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LETTER DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached report addressed to me on
1 September 1993 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee on the
activities of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

The previous report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council on 20 August 1993 (S/26337), contained the text of a peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina as it had been developed by the parties up to 20 August 1993. On that date, the parties had decided to return home to explain the map and to come back to Geneva for a final meeting on 30 August 1993 (S/26337, para. 7).

I. RESUMED PEACE TALKS (31 AUGUST TO 1 SEPTEMBER)

The parties returned to Geneva and resumed their discussions with the Co-Chairmen on Tuesday, 31 August. The Co-Chairmen first saw President Izetbegovic and Mr. Silajdzic. President Izetbegovic informed the Co-Chairmen that he was authorized to sign the peace package but asked that the Muslim majority province be given territory extending to the Adriatic Sea and that Muslim majority areas in the area of the River Drina, in the area east of Bihac and in Jajce, should be allocated to the Muslim majority republic, which should have a larger percentage of the national territory. Later, President Izetbegovic gave a map to the Co-Chairmen claiming 2.3 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Eastern Bosnia and 1.7 per cent east of Bihac making 4 per cent in all.

The Co-Chairmen then met Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban in the presence of Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Bulatovic. Dr. Karadzic stated that he was authorized to sign the peace package as it existed. He explained that the authorization of his parliamentary assembly had required a two-thirds majority vote and that he could not sign the package with any change.

Mr. Boban reported that his parliamentary assembly had also authorized him to sign the package without any change provided the other two parties signed. He added that it had been felt that the Croats had not received satisfaction in Central Bosnia, but that the Croats had accepted the package in the interest of peace.

The Co-Chairmen explained to Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban, in the presence of Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Bulatovic, that President Izetbegovic was unlikely to sign the package unless, at a minimum, there were changes granting the Muslim majority republic additional access to the Adriatic Sea and some Muslim majority areas along the River Drina.

After some discussion, the following method of proceeding was agreed:

1. The package should be retained and eventually signed as it is.

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2. Bilateral negotiations could take place between the Muslims and the Serbs and also between the Muslims and the Croats.
3. Any bilateral agreements worked out should be signed at the same time as the peace package.

President Izetbegovic held bilateral talks with the Serbs in the afternoon of 31 August and with the Croats in the same evening.

On Wednesday morning, 1 September, the Co-Chairmen first met with President Izetbegovic and Mr. Silajdzic. They then saw the Muslim, Serb and Croat delegations in turn. In the afternoon, they saw the three delegations again individually, and then together in a final session.

In the course of the discussions, the parties explored the following options:

A. Exchange of territories

1. A collateral agreement between the Muslim and the Serb parties that the road linking Gorazde to Zepa referred to in paragraph 2 of Part I of Annex A to the Constitutional Agreement shall be three kilometres wide and shall have two crossovers between points within the Serb majority republic.
2. After the withdrawal of all forces to the agreed boundaries of the Constituent Republics, good faith negotiations would be undertaken for the exchange of territories within the Serb majority republic in which a majority of Muslim people live for territories within the Muslim majority republic, such as the Czren Mountains, where a majority of Serb people live. Similar negotiations would also take place between the Croat and Muslim parties.

B. Access to the sea

1. A separate agreement would be concluded between the Muslim and Croat parties for the establishment of an exit to the sea for the Muslim majority republic through the Croat majority republic via the Access Authority Throughway from Poplat to Neum, and for the Muslim majority republic to acquire a tract of land on the shore of the Adriatic, either around Neum or on the Isthmus of Klek (Kosa) and, if feasible, on technical and environmental grounds, develop it as a commercial port.
2. The Serb majority republic might make an agreement with the Republic of Croatia regarding an exchange of territories in East Herzegovina with a view to establishing an exit to the Adriatic.

C. Political agreements

All three parties would agree that the first elections in the Constituent Republics should take place, under the supervision of the United Nations and the European Community, no later than two years after

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the entry into force of the Constitutional Agreement. All elections to the legislative bodies of Constituent Republics and of opstinas should be by proportional representation. All political parties registered in any of the Constituent Republics might organize themselves and act freely throughout the territory of the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided their activities are in accordance with the Constitutional Agreement.

II. OUTCOME

The original package (S/26337 and Addenda) and the options mentioned above, which were distilled from the three parties' own ideas, were put by the Co-Chairmen to the three delegations individually in the afternoon of Wednesday, 1 September.

The Croat delegation accepted and said it was ready to sign the original package and the collateral agreements.

The Serb delegation stated that it accepted the original package and the collateral agreements and was ready to sign them. It suggested that a clause be added stating an understanding of the three parties on the issue of sanctions.

When the Co-Chairmen saw President Izetbegovic and asked him for his position on the original peace package and the proposed collateral agreements, he informed the Co-Chairmen that while he appreciated the efforts made, the results achieved on territorial issues had, in his view, been meagre. He stated that he could not understand why the Muslim majority areas along the River Drina and in east of Bihac were not allocated to the Muslim majority republic; nor did he understand why the Muslims' request for territory extending to the Adriatic Sea was not accepted. In the circumstances, he was not prepared to sign the peace package or the collateral agreements.

The Co-Chairmen suggested that President Izetbegovic explain his position to the other delegations directly and they were then called in, whereupon President Izetbegovic repeated that he could not sign the peace package and the collateral agreement.

Dr. Karadzic commented that on 20 August the Serbs and the Croats had made five final concessions on the understanding that if there were no agreement, those concessions would be withdrawn. He noted that a good compromise package had been worked out on 20 August which the Serbs and the Croats had accepted and which should not be unravelled. He emphasized that the Serbs were withdrawing from 24 per cent of the territories they currently hold. He added that the Muslims now hold only 10 per cent but were being given over 30 per cent. He reiterated that he accepted the package and the collateral agreements, accepted implementation, and was ready to sign on the understanding that bilateral negotiations would continue. He stressed, however, that he was not ready to re-open the package and to start negotiations all over again.

Mr. Boban stated that on 20 August the parties had taken a peace package to explain it to their constituencies and had agreed to come back to Geneva for a final session on 30 August. Although the Croats had felt that their rights as a

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constituent people had been whittled down in the package to the barest minimum, yet they were ready to sign it and the collateral agreements in the interest of peace if the others did so. He urged that the Co-Chairmen proceed with signature of the package and cautioned against any side imposing conditions. He regretted that President Izetbegovic was setting up condition after condition. He cautioned that if the package were not accepted the result would be chaos and further war.

President Izetbegovic replied that as far as he was concerned the war should not continue. He was for continuing negotiations and would respect the cessation of hostilities and free passage of humanitarian convoys. He was also in favour of exchanging prisoners of war.

Following these statements, the Co-Chairmen informed the parties that they would remain at their disposal to assist them in the search for peace. However, they expressed their grave fears for the fate of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as for the personnel of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations. They urged the parties to keep their word to observe the cessation of hostilities and noted that they would be reporting on the talks to the Security Council and to the European Community. They felt that it was a great tragedy that the parties had come so near to agreement but that in the end it had eluded them.

III. ASSESSMENT

The assessment of the Co-Chairmen is that:

1. The choice at the end of the day was between a negotiated peace and the continuation of war. The consequences of this choice for the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be severe. If the conflict persists over the next winter, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to assure continued humanitarian relief and assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the consequences for the civilian population could be devastating.
2. Notwithstanding the protestations of the parties, the danger is high that further conflict could break out and could even intensify and expand.
3. The personnel of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other humanitarian workers are already encountering unacceptable security risks. There is, therefore, a distinct possibility that these organizations may not be able to continue their activities in a deteriorating situation.
4. The original package and the associated collateral agreements, in the absence of any alternative, should be kept on the table.
