



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 38TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)

CONTENTS

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 32, 34 TO 37, 39 TO 42 AND 44 TO 49 (continued)

Draft resolutions were introduced by:

Mr. Lie (Norway)	-	A/C.1/35/L.35
Mr. Djokic (Yugoslavia)	-	A/C.1/35/L.28 and L.32/Rev.1
Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico)	-	A/C.1/35/L.45
Mr. Awanis (Iraq)	-	A/C.1/35/L.25

UN LIBRARY  
UN/SA COLLECTION

\*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one month of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550, 866 United Nations Plaza (Alcoa Building), and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL  
A/C.1/35/PV.38  
22 November 1980

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 11.00 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 32, 34 TO 37, 39 TO 42 AND 44 TO 49 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Norway to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.35 entitled "Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons".

Mr. LIE (Norway): Having chaired the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction held in Geneva from 3 to 21 March this year, it is a privilege for Norway to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.35 concerning that Conference.

The biological weapons Convention is one of the major events in the disarmament field and represents the first agreement containing provisions regarding concrete disarmament measures. I am referring to the provisions in article II regarding the destruction of all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and their means of delivery.

The Convention could furthermore be considered an important step towards a similar ban on chemical weapons.

Such conventions are very necessary instruments for a more stable world. At least in the biological area, there is now a convention which has removed this category of weapons from the arsenals and which might help prevent the future development and use of more effective and more dangerous and inhumane weapons of this kind.

We note with satisfaction that at the time of the Review Conference 81 States had ratified the Convention, six States had acceded to it and a further 37 States had signed but had yet to ratify it. The Conference called upon all signatory States which had not ratified the Convention to do so without delay and those States which had not signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto in their efforts to eliminate the risk of biological warfare.

(Mr. Lie, Norway)

The proceedings of the three weeks during which the Conference carried out a successful review of the Convention confirmed the importance of the Convention and reaffirmed its validity as the first genuine disarmament measure taken in recent years to close one of the dangerous avenues of the arms race. The Conference has shown that the Convention occupies a special place in the field of disarmament by providing for the prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. The review also underscored the fact that the Convention has proved sufficiently comprehensive to cover recent scientific and technological developments. That conclusion is of even greater significance in the light of the fact that progress in other areas of science and technology often leads to the development and production of newer and more dangerous weapons. The halting of that ominous trend in the field of biological and toxin weapons is an achievement worthy of praise.

(Mr. Lie, Norway)

However, we should not forget that biological and toxin weapons are only part of a much larger problem. In this connexion I should like to emphasize that my Government regards international measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as one of the most important and urgent tasks that we are facing, and I should like to take this opportunity to join the appeals that have been made here to the negotiating parties to reach a speedy ban on chemical weapons.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): I am taking the floor in the discussion of draft resolutions and wish to address myself to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25, submitted by Iraq and others. This Committee knows its background, and I shall therefore be brief in recalling the history of an ostensibly merely procedural draft upon which we are asked to cast our votes.

Iraq submitted a draft resolution to the first special session on disarmament, which refused to consider it because it had more important tasks to perform. When the draft came to be considered by the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, Iraq demanded priority for its discussion. The General Assembly refused to go along with the Iraqi plea for urgency and, in a rare show of opposition to a proposal by a non-aligned State, the Assembly voted - 28 in favour, 59 against and 13 abstaining - for the postponement of consideration of the draft. It was finally adopted by the General Assembly by a reduced majority.

The refusal to go along with the Iraqi draft on the part of so many Member States from all regions was due both to the content of the resolution and to its character. The Iraqi resolution plainly demanded the disarmament of Israel and asked the Security Council to oversee the process by applying the provisions of Chapter VII.

Disarmament is indeed the business of this Committee, but not the disarmament of one country at the behest of its sworn enemy. Some 40 or so disarmament resolutions are normally submitted each year in this Committee. For the first time, one draft resolution - and one draft resolution alone - related to one country's allegations against another; that country thus broke an honourable tradition and disregarded a tacit understanding which

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

permitted this Committee to deal with disarmament and international security as a world problem without entering into contentious disputes among member States.

The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) echoed the general feeling in its Yearbook of 1979 by noting that the overwhelming feeling among representatives was that the highly controversial Iraqi draft resolution "would diffuse the focus of the session and undermine the consensus on the Final Document".

Iraq learned the lesson of the unpopularity accorded its initiative, and at the thirty-fourth session introduced a draft which concentrated solely on the nuclear moment. That resolution asked the General Assembly to set up a committee of experts to study Israel's nuclear armament.

Israel opposed the resolution by pointing out that it amounted to a discriminatory singling out of Israel from a list of more than 50 member States - one third of the membership of the United Nations, that have either signed but have not ratified, or not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or not complied with the Full-scale Safeguards agreement. Among those States, there are 13 States which belong to the region of the Middle East. The sheer hypocrisy of that resolution was revealed in a breakdown of the list of its sponsors. Out of the 34 sponsors of resolution 34/89, 20 States have, in one way or another, not done what Israel was asked to do.

It should now be noted that out of 22 co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25, which is before this Committee, nine did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty at all, two did not ratify it and four have not yet complied with the Full-Scale Safeguards. This is in accordance with the most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/35/365), of 25 August 1980.

Resolution A/C.1/35/L.25, unlike its predecessor, does not just "recall" the resolution demanding the imposition of sanctions against Israel, but "reaffirms" it. This is not a procedural draft, it is a restatement of Iraq's hostility towards Israel.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

As stated by the permanent representative of Israel in 1978:

"Given the automatic voting majority at the disposal of the Arab States, the presence of an accusation against Israel in a resolution of the General Assembly also ensures its almost automatic adoption, although, of course, it is in itself no proof of its veracity.

"The circle thus created is truly vicious. First, an accusation -- however unfounded and however untrue -- is railroaded through the General Assembly later, the authors of the slander need only quote a United Nations resolution to substantiate, as it were, their originally false allegations." (A/C.1/33/PV.51, p. 23-25)

While resolution 34/89 is discriminatory, the terms of reference of the group of experts established under that resolution are clearly prejudicial. The resolution does not ask the experts to express an opinion as to whether or not Israel possesses the nuclear option but demands of the Secretary-General, with their assistance: "to prepare a study on the Israeli nuclear armament" and to report on it.

Since the adoption of resolution 34/85, a number of events have taken place involving Iraq, the prime sponsor of that resolution. Last summer, Iraq acquired considerable nuclear facilities from several European countries, causing concern and consternation the world over. This transfer called the world press to ask why one of the largest oil-exporting countries should feel the need to spend billions in a frantic search for nuclear facilities. On 10 October 1980, Le Monde of Paris commented in a leading article:

"The questions which must therefore be raised, and to which answers must certainly be given one day, are the following:

"Can one continue to maintain the fiction that civilian nuclear deals have no military value whatsoever? Can one continue to adhere to the myth that it is possible to construct, without fear of a very grave accident, nuclear installations in a country prepared to go to war?"

Jonathan Kandell, of the International Herald Tribune, in its 27 June edition, indicated that, with the help of all its oil clients:

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

"The Iraqis have acquired in piecemeal fashion the nuclear material, technology and expertise necessary to produce and stockpile several bombs during the next five years."

Nigel Ash, writing in the 9 August 1980 edition of the Arab-financed weekly 8 Days, which is published in the United Kingdom, points out that Iraq's military intentions in the nuclear field were made clear beyond any doubt when Iraq refused to accept the Caramel-type uranium offered it by France. This type of uranium is impossible to convert to military uses. Instead, Iraq insisted on receiving weapons-grade enriched uranium (Osiris).

The French daily France-Soir published an article on 5 August 1980 on Iraq's nuclear programme entitled: "Le cri d'alarme d'un savant atomiste français". The warning was issued by an atomic scientist, François Perrin, who served as head of the French Nuclear Energy Commission from 1951 to 1971 -

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Iraq, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

Mr. AWANIS (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I am sorry to have to speak on a point of order, but the representative of the Zionist entity has departed from the subject under discussion, namely draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 on Israeli nuclear armament. I should like to remind representatives that Iraq is not the subject of the present discussion. As we know, the draft resolution has been sponsored by the Islamic countries and by the non-aligned countries. It is therefore submitted not by Iraq alone, but by all of its sponsors. That is why I ask the Chairman to request the representative of the Zionist entity to limit himself to the subject under discussion, namely the draft resolution, without discussing Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN: We have so far had a constructive and very high-level debate, and I hope that the same spirit will be maintained. I would appeal to all members to confine their remarks to the subject matter of the draft resolution on which we are now having an exchange of views.

With this appeal, I invite the representative of Israel to continue his statement.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): I should like to remind the Bureau, if I may, that the other day when I interrupted the representative of Syria because he referred to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1915 in making a statement on a draft resolution here, he was allowed to continue. Nowhere is it writ that one delegation can go into historical details and another delegation is not allowed even to continue discussing something that has very much to do with a draft resolution under our consideration. I shall continue.



(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Referring to the Osiris reactor supplied by France to Iraq, Mr. Perrin explained:

"it is fueled by highly enriched uranium which can be used for the production of an atomic weapon".

Expressing the fear that Iraq may revoke international controls on this enriched uranium, Mr. Perrin pointed out another possibility:

"It would not surprise me that Iraq effectively would like, in a few years hence, to be in the position to produce an atomic weapon, probably of plutonium."

France Soir then continues describing the nuclear deal:

"This Osiris reactor of Saclay, baptized Osirac by Baghdad, uses enriched uranium, up to 93 per cent. It should be operational next year with a first shipment of 13 kilogrammes of uranium to be delivered by France at the end of this year. Iraq, one of the great producers of oil, has evidently no need of nuclear electrical power. Why is there, therefore, this desire to possess atomic reactors? This evidently appears suspicious, especially in this State which, still being very backward, should look for other priorities in its development."

Some eight weeks ago, Iraq, the mover of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25, invaded a neighbouring country and is still in occupation of large parts of its territory in clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations.

These, then, are the credentials of the country that in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 points an accusing finger at Israel.

Yesterday afternoon, this Committee was the scene of a rare occasion in the United Nations when Member States were witness to progress towards the achievement of the ideal of the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

This morning, the same Member States are asked to vote on a draft resolution which is the product of hostility, the purpose of which is to perpetuate the Arab-Israel conflict.

Members of this Committee will have to decide if they can support the symbol of hostility and the spirit of reconciliation at the same time. Israel's choice is clear. Yesterday we voted in favour of the Egyptian draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.6. Today we vote against draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25. We are confident in our belief that both of our votes are votes for peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Yugoslavia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.28.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.28 on behalf of a group of sponsors consisting of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Zaire and Yugoslavia.

Our draft is concerned with the work of the Committee on Disarmament which this year has submitted to us its second report.

A very important role in the system of international negotiations in the field of disarmament was assigned to the Committee on Disarmament, which was established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In its capacity as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum it was entrusted with the task of negotiating on concrete problems of disarmament. The Committee is expected to contribute directly, by its results, to the implementation of the recommendations and decisions that we adopted unanimously at the first special session. This makes it incumbent on us to follow the work of the Committee with the closest attention and to assist it to fulfil its mandate effectively.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

The situation with which we are faced today in this exceptionally important field of international relations half-way between two special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament causes us grave concern. Many of the important actions on which we agreed at the special session have not even been initiated, in spite of the insistence of the large majority of members of the international community and their readiness to take a most active part in them. Even the first steps regarding the consideration of substantive problems of nuclear disarmament, to which the highest order of priority was accorded at the special session, have not been taken. Negotiations on the most important issues relating to the halting of the nuclear arms race have not begun either. The negotiations conducted on various problems of disarmament over a number of years are characterized by their slowness and absence of concrete results. In the meantime the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is constantly gaining new momentum and evolving at an accelerated pace.

The international community can and must oppose such a negative development. Its resolute action in the sense of solution of key problems of disarmament would be the best answer. This implies, among other things, an intensification of the negotiations now under way on priority problems of disarmament, with a view to achieving tangible results opening the way to further progress, launching of new negotiations in accordance with the Programme of Action which we adopted at the special session, and readiness on the part of the members of the international community, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil consistently and with the greatest sense of responsibility the obligations assumed by them with respect to the initiation and implementation of a process of genuine disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament is duty bound to lend its full support to such action by the international community.

The sponsors of the draft resolution attach great importance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Precisely for that reason, in preparing their draft resolution they were guided by the desire to support the Committee's work and help it to act as an effective body for international negotiations on problems of disarmament.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

In the preamble, satisfaction is expressed over the progress that the Committee on Disarmament has achieved with respect to the improvement of its organization and methods of work and the view is affirmed that the establishment of ad hoc working groups on substantive disarmament issues will promote the negotiating role of the Committee.

However, at the same time, concern is expressed over the fact that the Committee has not thus far been able to achieve concrete results on disarmament issues which have been under consideration for a number of years. Further, the preamble emphasizes the conviction that the Committee, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action adopted at the special session.

In the last preambular paragraph, it is stressed that negotiations on specific issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should not in any way constitute an impediment to negotiations on such questions in the Committee.

In the operative part, the Committee is urged to continue or undertake during its 1981 session substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on those questions.

Besides, the members of the Committee involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament are urged to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee on such issues.

The draft resolution also requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue at its session in 1981 negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit it to the second special session devoted to disarmament in time for consideration.

The draft resolution also contains a paragraph requesting the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its work on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute through concrete accomplishments to a favourable climate for the second special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

Finally, it contains two paragraphs in which the Committee is requested to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session and it is decided to include in the provisional agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

On behalf of the sponsors, I should like to express the hope that the draft resolution will meet with the full support of the members of the Committee and the United Nations General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Mexico to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.45.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour today to introduce to the First Committee the joint draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.45, sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, dealing with the strategic arms limitation talks, which are commonly referred to by the initial letters of those words - SALT.

Since the contents of this draft resolution, like that of other draft resolutions, might be said to be self-explanatory, I shall confine myself to a few comments aimed at emphasizing certain of its elements which, in our view, deserve special attention.

I should like first of all to point out that the Assembly's interest in the item dealt with in the draft resolution did not at all arise suddenly or unexpectedly. The 10 resolutions referred to in the document - eight in the first preambular paragraph, one in the second and one in the fourth - are irrefutable proof that the Assembly's interest began as long ago as 1969, the year in which the first SALT session took place in Helsinki, and that since 1972 it has been clearly demonstrated in an uninterrupted series of resolutions, including the only one adopted by the first special session devoted to disarmament - resolution S-10/2. The Final Document of that session lists, among the disarmament measures deserving priority in its Programme of Action, the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

There is another matter in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.45 which also deserves to be stressed. Great care has been taken in the drafting of the document to ensure that the provisions will contribute soon to Assembly resolutions on the matter in fulfilment of resolutions 33/91 C and 34/87 F. Briefly, it could be stated that the Assembly has never actually considered the SALT II treaty as an end in itself. As mentioned in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, the Final Document stresses that

"SALT II ... should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitations negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms." Similarly, in the resolution adopted last year, the instrument in question is described, as the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution says, as: "a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons".

As the draft resolution itself says, the final goal of those negotiations should be that defined by the highest representatives of the two contracting States, namely to

"move towards [the] complete, total destruction [of nuclear weapons], with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons".

The third element that I wish to stress, since it is unquestionably one of the most important elements to be taken into account in assessing the importance of the draft resolution, is contained in the sixth preambular paragraph. There, special emphasis is laid on the General Assembly declaration that "all the peoples of the world" have a "vital interest" in disarmament, and as unassailable proof of that interest reference is made to a few of the most convincing pronouncements of the Assembly set out in the Final Document - which could, indeed, easily be added to - such as:

"Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth ... The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it" (resolution S-10/2, para. 11)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuance of the arms race pose "a threat to the very survival of mankind". (ibid., preamble)

If those three elements are borne in mind, and if we bear in mind also the fact that the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in its Final Document, said:

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility"

(ibid., para. 48)

and that that responsibility has incalculable dimensions, since it concerns averting the threat of a universal holocaust, it should not surprise anyone that, in view of the complete lack of results of its last resolution, the General Assembly states its conviction, as the draft resolution suggests it should, that

"the signature in good faith of a treaty, especially if it is the culmination of prolonged and conscientious negotiations" - and, in this case, of course, they took more than six years-"carries with it the presumption that its ratification will not be unduly delayed."

Furthermore, any objective observer studying the draft resolution will surely realize that its purpose is not to make recommendations concerning conditions which may exist on Saturn, a planet which has become very popular of late. Its purpose is rather to seek a remedy for the alarming situation which has been caused by the unbridled nuclear arms race on earth, where, whether we like it or not, we have to live together. The purpose of the draft resolution is to promote the adoption of effective practical action to prevent a nuclear war, which, as so many in authority have already said, would mean universal suicide.

The purpose of the operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.45, which I am introducing on behalf of the seven co-sponsors that I mentioned at the beginning, is basically to call on the General Assembly, by adopting the draft resolution, to give formal expression in the records of the United Nations to what is spelt out in that part of the draft resolution. Finally, I will read out the whole of the operative part of the resolution:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"1. Deplores that the 'Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic offensive arms' (SALT II) has not yet been ratified notwithstanding that it was signed on 18 June 1979 and in spite of the many other reasons existing for such ratification, as illustrated by those which are summarized in the preamble of this resolution;

"2. Urges the two signatory States not to delay any further the implementation of the procedure provided for in article XIX of the Treaty for its entry into force, taking particularly into account that not only their national interests but also the 'vital interests' of all the peoples are at stake in this question;

"3. Trusts that pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the signatory States, in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, will refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty;

"4. Reiterates its satisfaction already expressed in resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979, for the agreement reached by both parties in the 'Joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms', signed on the same day as the SALT II Treaty, to the effect of continuing to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation which should culminate in the SALT III Treaty, and to the effect also of endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, inter alia, the following objectives:

"(i) Significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic arms;

"(ii) Qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"5. Invites the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

"6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled 'Strategic arms limitation talks'."

Mr. LIDGAARD (Sweden): The representative of Norway has just introduced draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.35 concerning the first Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

While I should like to underline one specific element in the draft resolution which we consider of particular importance, I first want to express our satisfaction over the way the first Review Conference was conducted under the very skilled and able presidency of Ambassador Vaerno of Norway. We were particularly satisfied that the Conference focused its attention on the complaints procedure in the Convention. That is a matter that has a long history, where Sweden and other neutral and non-aligned countries consistently have expressed concern over inadequacies of provisions in the Convention relating to that subject. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2827 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, recalled a joint memorandum on the matter which had been submitted by the then 12 neutral and non-aligned countries members of the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament and said, inter alia:

"... verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition,". (2827 (XXVI) A)

At this year's Review Conference my delegation, with the support of a large number of countries, presented its view that the obligations laid upon the States parties to the provisions of the biological weapons Convention dealing with the complaints procedure are inadequate, and not based upon equality. We therefore stated that they have to be amended so that all States parties are subject to the same measure of obligations to co-operate in carrying out investigation on the basis of complaints lodged by one or several of the States parties.

My delegation also outlined at the Review Conference in what way we considered that the complaints and verification procedure should be strengthened, guided by the principles of flexibility, objectivity and non-discrimination.

Despite the wide support we received, the results of those efforts at the Conference did not entirely meet with what we had hoped for. We were, however, encouraged that the Conference decided to state its belief in the final declaration "that this question should be further considered at an appropriate time". (A/C.1/35/L.35, para. 1.)

My country considers the question of an adequate complaints procedure in the biological weapons Convention to be of great urgency and we therefore intend to pursue the matter actively in the future. We intend to start consultations with key countries and sincerely hope that it will not take too long before we shall be able to reach an agreement with the States parties to the biological weapons Convention on amendments which will result in the desired strengthening of the Convention. We are naturally most grateful for all the support and co-operation we may get, in particular from those countries which we know share our concern.

These matters are of interest not only for the States parties to the biological weapons Convention. A strengthening of the Convention will add to its authority and contribute to a more universal adherence to it. In addition, confidence in disarmament agreements depends very much on the possibilities of verifying such agreements. Serious efforts in concluding new agreements require openness for demands concerning adequate international verification and complaints mechanisms.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Our delegation has had consultations with several delegations on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", as a result of which we should like to propose to the sponsor of that draft resolution that operative paragraph 1 should be amended to read as follows:

"Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session."

We believe the draft resolution so amended would meet with wide support in this Committee and would be adopted by consensus. Accordingly, we request the delegation of Hungary to consider this and to agree to issue a revised text incorporating the aforementioned amendment.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): In response to the statement just made by the representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, proposing an amendment to the first operative paragraph of the draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27, submitted by my delegation, I should like to state the following.

First, the Hungarian delegation, like many other delegations, would have preferred to maintain the text as it now stands. However, in the spirit of compromise and for the sake of reaching consensus, the Hungarian delegation is prepared to accept the proposed change in the first paragraph of the operative part.

Secondly, I should like to express the hope of the Hungarian delegation that every effort will be made in the Committee on Disarmament in the next year to reach agreement on the text of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. That would be in full conformity with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation will work to that end and hopes that many delegations will do likewise.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope all members of the Committee have taken note of the slightly revised version of operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27, as proposed by the representative of India and accepted by the representative of Hungary. Since this constitutes an amendment to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27, which we shall be voting upon today, I must again consult the Committee on whether, since the proposed amendment has been accepted by the representative of Hungary, it would agree to dispense with the requirements under rule 120 of the rules of procedure.

Rule 120 requires that proposals and amendments should be circulated in writing at least 24 hours before they are put to the vote, but in view of the fact that the amendment orally proposed by India has been accepted by Hungary I take it that the Committee agrees to dispense with that requirement.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is the representative of Iraq, who will introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.25.

Mr. AWANIS (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I have the pleasure of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 on behalf of Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

This is a procedural draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 reads:

"Takes note of the progress report of the Secretary-General on the work of the group of experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session".

Operative paragraph 2 reads:

"Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in this regard and submit his report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session".

And operative paragraph 3 reads:

"Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled 'Israeli nuclear armament'".

We hope that this draft resolution will commend an overwhelming majority here of the kind accorded to General Assembly resolutions such as resolution 33/71 A. I should like to remind members of the Committee that its text and content are similar to those of a resolution already adopted by the General Assembly on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa. Indeed the two have the same title.

(Mr. Awanis, Iraq)

At its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly also adopted resolution 34/89 in conformity with operative paragraph 6 of which a group of experts was appointed to prepare a study of Israeli nuclear armament. The group of experts has met once this year and has elaborated its first document, A/35/458, and we hope that it will complete its report in good time next year, since the Zionist entity is continuing to take measures to intensify its nuclear armament.

A few months ago I heard the allegations of the representative of the Zionist entity, who claims that a similar draft resolution received very limited support in previous years. He falsified the truth, because last year's draft resolution was approved by the majority by 98 votes.

He also spoke about my country, Iraq, forgetting that our draft resolution is not just an Iraqi one but has been supported also by the non-aligned countries, not only this year but in previous years also. It is an honour for Iraq to be one of the countries that has adhered to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. My country's delegation had the honour of presiding over the Second Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To this should be added all that has been recognized by international authorities. We have already spoken in detail of all this and of all the statements confirming that Iraq strictly observes the principles of international verification.

I should like to ask why the Zionist entity has not acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and why it refuses to submit its nuclear installations to international control, including that of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My delegation has in fact already asked that question many times in this Committee, and the representative of the Zionist entity has not dared to answer it. The reason is perfectly simple: the Zionist entity is developing new military techniques, and international control would bring those developments to light. That is why the Zionist entity refuses even to mention international control or the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the eyes of my delegation and many other delegations also, that confirms that the Zionist entity possesses the nuclear weapon and counts on it to achieve its aggressive expansionist ambitions to blackmail the Arab countries and to extend its territory at the expense of its neighbours with the aim of translating into reality the myth of "Greater Israel"

(Mr. Awanis, Iraq)

stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile. Everybody knows that those responsible for the creation of the Zionist entity have long wished to possess the nuclear weapon in order to expel the Palestinian people. The Zionists believe that conventional weapons are not enough to achieve that objective.

Concerning what the representative of the Zionist entity said about the peaceful activities of Iraq, my delegation reserves the right to reply at this afternoon's meeting.

My delegation also asks why the Zionist entity does not want to accept the conclusions of the group of experts, because those experts come not from Iraq or the non-aligned countries but are international experts to whom the United Nations has entrusted the task of preparing a report. That representative would have done better to declare in the Committee that the entity he represents was ready to help those experts and facilitate their task, and that eventually it would permit them to visit its nuclear installations and to exercise control over them.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Yugoslavia, who will now introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): The sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.32 and A/C.1/35/L.4 relating to implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly have during the last few days been in contact, prompted by the desire to co-operate with a view to elaborating a common draft. I am particularly gratified to inform the Committee that those endeavours have been crowned with success, and I now have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1.

I will draw the Committee's attention to the additions to A/C.1/35/L.32 contained in our revised draft.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

First, a new paragraph has been inserted after the third original preambular paragraph. It reads:

"Considering it imperative to achieve genuine progress in all negotiations dealing with disarmament issues".

Secondly, two new paragraphs have been inserted after the seventh preambular paragraph of the original draft. They read as follows:

"Calling attention to the tasks set forth in the Declaration on the Second Disarmament Decade, which demand intensified efforts to be taken in the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate fora"

and

"Stressing the necessity to promote the development, strengthening and intensification of international co-operation designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, as defined by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament".

Thirdly, in operative paragraph 3 the words "on effective" following the words "international fora" have been deleted, and the following words take their place: "or to proceed with negotiations on effective". The rest of operative paragraph 3 remains unchanged. Fourthly, two new paragraphs have been inserted after operative paragraph 3 of the original draft. They read:

"Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results"

and

"Expresses its conviction that one of the most important contributions for the preparation of the special session on disarmament to be held in 1982 will be to achieve tangible progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action".

Finally, the words "and the Committee on Disarmament" have been inserted after the words "General Assembly" in operative paragraph 5 of the original draft.

In conclusion I wish to thank the sponsors of both draft resolutions for contributing most directly, through their understanding and readiness to co-operate, to the successful outcome of our negotiations. May I also express the hope that the revised draft will be adopted by consensus.



Mr. KRUTZSCH (German Democratic Republic): The introduction of the revised text in A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1 by the delegation of Yugoslavia makes it necessary for my delegation to state the following.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.4, introduced by my delegation on 10 November, was aimed at drawing the attention of Member States to the problem of intensifying the negotiations on disarmament. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.32 served mainly the same purpose. Therefore it was obvious that my delegation should try to combine the two texts. Our intention found a positive response, and the result of subsequent efforts of the sponsors of both texts is incorporated in document A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1, which is now before the Committee for consideration and decision.

I should like to use this opportunity to thank the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.32 for their friendly co-operation and to express the deep appreciation of my delegation for the efforts of the representative of Yugoslavia. I wish also to express our gratitude to those delegations which pledged their support to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.4 and ask them to support the combined draft text which is now before the Committee.

On the assumption that a decision will be taken on A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will not press for a vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.4.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: Barbados, A/C.1/35/L.16; Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, A/C.1/35/L.25; France, Italy, A/C.1/35/L.39; Guinea, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1; Egypt, A/C.1/35/L.30 and L.31; Honduras, A/C.1/35/L.38; Guinea, Mongolia, Ireland, A/C.1/35/L.35; Guinea, A/C.1/35/L.18; Mongolia, A/C.1/35/L.24 and L.36; and Romania, A/C.1/35/L.33, L.40 and L.46.

(The Chairman)

It is now my intention to begin the decision-making process with regard to those draft resolutions which were listed by the Chair at the previous meetings of the Committee. However, may I inform the Committee that we shall not take up for the time being draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.2/Rev.1, since the new text requires a substantial revision of the financial implications involved in the original text.

The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18. This draft resolution has 26 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR at the thirty-second meeting of the First Committee on 17 November 1980. The sponsors are as follows: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Yemen and Yugoslavia.

I shall now call upon those speakers who wish to make a statement before a decision is taken on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18.

Mr. TAVARES NUNES (Portugal) (interpretation from French): My delegation abstained last year when this Committee adopted resolution 34/79 prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Today we have before us draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18, which deals with the same subject. Unfortunately, my delegation must abstain this time also because of the presence in this draft resolution of two elements which caused us to vote as we did at the thirty-fourth session. Two of those elements are, in our opinion, of particular importance.

As in the past, the draft resolution before us makes no reference to verification. My delegation feels that any measure prohibiting the production or development of any weapon or type of weapon should provide for an adequate verification mechanism. Furthermore, this draft resolution recommends the preparation of a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

My delegation considers that the objectives of disarmament would be better served by specific measures relating to well-defined and clearly identified weapons or types of weapons.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): On behalf of the nine States members of the European Community, I wish to make the following comments on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18, entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

As the Committee is aware, in 1978 two separate resolutions were presented on this subject. In that year, the Nine voted for resolution 33/66 A and abstained on resolution 33/66 B. Both resolutions covered similar ground but differed in the details of their approach to the solution of the problems involved, and the vote reflected those differences.

During the present session, as in 1979, the sponsors of resolution 33/66 A have not re-submitted their own text to this Committee. Notwithstanding some minor changes in the wording of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18 as compared to resolution 34/79, on which the Nine abstained, we still believe that the approach adopted in this draft is not a realistic one.

Clearly, there is no disagreement within this Committee on the need to prohibit any and all new weapons of mass destruction which are identified as such. The point at issue is simply the choice of means, in seeking most efficiently to pursue that objective. The Nine, together with many other States, believe that new weapons of mass destruction and their technologies, if they are to be effectively and permanently prohibited, must be the subject of separate and verifiable controls. This fundamental consideration has not, however, received the necessary emphasis in the present draft resolution. Moreover, the special importance given in operative paragraph 1 of the draft to the negotiation of a single blanket prohibition on the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction does not appear, in our view, to be warranted.

A comprehensive agreement could not, in the first place, adequately distinguish between peaceful research, without any military implications, and areas of research which could eventually be given military application. Its verification would furthermore require detailed international supervision of disparate civil research activities in many States with a view to determining whether work in particular research areas could lead to the development of new weapons of mass destruction. This is neither feasible nor realistic. Those engaged in peaceful academic or industrial research expect that their efforts should not be impeded. And in the absence of verification - and it is generally accepted that a comprehensive prohibition could not be verified - confidence and certitude in the long term would be traded for optimism in the short term, and the door would be opened to suspicion, recrimination and divisive debate unhelpful to larger disarmament objectives.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

While we do not believe that a generalized prohibition offers a practical solution to the problems involved, the Nine fully recognize the need to continue international discussions with a view to identifying potentially dangerous developments in science and technology so that early necessary controls can be introduced. Already such discussion has encouraged efforts towards the prohibition of radiological weapons, and the draft elements of a prohibition of such weapons are being negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Further discussion may produce equally useful results leading to the conclusion of individual verifiable agreements where dangerous new weapons possibilities are seen to emerge.

The Nine believe that the definition of 5 August 1948 established by the Commission on Conventional Armaments continues to provide a valid basis for the negotiation of individual agreements. According to this definition, weapons of mass destruction are: (a) atomic explosive weapons; (b) radioactive material weapons and lethal chemical and biological weapons; and (c) any weapons developed in future which might have characteristics comparable in their destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.

This appears to us the most realistic, practical and productive approach to the problems involved. Each weapon and weapons system has its own particular characteristics, which require detailed separate negotiation. Only through the conclusion of separate agreements, rather than a blanket prohibition, can we ensure that adequate verification arrangements are established so that all prohibitions will be fully effective and durable.

Only through the conclusion of individual agreements dealing with specific weapons systems, rather than a global convention affecting many diverse branches of science and technology, can we adequately meet the need to distinguish between peaceful research and weapons development. We firmly believe that such agreements should be designed and implemented in such

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

a way and manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States parties to those agreements. We do not, however, insist that a resolution such as the present draft resolution should emphasize only this particular approach to the problem. Indeed, we would have hoped that, in the interests of establishing a basis for consensus, a formulation which sought to keep all possibilities open and avoided giving priority to one approach over another would have been provided.

It is because the Nine fully support the need for effective and lasting prohibitions on new weapons of mass destruction that they cannot endorse the approach of the present draft resolution and therefore will abstain.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18. The sponsors of this draft resolution have requested that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote, but in view of the statement we have just heard from the representative of the Netherlands I feel that the Committee may wish to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18 was adopted by 107 votes to none, with 27 abstentions.\*

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those members that wish to explain their votes.

\* Subsequently the delegation of Afghanistan advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): My delegation has cast an affirmative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18. I should like to state, however, that my delegation remains flexible with regard to the mechanism to be adopted by the Committee on Disarmament to deal with the question of prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

While exploring the possibility of drawing upon the assistance of qualified governmental experts, the Committee on Disarmament would also set up an ad hoc working group to negotiate on this question. Such an ad hoc working group would also be assisted by experts attached to various delegations. My delegation would therefore like to make it clear that it is willing to consider any other proposals as well in this regard.

Mr. NONOYAMA (Japan): My delegation would like to reiterate its view that it is not appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate on preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, because the scope of such an agreement, including the weapons that it would encompass, is far from clear and it would present difficulties, for example in verification.

We still consider it more appropriate at this stage to keep the question under review in the Committee on Disarmament, so that negotiations can be started whenever any specific new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified come into the picture.

In view of these considerations, my delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The delegation of Finland voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18 which has just been adopted by the Committee.



(Mr. Rajakoski, Finland)

Very briefly, we did so because we believe that all approaches to the problem of preventing the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction should be explored. That includes the possibility of an agreement or agreements on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of such weapons. With this in mind, Finland supported both resolutions 33/66 A and B which were adopted by the General Assembly in 1978. As one step towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, we have welcomed the progress reported concerning a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Mr. LIDGAARD (Sweden): The Swedish delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18, and I wish now to explain the reasons for this.

Sweden is deeply convinced of the importance of preventing at an early stage the use of scientific and technological achievements for the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. We are therefore strongly in favour of the main objective of the draft resolution, which is to take effective measures to assure that new major scientific discoveries be used solely for peaceful purposes.

With respect to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, I wish to reiterate the doubts we have expressed on numerous occasions about the idea of a general agreement in this field. In our view, a generally accepted and clear definition of the scope and content of this field must be reached before starting negotiations on a draft convention.

We note with satisfaction that draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.18 requests the Committee on Disarmament to prepare specific agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction. We will continue to support all efforts to reach specific agreements on individual types of new weapons of mass destruction that may be identified.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.