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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE ARAB MAGHREB

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE MAGHREB

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INTRODUCTION

Excess manpower in the Maghreb, apart from Libya, and the sustained economic expansion of the receiving countries (in Europe, the Arab world or the new pull regions) has produced a substantial rise in migration over the last few decades.

Originally instigated by the receiving countries, this migration was essentially of an economic nature. It served to regulate the surpluses and deficits of the respective labour markets. The volume of immigrants and the resulting many social consequences have made it a major political concern. Aggravated by the economic crises in Europe, the multiple effects of the two oil shocks and the Gulf war, the problems of international migration are now acute for the sending and the receiving countries alike.

The industrial changes in Europe, brought about by technological progress and automation, on the one hand, and international competition, on the other, have made several million workers redundant in Europe, including migrant workers from the Maghreb. Foreigners have become the scapegoat to be blamed for the numerous social problems, and the different political parties agree on the need to lighten the "burden" of immigration and have taken highly restrictive steps to close the national doors. But the result has been the opposite of what was expected: the number of Maghrebi immigrants has grown steadily, as have the social tensions, concerning the second and third generations, in particular.

In the present study, we propose to examine the present situation and the outlook for the future, and discuss mid and long term strategies which could be adopted with regard to international migration in the Maghreb. This means examining the trends and characteristics of this migration, as well as the problems with which migrant workers and their families are faced. However, the available data are not always complete. There is an urgent need for an observatory of Maghreb migration, because of the very nature of the phenomenon, which has become structural, and because of its sharp annual fluctuations.

In the meantime, we have had to make do with the existing sources, which provide the fundamental elements necessary for analysis, but leave many aspects of migration in the dark.

The SOPEMI¹ provided the reference data on which our reflections are based. Many studies have been published on the migration of Maghreb Arabs, particularly to Europe. The literature of the various Arab, regional and international authorities is reviewed in the course of our study.

¹ Système d'observation permanente des migrations, Paris.

PANORAMA OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE MAGHREB

Schematically, international migration in the Maghreb can be broken down into two groups: vertical migration flows, in particular from the Maghreb to Europe, and lesser horizontal flows, from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria to the oil-producing Arab states.

Of the latter, the principal receiving countries are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Kuwait and Libya.

There are presently 3 million Maghreb expatriates, mostly in Europe, although new channels have emerged in recent years. Their numbers fluctuate daily, being affected by numbers of births, deaths, entries and exits by spatial mobility and naturalizations. Emigrants represent quite a substantial proportion of the population of the Maghreb: 5.2%. This is five times as high as in the rest of the world: 50 million expatriates², for a population of 5.5 billion.

PART 1 - MIGRATION TRENDS

Because of its strategic position and civilization history, the Arab world has always been a crossroads as well as a melting-pot. The interface between Asia and the West, a bridge between Africa and Europe, the Arab world has always served as a vehicle for cultural, cultural and scientific exchanges between men and civilizations. As such, it has experienced extensive migration. During the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, a large European colony settled in several Arab countries, particularly Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. The trend was then reversed towards the 'Old Continent', but also towards the New World, with the opening up of new channels of migration.

1.1. Migration to and from the Maghreb countries

The literature on contemporary migration history shows that, up to 1950, 12% of the population of Algeria was European; the proportion was 8% in Tunisia and 6% in Morocco.

In terms of urban population, the Europeans represented almost half in Algeria, one third in Tunisia and one quarter in Morocco.

With Independence, in 1956 in Tunisia and Morocco and 1962 in Algeria, and the departure of the Europeans, the migration flows were reversed. The European economies were in dire need of North African labour, because lower birth rates had resulted in structural imbalances: population aging, ratio of retired dependants to workers, shortage of unskilled workers...

² Source: *World Population at the Turn of the Century*, p. 59, United Nations, 1989.

For fifteen years, France, Belgium, Holland and Germany organized systematic recruitment drives, combing even the most remote regions of Morocco and Tunisia for healthy, vigorous males who would endure the most difficult working conditions. Between 30,000 and 40,000 Moroccans migrated to Europe every year, and almost 15,000 Tunisians. But for political reasons, France was not keen to entice Algerians, and preferred other sources of labour. North African workers, who were then highly appreciated, thus contributed to the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War had left it weak and drained.

However, the first oil crisis led the European countries, as early as 1974, to close their borders to immigration from the Maghreb, and to encourage return migrations.

New forms of migration then emerged. The European governments organized seasonal migration, limited in time. In parallel, well-organized underground networks were bringing in irregular flows of illegal immigrants. The effects of family reunion policies implemented in the receiving countries and the relatively high fertility of Maghrebis resulted in a regular and substantial increase of their numbers, to a level surpassing 2 million for all Europe. But naturalizations have since changed the trends for all three Maghreb countries.

1.1.1. Algeria

Almost 850,000 Algerians are now resident in Europe, in addition to the large number of those who have become French citizens. These emigrants represent 3.3% of the Algerian population. Almost 8 out of 10 are living in France.

The Algerian colony in France, which reached a level of 805,100 in 1982, has since diminished to 620,000, 41% of whom are women. This decrease is essentially due to naturalizations and to return migrations, which numbered 15,000 per year between 1976 and 1985. During the 1980s, the Algerian population of France fell by an annual rate of 32 per 1,000.

The number of Algerians in Belgium has been more or less stable, ca. 10,700, of whom 4,500 women. In Germany, it rose from 5,100 in 1981 to 6,700 in 1990, with relatively few women: 1,300 in 1988 and 1,600 in 1990. Algerians are starting to turn to new horizons, such as Italy (4,041 in 1989), Switzerland (2,185) and Spain, as well as Holland and Sweden. There are only a few thousand Algerians living in other Arab countries, mostly Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

The proportion of workers in this population has fallen over the last 15 years in France. The 195,000 workers in 1990 represented 31% of the Algerian colony; this proportion was only 22% for women, with 56,600 economically active. Algerian immigration to France

started back in the 1930s, and the Algerians are specific in that there are second and third generation immigrants who have more assets and predispositions for fitting into French social, cultural and economic life. Upward social mobility is observed in this population, with the emergence of an intellectual and entrepreneurial *élite*, a not inconsiderable class of research workers and academics and a more and more highly skilled workforce, engaged in the tertiary and secondary sectors, and less and less in agriculture.

Algerians are also increasingly attracted by emigration to new countries. Executives and intellectuals, in particular, who have studied in Europe or the US, either stay on at the end of their course or go back after a short return trip to Algeria has discouraged them from remaining in their homeland.

1.1.2. Morocco

Moroccan emigration started later and was less substantial than that of Algerians. But the Moroccans have soon caught up. The number living abroad is more than 1.3 million³, or 5% of the total population of Morocco. A recent publication by the CERED (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Démographiques) puts the number of Moroccan expatriates at 1.49 million⁴. Almost half of these live in France, while Holland and Belgium have about 12% each; another 250,000 are in Italy, Spain and Germany, the remainder being elsewhere in Europe: Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Finland.

Moroccans have recently started to go further afield, to Canada, Australia and, to a lesser extent, the USA. Several thousand Moroccans live in these countries. In addition, Black Africa has for many years been home to several thousand emigrants (Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire...).

In contrast with the downward trend observed for Algerians in France, the number of Moroccans has risen steadily, from 259,500 in 1975 to 584,708 in 1990, an annual increase of 55.6 per 1,000. This is a record, in particular in view of the context of immigration restrictions. High levels of natural increase, family reunions and the fact that a large proportion of Moroccans have refused naturalization account for this rise. The upturn in the number of Moroccan women who entered France during that period is even more striking: from 69,500 in 1975 to 257,800 in 1990, a mean annual increase of 91.3 per 1,000.

A similarly spectacular rise is observed in Holland, where the Moroccan community grew from 93,100 in 1981 to 156,900 in 1990, an increase of 59.7 per 1,000. In Germany, too, the Moroccan ranks have swollen, from 39,400 in 1981 to 67,500 in 1990.

³ Trends in International Migrations (SOPEMI), OECD, 1992. Updated data.

⁴ *La communauté marocaine à l'étranger*, CERED, February 1993 (cf. Appendix 1).

In Belgium, the rise has been more moderate, at a rate of 28.2 per 1,000, bringing the population from 110,200 in 1981 to 141,600 in 1990.

Many Moroccans are also living in other Arab countries. Algeria and Tunisia have had a Moroccan colony of several thousand for a very long time. Several thousand Moroccans have also emigrated to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates⁵. In Iraq, the size of the Moroccan population has fluctuated a great deal, and is presently falling sharply.

The migrants were first mostly unskilled workers from the rural areas of Souss and the Rif, who left for Europe and the Middle East. The range has since extended to all regions, and city dwellers are increasingly concerned. Thus emigration no longer drains only unskilled workers, but also persons who have received costly education and training: executives, physicians, university professors, engineers..., but also craftsmen and tradesmen whose departure creates a void in the Moroccan economy.

Over the last few years, family migration has overtaken labour migration. The proportion economically active fell from 50% in 1981 to 29.4% in 1990 in France, and from 31.1% to 17.2% in Holland. The burden of dependants -- particularly young children and unemployed wives -- upon workers has become much heavier, aggravating the problems of integration (or marginalization).

The data on economic activity of Moroccans in France show a spectacular rise in the numbers of unemployed, from 6,300 in 1975 to 62,104 in 1990, while the numbers employed have risen only slightly, from 145,900 in 1975 to 180,573 fifteen years later. During the same period, the economically inactive population has increased fourfold, from 107,800 in 1975 to 410,347 in 1990. These dependants are mostly children and adolescents, housewives and elderly⁶.

1.1.3. Tunisia

Different in timing and intensity, Tunisian emigration now amounts to 480,000 persons (5.8% of the population of Tunisia), most of whom live in France. The number in this country rose from 139,700 in 1975 to 207,496 in 1990, an annual increase of only 26.7 per 1,000, and a mere 10.5 per 1,000 during the last decade. Female immigration, on the other hand, has gained ground in the last decade, with an annual rate of 24.1 per 1,000.

Libya is home to roughly 100,000 Tunisians, Italy almost 50,000 and Germany almost 30,000. Other European countries such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Sweden

⁵ According to CERED, ca. 222,600 Moroccans are resident in the Arab countries (cf Appendix 1).

⁶ *La communauté marocaine à l'étranger*, CERED, February 1993 (cf. Appendix 2).

have taken in some 15,000. Algeria and the Gulf states have quite sizeable Tunisian communities: more than 40,000 in Algeria, 20,000 in Saudi Arabia and about 7,000 in the other Gulf states⁷.

Relatively many Tunisians in Europe have acquired the nationality of their host country. In addition, quite a number have returned definitively to their homeland.

Like Morocco and Algeria, Tunisia has during the last two decades lost many intellectuals and trained personnel, who have in majority left for France, but also, increasingly, for the USA, other European countries and Saudi Arabia.

The relative share of the working population has also diminished among Tunisian emigrants, dependants having increased due to family reunions and natural increase.

1.1.4. Libya: Receiving country for migrants from the Maghreb

A country of recent immigration, Libya is presently home to some 250,000 Maghreb Arabs, mostly Tunisians and Moroccans, but also has a sizeable population of Egyptians and other migrants, essentially from Muslim countries.

Libya's immigrant population has fluctuated considerably in size and structure, as a consequence of political and oil-related factors, but also of increasingly restrictive remittance policies.

Despite frequent ups and downs, the number of Tunisian expatriates in Libya is currently more than 100,000.

Moroccans are an estimated 90,000 and Algerians are much fewer.

Fluctuations in the Egyptian population have been intense and at the present time it cannot feasibly be estimated.

The Turkish population in Libya now amounts to less than 18,500, compared to 26,000 in 1989⁸.

2,068 Yugoslavs are presently resident in Libya⁸.

⁷ Source: *Emploi, émigration, éducation et population*. Ministère du Plan et du Développement régional, Tunis. Cahiers no. 5, page 86 (cf. Appendix 3).

⁸ Trends in International Migrations (SOPEMI), OECD, 1992, p. 89.

1.2. The problem of return migrations

The Maghreb emigrants "left in order to return". This was the adage of the 1960s and 1970s. They left to build up a capital which they would invest back home. Curiously, but understandably, return migrations from Europe to the Maghreb virtually stopped as soon as the receiving countries closed their doors to immigration. Emigration lasted longer and longer, then became practically permanent. For almost ten years, approximately 15,000 Algerians a year had returned home. This figure then fell drastically to a mere trickle, less than 200 per year. The trend was the same for Tunisians, although more muted.

Return migration of Moroccans, which was almost a general rule in the past, now concerns only a few hundred cases per year.

In general, the migrants who did return home suffered failure, in the economic, social and cultural spheres.

Very often, the migrant, who had left his country as a young man, went back home, after spending several years in Europe, with a wife and family. He invested the savings earned by the sweat of his brow into some form of enterprise. But he had become a stranger, and accumulated all the risks of failure. So he was back to square one, empty-handed, and with mouths (usually young ones) to feed. Such cases were unfortunately not rare, and successful reinsertions were relatively few and far between.

Those who had emigrated to another Arab country had fewer problems, because they were prepared from the outset for their return. Nonetheless, mass expulsions of workers and their families have produced social cataclysms... Tens of thousands of Moroccan workers expelled from Algeria because of political disagreement between the two countries, Tunisian and Egyptian workers expelled from Libya due to political circumstances...

The problems of return migrations as they stand show that there is a need to reconsider the very principles of migration. It is necessary to appreciate the true price of the many, incalculable, social and economic consequences of precipitate, unprepared returns, not only for the migrants and their families, but also for their homeland society. Indeed, precipitous, unplanned return migrations entail social and economic costs which are often borne as much by the country of origin as by the host country.

1.3. Summary of Part 1

The number of Maghreb expatriates has risen continuously over the last decades, in spite of the highly restrictive measures adopted by the receiving countries, particularly in

Europe. Almost 2 million Maghrebis are resident in Europe and several hundred thousand in the Arab world.

Migration to Europe is now of a permanent nature, a feature which has become marked since 1974. The number of migrants who return to their country of origin each year has dwindled from several tens of thousands to a mere trickle. This situation creates serious social and cultural problems for the new generations, who were either born in Europe or came to join their family who had already settled there.

PART 2 - PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MAGHREB EMIGRANTS

During the 1960s, international migration from the Maghreb was of a temporary nature, operating on a rotation basis, and concerned a majority of male workers. In-depth changes have since occurred, and it now concerns people of all origins, ages and socio-occupational categories.

2.1. Origins of the migrants

The emigrants who left the Maghreb for Europe came from the countryside and were generally illiterate and unskilled. The sending zones were limited, and were traditionally regions of out-migration; the migrants simply went further afield.

Nowadays, emigration and its consequences concern the whole of the sending countries. Migrants come from all rural areas and the towns as well.

The traditionally illiterate migrant is increasingly a thing of the past. More and more migrants are young people who have received training and education which puts them in good stand for slotting immediately into the production systems of the host countries and assimilating their techniques and technologies.

2.2. Sex structure of Maghreb migrants

In the 1960s, the migrants were mostly working-age males. Now, there are more and more family migrations, of children, adults and the elderly, which has changed the social dimension of migration. The sex and age compositions of the migrant populations in Europe illustrate this trend. In the course of the last decade, populations composed mostly of working-age males have given way to more balanced populations comprising almost 40% of females (Table 1).

TABLE 1.- NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE MAGHREB, BY SEX, IN THE PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (in thousands)

| Receiving country | | Algeria | | | Morocco | | | Tunisia | | | Total % women |
|--|------|---------|-------|------------|---------|-------|------------|---------|-------|------------|---------------------|
| | | Men | Women | % women | Men | Women | % women | Men | Women | % women | |
| France | 1982 | 494.6 | 310.5 | 39 | 268.9 | 172.4 | 39 | 118.8 | 72.0 | 38 | 39 |
| | 1990 | 363.7 | 256.2 | 41 | 326.9 | 257.8 | 44 | 120.4 | 87.1 | 42 | 43 |
| Holland | 1988 | - | - | - | 77.9 | 61.3 | 44 | 1.9 | 87.1 | 42 | 43 |
| | 1990 | - | - | - | 87.1 | 69.8 | 45 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 30 | 44 |
| Belgium | | 6.1 | 4.5 | 43 | 72.4 | 63.1 | 46 | 4.0 | 2.2 | 36 | 46 |
| | | 6.1 | 4.5 | 43 | 73.9 | 64.5 | 46 | 4.0 | 2.2 | 36 | 46 |
| Germany | | 3.8 | 1.3 | 26 | 30.7 | 21.4 | 41 | 13.2 | 8.4 | 39 | 39 |
| | | 5.1 | 1.6 | 31 | 40.6 | 26.9 | 40 | 16.1 | 9.8 | 38 | 38 |
| Norway | | - | - | - | 1.2 | 0.7 | 37 | - | - | - | - |
| | | - | - | - | 1.4 | 0.8 | 37 | - | - | - | - |
| <i>Source</i> : Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI, OECD, 1992. | | | | | | | | | | | |

The feminization of the Maghreb populations in Europe is the outstanding feature of the last decade. This is more marked for Moroccans than for Tunisians and Algerians, due on the one hand to more frequent family reunion, and on the other, to fewer naturalizations of Moroccan women (which reduce the stocks of immigrants).

The feminization of the Maghrebi labour force developed in parallel during the 1980s. But unemployment in Europe, which hit the immigrants in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has been greater among women.

In 1990, 781,300 Maghreb women were enumerated in the five major immigration countries of Europe, namely, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany and Norway.

2.3. Age structure of migrants resident in Europe

Their birth rates, which have remained relatively high, and the family reunion policies adopted by the host countries, have profoundly modified the age structure of the Maghreb populations in Europe.

In France, Moroccans are the youngest population, with almost 40% of under-15s, followed by Tunisians, while the proportion is much lower for Algerians (20%). This is due to naturalizations, which are more frequent for Algerian children, and to the greater length of time since migration. This order holds up to age 25, then above age 35 it is reversed, and the highest proportions are observed for Algerians (Table 2).

TABLE 2.- COMPOSITION OF MAGHREBI POPULATIONS IN FRANCE BY BROAD AGE GROUPS

| Nationality | Population in 1990 | Less than 15 | 15-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 55-64 | 65 and over |
|---|--------------------|--------------|--------|--------|---------|--------|-------------|
| Algerian | 619 923 | 124 075 | 74 021 | 97 266 | 224 589 | 72 100 | 27 872 |
| | 100 | 20 | 12 | 16 | 36 | 12 | 4 |
| Moroccan | 584 708 | 212 009 | 95 963 | 95 744 | 162 496 | 24 120 | 4 376 |
| | 100 | 36 | 16 | 15 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Tunisian | 207 496 | 69 519 | 26 811 | 34 109 | 63 177 | 9 764 | 4 116 |
| | 100 | 34 | 13 | 16 | 30 | 5 | 2 |
| Mauritanian | 6 236 | 2 220 | 352 | 688 | 2 704 | 252 | 20 |
| | 100 | 35 | 6 | 11 | 43 | 4 | 2 |
| Source : 1990 Population Census. <i>Info-actualités</i> . INSEE, Paris, 1992. | | | | | | | |

The French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) calculated that in 1986, 46% of Tunisians living in France were aged under 20. This proportion is expected to rise to 48% in 1996⁹. Similar trends can be projected for Moroccan and Algerian immigrants, with all the problems that implies for the young in terms of education, training and social assimilation.

2.4. Proportions economically active among Maghrebis in Europe

The proportions economically active among immigrants from the three Maghreb countries have declined constantly, as a result of family reunion, annual birth rates and ever younger age structure.

Table 3 gives these proportions for a number of host countries.

⁹ *Emploi, émigration, éducation et population*. Ministère du Plan et du Développement régional - IREP. Cahier 5, p. 89. Tunis, 1990.

TABLE 3.- PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS AMONG IMMIGRANTS FROM THE MAGHREB

| Receiving country | Algeria | Morocco | Tunisia | Maghreb |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Belgium | 18 | 15 | 26 | 16 |
| France | 41 | 30 | 36 | 36 |
| Germany | 27 | 22 | 30 | 25 |
| Holland | - | 17 | 39 | 18 |
| Spain | - | 60 | - | 60 |
| Switzerland | 60 | 63 | 69 | 64 |
| Total | 40 | 26 | 36 | 32 |

These data mean that, in Belgium, each Maghrebi worker has 5.25 dependants, a burden which is even greater for Moroccans, with 5.7 dependants per worker. In France, there are fewer dependants: 1.8 per worker. In Spain and Switzerland, because of recent immigration restricted to workers, the ratio is very low (only 0.7 and 0.6 dependants respectively per worker).

Overall, each Maghrebi worker living in Europe has 2.2 dependants, while until recently, he had practically none, and he met with considerably less social and cultural difficulties.

2.5. Socio-occupational characteristics

Despite the fact that emigration has in recent years extended to executives and intellectuals, the majority of the Maghreb Arabs living in Europe are manual workers and labourers. They account for three quarters of the total working population, the proportion being higher among Moroccans than Tunisians. The primary sector is important for Moroccans, but is losing ground among Tunisians and Algerians. Industry and construction, which in the past employed almost 6 out of 10 Maghreb immigrants, are now losing workers to the tertiary and service sector.

Unemployment, which concerned relatively few Maghreb workers in Europe in the 1970s (7-8% of the economically active population) has doubled in the space of 10 years, and has now reached a level of 15-16% (even more in some countries and sectors).

In the EEC countries, there are an estimated 140,000 unemployed Maghreb workers. The length of unemployment has also risen, from 238 days in 1983 to 310 days in 1986 for Tunisians, for instance.

2.6. Economic and financial aspects of migration

In general, international migration has contributed a great deal to families in both sending and receiving countries. Many investments have been financed by migrants or their remittances, at the individual, family and state levels. A considerable proportion of imports -- between 10% and 50% -- is paid for with the money set aside by emigrants. Although the level of remittances has continued to rise in Morocco and Tunisia (2 billion dollars for Morocco in 1992), it is questionable whether this trend will continue indefinitely. Remittances from Algerians have fallen off sharply in recent years and are now practically non-existent.

2.7. Summary of Part 2

Omnipresent on the social, economic and political scenes of the Maghreb, international migrations and their effects, both upstream and downstream, are characterized by younger age structures, with the consequences that implies, in particular in the European receiving countries, but also by growing feminization. This means an increasingly heavy social and familial burden for the migrant worker, on two levels, in the receiving country and the country of origin.

We can appreciate the full significance of these remarks when we bear in mind that the majority of emigrants from the Maghreb are still manual workers, and struck by unemployment.

Having outlined their demographic and occupational characteristics, we go on to consider the major problems the migrants encounter, more particularly in Europe.

PART 3 - THE PROBLEMS FACING THE MIGRANTS

Migration to Europe from the Maghreb, which was once essentially economic, and organized by the receiving countries as a response to their labour shortage, is inexorably becoming a more political preoccupation. The crises which have been undermining the European economies since the two oil shocks, and which are becoming structural, the mass arrival of Eastern European labour, the industrial changes brought about by computerization and automation, national debt, the difficulties of getting together an economic act for twelve EC member states... All these factors have contributed to fuelling the debate on immigration of non-EC nationals, and in particular those from the Maghreb.

This debate has fanned the embers of xenophobia and racism back into flame. At one time limited to small fringe groups, it has grown to such an extent that it has become a pedestal on which political and electoral strength can be built. And the first to applaud are

often those who were born yesterday in Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia, and who were fed, bred and educated there... hand in hand with newly naturalized immigrants!

In this context, certain authorities have made the most of the uncertainty shrouding migration statistics in Europe to publish figures which are unjustified and largely overestimated¹⁰.

It is clear that the Maghrebi immigrants resident in Europe are living a very preoccupying experience. The problems are all the greater for those who have entered the country illegally, or whose activities step outside the laws of the receiving country.

3.1. Illegal immigration

The adoption of restrictive immigration policies had as a consequence the development of more and more effective subterfuges and illegal immigration networks which organized -- sometimes in connivance with the local authorities, whose contacts were negotiated at a high price -- the entry of large numbers of migrants. It is impossible to say with any accuracy how many illegal immigrants from the Maghreb are currently resident in Europe.

According to relatively reliable statistical analyses, the total number of aliens in an irregular situation in Ile de France (the Paris Region) can be estimated at 380,000, of whom 23.5% Algerians, 11.8% Moroccans and 5.9% Tunisians, or a total of 156,000 Maghreb Arabs.

3.2. Social and cultural problems of Maghrebis in Europe

Since immigration has become permanent for most Maghrebis living in Europe, it has turned into something of a "settlement", with continuous inflows from family reunions and children born in the receiving country.

¹⁰ The Agnelli Foundation published the figure of 8.4 million Muslims in the EEC (XXI Secolo no. 4, February 1992), broken down as follows:

| | |
|------------------|---------------|
| - France | : 2.2 million |
| - Germany | : 2.0 " |
| - United Kingdom | : 1.3 " |
| - Italy | : 0.7 " |
| - Greece | : 0.7 " |
| - Holland | : 0.5 " |
| - Belgium | : 0.4 " |
| - Spain | : 0.4 " |
| - Portugal | : 0.1 " |
| - Denmark | : 0.1 " |

Source: «L'avenir démographique de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée». Y. Courbage, Ph. Fargues, INED, Paris, January 1992 (Working Paper).

The resulting younger age structure and the deterioration of the ratio of workers to dependants in the immigrant population have aggravated social problems in the families and in the local communities: unemployment, inactivity, juvenile delinquency.

Almost one out of five Maghrebi workers are unemployed, and they are staying unemployed for longer, up to a year or more...

Their cultural deficiencies, the fact that Maghrebi children often have to repeat a grade or drop out of school, aggravates their social situation. According to a survey by the French Ministry of Education, 65% of young Maghrebis repeat a grade, compared to 35% of nationals, and less than a third (31%) enter secondary school at the age of 11, vs 62.5% of French children.

Of the Tunisian immigrants living in Europe, the proportion having completed primary education is only 5%, and 80% of the over-15s have no diploma whatever.

In addition, problems of cultural identity are acute for immigrants' children, who do not know which way to turn.

They are not fluent in Arab, their mother tongue, but also have problems with French, their everyday language. They feel at home neither in their family nor in their host country, and experience great communication problems with both societies. Misunderstood, frustrated and marginalized, these children tend to react violently or turn to illegal activities...

In the Maghreb, the wives and children who have not followed the migrants are also faced with serious social problems. A father's absence has many consequences for the education of his children and the social organization of the household, and affects the family's stability and equilibrium, as well as the children's integration. In a word, the community system breaks down.

The problems of the second and third generation children become more acute each year. At a disadvantage because of their lack of education and training, handicapped in terms of socialization, torn between different cultures -- the family and school environments, the mass media, the values of the host society -- these children cannot fit into the society where they were born, and feel edged out, or in many cases are cast out.

Maghrebis who migrate within the Arab world have fewer social and cultural difficulties, because of the nature and object of this migration. Knowing it is temporary, they often leave their family behind, and prepare their return, which in time takes place.

In the light of the above trends and characteristics of international migration in the Maghreb and the problems generated by this migration, in particular for young people, what perspectives and recommendations can emerge? And what strategies could be adopted by the Maghreb countries?

PART 4 - PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

International migration in the Maghreb cannot be considered without taking into account the demographic and economic situations in both the sending and the receiving countries, and in particular their respective economically active populations. In the year 2000, there will be 24 million Maghrebis on the labour market, five years later 28.6 million and by the year 2010 the figure is expected to reach 33 million¹¹. Future emigration from the Maghreb will depend on the development gap between the sending countries and the (European) receiving countries, and more specifically on the levels of economic and population growth in the Maghreb. The creation of jobs at home, reliant on economic expansion, will govern to a large extent the intensity of emigration in the years to come.

4.1. The international context

Attitudes towards international migration are shown by the United Nations¹² to be increasingly sensitive to the national and regional contexts:

- The European Economic Community, with a resident population of 8 million non-EC nationals, has adopted policies to stabilize the number of immigrants. These have not, however, been crowned with total success;

- The Eastern European countries have relaxed emigration regulations, and should eventually become a serious threat to other countries of emigration to Europe;

- The member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council, whose incomes have been eroded by the drop in oil prices and the succession of political and economic crises, have

¹¹ Cf. *Projections de la population active arabe*, OAT-IAE, Tangiers, 1988. These projections can be summed up as follows:

| Year | Population (in millions) | | | | |
|------|--------------------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|
| | Tunisia | Algeria | Morocco | Libya | Total |
| 2000 | 3.524 | 8.257 | 10.771 | 1.681 | 24.233 |
| 2005 | 3.987 | 10.022 | 12.565 | 1.992 | 28.566 |
| 2010 | 4.579 | 12.090 | 14.522 | 2.364 | 33.555 |

¹² Cf. *The World Population Situation in 1991*, United Nations, 1992.

tended to establish stricter control over immigrants, to reduce immigration and encourage informal repatriation.

But it is in Europe and the Gulf countries that immigration causes most alarm, and that increasingly restrictive measures have been introduced.

It is important to note that there is now universal awareness that the problems of migration have become so complex that solutions must henceforth lie in a regional, systemic approach, and that a more narrow framework is no longer appropriate. The issue must be addressed in the context of growth and development differentials between sending and receiving countries, and from the angle of how to stop potential emigrants from leaving by creating job opportunities at home, employment projects ... in other words, in terms of investment.

4.2. The tandem migration-development -- development-migration

The development gap between the Maghreb and the countries north of the Mediterranean, in particular, explains to a large extent emigration from the former to the latter. Population pressure, too many workers, young people unemployed, are factors which encourage emigration. But this can, in turn, be a factor of development, at the individual level and also for the communities concerned. Migration brings different cultures and economies together, creates openings and exchanges which can be positive in the mid and long term. Generally speaking, migration can be said to have brought a number of contributions to both sides, and more particularly the transfer of techniques, which is still limited, but holds promises in the long term for the Maghreb countries.

In the same way, a number of changes and reforms in the sphere of social and demographic behaviour are not unrelated to emigration to Europe. Marriage and fertility rates have fallen sharply in all three Maghreb countries, for instance...

It is important to place prospects and recommendations in this framework. Feedback from migration should constitute a factor of development and social progress, permitting the reduction of the technological and economic advance of Europe vis a vis the Maghreb. And the development of the sending countries should eventually make it possible to dissuade potential emigrants from leaving.

In fact, it is necessary to examine this issue in a long term perspective. This is the only way to take into account the social, economic and demographic changes occurring in the Maghreb, but also the vaster regional strategies which are looming on the eve of the third millenium: integration of the Japanese and Southern Asian economies, whose runaway

expansion is already producing a labour shortage; integration of the Mexican economy into those of Canada and the United States, who have understood that to curb Mexican migration, it is necessary to develop Mexican economy; and -- why not? -- the opening up of the Maghreb economies to those of United Europe, which would lie in a natural geo-strategic context, around the Mediterranean which symbolizes so much common history and values.

This long term transnational perspective does not, however, dismiss the mid and short term consideration of specific problems posed by international migration in both the sending and the receiving countries.

4.3. Population prospects and migration from the Maghreb

The Maghreb is currently going through a period of in-depth social and population changes, and in particular, of rapid demographic transition. The levels of mortality and fertility have fallen substantially, resulting in the need to lower the population projections calculated in the past. Population pressure is thus expected to ease off, which will facilitate development efforts and job supply. Consequently, the number of potential emigrants should gradually decrease.

When the other factors affecting the volume of Maghreb immigrants in Europe -- naturalizations, mortality.. -- are taken into consideration, it seems reasonable to project a reduction of this population in the more or less distant future. This is all the more plausible in view of the Maastricht Treaty, which stipulates that United Europe will take a common stand against immigration, unauthorized labour entries and illegal migration from non-EEC countries¹³.

The acknowledged preference for Eastern European labour will no doubt confirm these trends. Not to mention the structural crises the European economies are entering, in their attempt to become more competitive on the world market!

The combination of these factors, and others which are just as important, such as the growing racism, will gradually, in the mid term, restrict migration flows to Europe. But they may also pave the way for economic co-operation, which would be so precious and positive for the countries concerned.

In the light of the above analysis, we propose a number of recommendations concerning international migration in the Maghreb, which may contribute to elaborating a strategy for the long term and a programme of action for the mid and short term.

¹³ Cf. Maastricht Treaty, Title VI, Art. K1.

4.4. Recommendations for the long term

1. A strategy for international migration should be elaborated at the level of the Maghreb countries. It should take into account population projections for the Maghreb and development prospects, labour supply and demand in the long term and the related surpluses and shortages, so that migration is considered as a factor of development for the countries of origin and destination.

2. Whatever their nature and their finality, migrations should be strictly planned and precise, clearly targeted agendas should be drawn up, to control the phenomenon, both upstream and downstream, and keep a rein on the many irregularities which accompany these movements on various levels.

3. The necessary legal, statutory and administrative dispositions should be taken to ensure immigrants' rights to dignity and stability. They should be seen as contributing to the growth and development of the receiving countries, and be protected against political vicissitudes and economic crises, and all the troubles or temporary perturbations which may affect the host countries.

4. To elaborate any strategy or plan of action in the field of international migration, it is necessary, and fundamental, to have objective, scientific tools for observing, following up and analysing migration flows. It is notorious that these flows are insufficiently documented. The concepts, definitions, amplitude and implications of migration are ill known. Appropriate tools permitting the objective analysis of the flows, to reveal trends and project future developments, should be set up at the Maghreb level.

4.5. Recommendations for the mid and short term

The following recommendations could constitute a programme of action for the coming years, so that results are obtained without delay. It is a matter of great urgency to address some of the problems with which Maghrebi immigrants are faced, particularly in Europe:

5. The situation of illegal immigrants should be cleared up rapidly by providing them with residence permits. Spain recently gave the example (in 1992) by regularizing in a single operation the situation of 48,000 Moroccan immigrants who had entered the country illegally.

Initiatives of this kind would be liable to reduce the social tensions existing in many host countries, in Europe in particular, and to offer a glimpse of a future which could be approached with more serenity and objectivity on both sides.

6. The necessary legal, economic and financial apparatus should be set up so that migrants who wish to go back home can manage successfully their social, cultural and economic reinsertion, smoothly and without hardships. Past experience has shown that it is not sufficient to provide financial incentives to return, without accompanying measures -- see the Barre Plan in France.

7. A Maghreb bank should be set up to appraise and monitor projects for potential return migrants. It should counsel the migrants on all aspects: economic and financial profitability, integration in the social and cultural environment, marketing, institutional, human resources, financing and administrative aspects... so as to put all the chances on their side. The government of the host country should support the endeavour by providing appropriate training before the return and a substantial financial aid.

8. For the immigrants who do not return, it is necessary to ensure their social, cultural and cultural rights, by permanent consultation and mutual aid with the countries of origin, given the contribution the migrants make to the economies of the receiving countries through their sweat and toil.

9. Special attention must be paid to immigrants' children in the countries of origin and destination, to ensure that they receive education and training which are in keeping with their culture and aspirations, and will facilitate their insertion in the society they eventually choose.

10. Specific programmes of action and assistance should concern the wives and daughters of immigrants, whether they accompany them or stay behind. They should receive training to improve their status and living conditions, and their social insertion should be facilitated, to protect them against the many problems caused by the absence of the head of household.

11. Return migration should be accompanied by specific training programmes in order to meet technical demands in the home country, as defined by *ad hoc* studies and research.

12. Finally, the importance of emigrants' remittances for financing projects and for the balance of payments in the country of origin cannot be ignored. It would be justified to reconsider the utilization of these funds, for instance by assisting the migrants and investing money in their name. This would be profitable for them and might encourage them to return home feeling more secure about their future and that of their children, and less exposed to the risk of failure.

4.6. General conclusions: migration and co-operation

International migration from the Maghreb, which reflects surplus manpower in these countries at their present level of economic development, has changed considerably over the past three decades. The related problems are increasingly acute: the receiving countries encourage the migrants to leave, in spite of their contribution to the production system, because they have become politically and socially embarrassing. But return migration, due to lack of organization and preparation, has often turned into a nightmare. Lessons should be learnt from the experience of the last few years, so as to support migrants who wish to go back home, after years of toil and sacrifice when they have given of their best for a host country.

The prospects all point to a check on emigration from the Maghreb. Potential migrants will be held back by the economic crises which are becoming chronic in Europe, and by the restrictive, Malthusian policies of governments that are not yet convinced of the need for a transnational, regional approach, which would be profitable to countries on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Until this necessary global approach is adopted, the countries concerned must examine the means to improve the status of migrants, by regularizing their situation, implementing structures to facilitate successful return migration and ensuring the dignity and tranquillity of those who wish to remain in their receiving country. Such actions are perfectly plausible and feasible, considering the rapidly changing demographic and economic contexts. The demographic transition is well under way in the Maghreb countries and will eventually relieve population pressure, thereby reducing the ranks of potential emigrants. It is to be hoped that economic growth will accompany this evolution, and that enough jobs will be created to meet the demand at home.

Such perspectives call for solutions that would reconcile the aspirations of the migrants and their families with the expectations of their country of origin, in terms of economic and financial gains from migration, which have become a structural necessity, and would also take into account the immigration problems of the receiving countries, in Europe or the Arab world.

But there are many facets to the relationship between the countries sending and those receiving labour. This issue should consequently be studied in a global, systemic context, in the framework of dynamic co-operation for an integrated development policy in favour of the emigration countries.

Unilateral and short term considerations must be discarded if we are to find objective, effective solutions to a problem which is as important as it is grave and distressing, both for the Maghreb and for the receiving countries.

Solutions are, in fact, already being sought in this direction: the EEC, Morocco and Tunisia are currently discussing the conditions of an economic and financial partnership. This should rapidly be extended to cover the human aspects of the problem and propose permanent solutions to the question of migration, co-operation being increasingly seen as the only workable option for the future.

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APPENDIX 1

DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCAN EMIGRANTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE CA. 1990
(in thousands)

| Region and country | Population | |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|
| | Numbers | Percentage |
| Total | 1490.6 | 100.00 |
| Europe | 1197.0 | 80.30 |
| France | 653.0 | 43.81 |
| Netherlands | 148.0 | 9.93 |
| Belgium | 138.4 | 9.28 |
| Spain | 80.0 | 5.37 |
| Great Britain (+ Gibraltar) | 21.0 | 1.41 |
| Italy | 78.0 | 5.23 |
| F.R.G. | 67.5 | 4.53 |
| Scandinavia | 6.1 | 0.41 |
| Switzerland | 2.3 | 0.15 |
| Denmark | 2.7 | 0.18 |
| Arab countries | 222.6 | 14.93 |
| Algeria | 100.0 | 6.71 |
| Libya | 90.0 | 6.04 |
| Saudi Arabia | 11.0 | 0.74 |
| Other Arab countries | 21.6 | 1.45 |
| America | 65.2 | 4.37 |
| Canada | 45.0 | 3.02 |
| U.S.A. | 20.0 | 1.34 |
| Asia (one country) | 0.2 | 0.01 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 5.0 | 0.34 |
| Australia | 0.8 | 0.05 |

Note : - Table taken from *La communauté marocaine à l'étranger*, CERED, Rabat, February 1993.

Sources : - INSEE. 1990 Population Census. Nationalités. Résultats n° 197, June 1992 (includes naturalized Moroccans).

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APPENDIX 2

DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCAN WORKERS RESIDENT IN FRANCE (in thousands)

| Year | Sex | Working population | | | | Economically inactive | | Total | |
|------|------------|--------------------|------------|---------|------|-----------------------|------|---------|-----|
| | | Employed | Unemployed | Total | % | Numbers | % | Numbers | % |
| 1975 | Both sexes | 145.900 | 6.300 | 152.200 | 58.5 | 107.800 | 41.5 | 260.000 | 100 |
| 1982 | Men | 130.400 | 19.000 | 149.400 | 56.7 | 113.800 | 43.2 | 263.200 | 100 |
| | Women | 11.700 | 6.500 | 18.200 | 10.8 | 149.700 | 89.2 | 167.900 | 100 |
| | Both sexes | 142.100 | 25.500 | 167.600 | 38.8 | 263.500 | 61.1 | 431.100 | 100 |
| 1990 | Men | 144.853 | 38.948 | 183.801 | 50.6 | 178.948 | 49.3 | 362.749 | 100 |
| | Women | 35.720 | 23.156 | 58.876 | 20.2 | 231.399 | 79.7 | 290.275 | 100 |
| | Both sexes | 180.573 | 62.104 | 242.677 | 37.2 | 410.347 | 62.8 | 653.024 | 100 |

Note : In France, the question on economic activity was asked of all persons reaching their 15th birthday at least during the census year 1982 and 1990. For census year 1975, it was only asked of persons reaching their 17th birthday at least.

Source : La communauté marocaine à l'étranger, CERED, Rabat, February 1993

APPENDIX 3

TUNISIANS RESIDENT IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES

| Country | Total |
|---|---------|
| Libya (1985) | 100 000 |
| Algeria (1987-88) | 41 140 |
| Iraq (1987-88) | 1 200 |
| Saudi Arabia (1987-88) | 18 190 |
| Kuwait (1987-88) | 1 830 |
| U.A.E. (1987-88) | 950 |
| Oman (1987-88) | 600 |
| Qatar (1987-88) | 890 |
| Bahrein | 350 |
| Total | 165 150 |
| <i>Source : Emploi, émigration, éducation et population en Tunisie, IREP, Tunis, February 1990.</i> | |



