



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 45TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)

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PROGRAMME OF WORK

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The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 44 and 48 (continued)

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Yesterday and today a number of delegations have stated their views on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1. We too would like to make some comments on that draft resolution.

First, in the preambular part references are made to reports alleging that chemical weapons have been used in "certain military operations in various regions of the world".

Statements yesterday and today by the sponsors of this document cause us to wonder what reports we are talking about. What is the scope of the draft resolution submitted to us?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Mention has been made of recent reports that Iraqi troops have ostensibly used chemical weapons of some kind in the military conflict with Iran. Those reports are unconfirmed and, as is known, are passed around from paper to paper. Indeed, if one takes them all together there are quite a few such reports circulating. In this connexion, I would draw the attention of all members of this Committee to the following report which appeared in The New York Times:
(spoke in English)

"Jerusalem, Nov. 24 - Israeli military authorities used tear gas and rubber bullets"

(continued in Russian)

against Arab demonstrators. As I say, this was in yesterday's issue of The New York Times. The report does not indicate, it is true, the consequences of the use of those chemical agents - whether there were any deaths or not; nor do we know what kind of chemical agents we are talking about here. Perhaps they were exceptionally poisonous. Apparently they used tear gas in large doses, and in such cases the intensive use of tear gas can be lethal.

We therefore ask the question: do the sponsors of this draft resolution intend to investigate that report which appeared in The New York Times? That report will undoubtedly be published in other papers as well. Did those chemical agents used in Jerusalem on 24 November result in fatalities.

Secondly, let us be frank: we all know that the text of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 was elaborated by the United States. In the original United States draft the intention was to carry out a so-called investigation, in certain countries of Indochina. But, as members know, cases of the use of chemical weapons and chemical agents by the United States against the countries of Indochina are unchallenged and are so obvious as to require no study.

Therefore, I think that the United States representative was wrong to be so bombastic about his Government's readiness to agree to such an investigation. Well, it has been proved already; there is no need for any further proof. The cases in which chemical weapons and chemical agents were used by the United States in Indochina give rise to no doubt in anyone's mind.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Now, as for the mendacious accusations against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, these have been decisively rebutted, as is known, by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. I would also draw members' attention to the fact that they have also been rebutted by international studies.

As for the International Committee of the Red Cross, we heard from the representative of Viet Nam recently that the Red Cross has conducted an investigation and submitted its findings. Apparently, those findings are not to the liking of the sponsors of the draft. Well, that is their worry; let them have the headache, for that matter. They would obviously have preferred it had the International Red Cross submitted findings of a different or contrary nature. And that is the sort of conclusion which the sponsors of this draft resolution are doing their utmost to draw.

As regards the various reports concerning the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, here too the situation is crystal-clear. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has presented the facts at press conferences attended by foreign journalists and has proved that various chemical agents - indeed, very poisonous, toxic ones - have been used against the people of Afghanistan on the territory of that country.

But that is not all: these facts have been reaffirmed and corroborated by various international non-governmental agencies as well which, at the invitation of the Government of Afghanistan, visited that country and drew conclusions which were published. Apparently, certain conclusions drawn by international organizations were not to the liking of the sponsors when it came to Viet Nam. Well, that is no concern of ours here; it is not our headache. In this case the initiators of this so-called study are interested more in lies than in the truth.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thirdly, there has been an attempt to prove to us that the sponsors of the draft are sincerely and vitally interested in conducting an investigation to get to the bottom of the facts. But, we ask, where have they been? Why these obstacles to the participation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament of questions pertaining to chemical weapons? Why, I ask, did these seekers of truth not raise their voices for the immediate, unreserved admittance of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Committee on Disarmament? Had that been the case, they, and France and the United Kingdom and other sponsors - particularly, of course, the real sponsor of the draft, the United States - could have raised any questions they liked of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; they could have asked for clarifications on any question they liked. But that was not done.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Why, we ask, did the sponsors of this draft resolution not respond to the proposal put forward by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which really would have helped to establish the facts? The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan gave its assent, it agreed to conduct this study.

I come now to my fourth point. People say to us here that this draft resolution involves an impartial approach. How can that be alleged? I should like to ask the sponsors why in this case it did not occur to them to consult the countries concerned, the countries about which there were suspicions? But they carefully hid from those countries the contents of the draft resolution. All this fuss about the draft resolution happened in the corridors, away from the socialist countries, beyond our ken. So who in that case can talk about its objectivity, its impartiality? The Soviet delegation in particular was never consulted on this matter.

Is this really normal? What about the representative of New Zealand and the other sponsors. If they were really concerned to co-operate and to be objective, could they not have approached us? Could they not have sought our advice on the matter? They did not do so once; they circumvented the Soviet delegation very carefully. And then they tell us about this impartiality, this objective approach. This shows once more the one-sided thrust of this draft resolution, its anti-socialist thrust.

I come now to my fifth point. People say here that the Geneva Protocol is not perfect, that it does not envisage verification or control measures. That is true. The Geneva Protocol does not contain a special provision to implement control measures. But who can deny, can any delegation dare to deny, that this is a highly important international instrument in the field of disarmament and that for 55 years now it has proved its effectiveness? Even the Hitlerites and their allies in the Second World War did not dare to use chemical weapons. Surely that very fact shows that the Geneva Protocol has been effective. I must point out that the only State by which chemical agents have been widely used - and, of course, it did not accede to the Geneva Protocol until 1975 - is the United States of America, and it does not deny that fact. They

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

really used chemical agents on a wide scale in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea in the 1960s and 1970s.

Now the idea is being pushed here that the Geneva Protocol should be revised. The idea is being mooted that this highly important international instrument is not effective, that this highly important achievement of mankind - and I do not hesitate to use such words, it really is a marvellous and very important achievement of mankind, - is not effective. How can one qualify these tricks? They are trying to subvert this highly important disarmament instrument. Instead of all exerting further efforts to bring about speedy agreement on banning chemical weapons, they are telling us that the Geneva Protocol is bad, it is weak, it has to be improved. Without having reached agreement on banning chemical weapons, we are going to destroy the entire Geneva Protocol.

Whether or not we shall agree to control under the Geneva Protocol - that is the big question. How much time we shall need for that we do not know yet, but what we shall certainly do if we adopt the course suggested is destroy the Geneva Protocol, and that must be absolutely clear to those who are advocating that we agree on additional machinery for the Geneva Protocol, those who are spreading doubt as to this major achievement of mankind in the field of disarmament.

So draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 will certainly not foster progress in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons, as the sponsors vainly try to prove. It is intended to worsen the situation as regards negotiations, to subvert the authority of the Geneva Protocol, to complicate and exacerbate the international situation as a whole.

The question arises: what is the foundation of these unseemly ventures? What is the point? What is the matter? I would venture to answer that question as well. We know that for some time now political and military leaders in the United States of America have been speaking in favour of a new spiral in the chemical arms race. To that end, bilateral and multilateral talks are going in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further to increase the potential of the chemical weapons of the United States of America

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

and its allies. Appropriations are being made for the development of more types of chemical weapons, terrible weapons in fact, like the binary combinations, the toxicity of which is many times - I repeat, many times - greater than that of the most poisonous types of chemicals existing at the present time. New factories, new facilities, are being built all the time to that end.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Those programmes are not being supported by international public opinion, which is looking for a speedy ban on chemical weapons, not a new spiral in the chemical weapons race. That concern is being shown in American public opinion as well, and we read about this in American newspapers.

So, in order to justify those steps, again they have recourse to the well-worn argument about the Soviet threat, about how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is falling behind the Soviet Union this time in the particular field of chemical weapons. In the past it was in the strategic aviation field or in anti-aircraft missiles or whatever. Now the field they are concerned about is that of chemical weapons, and they are trying to prove that NATO does not have a sufficient supply of chemical munitions and that the situation with regard to gas masks is bad, because the sole dream of the Soviet Union is to rain down tons of poisonous substances on Western Europe and the West.

The latest example of this kind of brainwashing took place on Sunday, 16 November 1980. Many people must have seen the television programme 60 Minutes on Channel 2. There are no grounds for the allegations made against the Soviet Union. Naturally their falsehoods regarding the plans for a chemical attack by the Soviet Union are completely groundless. They are trying to force people to believe in them so as to gain support for projects to develop chemical weapons in the United States, since they have made a new discovery: the reports about chemical weapons use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea and so on. Unfortunately, I seem to be using only sources from The New York Times; but the intensive work of the First Committee does not allow me even the time to read my own Pravda. I have, however, been reading The New York Times, and in its edition of 24 November it states, in connexion with charges against the Soviet Union, that (spoke in English)

"... the charge has been used to justify restocking the American arsenal with a refined version of the weapon" - that is, a chemical weapon.

(continued in Russian)

I apologize to the Committee and to you, Mr. Chairman, for speaking at length but I have one last point. For some time now the United States Government has, as is known, begun to carry out a series of actions aimed against the Soviet Union. Those actions are well known to the members of the Committee. They have gone against

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

a number of bilateral trade agreements and scientific and cultural links have been broken. They refuse to discharge obligations that they have assumed under an international agreement. They have broken off the bilateral talks on questions of arms limitation and disarmament. Attempts were made - which, I must say, proved futile - to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games and so on.

One of the elements of this campaign and this general line was the attempt to accuse the Soviet Union of having violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol. United States representatives in various forums insistently try to divert attention from the substance of the issues being discussed by circulating all sorts of rumours - and members should take note of this - which the representatives themselves at times have called "contradictory", "unfounded" and so on. That has been done notwithstanding the fact that, in various statements of the United States in February 1980, it was clearly indicated that the Soviet Union had strictly abided by and was abiding by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

We want to state most decisively that we do not have the slightest shadow of a doubt that the cooked-up campaign started at this session of the General Assembly is part and parcel, a link in the chain of this anti-Soviet line being pursued in recent times by the United States. I would ask all delegations to be quite sure about the opinion of the Soviet Union on this question. Nobody should have any illusions about the really political nature of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2.

In view of what I have stated, the Soviet delegation cannot consider that draft resolution as anything but the pursuit of the policy of doing damage to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, doing damage to the talks on banning chemical weapons and giving the go-ahead for new types of chemical weapons, while, at the same time, inflating even further this anti-Soviet propagandistic campaign.

Therefore, we consider draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 totally unacceptable and we shall vote against it.

Mr. MARTIN (New Zealand): I should like to make a few comments on the subject of the use of chemical weapons, following on my statement introducing draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 yesterday.

I should like to begin by responding to some of the questions asked by delegations in statements made following my introduction of that draft resolution, some of which have been referred to again by the representative of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Martin, New Zealand)

We were asked what is the precise territorial scope of the military operations referred to in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution. The answer to that is, of course, that no territorial limitations are proposed. The Secretary-General is simply asked to look, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts, into all complaints of the alleged use of chemical weapons in military operations and to examine the evidence brought to his attention with a view to ascertaining the facts.

We were asked what is the time span. The sponsors have not placed any specific limitation on the investigation. In introducing the draft resolution yesterday, however, I noted the view of the sponsors that there would be little point in tracing the history of allegations back to 1925 and that we had accordingly used the word "recent" in order to put a sensible limitation on the scope of the inquiry.

We were also asked what kind of reports of alleged use did we have in mind. I think the answer to that question is implicit in operative paragraph 5 (b), which refers to evidence. In my statement yesterday, I noted that the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on chemical and bacteriological warfare had referred to the many allegations since 1925 where evidence about the truth of alleged events was either non-existent or inconclusive; and I might add that in recent times there have been a good many allegations of use, and it is in the interests of us all that these should be looked into.

I also noted yesterday that we considered it important to establish fact-finding machinery that might constrain those who might otherwise be tempted to make false allegations of use and to provide means by which every State that might be falsely or recklessly accused could have that fact established by an impartial international body. If that objective is to be achieved, clearly reports of alleged use will need to be substantiated by evidence. As to what forms of evidence are admissible in this context, we clearly must leave that judgement to the qualified medical and technical experts to be appointed by the Secretary-General.

I should like to make a couple of other comments on related issues. It was suggested yesterday that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1

(Mr. Martin, New Zealand)

wanted to direct attention away from the use of defoliants and irritant agents in Viet Nam. I am sure, however, that my remarks in introducing the draft resolution would have made it clear that that was certainly not the intention of the sponsors.

It has also been said that the intention of the sponsors is to accuse certain States. I hope it is clear by now that nothing could be further from our intention - **that**, in fact, the draft resolution would establish a means by which any State wrongly accused of using chemical weapons would be able to have that fact established by an impartial investigation. In our view this could only improve the international climate and contribute to the development of greater confidence among nations.

We had hoped that it might be possible to reach agreement with the sponsors of the amendments in document A/C.1/35/L.57. We had hoped that we might be able to reach agreement on a compromise text that we could jointly submit to the Committee. For our part we made it clear that we were more than willing to have consultations to this end, whether on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 and the amendments in A/C.1/35/L.57 or on the second revision of A/C.1/35/L.43 that has been circulated this afternoon. We made it clear that we would be receptive to any proposals that might be made that would not completely alter the thrust of our original draft resolution. I regret to say that we have not been able to make progress to this end, and I wish accordingly now to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2.

I am sure that representatives will know that the intention of our proposal was to deal with allegations of use, for we considered that the United Nations had a duty to ensure that all reasonable steps were taken to look into all reports of alleged use to determine whether or not they had any foundation. Accordingly, in a spirit of compromise and in an effort to bridge the gap between the two texts - A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 and A/C.1/35/L.57 - we have adopted virtually all the amendments that were proposed in document A/C.1/35/L.57 which deal with allegations of use. We were not, however, able to accept amendments that had the effect of shifting the emphasis away from the need for machinery to establish the facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons. Those were new proposals rather than amendments and might perhaps more appropriately have been the subject of a separate draft resolution.

(Mr. Martin, New Zealand)

I should like to indicate how we have sought to take into account the proposals made in document A/C.1/35/L.57 and incorporate them into draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2.

It will be noted that the suggestion contained in paragraph 1 of section A of the amendments, dealing with the preambular part of the draft resolution, has been accepted and that paragraph has been included as preambular paragraph 3 in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2

The suggestion in paragraph 2 has been slightly revised and has been included as preambular paragraph 6.

With regard to paragraph 3, we have accepted the first phrase but did not feel able to accept the remainder of the sentence as that would have altered the balance of the draft resolution.

The point made in paragraph 4 has been included in preambular paragraph 5 of the second revision.

In paragraph 5 of the amendments, three new preambular paragraphs were proposed. We have included the first two as preambular paragraphs 8 and 9. We did not feel able to accept the third because it did not relate to use of chemical weapons but to development, production and stockpiling, which is the subject of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

The point in paragraph 6 again relates to a matter not directly related to the prohibition of use and, accordingly, has not been incorporated.

With regard to the proposals contained in section B, we have incorporated the sense of the first part of the proposed amendment in paragraph 1 but have excluded the words "without any exceptions or exemptions" because the General Assembly cannot, by passing a resolution, nullify reservations taken by Governments when they ratified or acceded to the Protocol.

Concerning paragraph 2, we have accepted the idea contained in the proposed operative paragraph 4 and incorporated it as preambular paragraph 10. The proposed operative paragraph 5 was not accepted for the same reason that we felt unable to accept the third preambular paragraph proposed in paragraph 5 of section A.

(Mr. Martin, New Zealand)

The third point is that we took on board the phrase "with the consent of the countries concerned" and incorporated it in operative paragraph 5 (b) of the revised text, and the essence of the balance of that proposed amendment has been included in operative paragraph 4.

As regards paragraph 4 of the proposed amendments, we have taken much of what was proposed into operative paragraph 5 with the inclusion of the words "taking into account proposals advanced by the States on whose territories the use of chemical weapons has been reported".

The point in paragraph 5 has been accepted and appears in the revised text as operative paragraph 6. We did not, for the reasons I have already given, feel able to accept the proposal in paragraph 6, but that in paragraph 7 has been incorporated.

I hope that that survey of the efforts that were made by the sponsors of A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 to accommodate the interests and concerns of the sponsors of the amendments will indicate that we did everything that we reasonably could to take into account the amendments that they proposed. We did so in a spirit of compromise and goodwill and in an attempt to bridge the differences between the two texts.

I hope that the text in A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 will prove acceptable to the Committee on that basis.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): In sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 the French delegation had only one concern: the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol, particularly by use of an inquiry procedure. Information from various sources regarding the possible use of chemical weapons suggested that it was appropriate, indeed even necessary for the international community to take a stand in favour of an impartial investigation into compliance with the provisions of the 1925 Protocol.

The French Government, as a depositary of the Geneva Protocol, felt that special attention had to be given to everything related to respect for

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

commitments entered into in that connexion. We feel that the terms of the draft resolution meet the goal being pursued. The text contains no accusations, names no State and is solely concerned with seeking the truth, without prejudging the results of the investigation.

The French delegation therefore rejects the allegations that this initiative is aimed at serving the policies of any State. The French Government cannot be suspected of lending itself to such manoeuvres.

Amendments to this draft resolution have been proposed. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 have to a very large extent incorporated those amendments in their draft resolution. I do not want to add to anything that the delegate of New Zealand said about consultations. We hope that the result will be general agreement.

It seems to us that the authority of the Geneva Protocol, the banning of chemical weapons and the means of successfully ensuring that ban are all such important matters that they require and justify a clear affirmation of the will of the international community.

Mr. NOLAN (Australia): Very briefly, I want to add the name of Australia to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2, the revised draft resolution on chemical and bacteriological weapons just introduced by the representative of New Zealand.

The Australian delegation considers that because of the fundamental importance of verification in relation to arms control that draft resolution is of considerable significance.

Mr. RASOLONDRALIBE (Madagascar) (interpretation from French): Madagascar is one of the countries that has acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and it is for that reason that I am speaking.

(Mr. Rasolondraibe, Madagascar)

It seems to us that the initiative under discussion really belongs in a conference of the contracting parties and not here in the General Assembly. I am afraid that we may be setting a legal precedent whereby the application of an international convention is beyond the control of parties to the convention and is examined directly in the First Committee.

We have the precedents of the Conference of the contracting parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Certain conclusions regarding the fulfilment of the obligations arising from that Treaty were first considered in the Conference of the contracting parties and then brought to the General Assembly later as the result of a consensus.

The second point concerns fact-finding. In international law, the question of fact-finding has not been solved in any way. It is very important, whether it relates to the problems of aggression, racism or the violation of human rights or to the application or verification of agreements concerning disarmament. There is in fact agreement regarding fact-finding only between the two major Powers in respect of certain treaties concluded between them.

A few years ago, we adopted a Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. In that Convention, adopted three years ago, there was agreement on the question of fact-finding but the authority of the Security Council was involved; it was not just verification carried out by a committee of inquiry or by personal investigation.

(Mr. Rasolondraibe, Madagascar)

We feel that the question of establishing the facts is too important in international life for us merely to adopt, in a casual way and using polemical arguments, certain machinery or certain positions. Why not in this case follow the example of the treaty on the environment in placing this investigation under the control of the Security Council? We stress this last aspect, because the independence of the Secretary-General is involved and it is he who will be in charge of conducting this investigation with the assistance of experts.

My country wishes here to pay a public tribute to the impartiality of the Secretary-General. We should also like to repeat that we feel his independence of action is extremely important. But to ask him to carry out an investigation in controversial circumstances, to try to induce him in advance to shoulder the responsibility for the possible weaknesses of the experts would expose the function of the Secretary-General to the kind of criticisms which we might perhaps be led to regret.

This is why we cannot give our support to this draft resolution.

Mr. VO ANH TUAN (Viet Nam) (interpretation from French): I should like to make some preliminary comments on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 which was delivered to us just a few moments ago. First of all, I should like to bring to the notice of representatives here the fact that draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 is a unilateral version produced by the sponsors.

I should like to stress the fact, in order to make it quite clear, that this second revision is certainly not the product of negotiations between the two groups of sponsors. No negotiation took place between the two parties.

It is true that this morning one of the sponsors of the draft resolution approached my delegation and expressed his desire for a meeting between the two groups of sponsors, even though draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 is purely propagandistic in nature and directed against the socialist countries, including Viet Nam, and is entirely unacceptable to us. However, in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation, we promised that we would contact the other sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.57 and give our reply at a later stage.

(Mr. Vo Anh Tuan, Viet Nam)

It is regrettable that the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 did not await our answer and submitted a revised version of A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 this morning. This initiative must be considered by my delegation as an attempt to sow confusion, to cut the ground from under our feet and to try to take us by surprise by means of a procedural ploy.

I should like to state that my delegation finds it impossible to take a decision now on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2. My delegation wants to work seriously and it needs time to study this draft resolution carefully. In accordance with the rules of procedure, my delegation reserves the right to submit official amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 later. Our amendments will be given to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

For the time being, my delegation will confine itself to making a few preliminary comments on the text of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2. Of course, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 took some elements selectively from the amendments we made in document A/C.1/35/L.57. The elements that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 drew from our amendments are secondary elements and they have deliberately left out the essential elements of the substantial amendments of our draft resolution.

In order that delegations here might have a concrete idea of these substantial elements, I should like to mention a few of them. Paragraph 3 of our amendments to the preambular part of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 reads as follows:

"To the existing fourth paragraph add:

"...and to their harmful effects, both immediate and long-term, to humans and to the environment of the victim countries and to the military personnel of the belligerent parties,"

I am talking about draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1 now, of course, because I have not had the time to study A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 in detail. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 have only taken four words of that amendment: "and their harmful effects". They have ignored all the rest, which we consider very important, that is to say, the part referring to an evaluation of the immediate and long-term damage not only to humans, but also to the environment; not only for the victim countries but also for the military personnel of the belligerents, including American troops and those of allied

(Mr. Vo Anh Tuan, Viet Nam)

countries who fought alongside those American troops.

Then, in paragraph 5 of our amendments to the preambular part of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.1, there is a third paragraph which the sponsors of that draft resolution have deliberately ignored.

I quote here that third paragraph:

"Gravely concerned over the continued research and development programmes in the field of chemical weapons, especially the development of binary and multicomponent weapons whose field deployment could compromise the ongoing effort to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and trigger a chemical arms race,"

(Mr. Vo Anh Tuan, Viet Nam)

Thirdly, the other side left out a very important point in the operative part as follows: we proposed in operative paragraph 1 to add the phrase "to observe strictly all provisions of the Protocol, with no exceptions or exemptions". The point of that amendment is that all States should abide strictly by the provisions of the Protocol.

Fourthly, they also left out our proposal to add a fifth operative paragraph that reads as follows: "Urges all States to refrain from the development, production and deployment of new types of chemical munitions, in particular binary and multicomponent munitions".

Then they also left out our proposal to add to operative paragraph 4, after the words "to carry out", the phrase "with the consent of the countries concerned" and that is very important. The omission of that phrase shows the desire to create conditions that would favour intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States. At the end of that same paragraph we proposed the addition of the phrase "and to assess the size of the damage caused by the use of chemical weapons to human beings and environment". The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 also left out those amendments.

Finally, we proposed adding to operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43 the following phrase: "and in particular, calls upon the States responsible for such use of chemical weapons to contribute to the healing of the damage caused to human beings and environment".

Members can perhaps see, now that I have listed the main points that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 have intentionally omitted, that that revised draft resolution is also totally unacceptable to my delegation.

In conclusion I should like to reaffirm once again that in accordance with the rules of procedure, my delegation reserves the right to propose official amendments to that draft resolution later.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.7, which has 39 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia at the 29th meeting of the Committee on 7 November 1980.

Members will also have received document A/C.1/35/L.58, containing the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7. I should like to call the attention of the Committee to subparagraph (d) of document A/C.1/35/L.58 in order to point out a mistake that has crept into the English and Spanish texts only. In subparagraph (d) the English and Spanish texts read: "Request the preparatory committee to meet for a short organizational session of not longer than one week before 4 December ...". The words "4 December" result from a typographical error and should be deleted from the English and Spanish texts of the document.

I am in the very happy position of being able to inform the Committee that this consultation on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7, which I personally conducted with the chairmen of the various regional groups and the Bureau of this First Committee, has proved successful and that as a result a complete consensus has been reached. I shall indicate the elements of that consensus. First, I would ask representatives to turn to operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7. The blank space in that paragraph should be filled in with number 78. Operative paragraph 1 will then read:

"Decides to establish a preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament composed of 78 Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of equitable geographic distribution".

(The Chairman)

There is also a blank space in operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7. The blank should be filled in with the following words:

"the end of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly". Therefore operative paragraph 5 will now read as follows:

"Requests the preparatory committee to meet for a short organizational session of not longer than one week before the end of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, inter alia to set the dates for its substantive sessions".

As a result of the consensus that has been reached, the sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted without a vote.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I am merely seeking clarification. My delegation is one of the sponsors of this draft resolution. It had always been our understanding that the dates on which the preparatory committee is to meet are 4 and 5 December. Could that not be stated in paragraph 5 by inserting the dates in the blank space?

The CHAIRMAN: In response to the point made by the representative of Mexico, certainly the dates of 4 and 5 December could be specifically mentioned in paragraph 5, but that would be restricting the first organizational session to only two days. The present wording is: "not longer than one week before the end of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly". While it still has to be adopted by the General Assembly, perhaps only next week, we may wish to keep some flexibility concerning not only the specific dates but the duration of the first organizational session. I hope that explanation satisfies the representative of Mexico.

The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee adopts the draft resolution without a vote.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to state, in connexion with the draft resolution that has just been adopted, that the 78 seats referred to will be allocated to the regional groups as follows: 16 for the Asian Group; 19 for the African Group; 15 for the Latin American Group; 18 for the Group of Western European and Other States and 10 for the Eastern European Group. I should like to stress that any other Member State will be entitled to participate in the work of the preparatory committee under the same conditions as were laid down for the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In that connexion it will be recalled that in regard to decision-making in that Committee it was agreed that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly would apply, on the understanding that every effort would be made to reach decisions by consensus.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their positions in regard to the decision that the Committee has just taken.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): My delegation attaches high importance to the success of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and it joined in the consensus on the draft resolution just adopted. In doing so, it understands that the language of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution by no means implies that the second special session will be attempting to revise or redraft the Final Document, including its Declaration and Programme of Action, so laboriously elaborated at the first special session.

The principal task of the coming special session devoted to disarmament should be to review the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session, as well as to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which the Committee on Disarmament is in the process of elaborating.

My delegation wishes to take this occasion to express the view that in order to enable the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to meet the ever-increasing requirements of national delegations to prepare for the forthcoming special session and to service effectively the special session itself, there is a need to strengthen its function of collecting and classifying disarmament data and material and providing the necessary

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(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

documentation to delegations by using all feasible means, including electronic data processing. My delegation hopes these matters will be taken into consideration by the Secretary-General in preparing for the second special session on disarmament.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): On behalf of the delegation of Ireland, I should like to state that we have participated in the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7, entitled "Preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". That draft resolution makes provision for the establishment of a preparatory committee for the second special session, composed of 78 Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.

To arrive at the figure of 78 it has been necessary to obtain the agreement of all the geographical groups to achieve a situation where the size of the preparatory committee would adequately reflect the wishes of countries desiring to participate, while giving adequate weight to the desire of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7 to keep the size of the committee within manageable proportions so as to assure speedy progress in its work.

We have been happy to participate in this consensus, on the understanding that, while we would not be or wish to be a member of the committee, we would actively participate in its work. At the same time we wish to express our appreciation of your statement, Mr. Chairman, that the understanding will be that the committee would achieve its decisions by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now my intention to begin the voting procedure on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.33. That draft resolution has 17 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Canada at the 37th meeting of the First Committee on 20 November 1980.

I call on the representative of the Soviet Union who has asked to explain his vote before the voting.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.33. My delegation has repeatedly stated that the solution of matters regarding the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes cannot be divorced from the question of the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until their complete elimination, since such

a separation would run counter to the attainment of the goals of nuclear disarmament.

Members know that the proposal of the group of socialist countries to start negotiations on this subject made in the Committee on Disarmament and contained in document CD/4, states that at a certain stage in those talks, one could take up the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. But draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.33 once again divorces the matter from the problem of nuclear disarmament, as was done at the two previous Assembly sessions. We believe that this approach is not in consonance with the interests of the attainment of nuclear disarmament or, indeed, the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes is linked to the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons as one measure towards a reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles until they are completely eliminated.

In view of that, the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.33.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take a vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.33. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,

Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Cuba, France, India, Mozambique, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.33 was adopted by 114 votes to 11, with 9 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote after the vote.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): India has consistently been of the view that a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials, combined with a simultaneous cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, would be a most significant measure in the field of nuclear disarmament. In that event, moreover, all nuclear facilities in all States, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, would become peaceful facilities, and one system of international safeguards could then be applied on a universal basis without any discrimination whatsoever.

However, we consider that a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes which is not accompanied at the same time by a total prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons would be by itself an incomplete step. The validity of the approach that India has taken in this regard has been recognized by the international community. The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament, in its paragraph 50 (b), calls for negotiation of an agreement on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The draft resolution on which we have just voted does not take this approach into account.

Since my delegation considers those two measures to be integrally linked, we abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.33.

Mr. FLOWEREE (United States of America): As our vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.33 demonstrates, the United States continues to support the objective of a prohibition on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes - a so-called cut-off - as a long-term goal.

It seems to us, however, that there are other, more practicable and pressing near-term arms control steps to which we should direct our attention at the present time. We consider adequate verification to be an essential factor in any consideration of the question of a cut-off, and we believe that verification would pose considerable difficulties.

Finally, I should like to reaffirm my Government's belief that its commitment to the maintenance of a stable and reliable nuclear deterrent helps to ensure international peace and security.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I wish to explain why the United Kingdom abstained in the vote on resolution A/C.1/35/L.33.

The United Kingdom supported the inclusion in the Final Document of the special session on disarmament of the proposal in paragraph 50 for the "negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification" on, inter alia, the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. My Government has always believed that a cessation of the production of fissionable material would be an essential element of any comprehensive disarmament arrangement, covering both the nuclear and the conventional fields. That is, we accept the idea of a cut-off as a long-term arms control objective, in association with other measures.

However, we are bound to conclude that the two prerequisites for any negotiations on a cut-off, as set out in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, still appear to be lacking. The first prerequisite would be agreement by all the parties directly concerned, and we have noted that the Soviet Union and its allies have consistently opposed proposals on the subject. In the light of this, my Government takes the view that we have not reached an appropriate stage for such negotiations and that negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament would not be fruitful.

A second prerequisite for negotiations on a cut-off, as noted in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, would be agreement on appropriate methods of verification. As we have stated previously, we believe that verification of a cut-off would present formidable difficulties. It appears to my delegation that these difficulties are likely to remain insuperable for the foreseeable future. In short, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we believe a cut-off cannot in present circumstances be regarded as a verifiable measure.

It is for these reasons that my delegation has this year decided to adopt a neutral position towards this proposal, and that is why we abstained on the draft resolution.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation supports the demand for cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes if it is linked to discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons. The isolated cessation of the production of fissionable material would not affect the nuclear arms race because in that case the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons - which, as stated in the Final Document, "alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth" - would be used for the further development and production of nuclear weapons, and more sophisticated and refined weapons would appear, making nuclear war more feasible and making it easier to unleash such a war.

Hence the only course is to proceed to negotiations on the cessation of the production of all nuclear weapons, including the halting of the production of fissionable material and the reduction of existing arsenals until their complete elimination.

Therefore, my delegation voted against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.33.

The CHAIRMAN: Requests have been made for postponement of action on draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.2/Rev.1 and A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2. There was an exchange of views on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39 at this morning's meeting. The representative of Canada, in fact, had withdrawn draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39 on behalf of the sponsors, but in view of the observations made by the representative of Mexico it is still not very clear whether the Mexican delegation would like to reintroduce that draft, with some possible amendments. In this connexion I call on the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): As I explained at length this morning, the purpose of the amendments proposed in document A/C.1/35/L.52 to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39 was quite clear and cannot give rise to any confusion. The idea was to come up with a procedure that would be in strict compliance with the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. That procedure, in the words of that document, should be acceptable to all the parties concerned.

With the withdrawal of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39 by its sponsors, the only way open to the Committee for it to express its views on the text we had suggested would have been for my delegation, invoking its right under rule 122 of the rules of procedure, to introduce in the First Committee under our sole sponsorship a revised version of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39.

As I said this morning, we would have resorted to that procedure only if it could have brought about a consensus solution. The informal consultations I have held have shown that that possibility does not now exist. Therefore, since draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39 has been withdrawn, the Mexican amendments to it contained in document A/C.1/35/L.52, for reasons beyond our control, no longer have any *raison d'être*.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, in view of the statement we have just heard from the representative of Mexico, and the fact that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.39 have withdrawn it, and as the amendments have also been withdrawn by Mexico, there is no further consideration which the Committee can now give to those two documents.

I shall now call on those representatives wishing to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. FLOWERIEE (United States of America): In view of the late hour, I do not propose to respond at length to the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union this afternoon, and certainly not on a point by point basis. I heard in his remarks a reference to the "bombast" of the United States delegation. I will therefore keep my remarks short and my voice low. A great deal of what he said this afternoon has been said before in other forums. It is unfortunate that he has chosen to introduce a confrontational note into a session devoted to discussion of serious arms control and disarmament measures. It is, of course, the right of any country to express its views on whether a measure is necessary or wise. However, I do not see why the representative of the Soviet Union was so exercised about an investigation to be conducted by the Secretary-General, whose impartiality is not at issue. For its part, the United States, as I said yesterday, is prepared to co-operate in an investigation of the facts wherever and whenever allegations of the use of chemical weapons may have been made against it.

My delegation reserves the right to reply in further detail if it so deems necessary at a later time.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I am going to speak in a whisper too, just like the representative of the United States of America.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

There is a Russian proverb which says that "repetition is the mother of learning". Therefore we repeat the arguments which we really did tell the representative of the United States about, and we are going to go on repeating them until he takes it into consideration.

As regards our attitude to the Secretary-General, we fully respect him. We are not against the Secretary-General. In my long speech, I did not mention him once. We have nothing against him. We are against the anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policies of the United States of America. We turn to the delegation of the United States and we say, let us co-operate, in the interest of strengthening the Geneva Protocol, to bring about progress in the negotiations to ban chemical weapons. In our bilateral contacts as well, we want the American delegation and the delegations of their allies to know that everything they are doing here now under the guise of "objectivity" will hamper those negotiations. If they are interested in making progress, let them leave aside this fuss, this hue and cry that we mentioned today.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Before I adjourn the meeting I wish to make some announcements with regard to our future work.

At our next meeting, which will be held at 10.30 on Friday morning, 28 November, we shall deal first with the two draft resolutions on which we have been unable to take action today, namely, A/C.1/35/L.2/Rev.1 - on which the report of administrative and financial implications will by then have been circulated - and A/C.1/35/L.43/Rev.2 and related documents containing amendments.

Thereafter we shall immediately take up agenda item 50, "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security". So far we have two representatives scheduled to speak on that item on Friday morning, and once again I would invite members to inscribe their names on the list of speakers so that we may be able to hold our meetings as planned.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.