to be updated.

Introducing a paper containing basic elements for a legally binding agreement on negative security assurances, France stated that such elements were the only realistic bases on which an international instrument of negative security assurances could be conceived. The United Kingdom disagreed with the view that negative security assurances should be unconditional, stating that one essential condition would always remain, namely that such assurances could be given only to the States which had themselves renounced the nuclear option.

China reiterated its commitment that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-

weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Once again it reaffirmed its support for the conclusion of an international convention on the question.

In its report, the Ad Hoc Committee noted that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a "common formula". Recognizing the importance of the question and feeling that it was necessary—in the light of recent transformations in the international political climate and other positive developments—to take a fresh look at it to enable the Committee to fulfil its mandate as soon as possible, it recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

At the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly two draft resolutions directly related to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were considered: one on the non-proliferation Treaty and the other on negative security assurances.

On 27 October, Peru, on behalf of the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee". In introducing it on 3 November, Peru stated that the draft resolution reflected a consensus agreement of the parties on the beginning of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference, that the Preparatory Committee would be open to all parties to the Treaty and that its first meeting would be held in New York from 10 to 14 May 1993.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 2 abstentions (Cuba and India). Two States explained their position before the voting. While voting in favour and supporting the establishment of the Preparatory Committee, Israel reiterated that it supported the principle of non-proliferation but continued to believe that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, freely negotiated between the States of the region, with provision for mutual verification, was the most reliable means of ensuring non-proliferation in that region. It added that the example of Iraq bore out its contention that the non-proliferation

Treaty did not adequately address the problem in the Middle East. India, which is not a signatory to the non-proliferation Treaty, stated that any approach that sought merely to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States while creating no firm obligations on nuclear-weapon States in respect of vertical and geographical proliferation was discriminatory and could not be accepted as a universal disarmament measure. In its view, it would be appropriate for the international community to begin serious negotiations towards a treaty which could replace the existing one and which would give legal effect to a binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons within an agreed time-frame and by non-nuclear-weapon States not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Before the General Assembly took action on the draft resolution on 9 December, two States non-parties to the Treaties explained their position. Algeria stated that while it would vote in favour of the draft resolution—it had not participated in the vote in the First Committee—it hoped that the 1995 Conference would be an opportunity to work out a new approach to the question of nuclear non-proliferation based upon the new vision of the international situation emerging in the post-cold war period. Such a reformulation should have two objectives: prevention of proliferation in all its aspects and promotion of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Cuba also voted in favour, believing that the text was procedural in nature and hoping that in the future there would be an exchange of views between the parties and non-parties to the Treaty, with a view to improving it and establishing an equitable balance of responsibilities.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 168 to none (with no abstentions), as resolution 47/52 A. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 A

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex to which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the provisions of article X, paragraph 2, of that Treaty, requiring the holding of a conference twenty-five years after the entry into force of the

Treaty, to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods,

Noting also the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, concerning the convening of review conferences, which provides for quinquennial review conferences,

Noting further that the last review conference took place in 1990,

Recalling that the Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970,

Recalling also its decision 46/413 of 6 December 1991, by which it took note of the intent of the parties to form a preparatory committee in 1993 for the conference called for in article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

1. *Takes note* of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to form a preparatory committee for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide on its extension, as called for in article X, paragraph 2, and also as provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty;

2. *Notes* that the Preparatory Committee will be open to all the parties to the Treaty and, if the Preparatory Committee so decides at the outset of its first session, to States not parties, as observers, and will hold its first meeting in New York from 10 to 14 May 1993;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

On 28 October, Bangladesh, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The text was later also sponsored by Colombia and Viet Nam. In introducing it on 13 November, the representative of Pakistan noted that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be their complete elimination. However, until that objective was realized, the non-nuclear-weapon States must be provided with legally-binding and unconditional assurances, and in the propitious climate that prevailed today there could be no reason why such assurances could not be extended. He concluded by saying that the draft was prepared along the lines of resolution 46/32, adopted at the previous session by an overwhelming majority, and he hoped that it would enjoy the widest possible support. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 139 to none, with 2 abstentions (United Kingdom and United States).

Several States explained their position regarding the draft resolution. Thus, France noted that the fact that the five nuclear-weapon States were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty created a new situation which could foster progress on the issue of security assurances. It attached importance to a multilateral solution of the problem, which would be both equitable and effective. It would not, in its view, be appropriate to put on an equal footing the overwhelming majority of States that accepted and complied with non-proliferation commitments and those that refused them or violated them. Nigeria stated that the current international situation was auspicious for the conclusion of effective international arrangements and it called upon all States to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty in order to be in a position to benefit from such assurances. Bulgaria, while voting in favour, expressed doubts whether submission of the same virtually unaltered resolution on this issue at a time when there were radical changes in the international security environment could serve in any practical way to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It considered that a new approach was needed, one which would place the question in the context of the extremely wide circle of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or similar instruments and within the context of preparations for the 1995 Conference on the Treaty. Speaking also on behalf of Australia, New Zealand stated that, to receive security assurances, the non-nuclear-weapon States must make a clear and unambiguous commitment to the non-proliferation cause by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty and other relevant regional accords. Further, it considered that the issue of negative security assurances could not be considered in isolation from broader efforts to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The United Kingdom, which abstained, stated that the text did not refer clearly to the necessary relationship between a security assurance given by a nuclear-weapon State and the need for a binding commitment from recipient States on nuclear non-proliferation, preferably through adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 162 to none, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 47/50. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/50

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament,

Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament, under effective international control,

Also convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Determined strictly to abide by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing also that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,

Recalling also paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Taking note of the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note also of the decision of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Twentieth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Istanbul from 4 to 8 August 1991, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note further of the unilateral declarations made by all nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

Noting also the greater willingness to overcome the difficulties encountered in previous years,

Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990 and 46/32 of 6 December 1991,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends also* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Conclusion

The question of non-proliferation in all its aspects was one of the issues discussed most in the various disarmament forums in 1992. This was the result of growing concerns that, in parallel with measures to radically reduce nuclear weapons and to achieve a complete and universal prohibition of chemical weapons through the Convention just concluded at the end of the year, clandestine programmes for manufacturing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continued. In addition, the transfer of missile technology to some States, especially to those in regions of tension, attracted the attention of the international community.

As regards the nuclear non-proliferation regime, several positive developments—such as the accession of the remaining two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, to the non-proliferation Treaty and the agreement to begin the preparations for the 1995 Conference—were seen as contributing to a further strengthening of that regime. However, the fact that there were still States with significant nuclear programmes that were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, some of whom were alleged to have nuclear weapons, the fact that even some parties to the Treaty had programmes that were not under IAEA safeguards,

the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in spite of the fact that it had signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA, and differences of view among nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the future of the Treaty were disquieting elements evident in the debate in the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee. Moreover, the solution of some unresolved issues, in particular those of negative security assurances and of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, were considered to be of the utmost importance for the outcome of the 1995 Conference.

As far as bacteriological (biological) weapons were concerned, the adoption and extension of confidence-building measures and the ongoing discussion on potential verification measures were seen as contributing to the effective implementation of the Convention and, thus, preventing the eventual proliferation of such weapons.

The question of the transfer of chemical weapons and of components for the manufacturing of such weapons was addressed extensively in the negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons, and it was hoped that, after its entry into force, this issue would be effectively addressed by the mechanism (the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) to be established under the Convention.

The different control regimes—the MTCR, the Australia Group and the London Club—the guidelines related to weapons of mass destruction adopted by the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, although (with the exception of the Register) not universally accepted, served as important frameworks for addressing some of the issues of proliferation, and the number of States participating in those regimes or applying the guidelines established by them increased.

On the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, no progress was made once again in 1992, mainly because of continuing differences of perception as to the real security interests and concerns of the few nuclear-weapon States and the large number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Whether the new French proposal on basic elements for a legally binding agreement on negative security assurances will be acceptable to all States and will facilitate further negotiations remains to be seen. A promising development is seen in the awareness of States—especially those which are members of the

Conference on Disarmament—that a fresh look is needed, especially now that all recognized nuclear-weapon States are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, that the number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties is continuing to increase, and that the question of the future of the Treaty itself will be decided at the 1995 Conference.

The statement of 31 January by the President of the Security Council on issues with regard to proliferation and the report of the Secretary-General entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, which also dealt with the non-proliferation question, were widely endorsed by States speaking in the First Committee.

The action taken by the General Assembly reflected, on the one hand, positive developments in the adoption, without any negative vote or abstention, of a resolution on the initiation of the preparatory work for the 1995 Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and, on the other hand, the continuing differences of view among States concerning the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

CHAPTER III

Regional disarmament

Introduction

THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT has received considerable attention over the years, not only at the regional level, but also at the global, or United Nations, level. It is generally accepted that such an approach provides one of the key elements in the achievement of world peace and security.

The 1980 United Nations study on all aspects of regional disarmament¹ found that most States perceived threats to their security and the need for military preparedness as primarily related to conditions in their own region. In this connection, the study made clear that progress in disarmament and avoidance of the deterioration of political and security conditions at the global level would greatly facilitate agreement on regional measures. Equally, progress in disarmament and the equitable solution of problems at the regional level would promote the relaxation of tension and disarmament at the global level and help keep regions free of external interference and rivalry.

There is, in fact, full compatibility between the regional and the global approaches to disarmament. As has been suggested, the multilateral arms limitation system must continue to focus on these two key approaches, by confirming and strengthening existing global instruments (for instance, the non-proliferation Treaty and the chemical weapons Convention) and seeking new ones, and secondly, by developing and applying regional measures and linking them to global measures as required.

¹ *Study on All Aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2).

It is also generally accepted that the goal of regional arms limitation and disarmament measures should be to increase stability and security within the region concerned; that the related initiatives should take full account of the specific conditions and problems of the region; and that a common approach to the problems to be solved should be developed by the States involved.

Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been a growing interest among States in developing regional approaches to arms limitation and confidence-building as practical means to strengthen regional peace and security and to promote the process of global arms reduction. Usually, initiatives have been taken at the regional level and have then been brought to the attention of the international community. It is, in fact, up to States, in a regional context, to decide for themselves, in the light of local conditions, what kind of arms limitation is required. To this end they can seek the help and support of regional and sub-regional organizations. These, for their part, can try to further the regional process on their own or together with the United Nations. The successful initiation of the work of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and of the Economic Community of Central African States (see "Action by the General Assembly, 1992", below) provides a recent significant example of the way in which cooperation between the United Nations and a regional or subregional organization can help promote the cause of security.

Over the years, regional organizations have been established in various parts of the world, supplementing the collective security system of the United Nations. For example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) provide means of coordinating regional political activity and, at times, of resolving concerns of regional security.

As the Secretary-General stated in his report *New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Era*,² it is possible today for the reduction and regulation of armaments to take place without putting national security at risk, and such measures can be implemented on different levels—global, regional and subregional. On the regional level, for example, there is

² A/C.1/47/7. Subsequently issued as United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8.

an evident need to devote major attention to the question of conventional arms races. For years, concern had been concentrated, and rightly so, he said, on the need to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, but too little had been done to address the highly destabilizing effect on regional and subregional security resulting from the transfers of conventional weapons which went far beyond the legitimate security needs of States. Moreover, the detrimental effect of those weapons transfers on regional security and stability continued to be felt today, particularly in connection with the transfer of weapons to volatile areas such as the Middle East, which had been the recipient of over 30 per cent of world weapons imports.³ (For an account of efforts in connection with this and other issues of conventional disarmament, see chapter VI, below.)

General developments and trends, 1992

In his 1992 report on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, known as *An Agenda for Peace*,⁴ the Secretary-General, considering measures essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States, asked all regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas. In this connection he indicated that he would undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat could provide.⁵ The Secretary-General also emphasized that regional arrangements and organizations have an important role in early warning. To this end he invited regional organizations that had not yet sought observer status at the United Nations to do so and to be linked, through appropriate arrangements, with the security mechanisms of the Organization.⁶

³ Ibid., paras. 15–17.

⁴ A/47/277–S/2411. Issued also as a publication under the symbol DPI/1247.

⁵ Ibid., para. 24.

⁶ Ibid., para. 27.

Subsequently, in his report *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, the Secretary-General came back to the subject of regional disarmament in the new international environment, stressing that arms limitation could have a most significant role in the context of peace-keeping and peace-building operations.⁷

In the course of 1992, a number of developments took place at the regional level. Steps taken by two subregions, South-East Asia and Central Africa, are described in "Action by the General Assembly, 1992", below. (For additional information regarding developments relating to the nuclear field, see chapter V, below.)

In *Europe*, on 5 June, the 29 parties to the 1990 CFE Treaty met in Oslo and signed the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty.⁸ Drafted in Vienna by the Joint Consultative Group of CFE, the document stated in part that "the understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Final Document and its Annexes A and B, together with the deposit of instruments of verification by all the States Parties, shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements for entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with its provisions". Annex A contained understandings and changes to Treaty wording made necessary by the dissolution of the USSR. Annex B contained notifications, confirmations and commitments and made some further necessary adjustments. The meeting was designed to make it possible for the parties to the CFE Treaty to ensure its entry into force in time for the Helsinki CSCE summit, to be held in July.

On 10 July, in Helsinki, the States parties to the Treaty decided to put the Treaty provisionally into force as from 17 July to allow more time for ratification by a number of States. It entered into force formally on 9 November, after all 29 States⁹ had ratified it. Shortly after its entry into force, the process of inspecting each party's baseline

⁷ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8, para. 12.

⁸ See appendix III to this volume. The text of the Final Document is also reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992).

⁹ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

data began. A politically binding agreement, known as CFE-IA, which sets out limits on personnel levels decided upon by each party and provides for exchanges of information on such forces, was signed on 10 July and will be implemented concurrently with the application of the CFE Treaty.

At the Helsinki summit meeting on 9 and 10 July, the Heads of State or Government of the 52 participating States of the CSCE also adopted the "Helsinki Document 1992—The Challenges of Change"¹⁰ and decided to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, in Vienna, with a strengthened conflict-prevention centre, as an integral part of the CSCE (see page 92).

In Asia, efforts to promote confidence-building and disarmament were evident in a number of subregions.

In North-East Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed and ratified a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Thus, by the end of the year, both Koreas were parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and had signed the basic safeguards agreement. During the year, the two republics were engaged in the process of implementing the two bilateral accords that were signed at the end of 1991¹¹ and entered into force in February 1992.¹² The basic agreement established a South-North Joint Military Commission with a mandate to negotiate confidence-building measures and, ultimately, a reduction in armaments. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula bans nuclear weapons from the peninsula as well as nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. As part of this agreement, the two republics are negotiating, through a Joint Nuclear Control Commission, a bilateral inspection regime that would complement IAEA inspections.

On 1 January, in an important follow-up to their 1988 agreement on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities, the Govern-

¹⁰ Circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/47/361).

¹¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. VI, "General developments and trends, 1991" The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration were circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147).

¹² The text of the Joint Declaration is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 3 (1992), and the text of the Basic Agreement in vol. XV, No. 2 (1992).

ments of India and Pakistan exchanged lists of their respective nuclear facilities. The two countries also issued, in August, a declaration by which they undertook not to develop, produce, acquire or use chemical weapons, and to refrain from assisting or encouraging others to do so. They reiterated their resolve to become original States parties to the chemical weapons Convention—which they did early in January 1993.

In recent months, high-level political contacts between China and India have established a number of measures to avoid tension along their borders, including regular meetings of border personnel, the establishment of supporting communication links at border points, and prior notification of military exercises. In May, during the visit of the President of India to China, the two sides agreed that, before the final settlement of their dispute, they should maintain armed forces along the line of control at the lowest level commensurate with the friendly relations existing between the two States.

The negotiations between China and the Soviet Union on border issues, which had begun in 1990, continued from the sixth round, in 1992, between China, on the one hand, and a unified delegation of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the other. A joint declaration issued in December by the Government of China and that of Russia reaffirmed their intention to reduce armed forces in the border region and to take concrete measures to strengthen mutual confidence and maintain tranquillity in that region.

In the *Americas*, efforts were made with a view to restraining the arms race and enhancing the stability of the region.

In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil took further bilateral steps with regard to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy following the inauguration, in December 1991, of the headquarters of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The Agency is one of the parties to the agreement for the application of safeguards signed between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC itself and IAEA on 13 December 1991.¹³ The function of the ABACC is to administer and implement a common system of accounting and

¹³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. VI, "General developments and trends, 1991". The Agreement was circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1118). See also *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2 (1992).

control to be applied to all nuclear materials involved in the two countries' nuclear activities, in order to guarantee, through transparency, their commitment to use nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes. This control system established by Argentina and Brazil in the nuclear field contributes to the consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whose obligations both countries are now prepared fully to accept (see page 125). Thus, steps are being taken to ensure that the Treaty of Tlatelolco comes fully into force everywhere within the Treaty area.

On 23 May, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States adopted a resolution entitled "Cooperation for Security and Development in the Hemisphere: Regional Contributions to Global Security",¹⁴ by which it resolved, *inter alia*, to accept, as a guiding principle of regional disarmament, arms control and limitation policies, the requirement to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with defence requirements and international commitments, and to that end urged member States to adopt a number of arms control and disarmament measures, in particular to become original parties to the chemical weapons Convention, and to prevent all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of missiles capable of delivering them. It also noted the many contributions to regional disarmament and arms control made by States of the Western Hemisphere, urged additional actions and acknowledged the concept that economic and social development was an important element of security.

In addition to these negotiated measures of regional disarmament, measures were taken within the framework of peace enforcement in the Persian Gulf area during the year. The disarmament and inspection procedures initiated under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), concerning Iraq, continued in operation. United Nations personnel, in the words of the Secretary-General, were directly involved in achieving important milestones regarding the implementation of disarmament measures.¹⁵ (See chapter X, below.)

¹⁴ AG/RES.1179 (XXII-0/92).

¹⁵ A/C.1/47/7, para. 13.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1992

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/38 A of 1991, the Disarmament Commission, at its 1992 session, considered the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", an item carried over from the Commission's 1991 agenda. Consideration of the item took place in Working Group III, which held nine meetings between 22 April and 8 May, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ricardo Luna, of Peru. In connection with its work, the Group had before it a number of papers.¹⁶

The Working Group decided to take the "Chairman's paper" of Working Group III of the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission¹⁷ as the basis for its deliberations on the subject, taking new proposals into consideration at the same time. It also agreed to proceed with its consideration of the subject by concentrating its efforts on the first two topics of the five topics of the 1991 paper, namely: (a) relationship between regional disarmament and global security and arms limitation and disarmament; (b) principles and guidelines; (c) ways and means; (d) machineries and modalities; and (e) role of the United Nations. Following an extensive consideration of the first two topics, the Chairman presented two papers on those topics for consideration by the Working Group, without prejudice to the positions of delegations.¹⁸ The item as a whole will receive further consideration at the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

At its forty-seventh session, the General Assembly paid considerable attention to the question of regional disarmament. It adopted five resolutions on the subject, as described below, and also a decision (see decision 47/420 in chapter VI). The Assembly had before it a report

¹⁶ In addition to the papers of the previous session, a paper by South Africa (A/CN.10/167) and one by Cuba (A/CN.10/168) were submitted.

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/46/42)*, annex III.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42)*, annexes III and IV.

of the Secretary-General entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale", containing replies received from Governments pursuant to decision 46/412 of 1991.¹⁹

On 30 October, 36 States, later joined by 10 others,²⁰ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament".

On 10 November, the representative of Peru introduced the draft resolution and reviewed its provisions. He concluded by saying that, in view of the growing importance attributed to regional disarmament in the United Nations and in view of the fact that in recent years the majority of the resolutions on the subject had been adopted by consensus, Peru considered that at future sessions of the First Committee members should make further efforts to merge, as far as possible, the various resolutions on the item in order to give the sharpest possible focus at the multilateral level to the question of regional disarmament.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee, on 12 November, without a vote. On 9 December it was adopted by the General Assembly, also without a vote, as resolution 47/52 G. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 G
Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 44/116 U and 44/117 B of 15 December 1989, 45/58 M of 4 December 1990 and 46/36 F of 6 December 1991,

Considering that the regional approach to disarmament is one of the most important means by which States can contribute to the strengthening of international security, arms limitation and disarmament,

¹⁹ A/47/316 and Add.1 and 2. Replies were received from Australia, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland and the United Kingdom.

²⁰ Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

Recognizing that the regional and global approaches complement each other and can be pursued simultaneously in the promotion of regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that disarmament can be carried out only in a climate of confidence based on mutual respect and aimed at ensuring better relations founded on justice, solidarity and cooperation,

Noting that the consumption of resources for potentially destructive purposes is in stark contrast to the need for social and economic development and that reduction in military expenditure following, *inter alia*, the conclusion of regional disarmament agreements could entail benefits in both the social and economic fields,

Considering that regional disarmament measures should be aimed at establishing a military balance at the lowest level while not diminishing the security of each State and at eliminating as a matter of priority the capability for large-scale offensive action and surprise attacks,

Noting also that disarmament measures in one region should not lead to increased arms transfers to other regions or extend the military imbalances and/or tensions from one area to other areas,

Considering also that confidence-building and transparency measures are essential elements in the implementation of regional disarmament,

Persuaded that verification measures are important to ensure compliance with regional agreements on arms control and disarmament,

1. *Reaffirms* that the regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in the global efforts to strengthen international peace and security, arms limitation and disarmament;

2. *Is convinced* of the importance and effectiveness of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative of States of the region and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, in that they can contribute to the security and stability of all States, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in compliance with international law and existing treaties;

3. *Affirms* that comprehensive political and peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and disputes can contribute to the reduction of tension and the promotion of regional peace, security and stability as well as of arms limitation and disarmament;

4. *Stresses* the importance of confidence-building measures, including objective information on military matters, in ensuring the success of this process;

5. *Affirms also* that multifaceted cooperation among States in the region, especially encompassing political, economic, social and cultural fields, can be conducive to the strengthening of regional security and stability;

6. *Notes with satisfaction* the important progress made in various regions of the world through the adoption of arms limitation, peace, security and cooperation agreements, including those related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and encourages States in the regions concerned to continue implementing these agreements;

7. *Recognizes* the useful role played by the regional centres of the United Nations;

8. *Encourages* States of the same region to examine the possibility of creating, on their own initiative, regional mechanisms and/or institutions for the establishment of measures in the framework of an effort of regional disarmament or for the prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict with the assistance, if requested, of the United Nations;

9. *Believes* that regional initiatives should enjoy the support of all States of the region concerned and the respect of those outside that region;

10. *Invites and encourages* all States to conclude, whenever possible, agreements on arms limitation and confidence-building measures at the regional level, including those conducive to avoiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

On 30 October, 69 States, later joined by 12 more,²¹ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament".

On 12 November, the representative of Pakistan introduced the draft resolution. He stressed that there had been important positive developments in the regional approach to disarmament in various regions; that the draft resolution—which was on the same lines as resolution 46/36 I of 1991—had equal relevance and applicability to all regions; and that it complemented ongoing efforts and agreements at the global level.

²¹ Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 4 abstentions (Bhutan, Cuba, India and Lao People's Democratic Republic). In connection with the vote, India stated that the draft resolution lacked focus and precision and tended to distort the concept of regional disarmament; moreover, it had eschewed a consensual approach. Cuba stated that the draft resolution omitted certain important ideas: the need for measures to help eliminate the possibility of surprise attacks and large-scale offensive manoeuvres; the need for peaceful political solutions to conflicts, so as to contribute to creating a climate of trust that would make it possible to adopt effective regional disarmament measures; the support of all countries of the region and certain States outside the region; and participation of extraregional States possessing military installations or bases in the region in the negotiating process.

On 9 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, by a vote of 168 to none, with 1 abstention (India). Cuba, while voting in favour of the draft resolution, repeated, in connection with the vote, that the draft had shortcomings (see above) which needed to be considered in the future. The resolution, as adopted by the General Assembly, reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 J

Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 45/58 P of 4 December 1990 and 46/36 I of 6 December 1991 on regional disarmament,

Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations,

Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,

Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels,

Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of smaller States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

1. *Stresses* that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;

2. *Affirms* that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

3. *Calls upon* States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels;

4. *Welcomes* the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;

5. *Supports and encourages* efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at regional and subregional levels;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament".

On 30 October, 31 States, later joined by 4 others,²² submitted a draft resolution entitled "Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe".

²² Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

On 9 November, the draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom, who stressed the fact that the draft was sponsored by most of the 52 States participating in the CSCE and that it aimed, *inter alia*, at welcoming the positive developments that had occurred since 1991 in the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe, as well as other related developments, in the framework of the CSCE (see "General developments and trends, 1992", above). As in previous resolutions on the same subject, the General Assembly would not only welcome those efforts, but also invite all Member States to consider the possibility of taking appropriate measures with a view to reducing the risk of confrontation and to strengthening security, taking due account of their specific regional conditions.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Then, on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the text, again without a vote, as resolution 47/52 I. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 I

Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe

The General Assembly,

Determined to achieve progress in disarmament,

Stressing that confidence-building and disarmament measures have a positive impact on international security,

Noting the work accomplished in 1992 by the Disarmament Commission on its agenda items entitled "Objective information on military matters" and "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security",

Recalling its resolutions 43/75 P of 7 December 1988, 44/116 I of 15 December 1989, 45/58 I of 4 December 1990 and 46/36 G of 6 December 1991,

Reaffirming the great importance of increasing security and stability in Europe through the establishment of a stable, secure and verifiable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, as well as through increased openness and predictability of military activities,

Considering that, along with the new political situation in Europe, the positive results of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, as well as those on conventional armaments and forces, both within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have considerably increased confidence and security in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security,

Welcoming the new measures agreed upon in these fields among the States signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and among the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Expressing the hope that the implementation of these decisions will contribute to the prevention or settlement of crises in Europe, including those due to acts of aggression or the use of military force in some parts of the continent,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the progress achieved so far in the process of disarmament and the strengthening of confidence and security in Europe;

2. *Welcomes* in particular:

(a) The decision of the States signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to implement this Treaty, as well as the recent Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;

(b) The signature of the Treaty on Open Skies, with the adoption of the Declaration on the Treaty on Open Skies;

(c) The adoption, by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, of a new significant set of confidence- and security-building measures;

(d) The decision of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, at the Helsinki summit meeting, to establish a Forum for Security Cooperation with a mandate to start new negotiations on arms control, disarmament, and confidence- and security-building; to enhance regular consultation and to intensify cooperation among them on matters related to security, and to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict;

3. *Invites* all States to consider the possibility of taking appropriate measures with a view to reducing the risk of confrontation and strengthening security, taking due account of their specific regional conditions.

On 30 October, a draft resolution entitled "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia" was submitted, sponsored by 137 States.²³ The Treaty, to which the six States members of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and

²³ Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, /.

Thailand) are parties, and which came into force in 1976, has as its objective the promotion of perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among the peoples of South-East Asia. It provides a framework for cooperation in many fields, as well as a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes. It has served as an important instrument of regional confidence-building, contributing to the peace and stability underpinning the economic growth and development of the ASEAN countries. In 1989 Papua New Guinea acceded to the Treaty, and in 1992 Viet Nam and the Lao People's Democratic Republic did likewise. The resolution was submitted in response to the call of the Secretary-General for a closer relationship between the United Nations and regional associations. In introducing it on 10 November, Singapore stressed that, in its single operative paragraph, it sought the General Assembly's endorsement of the purposes and principles of the Treaty.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

In connection with the adoption of the resolution, Cape Verde noted that the principle expressed in the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution (see below) had not been applied in the case of East Timor. While Cape Verde was in favour of the adoption of the resolution in order to contribute to the cause of promoting peace, stability and development in the South-East Asia region, it wished to see the people of East Timor exercise their inalienable right of self-determination as soon as possible. Similarly Portugal, while believing that such a treaty constituted a valuable instrument for strengthening international cooper-

Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

ation, drew attention to the illegal occupation of East Timor. At the following meeting, some of the sponsors stressed the desire of the sponsors to have the Treaty endorsed by the General Assembly and their regret that a matter that they considered extraneous to the draft had been introduced.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, again without a vote, as resolution 47/53 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/53 B

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with its Charter,

Recalling also the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, signed at Bangkok in August 1967, and the Singapore Declaration of 1992 adopted by the Association of South-East Asian Nations at its fourth summit meeting, held at Singapore on 27 and 28 January 1992,

Noting that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, signed at Bali on 24 February 1976, which came into force on 15 July 1976 in respect of the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand, and on 7 January 1984 in respect of Brunei Darussalam, was registered with the United Nations on 20 October 1976,

Noting also that Papua New Guinea acceded to the Treaty on 5 July 1989 and that the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Lao People's Democratic Republic acceded to the Treaty on 22 July 1992,

Noting further that the purpose of the Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation amongst the peoples of South-East Asia, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including, *inter alia*, mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of all nations, peaceful settlement of differences and disputes and renunciation of the threat or use of force,

Aware that the Treaty includes provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes which are in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing that the Treaty provides a strong foundation for regional confidence-building and for regional cooperation and that it is consistent with

the call by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace", for a closer relationship between the United Nations and regional associations,

Endorses the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia and its provisions for the pacific settlement of regional disputes and for regional cooperation in order to achieve peace, amity and friendship amongst the peoples of South-East Asia, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which are consistent with the current climate of enhancing regional and international cooperation.

Pursuant to resolution 46/37 B of 1991, the Secretary-General announced the establishment on 28 May of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the appointment of a Permanent Secretary of that Committee. Subsequently, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General on the subject,²⁴ the meeting of the Advisory Committee, held at the ministerial level in Yaoundé from 27 to 31 July under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted a series of confidence-building measures in the form of a programme of work. The programme grouped measures under the headings "Preventive diplomacy", "Peace-building", "Peacemaking and peace-keeping", "Training of peace-keeping personnel", and "Compliance and verification", and divided them into two categories: those for implementation in an initial stage and those for implementation at a later date. It was considered very important to take advantage of the momentum generated by the establishment and inauguration of the Committee so as to enable it to begin the drafting, adoption and implementation of specific confidence-building measures.

On 21 October, 11 States members of the Economic Community of Central Africa,²⁵ later joined by France, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Regional confidence-building measures". The draft resolution, which dealt with the work of the Standing Advisory Committee, was introduced by the representative of Cameroon on 2 November, and on that occasion he made a minor oral revision to the text. The representative stressed that the sponsors were firmly convinced that the adoption of the draft resolution by the Committee would serve to promote the implementation of confidence-building measures in Central Africa.

²⁴ A/47/511.

²⁵ Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zaire.

On 18 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 132 to 1 (United States), with 2 abstentions (Armenia and United Kingdom).

In connection with the vote, the United States made it clear that it strongly supported the concept of regional confidence-building measures and was pleased to see an African initiative to implement confidence-building measures in an African region. But while the United States shared the intent of the draft resolution—and had supported the corresponding resolution in 1991—it objected to the financial implications of the draft resolution, given the fact that in 1991 it had been indicated that all future costs would be borne by the participants themselves or through voluntary contributions, rather than from the regular budget of the United Nations. Similarly, the United Kingdom, which abstained, reiterated its firm support for such regional initiatives, but felt that for the implementation of the draft resolution recourse should not be had to the United Nations regular budget. The Russian Federation, which voted in favour of the draft resolution, also expressed its misgivings about the financing of the Advisory Committee.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 159 to 1, with 1 abstention, as resolution 47/53 F. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/53 F

Regional confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 43/78 H and 43/85 of 7 December 1988, 44/21 of 15 November 1989, 45/58 M of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 B of 6 December 1991,

Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, in that they can contribute to regional disarmament and to international security, in accordance with the principles of the Charter,

Convinced that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries,

Bearing in mind the announcement made by the Secretary-General on 28 May 1992 establishing the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, non-proliferation and development in the subregion,

Bearing in mind also the Secretary-General's appointment of a permanent Secretary of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on regional confidence-building measures, which deals chiefly with the organizational meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Yaoundé from 27 to 31 July 1992 under the auspices of the United Nations;

2. *Supports and encourages* efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and non-proliferation measures at regional and subregional levels in Central Africa;

3. *Welcomes* the programme of work including confidence-building measures adopted by the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States at the organizational meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance to the Central African States in implementing the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session an item entitled "Regional confidence-building measures"

Conclusion

Developments in 1992 confirmed once again that the regional approach to disarmament was an essential element in the pursuit of international peace and security. The Secretary-General, in his report on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, known as *An Agenda for Peace*, and, subsequently, in his report *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation*

and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era, emphasized and illustrated the important role that regional arms limitations could have for global efforts.

Encouraging steps were taken in 1992 in various parts of the world to strengthen regional security as well as international security as a whole. They were usually accompanied by confidence-building measures designed to contribute to transparency and predictability of military activities. The increasing emphasis on regional disarmament was also reflected in considerable activity under United Nations auspices, particularly in the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly.²⁶ The General Assembly adopted five resolutions (and one decision dealt with in chapter VI)—for the most part unanimously—on various aspects of the subject.

Undoubtedly, in a world threatened by a rising tide of conflict originating, in large measure, in ethnic rivalry, it is in the interests of the international community to seek the adoption, at the regional level, of arms limitation and disarmament measures, as well as confidence-building measures, which are also likely to contribute to global security.

²⁶ For information concerning regional activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, see chapter XII, page 284, and for a list of publications containing material on regional matters presented at meetings organized by the Office in cooperation with a number of Governments, see annex IV to that chapter.

CHAPTER IV

Transparency, confidence-building and the Arms Register

Introduction

TRANSPARENCY, that is, the systematic provision of information under informal or formal international arrangements, was not until recently a concept closely associated with the rather secretive field of armaments. Advanced technology has, however, brought such changes in weaponry and altered the understanding of national security so greatly that what was valid yesterday is no longer the rule today. Indeed, in a world that has become much more integrated economically and politically, a world in which security in isolation is no longer possible, there are serious reasons for introducing a large measure of transparency in matters related to defence policies and armaments, with a view to reducing misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and thereby contributing to the development of trust and more stable relations between States.

Thus, in 1992, for the first time, the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body, had on their disarmament agendas an item entitled "Transparency in armaments". In addition, the General Assembly had an item dealing with reduction of military budgets; one dealing with verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification; one dealing with transparency in international arms transfers; and two dealing with confidence-building measures. As a result, transparency is today an important element of the international security agenda. It is very likely that all these issues will be actively considered by the General Assembly in 1993. In addition, the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda in 1992 an item on objective information on military matters.

It is significant that the first post-war international agreement in this area was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR—the “hot-line” agreement of 1963—which was intended to reduce the risks peculiar to the nuclear and missile age by assuring quick and reliable *communication* directly between the Heads of Government of the two major nuclear-weapon States in times of crisis, an objective underscored by the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

The 1960s also saw the beginning of long debates in the United Nations disarmament forums on the subject of *monitoring and verification* as an integral part of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Slowly but steadily, progress was made towards a general acceptance of the principle that, in the interest of security, compliance with such agreements must be verifiable.¹

In addition, throughout the years, the General Assembly has repeatedly expressed deep concern about the huge amounts devoted to military budgets and their detrimental effects on international security and on economic and social development. This led, in the 1970s, to consideration of the question how to develop a standardized system for defining and *reporting military expenditures* and verifying compliance with agreements to reduce such expenditures.² As a result, the United Nations established an international system for reporting military expenditures and, pursuant to resolution 35/142 B of 1980, the Secretary-General has in fact, beginning in 1981, submitted annual standardized reports to the General Assembly containing information provided by Member States with regard to their military expenditures. In 1992, 32 States³ submitted standardized reports.⁴

Great attention has been given, in recent years, to the question of ways and means of promoting *transparency in the international*

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 13: 1988, chap. V; and vol. 15, 1990, chap. III.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XX and annex III, and subsequent volumes of *The Yearbook*.

³ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand, Niger, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

⁴ A/47/303 and Add.1 and 2.

transfer of conventional arms. In 1988 the General Assembly mandated an expert study on international arms transfers, including their security and disarmament implications. The study, which was completed and transmitted to the Assembly, through the Secretary-General, in 1991,⁵ analysed and underscored the positive impact of transparency. Enhanced transparency of arms transfers, the study stressed, could facilitate measures of limitation and restriction by increasing confidence and reducing the risk of misperception. Precisely because of these confidence-building effects, States could be led to assess more positively the desirability of limiting arms transfers, and mechanisms to promote transparency could provide the basis for monitoring and verification of limitation agreements. Thus transparency could serve several ends. It could progressively enhance confidence by extending into other military fields, such as holdings, procurement and expenditures, and, in general, serve as a catalyst for other positive measures, including informed public discussion, more accurate evaluation and analysis, regional cooperation and the provision of factual information about transactions at the global level.

The main recommendation in the expert study was that a universal and non-discriminatory arms transfer register should be established by the United Nations as soon as possible. The register should be so designed and maintained, the study made clear, as to provide meaningful information with regard to its purpose to build confidence, to promote restraint in arms transfers on a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral basis, to enhance security at lower levels of armaments, and to allow timely identification of trends in arms transfers. On 9 December 1991, by resolution 46/36 L, the General Assembly, welcoming the study submitted by the Secretary-General, requested him to establish and maintain at United Nations Headquarters a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include not only data on international arms transfers but also information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.⁶ In brief, the General Assembly advocated a policy of *transparency in armaments*.

⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XV. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.93.IX.6).

⁶ *Ibid.*

While confidence-building measures, such as those mentioned above, can further specific goals of the United Nations, the Organization has, for its part, encouraged *the process of confidence-building* and improvement of the functioning of actual measures in a number of ways. In particular, in 1988, the General Assembly unanimously endorsed a set of guidelines, agreed upon in the Disarmament Commission, for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level.⁷

General developments and trends, 1992

Among the many documents on confidence-building issued in 1992, the *Helsinki Document 1992—The Challenges of Change*,⁸ agreed upon at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held at Helsinki on 9 and 10 July, occupies an important place. The Document, which was unanimously adopted by the 52 members of the CSCE, consists of a declaration—the Helsinki Summit Declaration—and a number of decisions on a variety of subjects, including the strengthening of CSCE institutions and structures and the establishment of a CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation.

The purpose of the Helsinki 1992 summit meeting, as stated in the Declaration, was to contribute further to the realization of a community of free and democratic States from Vancouver to Vladivostok, a goal first affirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. To this end, the Helsinki Document 1992 offers ways to consolidate the achievements of the CSCE and to set its future direction, together with a programme to enhance the members' capabilities for concerted action so as to ensure for all of them better standards of life in larger freedom and equal rights of security. In this connection, the Helsinki Summit Declaration, emphasizing that this is a time of promise but also a time of instability and insecurity, notes that for the first time in decades war is being waged in the CSCE region; the loss of life and the debilitating consequences of human misery, involving huge

⁷ The guidelines are reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 13: 1988, chap. III, annex. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 14: 1989, chap. III, for an evaluation of the United Nations contribution to confidence-building measures.

⁸ Circulated as an annex to United Nations document A/47/361-S/24370.

numbers of refugees, have been the worst since the Second World War. Hence the need to make the CSCE more operational and effective, particularly by means of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peace-keeping), as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In line with these developments, and determined to give a new impetus to arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, security cooperation and conflict prevention, so as to contribute more effectively to the strengthening of security and stability and to the establishment of a just and lasting peace within the CSCE community of States, the members of the CSCE decided at their summit meeting, as reflected in section V of the Helsinki Document 1992, to start a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building; to enhance regular consultation and intensify cooperation among themselves on matters related to security; and to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict. To carry out these tasks, they decided to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, with a strengthened Conflict Prevention Centre, as an integral part of the CSCE. The new CSCE Forum opened in Vienna on 22 September. In accordance with the Helsinki decisions by the participating States, the Forum began by focusing on a programme for immediate action involving measures of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, and measures on security enhancement and cooperation.

In the course of 1992, the members of the CSCE also adopted a new specific document on confidence- and security-building measures, known as the Vienna Document 1992, which integrates new measures on the subject with measures adopted previously.⁹

The *Treaty on Open Skies* was completed early in 1992 and signed at Helsinki on 24 March.¹⁰ Thus, the proposal of President Bush, put forward on 12 May 1989, to seek an agreement which would permit flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft over the territory of the United States, the USSR and their allies came to fruition. The Treaty establishes

⁹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XVI.

¹⁰ The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming).

the regime for the conduct of observation flights by States parties over the territories of other States parties, and sets forth their rights and obligations in relation to such flights. The Treaty is open to all NATO members, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation and the other former Soviet republics. Upon its opening, it was signed by the 16 NATO members, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia and the 5 Eastern European States already mentioned, making a total of 25 initial signatory States. As stated in article XVII of the Treaty, for six months after the Treaty's entry into force, any other State participating in CSCE may apply for accession. Following six months after the Treaty's entry into force, the Open Skies Consultative Commission may consider the accession of any State which, in the judgement of the Commission, is able and willing to contribute to the objectives of the Treaty.

Significant developments took place in 1992 also in the field of *biological weapons*. Following the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, held in 1991,¹¹ an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, open to all States parties to the Convention, met at Geneva from 30 March to 10 April and from 23 November to 4 December, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tibor Tóth of Hungary, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, with a view to strengthening the Convention.

In terms of substance, the two sessions, which were attended by representatives of some 50 States parties, were highly technical ones and were devoted basically to (a) the examination of the ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities; (b) the ability of the potential verification measures to resolve ambiguities about compliance; and (c) the technologies of verification measures and their material, manpower and equipment requirements. In connection with the two sessions, a large number of technical papers were presented. Many delegations stressed that the Group should focus on the assessment of the technical and scientific basis of the proposed measures for subsequent consideration and should avoid any political judgements. At the

¹¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XIII.

second session, the Group entered into the stage of evaluation of the proposed measures, which will continue in 1993.

In the Final Document of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, a number of additional measures designed to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions had been endorsed. The States parties were then invited to make available information concerning their activities relevant to the provisions of the Convention on the basis of the annex to the Final Document on confidence-building measures. Out of 125 States parties (as of 31 July 1992), 36¹² provided information on the question in 1992.

Meeting in Washington on 28 and 29 May, the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed that they would strictly abide by the biological weapons Convention, undertake to maintain and support efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention, and implement in earnest the confidence-building measures adopted by the Third Review Conference. This commitment was part of the "Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction" issued by the five Powers at the conclusion of their Washington meeting.¹³

On 8 July, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution on the fulfilment of the Federation's commitments with regard to biological and chemical weapons. The resolution specifically confirmed the Russian Federation's status as legal successor to the USSR's commitments under the 1972 biological weapons Convention and under bilateral USSR-United States accords on the control of chemical weapons. Subsequently, on 11 September, the United Kingdom and the United States reached agreement with the Russian Federation on steps to be taken by the latter to make its biological weapons programme open, including visits by United Kingdom and United States

¹² Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Suriname, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia.

¹³ The text of the Guidelines is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992).

experts to non-military biological research facilities at any time, to be followed by visits to United States and United Kingdom sites.

With regard to *verification in all its aspects*, the Secretary-General submitted a report¹⁴ pursuant to General Assembly resolution 45/65 of 4 December 1990 on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. In addition to information on action undertaken by the Secretariat, the report contained replies from six Governments. Noting that in their study of 1990¹⁵ the experts had recommended the development of a United Nations data bank of published materials and data provided on a voluntary basis by Member States on all aspects of verification and compliance, the Secretary-General indicated in his report that, in spite of the limitation of existing resources, the Office for Disarmament Affairs had established a modest data collection including chapters on the history of negotiations and treaty compliance; information on various procedures for verification and monitoring; data on techniques and instrumentation for verification and monitoring; and bibliographical information and data, in particular information relating to the biological weapons Convention and the chemical weapons Convention. In addition, it was planned, the report of the Secretary-General stated, to compile lists of experts on verification and addresses of institutions, organizations, companies and individuals that could provide expertise, technologies and advice on aspects of verification. Such lists would be stored in the computerized database currently under implementation in the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

On the subject of the *United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*,¹⁶ there was further progress in 1992 towards making the Register operational in accordance with the declared goal of General Assembly resolution 46/32 L of 9 December 1991. By paragraph 8 of that resolution, the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to elaborate, with the assistance of a panel of governmental technical experts, technical procedures for the effective operation of the Register and to prepare

¹⁴ A/47/405 and Add.1. Replies were received from the following Governments: Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Russian Federation and United Kingdom.

¹⁵ *The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.IX.11). For a discussion of the study, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. III.

¹⁶ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. XV.

a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production; and by paragraph 11 (b), it had requested him to prepare, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 1994, a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the views expressed by Member States.

On 14 August the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly the first report,¹⁷ prepared by the panel of governmental technical experts, with a foreword. The report consists of three parts. Part I elaborates the technical procedures for the standardized reporting of data on international transfers of seven categories of conventional arms identified in the annex to the resolution. These categories are: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. Furthermore, this part of the report describes the manner in which Member States wishing to do so may communicate to the United Nations available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies. Part II of the report addresses modalities for earliest expansion of the scope of the Register *vis-à-vis* the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Part III deals with the resource implications for the development, upgrading and maintenance of the Register by the United Nations, through the Office for Disarmament Affairs. In particular, this part of the report discusses the resource requirements for the initial operation and storage of the data of the Register as well as the increased complexity of its subsequent continued operation. Special attention is given to the relevant needs of the computerized disarmament database of the Office for Disarmament Affairs which will be used to process information submitted by Governments for inclusion in the Register.

The establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms by the United Nations is a ground-breaking endeavour. As an action-oriented

¹⁷ A/47/342 and Corr.1, annex. See also A/47/370 and Add.1-3, a report of the Secretary-General containing information received from Member States on transparency in armaments (see footnote 23).

tool that will introduce openness and transparency in the area of international arms transfers, the Secretary-General wrote in his foreword, the Register has the potential to foster a climate of confidence and self-restraint, thereby creating an atmosphere more conducive to the effecting of real measures of disarmament. Indeed, the successful development and operation of the Register could in the final analysis provide the United Nations with an effective instrument in preventive diplomacy.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1992

In 1992, the Disarmament Commission completed its work on the item "Objective information on military matters", which had been on its agenda since 1990.¹⁸ The subject was pursued in a Working Group, under the chairmanship of Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. On 8 May, the Working Group adopted by consensus the "Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters", which were subsequently considered by the Disarmament Commission and submitted to the General Assembly.¹⁹ They read as follows:

Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters

1. In order to promote increased openness and transparency on military matters and to assist greater comprehension of the dangers of the arms race in all its aspects and of destabilizing accumulations of arms inconsistent with legitimate security needs and to contribute to faster progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2); taking into account the Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, as adopted by the Commission at its 1988 substantive session, and relevant General Assembly resolutions, has developed the following guidelines for objective information on military matters.

¹⁸ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. XVII, and vol. 16: 1991, chap. XVI.

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42)*, paras. 12 and 26.

Objectives

2. Objective information on military matters, though not an end in itself, may, through a dynamic process over time, serve among others the following purposes:

- To encourage openness and transparency on military matters in order to build confidence, enhance mutual trust and contribute to the relaxation of tension and to promote specific disarmament agreements and other concrete disarmament measures;
- To facilitate the process of arms limitation, reduction and elimination, as well as reduction of armed forces, and the verification of compliance with obligations assumed in these areas;
- To assist States in determining the level of forces and armaments sufficient for an adequate defensive capability;
- To increase the predictability of military activities and to avert crises and reduce the risk of military conflict, whether intentional or unintentional, by heading off dangerous errors or misperceptions that could generate or precipitate them;
- To promote greater public understanding and discussion of disarmament and security-related issues;

thereby leading to strengthened international peace and security, global as well as regional, and providing undiminished security of all States at the lowest possible level of armaments.

Principles

3. The Charter of the United Nations must be strictly observed. The purposes and principles of the Charter enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 are particularly relevant in the context of the provision of objective information on military matters.

4. Actions of States relating to objective information on military matters should be governed by the following:

- All States have the responsibility to provide objective information on military matters and the right of access to such information;
- The provision of objective information on military matters should be based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, which includes not only armed intervention but also other forms of interference;
- Objective information on military matters should be made accessible to the public of all States to the maximum degree possible consistent with national security and the provisions of related agreements;

- Bearing in mind the duty of all States to provide objective information on military matters, the States with the largest and most sophisticated arsenals have a special responsibility in providing information;
- Measures to promote openness and transparency in military matters, at both the global and the regional level, should take into account the legitimate security needs of States and the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments;
- The provision of objective information on military matters, in the regional context, should take account of the specific characteristics, degree of stability and political climate in each particular region in relation to the practical level of information necessary to promote openness and transparency, with the aim of contributing to confidence and stability;
- Any field of military activity, component of armed forces of States or their armaments, whether on their own territories, territories of other States or elsewhere, including outer space or the high seas, could be considered for the provision of objective information on military matters, including on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons, as appropriate;
- States should promote, through consultations on their own initiative, practical measures on the exchange of objective information on military matters, in the light of their specific situation and political, military and security conditions;
- The priorities in disarmament established by the General Assembly in paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Final Document of its Tenth Special Session should be duly taken into consideration, whenever applicable measures relating to objective information on military matters are taken;
- The information to be provided under agreements or arrangements for the exchange of objective information on military matters should be consistent in volume, range and quality with the objectives identified by the parties. The data should be accurate, comparable and provided on a reciprocal basis and may, if deemed necessary by the parties, be subject to verification;
- Exchange of information in the context of disarmament agreements or measures should be designed to meet the specific provisions of such accords;
- Information obtained under specific agreements may be restricted to the participants;

- Measures to promote openness and transparency may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, subregional, regional or global, and may use the potential of the United Nations;
- Such measures should be carried out in harmony with other efforts to build confidence, to promote disarmament and to strengthen security;
- As an important confidence-building measure, the provision of objective information on military matters can both promote, and in its turn be promoted by, improvement in the political climate among States concerned.

Scope

5. The potential for increase of openness and transparency through provision or exchange of objective information on military matters in all its aspects is as wide as the whole military field. The scope of any particular exercise will depend on the objective pursued and should be defined in accordance with the foregoing principles through consultations on an equal footing by parties concerned and can be adjusted, as necessary, upon their agreement.

Mechanisms

6. The foregoing objectives should be pursued in accordance with the foregoing principles through a range of mechanisms to promote the provision of objective information on military matters in a comprehensive and equitable manner, both within the United Nations system and outside it.

7. The United Nations should promote the provision of objective information on military matters, *inter alia*, through:

- Relevant guidelines and other recommendations developed by the Disarmament Commission;
- Collection and publication of information on military budgets provided by Member States on the basis of its standardized reporting system or possible future improvement thereof;
- Maintenance of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- United Nations studies carried out in accordance with General Assembly resolutions;
- Related activities of the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament;
- Research performed under the aegis of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;
- Operation of appropriate databases in accordance with the provisions of relevant resolutions and provision of advisory services, if requested by Member States.

In addition, if requested by the parties and subject to the availability of appropriate resources, the United Nations can assist in data collection and dissemination in the context of multilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament, as is already the case with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention.

8. The Conference on Disarmament can play an important role in promoting the provision of objective information on military matters through measures agreed upon by its members, in accordance with its rules of procedure.

9. Unilateral measures as well as bilateral, subregional, regional and other multilateral arrangements should also be utilized for the provision of objective information on military matters.

Recommendations

10. In the light of the foregoing objectives and principles, and with the aim of enhancing the security of all States, the following recommendations are offered for consideration.

11. The United Nations standardized system of reporting on military expenditures, which has attracted a growing number of participating States, should continue in operation and could be further improved as a global basis for the provision of objectively and comprehensively comparable information on such expenditures.

12. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should be operated and further developed on the basis of the relevant resolution of the General Assembly and the process set out therein, which is commended to the Member States.

13. States should, in the meantime, take practical measures, on the basis of existing agreements, where applicable, and within appropriate forums, to increase openness and transparency in military matters through the provision of objective information, including on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the transfer of high technology with military applications, imports and exports of conventional arms, military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.

14. Individual States and groups of States should consider formulating arrangements, freely arrived at between themselves, to promote the direct flow and exchange of information.

15. The General Assembly should consider the establishment of groups of experts to study ways and means of ensuring greater comparability of nationally supplied data. The objective of greater comparability could also be promoted through the exchange of information and cooperation among interested Member States on statistical methods.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1992

By resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, on transparency in armaments, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament: (a) to address, as soon as possible, the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in that field; (b) to address the problems of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase, openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments; and (c) to include in its annual report to the General Assembly a report on its work on the issue of transparency in armaments.

Thus, at the beginning of its 1992 session, the Conference on Disarmament held informal consultations on appropriate organizational arrangements to meet the requests made to it by the General Assembly. The President of the Conference appointed Mr. Mounir Zahran of Egypt as Special Coordinator to conduct such consultations. On the recommendation of the Coordinator, the Conference decided on 26 May "to add to its agenda for its 1992 session an item entitled 'Transparency in armaments'". In accordance with this decision, the Conference held five informal meetings on the agenda item between 9 and 26 June. During these meetings, the following questions were addressed:

1. The question of interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including: (a) military holdings, and (b) procurement through national production;
2. The elaboration of non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in the field;
3. The problems and the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to: (a) transfer of high technology with military applications, and (b) weapons of mass destruction.

At the informal meetings, numerous questions relating to organizational aspects of the consideration, by the Conference, of transparency in armaments were addressed, and delegations gave preliminary views on what they felt the role of the Conference in this area could or should

be. A variety of views were also expressed on the concept of transparency in armaments itself.²⁰

Delegations referred to a number of problems and issues with respect to the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, in particular: the need to take account of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence; the expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include information on military holdings and procurement through national production; the difficulties that some States might have in reporting this further information on the Register; the need to expand the Register on a step-by-step basis; the need for the Conference to take account of the report of the Panel of Governmental Technical Experts considering the expansion of the Register; the need to keep the provision of this type of information on a voluntary basis; the need to ensure that there is no link between the supply of information and decisions on economic and technological assistance; and the need to report transfers of know-how and technical services linked to the production, operation or maintenance of conventional arms, foreign technical support, transfers of plant technology, certain raw materials, and the construction by foreign contractors of installations necessary for the functioning, maintenance or production of such arms. Delegations also expressed varying views regarding the possibility that the Conference on Disarmament might take up the matters of the comparability of statistics, the nationality criteria for production facilities and the legal means used by Governments to obtain information from private sources; might consider an exchange of information on the organization and structure of military forces and of military budgets; and might play an important role in the movement towards the evaluation of information exchanged, leading eventually to a legally binding exchange of information linking suppliers and recipients.

The sensitive nature of the problems of openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications was fully analysed, and the need to handle this type of transfer in

²⁰ For details, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27)*, paras. 102 and 105.

a manner different from that of conventional weapons was duly stressed.²¹

Delegations attached importance to the problems of openness and transparency related to weapons of mass destruction and referred specifically to the following problems: increasing transparency as regards the nuclear-weapon States; the clandestine production of weapons of mass destruction; increasing transparency in States non-parties to existing legal instruments; the elaboration of universal and non-discriminatory means in this field; the relevance or the lack of relevance thereto of the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention, and the future chemical weapons Convention (specifically the provisions relating to the non-transfer of such weapons or their equipment, and arrangements with respect to exchanges of information among States parties to these agreements); and the need for the expansion of the United Nations Register to include this type of information exchange in order to reduce its discriminatory aspects.

Finally, delegations put forward ideas as to what the practical means for increasing openness and transparency might be.²² In conclusion, it was generally agreed that discussion of all these questions by the Conference had been useful and that the organizational framework for dealing with the item "Transparency in armaments" should be taken up at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

At its forty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted one resolution on each of the following related subjects: verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification; transparency in armaments; implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures; and guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters. A decision on another related matter, international arms transfers, is dealt with in chapter VI (see page 191). In addition to the various relevant reports of the Secretary-General already mentioned in this

²¹ Ibid., para. 108.

²² Ibid., para. 110.

chapter, his report²³ containing information provided by 23 Member States in connection with the implementation of resolution 46/36 L, "Transparency in armaments", adopted in 1991, was before the Assembly, as was his report²⁴ containing replies from 4 Member States pursuant to his request in accordance with General Assembly resolution 45/62 F, on implementation of the guidelines for confidence-building measures. In connection with the items on transparency and arms transfers, some national data on exports of military equipment were submitted to the United Nations.²⁵

On 30 October, 18 States²⁶ submitted a draft resolution on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. The draft was revised on 6 November by the addition of a ninth preambular paragraph, and was sponsored, finally, by 16 additional States.²⁷

In introducing the draft resolution on 5 November, the representative of Canada indicated that it had been Canada's intention to press for a follow-up study on verification, in consideration of the astounding changes that had taken place in the international system since 1990, when the previous study had been completed. One particular advantage of such a study, the representative stressed, would be the wider disse-

²³ A/47/370 and Add.1-3. Replies were received from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom.

²⁴ A/47/417. Replies were received from Cameroon, Finland, Nigeria and Portugal.

²⁵ Canada and Sweden provided various kinds of data, including information on their criteria for export and on recipients and types of goods exported in 1991. Canada's report, referred to along with other relevant documentation of Canada in document A/47/370, is available for consultation in the Office for Disarmament Affairs; Sweden's report was circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/47/183), annex.

²⁶ Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

²⁷ Armenia, Belgium, Bolivia, Cameroon, Denmark, Iceland, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Singapore, Slovenia and Thailand.

mination of information about a variety of United Nations activities relating to verification, including those mandated by the Security Council. Canada had decided, however, not to press ahead with its proposal, as there was no consensus on the subject, and to proceed instead with a draft resolution by which, in operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, as a follow-up to the 1990 study and in view of significant developments in international relations since that study, to seek the views of Member States on: (a) additional actions that might be taken to implement the recommendations contained in the study; (b) how the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements could facilitate United Nations activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building; and (c) additional actions that might be taken with respect to the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, including further studies by the United Nations on that subject.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 47/45. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/45

Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985, 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986, 42/42 F of 30 November 1987, 43/81 B of 7 December 1988 and 45/65 of 4 December 1990,

Noting that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is universally recognized,

Stressing that the issue of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is a matter of concern to all nations,

Recognizing that the United Nations, in accordance with its role and responsibilities established under the Charter, can make a significant contribution in the field of verification, in particular of multilateral agreements,

Affirming its continued support for the sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission,

Noting that recent developments in international relations have underscored the continuing importance of effective verification of existing and future

arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and that some of these developments have significant effects on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which require careful and ongoing examination,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, containing his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient, within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building,

Taking note also of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted on 27 September 1991, and the activities of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on verification,

Welcoming the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which contains an unprecedented regime of verification,

Recalling that in resolution 45/65 it requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on actions taken by Member States and by the United Nations Secretariat to implement the recommendations contained in the concluding chapter of the report of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on actions to implement the recommendations in the in-depth study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification;

2. *Encourages* Member States to continue to give active consideration to the recommendations contained in the concluding chapter of the study and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation where appropriate;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as a follow-up to the study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and in view of significant developments in international relations since that study, to seek the views of Member States on:

- (a) Additional actions that might be taken to implement the recommendations contained in the study;

- (b) How the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements can facilitate United Nations activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building;

- (c) Additional actions with respect to the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, including further studies by the United Nations on this subject;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

On 29 October, 43 States, later joined by 10 more States,²⁸ submitted a draft resolution on transparency in armaments. In introducing the draft resolution on 4 November, the representative of the Netherlands stated that the purpose of the draft resolution was to maintain momentum towards the overall political objectives set by the General Assembly. By the resolution the Assembly would keep intact all that had been decided by resolution 46/36 L of 1991 and would endorse the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report for the effective operation of the Register.²⁹ The representative of the Netherlands pointed out that the text stressed the importance of the participation of all States in the Register and the need for sufficient resources to be made available for the Secretariat to operate and maintain it. The sponsors believed that if all the points enumerated in the operative part of the text were carried out, the prospects would be good that the group of governmental experts would have a sound basis when they commenced their work in 1994 on the continuing operation and further development of the Register.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. At the time of the vote, three States expressed reservations. China's reservations pertained to the report: it did not cover all aspects of arms transfers; it was deficient in the categories listed for reporting; and it did not give adequate attention to the security of States that rely on imports. Cuba, which had not supported the corresponding re-

²⁸ Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

²⁹ See footnote 17 above and the corresponding outline of the report (A/47/342 and Corr.1, annex).

solution in 1991, joined in the consensus because the new text was basically procedural. It would have preferred that the requests made in operative paragraphs 5 and 8 be expressed more emphatically and that the General Assembly reiterate its determination to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. Pakistan believed that it was the responsibility of the major arms supplier countries to take the lead in reporting on transfers. Only in this way would proposals for transparency strengthen international and regional peace and security.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 47/52 L.

Three States expressed reservations regarding the resolution in the General Assembly.

Egypt continued to support the objectives underlying the establishment of the Register and to believe that the following were basic requirements if the Register was to fulfil those objectives; it had (a) to be truly universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory; (b) to ensure equal rights and obligations for all States; (c) to recognize the legitimate security concerns of all States; and (d) to provide the broadest degree of transparency in all fields of armaments. Egypt emphasized that when resolution 46/36 L had been adopted on 9 December 1991, expansion of the scope of the Register remained one of the highest priorities. It was only through the addition of further categories of equipment and the inclusion in the Register of information on military stockpiles and national production of armaments, on the transfer of high technology with military applications and on weapons of mass destruction that the Register would evolve to become a truly comprehensive instrument of disarmament providing the broadest degree of transparency. Such a comprehensive approach was fundamental for safeguarding the security of all States, eliminating suspicion and doubts, and guaranteeing the universality of the Register. With respect to the report of the panel of experts, Egypt expressed its surprise that the panel had not attempted to define "arms transfer", and that standardized forms for reporting transfers were lacking. It was concerned also that the panel had not given more substantive consideration to the issues it identified with regard to modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register.

Algeria took a similar position, noting what it considered shortcomings in the report of the panel of governmental experts and stressing the need for universality and comprehensiveness: provision of informa-

tion on national production of armaments, acquisitions and stocks, including weapons of mass destruction, as well as information on the transfer of technology. Only by expanding the scope of the Register in this way would it be possible to correct the inequalities in the obligations between those countries whose needs must be met through imports and those whose national production of armaments was sufficient.

The Syrian Arab Republic noted that the resolution did not take into account the special situation in the Middle East, where, it stated, the Arab-Israeli conflict persisted owing to Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and to its refusal to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. Another factor in the situation was, it stated, Israel's possession of the most lethal weapons of mass destruction and its ability to produce, develop and stockpile them.

Resolution 47/52 L

Transparency in armaments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, entitled "Transparency in armaments",

Continuing to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, contained in the annex to resolution 46/36 L, constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report on the technical procedures and adjustments to the annex necessary for the effective operation of the Register and on the modalities for its early expansion,

Welcoming also the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters as adopted by consensus in the Disarmament Commission,

Welcoming further the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments",

1. *Declares* its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms as provided for in paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 of its resolution 46/36 L;

2. *Endorses* the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report on the technical procedures and adjustments to the annex necessary for the effective operation of the Register;

3. *Notes* the suggestions offered in the report as a first step in the consideration of modalities for early expansion of the Register;

4. *Calls upon* all Member States to provide the requested data and information to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually, beginning in 1993;

5. *Encourages* Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their national arms import and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures, both as regards authorization of arms transfers and prevention of illicit transfers, in conformity with paragraph 18 of its resolution 46/36 L;

6. *Reaffirms* its request to the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development with the assistance of a group of governmental experts convened in 1994 on the basis of equitable geographical representation;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the United Nations Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;

8. *Encourages* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work undertaken in response to the requests contained in paragraphs 12 to 15 of resolution 46/36 L;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on progress made in implementing the present resolution to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

On 30 October, the 12 member States of the European Community and 29 other States, later joined by 6 more,³⁰ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures".

On 9 November, the draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom, who observed that the first review of the guidelines—originally adopted in 1988—had revealed that they had been implemented by a great number of States. Reviewing developments over the last two years, he expressed the view that one could

³⁰ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belarus, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

justifiably state that the process had been further strengthened by: (a) conclusion of negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons, in which the concept of confidence-building was the underlying rationale of a number of provisions; (b) the launching of a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms and the beginning of work in the Conference on Disarmament on the item "Transparency in armaments"; (c) the expansion of the confidence-building-measures regime of the Convention on biological weapons, which had been agreed at the the Third Review Conference of the Convention in 1991; and (d) finalization of work on the agenda item "Objective information on military matters" at the 1992 session of the Disarmament Commission. Moreover, confidence-building measures had been widely accepted as an important step towards prevention of conflict and, in times of political tension and crisis, as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. This was underlined by the fact that at its 1992 session the First Committee was considering a number of resolutions on confidence-building measures agreed upon in different regions of the world (see chapter III, "Regional disarmament", above).

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Then, on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 47/54 D. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/54 D

Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 45/62 F, adopted without a vote on 4 December 1990,

Reconfirming its support for the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level as endorsed in resolution 43/78 H, adopted without a vote on 7 December 1988,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on experience reported by Member States with the implementation of confidence-building measures,

Noting with satisfaction the encouraging results of specific confidence-building measures agreed upon and implemented in some regions and, in particular, of measures creating confidence by contributing to disarmament and arms control and by promoting constraint in the military field,

Realizing with deep concern that at the same time tensions in other regions rise and that in some places violent armed conflicts have erupted,

Considering that confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, can be conducive to achieving structures of security based on cooperation and openness and thus contribute to the wider objective of the renunciation of the threat or use of force,

Welcoming recent progress in the promotion of transparency in the military field as a cornerstone for confidence-building through the finalization in the Disarmament Commission at its 1992 session of its work on the agenda item entitled "Objective information on military matters" and through the inclusion of the item entitled "Transparency in armaments" in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament,

Bearing in mind that confidence-building measures pursued at the regional level can contribute to the development of global security,

Pointing to the ongoing elaboration and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with a view to building on the foundations already laid for cooperative security in Europe,

Aware that there are situations peculiar to specific regions that have a bearing on the nature of the confidence-building measures feasible in those regions,

1. *Stresses* the need for the development of confidence-building measures as a concrete and continuous process to help to prevent the use of armed force as a means of resolving political conflicts;

2. *Recommends* the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures to all States for implementation, taking fully into account the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives and with the agreement and cooperation of the States of the region concerned;

3. *Also recommends* to all States and regions that have started to implement confidence-building measures to pursue further and strengthen this process;

4. *Appeals* to all States to consider the widest possible use of confidence-building measures in their international relations, including bilateral, regional and global negotiations, as an important step towards prevention of conflict and, in times of political tension and crisis, as an instrument for peaceful settlement of conflicts;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue actively its work on the agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments", which includes consideration and elaboration of universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in military matters;

6. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue to collect relevant information from all Member States;

7. *Appeals* to all Member States that have not yet done so to make their contribution to the report of the Secretary-General;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda for its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures"

On 27 October, 15 States³¹ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters". The draft was later sponsored by 6 more States.³²

On 11 November, the draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom, who pointed out that the text was largely procedural and that it was primarily intended to provide the guidelines and recommendations, adopted by consensus in the Disarmament Commission (see page 97), with the endorsement of the General Assembly. The language of the draft, the representative stated, reflected the fact that the guidelines and recommendations themselves were appropriate.

At the time of the adoption of the draft resolution, two States expressed reservations. Pakistan believed that the availability of information on military matters could work against the security interests of small and weak States. It also felt that reductions in military expenditures should be initiated by the States with the largest arsenals. India stressed the fact that, to be useful, a reporting system should be universally complied with, and suggested that the system for reporting military budgets should be reviewed and refined.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 47/54 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/54 B

Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters

The General Assembly,

³¹ Austria, Brazil, Cameroon, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

³² Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Ireland and Japan.

Recalling its resolutions 43/75 G of 7 December 1988 and 44/116 E of 15 December 1989,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission, containing the text, adopted by the Commission at its 1992 session, of the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters,

Expressing its appreciation for the work accomplished by the Disarmament Commission in finalizing the text of the guidelines and recommendations,

Reaffirming its firm conviction that a better flow of objective information on military matters can help to relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements,

Appealing to all States to consider the widest possible use of objective information on military matters,

Noting with satisfaction the encouraging results of specific measures agreed upon and implemented in certain regions,

1. *Endorses* the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1992 substantive session;

2. *Recommends* the guidelines and recommendations to all States for implementation, fully taking into account specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned;

3. *Invites* all States to provide relevant information to the Secretary-General regarding their implementation of the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters not later than 31 May 1994;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the guidelines and recommendations, on the basis of national reports on accumulated relevant experience, to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters".

Conclusion

Confidence-building measures, which are intended to encourage more open and stable relations between States by reducing or even eliminating causes of tension, mistrust and fear in military matters, have received increasing attention since the end of the cold war, both inside and outside

the United Nations. There is a clear need for such measures—the need to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension and, therefore, to conflict, particularly in a situation where States lack clear and timely information about the real intent of such activities. Thus, the ultimate purpose of confidence-building measures is to reassure, to increase security, and to facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

As is evident from the developments covered in this chapter, the subject of confidence-building measures (often also referred to as confidence- and security-building measures) presents many aspects, the major ones being: reliable communication, monitoring and verification, reporting of military expenditures, transparency in the international transfer of conventional arms and, more generally, transparency in armaments, as exemplified by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Among the many documents on confidence-building which were agreed upon in 1992, the Helsinki Document 1992, unanimously adopted in July at the Helsinki summit meeting of the 52 members of the CSCE, occupies an important place. Equally significant is the Treaty on Open Skies, signed at Helsinki on 24 March.

The Disarmament Commission at its 1992 session adopted specific “Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters”. The General Assembly, in resolution 47/54 B of 9 December, endorsed them and recommended them to all States for implementation.

Among the other General Assembly resolutions adopted on the subject-matter of this chapter, the one on transparency in armaments covers a subject that is gaining increasing attention on the part of Member States. In resolution 47/52 L, of 15 December, the General Assembly, continuing in the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters, declared its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register and called upon Member States to provide the requested data and information to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually, beginning in 1993.

In his 1992 report *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, the Secretary-General had the following comments on the subject of transparency in armaments:

I am encouraged by the steady progress that is being made towards the goal of increased transparency in armaments. To be sure, transparency is no substitute for reductions in arms, but when properly applied, it can be conducive to confidence-building among States and helpful in alerting the global community to excessive accumulations of armaments. Thus, it could serve as another useful tool in facilitating non-proliferation efforts.

In this context, the newly created United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was the subject of much debate last year, assumes even greater practical importance. . .

. . .

In politics, as in everyday life, problems often arise from misinterpreted intentions. Thus openness and transparency are crucially important as part of the process of building confidence. Their significance must be emphasized, particularly at regional and subregional levels, in order to make military behaviour more predictable and to reassure concerned States of the non-threatening intentions of potential rivals. Openness and transparency can also be useful early-warning instruments in the process of preventive diplomacy.³³

³³ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8, paras. 34, 35 and 37. The report was originally issued as document A/C.1/47/7.

CHAPTER V

Nuclear arms limitation, disarmament and related issues

Introduction

QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS have been considered within and outside the United Nations since the very beginning of the nuclear age. As a result of these considerations, a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements have been signed through which certain limitations and reductions have been accepted by States parties to those instruments.

Through long bilateral negotiations on nuclear-arms limitation and other related nuclear matters, the former Soviet Union and the United States have through the years reached a number of agreements.¹ The recent rounds of bilateral negotiations on strategic arms, the so-called Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, led to the signing of the START I Treaty² on 31 July 1991, which provides for significant reductions and imposes limits on all elements of their strategic nuclear forces. As a result of the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991, Soviet nuclear arms were put under the jurisdiction of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Further negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States during 1992 led to the conclusion of a second strategic arms reduction treaty, START II, early in 1993 (see below).

The discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests has been considered at the bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels. The trilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States led to the conclusion, in 1963, of the partial test-ban Treaty, which

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chaps. VI and VII.

² For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, appendix II.

prohibits all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments except under ground. The other two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, have not become parties, but France, since 1974, and China, since 1986, have not conducted atmospheric tests. In addition, two bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States—the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty—were signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively, and officially entered into force in 1990 upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the two Treaties with their new verification Protocols.³

Although in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty, its original parties (Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States) stated that they would seek “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”, there has been no real progress in this regard in the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament mainly owing to the position of the United Kingdom and the United States, which believe that as long as their security depends in part upon a nuclear deterrent they have to continue with some testing in order to ensure the safety and reliability of their stocks. For similar reasons, the Amendment Conference of the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty, held in January 1991, did not achieve a comprehensive test ban.

A number of measures have been proposed to avert or reduce the risk of nuclear war and its devastating consequences. Some of these have led to the establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (see chapter II), while others—concerning the prevention of nuclear war, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear-arms freeze, the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, the checking of the spread of missile technology and, more generally, the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems—are still being discussed. However, divergences of view have impeded significant progress in multilateral disarmament forums on these issues. Nevertheless, the negotiations between the former Soviet Union and the United States, as mentioned above, have led to the conclusion of several agreements in the nuclear field.

At the regional level, various proposals have been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or demilitarized zones. In

³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. VIII.

1959 and 1967 agreement was reached on the demilitarization of the Antarctic⁴ and the denuclearization of outer space,⁵ respectively, and the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area was created by the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).⁶ In 1986 the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)⁷ entered into force. For many years, the setting up of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia has been debated, and proposals for other regions, including Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans, have been put forward. Although some positive developments in the course of the last two years seem to have brought the establishment of such a zone in Africa somewhat closer, it is not yet clear how soon this will be realized. In addition, efforts to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean have encountered many difficulties.

This chapter deals with cessation of the nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war and, within that broad subject-area, with bilateral negotiations, a nuclear-test ban, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a nuclear-arms freeze, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. In addition, the item "Weapons of mass destruction; radiological weapons", on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, is discussed.⁸

⁴ The Antarctic Treaty (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*).

⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status*.

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status*.

⁷ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII, or *Status*.

⁸ The relationship between nuclear weapons and radiological weapons is still under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament.

General developments and trends, 1992

Several major developments took place in 1992 in the areas of nuclear-arms limitation, nuclear disarmament and related issues. These questions were the focus of discussions both within and outside the United Nations.

In his report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*, that

the process of nuclear disarmament is gathering momentum, at least as it relates to the United States and the States of the former Soviet Union. By the end of this decade, the multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) may be a thing of the past, and the category of tactical nuclear weapons will be sharply reduced, if not totally eliminated ... The agreement reached last June between the two sides, when translated into treaty language, could by the end of this century leave the United States with 3,500 and the Russian Federation with 3,000 warheads. This would represent a reduction of approximately 70 per cent over the next decade.⁹

The Secretary-General further pointed out that the international community could aim for no less a goal than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and that the hazards posed to humanity by those weapons could not be adequately dealt with until the threshold of the post-nuclear-weapon age was crossed. In that context, a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would be a significant step leading to the goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.¹⁰

The major developments occurring in the nuclear field will be discussed in this section in the framework of: (a) negotiations on START; (b) nuclear-test ban and other nuclear questions; and (c) nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

Negotiations on START

Late in 1991, the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, which, along with the nuclear arsenal of the United States, was the subject of reductions and limitations under the START Treaty signed by President Bush and President Gorbachev on 31 July 1991, passed into the jurisdiction of four newly formed States: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Rus-

⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8, para. 22. The report was originally issued as a document (A/C.1/47/7).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 24 and 25.

sian Federation and Ukraine. To address the questions raised by the new situation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States signed, on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon, a Protocol to the 1991 START Treaty,¹¹ by article I of which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine "as successor States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty". Under article II, they undertook to make "such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently" throughout their territories. In addition, it was stipulated, in article IV, that the representatives of those four States would participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with article I of the Protocol. In article V, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine committed themselves to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest possible time.¹²

Negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States on further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons intensified. As a result, on 3 January 1993, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). The Treaty codifies a Joint Understanding signed by the two Presidents at their Washington summit meeting on 17 June 1992.¹³

According to article I of the START II Treaty, the reductions will be implemented in two phases, the first of which will be completed within seven years of the Treaty's entry into force, and the second phase

¹¹ The text of the Protocol is reproduced in appendix II of this volume.

¹² As of 31 December 1992, the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol had been ratified by Kazakhstan (2 July). On 1 October, the United States Senate consented to ratification, and on 4 November, the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty. Both States attached a number of conditions, among them the completion of implementation arrangements among the four former Soviet republics and adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Treaty will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification by all five parties. On 4 February 1993, Belarus ratified the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol and acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty.

¹³ The text of the statements is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992), pp. 167-168.

of which will be completed by the year 2003, or by 2000 if the United States can contribute to the financing of the elimination of the Russian Federation's strategic offensive arms. In the first phase, each side will reduce and limit its strategic forces to an aggregate number of warheads between 3,800 and 4,250. Within those limits each party shall not exceed 1,200 warheads attributed to deployed MIRVed ICBMs, 650 warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, and 2,160 warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs. In the second phase, the sides will reduce their overall totals to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 warheads; within these limits, the aggregate numbers for each party shall not exceed a number between 1,700 and 1,750 warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs. In addition, all MIRVed ICBMs and all warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs will be eliminated. Under article V, which deals with verification, the verification provisions of START I shall be used for implementation of START II. In addition, START II will include some new verification measures such as observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads, and exhibition of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable differences. To promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty, a Bilateral Implementation Commission shall be established. START II will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to the entry into force of START I.¹⁴

Members of the General Assembly generally welcomed these developments and, for the first time, adopted without a vote a resolution on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, in which they urged the parties concerned to take the steps necessary to bring the START I Treaty and its Protocol into force at the earliest possible date and invited the United States and the Russian Federation to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their agreements and unilateral decisions.

Nuclear-test ban and other nuclear questions

There was a major development with regard to the question of a nuclear-test ban: unilateral moratoria on testing were declared or extended by three nuclear-weapon States. On 8 April, France decided to suspend

¹⁴ As the START II Treaty was actually signed at the beginning of 1993, the text of the Treaty will be reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 18: 1993.

its testing of nuclear weapons until the end of 1992. On 24 September, the United States Congress took a decision to the effect that no underground test of nuclear weapons might be conducted after 30 September 1992 and before 1 July 1993; the legislation placed limits on the number of tests to be permitted annually after 1 July 1993 and prohibited testing after 30 September 1996 unless a foreign State conducted a nuclear test after that date. In addition, the Russian Federation decided to extend its one-year unilateral moratorium, which had been declared on 26 October 1991,¹⁵ to 1 July 1993. Thus, the trend towards a decrease in the number of tests continued in 1992, with only the United States and China conducting tests (6 and 2 respectively).¹⁶

In spite of these unilateral measures, there was no breakthrough at the multilateral level.

After the 1991 Amendment Conference of the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty, the President of that Conference conducted consultations, and in October 1992 an understanding was reached by a majority of the parties that a special meeting of States parties would be held in the second quarter of 1993 to review the developments on the issue of nuclear testing, with a view to examining the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference later that year, but no consensus was reached on this point. The United States and the United Kingdom continued to oppose plans to reconvene the Conference, as they had done at the Conference itself.

The Conference on Disarmament was unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban at its 1992 session because of the continued differences among member States concerning the Committee's mandate. In spite of this, there was agreement to intensify consultations with a view to re-establishing the Committee at the beginning of the 1993 session. In a statement on 26 May marking another major departure from its earlier position, France announced its decision to take part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee when it was re-established.

In the First Committee the majority of Member States welcomed the positive developments regarding nuclear testing, especially the initiation of unilateral moratoria by France and the United States and the

¹⁵ The statement of President Gorbachev announcing the initial moratorium is reproduced in document A/46/592-S/23161, annex.

¹⁶ SIPRI source.

Russian Federation's extension of its moratorium, and called upon the remaining nuclear-weapon States to do likewise. In addition, the proposal made by the Foreign Minister of France on 3 November in the National Assembly to the effect that the representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States in the Conference on Disarmament initiate a common reflection on the question of nuclear testing was favourably commented upon. For the first time, France abstained on, rather than voting against, the draft resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Action on the draft resolution is discussed below (see page 138).

There were no discernible developments in the Disarmament Commission, in the Conference on Disarmament, or in the First Committee at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly regarding nuclear disarmament and prevention of the use of nuclear weapons. While the majority of Member States agreed that nuclear disarmament was most topical and welcomed the positive developments in this area, differences of view evident at earlier sessions became even more pronounced.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace

Several positive developments with regard to existing or future nuclear-weapon-free zones took place in 1992.

As far as the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America was concerned, on a proposal by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean adopted a resolution—290 (VII) of 26 August—by which amendments of an essentially technical character, intended to enhance the implementation of articles 14 to 16, 19 and 20, which pertain to verification, were approved, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.¹⁷ After the adoption of the amendments, Brazil made a declaration,¹⁸ on behalf also of Argentina and Chile, to the effect that “as soon as the three countries have completed the procedures for ratifying the text of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, as amended, they will waive all the requirements set

¹⁷ A/47/467, annex. See also CD/1172, containing a commentary on the amendments, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The text of the amendments is reproduced in appendix IV.

¹⁸ A/47/461, annex.

forth in paragraph 1 of article 28 of the Treaty that still remain to be met".¹⁹ After repeated calls by the General Assembly, France deposited on 24 August its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thus giving full force to that Protocol. There was general agreement that these two actions would contribute to the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by that Treaty in Latin America and the Caribbean.

As far as the denuclearization of Africa is concerned, the positive developments on the continent in the course of the last two years gave rise to a general feeling that the evolution of the international situation was conducive to implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. On the basis of General Assembly resolution 46/34 B, a second meeting of experts organized by the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU, took place in 1992 at Lomé. In the report of the Group of Experts,²⁰ the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa were further examined. Several States, particularly States in the region, considered that the report of the experts could bring the continent closer to the conclusion of the desired treaty. The report is discussed more fully in the following section (see page 154).

There was no new development concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In spite of the expectation on the part of many States that favourable developments in international relations and the ongoing peace process would have a positive influence on efforts to create such a zone, many Arab States continued to consider that the main obstacle to the successful outcome of such efforts was Israel's nuclear-weapon capability.

In the light of persisting differences of view in both the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the General Assembly with respect to the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean, it was decided that a new, alternative approach, one which would take

¹⁹ According to paragraph 2 of article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, all signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of that article and they may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently.

²⁰ A/47/468, annex.

into account the changing international situation, was needed if the goals of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace were to be achieved. Therefore, it was agreed not to fix a date for convening the Conference but rather to leave the question of timing open.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1992

The Commission continued to consider the item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", which it had begun to consider in 1991. Two new papers on the item were submitted,²¹ one by China and the other by Portugal. The Commission decided to re-establish Working Group II to deal with the item. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Prakash Shah of India, the Group held nine meetings between 22 April and 7 May. The Group decided to base its work on the following four agreed subjects presented by the Chairman of the Group at the 1991 session of the Commission: (a) the relationship between the process of nuclear disarmament and international peace and security; (b) review of the steps taken in the process of nuclear disarmament; (c) strengthening of the process of nuclear disarmament, necessary conditions and mechanisms required for it; and (d) the role of the United Nations system in the process of nuclear disarmament with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

During the discussion, the four subjects were further elaborated by the Group, and it was the hope of the Group that at the next session of the Commission consensus might be reached on a document for this agenda item. The Working Group decided to annex to its report a list of elements identified and elaborated under the four subjects discussed.²² However, the list was without prejudice to the right of any delegation to address items that did not appear on it, and the sequence of the items did not reflect any order of priorities.

²¹ A/CN.10/166 (China) and A/CN.10/172 (Portugal on behalf of the European Community and its member States).

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42)*, para. 29 (report), and annex II (list of elements).

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1992

As there was no agreement to establish an ad hoc committee, the item *Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament* was addressed in the statements on all items in plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament, while the substance was discussed in informal meetings. It was decided that the discussion on the item at informal meetings would be duly reflected in the report of the Conference. Four informal meetings devoted to the agenda item were held between 12 March and 23 July. The President of the Conference prepared a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured and orderly discussion. The Group of 21 joined the consensus in favour of discussing the item in the informal meetings.

The representatives of the United States and the Russian Federation provided details concerning the agreement the two States had reached on 17 June, which would reduce their nuclear arsenals from 21,000 to 6,000-7,000 warheads in two phases—well below the totals for both sides agreed to in the START I Treaty.

While the majority of States referred to the progress achieved and looked forward to further reductions in the course of the START process, most members of the Group of 21 reiterated that bilateral negotiations could not replace or bypass the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. They felt that the present international situation and the end of the cold war lent further credence to the long-standing demand of an overwhelming majority of the world community that further urgent measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons be taken, and they stressed that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence could not be the basis for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war.

Argentina, Peru and Sweden, however, felt that a fresh look should be taken at the nuclear-related issues and that the Conference should consider these important questions in a broader context, taking into account, among other things, the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries which had up to now not possessed such weapons. India recalled a specific action plan its Government had presented at the third special session on disarmament, in 1988, and it elaborated upon elements of a proposal for a cut-off in the production of fissionable material. India further stated that so long as the envisaged regime for international control of the production of fissionable material was based on one set

of rules for nuclear-weapon States and another for the rest, verification of such a cut-off would remain difficult.

Peru maintained that the end of the cold war had brought nuclear deterrence to its historical crisis point. With the exception of one intermediate nuclear Power, it did not occur to anyone today to advocate renewing nuclear arsenals. In its view, the emerging new world order afforded a good opportunity to move towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation proposed that the strategic offensive weapons which it and the United States would retain after the upcoming deep cuts should not be targeted on United States or Russian facilities, respectively, nor on those of other countries. In that context, it proposed several concrete measures—that the strategic weapons be taken off alert status; that delivery vehicles and warheads be stored separately; and that nuclear military doctrines be reassessed—to be undertaken primarily by the two major nuclear-weapon States, while the other nuclear-weapon States could join in the process later.

The Western Group stated that nuclear disarmament remained one of its highest priorities. It believed that while the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with those States that possessed the most important nuclear arsenals, the international community as a whole had to be involved and to contribute to measures of nuclear disarmament and arms limitation and to non-proliferation. France recalled its initiatives for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, *inter alia* its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, its ratification of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the suspension of its nuclear testing in 1992.

China reiterated that it had all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and it called upon the two major nuclear States to create, by drastically cutting all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home and abroad, conditions for convening a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. In addition, it welcomed the recent progress made by the two major nuclear-weapon States, such as the implementation of the INF Treaty, the signing of the START Treaty and the conclusion of the agreement on further reduction of nuclear weapons.

The item *Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters* was also addressed at plenary and at informal meetings. Three informal meetings were held between 21 May and 25 June.

Most members of the Group of 21 continued to believe that the greatest peril facing the world was the threat of destruction from a nuclear war. In their view, conventional wars could not in any circumstances be equated with nuclear war, since nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction. Argentina, Peru and Sweden, however, felt that recent international developments were positive, and although they acknowledged that the risk of nuclear war had certainly not been eliminated, they believed that, given the new international climate, the Conference had reason to review its methodology for considering this item.

India stated that in keeping with its long-standing proposal for an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it had been heartened by the proposals made by the Russian Federation, mentioned above.

The Western Group remained of the view that the prevention of nuclear war could be dealt with satisfactorily only in the broader context of the prevention of war in general. It further noted that it was important that the Conference should continue to keep abreast of all disarmament initiatives and in particular encourage the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

The Russian Federation emphasized that it would pursue a policy for the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and would ensure the maximum security of nuclear weapons and all related facilities. It referred to the proposal made by the President of the Federation for setting up an international agency to ensure the reduction of nuclear weapons, which, at subsequent stages, could have under its control the whole nuclear cycle. The Russian Federation also announced its intention to become a fully-fledged participant in the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

China reiterated its call upon all nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones; to support the establishment of such zones; and to pull back all nuclear weapons deployed abroad.

At the beginning of the 1992 session, the President of the Conference carried out consultations on an appropriate organizational arrangement for the agenda item entitled *Nuclear test ban*. On 13 February, he appointed Mr. Prakash Shah of India as a special coordinator to seek agreement on such an organizational arrangement. On 26 May, France, the only nuclear-weapon State that had not thus far participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, announced its decision to join the Ad Hoc Committee when it was re-established.

On 13 August, the Special Coordinator reported that he had carried out active and intensive consultations, both bilaterally and through open-ended meetings. He stated that the growing importance of the question of a nuclear-test ban was recognized by all delegations and that an overwhelming majority had expressed their willingness to give a mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee to continue, as a step towards achieving such a ban, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues. While substantial progress had been made on improving the previous mandate, no final agreement had been possible before the end of the 1992 session.

Under this item, Norway presented to the Conference the full report of the Expert Study on Questions Related to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a summary of the Study.²³ The Study was commissioned and published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Many views on the substance of the issue of a nuclear-test ban, as well as on organizational issues, were expressed in the plenary meetings of the Conference throughout the session. The Conference agreed to intensify its consultations with a view to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the beginning of the 1993 session.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held its thirty-third and thirty-fourth sessions from 2 to 13 March and from 27 July to 7 August, respectively. The Group had, during the last several years, concentrated on the conduct and evaluation of its second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2), and it presented corresponding progress reports²⁴ to the Conference, including, in its July-August report, a de-

²³ CD/1167 (the full report) and CD/1151 (the summary).

²⁴ CD/1145 and CD/1163.

tailed account of the test and of the scientific and technical results obtained.

In introducing the March report, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden, stated that the purpose of the recent exercise of GSEIT was to test the methods and procedures developed by the Group and he suggested that recent developments had raised the interesting possibility of studying the feasibility of reducing the number of experimental international data centres, perhaps going so far as to have only one.

In introducing the August report, Mr. Dahlman stated that the Group had devoted most of its efforts to discussing the reassessment of the concept of the global monitoring system and its components. As to the overall conceptual design, the Group agreed to elaborate on the following topics: overall concept, station design, site selection, network studies, seismological procedures, establishment of a single international data centre, communications, interaction by the international data centre with national and regional networks, and cost estimates.

On 18 August, the Conference adopted the recommendation contained in the report of the Group, thereby approving the dates of the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, namely from 15 to 26 February 1993. Furthermore, as suggested in the report, the President, with the agreement of the Conference, extended an invitation to IAEA to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group at its next session.

During the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament, a number of member and non-member States made reference to the agenda item entitled *New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons*²⁵ in the course of their statements on all items in plenary meetings.

The Conference re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on 20 February with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Serguei Batsanov of the Russian Federation, the Ad Hoc Committee held four meetings between 17 March and 27 July. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on 22 August 1991, the Ad

²⁵ See footnote 8.

Hoc Committee was open to non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work.

The Ad Hoc Committee re-established its two contact groups: Contact Group A to continue to consider the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense, and Contact Group B to continue to consider issues relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, each Group to be chaired by a coordinator. Subsequently, Mr. Nebojsa Dimitrijevic of Yugoslavia and Mr. John L. Ausman of Canada agreed to assist the Chair by serving as Coordinators of Contact Groups A and B respectively. As in the past, France did not participate in the work of Contact Group B.

At the suggestion of the Chairman, it was agreed that the two Groups should pursue their work along the lines recommended in the 1991 report of the Ad Hoc Group,²⁶ namely by drawing upon the two annexes contained in that report.

On the basis of the work conducted within the Groups, the two Coordinators presented their reports to the Ad Hoc Committee. The reports were subsequently reproduced as annexes I and II to the Committee's report to the Conference.²⁷

On 6 August the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. In introducing it to the Conference, the Chairman of the Committee noted that little progress had been made on both tracks over several years. Although the draft convention prohibiting radiological weapons was at an advanced stage and had even been slightly improved at the 1992 session, the basic provisions governing the scope and definition of radiological weapons remained unresolved. Similarly, the possible elements of a convention banning attacks against nuclear facilities were only slightly modified at the session, so that the fundamental question what facilities would fall under the protection of the convention remained open. Therefore, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended that the Conference give guidance to it in reviewing its organization of work so that it could fulfil the mandate that it would be given in 1993.

²⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/46/27)*, chap. III, sect. G, para. 95.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, *Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27)*, chap. III, sect. G, para. 80.

The Conference continued to consider at its plenary meetings the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. In addition, the President of the Conference for the month of January, at a plenary meeting of the Conference, suggested that the Conference should keep the item under review, with expert assistance, as appropriate, with a view to making recommendations, when necessary, on undertaking specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons.

Action by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1992

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean held its session from 18 to 22 May, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stanley Kalpagé of Sri Lanka. At its 1992 session, the Ad Hoc Committee was composed, as at the previous session, of 44 States and 1 Observer.²⁸

The Ad Hoc Committee dealt mainly with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 46/49, by which the Assembly had called, *inter alia*, for "the full and active participation in the Conference of the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, whose cooperation and participation are essential for the success of the Conference". After consultations with three of the permanent members of the Security Council—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—and with some of the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, the Chairman informed the Committee on 18 May that they had conveyed the view that they would not find it possible to participate in a conference based on the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, as they believed that the Declaration had been overtaken by positive developments in international political relations; their position was that there was no longer rivalry between the great Powers in the Indian Ocean. Given this fact,

²⁸ Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and, as Observer, Sweden.

the Committee felt that it might not be possible to hold the Conference at Colombo in 1993 in accordance with resolution 46/49. The Committee was therefore of the view that the General Assembly might wish to consider new, alternative approaches to establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. While building upon existing important principles, the Committee should consider the changing international situation. On 22 May, the Committee adopted its report to the General Assembly.²⁹

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

As at previous sessions, the General Assembly had on its agenda several items related to nuclear weapons—such as bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, a nuclear-test ban, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a nuclear-arms freeze, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones and Israeli nuclear armament—and to implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

On 30 October, 31 States, later joined by 6 others,³⁰ submitted a draft resolution entitled “Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament”. In introducing it on 9 November, Indonesia stated that the draft resolution reflected the profound changes and transitions that had occurred in the international landscape and the resultant shifts in perception and attitude towards nuclear disarmament. After mentioning the main achievements in nuclear disarmament, Indonesia stressed that for the first time in many years concerted efforts by the Russian Federation, the United States and the non-aligned and other countries had drawn broad support for the draft resolution; the sponsors hoped it would be adopted unanimously.

²⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No.29 (A/47/29)*. The statement of the Chairman was reproduced as an annex to the report.

³⁰ Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

On 13 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Only Ukraine explained its position concerning the draft resolution. While joining the consensus, it observed that the text did not reflect the essence of the ongoing nuclear-weapons reduction process, nor did it pay due tribute to the contribution of some newly independent States to the process of reduction of nuclear weapons. It further stressed that the other nuclear-weapon States must now play their part in unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 47/52 K. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 K

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Recognizing the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons,

Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Stressing the importance of strengthening international peace and security through disarmament,

Emphasizing that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of our times,

Stressing also that it is the responsibility of all States to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Appreciating a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement and the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Noting that there are still significant nuclear arsenals and that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest nuclear arsenals,

Welcoming the steps that have already been taken by these States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status,

Noting also the new climate of relations between the United States of America and States of the former Soviet Union, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

Urging that further cooperation be undertaken to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear disarmament and nuclear-arms reductions,

Welcoming also the reductions made by other nuclear-weapon States in some of their nuclear-weapon programmes, and encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

Affirming that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should facilitate and complement each other,

1. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the continued implementation of the treaty that was concluded between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of all their declared missiles subject to elimination under the treaty;

2. *Welcomes* the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the accompanying protocol that was signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring this Treaty and the accompanying protocol into force at the earliest possible date;

3. *Also welcomes* the unilateral decisions announced by the President of the United States of America and similar unilateral steps announced by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and subsequently by the President of the Russian Federation to reduce significantly the size and nature of nuclear deployments worldwide, to eliminate certain nuclear weapons and to enhance stability;

4. *Further welcomes* the Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the Russian Federation that was announced in Washington on 17 June 1992, and urges that the early conversion of this Joint Understanding into a formal treaty be completed;

5. *Encourages* the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

6. *Further encourages and supports* the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armaments and

to continue to give these efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

7. *Invites* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions.

On 30 October, 66 States³¹ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", which was later also sponsored by an additional 33 States.³² At the time of its consideration in the First Committee, members had before them two notes by the Secretary-General,³³ one transmitting a quarterly report of Australia on presumed underground nuclear explosions, which referred to a nuclear explosion in Nevada on 26 March with an estimated yield of 40-150 kilotonnes, and the other, the annual register for the period 15 September 1991-14 September 1992, reporting the same explosion. Other nuclear explosive testing carried out during the period was not reported to the Secretary-General for consolidation in the register.

In introducing the draft resolution on 3 November, Mexico noted that the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests had been on the agenda of the First Committee for almost four decades, which was compelling evidence of the importance that the international community attached to the subject. After reviewing the various para-

³¹ Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

³² Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Guyana, Honduras, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zaire and Zambia.

³³ A/47/313, annex (communication of Australia), and A/47/482 (annual register).

graphs of the draft, Mexico expressed the hope that it would receive the firm support of Member States.

On 13 November, Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors, made a minor oral revision.

At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the draft resolution, as orally revised, by a recorded vote of 136 to 1 (United States), with 4 abstentions (China, France, Israel and United Kingdom).

In explaining its negative vote, the United States said that the draft resolution was not consistent with its policy regarding nuclear testing. After noting that the United States had suspended all nuclear tests temporarily and that in the future it would conduct only the minimum number of tests necessary for evaluating and improving the safety of its much smaller nuclear deterrent and for maintaining the reliability of its nuclear forces, it affirmed that it remained prepared to discuss all aspects of nuclear testing issues in the Conference on Disarmament.

France, explaining why it had abstained rather than voting against the draft resolution as had been its practice, enumerated its initiatives regarding nuclear issues, such as its suspension of tests until the end of 1992, its readiness to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, and its proposal for consultations among the five nuclear-weapon States. Its attitude would continue to be inspired by a sense of responsibility towards the international community, its own national security, and the search for acceptable solutions.

While voting in favour, India reiterated its view that its vote was without prejudice to its well-known position on the scope of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which, it believed, should coincide with that envisaged in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty. It also expressed a hope that when the Ad Hoc Committee was re-established in 1993 it would have an adequate negotiating mandate. It invited all nuclear-weapon States meanwhile to replicate without reservations the unilateral moratoria on nuclear-weapon testing announced by some of them in order to create a propitious atmosphere for those negotiations.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 159 to 1, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 47/47. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/47

Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Recalling previous resolutions which identify the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and a comprehensive test ban as one of the priority objectives in the field of disarmament,

Convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Welcoming the improved relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and their consequent announcements of significant measures, including unilateral steps, which could signal the reversal of the nuclear-arms race,

Welcoming also the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on 31 July 1991, and the signing of a protocol to this Treaty in which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America undertake to give effect to the Treaty,

Welcoming further the Joint Understanding of 17 June 1992 between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on further reductions in their strategic offensive arms,

Welcoming the decision taken by France to suspend its testing of nuclear weapons for 1992,

Endorsing the call made by France and by the Russian Federation on the other nuclear Powers to suspend their nuclear tests,

Welcoming also in addition the recent decision of the United States of America to implement a testing moratorium accompanied by a plan for achieving a multilateral, comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming further the decision of the Russian Federation to extend its earlier-announced nuclear-testing moratorium,

Convinced that an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting the concerns expressed about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing, as brought out in the Expert Study on Questions Related to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in CD/1167 of 14 August 1992, which noted, *inter alia*, the environmental benefits and economic savings to be derived from a complete ban on nuclear testing,

Convinced also that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion, at an early date, of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that will attract the adherence of all States,

Taking into account the undertakings by the original parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and also noting the reiteration of this commitment in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the work being undertaken within the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and in this context welcoming the results of the second technical test concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data, which will permit the system to be redesigned in the light of this experience,

Recalling that the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was held in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991,

Expressing its disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban", despite the improved political climate,

1. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of priority which would constitute an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation, and which would contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament;

2. *Urges*, therefore, all States to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions for all time;

3. *Urges*:

(a) The nuclear-weapon States to agree promptly to appropriate verifiable and militarily significant interim measures, with a view to concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;

4. *Reaffirms* the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and in this context urges the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in 1993;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in this context, to intensify its substantive work begun in 1990 on specific and interrelated test-ban issues,

including structure and scope and verification and compliance, taking also into account all relevant proposals and future initiatives;

6. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To take into account the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including the experience gained from the technical test concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data, and other relevant initiatives;

(b) To continue efforts to establish, with the widest possible participation, an international seismic monitoring network with a view to developing further a system for the effective monitoring and verification of compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(c) To investigate other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including on-site inspections, satellite monitoring and an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

7. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on progress made, including its recommendations on how the objectives of the Ad Hoc Committee on item I of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban", should be carried forward most effectively towards achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

On 30 October, 18 States, later joined by 5 others,³⁴ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water". On 11 November the draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mexico, who noted that although three of the nuclear-weapon States had unilaterally decided to observe moratoria on nuclear testing, the pledge made in the preamble to the Treaty nearly 30 years ago to seek "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" had not been achieved. In the draft resolution, after a reference to the Amendment Conference and the ongoing consultation conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference, all parties to the partial test-ban Treaty were called on to participate in, and contribute

³⁴ Bahamas, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela.

to the success of, that Conference for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at an early date.

On 16 November the First Committee took action on the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by a recorded vote of 86 to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 43 abstentions; and operative paragraph 2 was adopted by a recorded vote of 89 to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 41 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 93 to 2, with 40 abstentions.

Several States explained their positions regarding the draft resolution. Thus, the United States reiterated its position that consideration of the proposed amendment had been completed with the conclusion of the Amendment Conference in 1991 and that there was no legal basis for any further work to be carried out under the auspices of that Conference. It would neither participate in any further work on the amendment nor contribute to paying the costs for any additional meetings of the Conference.

Among those abstaining, Australia, speaking also on behalf of New Zealand, stated that while they strongly supported efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty, they were convinced that the most appropriate and effective way to achieve that goal was through the mechanism of negotiations conducted in the Conference on Disarmament, and in that connection they welcomed the proposal by France to hold consultations among the nuclear-weapon States on testing. A similar explanation was given by Japan, which added that efforts should be consolidated through the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in the Conference on Disarmament. Sweden considered that it was up to the States parties to the Treaty to agree on necessary measures with regard to its possible amendment; it would have preferred to see a draft limited to addressing the consultations held by the President of the Amendment Conference. Canada associated itself with the explanations given by Australia, Japan and Sweden.

While voting in favour, the Russian Federation explained that it supported the draft as a whole, but had abstained during the separate votes on operative paragraphs 1 and 2 because no agreement had been reached during the consultations held at the beginning of the session that there would be a special meeting of States parties to the Treaty and because there was no consensus on the question whether the condi-

tions necessary for resumption of the Amendment Conference had been met.

The General Assembly adopted operative paragraph 1 by a recorded vote of 113 to 2, with 43 abstentions, and operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 112 to 2, with 43 abstentions. The resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 2, with 41 abstentions, as resolution 47/46. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/46

Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 44/106 of 15 December 1989, 45/50 of 4 December 1990 and 46/28 of 6 December 1991,

Reiterating its conviction that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the highest-priority measure for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and for the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the central role of the United Nations in the field of nuclear disarmament and in particular in the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, as well as the persistent efforts of non-governmental organizations in the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Conscious of the growing environmental concerns throughout the world and of the past and potential negative effects of nuclear testing on the environment,

Recalling its resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, in which it noted with approval the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed on 5 August 1963, and requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Treaty,

Recalling also that more than one third of the parties to the Treaty requested the Depositary Governments to convene a conference to consider an amendment that would convert the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Recalling further that a substantive session of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was held in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991,

Reiterating its conviction that the Amendment Conference will facilitate the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Treaty and thus serve to strengthen it,

Noting with satisfaction the unilateral nuclear-test moratoria announced by several nuclear-weapon States,

Recalling its recommendation that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved,

Recalling also the decision adopted by the Amendment Conference to the effect that, since further work needed to be undertaken on certain aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the President of the Conference should conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and to resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time,

Welcoming the ongoing consultations being conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference,

1. *Notes* the ongoing consultations being conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the special meeting of States parties of a brief duration to be held in New York in the second quarter of 1993 to review the developments on the issue of nuclear testing, with a view to examining the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference later that year;

2. *Calls upon* all parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to participate in, and to contribute to the success of, the Amendment Conference for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at an early date, as an indispensable measure towards implementation of their undertakings in the preamble to the Treaty;

3. *Urges* all States, especially those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so, to adhere to the Treaty;

4. *Recommends* that arrangements should be made to ensure the fullest possible participation of non-governmental organizations in the Amendment Conference;

5. *Reiterates its conviction* that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear-test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria;

6. *Stresses once again* the importance of ensuring adequate coordination among the various negotiating forums dealing with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water".

On 28 October, 21 States, later joined by 1 more,³⁵ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes". On 3 November, the draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Canada, who drew attention to new elements in the text of the draft resolution, for example a new fourth preambular paragraph giving recognition to important developments in the area of nuclear disarmament during the past year, and a new fifth preambular paragraph, in which the Assembly would welcome the recent decision of the United States not to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. Canada expressed the hope that the draft would receive even greater support than in the past.

On 13 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 4 abstentions (France, India, United Kingdom and United States).

In connection with the voting, France explained that it had abstained rather than voting negatively, as it had in the past, because it wished to underscore that it shared the concerns of the international community about the future of the fissionable material released in the course of implementation of the disarmament agreements of the two major nuclear-weapon States. It added that this change in its vote should be interpreted in the light of the recent French initiatives in the area of nuclear disarmament and that it would not object to the opening of discussions at the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of the production of fissionable material. The United States recalled the decision it had taken earlier in the year not to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes—a decision that marked a fundamental change in its policy. It abstained on the draft resolution, however, because it continued to oppose multilateral action on this issue at this time. India reiterated its reason for abstaining, namely that there should be a simultaneous stoppage in the production of nuclear weapons and all fissionable material for weapons purposes.

³⁵ Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Sweden and Uruguay.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 164 to none, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 47/52 C. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 C
Prohibition of the production of fissionable material
for weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/36 D of 6 December 1991 and previous resolutions, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for 1992 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the programme of work of the Conference for all three parts of its 1992 session contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling also the proposals and statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on those items,

Welcoming the significant progress in reducing nuclear-weapon arsenals as evidenced by substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and unilateral undertakings by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States towards the reduction in some of their nuclear-weapons programmes or of the numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as well as regarding the disposition of fissile material,

Welcoming also the recent decision by the United States not to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would also be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering also that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

1. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes".

On 30 October, 5 States, later joined by 1 more,³⁶ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze". The draft was introduced on 10 November by the representative of Mexico, who stated that, in spite of recent positive developments, the sponsors believed that so long as the nuclear Powers refused to give up the policy of nuclear deterrence, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would continue to be Utopian and efforts to consolidate a true non-proliferation regime would be stymied. Although the draft was very similar to the corresponding texts of past years, it reflected agreements reached and welcomed the moratoria on nuclear-weapon tests currently observed by various nuclear Powers. Mexico concluded by saying that while a nuclear-arms freeze was not an end in itself, such a measure would hinder the qualitative improvement of the present generation of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of more such weapons.

On 13 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 92 to 18, with 28 abstentions. Several States explained their position in connection with the voting.

Among those States that voted against the draft resolution, Bulgaria explained its vote. While supporting the general thrust and objective of the draft resolution, it stressed that a freeze at a time when there had been agreement on a reduction of more than 70 per cent in the nuclear stockpiles of the major nuclear Powers was simply outdated.

Among those that abstained, Australia, New Zealand and Zaire expressed views similar to that of Bulgaria. New Zealand added that it hoped that no draft resolution on the subject would be submitted to the First Committee in 1993.

³⁶ Bolivia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Myanmar.

Among those States voting in favour, only Belarus explained its position, saying that it supported the draft as a matter of principle, although the text did not seem to take fully into account the recent progress made in nuclear disarmament.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 121 to 19, with 27 abstentions, as resolution 47/53 E. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/53 E
Nuclear-arms freeze

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Welcoming the new trends that have led to an improvement in the international security environment,

Welcoming also the announcements of the significant measures, including unilateral steps, by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which could signal the cessation and reversal of the nuclear-arms race,

Welcoming further the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on 31 July 1991, and the signing of a protocol to this Treaty in which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America have undertaken to give effect to the Treaty,

Welcoming the Joint Understanding of 17 June 1992 between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on further reductions in their strategic offensive arms, and expressing the hope that it will be followed by an agreement at an early date in this regard,

Welcoming in addition the moratoria on nuclear-weapon tests currently observed by France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America,

Convinced of the urgency of further negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute an effective step to prevent the qualitative improvement of existing

nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that it would at the same time reinforce the favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Convinced also that the undertakings derived from the freeze can be effectively verified,

Welcoming the unilateral steps taken by the nuclear-weapon States for the cessation of the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and for the shutting down of reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium,

Noting with concern that all nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any collective action in response to the call made in the relevant resolutions on the question of a nuclear-arms freeze,

Convinced further that the current international situation is most conducive to nuclear disarmament,

1. *Urges* the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to reach agreement on an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear-arms freeze, whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

(i) A comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and on their delivery vehicles;

(ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

(iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

(iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) It would be subject to appropriate and effective measures and procedures of verification;

3. *Requests once again* the nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report, or separate reports, to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-eighth session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze".

On 30 October, 13 States, later joined by 2 more,³⁷ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". The draft was introduced by the representative of India on 10 November. While noting with satisfaction the positive changes in the political, military and security situation in the world, India observed that there were no changes in the thinking that nuclear weapons were still necessary for security, no change regarding the doctrine of deterrence, and no change in the policy of reserving the right to conduct nuclear explosions for weapons purposes. It further believed that a nuclear-weapon-free world, complete nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all nuclear weapons—the objectives of the overwhelming majority of humanity—were achievable and that the improved political climate was conducive to their implementation.

On 13 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 97 to 21, with 19 abstentions. Four States explained their position in connection with the voting. Among those voting against, Bulgaria, which had abstained in 1991, reaffirmed its support for and commitment to the principle of the non-use of nuclear weapons, but stated that the call for negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons had not led to any progress in the past and that there seemed to be little chance that there would be any progress in the foreseeable future. Australia considered that the draft resolution related to an outdated concept and did not provide a solution to the problem it was seeking to address.

Voting in favour, China reiterated that it had long stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; although it was in favour of the main thrust of the draft text, certain of the elements in it and the annexed draft convention needed to be improved. Although the Russian Federation supported the draft text, it believed that the sponsors should take a more realistic approach in the future, given the changes that had occurred.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 126 to 21, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 47/53 C. It reads as follows:

³⁷ Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia and Viet Nam.

Resolution 47/53 C

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced also that nuclear disarmament is the only ultimate guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced further that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should strengthen international security and contribute to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the agreement reached between the Russian Federation and the United States of America in June 1992 to reduce their warhead stockpiles to a maximum of 3,000 for the Russian Federation and 3,500 for the United States of America by the year 2003,

Conscious that the recent steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon, and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1992 session, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 46/37 D of 6 December 1991,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of these negotiations.

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at ____ on the ____ day of ____ one thousand nine hundred and ____.

The First Committee had on its agenda the following items on nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace: (a) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"; (b) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"; and (c) "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". In addition, a separate item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" was considered in the context of the zone in the Middle East. A new item entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly.

During the debate on the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", the Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the nuclear capability of South Africa, which contained resolution GC (XXXVI)/RES/577 on the nuclear capabilities of South Africa, adopted by the General Conference of IAEA; and the text of the report of the Director General to the thirty-sixth session of the General Conference on the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material.³⁸ In addition, the Secretary-General submitted, pursuant to resolution 46/34 B of 9 December 1991, a report of the Second Meeting of the Group of Experts to Examine the Modalities and Elements for the Preparation and Implementation of a Convention or Treaty on the Denuclearization of Africa.³⁹ At their meeting, the experts considered the relationship of the convention with other international agreements and similar zones, and various clauses of the future instrument. They agreed

³⁸ A/47/533, annexes I and II.

³⁹ A/47/468, annex.

to recommend to the Council of Ministers of OAU that formulation of a convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa be begun and to request the General Assembly of the United Nations to consider the possibility of providing assistance to OAU to enable it to conclude that task.

On 28 October, Mauritania, on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa". It was introduced by Kenya on 11 November. Kenya explained that the Group of African States had taken into account the developments mentioned in the reports referred to above and the views of various delegations, in particular those expressed in 1991 by members of the European Economic Community and other Western countries. On 16 November, Kenya made a minor oral revision in the draft. On 18 November, the draft resolution, as orally revised, was adopted without a vote.

After the voting, Norway, speaking also on behalf of the Nordic countries, expressed their pleasure at being able to join in the consensus on the draft resolution, which they considered a great improvement over resolution 46/34 A. They welcomed the accession of South Africa to the non-proliferation Treaty and its conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA. As far as operative paragraphs 4 and 7 were concerned, the Nordic countries were working on the assumption that *pacta sunt servanda* unless proven otherwise. The United Kingdom was happy to join in the consensus, but believed that the resources necessary to fund the meeting of the Group of Experts, referred to in paragraph 6, should be found through the redeployment of existing resources.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 47/76. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/76

Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, in which they solemnly declare their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of atomic weapons,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as all its previous resolutions on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,

Calling upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Bearing in mind also the provisions of resolutions CM/Res.1342 (LIV) and CM/Res.1395 (LVI) Rev. 1 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth ordinary sessions, held respectively at Abuja from 27 May to 1 June 1991 and at Dakar from 22 to 28 June 1992, respectively,

Noting the accession by South Africa to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 10 July 1991,

Noting also that the Government of South Africa has concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and committed itself to early and full implementation of the agreement,

Recalling resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/577 on South Africa's nuclear capabilities, adopted on 25 September 1992 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Stressing that the full disclosure of South Africa's nuclear installations and materials is essential to the peace and security of the region and to the success of efforts exerted towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for Africa,

Having considered the report of the Second Meeting of the Group of Experts to Examine the Modalities and Elements for the Preparation and Implementation of a Convention or Treaty on the Denuclearization of Africa, set up jointly by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, held at Lomé from 28 to 30 April 1992,³

Convinced that the evolution of the international situation is conducive to the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa of 1964, as well as the relevant provisions of the Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development of 1968 of the Organization of African Unity,

1. *Reaffirms* that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

2. *Strongly renews its call* upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

3. *Takes note* of the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the safeguards agreement

between the Government of South Africa and the Agency, including the verification of the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material;

4. *Calls upon* South Africa to continue to comply fully with the implementation of its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency;

5. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which he has rendered effective assistance to the Organization of African Unity in organizing the meetings of the above-mentioned Group of Experts;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to take appropriate action to enable the Group of Experts designated by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity to meet during 1993 at Harare, in order to draw up a draft treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa, and to submit the report of the Group of Experts to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the progress made by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in ensuring the full implementation of the safeguards agreement with South Africa;

8. *Urges* all Member States to assist and cooperate with the Secretary-General and the Director General to this end.

During the consideration of the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the subject, in which he pointed out that during his consultations undertaken pursuant to resolution 46/30, it was a shared opinion that, in the light of the ongoing peace initiative, it would be premature for him to take any further action relating to the question at this time.⁴⁰

On 28 October, Egypt submitted a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East", which was later also sponsored by Armenia. In introducing it on 10 November, Egypt summarized the content of the draft and stressed that the present circumstances, particularly the ongoing peace process and negotiations, presented a historic opportunity to achieve progress towards the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East region.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

⁴⁰ A/47/387.

Israel, while joining in the consensus, registered its traditional reservations with respect to the modalities mentioned in the draft and reiterated those which it believed were essential, such as direct negotiations and mutually agreed verification arrangements.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 47/48. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/48

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990 and 46/30 of 6 December 1991 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing also the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 46/30,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

5. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

6. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

7. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;

8. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue further consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30, and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report, or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

10. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

When considering the related item "Israeli nuclear armament", the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General on IAEA action on the matter.⁴¹

On 28 October, 20 States⁴² submitted a draft resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

On 5 November, Q  tar, in introducing the draft resolution, stated that it was based mainly on earlier resolutions adopted on the subject, calling for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under IAEA safeguards pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

On 12 November, the sponsors submitted a revised text. The revisions consisted in the deletion of wording to the effect that Israel refused to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, was developing and testing their delivery systems and had not committed itself to refrain from attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities. In addition,

⁴¹ A/47/538. The document contained the text of resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 on "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East" and the report of the Director General on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East submitted to the IAEA General Conference at its thirty-sixth session.

⁴² Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

modification was made to the text referring to cooperation with Israel in the nuclear field. On 16 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 54 to 3 (Israel, Romania and United States), with 70 abstentions.

Israel reiterated its usual position regarding the draft resolution and added that the peace process begun in Madrid represented a concerted effort to address all bilateral and regional issues. It also noted that the General Conference of IAEA had resolved to discontinue any further reference to a resolution on Israeli nuclear armament and in its view it would be in the interest of the United Nations for the General Assembly to follow that example. Explaining its position, Romania said that, while supporting regional and global non-proliferation, accession to the non-proliferation Treaty by the States in the Middle East, submission of all nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, it had voted against the draft resolution in an effort to contribute to a dialogue aimed at creating a realistic, equitable and lasting settlement of the problem of the Middle East.

Seven States that abstained—the United Kingdom (speaking on behalf of the Twelve), the Russian Federation, Australia, Japan, Ukraine, Canada, and Sweden (speaking also on behalf of the Nordic countries)—explained their positions by referring to one or more of the following: the ongoing peace process in the Middle East, the discriminatory nature of the text, and the need to reflect recent developments in the nuclear field. They also expressed the wish that all States of the region would accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. The United Kingdom expressed the regret of the Twelve that the sponsors were unwilling to consider the suggestion that the General Assembly should follow the action taken by the General Conference of IAEA. An eighth State that abstained, India, explained that it had changed from its traditional vote in favour to an abstention because of difficulties it had in accepting the new language of operative paragraph 2, by which Israel was urged to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty; India felt that it was inappropriate to single out a State on that issue.

Among those voting in favour, Nigeria stated that it would have preferred it if the draft resolution had included an appeal to all States in the Middle East to sign the non-proliferation Treaty and submit their nuclear facilities to full-scope safeguards. Similar reasons were put for-

ward by Turkey. The Syrian Arab Republic would have liked to see stronger wording in the text, and felt that the revisions had diluted its content.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 64 to 3, with 90 abstentions, as resolution 47/55. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/55
Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is resolution 46/39 of 6 December 1991,

Recalling its resolution 44/108 of 15 December 1989, in which, *inter alia*, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Recalling also that the Security Council, in its resolution 487 (1981), called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Taking note of relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 of 25 September 1992,

Taking into consideration the final document on international security and disarmament adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, and in particular its paragraph 52, which relates to Israel's nuclear capabilities,

Deeply alarmed by the information with regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel,

Concerned at the cooperation between Israel and South Africa in the military nuclear fields,

1. *Deplores* Israel's refusal to renounce possession of nuclear weapons;
2. *Urges* Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
3. *Reaffirms* that Israel should promptly apply Security Council resolution 487 (1981), in which the Council, *inter alia*, requested it to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities;
4. *Calls upon* all States and organizations not to cooperate with or give assistance to Israel with the aim of enhancing its nuclear-weapons capability;

5. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may take to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

On 29 October, Bangladesh and Pakistan submitted a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". When considering the item, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the subject.⁴³ In introducing the draft resolution on 12 November, Pakistan stated that global and regional approaches to disarmament complemented each other and that the shared goal of universal nuclear disarmament would receive an impetus from the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was further of the firm view that the required conditions existed in South Asia to enable the countries of the region to move towards the objective of such a zone.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 117 to 2 (Bhutan and India), with 12 abstentions. Several States explained their position before or after the voting.

India, in explaining its negative vote, reiterated its reservations on the concept, stressing that nuclear disarmament was a global issue and must be solved globally.

Indonesia explained that although it continued to promote the establishment of South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, it had to abstain owing to the fact that agreement on the proposal had not yet been reached.

Among those voting in favour, the United States reiterated its position that its support for the draft resolution should not be interpreted as a universal endorsement of nuclear-weapon-free zones. France, voting in favour this year, explained that by doing so it showed its support for all efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Though it believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones played a particularly important role in non-proliferation, the agreement of all the States concerned

⁴³ A/47/304. The report transmitted the view of the United Kingdom on the item.

was a precondition for the establishment of such zones; the establishment of such a zone in South Asia would contribute significantly to strengthening peace and security both in the region and at the global level. Japan, Norway and Argentina voted in favour because they supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as one of the means to bring about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 144 to 3, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 47/49. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/49

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985, 41/49 of 3 December 1986, 42/29 of 30 November 1987, 43/66 of 7 December 1988, 44/109 of 15 December 1989, 45/53 of 4 December 1990, and 46/31 of 6 December 1991 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures that can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note with appreciation of the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes, reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Taking note of the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Taking note also of the proposal to hold consultations among five nations with a view to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the region,

Considering that the eventual participation of other States as appropriate in this process could be useful,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective;

3. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary cooperation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

The item on the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been on the Assembly's agenda since 1979. Because of the fact that France had deposited its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I on 24 August, thus giving full force to that Protocol, and because of the adoption of several amendments to the Treaty, a new item was included—at the request of the depositary State, Mexico—in the Assembly's agenda, entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean".⁴⁴ In addition, Mexico transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations resolution

⁴⁴ A/47/241.

290 (VII) adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, which contained the amendments to the Treaty.⁴⁵

On 30 October, 24 States, later joined by 1 more,⁴⁶ submitted a draft resolution with the same title as the item. In introducing it on 9 November, Mexico expressed the satisfaction of Latin American and Caribbean States at the concrete steps that had been taken in 1992 to consolidate the denuclearized regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It further pointed out that Additional Protocol I had come fully into force with the deposition by France of its instrument of ratification. It summarized the content of the draft resolution and stated that the amendments approved by OPANAL would make it possible for full effect to be given to the Treaty in the very near future by Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In addition to Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia made statements concerning the draft resolution.

On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. Only Cuba explained its position, stating that although it was not a party to the Treaty, it had participated in the activities of OPANAL as an observer since 1991. It further added that although its reasons for not signing the Treaty were still valid, it would, for the sake of regional unity, be prepared to do so once all the States of the region had assumed commitments under the Treaty.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 47/61. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/61

Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,

⁴⁵ A/47/467, annex.

⁴⁶ Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would lend it their full cooperation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and those which do not possess such weapons,

Recalling that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967,

Recalling also that in its preamble the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Recalling further that in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 it welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is open for signature to all the sovereign States of Latin America and the Caribbean and that it contains two additional protocols which are open for signature, respectively, to the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for territories located within the zone of application of the Treaty and to the nuclear-weapon States,

Bearing in mind also that, with the adherence in 1992 of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force for twenty-four sovereign States of the region,

Noting with satisfaction that the Government of France deposited its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I on 24 August 1992, thus giving full force to that Protocol,

Recalling that since 1974 Additional Protocol II has been in force for the five nuclear-weapon States,

Mindful that international conditions are more propitious for the consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

Also noting with satisfaction the holding of the fourth meeting of the signatories of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the seventh special session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, at Mexico City on 26 August 1992,

Welcoming the adoption on that occasion of resolution 290 (VII), in which the General Conference approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of that instrument,

Noting that the Government of Cuba has declared that, in pursuit of regional unity, it would be ready to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco once all the States of the region have assumed the undertakings of the Treaty,

1. *Welcomes* the concrete steps taken by several countries this year, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by that Treaty, including the adoption by acclamation on 26 August 1992 of the amendments to it;

2. *Welcomes in particular* the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by France, thus giving full force to the additional protocols of that Treaty;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* the declaration of the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the effect that as soon as the three countries have completed the procedures for ratifying the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as amended, they will waive all the requirements set forth in paragraph 1 of article 28 of the Treaty that still remain to be met;

4. *Urges* all Latin American and Caribbean States to take speedily the necessary measures to attain the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, in particular, the States in respect of which the Treaty is open for signature and ratification immediately to carry out the corresponding formalities so that they may become parties to that international instrument, thus contributing to the consolidation of the regime established by that Treaty;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session an item entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

On 30 October, Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". On 12 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution in which, in operative paragraph 6, the phrase "the possibility of holding another session of five working days, if necessary", was deleted and the phrase "not more than" was added before "ten working days".

Introducing the draft resolution on the same day, the representative of Sri Lanka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, stated that it was based on the discussion in the Committee during 1992. He stressed the need for time to address the complex issues involved and the differing perceptions, as well as the future role of the Committee. He added that there was a need for genuine dialogue involving littoral

and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, and expressed the hope that Member States that had withdrawn from participation in the Committee would return and work collectively towards the new, alternative approaches.

On 16 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 98 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 31 abstentions.

Two States explained their position. While it was pleased to see that in the draft the Committee was requested to consider new approaches in the future, Australia had abstained because it felt that the text still reflected a different era and repeated the language that had prevented progress in the Ad Hoc Committee for so many years. It hoped that at its next session the Committee would build a consensus round a completely new approach to security and cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The United States, which voted against the text, stressed that freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight were essential to the maintenance of world peace; it could not support a draft resolution that would compromise those freedoms and permit the establishment of zones where navies and military aircraft might or might not move freely.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 129 to 3, with 35 abstentions, as resolution 47/59. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/59

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolution 46/49 of 9 December 1991 and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also the report on the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held in July 1979,

Recalling further paragraphs 15 and 16, chapter III, of the Final Document adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,

Affirming the importance of the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace to achieve the goals contained in the Declaration of the Indian

Ocean as a Zone of Peace and as considered at the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Welcoming the positive developments in international political relations, which offer opportunities for enhancing peace, security and cooperation, and expressing the hope that the new spirit of international cooperation will be reflected in the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to that end,

Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,

Noting with appreciation the offer made by the Government of Sri Lanka to host the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo,

Noting also that it may not be possible to convene the first stage of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean in accordance with resolution 46/49 and urging that consideration be given to the timing of such a conference at Colombo at the appropriate time,

Desirous of continuing its efforts for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean,

Considering the need for new alternative approaches for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean;

2. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to consider new alternative approaches leading to the achievement of the goals contained in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and as considered at the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held in July 1979, taking into account the changing international situation;

3. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to address the complex ramifications of the issues involved and differing perceptions on these issues as well as the future role of the Ad Hoc Committee and to make recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

4. *Decides* to convene, as early as possible thereafter, the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean;

5. *Calls upon* the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee;

6. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to hold a session during 1993, with a duration of not more than ten working days;

7. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the present resolution;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".

In addition to the items on nuclear disarmament, the General Assembly considered the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons.⁴⁷ On 28 October, Belgium, Canada, the Russian Federation and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". In introducing it on 5 November, the Russian Federation noted that some positive work had been done in the Conference on Disarmament on the subject of radiological weapons. It pointed out, however, that a number of delegations had drawn attention to the need for new approaches to the solution of basic problems of long standing in the negotiations, and it noted that the recommendation concerning the re-establishment of the relevant Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1993 session stressed the need for that body to be given guidance by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft was similar to earlier ones and the sponsors hoped that it would be adopted by consensus.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. The General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, on 9 December, as resolution 47/52 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 B

Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/36 E of 6 December 1991,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1992 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;

⁴⁷ See footnote 8.

2. *Recognizes* that in 1992 the Ad Hoc Committee made a further contribution to the clarification of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important subjects under consideration;

3. *Takes note also* of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1993 session and that it should be given guidance on reviewing the organization of its work with the aim of fulfilling its mandate;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its substantive negotiation on the subject with a view to the prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents relating to the discussion of all aspects of the issue by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

Action on related issues

The General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General⁴⁸ transmitting replies received from Governments with regard to technological developments relevant to the sea-bed Treaty. That Treaty, which entered into force in 1972, prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

In addition, the Assembly dealt with two other items which, though not disarmament items, were closely related to the items on nuclear-weapon-free zones and on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: the items relating to Antarctica and the South Atlantic. By its resolution 47/57 entitled "Question of Antarctica", the General Assembly affirmed again its conviction that the region should continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. By resolution 47/74, "Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic", the General Assembly reaffirmed the purpose and objective of the zone; welcomed the recent initiatives

⁴⁸ A/47/362. Replies were received from Finland, Panama and Ukraine.

aimed at the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and stressed its relevance for the region of the South Atlantic; stressed also the importance of the results of UNCED for the zone; and requested the relevant organizations, organs and bodies of the United Nations system to render all appropriate assistance that States of the zone might seek in their efforts to implement the declaration of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic.

Conclusion

Nuclear-arms limitation, nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and other questions related to nuclear weapons continued to be a focus of attention at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The positive developments in the relationship between the former Soviet Union and the United States, which had led to the signing of the START I Treaty in 1991, continued and led in June 1992 to the United States-Russian Joint Understanding on further limitations and reductions of their strategic nuclear arsenals, which were transformed into treaty obligations with the signing of the START II Treaty on 3 January 1993. The envisaged limitation will result in the reduction of their nuclear arsenals by 70 per cent and will eventually open the way for the other nuclear-weapon States to join the process of nuclear disarmament. The positive developments in the nuclear field and especially the radical reductions of the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers enabled the General Assembly to adopt at its forty-seventh session, for the first time, a consensus resolution on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

It is expected that the unilateral measures taken with a view to further reducing nuclear explosive testing will eventually contribute to the efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty. After the unilateral moratorium on testing proclaimed in 1991 by the former Soviet Union, which was further extended by the Russian Federation, two other nuclear-weapon States made similar declarations. The French declaration of 8 April announcing suspension of testing of its nuclear weapons until the end of 1992 and its readiness to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban marked a departure from the previous position of France on this issue, and the United States decision

of 24 September regarding a testing moratorium until 1 July 1993 marked a fundamental change in its policy as well.

However, these positive developments were not reflected in the multilateral efforts to bring about a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament did not agree to re-establish its relevant Ad Hoc Committee. In addition, although there was an understanding on the part of the majority of parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to hold a special meeting in the second quarter of 1993 to review developments and the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference later that year, there was no consensus on this point.

In the General Assembly, two resolutions were adopted on nuclear testing. The resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was adopted by an overwhelming majority, including the Russian Federation, while only the United States voted against it, and other nuclear-weapon States abstained (including France, which had cast a negative vote in the past). The other resolution, on the partial test-ban Treaty Amendment Conference, was given less support (118 to 2, with 41 abstentions).

As far as the other nuclear-weapon-related issues are concerned, such as the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, the General Assembly adopted three traditional resolutions: on a ban of the production of fissionable material, on a nuclear-arms freeze, and on a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. The ban on fissionable material continued to be supported by the vast majority of States, and none voted against it. The declaration of the United States that it would stop producing plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes marked a fundamental change in its policy concerning this question and was welcomed as such by a number of States, although the United States remained opposed to multilateral action on the issue at this time.

The remaining resolutions, one on the nuclear-arms freeze and the other on a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, supported mostly by developing countries, continued to be opposed by many Western countries, as these two concepts, in their view, had become outdated, especially in the light of the positive developments in international relations in general, and in the nuclear field in particular.

There were also some positive developments at the regional level. The deposit by France of its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the amendments to the Treaty

adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL were looked upon as further signs of the consolidation of the denuclearized status of Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition, developments in Africa appeared to be facilitating the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. While there was continued support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, there was a prevailing feeling that the realization of the concept would, to a great degree, depend on the outcome of the peace process and ongoing negotiations. In the view of the Arab States, the main obstacle to the establishment of such a zone was Israeli nuclear capability. It was clear, with respect to South Asia, that there was not yet agreement among all the States of the region to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The majority of States still favoured the establishment of zones of peace in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. In the case of the South Atlantic, there was growing interest in the proposal and intensive cooperation among States of the region. In the case of the Indian Ocean, on the other hand, there were increasing reservations regarding the appropriateness of convening the Conference that had been called for, and, as a result, no date for it was fixed by the General Assembly.

CHAPTER VI

Conventional armaments and advanced technology

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS and armed forces has been on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations since the Organization was created, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis.¹ Efforts to regulate the build-up and transfer of such armaments were made as early as the mid-1960s² and continue to this day. A considerable breakthrough was achieved at the regional level in 1990 with the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, known as the CFE Treaty (see chapter III, above).

However, although almost all armed conflicts since 1945 have been fought with conventional weapons, and these weapons and armed forces have long accounted for some four fifths of global military expenditure, little has been done regarding conventional disarmament at the global level. Furthermore, owing to modern technology advances, there has been a steady increase in the accuracy and destructive potential of conventional weapons; at the same time, there has been an immense increase in their cost.

For many years, Western States and others, including China, advocated restraints on, and reduction of, conventional arms in conjunction with a process of nuclear disarmament, while the majority of States held that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had to have the highest priority in disarmament negotiations.

At the United Nations the discussion of the issue of conventional disarmament has focused on four elements: (a) conventional weapons

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945–1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XIX.

per se and efforts to limit them; (b) international arms transfers and, recently, the export of modern military technology; (c) inhumane weapons and the Convention restricting their use; and (d) the regional approach, which is discussed in chapter III, above.

As far as the question of conventional weapons *per se* is concerned, the need to address conventional and nuclear disarmament as concurrent requirements became increasingly recognized during the 1980s. In 1984 the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly an expert study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.³ In 1985 the General Assembly decided, by consensus, to include in its agenda an item entitled "Conventional disarmament" and, in 1986, it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider that item, taking into account the 1984 study. At the 1988 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the conventional arms race in its various aspects and its importance *vis-à-vis* the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament were debated intensively. The trend towards relatively increased emphasis on the conventional aspect of the arms race and conventional disarmament has become even more evident during the last few years, especially after the conclusion of several important agreements concerning the reduction of nuclear weapons.

While it has long been recognized that arms transfers have considerable implications for conventional disarmament, the subject is complex and arouses many concerns, particularly among developing States that do not have indigenous arms-production facilities and therefore feel the need to import arms for their legitimate needs of self-defence. In 1988 the General Assembly mandated a study on international arms transfers, including their security and disarmament implications and illicit transfer. The study was completed in 1991.⁴ In addition, more and more attention has been attached to the question of modern military technology and its impact on international security. In 1991, an item on the role of science and technology in the context of international

³ *Study on Conventional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1). It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXV.

⁴ *Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.6). It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chapter XV.

security, disarmament and related fields was placed on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission for the first time.

The idea of imposing a prohibition or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons regarded as particularly inhumane was introduced at the end of the 1960s as an issue in the field of international humanitarian law, and it developed as a disarmament matter in the course of the following decade,⁵ leading, in 1980, to the conclusion of the inhumane weapons Convention, to which are annexed three Protocols on specific types of weapons.⁶ The Convention and its Protocols provide for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attack by means of incendiary weapons, land-mines and booby traps, and prohibit entirely the use of any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. The Convention is kept under review in two contexts: that of wider adherence and that of broader scope, the latter either through the amendment of its existing Protocols or through the elaboration of additional protocols. For the status of the agreement as of 31 December 1992, see appendix I to this volume.

In recent years the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions and decisions on various aspects of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament. In 1992 it adopted nine resolutions and two decisions: three of the resolutions and both of the decisions relate to the aspects of the question dealt with in this chapter and are considered below. The others, relating to the regional approach and to transparency, are covered in chapters III and IV, respectively.

General developments and trends, 1992

Questions related to conventional weapons and armed forces and to military technology were addressed in different disarmament forums and dealt with in a number of reports.

⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XIV. For a fuller account of early activities concerning these categories of conventional weapons, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. X.

⁶ The text of the Convention and its Protocols is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix VII, and in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming).

The Secretary-General, in his report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, stated, *inter alia*:

On the regional level, for example, there is an evident need to devote major attention to the question of conventional arms races. For years, concern was concentrated, and rightly so, on the need to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. As a result, too little was done to address the highly destabilizing effect on regional and subregional security resulting from the transfers of conventional weapons which went far beyond the legitimate security needs of States. The relentless accumulation of armaments by States is not only a symptom of political tension; it can also cause and heighten such tensions and increase the risk of conflict.⁷

As part of the effort to address the problems of arms build-up, attention has turned to the role national legislation can play in regulating and monitoring effectively legitimate arms transfers and in preventing illicit arms trafficking. In order to make information on this subject available for consultation by Member States, the Secretary-General submitted a report,⁸ entitled "International arms transfers", containing detailed documentation received from interested States concerning their national legislation and/or regulations on arms exports, imports and procurement, and their administrative procedures, as regards both authorization of arms transfers and prevention of the illicit arms trade. Data included the criteria for refusing export, for example human rights violations or embargo decisions by the Security Council; texts of actual legislation; and procedures for enforcing the laws. The report also contained information concerning any seizures of arms and military equipment destined for destabilizing activities.

The closely related question of the transfer of high technology with military applications gave rise to considerable interest and was

⁷ A/C.1/47/7, para. 17. The report was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.93.IX.8).

⁸ A/47/314 and Add.1. Pursuant to resolution 46/36 H of 1991, replies were received from: Australia, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fiji, Lithuania, Malta, Niger, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Thailand and Togo.

the subject of another report⁹ of the Secretary-General. In this report the focus was, once again, on the role of national legislation and administrative procedures, in this instance as they pertain to regulating the export and transfer of knowledge and services while, at the same time, not denying access to high-technology products and know-how for peaceful purposes.

In addition to questions relating to the mechanisms for regulating trade in arms and in technology, there was discussion on the role of science and technology itself *vis-à-vis* international security and disarmament. In the course of the discussion, past differences in approach were still evident, the industrialized countries tending to emphasize the positive effects of application, while many developing countries expressed concern about a possible negative impact. In information transmitted to the Secretary-General by a number of Member States,¹⁰ reference was made, *inter alia*, to applications pertaining to the implementation of disarmament agreements in such areas as destruction of weapons, verification and conversion.

In response to resolution 45/60 of 1990, initiated by India, by which the Secretary-General had been requested to continue to follow scientific and technological developments in order to make an assessment of emerging "new technologies" and to elaborate a framework for assessing them, the Secretary-General submitted a report entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security".¹¹ In the report he noted, *inter alia*, that the Office for Disarmament Affairs was in the process of setting up an informal network of experts on science and technology and that the subject was under discussion in the Disarmament Commission. In the light of those activities, he con-

⁹ A/47/371 and Add.1 and 2. Pursuant to resolution 46/38 D of 1991, replies were received from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Panama, Russian Federation, Spain, Thailand and United Kingdom.

¹⁰ The Secretary-General informed Member States by a note dated 20 October 1992 (A/C.1/47/INF/2) that Namibia, Portugal, on behalf of the member States of the European Community, and the Russian Federation had transmitted documentation to the Secretariat, pursuant to resolution 45/61 of 1990, which was available in the reference library of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

¹¹ A/47/355.

sidered that it would be premature for any further action to be taken to develop a framework for technological assessment, as requested in the above-mentioned resolution.

In his message to the *Conference on Disarmament*, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that the recent recourse to arms in various parts of the world had forcefully reminded the international community that in order to be fully effective the process of disarmament must be concerned not only with the reduction of existing arsenals but also with the prevention of their actual use. He believed that in order to meet the demands placed upon it, the international community must both enhance its preparedness to anticipate new challenges and strengthen its capacity to respond efficiently to the remaining threats to international security.

Most States referred to conventional disarmament in the context of regional disarmament, confidence-building measures, including transparency, and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, discussed in chapters III and IV, and in the context of exports and imports of conventional weapons and of science and military technology, discussed in this chapter.

The fact that significant progress had been made in the past year in the field of nuclear disarmament was seen by some as a sign that it was now time to address in depth the problems of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. Moreover, with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, it would be necessary for Europe to refrain from exporting its superfluous conventional arms to the third world. It was pointed out, in this context, that the availability of sophisticated weapons had recently provoked conflicts to achieve unattainable objectives.

As for the role that science and technology play with respect to disarmament, security and development, Chile noted that any regime for technology control was fragile and transitory by nature and that the progress of science and technology could not be halted through treaties or national legislation. It recognized, however, the possibility of environmental applications of military technology. A number of members and Poland welcomed the concept—referred to at the Security Council Summit Meeting on 31 January—of an international science and technology centre in the Russian Federation in order to stem the

possible dissemination of know-how in the field of weapons of mass destruction and the related delivery technology. (See page 52.)

The *Disarmament Commission* continued to consider its item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", and reported that some moderate progress had been made. At the concluding meeting of its substantive session, a number of States expressed satisfaction at the growing recognition of the important contribution that science and technology could make in the field of disarmament and they voiced the hope that the Commission would be able to finalize a set of guidelines on the subject in 1993.

In the *First Committee*, general references to conventional disarmament and science and technology with military applications were made by many States. As far as conventional disarmament *per se* is concerned, the majority expressed their concern about excessive and destabilizing build-ups of this category of weapons, particularly in regions of tension and conflict, as demonstrated in the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf and currently in Somalia, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia.

The question of inhumane weapons was addressed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The representative pointed out that, in spite of the restrictions provided in Protocol II to the Convention on inhumane weapons, there was massive and indiscriminate use of mines by countries involved in armed conflicts. There was therefore an urgent need to encourage universal ratification of the Convention and to give serious thought to its applicability to non-international armed conflicts, given the fact that the majority of today's conflicts involved both internal and international elements. The ICRC was studying the problems of the potential use of blinding laser weapons and would publish, in 1993, reports of meetings of experts on the subject. The ICRC suggested that measures to strengthen the Convention and the eventual adoption of new protocols could be undertaken at a review conference, as provided for in the Convention. Sweden, the Netherlands and Ireland expressed support for the position taken by the ICRC and suggested that consultations should be carried out with a view to the convening of a review conference, as 1993 would mark the tenth anniversary of the Convention's entry into force.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1992

The Disarmament Commission established a working group to deal with the agenda item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". The Working Group, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe, of Nigeria, held 10 meetings between 22 April and 8 May. Informal consultations were also conducted by the Chairman and, upon his request, by Ms. Peggy Mason, of Canada.

The Working Group decided to continue a structured debate on each of the four substantive aspects of the item identified at its previous session: (a) scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security; (b) science and technology for disarmament; (c) the role of science and technology in other related fields; and (d) the transfer of high technology with military applications.

In addition to the seven papers submitted in 1991, four new papers were submitted: by Portugal on behalf of the European Community and its member States,¹² by Colombia,¹³ by Canada¹⁴ and by Brazil.¹⁵

Following the deliberations of the Group, the Chairman, on his own initiative and without prejudice to the positions of delegations, recalled that the following observations had been made:

- That one of the objectives of such a dialogue was to promote international cooperation in a framework that would ensure security and development, while preventing the dangers of the diversion for illegitimate purposes of high technology with military applications;

- That export-control measures taken by some supplier States were designed to implement their commitments under existing legal instruments not to transfer weapons of mass destruction;

- That all States should support existing agreements and other control arrangements and that increased participation should be welcomed and encouraged;

- That in order to reinforce the effectiveness of the existing control regimes, the legitimacy of such regimes would have to be recognized

¹² A/CN.10/165.

¹³ A/CN.10/169.

¹⁴ A/CN.10/170.

¹⁵ A/CN.10/171.

by all States, and an effort made to increase transparency in the transfer of high technology with military applications;

- That any measures taken in the field of controlling the export of technology should be multilaterally negotiated and agreed;

- That there should be further consideration of the question of seeking universally acceptable norms or guidelines that would regulate transfers of sensitive technology;

- That all countries had a stake in the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as in facilitating legitimate international exchanges in the field of high technology;

- That there was a need for improved modalities to guarantee the transfer and utilization of dual-use technology exclusively for peaceful purposes or legitimate defence purposes; and in this context the development of mechanisms for international cooperation on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis was suggested.

The Group adopted its report¹⁶ on 8 May. In presenting the report to the Commission, the Chairman stated that the debate in the Group had been rich and diverse, indicating progress, albeit slight, in the discussion of the various sub-items.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

In the First Committee three draft resolutions and two draft decisions were submitted in connection with different agenda items considered in this chapter.

On 28 October, Brazil and Germany, later supported by 34 other States,¹⁷ submitted a draft resolution entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". The draft was introduced by Germany on 10 November. In introducing it, Germany stated that the text merged strands of thinking thus far contained in two resolutions and that promising developments

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42)*, chap. IV, para. 31.

¹⁷ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela.

in the recent discussion about science and technology, reflected in the 1992 report of the Disarmament Commission, had made possible the submission, by Brazil and itself, of the joint draft resolution. After highlighting specific parts of the draft resolution, Germany expressed the hope that it would command broad support in the Committee. Endorsing the statement made by Germany, Brazil stated that the draft reflected the convergence of interests as well as the importance of the role of science and technology in the context of international security. The merging of the substance of the two resolutions adopted in the past and the broad spectrum of sponsorship augured well for the widening of the multilateral dialogue on the item in the Disarmament Commission and for its successful conclusion in 1993.

On 11 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution, which contained a few minor changes. On 16 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. The General Assembly adopted it on 9 December, also without a vote, as resolution 47/44. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/44

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 45/61 of 4 December 1990 and 46/38 D of 6 December 1991,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1992 substantive session, in particular on the work of Working Group IV on agenda item 7, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields",

Taking note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1992 substantive session, in particular on the work on the agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments", which includes, in response to resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, *inter alia*, the subject of the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications,

Recognizing that progress in the application of science and technology contributes substantially to the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements, *inter alia*, in the fields of weapons disposal, military conversion and verification,

Recognizing also that norms or guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account legitimate requirements

for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that they do not deny access to high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes,

Noting the interest of the international community in cooperation in the fields of disarmament-related science and technology and the transfer of high technology with military applications,

1. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work on agenda item 7 and to submit as soon as possible specific recommendations on this matter to the General Assembly;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue constructively in response to resolution 46/36 L its work on the agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments", which includes consideration of the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications;

3. *Invites* Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States;

4. *Also invites* Member States to widen multilateral dialogue, bearing in mind the proposal for seeking universally acceptable international norms or guidelines that would regulate international transfers of high technology with military applications;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session an item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields".

On 30 October, 9 States, later joined by 1 more,¹⁸ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security". In introducing it on 10 November, India recalled the concern it had expressed at the special session in 1988 regarding the qualitative aspects of disarmament, and the 1990 report¹⁹ of the Secretary-General on the subject in which five broad fields were identified as areas in which scientific and technological developments should be followed: nuclear technology, space technology, materials technology, information technology, and biotechnology. India further noted that in the Secretary-General's 1992 report on the subject²⁰ it was stated that he would take the outcome of the deliberations of

¹⁸ Afghanistan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Venezuela.

¹⁹ A/45/568.

²⁰ A/47/355.

the Disarmament Commission on the subject fully into account in preparing a framework for technological assessment; the purpose of the present draft resolution was to encourage the Secretary-General in his efforts in this regard.

On 16 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 104 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 28 abstentions (mostly by European countries).

Two States explained their position after the voting. While voting in favour, Australia registered its view that it should not be assumed that technological advances applied to military purposes would necessarily have a negative impact on the security environment, as such advances could contribute positively to international security. Poland explained its abstention on the ground that scientific and technological development was in itself neutral, and that it was only the application of the research in that field that might have positive or negative effects. Further, in its view, the draft resolution tended to overestimate the negative aspects of the question, especially in the new international environment free of bloc-to-bloc confrontation.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 128 to 3, with 30 abstentions, as resolution 47/43. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/43

Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it unanimously stressed the importance of both qualitative and quantitative measures in the process of disarmament,

Recognizing that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

Noting with concern the potential in technological advances for application to military purposes, which could lead to more sophisticated weapons and new weapon systems,

Stressing the interests of the international community in the subject and the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments which may have a negative impact on the security environment and on the process

of arms limitation and disarmament and to channel scientific and technological developments for beneficial purposes,

Emphasizing that the proposal contained in its resolution 43/77 A of 7 December 1988 is without prejudice to research and development efforts being undertaken for peaceful purposes,

Noting the results of the United Nations Conference on New Trends in Science and Technology: Implications for International Peace and Security, held at Sendai, Japan from 16 to 19 April 1990, and recognizing, in this regard, the need for the scientific and policy communities to work together in dealing with the complex implications of technological change,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security";

2. *Takes note also* of the interim report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 45/60 of 4 December 1990;

3. *Fully agrees* that:

(a) The international community needs to position itself better to follow the nature and direction of technological change;

(b) The United Nations can serve as a catalyst and a clearing-house for ideas to this purpose;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to follow scientific and technological developments in order to make an assessment of emerging "new technologies" and to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session a framework for technology assessment guided, *inter alia*, by the criteria suggested in his report;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security"

On 30 October, 18 States, later joined by 1 more,²¹ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects". Introducing the text on 5 November, Sweden noted that the Convention with its three annexed Protocols was an essential international agreement designed to place constraints upon the conduct of war. In the draft the sponsors recognized the need for wider ratification of the Convention and its Protocols, and urged States not yet parties to join as early as

²¹ Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden and Viet Nam.

possible. They also noted the potential of the ICRC to consider questions pursuant to the Convention.

Speaking on its own behalf, Sweden called attention to article 8 of the Convention, which provided for the possibility of convening a review or amendment conference 10 years after the Convention's entry into force. In Sweden's view, it was now timely to consult interested States on the appropriateness of holding such a conference in the near future. In its opinion, incendiary weapons and naval mines should be made subject to further specific restrictions. In addition, developments in laser technology should be followed closely as there was a clear risk that lasers could be developed for anti-personnel purposes on the conventional battlefield.

Two other sponsors spoke when the draft resolution was introduced. The Netherlands noted that it was civilians who suffered the most from conflicts in which weapons prohibited by the Convention were used, and that in an internal conflict they became weapons of terror for civilians. After observing that the Convention represented a major achievement in the development of international humanitarian law in the field of conventional weaponry but that it did not provide for verification, Ireland stated its belief that a consultative committee of experts to investigate alleged violations of the Protocols to the Convention would contribute to its strengthening and would promote universal adherence to it. Both Ireland and the Netherlands supported the suggestion of holding consultations on convening a review conference.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 12 November without a vote, and the General Assembly adopted it on 9 December, also without a vote, as resolution 47/56. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 47/56

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981, 37/79 of 9 December 1982, 38/66 of 15 December 1983, 39/56 of 12 December 1984, 40/84 of 12 December 1985, 41/50 of 3 December 1986, 42/30 of 30 November 1987, 43/67 of 7 December 1988, 45/64 of 4 December 1990 and 46/40 of 6 December 1991,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;

2. *Also notes with satisfaction* that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, as well as successor States to take appropriate action, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;

4. *Stresses* that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;

5. *Notes*, taking into account the nature of the Convention, the potential of the International Committee of the Red Cross to consider questions pursuant to the Convention;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

In addition to the above-mentioned resolutions, the General Assembly adopted two decisions related to conventional disarmament: one on international arms transfers and the other on conventional disarmament on a regional scale.

On 26 October, Colombia and Peru submitted a draft decision entitled "International arms transfers". Introducing the text on 5 November, Colombia stated that the successful development of initiatives in disarmament required globalization and democratization of the decision-making and negotiating processes. The purpose of the draft decision was to encourage the largest possible number of countries to reply to the Secretary-General's invitation, pursuant to resolution 46/36 H, to submit information on their national legislation regulating arms transfers and exports of arms. Official policies on arms procurement and arms transfer complemented the progress achieved so far in the promotion of transparency, and, similarly, the control of arms transfers would contribute to deterrence of the proliferation of conventional weapons, a phenomenon which, in its turn, was fed by the vast illicit traffic in weapons.

Before the First Committee took action on the draft decision, India explained its position, noting that in supporting the draft it recognized the importance of transparency in armaments, especially as it related to the illicit arms trade, which dangerously fuelled destabilizing phenomena such as terrorism, subversion and drug trafficking.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft decision without a vote. The General Assembly adopted it on 9 December, also without a vote, as decision 47/419. It reads as follows:

Decision 47/419

International arms transfers

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, and recalling its resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, entitled "International arms transfers", adopted without a vote at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and in particular its paragraph 10, decides: (a) to welcome the information provided by Member States on the subject contained in the report of the Secretary-General; (b) to invite Member States which have not yet done so to convey to the Secretary-General their views on this matter; and (c) to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "International arms transfers".

On 27 October, Peru submitted a draft decision entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale". In the draft decision, which was introduced by Peru on 29 October, Member States that had not yet done so were invited to convey to the Secretary-General their views on regional disarmament, as requested in General Assembly decision 46/412.²² Peru explained that it hoped to have enough information to prepare a draft resolution on the subject at the next session.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft decision without a vote, and the General Assembly adopted it on 9 December, also without a vote, as decision 47/420. It reads as follows:

Decision 47/420

Conventional disarmament on a regional scale

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, having recalled its decision 46/412 of 6 December 1991, decides: (a) to welcome the report of the Secretary-General on this question; (b) to invite Member States that have not yet done so to convey to the Secretary-General their views on this matter; and (c) to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale"

Conclusion

Efforts to curb the conventional arms race and to prevent the development of more sophisticated weapons and weapons systems continued in 1992. There was evidence of a greater sense of the urgent need to address the question inasmuch as a number of agreements providing for significant reductions of nuclear weapons had been signed, and force—with conventional weapons—was increasingly being used in regions of tension. Although progress has been made at the regional level in the reduction of conventional weapons, as discussed in chapter III, there has been no discernible progress at the global level. The debate, as discussed in this chapter, focused on the control of exports and imports of arms, including illicit traffic; transfers of weapons, with special emphasis on the transfer of high technology with military applications; and restriction of the use of inhumane weapons.

²² Replies were received from Australia, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland and the United Kingdom (A/47/316 and Add.1 and 2).

The Disarmament Commission continued to consider the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and related fields. Its deliberations indicated some progress regarding the four substantive aspects of the question that had been identified at its previous session; it is hoped that, on the basis of this work, the Commission will succeed in elaborating guidelines on the subject in 1993. Such guidelines would eventually prevent the dangers of diversion of high technology with military applications for illegitimate purposes, on the one hand, and would strengthen international cooperation in the use of high technology for the economic and social development of all countries, on the other.

In the General Assembly, the Secretary-General's reports on arms transfers, on the transfer of high technology with military applications, and on science and technology for disarmament were widely welcomed. Two different perceptions of the broad issue of science and technology led to the submission of two draft resolutions: one entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", which referred to applications of science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and was adopted without a vote; and the other entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security", which called for a framework for technology assessment and was adopted by a vote reflecting considerable reservation.

In connection with the inhumane weapons Convention, concerns were voiced about the increased use of prohibited weapons in ongoing conflicts. Noting that 1993 would mark the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution calling for universal adherence to the Convention and its Protocols and stressing the provision made in the Convention for convening a conference to consider amendments to it or its Protocols, to consider additional protocols or to review its scope and operation.

Two decisions, both adopted by consensus, one on international arms transfers and the other on conventional disarmament on a regional scale, were of a procedural nature, designed to ensure that these items would be included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

CHAPTER VII

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduction

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE SPACE AGE IN 1957, problems related to outer space have been discussed in the United Nations, particularly in the General Assembly, in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its subsidiary bodies, and in the Conference on Disarmament. The discussions have contributed to the conclusion of a number of international agreements concerning both peaceful and military aspects of the use of outer space.¹

The growing importance of preventing the militarization of outer space was reflected in the 1978 Final Document, which called for international negotiations to be held on the issue.² Since 1982, the Conference on Disarmament has had on its agenda an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, because of differing views concerning the formulation of a mandate, it was not until 1985 that it was able to set up an ad hoc committee with a mandate to examine, as a first step, through substantive and general consideration, issues

¹ The multilateral treaties referred to in this chapter are: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967) (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975) (General Assembly resolution 3235 (XXIX), annex). The text of the outer space Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming). In 1972 the United States and the former USSR concluded the anti-ballistic missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). See earlier volumes of *The Yearbook* for information concerning these and other treaties relevant to activities in outer space.

² General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 80.

relevant to the subject. No substantive progress has been made in the work of the Committee owing to continuing differences of view between the United States and the majority of the member States of the Conference.

In parallel with the multilateral negotiations, the United States and the former USSR initiated, in 1985, bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms "to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth".³ However, the "Defense and Space" negotiations which continued in 1992 between the Russian Federation and the United States have not produced conclusive results.

General developments and trends, 1992

During its 1992 session, the Conference on Disarmament continued to consider the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as discussed below. After 13 years of negotiations, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),⁴ at its 1992 session, agreed on draft principles for the use of nuclear power in space, and these were adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/68 of 14 December. There is ongoing discussion regarding the need for closer coordination between COPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament.

In parallel with these multilateral efforts, the United States and the Russian Federation continued their bilateral negotiations on ballistic missile defence. After announcing, on 29 January 1991, its new approach to ballistic missile defence, known as Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPAALS) and aware that any meaningful deployment of ballistic missile defence would require a change in the legal regime established by the ABM Treaty, the United States sought to negotiate with the Russian Federation a cooperative transition to allow such a change. Thus, in a joint statement issued by President Bush and President Yeltsin on 17 June at their Washington summit meeting,⁵ they noted that they were continuing their discussion of the potential benefits of a global protection

³ See "Joint United States-Soviet Statement on the Geneva Meeting of Their Foreign Ministers, 8 January 1985", reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. VIII, No. 1 (1985).

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/47/20)*.

⁵ The text of the joint statement was reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1992).

system (GPS) against ballistic missiles, and that they agreed that it was important to explore the role for defences in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. Further, they agreed that they should work together with allies and other interested States in developing a concept for such a system as part of an overall strategy with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the United States and the Russian Federation signed an agreement—the Agreement on Cooperation in Outer Space—which provides a broad framework for cooperation related to space activities.

The *Conference on Disarmament* considered the item in its relevant Ad Hoc Committee, which functioned under the same non-negotiating mandate as it had done in 1991. Open-ended consultations carried out by the Friends of the Chairman on terminological aspects of related issues, on issues related to verification of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), and on confidence-building measures were inconclusive. In spite of the changes initiated in 1991 regarding its methodology of work, differences among States persisted. On the one hand, a large number of members—principally non-aligned States—thought, as at previous sessions, that it would be desirable to undertake negotiations immediately, while, on the other hand, the United States remained opposed to such negotiations. Confidence-building measures continued to figure prominently in the debates in 1992 and several new working papers were submitted on the subject (by Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation).

At the forty-seventh session of the *General Assembly*, as at the previous session, there was no extensive discussion of the question of outer space. Statements made there referred mainly to the discussion of the subject in the Conference on Disarmament. During the general debate the Foreign Minister of France stated that in an effort to stop the development of an arms race in outer space, France would shortly propose a measure to enhance confidence by making it mandatory to give advance notice of the firing of ballistic missiles and rockets carrying satellites or other space objects. That notification measure, if adopted, would be complemented by the establishment of an international centre, under United Nations auspices, responsible for collecting and using the data received. It is expected that the proposal made by France will be further elaborated.

In the course of the presentation of the report of the Conference on Disarmament in the First Committee, Belgium, in its capacity as

President of the Conference, stated that the Ad Hoc Committee had made progress in its efforts to identify areas of convergence suitable for more structured work and noted the Committee's recognition of the importance of the presentations relating to confidence-building measures and to greater transparency in space.

The General Assembly adopted its traditional resolution on the subject. The United States continued to object to the part of the text referring to the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on outer space in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 45/55 B, of 4 December 1990, to carry out a study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space, held its second session in New York from 23 to 27 March under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto García Moritán of Argentina. The Group considered the first draft of the study. It is expected that the report will be completed in 1993.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1992

Throughout the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament, a number of member and non-member States referred to the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" in the course of their statements on all items in plenary meetings. The Conference re-established its Ad Hoc Committee on the agenda item and requested it to continue to examine and to identify relevant issues through substantive and general consideration. On 20 February the Conference on Disarmament appointed Mr. Romulus Neagu of Romania Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Committee held 13 meetings between 10 March and 11 August.

In addition to the documents of previous sessions, the Conference had before it compendiums of plenary statements and working papers on outer space from the 1991 session of the Conference, submitted by Canada,⁶ and several working papers.

The Ad Hoc Committee adopted the same programme of work as in 1991, which included the following items: examination and identification of relevant issues, existing agreements, and existing proposals and future initiatives relating to the subject. The programme also provided

⁶ CD/1142.

that in carrying out its work with a view to finding and building upon areas of convergence, the Committee would take into account developments since 1985, including those presented at the 1991 session as reflected in the work of the Friends of the Chairman. The Committee agreed that it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered by its mandate and specified in its programme of work. Accordingly, it decided to allocate the same number of meetings to each of these subjects.

The Committee agreed to continue to enjoy the assistance of the Friends of the Chair, who were appointed to deal with the following issues in open-ended consultations: (a) terminological aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space (Mr. A. Monckton of the United Kingdom); (b) issues related to verification of ASATs (Mr. M. Karem of Egypt); and (c) confidence-building measures in space activities (Mr. G. Diachenko of the Russian Federation). In addition, the Committee benefited from scientific and technical contributions by experts from various delegations, who addressed specific issues and initiatives under consideration by the Committee.

Many delegations expressed their regret that the Committee's mandate remained the same, and that no substantive changes had been made in the programme of work. The Group of 21 would have preferred the Committee to work under a negotiating mandate, because, it believed, such a mandate would help to concentrate efforts on concrete proposals. In the view of several delegations, the most promising directions for the work of the Committee appeared to be in the area of confidence-building measures.

In the context of identifying issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the United States observed that, in view of various misconceptions about space debris, some had come to the conclusion that an international legal regime on that subject was needed. In its view, for such a regime to be established, several legal issues, including the definition of space debris, jurisdiction and control over space debris, and the treatment of liability for damage from orbital debris, would need to be resolved.

Some delegations referred to the issue of GPALS. China expressed the belief that the new anti-ballistic missile system would not be totally defensive, and that its development would inevitably give rise to mutual suspicion among States. In its view, the system could also provoke countries with the ability to develop a ballistic missile system to speed

up the development of such a system, and it claimed that implementation of GPALS would surely violate the ABM Treaty.

As far as existing agreements were concerned, the differences of view expressed by States at earlier sessions persisted and were reiterated in the Committee. Canada argued that the legal regime could be reinforced by improving State practice under existing conventions. With respect to the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, it suggested that the United Nations Secretariat might devise some standard form of automatic dispatch of notices to remind States of their obligations under the Convention. In addition, the Conference could recommend that the Security Council adopt a resolution by which it would request the Secretary-General to send out automatic reminder notices and by which it would set up a committee of the Council to review periodically any failures on the part of States to register their launches. Canada also proposed more frequent use of article IX of the outer space Treaty (dealing with cooperation, assistance and consultations with regard to space activities) and suggested that article XI (dealing with dissemination of information received from States parties concerning their activities) could serve as a basis for requiring data beyond that which was currently provided for under the registration Convention.

As far as existing proposals and future initiatives were concerned, some delegations reiterated their concern that the first paragraph of article IV of the outer space Treaty left a legal loophole that was being exploited by some space Powers in their efforts to develop a new generation of weapons that could be placed in outer space. In this connection, Venezuela reiterated its proposal for an amendment to that article.⁷ Several delegations suggested ways of strengthening the registration Convention and the regime established by it, for instance by the provision of more timely and specific information concerning the function of satellites, including information as to whether they were fulfilling a civilian or a military mission.

In connection with the legal protection of satellites, some delegations indicated that both the question of ASAT weapons and that of immunity of space devices should be addressed with a view to achieving the prohibition of ASAT weapons and to guaranteeing legal immunity for satellites performing definitive peaceful functions. The United States

⁷ CD/851.

recalled that it had not found any measure regarding ASATs that would be verifiable or equitable, and suggested that the inability to construct a suitable and effective verification system could prevent agreements from being finalized. It also questioned the capability of most space nations to monitor compliance with "keep-out zones". France pointed out that the verification and monitoring of such zones would be a delicate task, and it stressed the usefulness of a trajectography tracking centre. Germany continued to consider that "keep-out zones" could play an essential role in a regime that would protect a State's space activities through agreed and verifiable provisions.

As at previous sessions, the question of confidence-building measures and the importance of transparency in outer space activities received considerable attention in the Conference. Many delegations were of the belief that confidence-building was one of the areas in which some degree of certainty and convergence of views existed and that it could form part of a negotiating process aimed at reaching agreements. Several favoured the approach centred on non-interference with non-aggressive activities and measures which would support that objective. While recognizing that confidence-building contributed to the positive development of international relations, the discussion on such measures should not, in China's view, obstruct the creation of a substantive and legally binding treaty banning all space weapons. It believed that some of the confidence-building measures already proposed could be considered as verification measures for a future treaty, among them the establishment of an appropriate international supervisory body to inspect objects before they were launched into space.

The discussion on terminological issues centred on two "non-papers" prepared by the Friend of the Chair on the phrases "peaceful purposes" and "the militarization of space". As no delegation questioned the illegality of any aggressive use of outer space, it seemed that a common denominator existed with regard to that concept, while there was agreement that further work was needed on the concept of "militarization".

The Friend of the Chair dealing with verification of ASATs held open-ended consultations on the basis of the paper he had prepared. While some delegations insisted that there was no legal instrument that governed activities of States with regard to this system, certain Western delegations recalled that the existing legal regime placed a wide variety

of legal restraints on the nature, deployment and use of ASATs. A number of delegations, among them Argentina, France, Germany and the Russian Federation, proposed that the subject be dealt with in a gradual, progressive fashion through confidence-building, transparency and trajectory-control measures that would raise the financial and political costs of any aggressive use of outer space. France indicated that ASATs could not be dealt with unless there was, as a legal basis or background, an agreement on the concept of aggression.

On the basis of consultations, statements and documents submitted earlier, the Friend of the Chair dealing with confidence-building drafted an analytical "non-paper" in which he identified five possible areas: (a) strengthening of the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; (b) use of satellite monitoring in the interests of the international community; (c) the drawing up of "rules of the road"/a "code of conduct"; (d) inspections of space objects at launching sites; and (e) establishment of an international trajectography centre. As a result of further consultations, these areas were grouped under three main headings: (a) measures to promote transparency, openness and predictability; (b) rules for the behaviour of space objects ("rules of the road"/a "code of conduct" for outer space); (c) "institutional" measures (the establishment of various types of bodies: a world space organization, an international satellite monitoring agency, a satellite-image processing agency, an international space monitoring agency, an inspectorate and a trajectography centre).

In its report to the Conference,⁸ the Ad Hoc Committee noted that there had continued to be general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space; of the significant role that the legal regime applicable to outer space was playing and of the need to consolidate and reinforce it and enhance its effectiveness; and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. The Committee also recognized the importance of the presentations relating to confidence-building measures and to greater transparency and openness in space made in

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27)*, para. 76 (paras. 30-33 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee).

the course of its work and the valuable contribution to the discussion made by experts. In addition, the Committee expressed its appreciation of the preliminary work done by the Friends of the Chairman and recommended that that exercise should be continued in 1993.

It also agreed that the work on the agenda item should continue and it was recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1993 session, taking into account all relevant factors, including the work of the Committee since 1985.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

At the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, a draft resolution on outer space was submitted by 27 States, later joined by 4 additional sponsors.⁹ In introducing it on 3 November, Venezuela noted that the sponsors considered that it was necessary to continue the in-depth bilateral and multilateral efforts to achieve the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to prevent the arms race from spreading to space. Although profound changes had taken place in the world, interest in the research and development of defensive systems that could be placed in outer space seemed to be continuing unabated. The great resources spent on that objective and the qualitative improvement of certain arms systems showed that the use of outer space could pose—if it did not already do so—a serious risk to collective security. Given the inadequacy of the existing legal regime applicable to space, the search for juridical norms to prevent the transfer of the arms race to outer space remained an item of primary importance on the disarmament agenda. Venezuela pointed out that the draft followed the general lines of the text of the previous year, but that there were some changes, such as emphasis on the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community regarding the use of outer space.

On 17 November, the First Committee took a separate vote on operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution, concerning the re-establish-

⁹ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela and Viet Nam.

ment of an ad hoc committee. It decided, by 130 votes to 1 (United States), with 4 abstentions (Israel, Japan, Federated States of Micronesia, and United Kingdom), to retain the paragraph. It then approved the draft as a whole by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 2 abstentions (Federated States of Micronesia and United States).

On 9 December, the General Assembly took action on the draft resolution. By a recorded vote of 159 to 1, with 4 abstentions, it decided to retain operative paragraph 8; and by a recorded vote of 164 to none, with 2 abstentions, it adopted the draft resolution as a whole. Resolution 47/51 reads as follows:

Resolution 47/51

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming also provisions of articles III and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities,

Reaffirming paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling also its previous resolutions on this issue and the Final Declaration adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Recognizing the grave danger for international peace and security of an arms race in outer space and of developments contributing to it,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space,

Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

Noting that bilateral negotiations, begun in 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, have continued with the declared objective of working out effective agreements aimed, *inter alia*, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Welcoming the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from these efforts as soon as possible,

Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community,

Recalling in this context its resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990 which, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Conscious of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing

the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

2. *Reaffirms its recognition*, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important strictly to comply with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, building upon areas of convergence and taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee at the 1992 session of the Conference and at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly;

8. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1993 session and to continue building upon areas of convergence with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. *Recognizes*, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the uses of outer space;

10. *Urges* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit with a view to reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and

to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Conclusion

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to be considered within and outside the United Nations. Differences of view persisted between the majority of States, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, regarding the appropriateness of multilateral negotiations on the subject.

In all forums dealing with the question, concern continued to be expressed about the danger of the militarization of outer space, and the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in that environment. There was increasing agreement on the relevance of confidence-building measures and of greater transparency and openness in space.

The Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament continued to examine the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In its report, the Committee voiced its appreciation of the preliminary work which the Friends of the Chair were continuing to carry out and of their organization of open-ended consultations on such important issues as those related to ASATs, confidence-building measures and terminological aspects of the prevention of an arms race. The outcome of those efforts was viewed as an encouraging development in the process of building upon the areas of convergence, and continuation of such an exercise in 1993 was recommended.

At its forty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted (with no negative vote and two abstentions) resolution 47/51, which was almost identical to the text adopted at its previous session, with somewhat greater emphasis on transparency and confidence-building measures.

CHAPTER VIII

Economic aspects of disarmament

Introduction

THERE IS A CLOSE LINK between armaments, disarmament and economics. It finds official recognition in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, which calls on the Security Council "to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". In this context, the possibility of reducing the huge financial, material and human resources devoted to the military sector and reallocating part of them to the civilian sector of national economies has been the object of deliberations within the framework of the United Nations for well over three decades.¹ Since the beginning of the 1990s, the subject has received fresh attention on the part of the international community in the light of the momentous changes in the political environment brought about by the end of the cold war. These, however, have not yet had a major impact on military budgets and the reallocation of resources from military to civilian endeavours.

In fact, world-wide military spending, which increased considerably in the early 1980s, stabilized at the end of that decade. Since then, the trend has been downward, mainly because both the United States and the Russian Federation have reduced their military budgets appreciably. With respect to the developing countries, the ratio of military spending to gross national product has declined in the past ten years, but there are few signs of a significant decrease in military spend-

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945–1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.IX.1), chap. 6; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970–1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chaps. XIII, XIV and XV; and previous issues of *The Yearbook*.

ing in the third world when measured in absolute terms. Globally, there has not been a reduction of military expenditures commensurate with the greatly improved international situation and the recent achievement of important arms limitation and disarmament agreements in the nuclear, chemical and conventional armament fields.

Through the years, the main issues that have been debated as part of the economic aspects of disarmament have included—in addition to the perennial question of the economic and social consequences of the arms race—disarmament and development, conversion of economic capacities from military to civilian endeavours, trends in military expenditures, reduction of military expenditures, standardized international reporting of military expenditures, problems involved in comparing military budgets, and problems likely to arise with respect to their verification. Among all these issues, the relationship between disarmament and development has consistently occupied a prominent place.²

In the Final Document of its first special session on disarmament, in 1978, the General Assembly stated that resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries. A major conclusion of an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development, mandated at that time, was that the world could either continue vigorously to pursue the arms race or move with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It could not do both.³ The choice between these two options implied, of course, a political decision in the first place.

Interest in the economic aspects of disarmament led, in 1987, to the convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development under the auspices of the United Nations. While there was wide acceptance of the significance of the Conference, it was recognized that it was only a first step in

² For a more detailed account of United Nations efforts to give effect to the relationship between disarmament and development, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter XIX, and vol. XII: 1987, chapter XVIII.

³ *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1), para. 391.

a long process in which the international community would have to engage in order to achieve the desired results. In the action programme set forth in the Final Document of the International Conference,⁴ the participating States *inter alia* requested the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts to foster and coordinate the incorporation of a disarmament-development perspective in the activities of the United Nations system. In particular, they called upon the United Nations to make greater efforts to promote collective knowledge of the non-military threats to international security; to establish an improved and comprehensive database on global and national military expenditures; to continue to analyse the impact of global military expenditures on the world economy and the international economic system; to monitor trends in military spending; and to facilitate an international exchange of views and experience in the field of conversion from military to civilian production. In accordance with the Final Document of the Conference,⁵ the Secretary-General established a high-level intra-Secretariat task force to carry out specific activities within the action programme adopted by the Conference.

Since the beginning of the decade, the issue of conversion has gained new prominence. A conference on conversion was held in Moscow in 1990,⁶ and a conference on cooperation in the peaceful use of military industrial technology was held the following year in Beijing.⁷ An expert study on charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment was submitted to

⁴ Report of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (A/CONF.130/39), part II. The Final Document was also issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.87.IX.8) and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 12: 1987, chapter XVIII, annex.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 35 (c) (ix), b.

⁶ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. IV. Material from the Moscow Conference, which was held under the auspices of the United Nations and co-sponsored by the Soviet Peace Fund, was published by the United Nations under the title *Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reduction*, vols. I and II (Sales Nos. E.91.IX.6 and E.91.IX.7).

⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. IV, "General developments and trends, 1991".

the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session, in 1991,⁸ the relevant results of which were made available to the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

Another issue whose relevance is growing is that of the economic costs of disarmament. Now that some significant arms reductions are actually taking place, many States are facing unforeseen costs relating to the safe physical dismantling and destruction of weapons or their storage, to the prevention of related environmental hazards, and to measures of verification necessary to ensure compliance with the arms reduction and disarmament agreements themselves.

The problems related to the dismantling of nuclear weapons have proved to be enormous, something that has been recognized only very recently. The most pressing challenge is how to store tons of plutonium and other fissionable material, until now part of the nuclear-weapon arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers. The costs of destroying chemical weapons are also daunting, a fact which was taken into account in the negotiations on a chemical weapons Convention.

As the Secretary-General recognized in his report on *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*,⁹ the international community has learned from experience that finding ways to deal with the new economic aspects of disarmament—the unavoidable consequence of implementing reductions of weapons—is no small problem.

General developments and trends, 1992

Steps to address the difficulties encountered in the destruction of weapons—among them, the costs involved—were taken by President Bush and President Yeltsin in June. At their summit meeting in

⁸ Ibid. The study was subsequently issued under the title *Potential Uses of Military-Related Resources for Protection of the Environment* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.7).

⁹ A/C.1/47/7. The report was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.93.IX.8) (hereinafter referred to as *New Dimensions*).

Washington,¹⁰ an agreement was signed between their two Governments concerning the safe and secure transportation, storage and destruction of weapons and the prevention of weapons proliferation. In addition, three implementing agreements were signed, by which the United States committed itself to bear costs of material, training and services incurred by the Russian Federation in connection with the destruction of its nuclear, chemical and other weapons for a total amount not to exceed \$65 million.

Subsequently, on 30 July, an agreement was reached between the United States Department of Defense and the President's Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons of the Russian Federation concerning the ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons.¹¹ By that agreement, the United States Department of Defense committed itself to provide appropriate assistance for the expeditious destruction of chemical weapons, the costs in connection with which would not exceed \$25 million.

Addressing the General Assembly on 21 September, President Bush announced his intention to work with the United States Congress to redirect the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to refocus on providing technical support for non-proliferation, weapons monitoring and destruction, and global defence conversion. Under the direction of the Secretary of State, the President added, ACDA should be used, not only in completing the traditional arms-control agenda, but, just as important, in providing technical assistance on the new world security agenda.

The Director of ACDA, speaking in the First Committee of the General Assembly, stressed how important it was to help the scientists, engineers and military experts whose talents were no longer needed for military programmes to make a successful transition to meaningful employment in other areas. The United States itself was experiencing some economic dislocation as a result of major cancellations and reductions in defence programmes and cut-backs in defence manpower and spending. Nevertheless, the Government of the United States was seek-

¹⁰ A number of statements and agreements signed at the summit meeting, among them the agreement and the three implementing agreements referred to here, were circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1162).

¹¹ CD/1161.

ing to work with the defence communities of a number of countries to help manage the impact of defence restructuring and the conversion of defence industries. That issue, he concluded, was just one example of the way in which the traditional arms-control agenda was in the process of transition to new priorities. Successful transformation of portions of the defence industry into commercially viable entities in other fields was surely central to beating swords into plowshares.¹² (For a discussion of efforts to aid former Soviet scientists make the transition from military to civilian research, see page 52.)

At the forty-seventh session, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly¹³ on specific activities concerning the relationship between disarmament and development carried out by the United Nations, in accordance with the priorities established by the existing intra-Secretariat task force—activities which, he noted, had been undertaken under severe resource constraints. In his report the Secretary-General referred specifically to a number of international conferences and workshops on problems of conversion and military expenditures held in 1992, with the participation of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

An international conference on “Conversion: Opportunities for Development and Environment”—organized jointly by the Centre for Science and Technology for Development of the United Nations Secretariat, the German Ministry of Higher Education and Research, the State of North Rhine Westphalia and the Institute of Environmental Protection Policy of the University of Dortmund, Germany—was held at Dortmund from 24 to 27 February. The Conference had attracted the participation of over 200 senior political leaders, industrialists, scientists and technologists from 35 countries, and representatives of the United Nations organizations and specialized agencies currently engaged in exploring practical measures for promoting the conversion of military facilities and capabilities for sustainable human benefits. As the Secretary-General stated in his report, the deliberations at the

¹² It should be noted that before adjourning in October, the Congress of the United States provided the Administration with new funds for economic conversion. The Congress actually appropriated \$1.7 billion for that programme. In addition, it authorized \$800 million in demilitarization and denuclearization assistance to the former USSR.

¹³ A/47/452.

Conference reflected the growing awareness, at the highest levels of government and industrial and research establishments, of possible environmental benefits of conversion.

Secondly, the Office for Disarmament Affairs also participated in a one-day workshop on linking financial flows to military expenditures, organized by the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C., on 28 January. The workshop had brought together experts from some major donor countries, representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations, and scholars from countries receiving developmental assistance to discuss a position paper prepared by the Overseas Development Council which dealt with the question of making reductions in military spending a condition for receiving developmental assistance. This was a rather controversial subject, since objections to the linkage between arms reduction and developmental objectives had been raised not only by the recipients of aid but also, as was evident at the workshop, by some donors. In this connection, the report noted, the workshop had shown that there was a generally shared feeling that, in view of the highly political nature of issues related to national security, including military expenditures, the United Nations was an appropriate forum for promoting military restraint and for dealing with the practical problems arising from information related to arms reductions.

Thirdly, an international conference on aerospace complex conversion—organized through the joint efforts of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other interested United Nations bodies, as well as ICAO, UNESCO and UNIDO, together with the Government of the Russian Federation—was held in Moscow from 12 to 16 October. The Conference, in which experts in the areas of conversion and disarmament, science and technology policies, aerospace technologies and development financing participated, was able to adopt a declaration which contained specific recommendations on organizational and political issues and on research and development issues, addressed to the international community; recommendations for policy makers; and recommendations to aerospace enterprises and commercial companies.

In the conclusion to his report *New Dimensions*, mentioned above, the Secretary-General noted that the correlation between disarmament measures and economic conditions had drawn more attention over recent years as democratic trends influenced development. A main aspect

of the correlation was found in current efforts designed to transform some military-oriented industrial complexes into enterprises serving social, humanitarian and development needs. Conversion of military capacities to peaceful uses, the Secretary-General stressed, was a complex task, as it affected both the manufacturing and the research and development capacities of countries. In many countries, in particular economically advanced ones, there were large segments of the population dependent on military production. Restructuring industrial capacities and retraining skilled and unskilled labour were likely to have a debilitating effect on their economies. Moreover, the arms industry and the military establishment, which usually enjoyed considerable privileges, tended to resist changes. Thus, unless States took decisive actions in changing this situation, the disarmament process would unavoidably be slowed down.

Disarmament as an investment process

In its resolution 45/62 G, of 4 December 1990, the General Assembly requested the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to prepare, with the assistance of independent experts, a research report on the economic aspects of disarmament. The report,¹⁴ entitled "Economic aspects of disarmament: disarmament as an investment process", was drafted by nine experts designated by UNIDIR, who worked in their personal capacities. It was submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, through the Secretary-General. The document examines different methodologies for analysing and forecasting the economic effects of disarmament and for evaluating public policies which may accompany conversion and transition processes.

The report begins with an executive summary which sets forth twelve "Economic principles for disarmament" summing up the main conclusions of the research. It is then divided into three parts. Part One gives an overview of the problem, considering, in particular, defence spending and disarmament. Part Two deals with key issues such as basic data, the economic approach to defence spending, military research and development, arms exports, arms limitation, development and economic adjustment, and conversion problems. Part Three presents

¹⁴ A/47/346.

the conclusions of the study, particularly on the issue of the "peace dividend" and the role of public policies designed to optimize it.

The main finding of the report is that disarmament has major economic consequences involving costs as well as benefits. On the cost side, it requires a fundamental reallocation of resources from military to civilian production. This is likely to result in major potential problems of unemployment or underemployment of labour, capital and other resources in the process of disarmament. As a result, the economic dividends of disarmament are likely to be small in the short term. In the long term, however, disarmament leads to significant and worthwhile benefits through the production of civil goods and services as resources are reallocated to the civilian sector. Thus, in its economic aspects disarmament is like an investment process involving short-run costs and long-run benefits.

Among the other findings of the report, the following raise important economic policy questions.

In order to maximize the social rate of return from disarmament, treated as an investment process, reductions of military spending should be gradual and predictable, allowing for smooth economic and social adjustments to decreasing defence expenditures.

Overcoming the economic, technological and environmental constraints on conversion requires financial commitments, managerial innovations, manpower retraining, capital retooling and other initiatives so as to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of disarmament. In addition, the physical conversion of defence plants and equipment can be difficult and costly. As a result, it is sometimes better simply to abandon specialized defence plants.

As Governments provide defence expenditure, they need to be involved in the adjustment process. Public policies which assist change and resource allocation can help to minimize the costs of disarmament. Examples include manpower policies which provide information on alternative employment opportunities and assistance for retraining and mobility; and incentives for creating new civil industries and for undertaking civil scientific and technological projects in areas such as energy, the environment and space exploration.

Increasing transparency of information regarding arms imports and arms exports is essential. The responsibility of many countries for limiting arms exports should be emphasized. Steps should be taken

at regional and international levels to ensure that disarmament does not lead to arms exports replacing domestic sales:

Industrialized countries might use some of the benefits from disarmament to assist the developing countries. Also, the developing countries might be encouraged to reduce their defence spending.

Access to and use of foreign experience and knowledge in the development of civilian production are key factors in successful conversion for all countries, especially countries in which the civilian sector of the economy has been neglected and suppressed by military priorities and claims. Joint conversion projects should be recognized as an important aspect of international economic cooperation.

An appendix to the report notes that the subject of defence economics, which involves the application of economic principles to defence, disarmament and peace, is a relatively new specialized field within economics. The appendix provides a number of examples of items that could be included in a research agenda on the economic aspects of disarmament.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

On 30 October, Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development". Introducing it on 10 November, the representative of Indonesia stressed that, in a world of growing interdependence, the promotion of an integrated approach to the issues of disarmament and development and the fashioning of a productive relationship between them would be in the common interest of all countries. Furthermore, in the light of the fact that the world was facing a deepening crisis in the global monetary, financial and trading systems, the need to reallocate resources away from military objectives and towards socio-economic objectives had become a political and moral imperative.

On 12 November, the draft resolution was adopted without a vote. In connection with the adoption of the draft resolution, the United States stressed that it had not participated in the voting because it was its belief that disarmament and development were two distinct issues and could not be considered as organically linked. For this reason, the United States had not participated in the 1987 International Conference on

the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and did not consider itself bound by the declaration in the Final Document of that Conference.

The draft resolution on the relationship between disarmament and development was adopted by the General Assembly, without a vote, on 9 December, as resolution 47/52 F. At the time of its adoption, the United States noted again its non-participation. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 F

Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,

Stressing the growing importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General and actions undertaken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

On 30 October, 26 States, later joined by 5 more,¹⁵ submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research", which was introduced by the representative of France on 5 November. After noting that the study had been carried out with the assistance of non-governmental experts, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, he stated that the growing importance of the economic aspects of disarmament was acknowledged by the international community and had been reflected in the debate in the First Committee. The sponsors felt that the conclusions of the report merited study by Member States.

On 12 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 3 abstentions (Israel, United Kingdom and United States). The United States abstained because the draft resolution contained language that gave the impression of United Nations endorsement of the principles contained in the UNIDIR study. As the United States disagreed with some of the principles set forth in the report, it did not wish to be associated with giving such an impression. The United Kingdom, which also abstained, took a similar position.

On 9 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as resolution 47/54 F by a recorded vote of 166 to none, with 2 abstentions. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 47/54 F

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on the basis of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General,

Reaffirming its resolution 39/148 H of 17 December 1984, in which it approved the Statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, renewed the invitations to Governments to consider making voluntary contributions to the Institute and requested the Secretary-General to continue to give the Institute administrative and other support,

¹⁵ Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Spain and Sri Lanka.

Recalling also its resolution 42/42 J of 30 November 1987, in which it took note with appreciation of the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and noted that the establishment of the Institute offered new opportunities regarding research in the field of disarmament,

Recalling further its resolution 45/62 G of 4 December 1990, in which it requested the Institute to prepare, with the assistance of independent experts, a research report on the economic aspects of disarmament and to report to the General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, at its forty-seventh session,

Reaffirming the need for the international community to have access to independent and in-depth research on disarmament, in particular on emerging problems and the foreseeable consequences of disarmament,

Noting in this regard the importance of research on the economic aspects of disarmament,

Having considered the annual report of the Director of the Institute and the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters acting in its capacity as Board of Trustees of the Institute,

1. *Welcomes* the research report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "Economic aspects of disarmament: disarmament as an investment process", as transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly;

2. *Commends* the report to the attention of Member States and encourages them to give active consideration, in particular, to the economic principles for disarmament contained in the executive summary of the report;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give the report the widest possible circulation.

Conclusion

In terms of United Nations interest, a major aspect of the broad question of the economics of disarmament remains the relationship between disarmament and development. Indeed, one can note increasing support for governmental action in the area where disarmament and development meet, that is, in the area of conversion. Since Governments provide defence expenditures, they are becoming increasingly involved in the adjustment process. There is also growing recognition of the importance of reducing military expenditures gradually, so as to facilitate smooth economic and social adjustment and the concrete achievement of conversion.

There is good reason to keep alive the hope of a “peace dividend”, and if the downward trend in military expenditure continues, the benefits of disarmament will soon become apparent. As has been pointed out by experts in the field, in its economic aspects disarmament is like an investment process, involving short-run costs and long-run benefits.

CHAPTER IX

Environmental issues and the ENMOD Review Conference

Introduction

ALTHOUGH MANY QUESTIONS RELATED TO PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT had already been raised at the beginning of the nuclear era, it was only in the early 1970s that the international community began to deal with these questions in a specific way. Thus, in the early 1970s, especially after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972, the problem of artificial modification of the environment for military or other hostile purposes began to attract increasing international attention. The Declaration adopted by that Conference¹ stated, *inter alia*, that nations had the responsibility of ensuring that their activities did not damage the environment of other nations. While scientific and technical progress opens up the possibility of influencing the natural environment in beneficial ways, it also makes it possible to use environmental modification techniques for military or other hostile purposes. Concerns with regard to this potential led to efforts to achieve, before the techniques involved had been fully developed by States, an international agreement prohibiting such modification of the environment.

These efforts led in 1977 to the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention), which entered

¹ *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corrigendum), chap. I.

into force on 5 October 1978.² In accordance with article VIII of the Convention, a review conference of the parties to the ENMOD Convention was held at Geneva in 1984. In the Final Declaration,³ adopted by consensus, the parties concluded that the obligations assumed under the Convention had been faithfully observed, and that there was a need to keep under continuing review and examination the provisions of the Convention. In 1991 the parties to the Convention decided to convene a second review conference in September 1992.

Destruction of the environment has been used as a method of warfare, both defensive and offensive, from ancient times. An extreme form of hostile environmental damage, also referred to as environmental terrorism, was seen in the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf area, in the course of which devastating damage was caused to the environment—affecting not only the people of the countries involved but also those of the whole region.

In the last few years, the environmental impact of disarmament measures has also raised concerns. Most of the arms reduction agreements prior to the late 1980s, for example the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the United States–USSR anti-ballistic missile Treaty, were designed to ensure that certain types of activities would not take place. These agreements did not require, as stipulated in the CFE Treaty of 1990, the INF Treaty of 1987, the START I Treaty of 1991 and the recently adopted chemical weapons Convention, the destruction of conventional, nuclear or chemical weapons. Although the question of the destruction of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons has been addressed in detail in the Convention, the consequences for the environment of the measures envisaged cannot be fully evaluated at this time. The destruction of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste also poses serious problems for the environment and for fulfilment of the obligations undertaken under the relevant agreements. The eco-

² For a discussion of the ENMOD Convention and related matters, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXII, and *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chapter III. The text of the Convention is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming).

³ *First Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: Final Document* (ENMOD/CONF.I/13/II).

logical problems encountered in the course of the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction under the authority of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) illustrate this point.

The damage inflicted on the environment during the war in the Persian Gulf led in 1991 to the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, entitled "Exploitation of the environment as a weapon in times of armed conflict and the taking of practical measures to prevent such exploitation". The item was allocated to the Sixth Committee for consideration. The debate led to the adoption of decision 46/417, by which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report on activities undertaken in the framework of the International Red Cross and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-seventh session the item entitled "Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict". The question was also considered by the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It was considered also at several meetings of governmental, non-governmental and independent experts, at which the relative benefits of, on the one hand, strengthening existing law, and, on the other, elaborating new law⁴ were debated.

General developments and trends, 1992

The question of the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict attracted attention once again in several forums during 1992, and it was considered as a separate agenda item in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

In the *Conference on Disarmament*, in the negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons, the question of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare was raised. A large number of States believed that it was sufficient to recognize, in the preamble of the draft Convention, the prohibition of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international law. However, some delegations, among them that of Viet Nam, considered such a reference insufficient. Therefore, to overcome those

⁴ For a short review of existing treaties and other instruments relating to the environment and warfare, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chapter III.

difficulties, Germany and 28 other States⁵ proposed that the ENMOD Review Conference should reconfirm, once and for all, the understanding that the military or other hostile use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party was a prohibited method of warfare under the ENMOD Convention. Although Viet Nam expressed gratitude to Germany for the proposed solution, it stated that its position of principle in favour of including the content of the prohibition of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare in one of the main provisions of the future Convention remained unchanged. (For the treatment of the issue of herbicides in the chemical weapons Convention, see page 29.)

Problems related to environmental protection in times of armed conflict were also discussed at the *United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, held in June in Rio de Janeiro. These discussions led to the adoption of several relevant texts, among them paragraph 39.6 of Agenda 21, which reads:

Measures in accordance with international law should be considered to address, in times of armed conflict, large-scale destruction of the environment that cannot be justified under international law. The General Assembly and the Sixth Committee are the appropriate forums to deal with this subject. The specific competence and role of the International Committee of the Red Cross should be taken into account.⁶

In addition, in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development the following principle (principle 24) was adopted:

Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.⁷

⁵ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Switzerland.

⁶ *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, 3-14 June 1992 (A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III)). chap. 39.

⁷ *Ibid.*, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), resolution 1, annex I.

In his report entitled "Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict",⁸ the Secretary-General of the United Nations reproduced information received from the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (ICRC) pursuant to General Assembly decision 46/417 of 9 December 1991. In connection with that decision, the ICRC convened a meeting at Geneva from 27 to 29 April which brought together over 30 experts from the armed forces, the scientific community, academic circles and Governments, as well as representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations. The goals of the meeting were as follows: (a) to define the content of existing law; (b) to identify the main problems involved in implementing this law; (c) to identify any gaps in existing law; and (d) to determine what should now be done in this area. An account of the work of the experts is included in the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General,⁹ which covered the following main areas: (a) existing law; (b) principal activities in recent years; (c) work carried out under the auspices of the ICRC; (d) the position of the ICRC; and (e) conclusions. It is noteworthy that while the ICRC agreed to a great extent with the initial conclusions reached in the various meetings of experts organized in recent months, it had reservations about proposals to undertake a new process of codification of the rules protecting the environment in times of armed conflict; it felt that the results would be of dubious value and could even be counter-productive. Therefore, it wished to see a particular effort made to increase compliance with existing rules and to improve their implementation; at the same time, it was quite aware that the law was in need of interpretation, clarification and development. The ICRC was willing to contribute actively to the search for adequate means of protecting the environment in times of armed conflict by providing the international community with solutions to current problems and it was continuing its consultations with experts in order to study a number of specific and still unresolved matters. In particular, it was ready to cooperate in the preparation of a handbook of model guidelines for military manuals.¹⁰

⁸ A/47/328.

⁹ A/47/328, paras. 46-60.

¹⁰ A/47/328, paras. 61-65 and 68.

At the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, questions related to protection of the environment from the impact of military activity were considered in both the Sixth Committee and the First Committee.

In the debate on the item entitled "Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict" in the *Sixth Committee*,¹¹ 27 States and 2 Observers addressed the question. There was general agreement that the Gulf conflict, by revealing the extent of the environmental damage which war could cause, had brought the issue to the fore. In addition, a great number of States welcomed the significant contribution made by the ICRC to the study of the problem.

As at the previous session, opinions differed as to whether the existing rules were adequate and whether there was a need for new rules. A number of States considered that although there were some international instruments dealing with protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, an effort should be made to eliminate the existing gaps and shortcomings, and the relevant norms of international law should be expanded.

On the other hand, some States maintained that the problems had arisen primarily because the existing rules had not been implemented. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, reiterated their view that existing international humanitarian law needed to be reviewed and implemented, and knowledge of that law spread. In that context, it was essential that military manuals should state clearly the obligations of members of armed forces in respect of the environment. The United States averred that it was necessary to guard against unintentionally weakening existing international law by implying that it had to be strengthened through the elaboration of new law, when the real need was to ensure that existing law was fully understood and applied.

Several States, among them Argentina, Brazil, New Zealand, Sweden and Uruguay, made reference to principle 24 of the Declaration and/or paragraph 39.6 of Agenda 21, adopted by UNCED in Rio, as additional contributions to examination of the question of the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict. References to the ENMOD Convention made in the Sixth Committee were reiterated and amplified in the First Committee, as described below.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Sixth Committee*, 8th, 9th and 19th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 73rd meeting.

In the debate in the *First Committee* several questions relevant to the protection of the environment with respect to hostile or military activities—such as the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, the Second Review Conference of the ENMOD Convention, the dumping of radioactive waste and some other activities which have negative effects on the environment—were addressed by several States. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, and Bulgaria welcomed the successful outcome of the Second ENMOD Review Conference, while Brazil observed that the Review Conference had taken place in a constructive atmosphere. Canada noted that the Conference had taken a modest step towards clarifying serious differences of interpretation with regard to the scope of the Treaty, most notably by agreeing that any and all environmental modification techniques were covered, regardless of the level of technology employed, and that the use of herbicides was also covered by it. Believing that more careful examination of such problems was necessary, Canada favoured the convening of a consultative committee of experts pursuant to article V of the Convention. Finland, together with the other Nordic countries, also supported the convening of such a committee.

In order to increase the effectiveness of the Convention in preventing extension of the arms race to the environment, the common heritage of mankind, it was necessary, Egypt believed, to focus on the following elements: (a) flexibility with respect to updating the definition in article II, in view of rapid modern technological development; (b) implementation of the principle of transparency in exchanging information regarding all scientific and technological developments, whether they concerned peaceful or hostile modifications of the environment; (c) clarification of international responsibility as related to the Convention; (d) reinforcement of the system of verification and monitoring of compliance; and (e) confirmation that the dumping of nuclear, chemical and other toxic wastes in the territories of developing countries was an act of environmental modification prohibited by the Convention.

The question of protecting the environment from the impact of destruction processes necessitated by the implementation of disarmament measures was addressed in a number of bilateral agreements. In this context, an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation providing for United States assistance to the Russian Federation

in carrying out the safe, secure and ecologically sound destruction of the latter's chemical weapons was signed in Washington on 30 July.¹²

**Second Review Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques**

Introduction

In its Final Declaration, the First Review Conference of the ENMOD Convention, held at Geneva in September 1984, requested the depositary to solicit the views of States parties concerning a second review conference if none was held before 1994. By resolution 46/36 A of 6 December 1991, the General Assembly noted that a majority of States parties to the ENMOD Convention had expressed their wish to convene the Second Review Conference in September 1992.

Work of the Preparatory Committee

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/36 A, which provided that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depositary of the Convention, would hold consultations with the parties to the Convention regarding the Second Review Conference, a Preparatory Committee held one session at Geneva from 6 to 8 April. The Preparatory Committee, attended by 35 parties, decided that the Review Conference would convene at Geneva on 14 September. The Committee decided to request the Secretariat to prepare an updated information paper containing a summary of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Convention and of subsequent developments, particularly for the period 1984 to 1992. The Committee further decided to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit a document containing a compilation of such official communications regarding the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Convention as he might have received. In addition, the Committee decided to request the Secretary-

¹² Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States and the President's Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons of the Russian Federation concerning the Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons (CD/1161).

General to make available to States parties to the Convention all relevant documents of UNCED regarding the subject of environment and security.

In the course of its session, the Preparatory Committee also took care of organizational matters such as the election of officers, the draft rules of procedure, the provisional agenda, and the composition of the General Committee of the Second Review Conference.¹³

Second Review Conference

The Second Review Conference, held at Geneva from 14 to 18 September, was attended by 40 of the 55 States parties at that time, 4 signatories, 6 Observer States,¹⁴ and several intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. At its first meeting, the Conference elected by acclamation Mr. Paul O'Sullivan, of Australia, as its President, and adopted its agenda and rules of procedure as recommended by the Preparatory Committee.

In his opening statement, the President noted that the Conference presented a timely opportunity to consider the utility of the Convention in contemporary circumstances, its operation and scope. In that connection, it might be wondered whether the protection afforded by the Convention should be restricted to the States parties and whether activities such as deliberate "low-tech" environmental damage came within its purview. The absence so far of any accusations that the provisions of the Convention had been violated could be interpreted as meaning that its scope was so narrow that it had little practical application. Another question that was raised was whether the Understandings contained in the Convention relating to the meaning of the terms "widespread, long-

¹³ See *Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD/CONF.II/1)*.

¹⁴ *States Parties*: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam. *Signatories*: Bolivia, Iraq, Luxemburg and Morocco. *Observer States*: Chile, France, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru and Venezuela.

lasting or severe effects" and the illustrations of the phenomena that could be caused by the use of environmental modification techniques remained valid or required updating. The fact that the Second Review Conference followed UNCED and the successful conclusion of negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention would, the President hoped, help place ENMOD firmly in the spectrum of environmental and arms control issues.

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that it was gratifying to note that since the entry of the Convention into force in 1978, States parties had, as affirmed by the First Review Conference in 1984, generally complied with their commitments and that the Convention continued to function effectively. The improvement in international relations, particularly in the post-cold war era, and the significant agreements achieved regarding nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons provided greater possibilities of realizing the wishes articulated by States parties in the preamble to the Convention regarding preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. The Secretary-General continued to share the belief expressed by the First Review Conference that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international security and strengthen trust among nations.

The general debate took place on 14 and 15 September, in the course of which 26 States parties explained their positions.¹⁵ The debate revealed the persistence of differences of view with regard to the scope of the Convention. The consensus reached on many questions is reflected in the Final Declaration. A number of proposals that were submitted did not receive general acceptance; it was, however, decided to annex some of them to the Final Document.

Work of the Drafting Committee

The Drafting Committee held five meetings between 16 and 17 September to conduct a review of the various articles and provisions of the Convention and to prepare and submit to the plenary meeting the draft Final Document of the Conference, including the Final Declaration. The Committee also held a number of informal consultations during that time.

¹⁵ In accordance with rule 41 of the rules of procedure of the Review Conference, parts of the meetings devoted to general debate were not covered by summary records.

As a result of informal consultations of Friends of the President, which included all interested delegations, the Drafting Committee decided to use as a basis for its work a compilation of the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference and any new specific written proposals which parties submitted to the Secretariat.

The participants confirmed that obligations assumed under article I not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party had been faithfully observed by the States parties. However, differences persisted with regard to the meaning of the threshold terms mentioned above as well as environmental modification techniques. Regarding the question of scope, some felt that it should be expanded to include, for example, unsophisticated technologies (such as those used in the war in the Persian Gulf), while others considered that the scope was adequate as originally intended to include "high-tech" means of environmental modification techniques. The participants affirmed the need to keep the provisions of article I under continuing review and examination in order to ensure their global effectiveness.

Regarding article II, there emerged significant agreement among the participants that the military or any other hostile use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique was "a method of warfare prohibited by Article I if such use of herbicides upsets the ecological balance in a region". In addition, the Conference reaffirmed its support for the definition of environmental modification techniques, contained in article II, and agreed that the definition and Understandings covered military or any other hostile use of any environmental modification techniques. The Conference agreed that due attention should be given to all relevant research, developments and techniques in the fields of science and technology. While some delegations wished to specify which fields should be covered (such as geophysics or genetic engineering), others did not agree to do so. The Conference noted that the list of phenomena in the Understanding relating to article II was illustrative and not exhaustive.

The Conference reaffirmed that article III was without prejudice to any rules of international law that might apply to environmental modification techniques used for peaceful purposes. It also called upon States parties to provide the fullest possible exchange of scientific and

technological information on the research on and development of environmental modification techniques, in particular within organizations of the United Nations system such as WMO, UNEP and WHO. Not all parties, however, agreed to inclusion in this section of a reference to ensuring transparency, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, and to having the Secretariat of the United Nations collect and disseminate information on the subject.

States parties noted the provisions of article IV, which requires each one to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction.

Observing with satisfaction that no State party had found it necessary to invoke the provisions of article V, dealing with international complaints, the Conference noted the intention of some States to consider requesting, not later than 1995, the depositary to convene a consultative committee of experts as provided for in paragraph 2 of article V to obtain expert views on the scope and application of the provisions of the Convention. The Conference also noted that other States parties believed that such a meeting was not necessary. This language was the result of arduous negotiations in which some parties wanted to include specific details about what a consultative committee of experts should consider, as well as a decision to convene such a committee no later than 1994, whereas other parties would not accept such language.

With reference to article VI, the Conference noted that during the period of operation of the Convention no State party had proposed any amendments to it; and with reference to article VII it reaffirmed that the Convention should be of unlimited duration.

With regard to article VIII, the Conference recognized the importance of the review mechanism, and decided that if a third review conference was not held before the year 2002, the depositary would be requested to solicit views of States parties concerning the convening of such a conference.

In the discussion of article IX, an overwhelming number of delegations reiterated their call for universal acceptance of the Convention. After lengthy discussion, the participants took the unusual step of naming all 17 signatories, and called on them to accede to the Convention as soon as possible. The Conference also called upon all successor States

and newly independent States to become parties to the Convention. Further, it requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as depositary, to intensify efforts to assist in promoting the universality of the Convention.

After some debate, representatives agreed to include, in an annex to the Final Document of the Conference, some of the proposals and ideas presented at the Conference that had not enjoyed consensus for inclusion in the Final Declaration.

Final phase of the Conference

On 18 September, at its last meeting, the Conference adopted by consensus its Final Document,¹⁶ which contained a Final Declaration (see the annex to this chapter). Following the adoption of the Final Document, a number of States commented on it and on the Conference in general.

Among those commenting on the Final Document, Canada stated that the work of the Conference demonstrated that all was not well with the Convention owing, in large measure, to significant problems with regard to the interpretation of its scope. Canada noted that while some parties maintained that ENMOD was a futuristic document covering exotic technologies that had yet to be invented, they contended at the same time that it covered the use of herbicides, which was a low-technology environmental modification technique. Moreover, Canada believed that all environmental modification techniques were covered by the Convention, regardless of the level of technology applied. Stressing that there was no basis for affirming the continuing effectiveness of the ENMOD Convention unless and until the problems of its interpretation had been cleared up, Canada had sought, together with other delegations, to elicit a decision to establish a consultative committee of experts to clarify the scope and applications of the Convention. It said it would consult with other countries on the issue of establishing such a committee before the end of 1994. The establishment of such a committee was expressly supported also by Austria, Finland and Sweden. Austria considered that the objective of improving the Convention and strengthening its credibility had been achieved to a certain extent and it hoped that all States parties would encourage non-party States to accede to the Convention. Finland stated that as a result of the discussions at the

¹⁶ ENMOD/CONF.II/12.

Conference there was greater awareness of the important role that the ENMOD Convention could play in the common defence against such wilful misuse of the environment for hostile purposes as had recently been witnessed. It held that the scope of the Convention needed to be interpreted in the light of today's circumstances rather than of those of two decades ago.

The United States noted that although the focus of the Conference had been on the narrower question of the use of the environment itself as an instrument of war, the Conference had created greater sensitivity to the broader dangers posed to an increasingly fragile environment by the destruction and devastation of war. Argentina and Sweden, among others, expressed their satisfaction with the ban on the use of herbicides as a method of warfare. The Russian Federation expressed its satisfaction with the spirit of cooperation shown at the Conference and voiced its hope that the Final Declaration would improve the efficacy of the Convention. The Netherlands noted that progress had been made in updating the Convention through an evolutionary interpretation of article II.

The representative of the ICRC stated that the meeting of experts convened by the ICRC in accordance with decision 46/417 of the General Assembly to define the existing law on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict had agreed that some of the provisions of the ENMOD Convention needed to be clarified. The proposals at the Second Review Conference with regard to making the Convention more attuned to the realities of modern warfare were welcomed.

In his concluding statement, the President noted that, after wide-ranging debate on the scope and effectiveness of the Convention, the Conference had been able to agree on a Final Declaration reflecting the common ground among States parties. That was particularly important because the agreed statement on the prohibition of the military or any other hostile use of herbicides covered an important dimension of the norms established by the forthcoming chemical weapons Convention. The President also welcomed the fact that the Conference had recognized other important events relating to the protection of the environment, such as UNCED, and the fact that information relevant to environmental modification might be available from WMO, UNEP and WHO.

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

At the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, three resolutions were submitted in connection with the protection of the environment from hostile or military activities. The first draft resolution, submitted under the agenda item entitled "Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict" and allocated to the Sixth Committee, was, in its final form, sponsored by 31 States.¹⁷ On 23 October, Jordan introduced the revised draft resolution. In so doing, it stated that the draft represented a serious effort to address to the greatest extent possible the concerns expressed by various States; that the text was delicate and carefully balanced; and that the sponsors hoped it would be adopted by consensus.

At the same meeting, the Sixth Committee adopted the revised draft resolution without a vote, although several States (Belarus, Canada and Malaysia) considered that the question should be included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its next session as a separate item.

On 29 November, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 47/37. The operative part of the resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 47/37

Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict

1. *Urges* States to take all measures to ensure compliance with the existing international law applicable to the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict;
2. *Appeals* to all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the relevant international conventions;
3. *Further urges* States to take steps to incorporate the provisions of international law applicable to the protection of the environment into their military manuals and to ensure that they are effectively disseminated;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to report on activities undertaken by the Committee and other

¹⁷ Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and Yemen.

relevant bodies with regard to the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, under the item entitled "United Nations Decade of International Law", on activities reported by the Committee.

The second draft resolution was submitted on 29 October by 23 States,¹⁸ under the agenda item "Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques". In introducing it in the First Committee on 2 November, Australia noted that the Conference had successfully reviewed the Convention in detail and had conducted a comprehensive debate about its overall place in the field of disarmament. Further, the Conference had produced an agreed Final Document, which reaffirmed the strong common interest of the States parties in preventing the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes. As one of the important elements in the Final Declaration, Australia noted the agreed understanding on the prohibition of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare. Also noteworthy, in its view, was the call upon all signatory States to ratify the Convention without delay, and upon those States which had not yet signed it to accede to it as soon as possible. The draft resolution reflected the consensus views of States parties to the ENMOD Convention, as contained in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference. The sponsors hoped that the draft would be adopted by consensus.

On 9 November, the original sponsors, together with an additional 13 States,¹⁹ submitted a revised draft containing minor changes, and on 12 November the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 47/52 E. It reads as follows:

¹⁸ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

¹⁹ The additional sponsors were: Albania, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Kuwait, Netherlands and Norway.

Resolution 47/52 E

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976, in which it referred the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention,

Recalling also its resolution 46/36 A of 6 December 1991, in which it noted that a majority of States parties to the Convention had expressed their wish to convene the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention in September 1992,

Welcoming the fact that States parties to the Convention met at Geneva from 14 to 18 September 1992 to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions were being realized,

Having considered the Final Document of the Second Review Conference,

Noting with satisfaction that the Review Conference confirmed that the obligations assumed under article I of the Convention had been faithfully observed by the States parties,

Noting also that the Review Conference recognized the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives, and the common interest of mankind in maintaining its effectiveness in prohibiting the use of environmental modification techniques as a means of war,

Emphasizing that in its Final Declaration the Second Review Conference reaffirmed its belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the States parties to the Convention reaffirmed their strong common interest in preventing the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes, their strong support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions,

1. *Notes* the assessment by the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques that the Convention has been effective in preventing military or any other hostile use of any environmental modification techniques between States parties, and that its provisions need to be kept under continuing review and examination in order to ensure their global effectiveness;

2. *Welcomes* the reaffirmation by the Review Conference of support for article II and for the definition therein of the term "environmental modification techniques", which States parties to the Convention agree that, taken together with the Understandings relating to articles I and II, covers military or any other hostile use of any environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any State party by another State party;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* the confirmation by the Review Conference that the military or any other hostile use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique in the meaning of article II is a method of warfare prohibited by article I if such use of herbicides upsets the ecological balance of a region, thus causing widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party;

4. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from military or any other hostile use of any environmental modification techniques;

5. *Urges* all States that have not already done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention as early as possible, and urges successor States to take appropriate action, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;

6. *Welcomes* the reaffirmation of the undertaking, under article V, of all States parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to intensify efforts to assist States parties in promoting the universality of the Convention, including through the provision of appropriate advice on procedures.

On 28 October, Mauritania, on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes". In introducing it, on 11 November, Kenya noted that the draft was nearly identical with the text of resolution 46/36 K, of 1991. Kenya pointed out that as the majority of African States did not have the appropriate technology for the quick detection, identification or differentiation of the waste dumped into their continent, they condemned and opposed the dumping of any kind of waste, not only radioactive waste, that was injurious to populations or harmful to the environment. After expressing the hope that the other delegations would take note of the sensitivity of the Group of African States on the issue, Kenya urged the support of all States so that the draft could be adopted by consensus.

On 13 November the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution. On 16 November they submitted a further revised draft resolution, in which the original operative paragraph 3, which had referred to the "recently reported effort to dump radiological and toxic wastes in Somalia" was deleted, and the subsequent paragraphs were renumbered accordingly.

On 18 November, the First Committee adopted the revised draft resolution without a vote.

While joining in the consensus, several States explained their position. Thus, Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, and the United States expressed reservations including the following: that a recent investigation conducted by UNEP confirmed that the efforts referred to in the ninth preambular paragraph had in fact been aborted and that no conclusive evidence of actual hazardous waste dumping had been found; that while they regarded the dumping of radioactive waste as an important issue and one which had given rise to legitimate concerns, especially among developing countries, the draft contained a reference to matters which were not within the competence of the First Committee; and that the environmental and public safety aspects of this issue should continue to be considered in the appropriate forums. In addition, the United States reiterated that it was not willing to define the dumping of radioactive waste as radiological warfare. Such practices concerned environmental and public-safety issues, which were already addressed in other forums, for example, IAEA. Canada also associated itself with the explanations given by Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 47/52 D. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 D

Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind resolutions CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) of 1988, and CM/Res.1225 (L) of 1989, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa,

Welcoming resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/509 on the dumping of nuclear wastes, adopted on 29 September 1989 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-third regular session,

Welcoming also resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/530 establishing a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, adopted on 21 September 1990 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-fourth regular session,

Considering its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, *inter alia*, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

Recalling resolution CM/Res.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa,

Aware of the potential hazards underlying any use of radioactive wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and its implications for regional and international security, and in particular for the security of developing countries,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Aware also of the consideration in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1992 session of the question of dumping of radioactive wastes,

Gravely concerned at the recently reported efforts to dump harmful wastes in Somalia,

Recalling its resolution 46/36 K of 6 December 1991, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session the progress recorded in the ongoing negotiations on this subject,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to a future convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons;
2. *Expresses grave concern* regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States;
3. *Calls upon* all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;
4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the ongoing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention;
5. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session the progress recorded in the ongoing negotiations on this subject;

6. *Takes note* of resolution CM/Res.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa;

7. *Expresses the hope* that the effective implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories;

8. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue keeping the subject under active review, including the desirability of concluding a legally binding instrument in this field;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

Under a related agenda item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution 47/56, under which it noted with satisfaction an increase in the number of States parties to the Convention and urged all States that had not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to it; and it stressed that, under article VIII of the Convention, conferences might be convened to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols annexed to the Convention or to review the scope and operation of the Convention. (For details, see chapter VI, page 188.)

Conclusion

Questions related to the impact of various military activities of States on the environment, whether in the course of war or in peacetime, continued to be the subject of debate within and outside the United Nations in 1992.

In the debate in the Sixth Committee on the agenda item "Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict", which had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly following the war in the Persian Gulf, States welcomed the activities of the ICRC in this field, including its plans to continue its consultation of experts. However, differences of view as to whether the existing rules were adequate and whether there was a need for new rules persisted. As a result, the General

Assembly decided, *inter alia*, to urge States to take all measures to ensure compliance with the existing international law applicable to the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict and requested the Secretary-General to invite the ICRC to report on activities undertaken by it and by other relevant bodies on the subject, and to submit a report to it at its forty-eighth session.

References to the protection of the environment were also made in the First Committee in the light of the results of the Second ENMOD Review Conference. Many States expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Conference, particularly with the understanding adopted at the Conference that the military or any other hostile use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique in the meaning of article II was a method of warfare prohibited by article I if such use of herbicides upset the ecological balance of the region, thus causing widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party. Although there had been no agreement on convening a consultative committee of experts, as provided for in paragraph 2 of article V, to solicit expert views on the scope and applicability of the provisions of the Convention, it was expected that some States parties would put forward a request for such a meeting.

In addition, UNCED adopted several texts regarding protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, stating, *inter alia*, that warfare was inherently destructive of sustainable development and that measures in accordance with international law should be considered to address large-scale destruction of the environment that could not be justified under international law.

ANNEX

Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, HAVING MET IN GENEVA FROM 14 TO 18 SEPTEMBER 1992 UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION, WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING THAT ITS PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS ARE BEING REALIZED AND IN PARTICULAR TO EXAMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE I IN ELIMINATING THE DANGERS OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES:

Continuing to be guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and of bringing about general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare,

Welcoming the fundamental changes in the international situation since the First Review Conference, which have contributed to important progress in arms limitation and disarmament,

Recalling the Rio Declaration adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro, on 14 June 1992, in particular its Principle 24,

Reaffirming their determination to continue negotiations with a view to achieving further progress towards effective measures in the field of disarmament,

Considering that the Convention constitutes a contribution to the strengthening of trust among nations, to the improvement of the international situation and to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives, and the common interest of mankind in maintaining its effectiveness in prohibiting the use of environmental modification techniques as a means of war,

Reaffirming their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security,

Considering also that universal adherence to the Convention could facilitate international cooperation in the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes in the interest of all States, including in particular developing States,

Appealing to all States to uphold the principle of transparency in all areas regarding environmental modification techniques and to refrain from any action which might place the Convention or any of its provisions in jeopardy,

Declare as follows:

Purposes

The States Parties to the Convention reaffirm their strong common interest in preventing the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes. They reaffirm their strong support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions.

Article I

The Conference confirms that the obligations assumed under Article I have been faithfully observed by the States Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued observance of this Article is essential to the objective, which all States Parties share, of preventing military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

Having re-examined the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I, taking into account the relevant Understandings, the Conference reaffirms that they have been effective in preventing military or any other hostile use of any environmental modification techniques between States Parties and, having regard to the different views expressed in the course of the debate on this Article on the question of scope, affirms the need to keep its provisions under continuing review and examination in order to ensure their global effectiveness.

The Conference believes that all research and development on environmental modification techniques as well as their use should be dedicated solely to peaceful ends.

Article II

The Conference reaffirms its support for this Article containing the definition of the term "environmental modification techniques". The Conference agrees that this definition, taken together with the Understandings relating to Articles I and II, covers military or any other hostile use of any environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any State Party by another State Party.

Together, the Article and its Understanding deserve to be emphasized. Due attention should be given to all relevant research, developments and new techniques in the fields of science and technology. With regard to the phenomena which could be caused by the use of environmental modification techniques listed in the Understanding to Article II, the Conference notes that this list is illustrative and not exhaustive.

The Conference confirms that the military or any other hostile use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique in the meaning of Article II is a method of warfare prohibited by Article I if such use of herbicides upsets the ecological balance of a region, thus causing widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.

Article III

The Conference reaffirms that Article III is without prejudice to any rules of international law which may apply to environmental modification techniques used for peaceful purposes. The Conference notes with satisfaction that the implementation of the Convention has not hindered the economic or technological development of States Parties. The Conference recalls that States Parties have undertaken to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. The Conference further calls upon States Parties also to provide and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the research on and development of such environmental modification techniques. The Conference reaffirms the need in the interest of transparency to strengthen exchange, as set forth in Article III, of all relevant information pertaining to development of environmental modification techniques, within the framework of the United Nations, in particular, in cooperation with such organizations of the United Nations system as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The Conference also calls upon States Parties in a position to do so to continue to contribute to and strengthen, alone or together with other States or international organizations, international economic and scientific cooperation in the preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article IV

The Conference notes the provisions of Article IV, which requires each State Party to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

Article V

The Conference notes with satisfaction that no State Party has found it necessary to invoke the provisions of Article V dealing with international complaints. The Conference reaffirms the importance of paragraph 1 of this Article, which contains the undertaking of States Parties to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention and of paragraph 2, which provides for the convening of a Consultative Committee of Experts. In the view of the Conference the provisions of Article V, paragraphs 1 and 2, do not exclude the possibility of consideration, by States Parties, of the summary of findings of fact of the Consultative Committee of Experts.

The Conference notes the intention of a number of States Parties to consider requesting, not later than 1995, the Depositary to convene a Consultative Committee of Experts as provided for under paragraph 2 of Article V in order to provide expert views relevant to clarifying the scope and application of the provisions of the Convention. The Conference also notes the view of some States Parties that such a meeting of the Consultative Committee of Experts is not necessary.

The Conference reaffirms the importance of paragraph 3 of Article V, which provides that any State Party which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, and of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article V, under which each State Party undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate and to provide support or assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of a violation of the Convention.

The Conference considers that the flexibility of the provisions concerning consultation and cooperation on any problems which may arise in relation to the Convention, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, should enable complaints or disputes to be effectively resolved.

The Conference notes that the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the experts' meetings of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will address the laws of armed conflict as they pertain to the environment and expresses its support for these efforts.

Article VI

The Conference notes that during the operation of the Convention no State Party has proposed any amendments to the Convention under the procedures laid down in Article VI.

Article VII

The Conference reaffirms that the Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article VIII

The Conference notes with satisfaction the spirit of cooperation in which the Review Conference was held.

The Conference, recognizing the importance of the review mechanism provided in Article VIII, decides that a third Review Conference may be held

at the request of a majority of States Parties not earlier than 1997. If no Review Conference is held before 2002 the Depositary is requested to solicit the views of all States Parties concerning the convening of such a Conference in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

Article IX

The Conference notes that 55 States have become Parties to the Convention and a further 17 States have signed but have yet to ratify the Convention. The Conference notes with concern that the Convention has not yet achieved universal acceptance. Therefore, the Conference calls upon all signatory States, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Holy See, Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Morocco, Nicaragua, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda and Zaire, to ratify the Convention without delay, and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to accede to it as soon as possible and thereby join the States Parties thereto in their efforts to prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Such adherence would be a significant contribution to international confidence and to the strengthening of trust among nations. The Conference calls upon all successor States, as appropriate, to confirm their membership or to take such actions as they find necessary to become parties to the ENMOD Convention. It also calls upon all other newly independent States to accede to the Convention. The Conference requests the United Nations Secretary-General, in his role as Depositary, to intensify efforts to assist States Parties in promoting the universality of the Convention, including through the provision of appropriate advice on procedures.

CHAPTER X

Follow-up to Security Council action on Iraq

Introduction

THE UNITED NATIONS HAS TAKEN UNPRECEDENTED ACTIONS in the past two years in the sphere of peace enforcement and disarmament as a result of Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

On 3 April 1991, following the war in the Persian Gulf and the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), by which, in section C, it imposed upon Iraq numerous unconditional obligations concerning the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres; and, in addition, an unconditional obligation not to acquire or to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related thereto.¹

Under section C of the resolution, the Security Council also decided to request the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a plan for the establishment of a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities. It further requested the Director General of IAEA, through the Secretary-General and with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities.²

¹ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. II, in which the text of section C of resolution 687 (1991) is reproduced.

² Ibid.

On 18 April, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his plan for the setting up of the Special Commission. The plan was approved by the Security Council the next day, and on 22 April the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Rolf Ekéus of Sweden as Executive Chairman of the Special Commission.

On-site inspections began in May. By the end of December, 8 nuclear, 6 chemical, 2 biological, 1 combined chemical/biological and 7 ballistic missile inspections had been conducted. The nuclear inspections were led by IAEA, while the non-nuclear inspections were led by persons designated by the Special Commission. These 24 inspections involved a total of 325 personnel from 34 countries.

In the course of 1991, the Security Council adopted two additional resolutions on Iraq. On 15 August, the Council, concerned about Iraq's failure to comply with some of its basic obligations, adopted resolution 707 (1991) to ensure full compliance with resolution 687 (1991). On 11 October, the Council approved, by resolution 715 (1991), a plan by the Special Commission³ and one by the Director General of IAEA⁴ for monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant parts of resolution 687 (1991). The Council demanded in the resolution that monitoring and verification under the plans should cover not only military but also civilian sites, facilities, materials and other items or activities that could be used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations.

Political developments affecting implementation of Security Council decisions

In 1992, the Special Commission and IAEA continued to conduct inspections of the sites declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission. These inspections served as the main source of information for the compilation of a picture of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and of the capabilities for their production. As reported by the Commission⁵ and by IAEA,⁶ although cooperation was, in most instances, extended by Iraq to inspectors at the field level, Iraq's authorities were

³ S/22871/Rev.1.

⁴ S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1.

⁵ S/24108 and Corr.1, annex, para. 9.

⁶ S/23644, annex, paras. 7 and 8.

not uniformly forthcoming in providing information on the weapons programmes as a whole. Thus, the emphasis in the Commission's work shifted from concentration on the organization of inspections to seeking compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council. The realization of the Commission's intentions to proceed with the evolution of its activities from inspection and survey through destruction to ongoing monitoring and verification were, however, in large part delayed by the actions of the Iraqi Government.

In February, in response to a special report by the Executive Chairman on the situation,⁷ the Security Council declared that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 687 (1991) and dispatched to Iraq a high-level mission, headed by the Executive Chairman, armed with a statement demanding that Iraq give the necessary assurances of compliance with the Council's resolutions or face serious consequences.⁸ That mission visited Iraq from 21 to 24 February. In its report of 25 February⁹ it concluded that unconditional agreement by Iraq had not been provided and that, therefore, the initiation and practical implementation of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder for ongoing monitoring and verification could not be undertaken in a credible manner.

The Security Council met in formal session on 11 and 12 March. In an initial statement, the President of the Council, on behalf of all members, reiterated the Council's position. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, made two statements, neither of which contained the assurances sought by the Council. The Council furthermore heard statements by all its members, by the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, by the Director General of IAEA and by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. The statement of the Director General mentioned areas where lack of cooperation and non-compliance persisted, such as those concerning information on the procurement of critical material and equipment and the source of technical advice. In his statement, the Executive Chairman indicated that, although it was the aim of the Commission to report to the Council as soon as possible that Iraq was in substantial compliance with section C of resolution 687 (1991), this was out of the question until Iraq had ac-

⁷ S/23606, annex.

⁸ See S/23609.

⁹ S/23643, annex, enclosure, sect. C.

knowledge and implemented its obligations under all the relevant Council resolutions and decisions. In a concluding statement on 12 March, the President of the Council, on behalf of the Council, stated that Iraq must immediately take steps to comply fully and unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Following the Council's meeting, Iraq made additional declarations concerning numbers of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and associated items. Furthermore, it declared its readiness to go along with the required destruction of buildings and equipment. Subsequently, destruction of such items, relevant to the missile and nuclear-weapon programmes, was carried out. The Iraqi authorities, furthermore, handed over to the Special Commission what they termed full, final and comprehensive reports on chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and submitted a similar report on Iraq's nuclear programme to the Director General of IAEA, in accordance with Security Council resolution 707 (1991). After studying the documentation, the Special Commission and IAEA reached the conclusion that it did not provide the information required by the Security Council and needed by the Commission and IAEA in order for them to carry out their mandate effectively.¹⁰

On 23 and 24 November, at the request of Iraq, the Security Council held a meeting to discuss the implementation of its resolutions concerning the situation in Iraq. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, addressed the Council as he had done in March, and repeated Iraqi complaints against the Council, the Special Commission and IAEA. He also presented what Iraq referred to as a "factual report",¹¹ which consisted in a selective résumé of events, ignoring mention of the areas in which Iraq was failing to meet its obligations.

Thus, Iraq's position on the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, approved under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), remained as stated in a letter of 19 November 1991 to the President of the Council from the Foreign Minister of Iraq,¹² subsequently elaborated upon in the statement of the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister before the Council on 12 March 1992. Essentially, Iraq's position is that the

¹⁰ S/24984, annex, para. 9, and S/24223, annex, para. 16.

¹¹ S/24829, annex.

¹² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, chap. II, p. 42.

plans approved by the Council are unlawful and that a solution that addresses the substance of the plans but that is acceptable to Iraq should be negotiated between Iraq, the Council, the Special Commission and IAEA.

A major political problem developed on 5 July, when Iraq refused an inspection team access to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Special Commission had reliable information from two sources that the building contained archives related to proscribed activities. Those archives were clearly of relevance to the Commission's work, and their retention by Iraq was also clearly prohibited. Iraq, however, claimed that the Commission had no right to enter the building as there was nothing in it of relevance to weapons systems proscribed under resolution 687 (1991) and that to allow access would be to undermine Iraq's sovereignty and national security. The deadlock prompted the Chairman of the Commission to visit Baghdad from 17 to 19 July. At the end of the visit, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq offered an inspection by persons from the neutral members of the Council, independent of the Commission. That proposal, on the advice of the Chairman, was rejected by the Security Council.

After a delay of over three weeks, and following further discussions in New York between the Executive Chairman and the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations on modalities, access to the Ministry was obtained. At the request of the Iraqi authorities, the Executive Chairman visited Iraq during the inspection and met Iraqi officials to discuss future relations. During those talks, Mr. Tariq Aziz promised a new chapter of cooperation and openness in relations between the Commission and Iraq.

The obstacles, however, were not eliminated. In its final report¹³ for 1992, dated 17 December, the Special Commission concluded that Iraq's "full, final and complete" disclosure of its proscribed weapons programmes, due under Council resolution 707 (1991), and its initial declarations, due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, contained major shortcomings which would need to be rectified if they were to form the basis for a definite material balance of Iraq's past programmes related to weapons of mass destruction and for effective monitoring and verification of compliance. Despite this, the Com-

¹³ S/24984, annex.

mission had accepted Iraq's declaration as a basis for dialogue with the Iraqi authorities in the hope that full, final and complete disclosures would be established. Iraq had failed, furthermore, to substantiate information provided to the Special Commission on its prohibited programmes. The Commission had repeatedly urged Iraq, the report noted, to provide access to authentic documents that would substantiate the Iraqi data. In the absence of a positive response from the Iraqi Government, the Commission had been obliged to conduct intrusive inspections, including document searches. Taken together, these obstacles impeded the Commission's operations and hindered the fulfilment of its mandate.

In his semi-annual report¹⁴ to the Security Council, dated 28 October, the Director General of IAEA concluded that the full implementation of the plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) would be possible only after the Iraqi authorities had fully complied with the information requirements laid down in that plan.¹⁵

Inspection activities by UNSCOM and operational developments

In 1992, UNSCOM carried out 3 chemical, 2 combined chemical/biological, 3 chemical-destruction and 7 ballistic missile inspections.¹⁶ IAEA, for its part, conducted 8 nuclear inspections (see following section).¹⁷ In addition, in order to improve the operational effectiveness of UNSCOM, the Commission started helicopter aerial surveillance flights. The first flight took place on 21 June. As of 14 December, 142 sites had been surveyed by the Aerial Inspection Team.¹⁸

With regard to chemical weapons, although verification and survey activities continued in 1992, there was a progressive shift in empha-

¹⁴ S/24722, annex, para. 13.

¹⁵ S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1, including the revised annex 3.

¹⁶ For details see S/24108 and Corr.1, annex, appendices II to IV; and S/24984, annex, appendices III, IV and VI.

¹⁷ An outline of these IAEA activities is provided in documents S/24110, annex, and S/24988, annex.

¹⁸ For details, see S/24984, annex, appendix V.

sis with relatively more time and resources being devoted to issues directly related to the destruction of Iraq's identified chemical weapons assets. While inspections of declared and undeclared sites proceeded, UNSCOM teams oversaw the destruction of most of the chemical-bomb-making equipment identified by the Commission; the Chemical Destruction Group was established in Baghdad; and at the Muthanna State Establishment, the destruction *in situ* of 122 mm rockets too unsafe to drain continued; the quantities and locations of munitions and agents awaiting destruction or removal were surveyed and the two chemical destruction facilities at Muthanna were completed. The full-scale destruction of nerve agent in the hydrolysis plant began. Final runs for the destruction of the mustard agent in the incinerator were successfully concluded and full-scale destruction will commence at the beginning of 1993.

A new development was the Iraqi admission on 19 March that it had omitted to declare 24,470 chemical munitions and that these weapons had been unilaterally destroyed. This was in direct contravention of resolution 687 (1991), which requires that possession of Iraq's chemical weapons should be yielded to the Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under the Commission's supervision. An UNSCOM inspection team has since been able to verify, by examining the excavated remains of the munitions, that the numbers contained in the Iraqi declarations were substantially correct.

There were few developments on the biological side in 1992. Inspection activities continued through joint chemical and biological teams.

Regarding ballistic missiles, the emphasis again shifted to the destruction of facilities associated with Iraq's production programme. The Executive Chairman informed the Iraqi authorities that destruction should begin in February. Initially, as recorded in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 March,¹⁹ Iraq delayed and refused to comply. Only at the end of March did it allow the destruction of these facilities to begin. Meanwhile, inspection activities also continued, with Iraq maintaining that it no longer had any missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and hence that there was no further missile destruction to be done. Confronted, however, with the information that the

¹⁹ S/23687.

Special Commission had incontrovertible evidence that Iraq's initial declarations of April 1991 had not included a substantial number of ballistic missiles and related equipment then in its possession, Iraq presented, in its communication of 19 March mentioned above, a new declaration. In it Iraq admitted that it had failed to declare 92 proscribed ballistic missiles and much associated equipment and vehicles, including mobile missile launchers, and that it had destroyed these unilaterally, in contravention of resolution 687 (1991), in the summer of 1991. Inspection teams since then have been able to verify that the numbers contained in this new declaration were substantially correct.

By the end of 1992, all ballistic missiles and items related to their production and development so far identified as requiring destruction (known as list A) had been destroyed. Certain items (known as list B) had been sealed or tagged, pending either a decision to destroy them or the establishment of full-scale ongoing monitoring and verification activities so that they might be monitored under that regime to ensure that they were used only for permitted purposes. Until the appropriate decisions are taken by the Special Commission, the items concerned cannot be used by Iraq or moved from their locations. During the period under review, considerable progress was made in obtaining information from Iraq about its operational use of missiles since 1980. Nevertheless, crucial data are still missing—in particular, sources of foreign procurement.

In general, although activities proceeded more smoothly at the field level than at the political level, there were occasions when there was deliberate interference with inspection activities, for example tampering with equipment designated for removal by inspection teams for further analysis and doctoring of documentation. Such interference, coupled with Iraq's failure to provide the full, final and complete disclosure required under resolution 707 (1991), could only be interpreted as evidence that Iraq was still seeking to conceal from the Special Commission information directly relevant to section C of resolution 687 (1991).

Aerial surveillance activities on the part of UNSCOM intensified during the second half of 1992. The regular flights of the high-altitude aircraft (running at about three per week) were supplemented with aerial inspections conducted from the Special Commission's helicopters based at Rasheed Airbase. These helicopter inspections were used to

supplement the high-altitude photography in the planning of inspections, monitoring of sites, preparation of inspection teams and identification of potential inspection targets. In addition, they gave the Commission the capability to transport an inspection team rapidly to a site in response to time-sensitive data.

On the question of Iraq's declarations, already referred to above, UNSCOM's report of 17 December confirmed that they were "flawed and incomplete",²⁰ and made clear that this assessment also applied to the disclosures of its proscribed weapons programmes and its declarations under the plans for "future compliance monitoring".²¹ On the subject, the report stated the following:

No information is given on suppliers. Iraq denies that it ever used chemical weapons, despite internationally verified evidence to the contrary. Declarations about imports and production are not backed with adequate supporting documentary evidence and are, in any case, incomplete. There is insufficient and probably misleading information about the evolution of the various programmes and about the links between them. In sum, "full, final and comprehensive report" is a misnomer and these declarations cannot be taken as an adequate base upon which to determine a material balance. However, the Special Commission has accepted that they provide the possibility for dialogue with the Iraqi authorities to arrive at such a base. The Commission looks to the Iraqi authorities to be forthcoming in filling in the gaps and resolving the inconsistencies in these reports.

A similar situation exists with the initial declarations due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. While Iraq has deposited substantial reports, the reports contain little new information, and little about facilities with dual capability which would have to be covered by the ongoing monitoring and verification regime. Again, the Special Commission has accepted these reports as a starting-point for further discussion. But of themselves, the reports are inadequate for the purposes of initiating full-scale ongoing monitoring and verification.²²

Nuclear inspections

As noted above, IAEA conducted 8 nuclear inspections in Iraq in 1992—the same number as in 1991. These 16 missions, as noted in

²⁰ S/24984, annex, para. 18.

²¹ S/24984, annex, para. 17.

²² S/24984, annex, paras. 18 and 19.

the report of 14 December from the Director General of IAEA to the Secretary-General,²³ entailed inspections at more than 70 sites and resulted in the gradual disclosure of a broadly-based nuclear programme aimed at the production of enriched uranium and at the development of nuclear-weapon capabilities. As a result of these inspections, in the course of which IAEA interviewed numerous Iraqi authorities and secured thousands of pages of documents, IAEA was able to draw a reasonably coherent and consistent picture of Iraq's nuclear programme. However, doubts remained as to whether the picture was complete.

Efforts to implement the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of all items referred to in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) were ongoing throughout 1992. In the course of the year, IAEA also supervised extensive destruction of facilities and equipment related to the production of enriched uranium and to the weaponization programme. Key buildings and equipment were demolished by Iraqi personnel at the direction of the IAEA inspection teams. With regard to nuclear-weapon-usable material, the only such material currently known to remain in Iraq is the highly enriched uranium in irradiated reactor fuel assemblies, removal of which from Iraq awaits conclusion of the necessary arrangements with recipient countries. The material has been verified and is being kept under seal until its removal. In addition, numerous other materials, equipment and components have been destroyed, removed from Iraq or placed under Agency seal in Iraq and are subject to regular verification. (A detailed description of activities carried out in Iraq in the course of 1992 can be found in the final report of each inspection, issued as a document of the Security Council.)²⁴

Conclusion

These activities in Iraq in 1992, in response to resolutions of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, confirmed the capacity of the United Nations to organize intrusive inspections and to ensure the destruction of proscribed weapons systems of mass destruction.

²³ S/24988, annex.

²⁴ S/23505, annex; S/23644, annex; S/23947, annex; S/24223, annex; S/24450, annex; S/24593, annex; S/24981 annex; and S/25013, annex.

The most important developments have taken place in the areas of destruction of proscribed items and information on missile programmes and use. Much, however, remains to be done. There are still a number of areas²⁵ which require action before the Commission and IAEA will be in a position to report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations. The main areas requiring action include: (a) acceptance and implementation by Iraq of all the Commission's privileges and immunities, including ensuring the safety and security of UNSCOM and IAEA personnel and property, the operation of and landing rights for UNSCOM aircraft and non-obstruction of the Commission's logistics and aerial surveillance flights; (b) unconditional acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991); (c) provision by Iraq of the documentation necessary to substantiate the data contained in its declarations and of a full picture of its foreign procurement networks and suppliers; (d) supplementation and revisions of Iraq's declarations to the point where, in the view of the Commission and IAEA, they constitute the full, final and complete disclosures required under resolution 707 (1991) and the initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification adopted under resolution 715 (1991); and (e) the initiation and smooth functioning of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire the weapons proscribed to it.

²⁵ See S/24984, annex, para. 22.

P A R T T W O

United Nations disarmament activities

CHAPTER XI

Institutional aspects

Introduction

THE FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT, both within and outside the United Nations, has changed over the years in response to efforts to address more adequately the concerns of the international community. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Security Council are the main organs dealing with matters of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The existing disarmament machinery, which was agreed upon at the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, in 1978, has remained essentially the same. It consists of the General Assembly and its relevant subsidiary bodies, namely the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee, and the Conference on Disarmament—the "single multilateral negotiating forum". In addition, questions of disarmament are dealt with in other institutional frameworks established on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements.

The activities of disarmament bodies within the framework of the United Nations as they relate to organizational and institutional matters are discussed in this chapter, while the substance of the various items on the agendas of these bodies is discussed in the topical chapters of this volume.

General developments and trends, 1992

In his report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* the Secretary-General, referring to the disarmament machinery, stated:

The United Nations framework in which disarmament has been pursued was created in the course of the cold war. This machinery should be reassessed in order to meet the new realities and priorities of our time. What we need is a coordinated system which would allow the international community to address major disarmament problems promptly, flexibly and efficiently.¹

The Secretary-General also supported greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters and, in particular, the enforcement of non-proliferation. He further stressed that a comprehensive approach was needed to address the structure, functions, methods of work and working agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and suggested that the Conference could also be considered as a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.

In fact, the new international situation resulted in a more focused discussion of the adequacy of the existing disarmament machinery to respond effectively to the new challenges and opportunities for disarmament. Although no changes were made during the year in the existing disarmament negotiating and deliberative bodies, statements regarding them were made by a number of States, and the question was discussed in all of these bodies.

The *Disarmament Commission* did not consider the question of its functioning as a separate item. A number of States, however, expressed the view that further improvement in its reform programme—adopted in 1990—was necessary, especially in the light of the changing international situation. During and after the substantive session, the Chairman of the Commission conducted consultations on possible modifications in the structure of its work, including the distribution of subjects over the years, with a view to facilitating and enhancing its operation in the future.

With respect to the *Conference on Disarmament*, it was generally agreed that, with the intense work on the chemical weapons Convention coming to an end, attention should be focused on questions of agenda and membership. For the first time since 1978, the Conference decided to add a new item to its agenda, "Transparency in armaments", following the request of the General Assembly in 1991 that the Conference address the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing

¹ A/C.1/47/7 (issued also as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8), para. 43.

accumulations of arms. The question of membership, which had been before the Conference for some time, assumed greater urgency as the international situation developed. In the light of the pressing need to review its agenda and membership, the Conference instructed the President to conduct consultations on these matters during the intersessional period.

In the course of the debate in the *First Committee*, the majority of Member States generally recognized that a new look at the disarmament machinery and agenda was required in view of the challenges of the post-cold war era. A number of States made comments referring expressly to the membership and agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. There was general support for early enlargement of the Conference to enable it to reflect more adequately the growing interest of the international community in its work. In fact, in 1992, 45 non-member States participated in the deliberations of the Conference. With regard to its agenda, some States stressed that a number of issues already on the agenda, such as that of a nuclear-test ban, security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, should remain priority items. Others considered that work should focus on a limited number of issues that they found to be of immediate concern. Still others proposed inclusion of new items reflecting the changing political realities, such as various aspects of non-proliferation, and confidence-building measures.

In general, references to the work of the First Committee related to the need for a more logical structure for its work, possibly involving the merging of some related items and resolutions and the consideration of others on a biennial basis. The joint consideration of disarmament and international security agenda items—carried out for the first time at the 1992 session—was regarded as a step in the right direction. In addition, several States commented favourably on the work of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and stressed the importance of its continuing its activities. There was also growing support for the activities of the three Regional Centres.

As a result of widespread interest in examining the existing disarmament machinery, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, decided to reconvene meetings of the First Committee in March 1993 for the purpose of reassessing the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, in particular the respective

roles of the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

In addition to various proposals for enhancing the efficiency of the existing disarmament machinery, Georgia proposed the establishment of "a world-wide arms control and disarmament agency as a separate specialized agency of the United Nations". In its view, the global agency should cover all disarmament fields, from weapons of mass destruction to monitoring, verification, confidence-building measures, conversion and multilateral negotiations.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1992

The Disarmament Commission held its substantive session from 20 April to 11 May under the chairmanship of Mr. André Erdős of Hungary.

The agenda, as adopted on 20 April, contained the following substantive items:

4. Objective information on military matters
5. Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons
6. Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security
7. The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

All four items were carried over from the Commission's 1991 agenda. Each item was entrusted to a separate working group.

Working Group I continued discussion of item 4 and succeeded in adopting by consensus "Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters", the text of which was annexed to the report of the Group.² (See pages 97 to 101.)

In Working Group II, discussion on item 5 continued on the basis of the four agreed subjects presented by the Chairman of the Group at the 1991 session of the Commission. In an annex to its report, the Group listed elements elaborated during the discussion under the four subjects.³ (See page 127.)

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42), annex I.*

³ *Ibid.*, annex II.

Working Group III continued consideration of item 6 in a structured manner on the basis of the Chairman's paper presented at the 1991 session of the Commission. Its discussion was concentrated on the first two of the five topics listed in the paper, namely: (a) relationship between regional disarmament and global security and arms limitation and disarmament; and (b) principles and guidelines. Two papers presented by the Chairman of the Group were annexed to its report.⁴ (See page 74.)

Working Group IV continued a structured debate on item 7, focusing on the four substantive aspects identified at its 1991 session. Following the deliberations of the Group, the Chairman summarized the observations made during the debate, on his own initiative and without prejudice to the position of delegations.⁵ (See pages 183 to 184.)

In his concluding statement, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission reflected upon the work of the Commission in its new organizational framework. He noted that, in spite of difficulties, the Commission had been able to achieve results in the four Working Groups, and he singled out the successful elaboration of guidelines on objective information on military matters. He believed, however, that if the Commission were to take advantage of the historic changes under way, modifications would be required in the ways in which it operated.

During the substantive session, Sweden proposed the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the 1993 session, entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction", in addition to the item entitled "International arms transfers" that had been proposed by Colombia in 1991. Following extensive discussions and consultations after the conclusion of the substantive session of the Commission, during the First Committee and at a meeting of the organizational session of the Commission, held on 8 December, it was decided, in view of the lack of consensus among delegations, to postpone the question of the inclusion of a new agenda item to the resumed organizational session, to be held early in 1993.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1992

The Conference on Disarmament was in session in 1992 from 21 January to 27 March, 11 May to 26 June, and 20 July to 3 September. During

⁴ Ibid, annexes III and IV.

⁵ Ibid, pp. 11-16.

these periods, the Conference held 30 formal plenary meetings. In addition, it held 16 informal meetings. The following member States assumed the presidency of the Conference: Yugoslavia, Zaire, Algeria, Argentina, Australia and Belgium (which remained in office for the recess until the 1993 session of the Conference).

On 21 January, the Conference, within the framework of its permanent agenda covering ten areas, adopted its agenda for 1992, which had the same substantive items as in previous years:

1. Nuclear-test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
4. Chemical weapons
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

On 26 May, the Conference decided to add to its agenda the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

Thirty-nine member States of the Conference participated in its work.⁶ In addition, 45 States not members of the Conference⁷ were invited to participate, upon their request, in the discussion on substantive agenda items, taking part in plenary meetings or in meetings of ad hoc committees or in both.

⁶ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

⁷ Austria, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

The question of expansion of the membership of the Conference—which had been deliberated upon for ten years—received further consideration during the session. There was a widespread feeling that a comprehensive review of the situation should be conducted at the next session and a positive decision taken. In addition to 18 non-members⁸ that had earlier requested membership in the Conference, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine requested membership. On 5 November, following the conclusion of the 1992 session, Croatia requested membership also.

The Conference continued consideration of its improved and effective functioning under the chairmanship of Mr. Kamal of Pakistan, as in the previous two years. As a result of four informal open-ended consultations under his chairmanship, general agreement emerged on ways to improve its functioning in the following areas: (a) report writing; (b) reduction of plenary meetings; (c) organization of work of ad hoc committees; (d) tenure of presidency; and (e) avoidance of duplication of documentation. With respect to a sixth area, (f), regarding agenda and membership, the following approach was adopted.

In order to identify possible future courses of action with regard to (f), the Conference, at the end of the 1992 session, entrusted the President with the task of conducting consultations on these matters during the inter-sessional period and of reporting back to it at the beginning of the 1993 session. Consequently, the President carried out a series of bilateral consultations and small-group meetings, both in Geneva and in New York, with members and with non-members that had participated in the work of the Conference in 1992 and that had officially requested membership. On 8 December, he held open-ended consultations with those delegations with which he had already met in order to inform them of the progress made.⁹

There was, he noted, a significant trend in favour of an expansion of the Conference by approximately 20 members, but differing views were held concerning the criteria for selecting the candidates. In addition, a wide majority of delegations supported or were prepared to accept changes in the agenda. Although there was a broad range of views on

⁸ In chronological order, the States requesting membership were: Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Senegal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Cameroon, Greece, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Chile, Belarus and Switzerland.

⁹ A/C.1/47/14, appendix.

what should be included on the agenda and what should not, it was possible to identify an order of preference: a nuclear-test ban, transparency in armaments, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space; two new items in which interest was high were the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and confidence-building measures, global and regional. Not only were these subjects mentioned most frequently by delegations, but also no opposition to them was voiced.

With regard to the substantive issues on its agenda during its 1992 session, the Conference decided to continue and intensify, as a priority task, the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention with a view to achieving final agreement at the session; thus most of the time was allocated to the meetings of the relevant Ad Hoc Committee (see pages 24 to 29). The Committee successfully completed the negotiations and transmitted the draft text of the Convention to the Conference for its consideration.¹⁰

As far as the other items were concerned, no significant substantive progress was made. On 21 January the Conference re-established two ad hoc committees: one dealing with effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the other dealing with radiological weapons, and on 13 February it re-established the ad hoc committee dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. With respect to the question of a nuclear-test ban, while substantive progress was made on improving the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, no final agreement was possible and, as a result, the Committee was not re-established at the session. No ad hoc committees were established on the item on cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament or on the item on prevention of nuclear war. Various issues related to these two items were, however, addressed by delegations in plenary meetings. (For an account of the work of the Conference on negative security assurances, see pages 56 to 58; on the other nuclear items on its agenda and on radiological weapons, see pages 128 to 134; on prevention of an arms race in outer space, see pages 197 to 202; and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, see below.)

¹⁰ CD/1170.

The Conference on Disarmament continued to consider the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at its plenary meetings. In addition, the Special Coordinator, Mr. Mounir Zahran of Egypt, appointed by the President and charged with seeking consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for that item, conducted informal consultations during the session, and reported to the President that, as there had been no significant changes in the positions of delegations, those consultations had been inconclusive. It was agreed that the organizational framework for dealing with the item would be considered at the beginning of the 1993 session.

Almost all delegations of the Group of 21 reiterated the importance they attached to the conclusion of the programme and felt that a majority of the international community clearly favoured the continuation and conclusion of work on it. However, two members of the Group felt that the new international situation warranted a fresh look. The Western Group underlined that present circumstances were no more conducive to progress than they had been in previous years, and they maintained that there was no consensus on this question. Similarly, the Group of East European and Other States believed that, given the differences of view that persisted, it would not be appropriate to resume work on the programme at this time.

As far as the new agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments" was concerned, the discussions held in the informal meetings devoted to the item were limited to a preliminary exchange of views and no attempt was made to reach agreement on any of the ideas raised and proposals put forward. (For further details, see pages 102 to 104.)

Action by the General Assembly, 1992

At its plenary meetings between 24 September and 8 October,¹¹ the General Assembly held a general debate on all disarmament and international security items, during which a very large number of Member States addressed different aspects of disarmament and security questions.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 30th meetings.

The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Elaraby of Egypt, held substantive meetings on the following disarmament and international security issues between 12 and 25 November:¹²

1. Reduction of military budgets
2. Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security
3. Science and technology for disarmament
4. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification
5. Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
6. Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty
7. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East
8. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia
9. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
10. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
11. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa
12. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
13. General and complete disarmament
 - (a) Notification of nuclear tests
 - (b) Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof
 - (c) Conventional disarmament
 - (d) Nuclear disarmament
 - (e) Defensive security concepts and policies
 - (f) Relationship between disarmament and development
 - (g) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes
 - (h) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons
 - (i) International arms transfers
 - (j) Regional disarmament
 - (k) Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

¹² Ibid., *First Committee*, 3rd to 37th and 40th meetings.

- (l) Transparency in armaments
- (m) Conventional disarmament on a regional scale
- (n) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee

14. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

- (a) World Disarmament Campaign
- (b) Regional confidence-building measures
- (c) Nuclear-arms freeze
- (d) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
- (e) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme
- (f) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

15. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission
- (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament
- (c) Status of multilateral disarmament agreements
- (d) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
- (e) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
- (f) Disarmament Week
- (g) Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures
- (h) Comprehensive programme of disarmament
- (i) Transfer of high technology with military applications

16. Israeli nuclear armament

17. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

18. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

19. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

A table of the resolutions and decisions adopted under these agenda items will be found in appendix V.

Between 29 October and 11 November the First Committee considered the draft resolutions submitted; between 12 and 25 November it took action upon 39 draft resolutions and 4 draft decisions, and on 9 December it submitted its recommendations to the General Assembly. On 30 November, and on 9 and 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the texts¹³ (28 of them without a vote) as recommended by the First Committee.

***Resolutions on the work of
the Disarmament Commission and
the Conference on Disarmament***

On 27 October a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which, in its final form, was sponsored by 37 States,¹⁴ was submitted. On 13 November, the sponsors submitted a number of amendments to the draft. On 20 November, the representative of Canada orally revised the proposed amendments. At the same meeting, the First Committee adopted the amendments, as orally revised, without a vote, and then adopted the draft resolution, as amended and orally revised, also without a vote.

Two States explained their position on the resolution. The United Kingdom expressed some reservations concerning the new items mentioned in the third and fourth preambular paragraphs because it felt that both lacked clarity of objective and were, in fact, likely to overlap to an unacceptable degree with consideration of aspects of the same subjects in other forums. In the opinion of the United States, the resolution was contrary to the procedures of the Commission, which decided its own agenda by consensus, and it believed that the text could not have an effect on the organizational session of the Commission, which was scheduled to be held shortly.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 47/54 A. It reads as follows:

¹³ Ibid., *Plenary Meetings*, 74th, 81st and 87th meetings.

¹⁴ Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.

Resolution 47/54 A
Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the annual report of the Disarmament Commission,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Noting the support for the proposal to include a new item in the agenda of the 1993 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission entitled, "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction",

Noting the support for consideration of the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the 1994 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 II of 6 December 1991",

Recognizing the need to further improve the effective functioning of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and bearing in mind the experience of the 1992 substantive session when the agenda item on objective information on military matters was successfully concluded,

Recalling its resolution 46/38 A of 6 December 1991,

1. *Takes note* of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Commends* the Disarmament Commission for its adoption by consensus of a set of guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, which were recommended to the General Assembly for consideration, pursuant to the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission";
3. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Disarmament Commission has successfully implemented its reform programme and has made considerable progress on other substantive items on its agenda;
4. *Recalls* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
5. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3

of resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items on its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission";

6. *Stresses* the importance for the Disarmament Commission to work on the basis of a relevant agenda of disarmament topics, thereby enabling the Commission to concentrate its efforts and thus optimize its progress on specific subjects in accordance with resolution 37/78 H;

7. *Recommends* that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1992 organizational session, adopt the following items for consideration at its 1993 substantive session:

(1) Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

(2) Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security;

(3) The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields;

8. *Also requests* that the Disarmament Commission, at the aforementioned organizational meeting, consider the following matters:

(a) The objective of moving the agenda of the Disarmament Commission to a three-item phased approach with one item in the first year of consideration, one item in its middle year and one item in its concluding year, with the result that, in principle, one item is added and one item is concluded respectively at each substantive session;

(b) That, in furtherance of the foregoing, the 1993 substantive session should be considered as a transitional year and therefore should consider whether:

(i) Two items on the current agenda, namely those items referred to in operative paragraph 7 (2) and (3) above, respectively, should be concluded;

(ii) One item, namely, that referred to in operative paragraph 7 (1), should be held over for conclusion at the next substantive session in 1994;

(iii) One new item should be included in the substantive agenda;

9. *Further requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1993 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly

relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages, and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to that end;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"

On 30 October, Belgium, in its capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament". On 6 November, the sponsor submitted a revised draft resolution incorporating a minor change.

In introducing the draft resolution on 10 November, Belgium noted that it was the result of intensive consultations and expressed the hope that it would be adopted by consensus. On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

Only India explained its position. It considered that the successful completion of the work on the chemical weapons Convention should not lull members into a sense of complacency about other areas of work in which the Conference had not been so successful, especially on nuclear-related issues. India stressed the importance of having negotiating mandates for priority items. In its view, the experience of the Conference in negotiating the chemical weapons Convention was proof that it could negotiate important international treaties and conventions on other agenda items and that there was no need to fear that members' viewpoints would not be reflected in negotiations.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 47/54 E. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/54 E

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

Considering, in this respect, that the present international climate should give additional impetus to multilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching concrete agreements,

Welcoming the conclusion of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which has reaffirmed the need for and the importance of the Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community,

Noting with satisfaction the results achieved so far on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, including the decision to carry out consultations on the issues of the membership and agenda of the Conference, and the decision of the Conference to continue the process at its 1993 session,

1. *Reaffirms* the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;

2. *Welcomes* the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil that role in the light of the evolving international situation with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items of its agenda;

3. *Encourages* the ongoing review of the agenda, membership and methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Decision on reconvened meetings of the First Committee

On 20 November, the Chairman of the First Committee submitted a draft decision entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". In introducing the draft decision on 25 November, the Chairman made some minor technical changes. He also stated that the draft decision had been the subject of intensive consultations and proposed that the First Committee adopt it without a vote. At the same meeting, the First Committee did so.

The United States, however, explained that it was reluctant to join in the consensus for several reasons. It believed that the holding of resumed meetings of the First Committee to focus on multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery was not really a very productive use of resources and time. It would oppose any attempts by the First Committee to take decisions regarding the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission by majority vote. Those bodies took their decisions by consensus, and any attempt to dictate to them other-

wise would undermine their integrity. It believed that the timetables given in the draft decision (see (a) and (c)) were unrealistic and that Member States should be given sufficient time to give adequate responses where appropriate.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft decision without a vote, as decision 47/422. It reads as follows:

Decision 47/422

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, decides:

(a) To reconvene meetings of the First Committee for five working days, from 8 to 12 March 1993 in New York, with the purpose of reassessing the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, in particular the respective roles of the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament and their interrelationship, as well as the role of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, including ways and means to enhance the functioning and efficiency of the said machinery, bearing in mind the competence of the Security Council in these matters. The aim of the session is to conduct the aforementioned reassessment with a view to reaching concrete, agreed recommendations for appropriate action. With respect to the Conference on Disarmament, it is understood that the primary responsibility for making recommendations on its future rests with that body;

(b) To invite Member States to provide their views on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" no later than 31 January 1993; to request the Secretary-General to submit a compilation of the said views thereon to the General Assembly for consideration at the reconvened meetings of the First Committee;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to transmit his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" to the Conference on Disarmament; and the Conference on Disarmament to transmit to the Chairman of the First Committee the results of its consideration of that report by 15 February 1993, as well as the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February 1993;

(d) To request the Chairman of the First Committee, with the assistance of the other officers of the Committee, and the Secretariat, to coordinate the above actions.

Conclusion

In the course of the year, considerable attention was paid to the United Nations framework for dealing with disarmament issues. Given the radical changes that have occurred in international relations since 1978, when the existing structure was set up, there was widespread interest in re-examining various institutional aspects, both the machinery itself—questions concerning the membership and function of the various bodies, and their operating procedures, for example—and the actual substance of the issues they addressed. The interest in these matters was so great that the General Assembly made provision for the discussion that began in 1992 to continue at reconvened meetings of the First Committee in March 1993.

CHAPTER XII

Studies; information and training; regional activities

Introduction

THE UNITED NATIONS undertakes extensive information and training activities in the field of disarmament: expert studies on various topics, an information programme, a fellowships, training and advisory services programme, regional activities and activities through three regional centres. During 1992, the Office for Disarmament Affairs provided substantive and technical support to two expert study groups, carried out numerous activities within the framework of the information programme, administered the fellowship programme and worked closely with the Regional Centres, which function under its auspices. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, an autonomous institution working in close relationship with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, carried out a programme comprising research and publications. (For details concerning publications of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and of UNIDIR, see annexes IV and V, respectively.) The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters advises the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies, serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR and advises the Secretary-General on the implementation of the information programme.¹

Disarmament studies programme

The General Assembly has frequently mandated the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of groups of experts and consultants,

¹ See the report of the Advisory Board on UNIDIR (A/47/345, annex II) and the report of the Secretary-General on the Advisory Board (A/47/354). The membership of the Board at the time of its twenty-third session, from 22 to 26 June, is shown in annex I to this chapter.

studies on particular disarmament issues and closely related subjects. The study reports may serve as guides for subsequent actions or negotiations or for the identification of possible negotiating areas. They may also contribute to a broader understanding of the intricacies involved in and viewpoints held on various issues. The following sections provide information concerning a study on defensive security concepts, which was completed in 1992, and a study on confidence-building measures in outer space, which was in progress during the year. The composition of the study groups is provided in annex II to this chapter. For a brief account of the study carried out by UNIDIR on economic aspects of disarmament, see pages 214 to 216.

Study completed in 1992

STUDY ON DEFENSIVE SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

By resolution 45/58 O of 4 December 1990, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and taking into account the views of Member States and other relevant information, to undertake a study of defensive security concepts and policies. To assist him in carrying out the study, the Secretary-General appointed a group of 11 experts, which prepared the report between May 1991 and July 1992. The Group unanimously approved its report² on 17 July, and transmitted it to the Secretary-General, for submission to the Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

The report begins by describing the background against which the proposal for the study emerged—the welcome developments brought about by the end of the cold war but also the emergence of new threats and the reappearance of long-standing problems. These opportunities and challenges, it was argued, provided a unique opening for the international community to search for adequate and effective common approaches to cope with the military dimension of security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. To this end, the experts offered the following definition of defensive security as a working tool:

While exploring the various existing defensive security concepts and policies, and taking into account that each region of the world has its own characteristics and security conditions, as well as political and security require-

² A/47/394, annex.

ments, the study aims at determining the general elements in those concepts and policies that could make a useful contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. On the basis of this analysis, the study introduces the notion of "defensive security", which, as a working tool, is defined as a condition of peace and security attained step-by-step and sustained through effective and concrete measures in the political and military fields under which:

- (a) Friendly relations among States are established and maintained;
- (b) Disputes are settled in a peaceful and equitable manner and the resort to force is consequently excluded;
- (c) The capacity for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action is eliminated through verifiable arms control and disarmament, confidence- and security-building measures and a restructuring of armed forces towards a defensive orientation.³

The study proceeds to examine current trends in the international security environment and how they may influence the peaceful settlement of disputes and the effecting of restraint and a defensive orientation in the development, maintenance and use of armed forces. In this connection, it notes that the changed international environment has provided the United Nations and regional organizations and forums with an enhanced role in the resolution of conflicts.

A discussion of the substance and main features of defensive security concepts and policies follows. Existing studies and models designed to eliminate the offensive character of military force postures by effecting a defensive orientation of capabilities are surveyed. In addition, the study discusses political and military aspects of defensive security, pointing out how defensive security differs from those existing models. An analysis is also provided of political and military-technical aspects that may hinder the implementation of a defensive orientation in military capabilities. Issues addressed in this connection include the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapon systems; the dilemma of maintaining effective counter-offensive capabilities while at the same time not projecting an offensive posture; the implications of collective defence and joint commitment of States for defensive security; and the applicability of defensive security at the bilateral, regional and global levels. To address those difficulties, strategies and measures that might facilitate the transition from an offensive to a defensive orientation in military postures

³ A/47/394, annex, para. 12.

are discussed. These include the effective implementation of the system of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as regional and other cooperative arrangements consistent with the Charter; confidence- and security-building measures; arms limitation and disarmament measures; and verification of compliance. The study concludes by recommending, for consideration by Member States, undertakings that might help to create a condition in which defensive security prevails. The conclusions and recommendations are reproduced in annex III to this chapter.

On 30 October, 13 States, later joined by 2 more,⁴ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Defensive security concepts and policies". On 12 November the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. On that occasion, Cuba stated that its support of the text should not be considered as a validation of the concept of preventive diplomacy, referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 47/52 H. It reads as follows:

Resolution 47/52 H

Study on defensive security concepts and policies

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 45/58 O of 4 December 1990, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to undertake a study on defensive security concepts and policies,

Noting with satisfaction positive developments in the world, reflecting a trend towards reducing the significance of military power in ensuring national policy aims,

Realizing that threats to international peace and security caused by recurring acts of aggression underline the need for intensified efforts towards elaborating a broad range of peaceful means for the prevention of conflicts, including confidence-building measures,

Noting that defensive security concepts as well as initiatives on preventive diplomacy contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security,

⁴ Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Considering the importance of the development of an international dialogue on defensive security policies for the promotion of security and stability in the world,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study on defensive security concepts and policies,

1. *Takes note* of the study on defensive security concepts and policies;
2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the group of experts who assisted in the preparation of the study;
3. *Calls upon* all Member States to familiarize themselves with the study and its conclusions and recommendations;
4. *Recalls* that, in its resolution 45/58 O, it invited Member States to initiate or intensify the dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies at the bilateral level, particularly at the regional level and, where appropriate, at the multilateral level, and notes that the study concluded that:

“To this end, Member States could:

“(a) Express their views on the concept and objective of ‘defensive security’, as defined in the present study;

“(b) Examine their current situation with respect to the political and military aspects of ‘defensive security’;

“(c) Determine to what extent their international relations, their security commitments and their regional situation might enable them to consider taking measures, on the basis of reciprocity, to achieve a situation of ‘defensive security’ at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level. The States that share common security interests at a regional or other level might consider undertaking consultations among themselves;

“(d) Consider, individually or jointly, problems relating to the resources needed to fulfil collective security commitments consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

“(e). Keep the Secretary-General informed of progress or initiatives in the field of ‘defensive security’”;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution.

Study in progress in 1992

STUDY ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN OUTER SPACE

The Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 45/55 B of 1990 to carry out a study related to the applica-

tion of different confidence-building measures in outer space held its second session in New York from 23 to 27 March under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto García Moritán of Argentina. The study is scheduled to be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, in 1993.

Disarmament information programme

During 1992, activities of the programme were carried out in the areas noted below.⁵

Regional activities. The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems was actively encouraged by the Office for Disarmament Affairs through the organization of meetings and seminars intended to facilitate an exchange of information between governmental and non-governmental sectors, and between governmental and other experts. The agendas of these meetings emphasized newly emerging issues and the role of the United Nations in addressing them. A conference on the theme of non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific, organized in cooperation with the Government of Japan and the Prefecture of the City of Hiroshima, was held in Hiroshima in June. Another such conference, on the theme of disarmament and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, organized in cooperation with the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and with the support of the Government of China, was held in Shanghai in August. Finally, a seminar on disarmament and security in Africa, organized in cooperation with the Government of Egypt through its Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Diplomatic Studies, was held in Cairo in September. (Refer to annex IV to this chapter for a list of publications arising from these meetings. For additional information regarding regional activities, see *Regional Centres*, page 291.)

Information and education activities. During the year, the Office for Disarmament Affairs issued and distributed publications, listed in annex IV to this chapter, covering the work of the multilateral deliberating and negotiating bodies in the field of disarmament, bilateral negotiations and topical issues. Work continued on the production of a televi-

⁵ For further information concerning the World Disarmament Campaign and Disarmament Week, refer to the relevant reports of the Secretary-General (A/47/469 and A/47/321, respectively).

sion documentary on chemical weapons and warfare, financed by the Governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. The documentary is expected to be released in the course of 1993. Work continued also on a joint project with the International Association of University Presidents to expand the teaching of specialized courses on arms control at the university level worldwide, and staff carried out many speaking engagements at Headquarters and in Geneva and participated in events organized by non-governmental organizations and universities.

Training activities. The United Nations chief training programme in disarmament, the fellowship, training and advisory services programme, is described below. In addition, the Office for Disarmament Affairs provided training to graduate students through its internship programme.

Special events. Disarmament Week was observed both at Headquarters and in Geneva. In New York, a special meeting of the First Committee was held, at which the Chairman of the Committee, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General spoke, and the Disarmament Week NGO Forum on the theme of the chemical weapons Convention was held.

During the forty-seventh session, agreement was reached that the World Disarmament Campaign and its Trust Fund would be known in the future as the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme—a change which delegations felt would lay the basis for broader support in the future and which more accurately described the work being done (the relevant resolution is discussed below). On 30 October, the Tenth Pledging Conference was convened at Headquarters, with Ms. Peggy Mason of Canada acting as President and 72 delegations participating. In her statement, the President pointed out that as the United Nations role in promoting arms control and disarmament and building cooperative security grew in importance, so too did the task of developing public understanding of, and support for, the Organization's objectives in disarmament. Pledges made to the Campaign and the Regional Centres totalled \$ 964,000, representing an increase of \$ 691,00 over those of 1991. In addition, \$ 573,000 was

pledged to UNIDIR.⁶

On 30 October, 13 States, later joined by 1 more,⁷ submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign", which was introduced by Mexico on 10 November. In its statement, Mexico noted that the text was very similar to the corresponding text of 1991, but included two new paragraphs, one (paragraph 7) commending the Secretary-General for supporting efforts to widen the availability of education in disarmament and another (paragraph 4) referring to the change in name mentioned above. The First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote on 12 November, and the General Assembly did likewise on 9 December. Resolution 47/53 D reads as follows.

Resolution 47/53 D **World Disarmament Campaign**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, by which the World Disarmament Campaign was launched,

Recalling also its various resolutions on the subject, including resolution 46/37 A, of 6 December 1991,

Having examined the reports of the Secretary-General of 8 October 1992 on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, and of 31 July 1992 on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters relating to the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, as well as the Final Act of the Tenth United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign, held on 30 October 1992,

Noting with appreciation the contributions that Member States have already made to the Campaign,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General of 8 October 1992 on the World Disarmament Campaign;

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts to make effective use of the resources available to him in disseminating as widely as possible information on arms limitation and disarmament to elected officials, the media,

⁶ A list of contributions pledged at the Pledging Conference and thereafter until 31 March 1993 will be issued as a document of the Conference.

⁷ Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Ukraine and Venezuela.

non-governmental organizations, educational communities and research institutes, and in carrying out an active seminar and conference programme;

3. *Notes with appreciation* the contributions to the efforts of the Campaign by the United Nations information centres and the regional centres for disarmament;

4. *Decides* that the World Disarmament Campaign will be known hereafter as the "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme" and the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund as the "Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme";

5. *Recommends* that the Programme should further focus its efforts:

(a) To inform, to educate and to generate public understanding of the importance of and support for multilateral action, including by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner;

(b) To facilitate unimpeded access to and an exchange of information on ideas between the public sector and public interest groups and organizations, and to provide an independent source of balanced and factual information that takes into account a range of views to help further an informed debate on arms limitation, disarmament and security;

(c) To organize meetings to facilitate exchanges of views and information between governmental and non-governmental sectors and between governmental and other experts in order to facilitate the search for common ground;

6. *Invites* all Member States to contribute to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;

7. *Commends* the Secretary-General for supporting the efforts of universities, other academic institutions and non-governmental organizations active in the educational field, in widening the world-wide availability of disarmament education, and invites him to continue to support and cooperate with, without cost to the regular budget of the United Nations, educational institutions and non-governmental organizations engaged in such efforts;

8. *Decides* that at its forty-eighth session there should be an eleventh United Nations Pledging Conference for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States that have not yet announced any voluntary contributions will do so, bearing in mind the objectives of the Third Disarmament Decade and the need to ensure its success;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session a report covering both the implementation of the activities of the Programme by the United Nations system during 1993 and the activities of the Programme contemplated by the system for 1994;

10. *Also decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session an item entitled "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme".

On 28 October, 25 States⁸ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Disarmament Week", which was introduced by Mongolia on 2 November. In introducing the draft text, Mongolia stated that it reproduced, with some slight changes, the text of the previous resolution on the subject, adopted without a vote in 1989. On 12 November the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote, and on 9 December, the General Assembly did likewise. Resolution 47/54 C reads as follows:

Resolution 47/54 C
Disarmament Week

The General Assembly,

Noting the momentous developments of unprecedented magnitude that have taken place in international relations recently, and welcoming the important achievements of late in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction the increasing role and prestige of the United Nations as a focal point for coordinating and harmonizing the efforts of States,

Emphasizing anew the need for and the importance of world public opinion in support of disarmament efforts in all their aspects,

Further noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed,

⁸ Afghanistan, Belarus, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Viet Nam.

Noting the support for the further observance of Disarmament Week expressed by Member States at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Recognizing the significance of the annual observance of Disarmament Week, including by the United Nations,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up measures undertaken by States, Governments and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;

2. *Commends* all States, international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their active support for and participation in Disarmament Week;

3. *Invites* all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week prepared by the Secretary-General;

4. *Invites* Governments and international and national non-governmental organizations to continue to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue to use the United Nations information organs as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session, the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, the item entitled "Disarmament Week".

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme

The emergence of new issues in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and security led to a corresponding broadening in the focus of the substantive content of the disarmament fellowship programme.⁹ Moreover, given the recent expansion in membership of the United

⁹ See the report of the Secretary-General on the programme (A/47/568). Fellowships were awarded to nationals of the following States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Benin, Cameroon, Chile, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Nations, the number of fellowships to be awarded yearly was increased from 25 to 30. The increase was effected within existing resources primarily by reducing the duration of the programme from 18 to 12 weeks. The programme included lectures, speaking, drafting and simulation exercises, preparation of individual research papers and study visits to IAEA and to five Member States at their invitation: Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, Japan and Sweden.

On 27 October, 28 States, later joined by 16 more,¹⁰ submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme". On 3 November, the draft text was introduced in the First Committee by Nigeria, which expressed the view that the programme should continue to enjoy the full support and funding of the United Nations, given its impressive record of performance and the prevailing positive international environment.

On 12 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote, and on 9 December the General Assembly did likewise. Resolution 47/53 A reads as follows:

Resolution 47/53 A

United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions repre-

¹⁰ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

sented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling also its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984, 40/151 H of 16 December 1985, 41/60 H of 3 December 1986, 42/39 I of 30 November 1987, 43/76 F of 7 December 1988, 44/117 E of 15 December 1989, 45/59 A of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 E of 6 December 1991,

Noting also with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, has enabled an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, Japan and Sweden for inviting the 1992 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that, within the framework of the programme, the Office for Disarmament Affairs organized regional disarmament workshops for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean;

4. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria for their support of the regional disarmament workshops, and to the Governments of New Zealand and Norway for making financial contributions;

5. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the implementation of the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

United Nations Regional Centres

During the year, the three Regional Centres intensified their efforts with a view to promoting cooperation among the States of their respect-

ive regions with a view to facilitating the development of effective measures of confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament.¹¹

Africa. The focus on the dissemination on information relating to disarmament and security in the African context gave rise to a number of activities. A project on the role of border problems in African peace and security was initiated, which, in its first phase, involved a workshop for experts from within and outside Africa and, in its second phase, will organize training programmes for senior governmental officials at the regional or subregional levels on the peaceful settlement of border disputes. Two conferences were held: one on the role of the media in the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa and the other on causes and consequences of regional conflicts in Africa. The Centre continued to publish its quarterly newsletter.

Latin America and the Caribbean. The Centre continued to serve as a resource centre, distributed United Nations publications, made available relevant videos and films, and promoted undergraduate and graduate studies on disarmament. In addition, it published a book entitled *Peace and Security in Latin America and the Caribbean in the Nineties*, containing papers by experts it had commissioned from different countries of the region. The Centre reported¹² on a seminar and a round-table discussion concerning the role of the military which it had organized for senior military officers and for military attachés accredited to Peru respectively, and on a conference which it had sponsored for ambassadors and chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions stationed in Peru.

Asia and the Pacific. The Centre's main activity was the dissemination of information on United Nations activities in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the answering of inquiries from the general public, students and non-governmental organizations. In addition, the Centre organized a major regional meeting, for the third consecutive year, on the topic of non-proliferation and other disarmament issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

On 30 October, a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United

¹¹ See the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/47/359).

¹² A/47/359, sect. B. The reporting period was August 1991 to July 1992.

Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean" was submitted. It was subsequently revised twice and then withdrawn. On 16 November, the same sponsors¹³ submitted a draft decision with the same title, which Togo introduced on 17 November. On 18 November, the First Committee adopted the draft decision without a vote. The General Assembly did likewise on 9 December. Decision 47/421 reads as follows:

Decision 47/421

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, decides: (a) to request the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the activities of the regional centres; and (b) to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean"

¹³ Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States), Uruguay (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States), and Viet Nam

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters*

Ednan T. Agaev, Head, Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

A. Bolaji Akinyemi, Former Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria and Former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

Martin Chungong Ayafor, Minister and Director, Office of the Prime Minister, Cameroon

Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, Ambassador of Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Relations of Brazil

Léon Bouvier, Ambassador of France

J. Soedjati Djwandono, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia

Mitsuro Donowaki, Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Muchkund Dubey, Former Foreign Secretary of India

Josef Holik, Ambassador, Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany

Juraj Kralik, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Bjørn Inge Kristvik, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Norway to NATO

LI Changhe, Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, United States

John Simpson, Director, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, United Kingdom

Klaus Törnudd, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland

Jayantha Dhanapala, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, is an ex officio member of the Advisory Board when it is acting in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the Institute.

* As of the twenty-third session of the Advisory Board, 22-26 June 1992.

ANNEX II

Composition of study groups at 1992 sessions

Group of Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study of Defensive Security Concepts and Policies

Alberto E. Dojas, Argentina
Mohamed Nabil Fahmy, Egypt
Wilhelm Nikolai Germann, Germany
Boris Petrovich Krasulin, Russian Federation
François de La Gorce, France
Johannes C. Landman, Netherlands
Henryk K. Pac, Poland
Suleiman Sa'idu, Nigeria
Farhad Shahabi Sirjani, Islamic Republic of Iran
Sheel Kant Sharma, India
Nugroho Wisnumurti, Indonesia

Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on the Application of Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space

Mohamed Ezz El Din Abdel-Moneim, Egypt
Sergey D. Chuvakhin, Russian Federation
F. R. Cleminson, Canada
Radoslav Deyanov, Bulgaria
Roberto García Moritán, Argentina
P. Hobwani, Zimbabwe
Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, Brazil
C. Raja Mohan, India
Pierre-Henri Pisani, France
Archelaus R. Turrentine, United States
Yu Mengjia, China
Sikandar Zaman, Pakistan

ANNEX III

Study on defensive security concepts and policies Conclusions and recommendations

257. This study has identified how defensive security concepts and policies could be a means to fulfilling the purposes and principles of the Charter of

the United Nations. Its focus has been on practical measures in the political and military fields that are both consistent with and a means towards implementing the crucial notions of defensiveness and self-restraint that are enshrined in the provisions of the Charter calling on Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations and recognizing their inherent right to individual and collective self-defence.

258. "Defensive security" is based on the recognition that its achievement depends upon creating the political and military conditions necessary for eliminating threats to international peace and security. Its goal is to promote awareness of the indivisibility of security by forgoing measures in the political and military fields that might appear threatening, offensive or provocative, establishing a concerted dialogue among States, strengthening collective security and other cooperative arrangements, adopting confidence- and security-building measures, pursuing a gradual restructuring of military force postures and reducing armaments. These and other steps would contribute to establishing a condition of "defensive security", as defined in paragraph/12 above.

259. It is recognized that the introduction of "defensive security" on a global basis in international relations will be a gradual process. The achievement of "defensive security" on a global basis requires a step-by-step approach that will differ from region to region and from one bilateral relation to another. In some regions, major progress has recently been achieved in transforming relations among States, and the possibility of achieving a system of cooperative security based on principles of "defensive security" is therefore clearly present. In many regions, however, basic conflicts persist, although some rudimentary steps towards "defensive security" are being taken.

260. Bearing in mind the distinctiveness of the security situations facing States, there are certain steps that all States can take to implement "defensive security". Foremost amongst these is respect for the principles and provisions of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. The strengthening of cooperative arrangements, regional or otherwise, is also fully consistent with and an important contributor to a strategy for promoting "defensive security". Similarly, political and military confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing openness and transparency can reduce secrecy and suspicions and create the degree of mutual trust necessary to convince States to adopt more defensively oriented military postures. Constraints on certain military activities, limits on and reduction in specific military equipment holdings and the reduction and ultimate elimination of weapons of mass destruction, if verified effectively and adequately, also form vital components of a defensive restructuring of a State's armed forces.

261. In pursuing these steps, however, States should be aware that the implementation of defensive security concepts and policies faces a number of

problems. The present study demonstrates the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of clearly distinguishing between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons and weapon systems. Like military formations, weapons and weapon systems can be used in an "offensive" as well as "defensive" mode. It is only within the context they are used that clear distinctions become apparent. This context, however, is by definition particular to specific circumstances. Similarly, it is recognized that the principle of collective defence requires that some States possess military capabilities that may exceed those necessary for the defence of their own national territory. In those situations, the possession and eventual use of such capabilities should be for the sole purpose of implementing collective self-defence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

262. The Group of Experts is aware that, since the specific security situation States face within their own region are likely to differ, there are no universally applicable, ready-made schemes for implementing defensive security concepts. Thus in order to identify possible measures for promoting "defensive security" within their own regions, States should feel encouraged to initiate an assessment of the security situation in their own regions and identify possible steps and measures to implement defensive security concepts and policies. On the basis of these voluntary assessments, States within a region could commence a dialogue aimed at defining the regional security situation, identifying possible measures for promoting defensiveness and self-restraint and finding a basis for implementing "defensive security" in the future. This dialogue might be conducted either at a bilateral or multilateral level, including through various regional and subregional organizations and other such cooperative arrangements.

263. The United Nations, through the Office for Disarmament Affairs, could promote regional/subregional dialogues along these lines by convening expert meetings, seminars and conferences designed to discuss regional/subregional security questions in an informal setting. Such meetings could be modelled after the seminars/conferences that the Office has organized in the past, particularly within the framework of the Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament established by the General Assembly in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia and the Pacific.

A. Collective security and cooperative arrangements

264. The strengthening of regional and other cooperative efforts in recent years is a positive development. Political and economic cooperation within and between regions is a valuable basis for building mutual trust and confidence between States. Enhanced confidence and greater trust in inter-State relations will lay a secure and stable foundation for implementing "defensive security" over time.

265. The prevention of conflict, the management of crises and the resolution of disputes should whenever possible be undertaken at the regional level. The States concerned are most directly affected by the circumstances and best able to assess for themselves the necessary steps to build peace and strengthen security among them. Success in these endeavours may further strengthen regional cooperation and enhance confidence and mutual trust. Regional dialogues on security in general and military matters in particular would be of great importance. All States should be encouraged to engage in such regional dialogues in the future.

266. The strengthening of the United Nations in recent years and its positive role in solving a number of conflicts throughout the world is a welcome development. The maintenance and expansion of this role, however, is to a large extent dependent upon a non-discriminatory treatment of all conflict situations by the United Nations. The enhanced role of the United Nations in peacemaking and the increasing number of peace-keeping missions undertaken by the United Nations since the late 1980s attest to a commitment by States to resolve their disputes peacefully. At the same time, the financial, human and technical resources required for fulfilling the rapidly growing demands placed on the United Nations should be forthcoming and the Organization's capability to deal with these demands enlarged. In this regard, the Secretary-General's recent report entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping" (A/47/277-S/24111) contains a number of suggestions the Group of Experts found particularly relevant to "defensive security", especially those relating to preventive diplomacy.

267. The ability to conduct military operations collectively and in a manner fully consistent with the principles of collective security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations can provide valuable incentives for all States to adopt defensive military postures and remove incentives for acquiring offensive, threatening and potentially provocative military capabilities. In so doing, prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes will be enhanced, thereby contributing to reducing the role of military force in international relations.

268. To ensure that the force projection capabilities necessary for collective military action are not perceived as threatening or provocative by other States, the idea of role specialization is worthy of further study.

B. Openness, transparency and confidence-building

269. The concept of "defensive security" rests on an awareness on the part of States that their security is indivisible. Such awareness can be promoted through political and military measures. Common to both sets of measures is the notion of openness and transparency in political and military affairs. Excessive secrecy breeds distrust and thus promotes a sense of insecurity; on

the other hand, openness in political and military affairs is likely to build confidence in relations between States.

270. The present study has identified practical political and military steps that can promote openness and build confidence over time. States have little incentive to greater openness without reciprocity. Therefore, bilateral and regional negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures/- including information, communication, access, notification and constraint measures/- are a valuable way in which to promote the implementation of "defensive security". At the same time, it may be more difficult to take steps towards greater openness in regions of conflict.

271. Recent experience from such negotiations in a variety of regions may have practical implications for future efforts in this area. These include the following:

(a) While there are a host of conceivable confidence- and security-building measures, negotiating agreements on specific measures will take time. The prevention of conflict and the building of confidence between States is a gradual process that requires a just treatment of the case and time to achieve its intended effect;

(b) The building of confidence between States in the military field requires openness and transparency. Although some aspects of military activities involve inevitably an element of confidentiality and secrecy, this element should be strictly limited in order to dispel misperceptions and misunderstandings leading to mistrust and worst-case assumptions;

(c) States are more willing to reduce their military capabilities once they gain confidence regarding the defensive orientation of opposing military force postures;

(d) An effective confidence-building process may, in certain situations, benefit from third-party participation. The involvement of third parties that are regarded as impartial by all sides in a conflict is often necessary to get negotiations going. A third party may be a country, a group of countries, a regional organization or the United Nations.

C. Restructuring military forces

272. Once a sufficient degree of mutual trust has been established or a modicum of common interests has been identified, States may decide that their security is best served by placing mutual restrictions on their forces. In this manner, the traditional goals of arms control/- to reduce the cost of maintaining military forces, the probability of war and the extent of damage in case of war/- can be achieved. In addition, arms limitation and disarmament agreements can serve the more specific purpose of promoting "defensive security". Depending

on the details, the defensive nature of military force postures can be enhanced by agreements that limit or reduce particular aspects of these postures.

273. In the area of weapons of mass destruction, major progress has been made in recent years. It can be expected that the 1972 Convention banning biological weapons will be followed later this year by a convention banning all chemical weapons. In the nuclear area, the East-West arms race has already ended and has been reversed. However, serious problems still exist, including the continued presence of large numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of some States and the continuance of nuclear weapons tests by some States, as well as problems relating to the proliferation of such weapons, both vertically and horizontally. Consequently nuclear disarmament should continue to be pursued with increasing resolve. Within the framework of general and complete disarmament, an objective which shall need a long transitional period, the nuclear weapon States should undertake further substantial reduction of their nuclear weapons stockpiles as a step towards their total elimination.

274. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements designed to enhance the defensive nature of conventional military capabilities should focus on three elements. First, the ability to generate strategic thrust through a combination of high mobility and concentrated firepower should be reduced in a balanced fashion. Secondly, forces capable of destroying targets deep in an opponent's territory should be adequately curtailed. Finally, the readiness and sustainability of conventional military formations should be limited commensurate with defensive requirements. In so doing, the ability to conduct large-scale strategic offensive operations or launch a surprise attack will be eliminated. In each of these cases, it is important to ensure that capabilities are reduced on a reciprocal, equitable and balanced basis within a given region or subregion.

275. Arms limitation agreements that cover these areas could help to strengthen the basic defensive orientation of military capabilities. Although the agreements would not in and of themselves guarantee the absence of an ability to conduct offensive operations, they would make such operations both more difficult and less likely to succeed. As a result, the inclination to use military force offensively will have been reduced and mutual confidence in the basic defensive nature of respective intentions will have increased. Of course, mutual confidence requires the assurance that agreements, once concluded, will be complied with. This is why adequate and effective verification of agreements plays a crucial part in the promotion of "defensive security".

276. As the present study makes clear, there have been only a few instances of successful bilateral or multilateral negotiations designed to effect a fundamental restructuring of military forces towards a defensive orientation. The modalities of achieving such a restructuring are complex and difficult to negotiate. To enhance the prospect for success in the future, States could start

a dialogue on how a restructuring of their military forces towards a defensive orientation could be achieved through negotiations. The United Nations, through the Office for Disarmament Affairs, should contribute to this dialogue by convening periodic meetings, seminars and conferences of governmental and non-governmental experts designed to investigate this issue in greater detail.

D. Towards "defensive security"

277. A study of the state of security in the world reveals some situations in which "defensive security" is closer to reality, others in which the prospects for "defensive security" seem promising and, finally, others in which relations are marked by tension and disputes and where a concept of security based on military strength prevails. Although the modalities of implementing "defensive security" could vary, strict adherence to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and a respect for international law provide a necessary basis. Wherever possible, increased openness and transparency in political and military affairs is also necessary. Other measures and steps have been identified in the present study as well. Above all, however, States should commit themselves to regional and other forms of dialogue designed to identify possible steps they could take individually or in concert to move towards "defensive security". In this manner, all States may over time arrive, albeit by different routes, at a situation in which "defensive security" may prevail.

278. The General Assembly, in its resolution 45/58/0, invited "Member States to initiate or intensify the dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies at the bilateral level, particularly at the regional level and, where appropriate, at the multilateral level". To this end, Member States could:

(a) Express their views on the concept and objective of "defensive security", as defined in the present study;

(b) Examine their current situation with respect to the political and military aspects of "defensive security";

(c) Determine to what extent their international relations, their security commitments and their regional situation might enable them to consider taking measures, on the basis of reciprocity, to achieve a situation of "defensive security" at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level. The States that share common security interests at a regional or other level might consider undertaking consultations among themselves;

(d) Consider, individually or jointly, problems relating to the resources needed to fulfil collective security commitments consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

(e) Keep the Secretary-General informed of progress or initiatives in the field of "defensive security".

279. In view of the above, the General Assembly may wish to keep itself informed of the state of "defensive security" and the progress achieved in this regard.

ANNEX IV

Publications of the Office for Disarmament Affairs

Books

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 16: 1991 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 92.IX.1)

Periodical

Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, Volume XIV, Numbers 1-4

Topical Papers

The Asia-Pacific Region: Non-Proliferation and Other Disarmament Issues (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.IX.2)

Non-Proliferation and New Security Arrangements in Asia and the Pacific (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.IX.3)

Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.IX.4)

Disarmament and Security in Africa (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.IX.5)

Newsletter

Disarmament Newsletter, Volume 10, Numbers 1-4

ANNEX V

Publications of UNIDIR

Research Reports

Verification of Disarmament or Limitation of Armaments: Instruments, Negotiations, Proposals, Serge Sur, ed., 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.92.0.10)

National Security Concepts of States: Argentina, by Julio C. Carasales, 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.92.0.10)

National Security Concepts of States: Sri Lanka, by Vernon L. B. Mendis, 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.92.0.12)

Military Industrialization and Economic Development: Theory and Historical Case Studies, by Raimo Väyrynen, 1992, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot)

European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe: Proceedings of the Rhodes (Greece) Conference, 6-7 September 1991, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, ed./*La sécurité européenne dans les années 90: Problèmes de l'Europe du Sud-Est: Actes de la conférence de Rhodes (Grèce) 6-7 septembre 1991*, sous la direction de Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE/F.92.0.14)

Disarmament and Limitation of Armaments: Unilateral Measures and Policies: Proceedings of the Paris Conference/24 January 1992, by Serge Sur, ed., 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.23)

Conference of Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific, Proceedings of the Beijing (China) Conference, 23-25 March 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE..92.0.29)

Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence, by Jozef Goldblat, ed., 1992, (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.31)

Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by David Fischer, 1992. Published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot)

From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States, Fred Tanner, ed., 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.26)

Research Papers

The Implications of IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687, by Eric Chauvistré, February 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.6)

Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace, by Serge Sur, 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.8)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty: How to Remove the Residual Threats, by Jozef Goldblat, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.25)

Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Option, by Victor Batiouk, 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.28)

Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, by Péricles Gasparini Alves (United Nations publication, Sales No. GVE.92.0.30)

Newsletters

Vol. 5, No. 1, April/avril 1992, *Conference on Disarmament/La Conférence du Désarmement*

Vol. 5, No. 18, June/juin 1992, *Disarmament—Environment—Security/Désarmement—Environnement—Sécurité*

Vol. 5, No. 19, September/septembre 1992, *Economic Aspects of Disarmament/Aspects économiques du désarmement*

Vol. 5, No. 20, December/décembre 1992, *The Chemical Weapons Convention/La Convention sur les armes chimiques*

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements concerned.

The Secretary-General is the depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Canada and Hungary are depositaries of the Treaty on Open Skies.

France is the depositary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mexico is the depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The Netherlands is the depositary of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America are depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The United States of America is the depositary of the Antarctic Treaty.

The Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat (formerly the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation) is the depositary for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 1992

The following list shows actions reported,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1992 with regard to the multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information is provided in the fourth edition of *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France^c

^a Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "O", "B", "M", "L", and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "O" for Ottawa, "B" for Budapest, "M" for Moscow, "L" for London, and "W" for Washington.

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1993 (United Nations publication, forthcoming).

^c On 23 December 1992, the Spanish Government informed the depositary Government that it had decided to withdraw the reservation entered on 17 June 1925. Such withdrawal took effect on 28 December 1992.

NEW PARTIES: Algeria—27 January 1992 (a)^d

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 131

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Ukraine—28 October 1992 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 41

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES^e IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Slovenia — 7 April 1992 (L) (s)
 —20 August 1992 (W) (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 119

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

^d With the following reservation:

“The Algerian Government will be bound by the Protocol only with regard to States which have ratified or have adhered to it and it will cease to be bound by the said Protocol with regard to any State whose armed forces or whose allies’ armed forces do not respect the provisions of the Protocol.”

^e The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

NEW PARTIES: Algeria—27 January 1992 (W) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 91

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)^f

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

TREATY: NEW SIGNATORIES: Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines —14 February 1992
Belize —17 February 1992
Saint Lucia —25 August 1992

NEW PARTIES: Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines —14 February 1992

Amendment to article 25, paragraph 2

SIGNATURE: Haiti —21 January 1992
Nicaragua —21 January 1992
Paraguay —21 January 1992
Peru —21 January 1992
Brazil —23 January 1992
Honduras — 4 March 1992
Mexico — 2 September 1992

RATIFICATION: Mexico —10 April 1992

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I—NEW PARTIES: France—24 August 1992

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II—NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 33^g

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

^f For the text of amendments adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL on 26 August 1992, see appendix IV.

^g Total includes Brazil, Chile and Dominica, which have not waived the requirements set out in article 28, and the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols.

NEW PARTIES:	Estonia	— 7 January 1992 (L) (a)
		—31 January 1992 (W) (a)
	Latvia	—31 January 1992 (L)
	China	— 9 March 1992 (L) (a) ^h
		—12 March 1992 (M) (a) ^h
		—17 March 1992 (W) (a) ^h
	Slovenia	— 7 April 1992 (L) (s)
		—20 August 1992 (W) (s)
	Uzbekistan	— 7 May 1992 (M) (a)
	France	— 2 August 1992 (M) (a)
		— 3 August 1992 (W) (a)
	Azerbaijan	—22 September 1992 (M) (a)
	Namibia	— 2 October 1992 (L) (a)
		— 7 October 1992 (W) (a)

^h With the following reservation:

“1. Pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. With a view to bringing about this objective and maintaining international peace, security and stability, and taking into consideration the aspirations and demands of the large numbers of non-nuclear-weapon countries, China has decided to accede to the Treaty.

“2. China pursues a policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons. China supports the objectives set forth in the Treaty, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, acceleration of nuclear disarmament and promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and believes that these three objectives are interrelated.

“3. China maintains that the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, but a measure and step in the process towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament should be mutually complementary. Only when substantial progress is made in the field of nuclear disarmament can the proliferation of nuclear weapons be checked most effectively and the authority of the nuclear non-proliferation regime truly enhanced. At the same time, an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime is conducive to the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. To attain the lofty goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfil their special obligations by taking the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing those weapons of all kinds they have deployed inside and outside their countries. Tangible progress they make in all these aspects will create conditions for the convening of a widely representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

— 9 October 1992 (M) (a)
 Niger — 9 October 1992 (L) (W) (a)
 Myanmar — 2 December 1992 (L) (W) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 156

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Algeria —27 January 1992 (W) (a)
 Slovenia — 7 April 1992 (L) (s)
 —20 August 1992 (W) (s)
 Latvia —24 June 1992 (L) (a)

"4. China maintains that in order to improve and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and help attain the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the following specific measures should also be taken:

"(1) All nuclear-weapon States undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and an international agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons should be concluded.

"(2) All nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries or nuclear-free zones, and an international legal instrument on the non-use or non-threat of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-free zones should be concluded.

"(3) All nuclear-weapon States undertake to support the proposition of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations.

"(4) All States that have nuclear weapons deployed outside their boundaries withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories.

"(5) The major space Powers halt their arms race in outer space and cease the development of space weapons, the nuclear-related in particular.

"5. The signing and ratification of the Treaty by the Taiwan authorities in the name of China on 1 July 1968 and 27 January 1970 respectively are illegal and null and void."

— 3 August 1992 (W) (a)
—21 August 1992 (M) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 87

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Indonesia — 4 February 1992 (M)
 —19 February 1992 (L)
 — 1 April 1992 (W)
 Botswana — 5 February 1992 (W)
 Oman —31 March 1992 (W) (a)
 Slovenia — 7 April 1992 (L) (s)
 —20 August 1992 (W) (s)
 Uganda —12 May 1992 (W) (a)
 Albania — 3 June 1992 (W) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 124

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Dominica — 9 November 1992 (s)
 Mauritius — 9 December 1992 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 57

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 8

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: ⁱ	Greece	—28 January 1992
	Slovenia	—25 June 1992 (s)
	Niger	—10 November 1992 (a)
	Germany	—25 November 1992

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 35

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat

TREATY—NEW PARTIES: none

PROTOCOL 1—SIGNATORIES: none

PROTOCOL 2—NEW PARTIES: none

PROTOCOL 3—NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13^j

Treaty on Conventional Armed Force in Europe (CFE Treaty)^k

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

ⁱ Article 5, subparagraph 2, of the Convention states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

^j Total includes the two nuclear-weapon States, China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3.

^k For the text of the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties, see appendix III.

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: The Netherlands

RATIFICATIONS:	Luxembourg	—22 January 1992
	United States	—29 January 1992
	France	—24 March 1992
	Romania	—21 April 1992
	Italy	—22 April 1992
	Spain	— 1 June 1992 ^l
	Georgia	— 6 July 1992
	Moldova	— 6 July 1992
	Greece	— 8 July 1992 ^m
	Turkey	— 8 July 1992 ⁿ
	Azerbaijan	— 9 July 1992
	Ukraine	— 9 July 1992
	Portugal	—14 August 1992
	Russian Federation	— 3 September 1992
	Armenia	—12 October 1992
	Belarus	—30 October 1992
	Kazakhstan	—30 October 1992

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 29

^l With the following declaration:

"The application of the present Treaty over Gibraltar is understood without prejudice to the judicial position of the Kingdom of Spain concerning the controversy with the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of the Isthmus."

^m With the following declaration:

"Greece wishes hereby to reaffirm the validity of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, the 1936 Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Straits and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty between the Allies and Italy, insofar as obligations deriving from them have not explicitly or implicitly been abolished by other Treaties, including the present one, or other rules and principles of international law."

ⁿ With the following reservation:

"The provision contained in Article II/1/B and Article V/1/A of the Treaty that the Treaty covers the entire land territory in Europe, including all the European island territories of the States Parties, or any other of its provisions do not alter, terminate or affect in any way the demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands established by the 1914 Decision of the Six Powers, 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, 1923 Lausanne Convention on the Straits and 1947 Paris Peace Treaty."

Treaty on Open Skies

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary

SIGNATORIES:	Belarus	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Belgium	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Bulgaria	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Canada	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Czechoslovakia	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Denmark	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	France	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Georgia	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Germany	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Greece	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Hungary	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Iceland	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Italy	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Luxembourg	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Netherlands	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Norway	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Poland	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Portugal	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Romania	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Russia	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Spain	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Turkey	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Ukraine	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	United Kingdom	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	United States	—24 March 1992 (O), (B)
	Kyrgyzstan	—15 December 1992 (O), (B)
PARTIES:	Canada	—20 July 1992 (O), (B)
	Czechoslovakia	—21 December 1992 (O), (B)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 2

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1992, as reported by depositaries

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	IPW ^a	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies ^b
Afghanistan	r		s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	r		s			
Albania	r				r			r						
Algeria	r		s	r			r		r					
Angola	r													
Antigua and Barbuda	r		r	r	s r	r	r		r					
Argentina	r	s r	s r	s r	s		s r	s r	r		s			
Armenia														r
Australia	r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r		
Austria	s r	r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r			
Azerbaijan					r									r
Bahamas			r	r	s r	r	r	r						
Bahrain	r				r			r						
Bangladesh	r		r	r		r	r	r	r					
Barbados	r		r	r	s r	s r		s r						
Belarus			s r	s r			s r	s r	s r		s r		r	s
Belgium	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r		s		s r	s
Belize					s	r		r						

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1992, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Sea-Bed	NPT	BW	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	IV ^a	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies ^b
Benin	I		SI	I		SI	SI	SI	SI		I			
Bhutan	I		I		I			I						
Bolivia	I		SI	S	SI	S	SI	S	SI	S				
Bosnia and Herzegovina														
Botswana			I	S		SI	SI	SI						
Brazil	SI	I	SI	SI	SI ^C	SI	SI	SI	SI					
Brunei Darussalam					I			I						
Bulgaria	SI	I	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	S
Burkina Faso	I		S	SI		SI		I						
Burundi			S	S		I	S	S						
Cambodia	I					I	S	SI						
Cameroon	I		S	S		SI	S							
Canada	SI	I	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI	S		SI	SI	SI
Cape Verde	I		I		I	I	I	I	I					
Central African Republic	I		I	S		I	SI	S						
Chad			SI			SI								
Chile	SI	SI	SI	SI	SI ^C			SI		SI				

China	r	r	(A.III) ^d				r	r	r	r	s r	(P.2-3) ^e
Colombia	r	s r	s	s r	s r	s r	s r	s	s r			
Comoros												
Congo							r	r	r			
Cook Islands											s r	
Costa Rica		s r		s r	s r	s	s r					
Côte d'Ivoire	r	s r		s r	r	s						
Croatia												
Cuba	r	r	r				r	s r	s r		s r	
Cyprus	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r		r		
Czechoslovakia	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	r	r					r	r	r			
Denmark	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	-	s r	s r
Djibouti												
Dominica					s r ^c	r						
Dominican Republic	r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r				
Ecuador	r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r			s r	
Egypt	s r		s r	s r	s r	s	r	s	r		s	

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1992, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	IN ^a	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies ^b
El Salvador	I		I	I	I	I	I	I						
Equatorial Guinea	I		I	I	I	I	I	I						
Estonia	I				I									
Ethiopia	I		S	S	I	I	I	I	S					
Fiji	I		I	I	I	I	I	I				S	I	
Finland	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I				
France	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I		S	I		S	I
					[(A.PI-I-II) (A.PI-II)]									
Gabon			I		I			S						
Gambia	I		I	S	I	S	S							
Georgia													I	S
Germany	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I		I	S
Ghana	I		I	S	I	I	I	I	I	I				
Greece	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I			I	S
Grenada	I				I	I	I							
Guatemala	I	I	I	I	I	I	S	I	I	S	I			
Guinea					I	S								
Guinea-Bissau	I		I	I	I	I	I							
Guyana				S				S						

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1992, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Wpa	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies ^b
Lao People's Democratic Republic	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		I			
Latvia	I				I	I								
Lebanon	I		S I	S I	S I	S	S I	S I	S					
Lesotho	I			S	S I	S I	S I	S I						
Liberia	I		S I		S I	S	S	S	S					
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	I		S I	I	S I	I	I							
Liechtenstein	I				I	I	I	I		S I				
Lithuania	I				I									
Luxembourg	S I		S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S		S		S I	S
Madagascar	I		S I	I	S I	S	S	S						
Malawi	I		I		I	I	S	S	I					
Malaysia	I		S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I						
Maldives	I				S I									
Mali			S	I	S I	S	S							
Malta	I		I		S I	S I	S I	S I						
Marshall Islands														
Mauritania					S I									

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1992, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	IWA	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies ^P
Pakistan	r		sr	sr				sr	r	r	sr			
Panama	r		sr	s	sr	sr	sr	sr						
Papua New Guinea	r	r	r	r		r		r	r			sr		
Paraguay	r		s		sr	sr	s	r						
Peru	r	r	sr	sr	sr	sr		sr		s				
Philippines	r		sr	s		sr		sr		sr	s			
Poland	sr	r	sr	sr		sr	sr	sr	sr		sr	sr	s	
Portugal	sr		s			r	r	sr	s		s		sr	s
Qatar	r					r	r	sr						
Republic of Korea	r	r	sr	sr		sr	sr	sr	r					
Republic of Moldova												r		
Romania	sr	r	sr	sr		sr	sr	sr	sr	s	s		sr	s
Russian Federation	r	sr	sr	sr	sr	sr	sr	sr	sr		sr	sr	sr	s
Rwanda	r		sr	s	(A.P.II)	r	sr	sr						
Saint Kitts and Nevis	r					r		r						
Saint Lucia	r				s	r		r						

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		s r	r							s r
Samoa		s r		r						s r
San Marino		s r	s r	s r						
Sao Tome and Principe				r	r	r	r			
Saudi Arabia	r		r	r	s r	s r				
Senegal	r	s r		s r s	s r					
Seychelles		r	r	r	r	r				
Sierra Leone	r	s r	s r	r s	s r	s				s
Singapore		r	r	s r	s r	s r				
Slovenia		r		r	r	r				r
Solomon Islands	r			r	r	r				s r
Somalia		s	s	s r		s				
South Africa	r	s r		r	s r	s r				
Spain	s r	r	r	r	r	s r			s	s r s
Sri Lanka	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r				
Sudan	r	s r		s r s		s				
Suriname	r			s r	r					
Swaziland	r		r	s r	s r	r				
Sweden	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r			r	s r

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1992, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	IN ^a	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies ^b
Switzerland	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	I		S I			
Syrian Arab Republic	I		S I	I	S I			S						
Tajikistan														
Thailand	S I		S I	S I	I			S I						
Togo	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I			S			
Tonga	I		I	I	I			I						
Trinidad and Tobago	I		S I	S	S I	S I								
Tunisia	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		I			
Turkey	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S		S		S I	S
Turkmenistan														
Tuvalu					I							S I		
Uganda	I		S I	I	I			I	S					
Ukraine		I	S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I		S I		I	S
United Arab Emirates								S						
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S		S I	S

(A.P.I-II)

APPENDIX II

Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty*

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their support for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Recognizing the altered political situation resulting from the replacement of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a number of independent states,

Recalling the commitment of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States that the nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be maintained under the safe, secure, and reliable control of a single unified authority,

Desiring to facilitate implementation of the Treaty in this altered situation,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty.

Article II

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; to allow function-

* Text obtained from the United States Department of State.

ing of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; and to allocate costs.

Article III

1. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall be interpreted to mean the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

2. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase "national territory", when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be interpreted to mean the combined national territories of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

3. For inspections and continuous monitoring activities in the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, that state shall provide communications from the inspection site or continuous monitoring site to the Embassy of the United States in the respective capital.

4. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the embassy of the Inspecting Party referred to in Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms shall be construed to be the embassy of the respective state in Washington or the embassy of the United States of America in the respective capital.

5. The working languages for Treaty activities shall be English and Russian.

Article IV

Representatives of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with Article I of this Protocol.

Article V

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear-weapons states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary actions to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices.

Article VI

1. Each Party shall ratify the Treaty together with this Protocol in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange instruments of ratification with the United States of America. The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty.

Done at Lisbon on May 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the Byelarusian, English, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

APPENDIX III

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty*

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Reaffirming their determination to bring into force the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, by the time of the Helsinki Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on July 9-10, 1992,

Desiring to meet the objectives and requirements of the Treaty while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed,

Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking,

Having met together at an Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Kingdom of Spain in Oslo on June 5, 1992, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, as provisionally applied,

* English text obtained from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Have agreed as follows:

1. The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Final Document and its Annexes A and B, together with the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the States Parties, shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements for entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with its provisions. Accordingly, the Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after the last such instrument has been deposited.

2. In this context, the States Parties note the Agreement of May 15, 1992, on the Principles and Procedures of Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the four Protocols to that Agreement and the Joint Declaration of May 15, 1992, in relation to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as transmitted on June 1, 1992, by that Agreement's Depositary to all States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 of that Agreement, the four Protocols to that Agreement, and the Joint Declaration of May 15, 1992, in relation to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contain necessary confirmations and information.

3. The States Parties confirm the understandings as elaborated in the Joint Consultative Group, and specified in Annex A of this Final Document.

4. The States Parties confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group.

5. This Final Document in no way alters the rights and obligations of the States Parties as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents.

6. This final document shall enter into force upon signature by all of the States Parties.

7. This final document, together with its Annexes A and B, which are integral to it, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Document to all the States Parties.

ANNEX A

Understandings

1. The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic

of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties.”.

2. The second paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

“Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989,”.

The third paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

“Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted in Vienna beginning on March 9, 1989,”.

3. With regard to the ninth paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty, it is noted that the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 is no longer in force, and that some of the States Parties in the first group specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex did not sign or accede to that Treaty.

4. The “groups of States Parties” referred to in paragraph 1(a) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to consist of:

“the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine,”

and

“the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.”.

5. The first two sentences of paragraph 1(b) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

“the term ‘area of application’ means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Moun-

ains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the Islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Russian Federation. In the case of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea."

6. In Article IV of the Treaty, in accordance with the map provided by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at signature of the Treaty:

—the second sentence of the second part of paragraph 1 shall be understood to read:

"such designated permanent storage sites may also be located in the Republic of Moldova, that part of Ukraine comprising the portion of the former Odessa Military District on its territory, and that part of the territory of the Russian Federation comprising the southern part of the Leningrad Military District."

—the first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, that part of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the area of application, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Moscow Military District and the portion of the Volga-Ural Military District on its territory west of the Ural Mountains, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:"

—the first sentence of paragraph 3 shall be understood to read:

“within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers of active units do not exceed”:

—the first sentence in paragraph 3(d) shall be understood to read:

“in that part of Ukraine comprising the former Kiev military district, the aggregate numbers in active units and designated permanent storage sites together shall not exceed.”.

7. The first sentence of paragraph 1(a) of Article V of the Treaty shall be understood, in accordance with the map provided by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at signature of the Treaty, to read:

“within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Georgia, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of Ukraine comprising the portion of the former Odessa Military District on its territory, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed the difference between the overall numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1, and those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is:”

8. Paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters shall be understood to read:

“Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine may hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 MI-24R and MI-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of information in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. MI-24R and MI-24K helicopters in excess of this limit shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty.”.

9. With reference to paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the proportion of the expenses of the Joint Consultative Group allocated to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall become the collective responsibility of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

ANNEX B

Notifications, Confirmations and Commitments

I: Notifications

1. The States Parties note that each State Party has provided to all other States Parties notifications of maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (Article VII, paragraph 2) in advance of the Extraordinary Conference.

2. Each State Party shall provide the following notifications and information, where applicable, to all other States Parties no later than July 1, 1992:

(a) in view of the inspection requirements in the Treaty, information on its objects of verification and declared sites effective as of November 19, 1990 (Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section V and Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, Section V);

(b) list of its points of entry/exit (Annex on Format for the Exchange of Information, Section V, paragraph 3);

(c) notification of changes to its points of entry/exit (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 11);

(d) lists of its proposed inspectors and transport crew members (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 3);

(e) notification of deletions from the lists of inspectors and transport crew members (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraphs 4 and 7);

(f) notification of its standing diplomatic clearance numbers for transportation means (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 9);

(g) notification of the official language or languages to be used by inspection teams (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 12);

(h) notification of its active inspection quota for the baseline validation period (Protocol on Inspection, Section II, paragraph 24);

(i) notification of entry into service of new types, models or versions of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty (Protocol on Existing Types, Section IV, paragraph 3);

(j) notification in the event of destruction by accident, and documentary evidence supporting destruction by accident, of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (Protocol on Reduction, Section IX, paragraphs 2 and 3).

II: Confirmations

1. With regard to Article VIII, paragraph 7, of the Treaty, the States Parties confirm that, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty, their respective reduction liabilities in each category shall be no less than the difference between their respective holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, as of the signature of the Treaty, and their respective maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII. In this regard, for those States Parties that have jointly confirmed the validity for them of holdings as of the signature of the Treaty, the sum of their reduction liabilities in each category shall, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty, be no less than the difference between the jointly confirmed holdings and the sum of their maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII.

2. The States Parties confirm their commitment, in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Personnel Strength of November 19, 1990, not to increase during the period of the negotiations referred to in Article XVIII of the Treaty the total peacetime authorised personnel strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the Mandate in the area of application.

3. The States Parties confirm their commitment to the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft of November 19, 1990.

4. The States Parties confirm their adherence to the agreement set out in the Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group on October 18, 1991.

III: Commitments

A. Costs

1. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2(f), of the Treaty, and with reference to paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the Joint Consultative Group shall review its scale of distribution of expenses after entry into force of the treaty in the light of decisions taken on the scale of distribution of expenses of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

B. Article XII

1. In order to meet the security interests of all States Parties in light of new circumstances in Europe, the States Parties shall as a first priority seek to reach agreement, immediately after entry into force of the Treaty, on Article XII, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.

2. In this context, the States Parties will cooperate to respect the security objectives of Article XII within the area of application of the Treaty. In particular, no State Party will increase, within the area of application, its holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions above that aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of signature of the Treaty, as notified pursuant to the information exchange effective as of November 19, 1990.

3. Notwithstanding the political commitment set forth in paragraph 2 above, any State Party that had an aggregate number of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions on its territory, as notified effective as of November 19, 1990, that was less than five percent of its maximum levels for holdings for armoured combat vehicles, as notified pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, or less than 100 such armoured infantry fighting vehicles, whichever is greater, will have the right to increase its holdings of such armoured infantry fighting vehicles to an aggregate number not to exceed five percent of its maximum levels for holdings for armoured combat vehicles, as notified pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, or to an aggregate number not to exceed 100, whichever is greater.

APPENDIX IV

Amendments to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)*

The General Conference,

Recalling that, as indicated in the preamble to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature in Mexico City on 14 February 1967, which entered into force on 25 April 1969, militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for promoting the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in accordance with established principles in the field in question, by the relevant organs of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance of achieving as soon as possible full application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, once ratification by France of Additional Protocol I to that international instrument has been received, whereupon the two additional protocols will enter into force, whose goal it is, on the one hand, to safeguard the statute of denuclearization of the territories of the Latin American zone that are *de jure* or *de facto* under the control of extra-continental Powers and, on the other hand, to guarantee that the nuclear Powers respect the statute of denuclearization of Latin America,

Expressing its satisfaction at the decision by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to take the necessary steps as soon as possible to enable the Treaty to enter fully into force in respect of each of those countries,

Respectfully urging the Latin American and Caribbean States in respect of which the Treaty is open for accession immediately to carry out the corresponding formalities so that they may become parties to that international instrument, thus contributing to one of the most noble causes uniting the Latin American continent,

Reaffirming how important it is that any amendment to the Treaty scrupulously respect the basic goals of that instrument and the fundamental elements of the necessary control and inspection system,

* Resolution 290 (VII) of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (A/47/467), annex.

Resolves

To adopt and open for signature the following amendments to the Treaty:

Article 14

2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously forward to the Agency copies of the reports submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency with regard to matters that are subject of this Treaty that are relevant to the work of the Agency.

3. The information furnished by the Contracting Parties cannot be, totally or partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the recipients of the reports, except when the Contracting Parties give their express consent.

Article 15

1. At the request of any of the Parties and with the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any extraordinary event or circumstance which may affect compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall immediately inform the Council and the Contracting Parties of such requests and the respective replies.

Current article 16 shall be replaced by the following text:

Article 16

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the power of carrying out special inspections, subject to article 12 and to the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty.

2. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties in accordance with the procedures established in article 15 of this Treaty, the Council shall submit for consideration by the International Atomic Energy Agency a request that the necessary mechanisms be put into operation to carry out a special inspection.

3. The General Secretary shall request the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency opportunely to transmit to him the information forwarded for the knowledge of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency with regard to the conclusion of the special inspection. The General Secretary shall promptly make this information known to the Council.

4. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall transmit said information to all the Contracting Parties.

Article 19

The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established in the present Treaty.

And the remaining articles, from article 20 onwards, shall be renumbered:

Article 20

1. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.

2. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute.

TABLE OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS

RESOLUTIONS

Resolution No.	Title	Agenda item	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
47/39	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	60	36	without a vote	without a vote
47/43	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	50	186	104-3-28	128-3-30
47/44	The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields	51 and 63 (i)	184	without a vote	without a vote
47/45	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	52	105	without a vote	without a vote

47/46	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	53	142	93-2-40	118-2-41
47/47	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	54	138	136-1-4	159-1-4
47/48	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	55	157	without a vote	without a vote
47/49	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	56	163	117-2-12	144-3-13
47/50	Conclusion of effective international ar- rangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	57	60	139-0-2	162-0-2
47/51	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	58	202	133-0-2	164-0-2
47/52	General and complete disarmament				
	A. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu- clear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	61 (n)	58	133-0-2	168-0-0
	B. Prohibition of the development, pro- duction, stockpiling and use of radio- logical weapons	61 (h)	171	without a vote	without a vote
	C. Prohibition of the production of fission- able material for weapons purposes	61 (g)	146	133-0-4	164-0-3

Resolution No.	Title	Agenda item	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
47/52 (cont.)	D. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	61 (k)	238	without a vote	without a vote
	E. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	61	235	without a vote	without a vote
	F. Relationship between disarmament and development	61 (j)	216	without a vote	without a vote
	G. Regional disarmament	61 (j)	75	without a vote	without a vote
	H. Study on defensive security concepts and policies	61 (e)	282	without a vote	without a vote
	I. Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	61 (m)	79	without a vote	without a vote
	J. Regional disarmament	61 (j)	77	130-0-4	168-0-1
	K. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	61	135	without a vote	without a vote
	L. Transparency in armaments	61 (l)	108	without a vote	without a vote

47/53	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly				
	A. United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme	62 (e)	290	without a vote	without a vote
	B. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia	62 (b)	81	without a vote	without a vote
	C. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	62 (d)	151	97-21-19	126-21-21
	D. World Disarmament Campaign	62 (a)	286	without a vote	without a vote
	E. Nuclear-arms freeze	62 (c)	148	92-18-28	121-19-27
	F. Regional confidence-building measures	62 (b)	84	132-1-2	159-1-1
47/54	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session				
	A. Report of the Disarmament Commission	63 (a)	272	without a vote	without a vote
	B. Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters	63 (a)	114	without a vote	without a vote
	C. Disarmament Week	63 (f)	288	without a vote	without a vote

Resolution No.	Title	Agenda item	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
47/54 (cont.)	D. Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	63 (g)	111	without a vote	without a vote
	E. Report of the Conference on Disarmament	63 (b)	275	without a vote	without a vote
	F. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research	63 (e)	218	132-0-3	166-0-2
47/55	Israeli nuclear armament	64	160	54-3-70	64-3-90
47/56	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	65	188	without a vote	without a vote
47/59	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	68	168	98-3-31	129-3-35

47/61	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	142	166	without a vote	without a vote
47/76	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	59	155	without a vote	without a vote
DECISIONS					
47/419	International arms transfers	61 (<i>i</i>)	191	without a vote	without a vote
47/420	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	61 (<i>m</i>)	192	without a vote	without a vote
47/421	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	62 (<i>f</i>)	292	without a vote	without a vote
47/422	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	63	276	without a vote	without a vote

TABLE OF SPONSORSHIP OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS

RESOLUTIONS

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
47/39	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany , Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,

47/39
(cont.)

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and United Kingdom

47/43

Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

Afghanistan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Venezuela

47/44

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela

47/45

Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan,

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
47/45 (<i>cont.</i>)		Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Thailand
47/46	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	Bahamas, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela
47/47	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,

47/47 (<i>cont.</i>)		Samoa, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe
47/48	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Armenia and Egypt
47/49	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	Bangladesh and Pakistan
47/50	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	Bangladesh, Colombia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan , Sri Lanka and Viet Nam
47/51	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela and Viet Nam
47/52	General and complete disarmament A. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	Peru (on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
47/52 (<i>cont.</i>)	B. Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Belgium, Canada, Russian Federation and Sweden
	C. Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada , Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Sweden and Uruguay
	D. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Kenya (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States)
	E. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia , Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States
	F. Relationship between disarmament and development	Armenia, Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries)

G. Regional disarmament

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay

H. Study on defensive security concepts and policies

Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Russian Federation and Ukraine

I. Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe

Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, **United Kingdom** and United States

J. Regional disarmament

Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, **Pakistan**, Panama, Papua New

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
47/52 (<i>cont.</i>)	K. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe
	L. Transparency in armaments	Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States
		Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Nepal, Netherlands , New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela

Review and implementation of the
Concluding Document of the Twelfth
Special Session of the General
Assembly

A. United Nations disarmament
fellowship, training and advisory
services programme

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, **Nigeria**, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe

B. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in South-East Asia

Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
47/53 (cont.)		Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe
	C. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia and Viet Nam
	D. World Disarmament Campaign	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Ukraine and Venezuela

47/53
(cont.)

E. Nuclear-arms freeze
Bolivia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia,
Mexico and Myanmar

F. Regional confidence-building
measures

Angola, Burundi, **Cameroon**, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, France, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, and **Zaire**

47/54

Review of the implementation of the
recommendations and decisions
adopted by the General Assembly at
its tenth special session

A. Report of the Disarmament
Commission

Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
Finland, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay

B. Guidelines and recommendations
for objective information on
military matters

Austria, Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia,
Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sweden, **United
Kingdom** and Uruguay

C. Disarmament Week

Afghanistan, Belarus, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Micronesia (Federated States of), **Mongolia**,

Resolution No.	Title	Sponsors*
47/54 (<i>cont.</i>)	D. Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Viet Nam Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States
	E. Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Belgium (as President of the Conference on Disarmament)
	F. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research	Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Spain and Sri Lanka

- 47/55 Israeli nuclear armament
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, **Qatar**, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen
- 47/56 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, **Sweden** and Viet Nam
- 47/59 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
Indonesia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) (**Sri Lanka**)
- 47/61 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, **Mexico**, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela
- 47/76 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa
Kenya (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States)

DECISIONS

<i>Decision No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Sponsors*</i>
47/419	International arms transfers	Colombia and Peru
47/420	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Peru
47/421	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States), Uruguay (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States) and Viet Nam
47/422	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	Proposed by the Chairman of the First Committee

* The State that introduced the draft resolution is shown in bold type.

APPENDIX VII

List of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at the first part of its forty-seventh session, held from 15 September to 23 December 1992 (including voting)

	<i>Reference in text</i>
Resolutions on disarmament questions	
47/39 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	39
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
47/43 Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	187
<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 3, with 30 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,	

- 47/43 (cont.) Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining:* Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey
- 47/44 The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields 185
- Adopted without a vote*
- 47/45 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification 106
- Adopted without a vote*
- 47/46 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 144
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 2, with 41 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti,

47/46 (cont.) Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey

47/47 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 140

Adopted by a recorded vote of 159 to 1, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,

- 47/47 (cont.) Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated State of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: China, France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

- 47/48 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 158

Adopted without a vote

- 47/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 164

47/49 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 144 to 3, with 13 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Myanmar, Republic of Korea, Seychelles, Viet Nam, Yemen

- 47/50 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

62

Adopted by a recorded vote of 162 to 0, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,

47/50 Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
(cont.) Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic
of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America

47/51 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 203

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 164 to 0, with 2 abstentions,
as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica,
Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic
of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San
Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

47/51 (cont.) Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

47/52 General and complete disarmament

Resolution A—Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee

59

Adopted by a recorded vote of 168^a to 0, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,

^a The delegation of India subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

47/52 (cont.) Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: None

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Adopted without a vote

Resolution C—Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes 147

Adopted by a recorded vote of 164^b to 0, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros,

^b The delegation of France subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

47/52 Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
(cont.) Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire,
Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: India, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America

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Adopted without a vote

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<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 168 to 0, with 1 abstention, as follows:</i>	
<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,	

- 47/52 (cont.) Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: India

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Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 21, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

47/53 *Against:* Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech-
(cont.) oslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Armenia, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece,
Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Sweden

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Adopted without a vote

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Adopted by a recorded vote of 121^c to 19, with 27 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo,
Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,

^c The delegation of Argentina subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

47/53 Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
(cont.) Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San
Marino, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Armenia, Australia, Austria, China,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Zaire

Resolution F—Regional confidence-building measures

85

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 159 to 1, with 1 abstention,
as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall

47/53 (cont.)	Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States), Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yemen	
	<i>Against:</i> United States of America	
	<i>Abstaining:</i> United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	
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	Resolution E—Report of the Conference on Disarmament	275
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution F—United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research	218

47/54 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 166 to 0, with 2 abstentions,
(cont.) as follows:*

In favour. Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Baharain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

47/54 *Abstaining:* United Kingdom of Great Britain and
(cont.) Northern Ireland, United States of America

47/55 Israeli nuclear armament

162

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 64 to 3, with 90 abstentions,
as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, China, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, Romania, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent

- 47/55 and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore,
(cont.) Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Suriname, Sweden,
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Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire
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Effects

Adopted without a vote

- 47/59 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean 169
as a Zone of Peace

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 3, with 35 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,

47/59 Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
(cont.) United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu,
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
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United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament
and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Adopted without a vote

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Adopted without a vote

APPENDIX VIII

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CBM	confidence-building measure
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces In Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COPUOS	Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
ENMOD	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
GPALS	Global Protection against Limited Strikes
GPS	Global Protection System
GSETT	Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMO	International Maritime Organization
MIRV	multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	strategic arms reduction Treaty (I and II)

UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

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