



General Assembly

Forty-ninth Session

First Committee

7th Meeting

Thursday, 20 October 1994, 3 p.m.

New York

Official Records

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 (continued)

General debate on all disarmament and international security items

Mr. Mwakawago (United Republic of Tanzania): I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to congratulate you, Sir, on your well-deserved election to the chairmanship of the First Committee at the current session of the General Assembly. My delegation is confident that, with your vast diplomatic experience and the help of skilful officers, you will ably steer the Committee's deliberations to a successful conclusion.

Peace and stability have so far eluded us, despite cordial post-cold-war international relations. The world is still haunted by recalcitrance of varying magnitudes. This unfortunate situation has destroyed thousands of lives and a great deal of property and has brought misery to millions of people throughout the world.

My continent has not been spared the scourge. For example, the fragile political situation in Rwanda and Burundi not only has destabilized the entire subregion, in terms of loss of life, refugees and displaced persons, but has also seriously retarded economic development and caused enormous social, health and environmental degradation in the area. Tanzania takes this opportunity to appeal once again to the international community to continue to be seized of the matter and to render assistance to those countries that are most seriously affected.

As we approach the 1995 review and extension Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it becomes increasingly pertinent for the international community, and indeed for this Committee, to take stock of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The importance of international peace and stability must override national considerations, which have for too long divided the international community on whether to extend the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally or for a limited period or limited periods.

While we are greatly encouraged by the overwhelming commitment of all parties to the Treaty to extension of the regime beyond 1995, there is little comfort to be derived from the proponents of indefinite and unconditional extension. We feel that their action is an attempt to take undue advantage of the situation. How can the advocates of this school of thought really expect support from our countries when incontrovertible data demonstrate clearly the alarming multiplication of nuclear arsenals throughout the period of the existence of the non-proliferation regime?

We regret nuclear-weapon States' non-compliance with article VI, which calls for cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date — in particular, the banning of nuclear testing, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Most disconcerting is the fact that, after almost a quarter of a century, none of these measures has been achieved in an internationally binding form.

For their part, most non-nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily given up any ambition to have a nuclear

programme intended for military purposes. The Treaty of Rarotonga, which covers the South Pacific, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which applies to Latin America and the Caribbean, and now the process that is under way to conclude a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty for Africa attest to this commitment and to the genuine resolve to outlaw these deadly weapons. It is against this backdrop that we fully support the concept of negative security assurances. Non-nuclear States, having fulfilled their obligations and responsibilities, as stipulated in article II of the NPT, deserve such assurances.

My delegation takes cognizance of the START I and II Treaties negotiated bilaterally between the United States and the then Soviet Union — now between the United States and the Russian Federation. However, we are not happy with the progress of the negotiations, which have yet to go below the final START II levels of land-based and sea-based strategic-missile warheads. All the evidence shows that the levels are higher than those of both sides in 1970, when the NPT went into force. We also see no indications whatsoever from nuclear-weapon States that they are striving for general and complete disarmament, which is one of the core requirements of article VI. Besides, contrary to popular belief, the bilateral agreements on arms reduction concluded thus far only call for weapon systems to be disabled by the demolishing of missile silos. In other words, they do not require nuclear warheads to be destroyed. They allow for the warheads and their firing mechanism to be merely dismantled, while their nuclear cores are either stored for future disposition or recycled into new weapons. This situation does not augur well since it is clear that dismantled parts can easily be reassembled for reuse.

Tanzania still believes that a multilateral forum is the best place in which to resolve arms control and disarmament issues. Indeed, it is in line with the new thinking. Therefore, the forthcoming review Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty represents a momentous opportunity for signatories to rectify the inherent weaknesses of the Treaty. This means getting rid of the outmoded concepts that dominated the bipolar world for years. We must be forward-looking in working for qualitative changes which would enhance the credibility of the regime with legally binding commitments by all parties concerned to eliminate all their nuclear warheads within an agreed time-frame. Any attempts to weaken this commitment, thus widening the dichotomy between nuclear Powers and non-nuclear States, will be very counter-productive.

I also wish to draw the Committee's attention to the decision taken at the Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Cairo last June, to re-submit and put to the vote the draft resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. This move is important because it will help to sensitize the international community to the need for total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

We all welcome the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban Treaty, which commenced earlier this year. We are delighted to learn that some tangible progress has been made. Unfortunately, lack of political will on the part of some countries stands in the way of the process of negotiation. We appeal to those countries to cooperate lest we should be compelled to revert to the Amendment Conference on the partial test-ban Treaty and begin thinking beyond a comprehensive test-ban treaty. To this end, the conclusion of a convention banning all nuclear weapons has the full support of my delegation, for it will further solidify the resolve to eliminate nuclear weapons for ever.

Let me also refer to the disturbing developments regarding the inventory of nuclear material unaccounted for and the misplaced nuclear warheads, which can have grave consequences for world peace, security and stability.

It is most unfortunate that yet another kind of arms race in respect of stockpiles of fissile material is now threatening to emerge, on the pretext of energy security. Indeed, the world has reached an appalling stage at which some countries are becoming unable to account fully for their own inventory of plutonium and are actually admitting cases of misplaced warheads. This is a dangerous and unprecedented dimension, unheard of in the entire history of the nuclear era.

If the world can lose track of the nuclear materials it possesses, is there any need to continue producing more? The only viable way out of this vicious circle is for the international community to impose, decisively, a total ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

The failure by the United Nations Disarmament Commission earlier this year to reach consensus on two important items was a great set-back for the work of the Commission since the commencement of a revised package which settled on a shorter list of agenda items a few years ago.

The agenda item on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields was unceremoniously put to rest after four years of strenuous deliberations. We still insist on the need for this issue to be considered carefully in all other international forums. To deny the transfer of dual-use technology to developing countries because of the misconceived fear of its military use is as illogical as it is unfair, especially when such decisions are taken by exclusive clubs without transparency. While we agree that internationally recognized export-control regimes could help in preventing the spread of technologies relating to the production of weapons of mass destruction, such regimes should not become obstacles to access to technologies for peaceful and legitimate purposes.

The second item, on the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, was also not concluded. Hence it has been deferred to next year's session. We have had occasion in the past to express our disappointment and concern with regard to the refusal of the major nuclear-weapon States to allow any real progress to be made on this item. We urge those States to summon the necessary political will to expedite progress on this important matter.

My delegation continues to cherish the principle of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean as an impetus to the realization of the goals of peace, security and stability in the region. Tanzania, which borders on the Indian Ocean, has every reason to be concerned about the external military presence in the Ocean.

Some 22 years of concerted efforts on the part of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean have not been able to yield positive results. This year the Ad Hoc Committee held another session in New York to consider new, alternative approaches in conformity with General Assembly resolution 48/82. It is our fervent hope that all members of the Ad Hoc Committee will in future participate fully in its work, given the cordial post-cold-war atmosphere existing within the Committee and the international system.

Since we are discussing new, alternative approaches, we sincerely hope that this is an opportune moment for all Members of the United Nations to contribute their views. We also welcome the imminent entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and we view this development as an inspiration to the Committee and, indeed, an incentive for those who have left the Committee to resume participation.

Lastly, let me assure the First Committee of my delegation's support and cooperation in ensuring the success of its deliberations.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, upon your election to your important post. We hope that under your guidance we shall achieve good results, including progress in the rationalization of the work of the First Committee.

I should also like to express my gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for his important address to the Committee.

The Russian delegation shares the main provisions of that address and expects that they will be appropriately reflected, not only in the resolutions of the current session, but also in decisions of other important international forums, and, first of all, of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Taking into account earlier decisions and your recommendations, Mr. Chairman, I shall touch briefly on the most important issues.

In his address before the current session of the General Assembly, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, stated the Russian view of the programme of action in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. This programme bears witness to Russia's intention to go along with other nuclear Powers in de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons for security, to move steadily towards the final goal — the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere in the world as envisaged in United Nations decisions and as stated in the Russian military doctrine.

One of the main tasks of strengthening global stability today is the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons.

The strengthening of the regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has key significance in this regard. Russia stands for the indefinite and unconditional extension of this Treaty at the Conference next year. The confirmation of the effectiveness and the broadening of the adherence to the Treaty would speed up the process of reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals, and would further enhance international security. We express our satisfaction with the growing number of

parties to the Treaty and urge those States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty as soon as possible.

It is highly important to stay on realistic ground on the issue of the extension of the Treaty. If we look at the situation without any bias it becomes clear that a lot has already been done with regard to the implementation of the NPT, especially article VI, and a lot more will be done if the stability provided by this Treaty is maintained and strengthened.

There is also a need to intensify the negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty so that it could be signed next year, thus marking the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations by a cessation of the upgrading of the quality of nuclear weapons. The report of the Conference on Disarmament demonstrates that the initial stage of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, devoted to an in-depth study of the issues and to the presentation of the positions of States, has already been basically concluded. Next in turn is the decisive stage of finding mutually acceptable decisions on issues which have already been identified. Stipulating that the signing of the Treaty should take place not later than in 1995 does not, in our view, imply that the NPT is made a hostage to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. On the contrary, such a position testifies to the fact that we are serious about achieving the prohibition of nuclear tests as soon as possible.

We urge all States to work for the success of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and we urge the nuclear Powers to observe the moratorium on such tests. In this respect, the nuclear explosion carried out by China on 7 October this year is a matter of serious concern to us, as it is to many others.

Russia is in favour of giving the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT which voluntarily repudiated the nuclear option and honestly fulfil their obligations under the Treaty more clear-cut security assurances, which would ensure appropriate assistance to them by the United Nations Security Council should they become subject to nuclear threat or blackmail. It is known that the President of Russia has proposed that a special meeting of the Security Council be held at the foreign minister level in the very near future with a view to reaching agreement on a new Security Council resolution elaborating further the provisions of the well-known resolution 255 (1968).

Russia stands ready to work actively for the strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear States

concerning the use of nuclear weapons against them, the so-called negative assurances. What we are talking about is both the development of an international convention and also, as a first step, the reaching of an agreement by all nuclear States on a common formula for such assurances that could be reflected in a relevant resolution of the Security Council.

I should also like to remind the Committee that Russia is in favour of beginning, at the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations devoted to working out a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The mandate for such negotiations would be based on the relevant resolution adopted by the General Assembly by consensus at its forty-eighth session. We proceed from the possibility that nuclear Powers may put the weapon-grade materials released by the process of arms reduction under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I should also like to remind the Committee that Russia and the United States, as was agreed in the course of the September meeting of the Presidents of our two countries in Washington, will intensify their dialogue with a view to comparing their conceptual approaches and developing specific steps to adjust the nuclear forces and practices of both countries to the changed situation in the sphere of international security, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions and limitations of the remaining nuclear forces.

The new international realities make it imperative that all nuclear-weapon States participate in the process of the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons. Experience shows that the method of solving problems related to nuclear weapons through bilateral agreements, even the most important ones, has its limitations. In view of their interdependence, nuclear problems call for a comprehensive approach.

Having in mind these considerations, the President of Russia put forward a proposal regarding preparation by the five nuclear-weapon States of a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability. The advantage of having such a treaty is that it covers the most essential element in the nuclear-weapons chain, that is, its material and technical base. The treaty would address in a comprehensive manner the problems of banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; banning the re-use of weapons-grade fissile materials which are extracted from the nuclear munitions that are being reduced; eliminating nuclear charges; and reducing nuclear-weapons delivery vehicles.

A treaty of the five nuclear-weapon States, together with a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and an efficient regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would open up prospects for the steady and predictable advance by all countries towards a stable, nuclear-weapon-free world in the twenty-first century. The elaboration of such a treaty by the five nuclear-weapon States would also facilitate the multilateral efforts undertaken at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in respective areas, without duplicating them.

Obviously, the current nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear Powers do differ. Therefore, the measures planned could be implemented stage by stage, with due respect being paid to the specific aspects of the nuclear potential of given countries, while allowing for asymmetry in their commitments. At the initial stage, while Russia and the United States would be in the process of agreeing upon follow-up steps aimed at a reduction of their nuclear forces, other nuclear States could pledge not to build up strategic nuclear weapons which are in their possession. It is also important that the treaty include a pledge by all parties not to arm themselves with new kinds of strategic weapons which at this time are not in their arsenals.

Russia, being among the first countries to sign the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in Paris on 13 January 1993, continues to make efforts to ensure its coming into effect. In their joint statements in the wake of the January and September summit meetings of 1994, the President of Russia and the President of the United States expressed their intention to promote early ratification of the Convention and noted the need for all countries to adhere to it and to take urgent measures which would help to bring it into effect, advisably as early as 1995. Russia is taking measures at the national level in preparation for fulfilment of its obligations under the Convention.

We are satisfied with the results of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the 1972 biological weapons convention. The mechanism for negotiations which was set up at this Conference should now begin functioning without delay, in accordance with the mandate that has been agreed upon.

Increasingly important are the issues related to conventional weapons, particularly the idea of ensuring transparency. Russia will continue to support fully the activities concerning the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons and provide the necessary data for it. It is essential to seek the universal participation of States in this Register.

Russia is in favour of holding a conference in 1995 to review the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

We also intend to impose the maximum restrictions on exports of anti-personnel mines. Russia advocates a widening of cooperation, under United Nations auspices, in the implementation of programmes of assistance in mine clearance. We have substantial experience, highly qualified experts and technical means which could be used within the framework of such programmes.

The process of disarmament, renunciation of the arms race and conversion of the military industry require the solution of extremely complicated economic and social problems. It is important to harmonize the efforts of the international community. This has been the thrust of Russia's proposal to convene in 1996, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference devoted to the problem of international cooperation in the area of conversion.

Our main policy is still to achieve more active use, in the field of disarmament, of the capabilities of the Security Council.

We also support the view expressed by the Secretary-General concerning the need to integrate disarmament and international security efforts. We consider that this approach should be reflected in the work of the First Committee.

Mr. Razali (Malaysia): Mr. Chairman, the Malaysian delegation would like to extend its best wishes and congratulations to you and your Bureau.

If we recall that the United Nations was established, in the words of the Charter,

“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”,

we note that those expectations remain largely unfulfilled. In fact, new conflicts have emerged, while old ones have resurfaced.

As the United Nations approaches its fiftieth anniversary, and we take stock of its achievements in maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the Charter, here again we are sorely disappointed. In order to meet the new realities of the post-cold-war era, the

United Nations must continue to assert, as well as exert, itself in regard to the full range of issues relevant to disarmament and international security. The United Nations has a pivotal role to play and a primary responsibility in regard to all issues of disarmament, given the global implications of the subject.

Nuclear disarmament has always been at the heart of the disarmament debate. The year 1995 will be an important one for the issue of nuclear disarmament because the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will convene its review and extension Conference. Notwithstanding its imperfections, the NPT is a viable instrument against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and there is no doubt in our mind that it should be extended.

The Treaty provides for three options for its extension, namely, an indefinite extension, or an extension for a fixed period, or an extension for a series of fixed periods. An argument has now surfaced that there are actually no other options than the indefinite extension, because any other kind of extension would necessitate amendments to the Treaty. It is further argued that amendments can take place only at an amendment conference.

Malaysia is committed to the position expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement in a document circulated at the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 1995 review and extension Conference. We believe that in order for the Treaty to be extended indefinitely, there must be a clear, verifiable correlation with corresponding advances in areas that would ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons.

These areas are the comprehensive nuclear-test ban, security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States, the ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, respect for existing and future nuclear-weapon-free zones and allowing full access by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to nuclear material and technology to be used for peaceful purposes. A series of actions are required over a fixed period of time to negate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty.

An indefinite extension of the Treaty is tantamount to changing the Treaty from one that is against the proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons into a Treaty that legitimizes nuclear weapons. By indefinitely extending the Treaty, we would leave nuclear weapons for ever in the hands of a few self-appointed arbiters of the fate of this planet. It has been said that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must not be fought. In this regard, concerted and transparent efforts must be made by nuclear-

weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination.

The NPT must gain universal ratification in order to ensure a nuclear-free world. As far as we are concerned, the discriminatory nature of the Treaty is responsible for the omnipresent danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is our hope that the 1995 Conference will provide parties to the Treaty with an opportunity for frank and constructive dialogue about each other's obligations.

Malaysia is in full support of the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban the mandate to begin substantive negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation regrets that after a year of negotiation there is still no indication that such a treaty will be concluded before the 1995 NPT Conference. In the meantime, we would like to call on the nuclear-weapon States to continue showing restraint in terms of self-imposed moratoriums on the testing of nuclear weapons.

My delegation is equally concerned over reports pertaining to the so-called revolution in simulated nuclear bomb technology and its implications for nuclear-weapon testing. If these reports are confirmed, it may necessitate a review of the proposed thrust of the comprehensive test-ban treaty itself.

As is well known, the International Court of Justice has been requested by the World Health Organization to give an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, Malaysia has recently made a submission to the Court arguing that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal. Consistent with this decision, we look forward to the submission of the resolution of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on this issue to this Committee.

The proliferation of conventional weapons deserves our priority attention as well. The arms industry has continued to flourish unabatedly. The major Powers, which are permanent members of the Security Council, are the principal producers and exporters of arms and weapons of mass destruction, which contribute to death, devastation and despair. This is indeed ironic when one considers that States Members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The United Nations should ensure that the procurement of conventional arms will not threaten international peace.

While acknowledging the legitimate defence needs of a country, we are opposed to the production and sale of more potent and efficient killing machines, equipment and products. In this context my delegation would like to see a ban on the use and development, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of all types of land-mines. Any attempt to draw distinctions between categories of mines on the basis of self-destroying and self-neutralizing mechanisms should be resisted.

We are encouraged by the proposal made by the United States with regard to the moratoriums on the export of mines. We are also supportive of the initiative pertaining to assistance in mine clearance. Indeed it should be mandatory for all mine-exporting countries to contribute to the Trust Fund for the provision of assistance in mine clearance.

The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms under General Assembly resolution 46/36 L was acknowledged as an important achievement in the efforts to promote confidence-building and disarmament. Malaysia, as one of the countries actively involved in the drafting of that resolution, wishes to seek greater participation of States in the operation of the Register. We believe that the Register must continue to be maintained and developed to include weapons holdings and weapons acquired through national or domestic procurement. The categories of weapons to be reported should also be expanded.

The role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security is an important dimension of our debate. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter recognizes the role that could be played by regional organizations. At the same time, we must take into account the differences within and among existing regional organizations. Most of the regional organizations, especially in the developing regions, are essentially devoted to the provision and enhancement of economic cooperation.

In recognition of the value of regional arrangements, Malaysia and its partners in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are now undertaking serious efforts through the ASEAN Regional Forum to contribute to confidence-building measures. ASEAN itself has consciously worked to achieve regional resilience among its members. The convening of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Declaration on the South China Sea are signals that ASEAN has come of age and is ready to take charge of its own destiny.

The call for reform and restructuring of the multilateral system must of necessity include the whole disarmament mechanism as well. Last year the Secretariat restructured its Office for Disarmament Affairs into a Centre. We believe that the restructuring should also include the form and functions of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and those of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York. The Conference on Disarmament has been in existence for more than two decades and the United Nations Disarmament Commission for about the same time. Yet what tangible results have emerged from them? We need to take a hard look at these two bodies.

It is timely to give consideration to the transformation of the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Both could be transformed into a single functional commission similar to the commissions under the Economic and Social Council, with an elected membership.

Mr. Aljunied (Singapore): Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the First Committee, on your election to office. We are confident that under your guidance our Committee will have a productive session.

The end of the cold war has ushered in a new global dynamic, triggering the evolution of a complex pattern of cooperation and competition. While the demise of bipolarity may have brought down ideological barriers and created a sense of optimism, it has also brought uncertainty in its wake. This juxtaposition of opportunities and uncertainties is clearly reflected in the United Nations Secretary-General's comments in a report on the work of the Organization, in which he stated:

“The period we have entered is Janus-faced. It wears both the aspect of hope and the countenance of dangerous unrestraint. In one major segment of world affairs, we have witnessed political change of a phenomenal character. In large parts of the globe however, the scene continues to be one of simmering resentments, violent collisions and at best a precarious peace.”

The United Nations success in Namibia and Cambodia, the current peace process in the Middle East, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the impending elections in Mozambique have engendered optimism. However, new conflicts have emerged, motivated by racial, religious and cultural hatred. The tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia are testimony to this.

One of the major challenges facing the international community in the post-cold-war world is that of the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. My delegation wishes to express its concern about this continuing trend. Singapore is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and supports the efforts of the international community to control the rapid spread of those deadly weapons. Also cause for alarm are several recent cases of illegal trafficking in and smuggling of plutonium and other radioactive substances.

Nevertheless, we are heartened to note some recent positive developments in disarmament. The Convention on chemical weapons, which was successfully negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and signed in Paris in January 1993, and the decision of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the biological weapons Convention to strengthen the Convention are some examples. There is a growing awareness that although disarmament is an objective in itself it is also the central component of any vision for a new world order. The international focus on disarmament has also shifted from nuclear disarmament to include issues relating to transparency in the transfer of arms and the non-use of conventional weapons that cause great bodily harm, such as land-mines and chemical and biological weapons. Disarmament is therefore an integral part of the larger process of building an enduring peace.

While disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, has to be pursued, my delegation is of the view that at the same time the international community could also undertake confidence-building measures. As mutual trust and confidence among States increase there will be less need to arm ourselves to the teeth. Confidence-building measures promote understanding and trust between parties. This is an integral part of preventive diplomacy, a term highlighted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report "An Agenda for Peace".

In the Asia-Pacific region there have been efforts to establish a comprehensive institutionalized mechanism for dealing with peace, security and disarmament. The aim is to build a predictable and constructive structure that could encourage and reinforce positive patterns of behaviour. Regional organizations like ASEAN have, in conjunction with the United Nations, been exploring ways and means to create suitable structures to manage change and to ensure that favourable conditions for growth and development continue. One confidence-building measure that we have in our region is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-

East Asia, concluded in 1976. It is a unique diplomatic instrument in the region in that it establishes a code of conduct and provides a mechanism for dispute resolution. It currently has as signatories the ASEAN countries, Laos, Viet Nam and Papua New Guinea. The principles and purposes of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia were endorsed in consensus resolution 47/53 B, which was sponsored by more than 137 States from the different regions at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly in 1992.

Another positive development in developing confidence-building measures to deal with issues of peace, security and disarmament is the establishment by ASEAN of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1994. The Forum was established as a consultative body with a view to building mutual confidence, preserving stability and ensuring growth in the Asia-Pacific region through the creation of a network of constructive relationships. The Forum differs from other bodies in that it emphasizes consensus-building.

There are currently 18 participants in the Forum: the ASEAN countries; their dialogue partners, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the European Union; three observer countries, Viet Nam, Laos and Papua New Guinea; and two guests, China and the Russian Federation.

As pointed out by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Alatas, in his recent address to the General Assembly, the formation of the Forum is an indication that regional and subregional organizations can continue to make substantial contributions to the cause of disarmament and peace. The Forum can also contribute to preventive diplomacy, since it seeks to manage change in such a way that a stable relationship between the major and the regional Powers will evolve gradually and peacefully. This mechanism of open dialogue and consultation serves to allay suspicions and fears and is significant in a region where there are many outstanding territorial disputes. We believe that, although the Forum is an Asia-Pacific invention, its values and principles are universal. The Forum aims at creating a web of cooperation and understanding among countries in the region. Singapore is confident that the Forum will continue to develop and become a centre for serious discussions of political and security issues affecting the region.

Mr. Rahman (Bangladesh): Mr. Chairman, please accept the warmest felicitations of my delegation on your unanimous election. I should also like to congratulate the

other members of the Bureau. We look forward to working in close cooperation with you and your colleagues. To your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, we owe thanks for a job well done, especially for his untiring efforts to rationalize the work of our Committee.

We are living in a time of change and challenge and also of great opportunity. The end of ideological antagonisms has had a salutary effect on the international security environment and has also led to democratic renewal across the globe. The present time is thus more propitious than any in the past for substantively addressing security and disarmament and related issues. During the cold war, the disarmament process was geared predominantly to maintaining a balance between the major alliances. In contrast, today there is a legitimate and widespread desire and expectation among nations to genuinely move forward on issues that were previously thought to be intractable. This lends importance and a sense of urgency to our task.

And yet in the midst of hope there is no room for complacency or euphoria. New obstacles to peace and threats to security have emerged. Revivals of ethnic animosities; conflicts in different parts of the world rooted in religious, linguistic, cultural and economic differences; drugs; terrorism; and clandestine trafficking in arms and even nuclear materials afford tangible threats to security and peace. The threats are more diffuse and less global in range and scope than those of the cold war, but they are none the less very real and need to be addressed in all earnestness in the world forum.

A more subtle and insidious threat is the widening of disparities between North and South. Over two decades ago, the Brandt Commission cautioned that security in the North could be imperilled by instability in the South. In 1992, the Security Council, meeting for the first time at the summit level, recognized that non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields posed threats to peace and security. The United Nations Development Programme's Human Development report of 1994 has warned that the origins of future conflicts may be found in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The quest for security and peace must take these realities into account. As the Secretary-General so aptly put it, security involves far more than questions of land and weapons. It is

“the lack of economic, social and political development [that] is the underlying cause of conflict”.
(A/49/1, para. 790).

The major focus of our Committee's work has always been the imperative of curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The whole purpose of arms control and disarmament is to ensure undiminished security at the lowest levels of armaments. For Bangladesh, general and complete disarmament is a constitutional commitment. We therefore wholeheartedly welcome and support all steps, advances and initiatives in this field.

Major disarmament negotiations have often taken place outside the purview of the United Nations. The United Nations system is obviously, in our view, the appropriate and ultimate forum for arms-control issues. We believe, however, that bilateral or regional initiatives can supplement and reinforce efforts in larger forums and are therefore to be welcomed. In particular, arms-control agreements between the two largest nuclear Powers have naturally had a wholesome impact on the security environment. In this context, the recent agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin to expedite implementation of START II, so that the dismantling of warheads can begin as soon as the accord is ratified, is a most welcome development.

Non-proliferation, particularly of weapons of mass destruction, is in our view absolutely vital to international security. Next year the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will meet to review the performance of the Treaty and to decide on its extension. Bangladesh is a party to the Treaty and wholeheartedly subscribes to it. The purpose of the Treaty was certainly not to codify inequality among sovereign States. It has twin but mutually reinforcing aims, namely nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Its critics contend that it has not adequately addressed the issue of vertical proliferation and that there are today appreciably more nuclear weapon and warheads than when the Treaty came into force. On the other hand, it is certainly true that the number of avowed nuclear-weapons States has not increased in the same period. But for the Treaty, there could have been many more nuclear-weapon States today. The Treaty has therefore functioned as an invaluable instrument of preventive diplomacy.

Many non-nuclear-weapon States, including non-aligned Member States, however, have legitimate concerns and questions that need to be addressed at the 1995 Conference. Such countries would like to be reassured about access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to receive security assurances as well as assurances about non-first use of nuclear weapons. They would like to see accelerated progress on nuclear disarmament, in keeping with article VI of the Treaty. Universal adherence to the

Treaty, they feel, would also reinforce its rationale and moral weight. We hope that a strengthened Treaty will emerge from the 1995 Conference, and we look forward to working for this objective in cooperation with other States parties.

My delegation shares the view that the successful conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on fissile material cut-off would have a favourable impact on the Treaty review Conference. We are happy that some progress has been made by the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiations for a comprehensive treaty. We sincerely hope that more will be achieved in the inter-sessional negotiations that have been scheduled. I also echo the view of the Canadian representative that the First Committee should unequivocally reaffirm that production of fissile materials for weapons purposes must cease. We sincerely hope that the Conference on Disarmament will soon be able to agree on a negotiating mandate for this purpose.

Bangladesh is prepared to contribute to the major negotiations in the field of disarmament, and with this end in view is seeking membership of the Conference on Disarmament. It is our hope that the impasse on the expansion of the membership of the Conference can be overcome soon.

Bangladesh is committed to the concept and principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones and also of zones of peace and security. Nuclear weapons cannot, unfortunately, be "un-invented", and the goal for us should be their total elimination. It is our view that nuclear-weapon-free zones can supplement global efforts towards this ultimate objective, and we welcome in this connection the advances that have been made to establish such zones in Latin America, Africa and the South Pacific. Bangladesh has long been a co-sponsor of resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Bangladesh fully supports efforts aimed at eliminating other categories of weapons of mass destruction as well. We hope that the chemical weapons Convention will come into force in the course of the next year and we support the strengthening of the biological and toxin weapons Convention through an effective verification regime.

Weapons of mass destruction naturally receive more attention in public forums than so-called conventional arms. And yet excessive accumulations of such arms, which are not commensurate with the legitimate security concerns of a country, can also be a destabilizing factor. Many millions

of casualties in wars and conflicts since 1945 have been victims of conventional weapons.

The view has often been expressed that developing countries in particular should exercise the utmost restraint in respect of defence expenditures so as to ensure that procurements do not exceed legitimate security requirements. Economy in the defence sector would mean more funds for the social and development sectors. This is a view with which most people would concur. However, such a prescription, to be effective and realistic, should impose restrictions and constraints on arms-exporting countries as well. The Human Development report has characterized the arms business as one of the most reprehensible sectors of international trade, with arms traders making profits out of poverty and continuing to ship weapons to potential trouble spots. It is perhaps not realistic to expect producers not to manufacture what they can profitably sell and also not to consolidate markets through persuasion and liberal incentives, not infrequently with some support from their Governments. The solution or answer lies in the adaptation and eventual conversion of military spending to civilian production so as to reflect post-cold-war realities and priorities.

According to published figures, there was a decline in global military spending from 1987 to 1994, which generated a peace dividend of some \$930 billion dollars. In the Human Development report it is estimated that if military spending continues to decline at the very feasible rate of 3 per cent a year, between the years 1995 and 2000 another \$460 billion could be saved. Surely a fair proportion of such a peace dividend could be diverted to development purposes.

We are of the view that a new, comprehensive and holistic approach to security, disarmament and development is warranted at this time. Security and disarmament are inextricably intertwined. Peace and security are inseparable, and development is the obverse aspect of peace. There is thus a patent need for an integrated approach to the very basic issues of disarmament, security and development. Disarmament and security goals that seemed distant during the cold war are eminently achievable today. The momentum and will to move forward must not, however, be dissipated. History abounds with instances of squandered opportunities that could be redeemed only at great cost.

Mr. Mabilangan (Philippines): As this is the first time I have addressed the Chair, may I, on behalf of my delegation, extend my congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the post of Chairman of the First Committee. We

are confident that under your able leadership and with the assistance of the members of your Bureau, our work in this Committee will proceed smoothly and that much will be accomplished. My gratitude and appreciation also go to your predecessor, His Excellency Mr. Wilhelm Adolf Ritter von Wagner, for the excellent work he and his Bureau did for the Committee during the last session of the General Assembly.

As my delegation stated last year and in previous years, the end of the cold war has ushered in a transition towards a new international order, which we had hoped would bring about global stability, economic prosperity and political harmony. Regrettably, however, omnipresent territorial and internal strife has shown the ugly face of political ambition, heretofore repressed during the bipolar period.

Nevertheless, there have been a number of outstanding achievements in the political arena in the past year: the Middle East peace accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and recently the one between Jordan and Israel; the end of apartheid in South Africa; and, lately, the restoration of democracy in Haiti. But those developments pale in comparison with the needless sufferings of dislocated populations and refugees because of local conflicts, which are daily fare in the mass media.

There can be no doubt that existing international institutions and mechanisms are hard-pressed to adequately address these developments. It is only when these institutions are restructured and reformed to be more responsive to global realities and relationships that mechanisms can become more attuned to resolving disputes and keeping the peace.

Today, Governments throughout the world, of both developed and developing countries, have been challenged to be more attentive to domestic agendas: to find ways to be more competitive globally, to expand to new markets and to create jobs. Indeed, geoeconomics is assuming more prominence. Consequently, international and multilateral institutions should not only redefine themselves but should become more visible to many Governments in such high-profile activities as peace-keeping and humanitarian operations.

In the First Committee, we are fortunate to have commenced the process of rationalizing our methods of work and reforming the agenda. We have also seen, in the recent past, a steadily growing consensus in the resolution of many contentious issues. Last year, for instance, we

finally adopted without a vote the resolution endorsing negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a ban on the production of fissionable materials. These are indeed milestones. We hope that this momentum will move us forward in our work this year as well as in other important disarmament forums.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose the greatest potential threat to human survival. Nuclear disarmament has been one of the biggest issues facing the United Nations since its founding. With the cold war behind us, it is often frustrating to note that progress in this field has not kept pace with expectations.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is up for review and extension next year. While this Treaty has recognized flaws, it is the only multilateral instrument we have that limits nuclear weapons.

My delegation has participated in all sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty held thus far. We have made clear in these sessions that the 1995 Conference should be a single conference with the mandate to review and extend the Treaty. We reiterate that we are prepared to work for its extension for the longest possible period.

It is in this context, therefore, that we encourage all States parties to the NPT to adhere to, and fully comply with, its provisions. We also urge all nuclear-weapon States to accelerate their disarmament programmes to promote the confidence of all parties and non-parties to the Treaty. Only on the basis of mutual trust and confidence can we have the promise of an indefinite extension.

Achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be one of the most effective ways to encourage the process of nuclear disarmament. My delegation has always maintained the wisdom of this approach. It has participated actively in the consultations led by the President of the Amendment Conference on the partial test-ban Treaty. We have consistently sponsored the First Committee's resolutions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We therefore welcome the decision by the United States last March to continue its unilaterally declared moratorium on nuclear testing until September 1995. This moratorium would give a much-needed boost to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban within the Conference on Disarmament. It would also create an environment that would be more conducive to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1995 in that it would

improve the prospects for cooperation in the 1995 review Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty.

On other weapons of mass destruction, the Philippines is in the process of ratifying the chemical weapons Convention, which it signed in Paris on 13 January 1993. We also participated in the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, Netherlands. We shall continue to support all measures designed to ensure the timely entry into force of the Convention, which is reckoned to be the first real multilateral treaty in the field of disarmament.

The matter of confidence- and security-building measures has been addressed by my delegation in recent sessions. Let me, however, share our continuing experience of these measures in our region, South-East Asia.

Dialogue has been an integral part of our quest for peace and prosperity in South-East Asia. While the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was initially established as an association geared to promoting economic and social cooperation, the end of the cold war and its accompanying uncertainties intensified efforts between its members and its dialogue partners to discuss the security concerns of States. This dialogue process led to the organization in 1993 of the ASEAN Regional Forum, an idea that was subsequently accepted by other South-East Asian States, including Viet Nam and Laos.

The first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Bangkok last July. For the first time, the Philippines had the opportunity to propose in an ASEAN session the establishment of a regional arms register and the exchange of white papers on defence to stress the importance of transparency in building trust and confidence in the region. This first meeting, along with the declaration on the South China Sea, has, we hope, opened a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation in South-East Asia. It is also our sincere hope that this Forum will help accelerate the realization of a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Peace, stability and cooperation are indeed prerequisites of lasting economic prosperity. Many of us had the preconception at one time that once the cold war was over prosperity would immediately follow. Developing countries are accelerating their efforts to achieve greater economic progress. And one way to "leapfrog" is to ensure continuing access to new technologies for industrialization and sustained development. This becomes more urgent in a world in which high technology, including dual-use

technology, changes at an exhilarating pace and government policies become a bottleneck to innovation, access and commercialization.

In this regard, my delegation wishes to register its disappointment over the inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, for the fourth consecutive year, to reach consensus on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. This is one issue that is too important for developing countries to ignore. This agenda item was, ironically, one of the first three items that were agreed upon in the Commission's 1990 reform package. We hope that elements in the draft report, in which a large degree of common ground has been reached, can serve as the basis for any consensus document in the next session of the Commission.

Despite the unpredictable and sometimes unpleasant developments of the post-cold-war era, the prospects for lasting peace have never been so promising as they are now. The issues that confront us are also evolving. That we are nearing a conclusion on the outstanding issues can be gleaned from our voting records and the tone of the general debate. New and emerging issues on our agenda — such as the role of science and technology, objective information on military matters and the illicit transfer of arms, to name a few — are closer to home and our domestic agendas.

We have already witnessed dramatic and constructive changes in our political and social landscape. As we in the international community act to resolve the problems of the present, we must in hindsight remember that the countless adversities that plagued our planet and humankind were caused by a lack of political will and of a cooperative spirit among us. In this context, allow me to quote a pertinent portion of the policy statement of my Foreign Secretary, Mr. Roberto R. Romulo, delivered on 5 October:

"We find that the United Nations has been effective in keeping the peace in those cases in which both the parties to the disputes and the major Powers involved have turned — or have been compelled to turn — to the international community to separate the contending forces and allow them a respite from war." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 18th meeting, p. 19*)

Mr. Sandoval (Paraguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of the delegation of Paraguay, we wish to congratulate Mr. Valencia Rodriguez on his election to the chairmanship of this Committee. Familiar as we are

with his diplomatic skills, we are sure that we shall achieve positive results in the work of the Committee. We also congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election.

We all know that the survival of mankind urgently requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. However, we must unfortunately acknowledge that this does not appear to be a realistic possibility. That is why my delegation wishes to take this opportunity to support and affirm the desire expressed by many to see it become a concrete reality. What we need now is genuine will on the part of all the parties.

The benefits of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was so painstakingly elaborated and which my delegation strongly supported, are obvious. We hope that, within the framework of its review at the Conference of the States parties to the Treaty in 1995, all the consequences will be carefully weighed and wise decisions adopted to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty, decisions that will not tie our hands in fulfilling the desires of the majority. In this connection, we are very pleased that progress has been made towards the formulation of an international instrument of that kind.

As regards other related matters, we would be pleased to see greater progress in such areas as a comprehensive test ban, a ban on the production of fissionable material and the granting of effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. General Assembly resolution 48/70, adopted on 16 December 1993, stresses that a positive decision on the subject of a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be reached speedily and decisively. This has been an outstanding issue on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and the subject of a variety of strategies. We would urge all delegations to continue to put forth every effort during the preparations both in New York and in Geneva to achieve success in the negotiations.

At the regional level, the greatest tribute that could be paid to our continent is that we are providing a perfect example of the fact that it is possible to achieve a zone entirely free of nuclear weapons. Hence, Paraguay warmly welcomes the decisions of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile and Saint Lucia to become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, of 1967.

We are also pleased to note the progress that has been made along these lines on other continents. It now remains for the nuclear-weapon States to take action to reduce and

ultimately eliminate their weapons, thereby completing the logical circle.

The Government of Paraguay is one of the signatories of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and has sent this instrument to the national Congress for ratification. We expect that it will very soon enter into force, and we would urge all other States to adhere to it. The entire structure of the Convention is an example of what can be achieved in the area of disarmament through a complete ban on one type of weapon of mass destruction.

The question of the removal of mines, as well as the moratorium on the exporting of anti-personnel land-mines, has been given careful consideration by my delegation, in view of the uncontrollable and indiscriminate damage such weapons cause, above all in terms of cost in human lives, particularly among the civilian population. As is well known, mines also make peace-keeping operations in conflict zones very difficult. Consequently, we support all measures for the complete elimination of such weapons, which are so inhumane and absolutely at variance with the minimum standards of human behaviour.

As regards the relationship between disarmament and development, both of these subjects are being given major consideration in the United Nations. If, as is the case, collective efforts are now being made to make more rational use of the economic and human resources available in the world, and if, as is also the case, greater use is being made of the knowledge of science and technology to consolidate peace, we would like to see further progress in this area in response to the urgent development needs of our countries.

Here I might mention a part of the report of the Secretary-General on the subject, where he says:

“Development, too, is increasingly understood as requiring more than demands by the South on the North. Already a political consensus is emerging that a global partnership for development rests essentially upon an expansion of economic opportunities, greater participation, enlarged choices and fuller utilization of people’s potential everywhere.” (A/49/476, para. 10)

The World Summit for Social Development, to be held in 1995 in Copenhagen, will provide an excellent opportunity to consider this matter carefully and to reach decisions.

In conclusion, we associate ourselves with the idea that the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of our Organization provides an auspicious occasion for us to reach agreement in the field of disarmament, an agreement that should lead to greater international security.

Ms. Arystanbekova (Kazakhstan) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Republic of Kazakhstan would like to join in the congratulations expressed to you, Mr. Valencia Rodriguez, and to the other officers of the Committee on their election to such responsible positions, and to wish them success and good results in tackling the serious and broad agenda of the First Committee.

In the light of new political realities connected with the dissolution of the bipolar world, the end of the cold-war era and the liberation of mankind from ideological confrontation, the opportunities for constructive interaction by States in the field of disarmament and international security have increased. The role of international organizations, above all of the United Nations, in resolving these problems has increased.

In this context, we would like to refer to the report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the work of the Organization, in which he stressed that:

“The consensus reached in many areas of arms limitation and disarmament at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly clearly indicated the resolve of the international community to continue effectively to pursue genuine disarmament.” (A/49/1, para. 741)

Ever since it proclaimed its independence as a sovereign State, Kazakhstan has confirmed its dedication to the strengthening of international peace and security. One of the priority directions of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan is active participation in international disarmament processes.

On 23 May 1992, Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol and thereby became a party to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I). On 14 January 1993, our Republic signed the Convention on chemical weapons; on 13 December 1993, Kazakhstan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State.

Our young independent State, which recently adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), resolutely and consistently pursues a policy of strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons. Clear proof of this is the fact that Kazakhstan was the first to ratify the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms and the Lisbon Protocol, and took a step unprecedented in history by closing for ever the Semipalatinsk nuclear base. In 1993, Kazakhstan proposed an initiative concerning the extension until the year 2005 of the moratorium on tests of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction of all kinds.

In welcoming the participants in an international conference on the extension of the NPT held in Alma Ata on 10 October last, President Nazarbayev stated that Kazakhstan would continue to do everything in its power not to allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the planet or an increase in their destructive power, or the strengthening of the nuclear potential.

Our Head of State stressed that among the high-priority foreign policy tasks of the new Kazakhstan diplomacy were the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the extension of international cooperation in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, complete prohibition of nuclear testing, the closing of the remaining nuclear bases, reliable guarantees for the security of non-nuclear States and the establishment of international machinery for that purpose.

He wished the participants in the seminar success in reaching their noble goal, which was vital for the future of mankind: the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Among the nuclear problems facing mankind, the most pressing is that of further strengthening the international regime with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, Kazakhstan attaches great importance to the NPT and, being a party to that Treaty, not only carries out its obligations but makes every effort to contribute to the strengthening of that regime.

As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan noted in his statement to the General Assembly at the current session, at the upcoming 1995 review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons we intend to embrace the position of those States that are in favour of extending the Treaty unconditionally and for an indefinite period.

Kazakhstan signed the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State and attaches great importance to the elaboration, within the Conference on Disarmament, of effective international agreements and assurances to non-

nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The delegation of Kazakhstan considers that, at this juncture, the efforts of the international community should be focused on multilateral negotiations, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, to elaborate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty should be subject to effective multilateral controls and could have a positive influence on the process of nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of international peace and security as a whole. As a State that has suffered because of atomic and nuclear-weapon tests on its territory, the Republic of Kazakhstan seeks a total prohibition of nuclear tests. I had the honour to say that for the first time in October 1990, in my statement during the general debate in the First Committee at the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

Today I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues once again to the serious public health and environmental problems in the vicinity of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear base. To solve them, we need the active support and aid of the international community.

We attach great importance to the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the area of improving its control activities and strengthening the safeguards system. On 1 October 1993 Kazakhstan became a member of the IAEA and undertook the obligations deriving from its membership in that international organization. A safeguards agreement has been reached between Kazakhstan and the Agency on assurances, paving the way for non-military use of atomic energy in Kazakhstan. We would like to note that the adoption of a safeguards regime for all nuclear installations will require Kazakhstan to make considerable expenditures in order to work out and put into place a comprehensive system of control of nuclear components and of accounting for them. We therefore hope to have international assistance in training staff and setting up the Agency's safeguards system.

Since 1992 Kazakhstan has submitted information about conventional arms for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We attach great importance to transparency in military matters, and we consider the Register of Conventional Arms an important factor in strengthening confidence between States and ensuring global and regional stability.

Deeply concerned about strengthening its State sovereignty and security, the Republic of Kazakhstan is sincerely interested in strengthening general security all over the world, maintaining international stability and developing cooperation with all States. We attach great importance to strengthening United Nations cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations and strengthening their role in the activities of the Organization with a view to ensuring and maintaining international peace and security.

In this context, we should recall the well-known initiative of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, put forward in the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, to hold a conference on activities to ensure confidence in Asia. The goal of that initiative is to work out fundamental principles for cooperation in the strengthening of peace and stability for cooperation in the economic progress of Asian States. This idea has already been implemented. Two meetings of experts called by Kazakhstan in Alma Ata last year to discuss this initiative were attended by representatives of over 20 countries of the region, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States. Concerning the results of the Alma Ata meetings, there were two meetings, in New York, of the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of 25 States, with the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and many international organizations. At the end of October of this year, there is to be a third meeting, in Alma Ata, at the level of senior officials of foreign-policy agencies, to which we have also invited representatives of 35 States and international organizations.

We support our colleagues' efforts to rationalize the work of the First Committee with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the operation of United Nations machinery in the field of disarmament. The First Committee will have to take important and responsible decisions aimed at strengthening international peace and security. The delegation of Kazakhstan is ready for constructive cooperation with the delegations of other States Members of the United Nations in reaching our common goals.

Mr. Khandogy (Ukraine): Allow me first of all to congratulate Mr. Valencia Rodriguez on his election to the office of Chairman of the First Committee and to express our confidence that his skills, coupled with the experience and support of the Committee's members, will promote the success of its work. The delegation of Ukraine, on its part,

is ready to provide him and the other members of the Bureau with all necessary assistance.

The policy of Ukraine in the field of arms control and disarmament, being a part of its foreign and defence policy, is directed first and foremost towards ensuring the security of Ukraine and the creation of favourable conditions for the integration of our country into the world community as a democratic and peace-loving State.

The delegation of Ukraine is convinced that strengthening international security through observance of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and concrete measures in the field of disarmament would have a positive impact on the economic situation and social stability in my country, to the benefit of every citizen.

Since the first day of Ukraine's independence the main goals of the country's foreign policy have been, *inter alia*, the non-use of force in inter-State relations, significant reductions in conventional arms, the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction and strengthening of the regime for the non-proliferation of such weapons. These priorities are reflected in the relevant fundamental instruments adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine, including the declaration on State sovereignty, which determined the non-nuclear status of the country, the military doctrine and the main principles of foreign policy in which this status is reaffirmed.

The ratification and implementation by Ukraine of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the signing of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, strict implementation of the Convention on prohibition of biological weapons and a number of other international agreements testify to Ukraine's willingness to play a constructive role in the process of disarmament.

Ukraine — indeed, the international community as a whole — pays special attention to the question of resolving what is one of today's most complicated problems: the elimination of nuclear weapons. As time is short, I shall briefly address only the main challenges facing Ukraine in this field.

The signing of the trilateral statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 14 January 1994 — an event that was the culmination of intensive talks held in London, Kiev, Washington and Moscow — like the decision taken by the Parliament of Ukraine early this year to ratify START I, was one of the most important events of the inter-session

period. These documents finally removed all obstacles on the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons — obstacles that Ukraine inherited from the former Soviet Union — and opened up the prospect of the country's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the shortest possible time.

If there is logical follow-up to these steps one may hope for the settlement, in the very near future, of a number of key issues of paramount significance to further progress in the field of arms control and disarmament.

I should like to remind representatives that the arrangements that were arrived at in Moscow envisage in particular the following: providing Ukraine with national security guarantees following the country's accession to the NPT; providing Ukraine with technical and financial assistance to eliminate and dismantle nuclear weapons, as well as to secure the successful implementation of agreements already in force; providing for Ukraine's supervision of the process of dismantling and eliminating the nuclear warheads being removed from its territory; and committing the Russian Federation to the provision of safe maintenance for nuclear warheads located in the territory of Ukraine and fair compensation for the value of highly enriched uranium contained in nuclear warheads that were or are being removed from the territory of Ukraine.

As a follow-up to the trilateral statement, the bilateral agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the implementation of trilateral arrangements was signed on 10 May 1994. This agreement specifies the order and the timetable for the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine, deals with the supply, in return, of fuel rods for nuclear-power stations and defines the principles of mutual payments.

In strict observance of the provisions of the trilateral statement and the Ukraine-Russia agreement of 10 May 1994 and in compliance with the agreed programme, Ukraine has been removing nuclear warheads to the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, I should like to stress once again that our decision with regard to the attainment of non-nuclear status in the future coincided with extreme difficulties resulting from the deepest economic crisis in Ukraine.

We highly appreciate the resolve of the 16 most developed States to provide Ukraine with financial and economic assistance related to the elimination of nuclear weapons. We have already concluded relevant bilateral

agreements, and the implementation of some specific programmes has begun.

However, the process of eliminating nuclear weapons is multifaceted and requires, apart from the dismantling of nuclear warheads and the means of their delivery, the solution of a number of closely related issues — for example, the conversion of military-industrial structures and the redeployment of human resources currently used in the production and maintenance of the most terrible weapons of mass destruction.

Ukraine is ready to fulfil its obligations strictly, and I should like to express the hope — indeed, the conviction — of my delegation that other States that have a direct interest in Ukraine's nuclear-disarmament process will provide us with adequate assistance, in accordance with their position in the world economic system.

At the same time, it is obvious that Ukraine, which is giving up nuclear weapons — the most effective means of deterrence — of its own free will, has a right to receive from the nuclear-weapon States reliable security guarantees compatible with the concept of nuclear deterrence.

We are encouraged by the remarks of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, at the opening of the First Committee's deliberations, explicitly stated that there should be no delay in giving stronger international and legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. He said:

“Especially to those States that have pledged to renounce fully and unconditionally the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons, security assurances must be granted”. (*A/C.1/49/PV.3, pp. 6-7*)

The delegation of Ukraine would like to thank the Secretary-General for this important statement.

Ukraine welcomes the substantial progress made in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We should like to see the speedy conclusion of an effective, verifiable, multilateral and universally applicable treaty. This would make an important contribution to non-proliferation and disarmament.

Ukraine has signed the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and will ratify it as soon as possible. We consider it extremely important to rid the densely

populated European continent, as well as other regions, of these deadly weapons by the beginning of the next century.

We should like to place on record our support for the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is an effective and useful instrument in preventing the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. However, every effort should be made to ensure that all non-proliferation regimes are non-discriminatory. To be effective, these regimes should make possible the transfer of advanced technology for peaceful and legitimate purposes.

Ukraine believes that the international community should take strong action to reduce the threat posed to civilian populations by the indiscriminate use of land-mines. We therefore support the proposal to introduce a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. Moreover, Ukraine is working out national measures for the introduction of such a moratorium and the strengthening of control over the illicit use of conventional weapons.

Ukraine reaffirms its desire to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament with a view to taking an active and constructive part in the solution of important problems in the realm of arms control and disarmament. I should like to express our hope that the decision on the expansion of the membership of that body will be implemented without further delay.

In conclusion, the delegation of Ukraine would like to say that it is confident that the work of the First Committee this year will bring positive results and will be marked by important decisions that strengthen international peace and promote international security and multilateral disarmament.

Mr. Rivero Rosario (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba is gratified to see the representative of a fraternal country of Latin America elected to preside over the proceedings of the First Committee. We have witnessed the fine work that Ecuador has done in this forum and now that we have the Chairman's knowledge and skill working for us, we are confident that, together with the representatives of Austria and Japan, who were deservedly elected Vice-Chairmen, and Mr. Goosen, the representative of South Africa, who was elected Rapporteur, he will ensure the success of our deliberations. Here and now we wish to say that our delegation is prepared to cooperate fully in efforts to reach our common objectives in this forum.

Since the conclusion of the substantive work of the First Committee at the last session of the General Assembly, disarmament and international security items have been widely discussed, both in the United Nations and elsewhere. This confirms the importance which the international community attributes to these items.

Notwithstanding this fact, and promising though many of the results achieved may have been, in the opinion of the delegation of Cuba our past accomplishments still fall short of the expectations and needs of our people. We will not achieve a safer world, economic and social development and at length a just, real and lasting peace until we find a legitimate way to unite political will with concrete action and the common good; until we succeed in putting an end to the differences between countries with nuclear weapons and those without, between those which produce weapons and have large military arsenals and those which do not, between the great and the small, between those in the North and those in the South, between those who are rich and those who are poor.

In this context, the question of the existence of weapons of mass destruction is once again of particular importance and there is an overriding need to eliminate them completely.

The deepest yearning and the most frequently expressed desire of the international community is for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and yet, in spite of the reductions that were agreed between the two countries with the largest arsenals, the number of such weapons still in existence continues to pose a potential threat to the very survival of mankind.

Next year the fifth Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will take place, and it will have to deal with the extension of this international instrument. There is no better opportunity to show a sincere desire to strengthen peace and international security by reaching an agreement between nuclear-weapon States on the complete elimination of these weapons within a certain time-frame. This would be fully in compliance with article VI of the Treaty, in terms of the willingness of nuclear-weapon States to negotiate a complete ban on these weapons. Furthermore, this commitment would eliminate one of the basic discriminatory elements of this Treaty referred to by many countries, both parties and non-parties to the Treaty.

As Cuba has frequently stated, we favour the complete elimination and destruction of nuclear weapons. Consistent

with this position and with the commitment we made at the first Ibero-American summit, very recently the President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, in a letter to the President of Brazil, confirmed our country's readiness to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco at an early date.

The Cuban delegation shared the sense of pride at the fact that, at the last session of the General Assembly, we approved, for the first time without a vote, a draft resolution on the urgent need to establish a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Despite that fact and notwithstanding the efforts made by a group of delegations, including the delegation of Cuba, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, we can only regret that it has been impossible to finalize the negotiations because of the continued obstacles raised by some delegations.

Of no less importance, within the context of all the nuclear issues, is the question of security assurances against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons for countries that do not possess such weapons. We should like to reiterate that, although the best assurance would be the elimination of these weapons, as long as they do exist we should adopt a legally binding international instrument on the subject.

The question of a ban on the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is now being raised and this may well help prevent the qualitative development of these weapons. At the same time, we can only lament the fact that it has not been possible to establish the negotiating mandate for the appropriate body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with these questions.

We think that prompt action should be taken on this subject in the negotiating body at Geneva and that we should meet the legitimate concerns expressed by many delegations which say that it is not enough to prevent the production of this material for weapons purposes; we should also deal with the existence of material derived *inter alia* from the dismantling of the nuclear weapons that are still being produced and at the same time we should look at the potential use of this material for peaceful purposes.

As a State party to the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons, we took an active part in the lengthy — and recently concluded — process in which a group of experts considered possible verification measures with regard to that Convention, and ways to strengthen it. Early next year, a new process will begin, with a view to the consideration of possible measures to be

included in an instrument to supplement the Convention and to the drafting of such a text. We believe that this may help to strengthen the efforts to prevent the existence of biological and toxin weapons.

With regard to banning chemical weapons, we have also made our position very clear. Cuba is one of the original signatories of the chemical weapons Convention and is working very hard, within the framework of the Preparatory Committee, for the achievement of all the agreements deriving from the entry into force of the Convention and to establish the new international body. Here, in this forum, we should like to call once again for an intensification of the preparatory work in all areas on which agreements must be reached.

As part of our efforts to facilitate the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention and as an expression of our desire to help to fulfil Latin America's calling to fight against weapons of mass destruction, our country, together with the Technical Secretariat of the future Organization, is holding a regional seminar in Havana this December, dealing with matters relating to the Convention and its entry into force. Representatives and sponsors from other countries and even from other regions will attend.

My country attributes considerable importance to the opportunities provided by scientific and technological progress for economic and social development. Within the framework of the Disarmament Commission, we joined in all efforts to reach agreement on the transfer of dual-purpose technology for peaceful purposes; yet it was not possible to reach agreement on this subject.

My delegation greatly regrets that because of considerations with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, discriminatory policies continue to be defended through regimes controlling substances, equipment, technologies and know-how. These regimes obstruct the free access of developing countries and make it impossible for them to establish their own programmes for peaceful uses in these areas.

In stressing the importance we attach to expanding discussions within the United Nations regarding the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes and in an effort to reach an agreement in this area, we repeat that broad agreements are inconceivable if we start from the premise that the aforementioned control regimes must remain permanently in existence.

Mr. Hallak (Syria) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation is pleased to extend to the Chairman our congratulations on his election to chair this Committee in recognition of his outstanding diplomatic and political skills. We are confident that the Committee will conclude its work successfully under his able guidance. We would like also to extend our congratulations to the officers of the Committee and to wish them every success.

The optimism generated by the changes that took place after the end of the cold war has begun to fade as a result of the new conflicts that have started to plague the world and the old conflicts that have resurfaced, a situation that has made the maintenance of international peace and security a much more complicated affair than was expected at the end of the era of ideological confrontation. Such a situation requires us to focus special attention on building peace by promoting the emergence of a just, equitable and non-discriminatory international order wherein all nations, large and small alike, would be treated on an equal footing in a world that continues to be in the grip of chronic imbalances at the economic, military and political levels.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to international peace and security. This is an issue that has to be addressed urgently. The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides us with the valid legal framework within which we can reconcile the objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons with the need to encourage the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and thereby to consolidate security and stability in the world.

The question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ought to be addressed in both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions. Every effort must be made to reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty, accession to which has come to be a well-established yardstick of international conduct. All States should become parties to this Treaty, and they should implement in good faith the agreements providing for comprehensive safeguards. The commitment by the parties to the Treaty will be a decisive factor in making it possible to extend the Treaty at the review Conference in 1995.

The holding of the NPT Conference next year as a result of the expiry of the Treaty will afford all the States of the world a rare opportunity to demonstrate their peaceful intentions. This applies in particular to the States of the Middle East region, where the issue has become very important and crucial in light of the ongoing peace process in that region. It is unacceptable to concede an exceptional

or privileged standing to any one party at the expense of the other parties when it comes to dealing with crucial considerations that have to do with such issues as regional security, a question that must be addressed fairly in a spirit of equality.

At the 1989 chemical weapons Conference in Paris, Syria was one of the first countries to call for the Middle East to be made a weapons-of-mass destruction-free zone within the framework of the United Nations. This meant freeing the region of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. However, Israel did not respond to this call, just as it had not responded to the calls made by the United Nations, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

The accession of all countries of the Middle East region to the NPT is a crucial step towards transforming the Middle East region into a region free from all weapons of mass destruction. With this end in view, we call upon Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA so that all countries of the region may be able to agree to the extension of the Treaty. Should this be achieved, an important step will have been taken towards creating a climate of trust and contributing to consolidating peace and security in the Middle East region.

The climate of détente and the convening of the Madrid Conference have afforded the countries of the Middle East an opportunity to put an end to conflict, to break out of the vicious circle of war and to build a real and lasting peace on the solid foundations of international legality embodied in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978) and the peace-for-land formula. Peace in the Middle East needs a climate of confidence. One of the prerequisites of the creation of such a climate is the accession by all the countries of the region to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as the acquisition of such overkill weapons by any country of our highly sensitive region is cause for great concern not only for the peoples of the region but also for the peoples of the whole world. My country had expected that its early signature of the non-proliferation Treaty was going to prompt Israel, sooner or later, to accede to the Treaty as it would lessen its obsession with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, our expectation was later shown to have been misplaced.

Syria has adhered to all United Nations resolutions and conventions relating to disarmament and in that context

acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, which we signed in 1968. We have also signed the safeguards agreement and the biological weapons Treaty. My country welcomed the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and the establishment of confidence-building measures for outer space.

As regards disarmament, Syria calls for more resolute and decisive steps to be taken towards the promotion of all efforts aimed at establishing security. We also look forward to a comprehensive ban on the production of fissionable materials that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since 1961, Syria has encouraged all steps aimed at concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty in all environments.

As regards transparency in the area of disarmament, my delegation reiterates its full support for the universal drive towards building an international community which would be free from the use or threat of use of force and in which the principles of justice, equality and peace would prevail. While affirming its readiness to participate in any international effort made in good faith towards the achievement of this goal, my delegation wishes to draw attention to the special situation with regard to the Middle East region.

The issues of peace, security and disarmament in today's world have acquired a more comprehensive nature and interrelatedness with other issues such as development. This requires the creation of a conceptual link between disarmament and development by assisting in the process of economic adjustment through the activation of speedier progress in dealing with international development issues and through the consolidation of international peace and security. My delegation believes that mutual understanding, constructive cooperation and sincere political determination are bound to lead to further progress in the search for a more secure, equitable and prosperous world, if such understanding and cooperation are encouraged and maintained.

Mr. Goonetilleke (Sri Lanka): On behalf of the delegation of Sri Lanka and on my own behalf, permit me to congratulate Mr. Valencia Rodriguez upon his election and to offer my delegation's fullest cooperation in the discharge of his responsibilities. Allow me also to congratulate other members of the Bureau upon their election, and at the same time to pay a warm tribute to his predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, who steered the work of this Committee with great dedication and skill during the forty-eighth session.

We are meeting at a time when many far-reaching changes are taking place in the international security environment. The end of the cold war was the single most positive development that the world had witnessed in many decades. It took more than half a century for the major nuclear protagonists to overcome each other's real and imaginary fears and to replace confrontation with cooperation, secrecy with transparency, and pessimism with optimism. The iron curtain, the Berlin Wall and apartheid, which resulted in inhuman segregation, are, we hope, relics of the past. Despite the dark clouds we occasionally see on the horizon, we are confident that there is no turning back on the positive developments. We must grasp this unprecedented opportunity and put into action an agenda which will meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Sri Lanka is pleased to note the gradual improvement of the international security climate. Despite these positive developments, we cannot be complacent about the future disarmament agenda, both nuclear and conventional. That agenda remains heavy and unfulfilled. We are gratified to note that considerable progress has been possible in curbing the nuclear-arms race, which was the hallmark of security doctrines during the cold-war era. Nuclear-weapon States should make use of the opportunity presented by the newly evolving positive international situation and take steps to cease the manufacture of new nuclear weapons and eliminate totally their current stockpiles and their means of delivery. The time has come for them finally to admit the obvious: their national security cannot be secured by adopting doctrines based on weapons of mass destruction which threaten the very existence of the human race.

After a considerable amount of work this year, the Conference on Disarmament has come up with a rolling text, which will be the basis of our future work on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Sri Lanka shares the wish of many countries that the draft treaty should be completed at the latest by the first quarter of 1995. In view of the complexities involved in negotiating a treaty of this importance, we recognize that it would not be realistic to apply artificial deadlines. However, a time-frame for concluding negotiations will certainly provide an impetus to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee as it did to the chemical weapons Convention negotiations a few years ago. Sri Lanka is hopeful that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to produce a largely completed, if not fully completed, text by the time of the review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context, we welcome the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to resume work on the

draft treaty from 28 November to 16 December this year, and we pledge our fullest support to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, the indefatigable Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Although not directly linked, the proposed comprehensive test-ban treaty is very much related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the most widely adhered to arms-control agreement. It is now universally accepted that the NPT and the comprehensive test-ban treaty will represent an effective barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon States. Since the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly the number of States parties to the NPT has increased to 165. We warmly welcome the new States parties to the fold of the NPT.

The strength of the NPT has been its resilience. During the 25 years of its life the Treaty has been able to brave the cold war and decades of super-Power confrontation. Nobody would deny the fact that the Treaty has succeeded in preventing widespread horizontal proliferation.

Despite these positive attributes, views expressed here and elsewhere clearly indicate that the Treaty is not above criticism. However, Sri Lanka, as a country which has given its fullest support to the Treaty, believes that States parties should take a fresh look at the operation of the Treaty when an opportunity for a review is presented in April 1995. This exercise should involve improving the functioning of the Treaty in order better to serve the interests of States parties and to attract universal adherence. Those who have crossed the threshold since 1968 should be brought into the fold of the Treaty sooner rather than later.

Sri Lanka has noted various views expressed by States parties on the extension of the Treaty and hopes that this issue could be decided through consultation and negotiation. The authors of the NPT made a deliberate choice to give us an opportunity to discuss and reach a decision on the question of extension 25 years after its coming into force. This, we believe, was done with some purpose. We have now reached the stage when that historic decision must be taken. Sri Lanka is confident the decision will be a positive one and that the Conference will reach consensus on the longevity of the Treaty.

We welcome the reaffirmation by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances that, pending the effective elimination of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States should be

effectively reassured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

For nearly a quarter of a century, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have been urging the nuclear-weapon States to give such assurances. For 14 years, members of the Conference on Disarmament have been negotiating to secure effective guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States. With the positive changes in the international relations reflected in major nuclear-arms-control treaties, and the de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons in the present political and security context, Sri Lanka believes that the time is now ripe for the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances to take meaningful steps in this direction.

In the Ad Hoc Committee non-nuclear-weapon States have referred to the unilateral guarantees offered by them. While appreciating such gestures, we firmly believe that the end product of the Ad Hoc Committee should be a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding international instrument. It would be incongruous and counter-productive for anyone to insist on an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT, on the one hand, and to sidestep the issue of security assurances, citing outdated strategic doctrines, on the other.

There are several other areas of concern to my delegation. The first involves highly enriched uranium and plutonium supplies, which are accumulating worldwide and causing considerable concern to the international community.

The second area of concern is the smuggling of nuclear fissile material. This year, there have been several instances of such smuggling in Europe. This is certainly an alarming trend. It confirms the fact that there are parties interested in acquiring weapon-grade and other fissile material, which can also pose serious environmental threats. It also indicates the availability of ready supply sources to meet this illegal demand. This problem could be tackled only by taking immediate steps to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and the strict regulation of fissile material used by the civilian sector.

In this context, Sri Lanka welcomes the preliminary steps taken by the Conference on Disarmament to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangements to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We regret very much the inability of the

Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc committee. Sri Lanka is among those who hold the view that existing stockpiles have to be taken into account in our discussions, and, as such, they should be included in the mandate of the proposed ad hoc committee. To ignore the current stocks would be to invite the charge of discrimination against the future regime on fissile material.

My delegation continues to hold the view that transparency in armaments can be an effective confidence-building measure only if it can guarantee equal and balanced rights and responsibilities of all States participating in such a regime.

Sri Lanka shares the view that the United Nations Register could be expanded at an appropriate time to include military holdings and procurement. We do not see how confidence could be built by supplying information on some weapons systems and withholding it on other. To be fully effective, transparency should be applied to all armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, high technology with military application and all types of advanced conventional weapons.

While we speak of transparency in armaments, we should not ignore the more insidious aspects of arms transfers. Massive quantities of sophisticated arms released as a result of the end of the cold war are to be found in the open weapons bazaar at rock-bottom prices. These weapons are procured and transported to trouble spots around the globe by merchants of death in close collaboration with their natural allies, the drug traffickers and terrorists. States Members of this United Nations have to take effective steps, individually and jointly, to prevent this bizarre trade, which can destabilize vulnerable countries. Sri Lanka looks forward to productive work on this item in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and intends to present a working paper on the subject.

Since 1971, Sri Lanka, in cooperation with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, has striven to realize the goals of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region.

Great-Power rivalry is a thing of the past. It has been replaced by a climate of confidence, trust and cooperation. This climate is most suitable for realizing the long-held goal of the people of littoral and hinterland States to establish a zone of peace where they could interact with each other, as well as with those from outside the region, for mutual benefit. In this context, we welcome the new thinking in,

and the approach of, the Ad Hoc Committee and its search for new, alternative approaches to the realization of this objective, taking into account the emerging realities.

In view of the progress so far achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee, we sincerely hope that those permanent members which are not associated with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee at present would see the merits of actively participating in it once again. The goal of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is not beyond our reach. What is required is the necessary political will, vision, and courage on the part of all to seize the present opportunity and to work purposefully towards achieving that goal.

Year after year, we come to the General Assembly, make statements, adopt resolutions and return to our respective capitals in the belief that we have done our share of work. This is a mistaken notion. The real work involves the implementation of what we have agreed upon here. Yet precious little has been done to realize the decisions taken by the General Assembly.

For example, year after year we adopt resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Conference on Disarmament follows up by establishing an ad hoc committee. In the ad hoc committee, some delegations take the position that there is no arms race in outer space. Even if we were to agree that there were at present no ongoing developments by any State with respect to arms in outer space, one might still ask whether we should wait until such developments took place to seek remedial measures. There is an old adage which says that prevention is better than cure. We should actively pursue the matter in the Conference on Disarmament, and take appropriate measures to ensure that the arms race that destabilized the Earth not be allowed to spread to outer space.

The expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is yet another area where the Conference will certainly face widespread criticism. Since 1982 there have been no less than 34 applications for membership of the Conference. After considerable consultations, a package was presented to the Conference on Disarmament in 1993; this had wide support. Yet that package did not see the light of day, and we have not yet been able to come up with an alternative proposal. Meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament is involved in negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty without the input of so many delegations. Another year has passed without significant movement, and the Conference on Disarmament is expected

to traverse the same ground again in 1995 in search of the consensus that has so far been elusive.

Finally, my delegation notes with appreciation the role played by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific based in the capital of our friendly neighbour Nepal. The Centre has proved to be an asset to the region, and its contribution in bringing together officials, academics and non-governmental organizations of the region is appreciated by my Government. In recognition of the role played by the Centre, we hope that it will continue to receive the support of the United Nations, Member States and non-governmental organizations, so that it may become a robust institution.

Mr. Abdellah (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): I congratulate Ambassador Valencia Rodriguez on his election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are extremely glad that so able and well-qualified diplomat is guiding the work of this important Committee on political and security matters, which augurs well for the success of our work. We also congratulate the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur. We look forward to working with all of the Committee officers in a constructive spirit.

During the general debate on disarmament matters at the forty-eighth session, my delegation underscored the multidimensional nature of collective security. While the military dimension remains crucial, today's concept of security embraces economic, social, humanitarian and environmental elements. These elements are merged in their causes and effects, and only by considering them simultaneously can we understand the great complex problems now facing the international community — and only by doing so in the context of present efforts to establish a new order for peace and development.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be the focus of special attention by the entire international community and by its member States. While welcoming the progress made in recent years, we still feel that there should have been more substantial world-wide reductions in nuclear weapons, gradually leading to the complete elimination of those weapons, which affect the security not only of non-nuclear-weapon States but of nuclear-weapon States as well.

The 1995 review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should aim not only to extend the Treaty, but also to reaffirm our common determination to eliminate nuclear weapons for ever. So that the NPT can govern relations between nuclear and non-

nuclear States, it must be a universal, non-discriminatory instrument that conforms to the aspirations of all States.

It is of concern that the encouraging developments in the Middle East peace process have not been followed by regional confidence-building measures, in particular by Israel's becoming a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and placing all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That action would expedite the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The key element for halting both vertical and horizontal proliferation remains the speedy conclusion of a multilateral treaty totally banning nuclear tests in all environments. We ought also to seize the opportunity presented by resolution 48/75 L, adopted by consensus at the forty-eighth session, for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

There is no need to dwell on the negative security assurances that must be given to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The question of nuclear non-proliferation brings us to the problem of the clandestine traffic in plutonium that has been going on for some time. The origin and destination of these very dangerous materials, which can pose a threat to international security, should be determined as soon as possible through effective international cooperation. My delegation supports resolutions on illicit trafficking in conventional arms, and would favour speedy multilateral efforts in that sphere.

Excessive arsenals of conventional weapons are a destabilizing element. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was an innovative measure that could bring transparency to the world arms trade. Yet we continue to believe that, to be an effective confidence-building measure, transparency must apply to all weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, to high technology with military applications, and to all advanced conventional weapons acquired through purchase or through in-country manufacture.

We consider that serious consideration of these elements must continue in the context of the further development of the United Nations Register, which can

become universal only if all States view it as balanced and non-selective.

We regret that at its last session the group of governmental experts was unable to complete the task of further developing the Register to include categories beyond the seven now listed in the annex to resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments.

Essentially for humanitarian reasons, we must pursue the question of international regulation and effective monitoring to limit the manufacture, use and transfer of anti-personnel mines. We support the position of a number of international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Children's Fund, favouring the complete prohibition of the manufacture, transfer, stockpiling and use of land-mines.

There is a common need and desire to improve the basis of security throughout the world. The integration of the world economy, the interdependence of interests, and the links between instability and underdevelopment are new elements which motivate us, as stressed by the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Development, to rethink the notion of collective global security.

Indeed, a number of the unstable situations in the world are direct consequences of the effects of poverty and of the failure to manage certain socio-political elements. In some cases, the United Nations has been able to respond effectively and thus manage internal conflicts. However, we consider that the efforts to be made by the international community for development are much more effective and profitable, not to mention less costly, than peace-keeping operations, which, in some cases, are based on political considerations. Indeed, if we give higher priority to preventing tensions and conflicts by affording international assistance, the emergency activity in which the United Nations has tended to engage in recent years will diminish considerably, and countries in economic difficulty will be able to activate, and to ensure the success of, their development programmes.

Indeed, if the international community and particularly the developed countries do not foster an equitable international development and do not help the third world to free itself from the devastating debt crisis, to protect the environment and to prevent disease, hunger, malnutrition and poverty, the prospects for peace and security will not improve much, because the non-military threats to them will

be just as severe as those posed by weapons and military force.

Aware of the imperatives of its own security, Africa has already, since the latest summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity, held in Tunis, begun to implement its own arrangements for preventing, managing and settling conflicts in the continent. This initiative is very important and comes at a particularly sensitive moment in the history of Africa. It shows the will of the African countries to take control of the destiny of the continent, which, in addition to its current insecurity and instability, has now become almost marginalized in a world in flux because of a disastrous economic situation complicated by the debt crisis, the exponential increase in its servicing, and the deterioration of the terms of trade.

Peace and security in Africa today must be seen not in military terms but rather in economic and development terms. As they prepare for the rapid conclusion of a treaty that would make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the African countries, most of which are parties to the various treaties and conventions on disarmament, aspire to play a role in the international economic dynamics. Our continent understands that its security resides much more in its ability to meet its urgent development needs than in the power of its arsenals. The conflicts that arise there are not a consequence of the accumulation of weapons or of improvements in war machines, but rather the cumulative effects of economic difficulties, natural disasters, drought, desertification, environmental deterioration and the uprooting and frustration of the poorer elements. Such is the picture of Africa at the time of the Agenda for Peace, of the Agenda for Development, of the fiftieth anniversary of this ideal, the United Nations. Such is the picture of Africa on the threshold of the twenty-first century.

We say: contribute to the revival of Africa, to its development, to its movement upward, to its integration into international economic dynamics and to its prosperity, and there will no longer be any need to send the Blue Helmets there.

Tunisia considers that stability, security and development are a shared responsibility. It has therefore consistently adopted a diplomacy of cooperation with its immediate neighbours within the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union, with the African countries, the Arab world and all other friendly countries.

My country attaches particular importance to security and to cooperation with its partners in the Mediterranean

with a view to making of that area a zone of peace and to encouraging the emergence of an integrated and prosperous Euro-Mediterranean region. In terms of its political, economic, social and cultural dimensions, security in the Mediterranean becomes an indivisible, global concept that should, in view of the interdependence of interests, imply a strategy of long-term co-development between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

In that spirit, Tunisia has continued to ask for a Mediterranean dialogue to work out regional, multilateral, multidimensional and multiform cooperation. We would set up what President Ben Ali referred to, in his speech to the European Parliament in 1993, as a “co-development and partnership contract” that would link the countries of the north and south shores to make of the Mediterranean a centre of solidarity and development.

It is important to stress in that regard that my country is pulling together its efforts to achieve what I might call “the Mediterranean ideal”, to which we sincerely aspire: witness the many international events organized in Tunisia with the aim of establishing that ideal and of enriching the debate on what the two shores of the Mediterranean should think of as their common future. In this month of November we organized an international symposium in Tunis on the future and on cooperation in the Mediterranean. In a few days Tunis will also host the “Med 21” conference on sustainable development in the Mediterranean, which is related to the approach adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio. The Mediterranean — a fragile sea over which passes one-sixth of the world’s maritime traffic and a third of its international trade, and whose waters are renewed only every 100 years — is a pilot area in which the ambitions of and the commitments entered into at Rio will be put to the test.

Such initiatives will help the peoples of the Mediterranean to become really aware of their interests. Tunisia, with its usual pragmatic approach, is convinced that in a world in flux barriers should no longer be erected between nations and peoples. On the contrary, we must open the doors to cooperation and to international mutual assistance, which alone will lay the foundations of international peace and security.

Mr. Hasan (Iraq) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It gives me great pleasure at the outset to express our pleasure at the election of Mr. Valencia Rodriguez. We are certain that his chairmanship of this important Committee will be yet another effective and valuable contribution by his country, Ecuador, which has an outstanding record in promoting the

achievement by the international community of the goals of justice, peace and equality.

The current international climate is characterized by radical changes that make it incumbent upon us, more than ever before, to change our approaches and our methods of work in response to such changes. The international community still faces numerous swords of Damocles that continue to hang over all our heads, such as nuclear weapons, ethnic and regional wars, famines and underdevelopment.

Unless these challenges are confronted collectively by the entire international community, no one will be spared the grave consequences. These challenges devolve upon the United Nations and its organs a number of heavy tasks in facing up to them in a manner that takes its cue from principles that transcend the dictates of the narrow interests of this or that State, and that renounces totally the policies of force and double standards.

The non-aligned conference held recently in Cairo underscored the fact that the approach to issues of international security will never be effective or lead to durable solutions unless it is non-discriminatory and well balanced and seeks to ensure the security of all countries by means of complete nuclear disarmament, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the gradual reduction of conventional weapons. These are objectives which should be accorded the priority envisaged by the international community in the 1978 document.

The 1995 non-proliferation Treaty review and extension conference is scheduled to convene shortly. Most of the States parties to the Treaty have voiced the view that the extension of the Treaty is linked to the achievement of real progress in the areas of: nuclear disarmament; the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; agreement on comprehensive negative security assurances; negotiating measures on the conclusion of a non-discriminatory treaty; and encouraging technology transfers for peaceful purposes.

On the other hand, the countries of the Middle East, including mine, have the additional concern that arises from the fact that Israel, a country that possesses nuclear weapons, has not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. It goes without saying that it is not logical, under such circumstances, for the countries of the Middle East to be called upon to accept the extension of the Treaty indefinitely and thereby to perpetuate in the region a discriminatory situation that runs counter to the principle of

universality. Justice and logic require that Israel should not continue to be the exception to the principle of universality even though the Security Council has called upon it, in its resolution 487 (1991), to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Conference on Disarmament has revived the hopes of the international community after the period of stagnation that followed the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. While we urge the Conference to move forward and to find speedy solutions to the items relating to nuclear disarmament, we wish to express satisfaction over the fact that the Conference is seriously discussing a number of important items on its agenda, such as negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the halting of fissionable materials production. We hope that some States members of the Conference will be able to muster the political will that would enable the Conference to realize the aspirations of the international community in the shortest possible time.

In this context, I should like to point out that my country, which, since 1989, has been participating in the Conference as an observer, is very interested in acquiring membership. We consider that the expansion of the Conference through the admission to membership of a group of countries, including mine, would make the Conference more representative of the international community and would enrich its work and strengthen its credibility. We hope a decision will be reached soon in compliance with General Assembly resolution 48/77. We also support the call for the General Assembly to adopt a new resolution urging expansion of the Conference's membership.

A number of arms-control measures have been imposed on my country under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). My country has accepted and implemented these measures, taking into account the fact that these measures, as stipulated in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991),

“... represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery”.

Regrettably, three and one-half years after the coming into force of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and after the discharge by Iraq of all its obligations and the start of the phase of future monitoring under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), paragraph 14

of section C remains inoperative. Therefore, we call upon the United Nations and the international community to demonstrate keenness to preserve the credibility of Security Council resolutions, not to adopt selectivity in

implementing the provisions of any of those resolutions, and to pay due attention to this issue which could have grave consequences for the future of the region and the entire world.

Strength and weakness are relative. The arrogance of power should not induce some States to disregard lasting and relevant principles, namely the principles of justice, equity and non-discrimination that are emphasized in all instruments, including the United Nations Charter. International and regional problems cannot be resolved through interference in the internal affairs of others, exerting pressure, imposing sanctions, or by using or threatening to use force. Such problems can be resolved only by applying the principles of justice and equity, which are the only means of creating a world wherein security, stability and prosperity may prevail.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.