



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 33RD MEETING

Chairman: Mr. MULLOY (Ireland)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31 TO 49 AND 121 (continued)

Mr. AL-ZUBI (Jordan): The establishment of peace and security in the Middle East has been one of the major preoccupations of the United Nations. No less than four times since the United Nations was founded, the area has been subjected to a devastating war, with all its tragic consequences for the people of the region and its attendant risk to world peace. Since 1947, the General Assembly and the Security Council have held countless meetings, adopted hundreds of resolutions and taken hundreds of decisions on the question of Palestine and the wider Middle Eastern problem. Most of the General Assembly resolutions have dealt with human rights aspects, armistice, a cease-fire, demarcation lines, violations and peace-keeping operations in the region. The main aim of those resolutions was to restore the Palestinian people's rights and to bring about a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, none of those objectives has yet been achieved. The situation in the Middle East continues to dominate the affairs of the international community. Its ramifications continue to pose a threat to the political and economic stability of the world. The Palestinian people are still denied the right to return to their homes and properties in Palestine. They are still denied the right of self-determination. Israel is still relentlessly proceeding with its occupation of Arab territories, taking advantage of the deteriorating situation in the area, and manipulating the factors underlying that situation in order to promote its expansionist and hegemonistic ambitions. Peace, from the Israeli standpoint, is perceived within the framework of aggression and the maintenance of the policy of status quo, and not within just and mutual rights and obligations provided for in relevant United Nations resolutions.

(Mr. Al-Zubi, Jordan)

Israel's concept of security is somewhat more peculiar. It is based on military superiority, in both conventional and nuclear weapons, over all the Arab States put together. This explains the complexity of the issues relating to the item under discussion, namely, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as conducive to the promotion of peace and security in the area. It is our conviction that this question should be addressed in its broader context. We should not lose sight of the fact that the military factor constitutes one element of the multi-dimensional nature of the peace process in the Middle East.

The General Assembly, at its tenth special session, on disarmament, emphasized the importance of establishing nuclear-free zones in some areas in the world to "enhance international peace and security". Paragraphs 60-63(d) of the Final Document stress the importance of taking into consideration the characteristics of each specific region.

With regard to the Middle East, paragraph 63(d) stresses that:

"The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." (resolution S-10/2, para.63(d))

(Mr. Al-Zubi, Jordan)

The General Assembly reiterated its position in several other resolutions between 1974 and 1979. Resolution 34/77, of 1979, relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, urged, among other measures, that all parties concerned should accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and should agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Jordan, along with other Arab States in the region, supported that General Assembly resolution, signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and also accepted the IAEA safeguards. Israel, on the other hand, abstained from voting on the Assembly resolution and accepted none of its measures. On the contrary, Israel has maintained its policy of aggression and its occupation of Arab territories. Israel has not refrained from contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons. The massive nuclear co-operation programmes between Israel and the racist régime of South Africa are well known to this body; they need no further elaboration.

Referring to Israel's negative attitude towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Secretary-General rightly stated the following in his report, entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons":

"The General Assembly in supporting this objective, has called on the States in the region to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty or give solemn assurances to the Security Council that they will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Israel has refused to accede to these calls and instead posed the pre-condition of direct negotiations between the States of the region."

(A/35/392, para. 476)

Israeli proposals for "negotiated regional arrangements" and "confidence-building measures" necessary for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East are groundless and deluding. They are meant to conceal the aggressive intentions of the Israeli authorities and their desire to frustrate the objectives of creating

(Mr. Al-Zubi, Jordan)

a nuclear-free zone in the area. How can we reconcile what the Israelis say with what they do? How can we judge the validity of Israeli practices in the occupied Arab territories and their advocacy of confidence-building measures? How can we reconcile Israeli denial of all United Nations resolutions on the restoration of Palestinian rights and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East with its calls for peace and security in the region? Finally, how can we reconcile Israel's professed desire for peace in the region with its attempts to build huge conventional and nuclear arsenals?

In conclusion, we believe that any arrangement for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East should be based on the following principles: first, all countries of the region should pledge, on a mutual basis, to renounce all production and acquisition of nuclear weapons; secondly, they should subject their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards; thirdly, Israel should be bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty; fourthly, the status of the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone should be respected; it should be free from super-Power rivalry.

If Israel continues to proceed with its political and military blackmail, the United Nations should take the necessary measures under the Charter to prevent any threat to world peace in the region.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Australia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.23.

Mr. ANDERSON (Australia): On behalf of the sponsors I have pleasure in introducing the draft resolution dealing with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/73, as contained in document A/C.1/35/L.23. This draft resolution deals with the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Last year, in resolution 34/73, the General Assembly reaffirmed its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time was a matter of the highest priority. It was agreed that positive progress by the Committee on Disarmament in

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

negotiating such a treaty was a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and would contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this respect, it called on the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority.

In addition, resolution 34/73 called upon the negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Although we welcome the statement of the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States made in the Committee on Disarmament on 31 July 1980 on the progress of their negotiations, we regret that these have not been completed. It remains entirely uncertain when a comprehensive test ban is likely to be concluded. Similarly, it is of some concern that the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is therefore necessary that this important issue be again addressed by the General Assembly - this time with greater urgency.

We are looking to a treaty which will lead to the cessation of all nuclear test explosions for all time. Such a treaty would cover explosions for both military and peaceful purposes and would thereby limit and perhaps even stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the parties to the treaty. Added to this, such a treaty would make the development of new nuclear weapons and the improvement of existing ones more difficult. The implementation of and wide adherence to such a treaty would considerably strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by leading to its fuller implementation and by helping overcome the objections of those States which see the Treaty as discriminating in favour of the existing nuclear-weapon States. Certainly, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be seen as a major demonstration by the nuclear-weapon States of their intention to work for measures of nuclear disarmament which are fundamental to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

The conclusion of such a treaty would also contribute to limiting or even preventing horizontal proliferation. In this respect, it is relevant that States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty could become party to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and thus provide assurances that they would not become nuclear-weapon States.

It was a disappointment to Australia that because of differences over nuclear arms control issues, the recently-concluded Second Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was not able to reach agreement in the time available on a consensus final declaration. While the Conference was unanimous in its concern to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and thus demonstrate the indispensability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it did sound a warning that the nuclear-weapon States will have to achieve measures limiting their own nuclear arsenals if the Treaty's objectives are to be maintained. The early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is central in this context.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

The effective implementation of a comprehensive test ban treaty is of course dependent on adequate verification, and in this regard the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Establish an International Seismic Data Exchange System is of the utmost importance. It is hoped that States will continue to co-operate with this group. It is also hoped that work can begin, as a matter of priority, in the Committee on Disarmament on the institutional and administrative steps necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and effective verification system.

I turn now to the draft resolution before this Committee. The sponsoring delegations have had in their minds the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty to be concluded. The draft resolution acknowledges the progress in the trilateral negotiations reported to the Committee on Disarmament but regrets that those negotiations have not moved as rapidly as had been expected. The negotiating nuclear-weapon States are therefore called upon to exert their best efforts to conclude their negotiations in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. In this respect the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty is recognized and the Committee is requested to take the steps necessary to initiate negotiations on such a treaty.

It is not appropriate for this body, the General Assembly, to instruct the Committee on Disarmament how it should conduct its work. The timing and method are at the discretion of that Committee. The draft resolution does, however, note the urgency involved and suggests that the Committee on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc working group to undertake this task.

If we are to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive test ban treaty will, we believe, be a vital element in action towards that goal. On behalf of its sponsors I commend this draft resolution to the Committee.

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (interpretation from French):

The Italian delegation listened with close attention to the statement of the representative of Sri Lanka on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. We wish to congratulate Ambassador Balasubramaniam for the efforts he has made, as Chairman of that Committee, to ensure that its work should proceed in the most constructive and effective manner possible. If account is taken of the objective difficulties posed by the subject matter dealt with, the results achieved up to now are far from being negligible.

Last June Italy joined the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean as a major maritime country. Italy took an active part in the work of the Committee, setting itself the twofold aim of clarifying the general concept of a zone of peace and defining the specific content of a possible initiative to that end in the Indian Ocean region.

We are happy to note that the Committee has embarked on such a course and that a first exchange of views on substantive questions has already taken place.

However, much remains still to be done. The various positions are yet to be co-ordinated. Differences must be overcome through the necessary negotiations in the Committee itself. Certain fundamental points must be clarified once and for all. I have in mind, for instance, the geographical delimitation of the Indian Ocean region and the guarantees to be given for the full implementation of international law as regards freedom of navigation on the high seas. Italy's views on these and other questions being dealt with by the Committee are known and I shall refrain from reiterating them on this occasion.

I cannot, however, fail to stress that the invasion of Afghanistan has not only contributed to the deterioration of the international situation but also introduced into the Indian Ocean region a particularly serious element which, if it were not rapidly removed, would considerably reduce the prospects for the success of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The draft resolution contained in the Committee's report is all the more valuable since it is the fruit of a consensus. We attach great importance to that principle; in our view it should be the basis of all the Committee's decisions if we want practicable and effective solutions to be worked out.

(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

A draft resolution whose formulation is agreed upon by consensus obviously cannot take fully into account all the views put forward. In the course of the present debate we shall have an opportunity to give our interpretation of the provisions contained in that draft. Suffice it to recall at this point that Italy's agreement to the draft resolution does not mean its acceptance of all the previous resolutions cited therein, particularly General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI).

Mr. KAHN (German Democratic Republic): Yesterday the draft resolution on agenda item 41, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", was introduced. My delegation welcomes the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean succeeded in completing a draft resolution. We appreciate the efforts undertaken by its Chairman, Ambassador Balasubramaniam, which finally led to overcoming the considerable difficulties.

As a member of that Committee, my delegation has given its approval to the draft resolution, even though it is to be regretted that in some of its passages it lacks the necessary clarity and unambiguity.

(Mr. Kahn, German
Democratic Republic)

That is particularly true of the sixth preambular paragraph. The wording regarding "the continued danger posed by the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of their confrontation", and so on, needs to be cleared up.

With the shift from the policy of détente to a course of confrontation on the part of the chief imperialist Power and of NATO - which finds expression in the military field in NATO's long-term armament programme, adopted in 1978; the measures that followed which obstructed ratification of SALT-II; the decision made on the deployment of additional medium-range strategic nuclear missiles in Western Europe; the setting up of rapid deployment forces and the declaration of the new nuclear targeting strategy - the United States of America and other Western States are considerably enhancing also their military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

According to details provided by the military commentator of The New York Times, Drew Middleton, on 17 October of this year, more than 60 warships of those States are cruising in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, as he put it "to prevent interference with tanker traffic moving out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz".

Who else but the United States itself would be impeding free maritime traffic in the Gulf region? On 17 April of this year, the same military commentator of The New York Times, referring to information from the Department of Defense, reported that

"the cheapest way to blockade the Gulf from the standpoint of current American naval resources in the area would be to establish naval patrols, sea and air, in the Strait of Hormuz ... but it was admitted that the operation of such a blockade would inevitably interfere with the oil tanker and other ship traffic moving to and from friendly Gulf States ... In view of the difficulties associated with blockade, the preferred option at the moment is inshore mining carried out by aircraft from the fleet and under constant surveillance by patrol aircraft from the two aircraft carriers that form the nucleus of the Indian Ocean force."

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Democratic Republic)

That illustrates the real purpose of the massive militarization of the Indian Ocean and the presence of United States warships in the Gulf region. It is directed precisely against the interests of the peoples of that region and, to be frank about it, also against the security interests of other peace-loving States. The strategic threat to the USSR emanating from the south, as well as to its sea routes that lead from the European part of the country to the far eastern part, is obvious. The confrontation prevailing in that region is, to put it in simple and clear words, between the United States and other Western countries, on the one hand, and States that are rightfully concerned about their political and economic independence and the USSR, on the other hand. The question "Who confronts whom?" can clearly be answered when one considers the facts.

The United States declaration of that region as a "sphere of vital interests" is a declaration that disregards the legitimate interests of other States. The reinforcement of Diego Garcia; the establishment of new military bases; the commando mission carried out in April last against a coastal State of the Indian Ocean; the preparation of rapid deployment forces for action in that region; the transfer of 1,400 soldiers of those forces to the Middle East; the advanced deployment of supply vessels for the rapid deployment forces in the Arabian Sea - all are further elements of the policy of confrontation, and they give rise to grave concern.

My delegation is also concerned about the fact that, in connexion with this dangerous evolution of events in the Indian Ocean, a Western European NATO country has temporarily sent destroyers of its federal navy and supply vessels to that region, of all places. Also, the expansion of the area of operation of that federal navy beyond 61°N is disquieting since it serves the declared aim of releasing formations of the United States navy for the purpose of their being deployed in the Indian Ocean.

Despite those doubts my delegation considers the draft resolution acceptable in its entirety. Each party concerned with its preparation has made concessions. For the sake of preserving that compromise no changes should be made that could jeopardize this compromise and cause troubles for the holding of the Conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo in 1981. The German Democratic Republic considers it urgent and

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indispensable to hold that Conference in the course of next year.

Given the gravity of the situation in that region, all States members of the Committee on the Indian Ocean are called upon to respect with a high sense of responsibility the legitimate desire of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to transform it into a zone of peace. It is important to reach agreement, as a first step, in order to stop the present development, which impedes the attainment of the aforesaid goal, and subsequently to initiate demilitarization of that ocean. The United States could render a good service with regard to the preparation of that Conference if it would immediately resume talks with the USSR with a view to freezing the military presence and military activities and subsequently reducing them.

My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to extend its thanks to the delegation of Madagascar for the initiative of the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar to host in Antananarivo a summit meeting of those Heads of State who are interested in peace and security in the Indian Ocean area and are concerned about the existing dangers to which I have referred.

The German Democratic Republic regards that proposal as another expression of the serious efforts undertaken by numerous littoral and hinterland States as well as major maritime users of the Indian Ocean with a view to giving effect to the Declaration in question.

Allow me for a moment to turn to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.15. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the agreements reached at the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.

Time and again, the German Democratic Republic as well as all other socialist States has declared its willingness to negotiate any type of weapon while observing the principle of equal security and reciprocity. Having that in mind, the German Democratic Republic actively helped elaborate the pertinent Convention and the three additional Protocols, and displayed a good deal of flexibility. The results achieved are proof of the fact that where there is political will negotiations can be

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Democratic Republic)

conducted on difficult subjects even in complicated international circumstances and that there can be a positive outcome.

The prohibition or restriction of the use of those types of weapons dealt with in the Protocols is a step forward on the road towards arms limitations and disarmament and to the reduction of the threat of war. However, we must not overestimate the significance of those measures in view of the destructive power of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The adoption of the Convention and the Protocols at the same time means that one item of the Programme of Action of the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, has been realized. The provisions stipulated are of a realistic nature, and their translation into reality will enhance the security of civilians in armed conflicts. That is indeed another step towards effectively extending and complementing already existing international obligations.

Special importance is to be attached to the circumstance that the use of precisely such weapons - which are often used against peoples that offer resistance against colonial or racial oppression - will be prohibited or at least restricted.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): I wish to make a statement in the discussion on draft resolutions and specifically with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.8 and to the statements made by some representatives with respect to this draft resolution.

I am emphasizing the precise procedural situation in which we now find ourselves. Unlike the representatives of Syria, Iraq and Jordan, I shall not digress into a substantive discussion, because in the view of my delegation that should not be permitted when draft resolutions are being discussed. I shall therefore refer only to such remarks made by some Arab representatives as have a direct bearing on the draft resolution submitted by Israel on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

If the statements of Syria, Iraq and Jordan regarding draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.8 are divested of the usual repetitive denunciations of Israel, the usual clichés, epithets and pejoratives, what remain are two arguments with which these representatives are trying to justify their plain and unequivocal refusal to respond to the call contained in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.8.

The first argument is roughly this: "Israel has not always accepted United Nations resolutions; one cannot therefore conduct negotiations with it on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone."

I shall say nothing at this point about the particular political circumstances prevailing these days in the United Nations which permit the group of Arab States to push through the General Assembly whatever resolutions they wish, on whatever subject, with complete certainty of success. I should like to address myself to another and very dangerous aspect of this argument.

If one were to apply the yardstick of compliance with resolutions of the General Assembly as a measure of whether or not a Member State can be considered a fit partner for the conduct of multilateral negotiations and for signature of a treaty, a good part of the membership of the United Nations, including some permanent members of the Security Council, would

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

have to be excluded henceforth from the process of negotiations as envisaged in Article 33 of the Charter. The argument is obviously spurious and is designed merely to cloak the refusal of some Arab States to consider seriously the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Their second argument against the essence of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.8 consists of calling Israel a "nuclear menace" and accusing us of practising "nuclear intimidation". If they really believe what they are saying - which I greatly doubt - they should all the more welcome Israel's offer to negotiate a treaty for the denuclearization of the Middle East, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.8. Their refusal to respond to the call in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution exposes this second argument of theirs as being purely rhetorical and devoid of substance.

Israel has on many occasions called on the Arab States to join it and Egypt in the peace process initiated at Camp David. Unfortunately for the Middle East and for the peace of the world they have refused.

In draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.8 Israel appeals to the Arab States and to States adjacent to the region to come together to discuss the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, irrespective of and without prejudice to any political or legal claim - and I should like to draw the attention of the representative of Jordan to this last sentence of mine. This offer, it seems, has also been rejected. This rejection poses a great danger to the peace of the world.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the Philippines to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.19.

Mr. YANGO (Philippines): I have asked to be allowed to speak today to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.19, entitled "Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security". This draft resolution, solely as a matter of procedure:

"Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session".

The Committee is aware that a study group has been working for the last two years on the study, and the last relevant resolution of the General Assembly has requested that the final report on this study be submitted to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. However, in the course of its work, the Chairman of the Study Group, on behalf of all its members, informed the Secretary-General that, owing to the vast area to be covered and the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved, the Study Group would need more time to complete its work.

In introducing this draft resolution on behalf of Cyprus, Denmark, Liberia, Peru and my delegation, I hope that the Committee will find no difficulty in supporting it so as to give the Study Group on the relationship between disarmament and international security the time needed to complete its work. As this is solely a matter of procedure, it is also hoped that the Committee will adopt this draft resolution by consensus.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): I should like this morning to comment briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.7, entitled "Preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament." It will be recalled that this draft resolution was introduced on 7 November by the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mihajlovic. Although of an essentially procedural nature, the draft resolution has become the centre of an intensive negotiation, particularly on the composition of the preparatory committee. I should like to pay a tribute to the Chairman of the First Committee, Ambassador Naik, for his efforts and the devotion he has shown in conducting negotiations on this rather delicate question.

In introducing the draft resolution on 7 November, the representative of Yugoslavia expressed the view of all the sponsors, which include Nigeria, when he laid stress on the need for a preparatory committee with a definite membership appointed on the basis of equitable geographical representation. That view seems to be widely shared. Speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community on 29 October 1980, the Ambassador of the Netherlands, my good friend Ambassador Richard Fein, stated that the Nine would favour in principle a limited membership on the basis of equitable geographical representation. He did indicate, of course, and I should say this in order to be fair to him, that the Nine also believed that no State which wished to participate should be excluded.

My delegation believes that the indispensable basic requirement for a preparatory committee of limited membership is reconcilable with opportunity for participation by other Member States of the United Nations. The experience of the preparatory committee of the first special session clearly showed this. Besides, we all work first through our various regional groups, in which our views are taken into consideration before a group position is presented to any committee, preparatory or not. In the circumstances, an enlargement of the first preparatory committee of 54, that is, the preparatory committee of the first special session, which would give each regional group a few more seats, as is

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

now being informally considered by the Chairman of our Committee, should in the view of my delegation provide a satisfactory solution, and it is my hope that we would all give the Chairman the support he requires in order to be able to conclude this matter expeditiously. Since equitable geographic representation is a basic principle which we all have to bear in mind, the enthusiasm for participation within each regional group should not distort that principle. Thus, each group will have to assist the Chairman of the First Committee by making intra-group arrangements, which of course may not exclude the possibility of an understanding that any group can substitute some of its members for others within the preparatory committee, provided the total representation of the group remains at the agreed number. This would be an internal arrangement, on which we can all reach understanding.

In view of the need to work out the modalities for the operation of the preparatory committee, it is the hope of my delegation that all regional groups will assist the Chairman to reach agreement leading to the adoption of the draft resolution not later than the end of this week.

Permit me now to express some preliminary views of my delegation on the special session itself. Two years ago, when thought was being given to the timing of a second special session devoted to disarmament, I expressed the preference for 1982 rather than 1981, which had then been widely suggested. My main reason was that if sufficient time were not given for us to digest and to implement the Programme of Action elaborated at the first special session devoted to disarmament, a second session devoted to disarmament would be no more than a session of recrimination. In effect, it was my belief that one of the essential functions of the second special session would be to take stock of the implementation of the carefully prepared programme in the Final Document. But it seemed to me that we needed a fairly long time in order to give ourselves the opportunity to take stock, and to take into account the implementation of that programme over the fairly long term we would have allowed.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

My delegation believes that the Final Document was and is a major achievement embodying the aspirations of the international community gathered together for the first time in such large number to focus on the subject of disarmament. To that extent, one may say that the Final Document of the first special session may be irreplaceable; we might perhaps not have the time to elaborate such a large number of principles. However, the events in the period between now and 1982, those achievements and happenings, when taken together with our experience so far, may well dictate the necessity of not regarding the Final Document of the first special session as an ex cathedra document. Its purpose was not to lay down a new Bible, even if many have from time to time referred to it as such. Rather, it was to guide activities in the field of disarmament through the implementation of the Programme of Action in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration on disarmament

"with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

(resolution S-10/2, para. 43)

Those were the words of the Final Document itself.

A major question which the second special session will have to answer, therefore, is whether the Final Document of the first special session has fulfilled that hope. There is time between now and 1982 of course to determine the answer to that major question. There is time to show that the underlying assumptions in the programme of action of the Final Document are right; there is time to canalize the enthusiasm generated by the special session into agreement on concrete measures, especially in the priority areas.

In the "Elements of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade" elaborated by the Disarmament Commission at its last session in May, the Commission has recommended - and my delegation has every reason to hope that that recommendation will be accepted, thanks to the work done over the last few days

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

by the Ambassador of India as representative of the Chairman of the Commission -
that the General Assembly declare that the

"accomplishment of those specific measures of disarmament which have been
identified in the Final Document as worthy of priority negotiations by the
multilateral negotiating organ would recreate a very favourable international
climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament." (A/35/42, para. 19(10))

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

Of course, we all know what those specific measures worthy of priority negotiations are. They are also contained in the Declaration of the Disarmament Decade, and I will not bother, therefore, to repeat them here. However, it is pertinent to say that if the efforts to be exerted on these specific measures, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere, bear fruit by 1982, the approach to be adopted at the second special session devoted to disarmament may be somewhat different from what we would have to consider if no progress is made. The necessity for approaches other than those at present found in the Final Document of the tenth special session cannot therefore be ruled out ab initio. I think we shall have to wait and see what progress - if any - we make between now and 1982.

It is the view of my delegation that the second special session devoted to disarmament should not be approached as a routine review conference of parties. Indeed, there is no such thing; there are no parties to the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. The second special session devoted to disarmament is therefore not a review conference. On the contrary, there are going to be several inputs which ought to be fully taken into account in order to ensure progress from the early years of spade-work to the later years of constant negotiations and the conclusion of real disarmament measures, which we should like to see following the second special session devoted to disarmament.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament, the studies on disarmament and international security, the studies on disarmament and development and the studies on institutional requirements, to mention a few, can in the view of my delegation not only supplement the Final Document but also possibly dictate revisions of parts of it. By revision I do not, of course, mean reformulation; rather, I mean a willingness on our part to make our tools commensurate with the task which we would set ourselves.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The fact that the Government of Mexico is the depositary Government of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, affords me the privilege on this occasion, as in past years, to present to this Committee draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.29, which is sponsored by the 22 States Parties to that Treaty, namely, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico.

That draft resolution, which is self-explanatory, begins in the first preambular paragraph by recalling the seven resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly on this subject. Among those resolutions it is appropriate to recall that at its special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly intended to deal exclusively with this question and, in paragraph 63 of the Final Document, adopted by consensus, it stated:

"In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudice to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

"(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed at the tenth special session on the adherence to it;

"(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty...by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so." (resolution S-10/2)

The last part has the most relevance to the matter before us today.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In the second preambular paragraph mention is once again made, as in previous years, of the fact that within the zone of application of the Treaty, to which, as I have said, 22 sovereign States are already parties, there are also some territories which in spite of not being sovereign political entities are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I. This Protocol, as is well known, is designed to ensure that those States which de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The third and last preambular paragraph recalls with satisfaction two facts which are compelling reasons for expediting the pending ratifications of Additional Protocol I, and those two facts are: ratification of the Protocol by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 1969 and the ratification by the Netherlands in 1971.

In contrast, if we compare the dates of signature by the United States and France we see that in the case of the United States there was a delay, so to speak, of 8 years in relation to the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the United Kingdom, and of 10 years in the case of France.

If we take that into account, as well as the fact that more than 3 years have elapsed since the United States signed Additional Protocol I on 26 May 1977, and that it is almost 2 years since France did so on 2 March 1979, it will readily be understood, it seems to me, why the draft resolution, in operative paragraph 1, suggests that the General Assembly should express regret at the fact that those two signatures of Additional Protocol I

"... have not yet been followed by the corresponding ratifications, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to them ..." (A/C.1/35/L.29), and why it is also suggested in the draft that the Assembly, in adopting the relevant resolution, should reiterate those invitations "with special urgency".

We hope that the resolution to be adopted by the Assembly on the basis of our text will be adopted by consensus, as happened last year with resolution 34/71. We also hope that when, as requested in operative paragraph 2, we again consider this question next year, we shall be able to do so in conditions similar to those which permitted us last year, in the case of resolution 34/74, of 11 December 1979, concerning Additional Protocol II, to express our satisfaction at the realization of one of the aspirations of the General Assembly and that, with respect to Additional Protocol I, we shall be able to express similar satisfaction at the realization of another aspiration of the General Assembly, namely, that contained in the draft resolution we are now introducing.

The CHAIRMAN: The list of speakers for this meeting has been exhausted, but before we adjourn there are one or two announcements that I should like to make.

First, I would advise the Committee of the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: Colombia, A/C.1/35/L.11; Belgium and Greece, A/C.1/35/L.15; Congo and Qatar, A/C.1/35/L.14; Congo, A/C.1/35/L.16; Congo and Indonesia, A/C.1/35/L.21; Congo and Guyana, A/C.1/35/L.7; Austria, A/C.1/35/L.26; Egypt, A/C.1/35/L.22; and Guinea, A/C.1/35/L.4, 5 and 7.

Secondly, I would point out that a revised version of the draft resolution concerning the study on all aspects of regional disarmament has now been issued in document A/C.1/35/L.17/Rev.1, and that the names of the following delegations should be added to the list of sponsors: Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Qatar, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Members of the Committee will recall that at our last meeting I reported on those draft resolutions which would be put to a vote beginning on Thursday, 20 November. I think that we may add to them draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.17/Rev.1, "Study on all aspects of regional disarmament", and A/C.1/35/L.19, "Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security".

Unfortunately, I am unable to provide today a more complete list of draft resolutions ready for decision, since consultations are in progress on some of those submitted and already introduced in the Committee. I would appeal to delegations conducting consultations to intensify them so that we might act promptly on those texts.

At the same time, might I appeal also to those members submitting draft resolutions to inscribe their names on the list of speakers for the purpose of introducing them as soon as possible, since time is now of the essence and we should not delay the decision-making process if we wish to fulfil our programme of work as scheduled.

(The Chairman)

I will keep the list of draft resolutions submitted and introduced in the Committee under constant review in order to bring up to date the list of those ready for decision.

In that respect, I appeal to the sponsors of the various proposals to inform the Secretariat when they are ready to have them put to the Committee for decision.

I would remind members that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is 6 p.m. today. The Bureau has instructed the Secretariat to respect this deadline strictly and to refer to it any difficulties which may arise.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.