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EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament and taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major aspects of the over-all question. The series started with the 1976 edition.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even of the Powers directly concerned; for further information on the official positions of States the reader should consult the official records of the General Assembly and other sources.

For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization in previous years, the reader may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1).

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ASBM	air-to-surface ballistic missile
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
EEC	European Economic Community
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
MIRV	multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

THIS VOLUME IS THE FOURTH OF THE YEARBOOKS ON DISARMAMENT prepared by the United Nations Secretariat in accordance with the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament¹ which were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976. Since that time, the Assembly has on a number of occasions called for wider dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it in order to mobilize world public opinion in support of the objectives of disarmament.

In 1978, in the Final Document of its tenth special session,² which was devoted entirely to disarmament, the General Assembly stated that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the area of presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament.³ *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, volume 4: 1979, like the three previous volumes, is one of the means by which the Centre presents such information. It comprises primarily a review of the deliberations, negotiations and other developments which took place during that year in the United Nations bodies or under the auspices of the Organization, and in the Committee on Disarmament.

As a year devoted largely to follow-up of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session or as the direct result of that session, 1979 was to a considerable extent a year of consolidation rather than of new initiatives. Noteworthy events of the year included the beginning of the substantive work of the machinery for disarmament as revitalized by the General Assembly at its special session. Thus the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the reconstituted deliberative body composed of all Member States as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, held its first substantive session in New York from 14 May to 8 June. The Committee on Disarmament, as the enlarged negotiating body, held its first session in Geneva, convening from 24 January to 27 April and from 14 June to 14 August. The work of both bodies is discussed throughout the present volume.

The year 1979 was also the first full year of existence of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. The interest of the membership of the

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36)*, chap. II.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 103.

United Nations in studies undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations on various aspects of disarmament and arms limitation appears to be increasing. Thus, five new studies were added by the General Assembly to the six already being carried out pursuant to various mandates of the Assembly from previous years.

One of the major events of the year concerning arms limitation occurred outside the aegis of the United Nations: the signing, on 18 June, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II). That Treaty is discussed in chapter VIII.

During the year there was continuing interest in essentially all the current questions in the disarmament field, among others, development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, nuclear-weapon-free zones, banning of chemical weapons, prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction, the build-up and transfer of conventional weapons, certain conventional weapons with excessively injurious or indiscriminate effects, regional approaches to disarmament, reduction of military budgets, and the relationship between disarmament and development. Those issues are among the many discussed in the Disarmament Yearbook. Since a number of them are closely interrelated, the relevant chapters, while basically self-contained, employ cross-references to reduce redundancy.

Appendix III shows actions taken during the year in respect of existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. Thus it complements the information contained in the publication entitled *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*⁴ and appendix II of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, volume 3: 1978.⁵

While the text of the present volume was prepared mainly by the United Nations Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency contributed chapter XIV, entitled *IAEA safeguards and related activities*, and the United Nations Environment Programme provided appendix IV. Four specialized agencies, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization contributed the texts for appendices V, VI, VII and VIII, respectively. Appendix XII contains a list of the disarmament and disarmament-related resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session in 1979.

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3.

PART ONE

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament

CHAPTER I

General and complete disarmament

Introduction

THE UNITED NATIONS REALIZED, almost from its inception, that the subject of disarmament was both one of its major concerns and a question requiring solution on a comprehensive basis. The importance of the subject is recognized implicitly in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, which refers to a system for the regulation of armaments and states that the establishment of international peace and security should be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. From the outset, the question of disarmament proved to be an immensely intractable one. So far, all attempts to deal with disarmament, in various forums and involving numerous approaches, both within and outside the United Nations, have met with little success.¹

In 1959, the question of disarmament in the over-all sense was given fresh impetus with the adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV) by which the General Assembly specifically expressed the hope "that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time" Thus the Assembly established the ultimate United Nations disarmament objective² — a goal which has been reaffirmed many times. The continuing difficulty encountered in attempts to work directly towards that ideal, however, resulted in attention turning increasingly to specific aspects of arms control and disarmament with regard to which results might be achieved in the near term.³

The United Nations has none the less kept the established objective in view, and the item on the annual agenda of the General Assembly entitled

¹ *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1) provide a detailed account of disarmament efforts in the period 1945-1975.

² *Ibid.*, chaps. 4 and I respectively.

³ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), chap. I; *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), chap. II; and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), chap. IV.

“General and complete disarmament” has been most valuable in facilitating the Assembly’s consideration of a wide variety of issues and concepts, because so many new proposals, both for disarmament measures and on ways and means of dealing with the question, may be considered as directed towards that objective. Progress towards actual disarmament remained elusive throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, however, and, despite the conclusion of some important multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements,⁴ the arms race continued and remained an ever-growing cause of concern in the international community.

In 1976, on the basis of an initiative of the non-aligned group of States, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/189 B by which it decided to hold a special session devoted to disarmament. The tenth special session of the General Assembly took place from 23 May to 30 June 1978, and was the largest and most representative convocation on disarmament ever convened. During the preparation for the session as well as throughout the session itself, the concept of a comprehensive approach embracing all the specific aspects of the question was emphasized and agreed upon as the necessary and only means by which the international community could work towards the goal with any hope for eventual success, and general and complete disarmament under effective international control was once again affirmed as being the ultimate disarmament objective. That objective was referred to in various contexts in the resolution comprising the Final Document⁵ which the Assembly adopted by consensus at the end of the session.

Thus the section in the Final Document entitled “Programme of Action” encompasses virtually all aspects of the disarmament question, sets out basic priorities, enumerates measures which should be implemented in the near term, and prepares the way for future negotiations. The final section, entitled “Machinery”, describes the changes in the deliberative and negotiating bodies intended to make the United Nations more effective in fulfilling its central role in the field of disarmament. By those changes, *inter alia*, the Disarmament Commission was established as a deliberative body and given the mandate to consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be recommended to the General Assembly and submitted through the Assembly to the revitalized negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. The following closing paragraphs of the Final Document are relevant:

126. In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and re-

⁴ For a review of the agreements in force, see *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2).

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III; the Final Document is also reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix 1.

ducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

127. The General Assembly expresses its satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its special session devoted to disarmament and the deliberations thereon have made it possible to reaffirm and define in this Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities and procedures for the implementation of the above purposes, either in the Declaration or the Programme of Action or in both. The Assembly also welcomes the important decisions agreed upon regarding the deliberative and negotiating machinery and is confident that these organs will discharge their functions in an effective manner.

In their repeated reaffirmation of the established goal during the tenth special session⁶ and in the Final Document, as well as in various positive references to it made since that time,⁷ Member States have generally acknowledged that it can only be achieved at some time well in the future. In view of the complex interrelated problems requiring solution in order to halt and reverse the arms race, it is perhaps realistic that States appear to have accepted that general and complete disarmament is unlikely to be achieved according to a timetable, and that the comprehensive approach to disarmament must be flexible, leaving room for adjustment as initial steps are completed, as to both the timing and the substance of subsequent phases.

The view that disarmament measures must be sought in the context of specific measures within an over-all programme, while keeping the ultimate goal in view as the desired end of a long process, may be regarded as realistic also because the political and social institutions of the world will thereby have time to progress from present structures to those appropriate to a disarmed world. Thus the United Nations, while urging near-term implementation of concrete measures of real disarmament and not merely arms control, has perhaps, by its recent actions, placed the enormity of the challenge and the distance to the goal in a pragmatic perspective. Since the functioning disarmament bodies are established to help reach that goal, their consideration of organization and procedures as well as their substantive work are noted briefly in the following parts of this chapter.

First substantive session of the Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission convened at New York from 14 May to 8 June 1979 for its first substantive session, under the chairmanship of Mr. M. A. Vello di of India. More than 100 Member States participated. For the session, the Commission had before it a number of documents, among them a report of the Secretary-General⁸ comprising a compilation of views and suggestions of Member States on a comprehensive programme of disarmament

⁶ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. IV.

⁷ *Ibid.*, and see, for example, pp. 9-10 and 14-17 below.

⁸ A/CN.10/1 and Add. 1-6.

and another⁹ listing proposals contained in the Final Document of the special session which the Assembly, at that session, was not able to deal with fully¹⁰ and identifying those which were covered by separate resolutions at the thirty-third session. The Commission also had before it a number of documents concerning disarmament received from non-governmental organizations (NGOs).¹¹ Representatives of a number of NGOs also attended the plenary meetings.

The first substantive item on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission was the consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, a subject which is discussed in detail in chapter III below. The two other major substantive items were the consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the harmonization of views on the reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources to economic and social development.

At the beginning of the session, the Commission held an exchange of views on the items on its agenda during which it focused mainly on the one concerning a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It formed a working group to deal specifically with that item and a drafting group to prepare its report.

During its deliberations in the plenary meetings,¹² general and complete disarmament was referred to in one way or another by many representatives, often as the accepted end-point towards which all disarmament efforts must lead or in connexion with the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In fact, the Chairman, at the opening of the exchange of views, said that it appeared to him that a consensus existed that there was a link between a comprehensive programme and the goal of general and complete disarmament. He cited paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the special session, noting its reference to a comprehensive programme of disarmament as:

... encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.

Among the delegations which linked the end goal with the programme were Mexico and Nigeria, who also referred to paragraph 109, with the former recalling that the paragraph also contained the statement that "Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament"

⁹ See A/CN.10/3, annex.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 125.

¹¹ For a listing, see A/CN.10/INF.3.

¹² See A/CN.10/PV.9-22 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22/Corrigendum.

The representative of Sri Lanka, in introducing the working paper¹³ containing the programme of the non-aligned group of States, stated that their proposal was meant to maintain and further the momentum generated by the special session with the long-term objective of the realization of general and complete disarmament.

Among the individual countries which elaborated on the connexion between the programme and the goal, Romania emphasized that the programme should advocate a system of steps organically subordinate to the final goal but bringing the international community closer to it, while Peru said that the programme should embody, in a gradual, balanced and verifiable process, all the measures considered likely to lead to its successful achievement. The representative of Canada noted that the idea of a comprehensive programme was based on the assumption that the goal of general and complete disarmament was valid and acceptable to all. Noting that earlier attempts to implement such a programme had failed and other items had absorbed attention for almost two decades, he held that a comprehensive programme, perhaps divided into phases, should look forward to the accepted end-point.

The speakers for many States emphasized the difficulty of achieving general and complete disarmament and the need for a step-by-step or gradual process in working towards it. For instance, speaking on behalf of the European Economic Community, the representative of France said it had been agreed by the nine member States of the Community that the goal could be attained only point by point, at the end of a long process. India, for its part, stressed that the goal was not easy to achieve and indeed might continue to elude the international community for several more decades. It supported determined efforts towards that end none the less and expressed concern that for 20 years mankind had been marching perhaps in the reverse direction. It believed in a global approach to real disarmament and that any partial measures should promote progress towards the goal. Sweden similarly observed that general and complete disarmament appeared to be at least as distant as ever before, and that through almost two decades limited measures had not moved the world closer to that objective. It expressed particular concern that whenever negotiations were approaching agreement, it appeared that new achievements in weapons technology threatened to destabilize the situation, a trend whose impact had to be considered in disarmament deliberations in the long-term perspective.

Cyprus, for its part, blamed the "outmoded" concept of seeking security through a balance of power for the continuing arms race over the past two decades. Its representative referred to what is known as the "McCloy-Zorin" joint statement of agreed principles of 1961¹⁴ which was transmitted to the United Nations by the Soviet Union and United States that year, and to other more recent proposals which had provided for agreements on a

¹³ A/CN.10/6.

¹⁴ See *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970*, chap. 4.

United Nations peace force as envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter. According to Cyprus, the Commission should bear in mind documents and proposals which had been agreed upon and, utilizing such areas of agreement, turn attention to slowing down or stopping the arms race which ran counter to all concepts of a United Nations era.

The representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Byelorussian SSR both observed that the new Soviet constitution strengthened the commitment of the USSR to strive for general and complete disarmament. The widespread acceptance of commitment to the established goal was also referred to by representatives of other Eastern European countries and Mongolia, as well as those of Colombia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Nigeria, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Other considerations put forward in connexion with the solution of the overall question included the need to ensure the maintenance of stability and security during a disarmament process (Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, and Spain), the need for confidence-building and trust (Ghana and Portugal), the view that genuine disarmament must commence with the super-Powers (China), and the role of an international disarmament organization for the verification of agreements (Sweden).

In the report of the Commission to the General Assembly,¹⁵ the section entitled "Recommendations,"¹⁶ which sets out the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, included the following introduction:

1. Advocated by the General Assembly of the United Nations for nearly two decades, general and complete disarmament under effective international control must continue to be the ultimate goal of all endeavours undertaken in the sphere of disarmament.

2. In 1969, the General Assembly, after declaring the decade of the 1970s as a "Disarmament Decade", requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

"to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control"

Although this appeal was reiterated by the General Assembly in later years, it was not possible for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to discharge this mandate.

3. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament laid the basis in its Final Document, adopted by consensus, for an international disarmament strategy, in which the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is an important element. The Disarmament Commission was entrusted with the task of considering "the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament", which was requested by the Assembly to "undertake the elaboration" of such a programme.

4. The comprehensive programme of disarmament, which would provide the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, should be a carefully worked out package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, which would lead the international community towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

The Commission adopted its report by consensus, and, notwithstanding a number of comments and reservations expressed on the substance of the programme, there was no controversy about the reaffirmation of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal.

Later, on 13 December 1979, the Disarmament Commission held two further meetings¹⁷ at which it reviewed the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and adopted a provisional agenda for its own 1980 session.

Work of the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The Committee on Disarmament,¹⁸ the negotiating body succeeding the CCD, convened at Geneva for its 1979 session from 24 January to 27 April and from 14 June to 14 August. The Committee held 52 plenary meetings and 50 informal meetings, during which it dealt with organizational matters as well as substantive questions. It submitted a report on its work¹⁹ to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

Organizational matters and agenda

Considerable effort during the Committee's 1979 session was devoted to its organization and procedures. The Chairmanship was rotated alphabetically on a monthly basis in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly taken at its tenth special session;²⁰ thus, Algeria, represented at the first two meetings by its Foreign Minister, chaired the Committee during January. In June, after appropriate consultations, Mr. Rikhi Jaipal (India) was appointed by the Secretary-General as Secretary of the Committee and to act also as his personal representative.

Although a number of arrangements were agreed upon prior to the opening of the session, many organizational matters remained to be finalized by the Committee. Various proposals in that regard were made from early in the session and an *ad hoc* working group was established to prepare draft rules of procedure.

¹⁷ A/CN.10/PV.23 and 24.

¹⁸ The 39 Member States represented on the Committee were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. The Committee on Disarmament was also open to China, as a nuclear-weapon State; it did not participate in 1979.

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 120.

In a message which was conveyed to the Committee at its opening meeting, the Secretary-General stated, in part:

The Committee on Disarmament is an indispensable instrument of the international disarmament strategy contemplated in the Final Document unanimously adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. . .

The composition of the Committee ensures better representation to different regions and is designed to assimilate diverse viewpoints in the negotiating process. .

This Committee will henceforth work with the awareness of greater interest in its progress among Member States of the United Nations. I attach special importance to the decision that States which are not members of this Committee will be entitled to participate in the discussion of the proposals or working papers which they may submit, and also to express views on questions of particular concern to them. It is also appropriate that the Committee will, as a rule, open its plenary meetings to the public. . . .

The representative of Mexico, noting the characteristics of the Committee as set forth in the Final Document, observed that his country had striven for some 10 years to improve the organization and procedures of the negotiating body; he particularly welcomed the replacement of the permanent USSR/United States co-chairmanship by the rotating system. With regard to rules of procedure, he supported provisions to prevent the Committee from being paralysed when the nuclear-weapon Powers did not submit agreed joint draft texts of treaties or conventions.

A number of representatives commented on the organization of the Committee early in the session, virtually all of them applauding the changes which had been made. Many members, for instance, welcomed the participation of France in the work of the Committee and hoped that China would soon accept the invitation to participate. The enlargement, broader representation, and further democratization of the body were widely regarded as encouraging developments, most particularly among the group of 21,²¹ which itself reflected an expansion in membership of the former group of 15, as it had been called in the CCD. A number of members referred to the necessity of continuing to take decisions by consensus. Some members regarded the Committee as a new negotiating body, while others felt that it was an enlargement of the previous one. Some, again notably among the group of 21, held that it was a United Nations organ, while others regarded the Committee as being linked to the Organization without being a part thereof.

The *ad hoc* working group to prepare draft rules of procedure held 17 meetings. It took into account proposals informally circulated respectively from the group of 21, the Eastern European States, the Western States, Pakistan and Romania, as well as views expressed orally. The draft rules of procedure²² were adopted by the Committee at its 15th plenary meeting on 28 February. Highlights include the affirmation of the new system of chairman-

²¹ That is, the members not associated with the major blocs, namely, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²² See CD/53 and Corr. 1, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/8.

ship and the detailing of the functions of the Chairman. Rule 18 confirms that the Committee will conduct its work and take its decisions by consensus, and, as the Chairman stated after consultations, it is understood that this rule applies also to subsidiary organs established by the Committee. Section IX, containing rules 32 to 36, deals with participation by States which are not members of the Committee. Section XIII, rules 43 to 46, deals with the form and contents of the reports of the Committee to the General Assembly. The rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament are reproduced in appendix I of the present volume.

With regard to the question of its agenda and programme of work, the Committee established another *ad hoc* working group, open to all its member States, which held 11 meetings. That working group had before it draft agendas submitted by the group of 21, the Eastern European and the Western groups. The draft of the group of 21 was based on the concept of an annual agenda containing items for the year, while the other two proposed a general agenda from which appropriate items to be dealt with each year would be selected. Most comments on the question in plenary meetings took both positions into account. The representative of India, for instance, suggested two kinds of agenda, one a comprehensive agenda which would define the terms of reference, competence or mandate of the Committee, and the other listing specific items to be taken up annually, taking into consideration the recommendations of the General Assembly. Bulgaria's representative believed that the agenda should be comprehensive, but that, at the same time, the most pressing and important problems should be selected for solution within a given period. Later, he observed that the Programme of Action in the Final Document provided the denominator for priorities and that agreement on the agenda was being held up because some delegations wished to include all items of importance despite the fact that the Committee would not be able to consider them all. The position of the United States was that the recommendations of the Assembly should not be viewed in the same light in formulating the agenda as in considering the programme of work. Since the programme would be based on the agenda, a principal consideration in developing it would be which subjects could be usefully addressed in such a programme, taking into account the time available and the "ripeness" of particular subjects under negotiation.

The agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament²³ was adopted at the 26th and 27th plenary meetings, on 10 and 11 April. In the introduction of the document, the Committee committed itself to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Thereafter, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session, the Committee stated that it would deal with the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

²³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*, para. 20; and CD/53 and Corr. 1, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/12.

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within that framework, the Committee, for 1979, decided to consider the following specific items:

1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
4. Chemical weapons
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
6. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

In the programme of work, the Committee scheduled, for the remainder of the first part of its 1979 session, consideration of items 2 and 4; for the second part of its session it adopted a schedule providing for consideration of all the items on the agenda for the year. The work of the Committee on items 1 to 5 is dealt with in pertinent topical chapters of the present volume.

Consideration of general and complete disarmament

The Committee on Disarmament clearly enshrined its commitment to promotion of the attainment of general and complete disarmament in the introduction to its agenda and in area ten thereof which deals with a comprehensive programme of disarmament and, in that connexion, includes the words "leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control". Some other areas, such as reduction of military budgets, reduction of armed forces, and disarmament and international security, are also connected to the ultimate goal.

Early in the debate in the Committee,²⁴ many members expressed their Governments' overall views relating to the arms race and general disarmament.

²⁴ CD/53 and Corr.1, appendix IV, vols. I-III, documents CD/PV.1-52.

The representative of France, in introducing his country's views to the Committee, expressed frustration at the scant results attained so far and observed that there were two temptations: first, to freeze the existing international balance through the perpetuation of blocs, and secondly, to believe that general and complete disarmament is possible in the world as it is. Either, he held, would be equally disastrous. The essential course lay in the fundamental principles embodied in the Charter, from which the right of States and peoples to security is derived. That right, in France's opinion, was comprised of three major elements: strict observance of international guarantees of security, starting with those embodied in the Charter; the right of each State to organize its defence in order to deter a potential aggressor; and the obligation of each State not to arm to a level others regard as a threat. Deriving from that right to security, the first objective of disarmament should be the attainment by each country of the minimum level of armament compatible with its security. The representative emphasized that France did not reject the ultimate objective — rather, it did not regard it as a present possibility but as the end-point of mankind's march towards total solidarity.

The representative of the USSR read a message from Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which he wished the enlarged Committee success in solving the complex problem of ending the arms race and achieving disarmament, stressed the scope and importance of the subject and gave assurance of the support of the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative stated that his country would do everything to ensure that the Committee fulfilled its purpose by contributing to the limitation and elimination of the material basis of war.

The United Kingdom stated that arms control enhanced security only if it was credible and in that context stressed the importance of verification. In its view, undiminished security was an essential context for progress towards the final objective; it regarded the right answer as pressing ahead as fast as possible without dangerous side effects. The representative saw co-ordinated work on a comprehensive programme as a useful task in preparing the path towards general and complete disarmament.

The representative of the United States stated that the Committee symbolized the increasingly active role of the community of nations in the processes of arms control and disarmament. He stressed the essential role of the negotiating forum in the pursuit of common goals and, stating that no nation could be expected to support an agreement which put its security at risk, said that the objective should be to strengthen the security of all peoples and nations.

Among the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, many made reference to general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal, often stressing such aspects of the overall question as the continuing arms race and lack of progress in disarmament; the need for verification and undiminished security during the disarmament process; the importance of

confidence-building and political will; and the necessarily long course from the existing world situation to the ultimate goal.

Both the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary noted that although the system of co-chairmanship had been replaced, there remained in the Committee a common recognition and understanding of the key role of the USSR and the United States in disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany stated in that connexion that without the specific contribution of those Powers progress was not conceivable, and Hungary that the key element of a more dynamic advance in the field of disarmament lay in the relationship between the two Powers and the results of their negotiations.

Italy, for its part, in addition to expressing support for a step-by-step process which would safeguard the strategic balance of forces, referred to substantial progress towards disarmament as the first prerequisite for seeking a solution of the problem of harmonious development of all regions of the world.

A number of Eastern European States, including Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, mentioned the Moscow Declaration made by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries on 23 November 1978, by which those countries had confirmed their dedication to détente and disarmament. Several of those States referred to the policies or actions of the NATO countries which, they held, stood out against progressive processes and opposed constructive efforts aimed at détente and practical measures of disarmament.

Belgium stated that despite differences in the views of various countries, there were recognized principles and a programme of action specifying priorities for disarmament. It added that the contrast between the intentions proclaimed in international forums and the practice of the right of the strongest was a cause for discouragement, but also gave the measure of the long road to be travelled to achieve disarmament.

Yugoslavia stated that the military blocs and great Powers were the protagonists in the arms race and that both had unfortunately made plans for further armament programmes. It stressed that it had always supported initiatives aimed at starting and accelerating the process of disarmament and that the special session had clearly demonstrated the desire for the establishment of democratic international relations and for genuine and equal security for all, which would give rise to massive efforts, particularly among the non-aligned countries, to ensure world-wide détente.

Sweden recalled that in 1962 the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) had seen general and complete disarmament as the immediate object of negotiation, while other tasks were called "collateral" measures. Soon, however, difficulties had led ENDC to focus on specific "collateral" measures, and even the drastically lowered ambitions had proved difficult to fulfil. The Swedish delegation felt that the main obstacle was neither military-industrial complexes nor lack of goodwill, but lack of confidence between blocs. Accordingly, it held that remedies would be long-term and would be the result of consistent conduct by States, respect

for international agreements and forums, responsible action and unilateral restraint.

During the 1979 session, the Committee did not reach a stage where it could cover the area concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament in its programme of work. Consequently, general and complete disarmament was noted only in the context of broad views and positions.

At the closing meeting, when the Committee adopted its report to the General Assembly, the Chairman noted the significance of its consensus agreement on its rules of procedure and programme of work, and expressed gratification at the intensity of debate and the efforts which delegations had made to limit discussions to essential areas.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In the debates in the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, both in the plenary meetings and in the First Committee,²⁵ the recognition of general and complete disarmament as the essential end goal was frequently reaffirmed by States from all political and geographical groupings.

As in other recent years, the agenda item was also used as a vehicle for the presentation of papers and introduction of initiatives on a variety of topics in the field of disarmament, including the transmittal of documents of conferences held outside United Nations auspices (see pp. 26-27 below) and consideration of draft resolutions on confidence-building measures, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and a study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

The majority of references to general and complete disarmament emphasized its continued relevance and the necessity of keeping it in view; many speakers stressed that it was a distant goal whose attainment was difficult, and noted that progress had so far been meager.

In the plenary debate, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet Union stated that his country would continue to work consistently, together with other States, towards cessation of the arms race, reduction of arsenals and general and complete disarmament. In that connexion, the USSR called for a strengthening of mutual trust. The Foreign Minister referred to various initiatives directed towards improvement in the political climate and expressed concern that such initiatives had encountered opposition and required tremendous efforts to be brought to the decision-making stage.

The Soviet Union and the United States transmitted to the Assembly the Joint United States-USSR Communiqué²⁶ issued on 18 June 1979 following the meetings at Vienna of President Carter and President Leonid I.

²⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²⁶ See A/34/414, annex.

Brezhnev. The Communiqué, marking the occasion of the signing of the SALT II agreement, reviewed the general aspects of United States-USSR relations, and their bilateral views on limitations of nuclear and conventional armaments and on international issues.

France, for its part, expressed the belief that, despite the difficulty of achieving disarmament, progress could be made provided three conditions were fulfilled: clarity and realism in objectives; continuity in action; and imagination in initiatives. It stated that progress would be easiest on a regional basis and recalled its proposal for the convening of a conference on disarmament for Europe.

In their general statements, a number of non-nuclear-weapon States, including Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal, the Niger, the Sudan and Zaire, referred to the hope for progress engendered by the tenth special session of the General Assembly, and most of them expressed disappointment concerning developments since that event. Several others, including Chile, Mozambique, the United Republic of Cameroon and Yemen, placed more emphasis on the economic consequences of the arms race. On behalf of the non-aligned group of States, Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba, in an address to the Assembly emphasizing a development strategy, observed that SALT and negotiations between the great Powers were an important and decisive element in the process leading to disarmament, but emphasized also that the endeavour to consolidate détente and avert war was a task in which all the peoples of the world should participate.

In the First Committee, the major references to the subject were along the same lines as in the plenary meetings. In all, some 100 Member States addressed the question of the arms race and disarmament in general terms and offered ideas concerning causes and solutions. Many references reviewed the organizational changes stemming from the special session, with representatives often expressing regret that their expectations that concrete results would follow those changes had not been met. Others placed more emphasis on the cost in terms both of money and waste of human and material resources of the arms race. Still others stressed the grave danger to civilization and humanity represented by the continuing increases in the quantity and quality of weapons of mass destruction.

On 24 October, at a special meeting inaugurating the second annual Disarmament Week, messages from both the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General were read, stressing the cost in resources and the danger of the arms race, and the urgent need to embark on a process of disarmament. At the same meeting, spokesmen for all the regional groupings expressed themselves in the same vein. The agenda item entitled "Disarmament Week" is discussed in detail in chapter XXIV below.

Among the States stressing institutional considerations, Argentina and Burma welcomed the changes in the negotiating body. Both noted that the success of the Committee on Disarmament in procedural areas had not been accompanied by progress on substantive questions or shown concrete

results. Argentina observed the continuation of a trend to divert the attention of the negotiating body to preventive disarmament — i.e., to areas of potential concern or secondary or collateral measures — thus obscuring the risk represented by operative nuclear weapons.

Austria detailed some examples of the costs of the arm race — noting, *inter alia*, that world-wide military expenditures amounted to \$1 million a minute — and stated that the longer concrete and militarily significant measures were delayed, the more difficult control would become. Venezuela felt that greater knowledge of the scope and the devastating effects of the arms race and its economic and social consequences would make it easier to unite efforts to end the race and reverse its trends; accordingly, it advocated a publicity campaign aimed at international condemnation of the arms race. Zambia, besides referring to the negative aspect of enormous and rising military expenditures despite the difficult world economic outlook, held that, since nuclear weapons could now kill the whole of mankind many times over, the world was in more danger than at the height of the cold war. It felt that the only way to avoid an impending holocaust was the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament.

China blamed the arms race on the super-Powers, holding that the super-Power which was advocating disarmament and détente was the very Power which had been frenziedly expanding arms and was going all out to achieve military superiority. China reiterated its position that, once progress had been made in disarmament by the super-Powers, other nuclear and major military powers would join them in reducing armaments according to reasonable ratios. That would be the surest and only way to set the process in motion and achieve progress in disarmament.

Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR drew attention to initiatives of their group,²⁷ aimed at deepening détente and extending it to the military sphere and achieving concrete measures of disarmament. Czechoslovakia, for instance, stated that, in co-operation with all socialist and peace-loving countries, it was determined to continue searching for effective means of reducing the arms race and expediting disarmament measures. Poland mentioned its policy of joining with other socialist States on specific initiatives; it also recapitulated the history of its own initiatives,²⁸ particularly for Europe, Romania referred to its initiative to reduce its military expenditures and allocate the funds thus released to increase allowances for children.²⁹ It also recalled its proposal to the tenth special session for a 10

²⁷ See, for instance, documents A/34/275-S/13344, annex, transmitted by Hungary (communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979) and A/34/735, annex, transmitted by the German Democratic Republic (letter from the President of the National Council of the National Front of the German Democratic Republic).

²⁸ See, for instance, *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970*, pp. 328-329 ("Rapacki Plan").

²⁹ See A/34/183, annex.

to 15 per cent reduction in military budgets in the first phase of a long-term programme leading ultimately to general disarmament. A number of the Eastern European States also referred to the military-industrial complex, the NATO alliance, or other phenomena or tendencies which, they held, opposed disarmament and stimulated the arms race.

Among the Western countries, the representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the intention of the USSR, announced by President Leonid I. Brezhnev, to withdraw 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from the German Democratic Republic, but at the same time pointed out that, even with those reductions, the Warsaw Treaty troops in Eastern Europe would outnumber those of NATO by 140,000, and that the tank withdrawals would do little to change the Warsaw Treaty tank superiority of nearly 3 to 1 in Central Europe. The representative added that his Government could not accept the claim that allegations about increases in Soviet military strength were without foundation; he referred specifically to the SS-20 missile and the "Back-fire" bomber, which, he held, had greatly increased Soviet capabilities. The British representative stressed that during the last 10 years, NATO had taken no steps to modernize its theatre nuclear systems and could not accept the present imbalance. His Government believed, however, that realistic, balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures could enhance national security. The heart of its approach, he stated, was to seek agreement on specific measures, moving step by step to make the world safer.

The delegation of Greece questioned whether adopting a great many resolutions on disarmament indicated movement in the proper direction and suggested that the first Committee should be less prolific but more effective. The Committee's methods, it said, should be designed to enable realization of partial goals within a not too distant time-limit, thus encouraging progress under the principles enunciated in the Final Document.

The representative of Canada described his country's approach as, first, giving preference to initiatives involving real measures of restraint and reduction or elimination of weapons and armed forces. Secondly, he expressed the belief that the Committee on Disarmament should be more involved in dealing with the main issues such as chemical weapons. Thirdly, Canada attached importance to verification, and, finally, it supported strengthening the United Nations as a source of information and expertise, rather than relying for those purposes on semi-private institutions.

Portugal felt that the first requisite for significant advances in disarmament was for States to avoid making suggestions for simple political gain; it held that neither understanding nor the cause of disarmament were served by fruitless proposals designed to exacerbate situations of imbalance of forces between States. In that connexion, the delegation recalled the following paragraph of the Final Document:

29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

In the First Committee, between the 31st and 42nd meetings, six separate draft resolutions were introduced under the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament" and all were later adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 34/87 A to F. The events leading to the adoption of four of those resolutions are dealt with in the pertinent topical chapters of this volume as follows:

- (a) resolution 34/87 A (radiological weapons) — chapter XVII;
- (b) resolution 34/87 C (non-stationing of nuclear weapons) — chapter VII;
- (c) resolution 34/87 D (prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes) — chapter VII;
- (d) resolution 34/87 F (strategic arms limitation talks) — chapter VIII.

The two other draft resolutions, 34/87 B (confidence-building measures) and 34/87 E (institutional arrangements relating to disarmament) are considered in the present chapter, together with resolution 34/83 L (assistance and services to the Committee on Disarmament), which was submitted under the agenda item dealing with follow-up of the special session. Finally, the pertinent aspects of one disarmament-related resolution, 34/100, submitted under the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" are dealt with in the present chapter.

The draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building measures" was sponsored, in its final form, by Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Zaire. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany drew attention to the support which the resolution on the same subject (resolution 33/91 B), adopted in 1978,³⁰ had received. He felt that the views which many States had expressed to the Secretary-General³¹ pursuant to that resolution indicated the need to continue the momentum generated in keeping with the concept of confidence-building. The representative stressed that confidence-building measures could be applied flexibly, as appropriate, to the specific needs of individual regions. He called attention also to the request to the Secretary-General, contained in the new draft resolution, to carry out a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts.

Before the vote in the Committee, Nigeria explained its support of the draft, stating that some trust among States was essential to the development of confidence-building measures, and that States were unlikely to be persuaded of the efficacy of such measures if threatened by non-respect of the Charter by other States in the region. Thus, Nigeria suggested that the study

³⁰ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, p. 120.

³¹ A/34/416 and Add. 1-3.

should specifically examine conditions which would facilitate consideration of confidence-building measures on a regional basis. While that suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution, Nigeria appreciated the difficulties faced by the sponsors and accepted their explanation that the intent of its suggestion was implicit therein. The USSR, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland explained their position with regard to operative paragraphs 2 to 5 of the draft, which they could not support on the grounds that, in the light of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe³² and a number of more recent confidence-building proposals put forward by socialist countries, the study was not needed. Poland drew attention also to the study in progress on all aspects of regional disarmament (see chapter XXII below) which it regarded as covering the question. The USSR called for a separate vote on paragraphs 2 to 5 of the draft.

At the 41st meeting, in a separate vote, the Committee adopted operative paragraphs 2 to 5 of the draft resolution by 109 votes to none with 15 abstentions, and thereupon adopted the draft as a whole without a vote. Kuwait and Syria, which supported the draft, spoke afterwards, with Kuwait expressing particular gratification that the draft took account of regional situations and Syria its appreciation that the sponsors had taken its views into account.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on 11 December at its 97th meeting, as resolution 34/87 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978 on confidence-building measures,

Desiring to eliminate the sources of tension by peaceful means and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the world,

Stressing again the importance of the statement contained in paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly that it is necessary, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, to take measures and to pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing the need and urgency of first steps to diminish the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or from misinterpretations of military activities,

Reaffirming its conviction that commitment to confidence-building measures could contribute to strengthening the security of States,

Aware that there are situations peculiar to specific regions which have a bearing on the nature of confidence-building measures feasible in those regions,

Convinced that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, can play an important role in creating conditions which are conducive to the consideration of confidence-building measures,

Recognizing that a minimum of trust among States in a region would facilitate the development of confidence-building measures,

Taking note of the views and experiences of Member States submitted to the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 33/91 B.

³² Held at Helsinki and Geneva between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975.

1. *Recommends* that all States should continue to consider arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;

2. *Decides* to undertake a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, taking into account the answers received by the Secretary-General and relevant statements made at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the work of the group of governmental experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. *Invites* States which have not yet done so to respond to the request of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 33/91 B and to acquaint the group of experts with their views and experiences through the Secretary-General;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Confidence-building measures"

The draft resolution entitled "Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament" was initiated by Sweden and sponsored also by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Sweden drew attention to the growing disarmament agenda, the complexities of the issues involved, and the more active participation in disarmament efforts by a large number of States. Thus, he held, increasing demands had to be met for such purposes as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament. He emphasized that the sponsors did not have in mind criticism of the existing institutions, such as the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, or any changes in the deliberative or negotiating bodies. Rather, the study they envisaged should assess present needs and future requirements, covering the question of whether there was need for reform or restructure of the institutional arrangements for management of disarmament affairs and, if so, what the structure should be. There was no intention on the part of the sponsors to prejudice the outcome of the study. It should, however, be comprehensive, be carried out with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, and take views of States into account.

Before the vote on the draft in the First Committee, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the USSR explained their intention to vote against it on the grounds that, in view of institutional changes which had been implemented in recent years and the limited period of operation of the machinery revitalized by the tenth special session of the Assembly, such a study could not be justified and probably would not contribute to substantive measures. Poland gave a similar explanation after the vote, noting also the financial implications and the diversion of effort from substantive issues.

The Committee adopted the draft resolution by a vote of 102 to 9 (the Eastern European States and Mongolia), with 8 abstentions. After the vote, the United States expressed the hope that the United Nations Administrative Management Service would contribute to the study. India, although voting

in favour, stated that in the existing situation in the field of disarmament, it would not support any proposal for creation of a United Nations disarmament organization. Sierra Leone felt that the existing United Nations machinery could carry out the study; it had abstained because of the financial implications.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a vote of 121 to 9, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 34/87 E; it reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament,

Recalling with satisfaction the measures undertaken as a result of its tenth special session in order to revitalize existing disarmament machinery and appropriately to constitute forums for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character,

Noting that the growing disarmament agenda, and the complexity of the issues involved, as well as the more active participation of a large number of Member States, create increasing demands on United Nations management of disarmament affairs for purposes such as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission, adopted on 8 June 1979, that the requirements of an institutional and procedural nature should be examined in order to facilitate the disarmament process and to ensure implementation of disarmament agreements, including the relevant proposals referred to in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly or made elsewhere,

Convinced that a comprehensive study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament would be desirable in providing for carefully considered decisions regarding the organization, functions and structure required to meet present and future needs in the disarmament process,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing present institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter;

2. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General, in carrying out this study, should seek the views of Member States, for the benefit of the experts, on some key issues, such as desirable functions and structure as well as the institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament affairs;

3. *Invites* all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

The draft resolution entitled "Committee on Disarmament" regarding the assistance and services provided by the Secretary-General to that Committee was submitted by the representative of Burma as the current Chairman of that Committee. In introducing the draft, he stated that the sole intention of the proposal was to update the authority of the Secretary-General to provide services to the Committee on Disarmament under the same terms as they were provided originally to the former Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This was required in keeping with rule 17 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament (see appendix I below). The representative noted that, because of the increased workload of the Commit-

tee and the subsidiary bodies which it had requested to deal with various aspects of its work, additional services had been required and the demand for such services might increase in the future.

The First Committee and the General Assembly both adopted the draft resolution without a vote. Following its adoption in the First Committee, the representatives of Italy, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, while not objecting to the consensus, questioned the financial implications indicated in connexion therewith. The resolution, 34/83 L, reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Stressing once again that considerable and urgent work remains to be accomplished by the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament adopted its rules of procedure, which contain detailed arrangements on all aspects relating to its work,

Noting also that rule 17 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament states that the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Committee and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish,

Requests, accordingly, the Secretary-General to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Committee on Disarmament and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish in accordance with the arrangements contained in its rules of procedure.

The agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Strengthening of International Security" was assigned to the First Committee as being related to disarmament. The Committee approved three draft resolutions under this item which were subsequently adopted by the Assembly. Two of them, entitled "Development and strengthening of good neighbourliness between States" and "Non-interference in the internal affairs of States", do not contain direct references to disarmament, while the third, resolution 34/100, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" refers to disarmament issues in its fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs as follows:

The General Assembly.

Noting with deep concern the continued existence of focal points of crises and tensions in various regions of the world, the emergence of new conflicts among States endangering international peace and security, the continuation and escalation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, the manifestation of tendencies to divide the world into spheres of influence and domination, continued interference in the internal affairs of States, including the use of mercenaries, and the continuing existence of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism in all its manifestations and *apartheid*, which remain the main obstacles to the strengthening of international peace and security;

6. *Also calls upon* all States to refrain from any act which may hinder the continuation of the process of relaxation of international tension, impede the resolution of the focal points of crises and tensions in various regions of the world, hamper the implementation of the recom-

mendation of the General Assembly at its tenth special session on effective measures for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and for disarmament, and postpone the implementation of the new international economic order;

9. *Reaffirms* the provisions of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and invites the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to prepare for the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981;

10. *Commends* the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to be held at Madrid in 1980, and expresses the hope that it will result in further strengthening the security and co-operation of States in Europe in all spheres, including reduction of armaments and armed forces and halting the arms race in both the nuclear and conventional fields;

In addition, the following documents, which are not referred to above, were placed before the Assembly or First Committee in connexion with the agenda item on general and complete disarmament:

(a) Letter dated 13 February 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (with the texts entitled "Appeal of the special session of the World Peace Council" held at Berlin from 2 to 5 February 1979 and "Call to the five nuclear Powers" adopted at the special session of the World Peace Council annexed);³³

(b) Letter dated 6 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting documents of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 4 to 9 June 1979;³⁴

(c) Letter dated 27 July 1979 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the resolutions and final communiqué of the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez from 8 to 12 May 1979;³⁵

(d) Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and international security (see chapter XXII below);³⁶

(e) Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the annual report for 1978 of the International Atomic Energy Agency;³⁷

(f) Report of the Secretary-General on all aspects of regional disarmament (see chapter XXII below);³⁸

(g) Letter dated 1 October 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979;³⁹

(h) Letter dated 10 October 1979 from the Permanent Representatives of Colombia, Fiji, Lebanon, Lesotho, Poland and Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-

³³ A/34/85.

³⁴ A/34/357.

³⁵ A/34/389 and Corr. 1.

³⁶ A/34/465 and Corr. 1.

³⁷ A/34/497.

³⁸ A/34/519.

³⁹ A/34/542.

General (containing the text of the address by His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the General Assembly);⁴⁰

(i) Letter dated 31 October 1979 from the Permanent Representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (with the views of the Nordic countries on the question on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons annexed);⁴¹

(j) Letter dated 31 October 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (with the statement of the Government of Mongolia concerning the new initiative of Soviet Union on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe annexed);⁴²

(k) Letter dated 7 December 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States, held at Berlin on 5 and 6 December 1979.⁴³

Conclusion

General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the goal of the United Nations in the disarmament field. Facing the reality of the continuing arms race and the great distance which separates the world from that goal, Member States have tended to focus in recent years on efforts to achieve a turning-point — a slowing down and cessation of the arms race — from which the first steps to real disarmament could be implemented while taking into account the valid security needs of States. A wide variety of ideas has been advanced and a great deal of work is being directed towards this more limited objective in the hope that it may be reached in the foreseeable future.

The special session of the General Assembly on disarmament represented a massive effort to reach such a turning-point. Despite some dissatisfaction at the lack of progress since that event, taking the number and the complexity of the current issues into account, it might be argued that greater progress could hardly have been expected. The initiatives being taken as a result of the special session include promising concepts which may yet prove effective and it is encouraging that so many aspects of the question of disarmament are being examined. It is also realistic that the United Nations has accepted that disarmament is a process which should be achieved step by step.

Accordingly, it is important that ideas designed to curb the arms race and foster genuine disarmament be advanced tirelessly by the world Organization despite the patience, cost and effort required. It is equally important that the lofty ultimate goal of the United Nations in the field of disarmament be kept in view for a more distant future.

⁴⁰ A/34/566.

⁴¹ A/C.1/34/4.

⁴² A/C.1/34/5.

⁴³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1979*, document S/13686.

Follow-up of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF FOLLOW-UP was one of the central issues discussed at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Adequate continuation of the work of the session was recognized as an essential prerequisite for successful implementation of the provisions of the Final Document of the special session concerning the cessation and reversal of the arms race.

This follow-up is carried out through various bodies forming the main components of the disarmament machinery set up in accordance with the Final Document. One of those bodies is the United Nations Disarmament Commission, established as a deliberative body and as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly; it is entrusted with the function of considering and making recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and of following up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session. Another primary disarmament body, the Committee on Disarmament, was established on the basis of appropriate consultations among the Member States during the special session as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum; it is entrusted with the negotiation of various specific arms regulation and disarmament measures envisaged in the Programme of Action of the Final Document. Further, the General Assembly, in view of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, is entrusted with the periodic review of the status of realization of the goals and objectives set forth by the special session. To give effect to that function, the Final Document of the special session provides that the General Assembly should regularly include on the agenda of its thirty-third and subsequent sessions an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" To ensure appropriate application of effort in that regard and in disarmament matters generally, the Assembly also decided that, starting with the thirty-third session, the First Committee would deal only with disarmament and related international security matters. During 1979, all three disarmament bodies continued or initi-

ated active work in their respective areas of responsibilities with the view to giving practical effect to the various provisions of the Final Document.

The Final Document, in the area of machinery, also provides for the strengthening of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to help the Organization continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and carry out additional tasks assigned to it. The Document further suggests the utilization of the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. Finally, it calls on the Centre for Disarmament to increase its contacts with and encourage non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerning the role they play in disarmament.

While the various bodies and organizations mentioned above do not exhaust the references in the Final Document to institutions called upon to deal in one way or another with disarmament, they describe both the major structures set up by the Assembly to ensure adequate follow-up of the substantive issues as agreed upon at the special session and suggest a number of recommendations of the Assembly that inherently require follow-up action.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

Following its organizational session in 1978, the Disarmament Commission held its first substantive session from 14 May to 8 June 1979. The major substantive items of the agenda adopted by the Commission were:

3. Consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament
4. Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war
5. Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly

During the session, the Commission considered in particular agenda item 3. After a thorough exchange of views focusing particularly on that matter, the Commission was able to adopt, by consensus, recommendations under the heading "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament". The recommendations were included in the Commission's report¹ to the General Assembly for its consideration and transmission to the Committee on Disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 118 (a) of the Final Document of the special session; they are reproduced in appendix II below.

The explanatory introduction to the elements of a comprehensive programme, included in the Commission's report, contains the following paragraph:

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (AJ/34/42).*

5. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be based principally on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. It should lay down an agreed framework for sustained international action in the field of disarmament, including negotiations at different levels, that is, multilateral, bilateral and regional, on specific measures of disarmament. The elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not in any way impair the commitment entered into by Member States, in the Final Document, to make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth therein.

For a more detailed account of the work of the Disarmament Commission, particularly with regard to the recommendations relating to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, see chapter III below.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The Committee on Disarmament held its first session from 24 January to 27 April and from 14 June to 14 August 1979. At the end of the session, the Committee adopted its report to the General Assembly.² In the course of the year, the Committee devoted considerable attention to the preparation of its rules of procedure (see appendix I below) and agenda and programme of work. After the adoption of those documents in April, the Committee proceeded with the consideration of the following substantive items:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

Detailed accounts of the consideration by the Committee of its agenda items are given in the respective topical chapters of the present volume. All of those agenda items are among the issues of high priority referred to in the Programme of Action of Final Document of the special session; they are also issues on which Member States consider that near-term results might be expected.

With regard to the general question of follow-up, a number of members of the Committee stressed the importance of maintaining the impetus and spirit generated during the special session while striving for concrete action on items such as those on the agenda and in the field of disarmament in general. The representative of Algeria, for instance, in his capacity as Chairman, noted at the opening meeting that the convening of the Committee on Disarmament marked the final stage in the establishment of the machinery provided for by the special session. He went on to state that it was of para-

² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1).

mount importance that the consensus reached in June 1978 as a result of compromise should not be short-lived and that every State should continue to strive to understand the legitimate interests of others and take them into account. That, he held, was the prerequisite for the complex task of the elaboration of a set of disarmament measures in accordance with the programme and priorities defined in the Final Document. The Chairman noted that the Committee had less than four years to work out such measures because, by deciding to hold a second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982, the Assembly had expressed its conviction that it would be possible, given real political will, to conclude agreements which would mark a beginning to the solution of the disarmament problem by that time. Other representatives also referred to the need for political will, mutual understanding and trust if objectives which had been agreed upon were to be implemented.

The representative of Nigeria stressed that the assessment of the special session could not long be based on its adoption of the Final Document; there was also an onus on the Committee as well as on the Organization to adopt concrete measures to stem the danger of the arms race. He added that world opinion would not long be satisfied with a "finely composed document" if the arms race continued to escalate. Finally, the Nigerian representative noted that it would not only be a great disappointment but that bitter scepticism would be aroused if there were no concrete measures by the time of the special session in 1982.

Among those addressing the follow-up question more directly, the representative of Indonesia said that it was the responsibility of the Committee to follow up on the resolutions adopted by the special session by narrowing differences and reaching agreement on the steps required for their implementation. Thus the Committee would generate the needed momentum in negotiations and fulfil the high expectations of the international community. Such references to the need for narrowing differences and co-operation, and living up to the expectations of the international community were among the themes voiced most frequently by speakers, either in the context of follow-up or in the general context of the responsibility of the Committee to achieve concrete results.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

As explained above, consideration of the follow-up to the special session was conducted in the General Assembly under the agenda item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"

In the course of the general debates, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee,³ an overwhelming number of Member States expressed

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

their views on follow-up, many of them in connexion with proposals designed to give effect to, or further elaborate, particular provisions of the Final Document. The statements generally tended to indicate satisfaction with the initial steps that had been taken since the special session, but many also expressed the notion that the disarmament negotiations ought to be expedited so as to achieve agreement on issues of decisive importance for curbing and reversing the arms race. The statement made by Australia may be taken as indicative of the feelings prevailing in the General Assembly on the question of follow-up, as shown by the following excerpt:

We are completing the first full year in which the disarmament machinery set up by the tenth special session has been established. Although negotiations in the various disarmament bodies and in bilateral negotiations have not been without difficulties and disagreements, they have reflected a genuine desire on the part of all nations to work together towards the common goal of universal disarmament. We still have a long way to go, but no one expects all disarmament issues to be resolved at a stroke. In fact, a number of forums, both multilateral and bilateral, have been established to grapple with the complex of vital interrelated issues, all of which, when resolved and combined, hold the promise of an end to the arms race and progress towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament.

Cuba, for its part, in reiterating the importance of the Final Document, also expressed a view on the objective of further efforts which was representative. It stated: "In our view, we must promote compliance with the Final Document and its Programme of Action, while at the same time contributing additional proposals calculated to create a climate conducive to their application in the light of present-day reality" Similar statements were made by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, Iraq, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

Other Member States alluded to the matter in more sceptical terms. Egypt, for example, in its address, questioned whether the provisions of the Final Document and resolutions of the Assembly, as well as other statements on the subject, represented a practical view of the possibilities of making progress in disarmament, or whether they erred in the sense of being too ambitious and going beyond what was feasible; it urged a realistic approach. Nigeria held that even the most charitable judgment would find cause for disappointment in that, a year after the special session on disarmament, the arms race was still manifesting itself in many ways. And both Egypt and Nigeria referred to the inability of the Committee on Disarmament to make progress in negotiating disarmament measures in 1979.

As at the previous session, the First Committee had before it a number of draft resolutions pertaining to this agenda item, which were introduced during the 24th to 40th meetings. All of the draft resolutions put to the vote were adopted by the Committee and recommended to the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted them as resolutions 34/83 A to M. One draft decision was introduced under the same item and adopted as decision 34/422. The events leading to the adoption of 10 of the resolutions and the decision are dealt with in the appropriate topical chapters of this volume, as follows:

- (a) Resolution 34/83 D (United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament) — chapter XXV;
- (b) Resolution 34/83 E (Monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security) — chapter XXII;
- (c) Resolution 34/83 F (Freezing and reduction of military budgets) — chapter XXI;
- (d) Resolution 34/83 G (Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war) — chapter VII;
- (e) Resolution 34/83 H (Report of the Disarmament Commission) — chapter III;
- (f) Resolution 34/83 I (Disarmament Week) — chapter XXIV;
- (g) Resolution 34/83 J (Nuclear weapons in all aspects) — chapter VII;
- (h) Resolution 34/83 K (Study on the relationship between disarmament and development) — chapter XXIII;
- (i) Resolution 34/83 L (Committee on Disarmament) — chapter I;
- (j) Resolution 34/83 M (Programme of research and studies on disarmament) — chapter XXII;
- (K) Decision 34/422 (Study on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban) — chapter IX.

The remaining three resolutions — 34/83 A, B and C, adopted under the agenda item in question — are considered in the present chapter.

The first draft resolution, entitled “Disarmament and international security”, was submitted by Cyprus. In introducing the draft at the 24th meeting, on 31 October, the representative of Cyprus pointed out that the development of a system of international security was the primary responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter. The long-standing need for such a system in the interest of peace had now emerged and, in the view of Cyprus, had a direct relation to the disarmament problem. In that connexion, Cyprus noted that both the Declaration and the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the special session, in paragraphs 13 and 110 respectively, had clearly spelled out the need for an international security system to accompany disarmament efforts, and the representative quoted from the first of those paragraphs as follows:

Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces. . .

In the opinion of Cyprus, the decision of the General Assembly at its special session to continue the study by experts on the relationship between international security and disarmament clearly confirmed the importance of the link between the two concepts. For a detailed account of the work of the study group, see chapter XXII below.

The draft resolution was subsequently revised, first by the addition of the words “particularly the nuclear arms race” in operative paragraph 2 (see below), and then further by the incorporation of references to the Charter of the United Nations; some other changes were made in the interest of clarifi-

cation, particularly in operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. In its final version, the draft was sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, India, Ireland, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee at its 36th meeting, on 16 November, without a vote, and by the General Assembly at its 97th meeting, on 11 December, also without a vote, as resolution 34/83 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming also that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Recognizing that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and through the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Convinced that disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other,

Recalling its resolutions 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978 and 33/91 I of 16 December 1978,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security";

2. *Considers* that the halting of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, should be the first step in the implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. *Calls upon* all States to eliminate tensions and conflicts in their relations and proceed towards effective collective measures under the Charter of the United Nations for a system of international order, security and peace, concurrently with efforts at disarmament measures;

4. *Calls upon* all States also to pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States;

5. *Requests* the organs of the United Nations to initiate or accelerate work on developing and strengthening institutions for maintaining peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The second draft resolution, entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament" was submitted by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire, and introduced by Yugoslavia at the 32nd meeting, on 9 November. In introducing the draft, the representative of Yugoslavia noted that the special session had devoted particular attention to the organization of work of international bodies dealing with disarmament issues and had taken important decisions whose primary goal was to promote the process of international negotiations. In that context, the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, was partic-

ularly welcomed. However, as had been pointed out by many States in the plenary debate and in the First Committee, negotiations on priority tasks had not yielded any concrete results as yet. The sponsors of the draft were therefore concerned that the Committee should urgently initiate negotiations on the priority measures of disarmament and play the central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the special session.

Following a request by the United States for a vote, the draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 21 November by 114 votes to none, with 10 abstentions. A number of delegations explained their positions before or after the vote.

The United States shared the hope that rapid progress would be made in arms regulation and disarmament, but it did not believe that that purpose was served by unrealistic requests. Also, it did not see how the Committee could be expected to negotiate on all the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda and simultaneously elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament before the second special session on disarmament. Therefore, the United States was not prepared to join in criticism of the Committee. The Soviet Union, for its part, pointed out that its abstention was due to the "extremely subjective approach" reflected in the draft resolution. Furthermore, it stated that the draft resolution contained provisions relating to the links between the work of the Committee and the talks going on outside it, which were formulated in language that was unacceptable since the Soviet Union did not believe that those talks were an obstacle to the Committee's work — which was the impression that one might obtain from the operative paragraph 2 of the draft. Bulgaria said that it had abstained for similar reasons. In its view, the draft did not properly reflect the consensus on the constitution and status of the Committee which had been achieved during the special session. Its misgivings were related to the second and sixth preambular paragraphs and to operative paragraph 2. The requirement in operative paragraph 2, that participants in bilateral or regional negotiations outside the Committee should submit to the Committee a full report, was not of a nature to facilitate the course of the negotiations themselves. In the opinion of Bulgaria, instead of trying to subordinate the efforts outside the Committee to the authority of the Committee, it would be more appropriate for the various efforts to complement one another and be oriented in the same direction, namely, towards the achievement of real disarmament measures.

Burma, as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, considered it to be a matter of paramount importance that the progress and results of negotiations on certain specific issues conducted outside the framework of the Committee should be fully and regularly reported to the Committee. Only then would the Committee be able to keep abreast of the progress of the negotiations and, at the appropriate stage, involve itself in substantive negotiations on a multilateral scale. Finally, Jordan, in supporting the draft resolution, pointed out that the draft was not accusatory but simply stated the fact, upon which all were agreed, that so far achievements had been limited. In addition, the role assigned to the Committee was not intended to be exclusive,

but rather, complementary to the bilateral talks. It seemed to Jordan to be a contradiction in the positions of States to have had a special session in which almost all had expressed their deep concern over what was going on in the world and then to limit the involvement in the problem and exclude from the picture the Committee that represented the world community.

The Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 97th meeting, on 11 December, by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 11 abstentions (including the USSR and the United States) as resolution 34/83 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Expressing its satisfaction over the establishment, in accordance with the agreement reached at its tenth special session, of the Committee on Disarmament and the fact that the Committee held its first session in the course of 1979,

Noting with appreciation the valuable results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament concerning its organization and procedures,

Deploring that negotiations on priority tasks in the field of disarmament have not yielded any concrete results so far, in spite of the repeated appeals of the General Assembly,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should become urgently and most directly involved in substantive negotiations on priority disarmament questions and play the central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should not in any way constitute an impediment to the negotiations on such questions in the Committee,

Having considered the first report of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. *Urges* the Committee on Disarmament to proceed, without any further delay, to substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on these subjects;

2. *Invites* the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to make every effort to achieve a positive conclusion of these negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, failing this, to submit to the Committee a full report on the status of their separate negotiations and results achieved so far in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations at its next session on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and, in doing so, to take as a basis the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"

The third draft resolution, entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session" submitted by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire, was introduced by Yugoslavia at the 35th meeting, on 15

November. Yugoslavia stated that the draft resolution was concerned with the over-all implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the special session and that it contained all the relevant elements to be taken into consideration when dealing with the recurrent item on that subject on the agenda. It expressed satisfaction that some initial results had been achieved, primarily in the field of active involvement of the United Nations and in a considerable revitalization of its multilateral disarmament machinery. Yugoslavia noted, however, that the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, continued to cause an alarming increase in expenditures on armament, that negotiations on priority tasks in the field of disarmament had not yielded concrete results and that negotiations on a number of issues dealt with at the special session had not yet started. Consequently, the draft resolution expressed a deep concern over the continuing arms race and growing military budgets and urged all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to undertake steps leading to the effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament.

The draft was subsequently revised and in its revised form sponsored additionally by the German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Mauritius, the United Republic of Cameroon and Uruguay. In connexion with its sponsorship, the German Democratic Republic said that it had submitted its own draft resolution entitled "Negotiations on disarmament," which it had introduced at the 32nd meeting, on 9 November, but that it had decided not to press that draft to a vote since, as a result of appropriate consultations, it had been possible to combine the two drafts.

The draft resolution was subsequently further revised with the addition of new second and third preambular paragraphs, bringing the number of preambular paragraphs up to a total of 10 (see below). In its final form, it was sponsored also by Angola, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, the Niger, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam, thus making 36 sponsors in all. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee at its 42nd meeting, on 26 November, without a vote, and by the General Assembly at its 97th meeting, on 11 December, also without a vote, as resolution 34/83 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Recalling that disarmament has become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community and that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Calling attention to the measures qualified in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly as being most urgent and feasible within a short period of time and to the task of bringing about effective agreements,

Expressing its satisfaction over the fact that the tenth special session greatly stimulated the involvement of all countries and set in motion a number of new initiatives in the field of disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that some initial results in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been achieved, primarily in the field of active involvement of the United Nations and in a considerable revitalization of the multilateral disarmament machinery,

Deeply concerned about the continued arms race and the alarming increase in expenditures on armaments,

Considering that it is necessary to make sustained progress in all negotiations dealing with disarmament and arms limitation issues,

Noting with concern that most negotiations on priority tasks in the field of disarmament have not yielded concrete results so far, in spite of the repeated appeals of the General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that negotiations have not, as yet, started on a number of issues which are contained in the Programme of Action,

Determined to encourage the adoption of urgent measures in order to secure the implementation of the recommendations and decisions endorsed by Member States in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to proceed to disarmament,

1. *Expresses its deep concern* over the continued arms race, nuclear as well as conventional, and over constantly growing military budgets which bear negative consequences and pose a growing threat to international peace and security and also for the unhampered development of countries, particularly developing countries;

2. *Urgently calls upon* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to undertake steps leading to effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament and, to this end:

(a) To make every effort to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently going on in the Committee on Disarmament and in a limited or regional framework on effective international agreements according to the priorities of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

(b) To resume or undertake as soon as possible negotiations on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis on measures which have been agreed upon by consensus at the tenth special session, taking into consideration all relevant proposals;

3. *Invites* all States which are engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament or arms limitation negotiations outside the United Nations framework to keep the General Assembly informed of the results of such negotiations in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

In connexion with the agenda item on follow-up, the Assembly also had before it a number of reports of the Secretary-General required under the provisions of resolutions adopted by the Assembly under the corresponding agenda items at its thirty-third session and other documents which have not heretofore been mentioned.⁴ The various reports and documents are:

(a) Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Director-General of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization on dissemination of information

⁴ Documents may be placed before the General Assembly under two or more agenda items. Thus, a number of the documents submitted under the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly at its tenth special session" were also submitted under the item "General and complete disarmament". Accordingly, the documents submitted under both items are already noted in chapter I and are not referred to again here; they are: A/34/183 (see p. 19 above) and A/34/85, A/34/357, A/34/542 and A/C.1/34/4 (see p. 26 - 27).

on the arms race and disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 G;⁵

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security, pursuant to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 J;⁶

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament Week, pursuant to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 D;⁷

(d) Report of the Secretary-General on non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, pursuant to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 B;⁸

(e) Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament Week, pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 D;⁹

(f) Report of the Secretary-General on dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 G;¹⁰

(g) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations and decisions taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, pursuant to paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 F;¹¹

(h) Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and development, pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 M;¹²

(i) Report of the Secretary-General on monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security, pursuant to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 J;¹³

(j) Report of the Secretary-General on dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 G;¹⁴

(k) Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations studies on disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 98 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;¹⁵

(l) Report of the Secretary-General on the programme of research and studies on disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 K;¹⁶

(m) Report of the Secretary-General on a new philosophy on disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 N;¹⁷

(n) Letter dated 16 October 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the Final Communiqué adopted by the Extraordinary Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New York from 4 to 6 October 1979;¹⁸

(o) Letter dated 16 October 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at the 66th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Caracas from 13 to 21 September 1979;¹⁹

(p) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 E;²⁰

(q) Letter dated 1 November 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the message from the Organizing Committee for the Observance of the United Nations Disarmament Week in Ethiopia.²¹

⁵ A/34/147.

⁶ A/34/374.

⁷ A/34/436.

⁸ A/34/456 and Add.1.

⁹ A/34/457 and Add.1 and 2.

¹⁰ A/34/458 and Add.1.

¹¹ A/34/495.

¹² A/34/534.

¹³ A/34/540.

¹⁴ A/34/547.

¹⁵ A/34/588.

¹⁶ A/34/589.

¹⁷ A/34/590.

¹⁸ A/34/599.

¹⁹ A/34/619.

²⁰ A/34/640.

²¹ A/C.1/34/6.

Conclusion

During 1979, much of the activity of Member States represented in the three major bodies — the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly — was directed towards setting in motion the disarmament machinery provided for in the Final Document of the special session, in order to enable that machinery to work towards implementation of the concrete measures of disarmament and other recommendations of the Assembly deriving from that session. Because of the different natures of the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, the former, after having settled procedural matters, was able to devote detailed attention to substantive issues on its agenda; its most important achievement was to reach agreement by consensus on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The latter body, however, had to devote most of the first part of its session to establishing its rules of procedure and its agenda and programme of work. It was mainly during the second part of its session that the Committee was able to initiate in-depth consideration of various substantive items.

The General Assembly, for its part, overwhelmingly welcomed the results of the special session and reiterated its determination to promote arms regulation and disarmament efforts. However, a number of States expressed concern over the slow pace of disarmament negotiations and the paucity of results achieved so far. In 1979, the General Assembly again adopted an exceptionally large number of resolutions under the item concerning the question of follow-up of the special session on disarmament. This question first appeared on the agenda at the thirty-third session in 1978 and it may be expected to reappear annually at least until the second special session on disarmament in 1982. The agenda item serves both as a means of keeping issues on which agreement was reached at the special session alive and up to date, and as a vehicle for dealing with proposals placed before the special session which were not dealt with fully at the time or on which agreement was not reached. Some questions under the item may become separate agenda items at a later date.

Thus the activities in the area of follow-up in the various bodies are designed, first, to provide continuation of action on both new and established issues in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the special session and subsequent Assembly resolutions and, secondly, in a broader perspective, to identify areas of particular concern and thus enhance the search for more substantial results in the attempt to curb and reverse the arms race.

CHAPTER III

Development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introduction

DURING THE 1960s, the concept of general and complete disarmament provided the major United Nations framework to encompass plans and measures aimed towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. Within that framework, primary emphasis was given to the need for effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. The 1961 joint statement of agreed principles for future disarmament negotiations¹ and the draft treaties of the Soviet Union and the United States on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament² have remained a basis of discussion on the subject and have been considered as the forerunner of later efforts to develop a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In 1969, in the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session, much of the discussion on the broad aspects of general and complete disarmament took place in the context of a proposal to declare the 1970s a "Disarmament Decade". In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1968-1969,³ the Secretary-General proposed the designation of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and expressed the view that the Assembly could establish a specific programme and time-table for dealing with all aspects of arms control and disarmament.

The proposal of the Secretary-General was welcomed by the Assembly and on 16 December 1969, it adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) by which it declared the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and requested the newly expanded Conference on the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a compre-

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

² See *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 4.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/7601/Add.1)*.

hensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Consequently, the CCD debated the question at its 1970 session and had submitted to it a number of specific proposals on the subject including a joint draft comprehensive programme on disarmament by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia,⁴ as well as suggestions contained in working papers submitted by Italy⁵ and the Netherlands.⁶

In the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session in 1970 Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia proposed⁷ a comprehensive programme of disarmament similar to the one submitted earlier by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia to the CCD. At that session, the Assembly considered the last mentioned as well as the other proposals that had been submitted on a comprehensive programme and, by its resolution 2661 C (XXV), recommended that the CCD take those proposals into account in its further work and its negotiations.

Subsequently, and until the convening of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, the question of a comprehensive programme was discussed in the Assembly — first as one of the elements within the framework of the item on general and complete disarmament⁸ which appeared each year on the agenda and, starting in 1975, under specific agenda items concerning the Disarmament Decade⁹ (see also chapter VI below). During the same period, the question of a comprehensive programme also continued to occupy a place in the discussions of the CCD, culminating, in the spring session of 1978, in the establishment of a working group to elaborate a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament.¹⁰ At the tenth special session, the General Assembly established, as a successor to the Commission originally established in 1952, a Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the United Nations¹¹ and determined that the Commission should, *inter alia*, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document CCD/313.

⁵ *Ibid.*, document CCD/309.

⁶ *Ibid.*, document CCD/276.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/8191.

⁸ Relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted were 2825 B (XXVI) and 3261 A (XXIX).

⁹ The General Assembly resolutions adopted were 3470 (XXX), 31/68, 32/80 and 33/62.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, paras. 251-275; also document CCD/567 and Add.1 comprise a tabulation by the Secretariat of working papers and proposals submitted to the CCD on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 118.

The Commission held an organizational session in 1978 and submitted a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session containing recommendations regarding its mandate. The Assembly, on 16 December of that year, adopted resolution 33/91 A by which, *inter alia*, the report was endorsed and the Commission was requested to continue its work in accordance with its recommendations as well as the relevant decisions taken by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. By the same resolution, Member States were invited to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on a comprehensive programme of disarmament for transmission to the Disarmament Commission. By another resolution adopted at the thirty-third session, resolution 33/71 H, the Assembly recommended the inclusion in the agenda of the Commission at its forthcoming substantive session, in addition to its consideration, on a priority basis, of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (a) consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and (b) harmonization of views regarding the reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources thus released for development purposes.

Thus, by the beginning of 1979, the responsibility for continuing work towards a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been given by the Assembly to the Disarmament Commission.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The question of the comprehensive programme was not on the agenda of the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, in 1979; however, the subject was touched upon by a few of its members. Egypt expressed the hope that the Disarmament Commission would be able, in the near future, to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the duly considered elements of the comprehensive programme. In that way, the Committee would be able to discharge its mandate to undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would become a reality.

Nigeria noted during the discussions on nuclear disarmament that the Committee would soon begin the task of the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and said that such a programme should be so comprehensive that it would provide a basis for negotiations in any forum with the added advantage of indicating to the negotiators the "interrelatedness" of the entire process.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

The Disarmament Commission held its first substantive session from 14 May to 8 June 1979 in New York and adopted its agenda, which included

three main substantive items: consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament; consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the dangers of nuclear war; and harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Commission had before it certain reports and documents submitted by the Secretary-General, including a report of the Secretary-General¹² containing views and suggestions of Member States on the comprehensive programme of disarmament communicated to him in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/91A. It also had a letter from the Secretary-General¹³ transmitting a list of the proposals and suggestions made at the tenth special session of the General Assembly and reviewed in its Final Document together with lists of other pertinent disarmament documentation, and a letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*,¹⁴ addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa; both letters were noted in the agenda.

Working papers were also submitted to the Commission by delegations, giving the respective countries' views concerning the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as follows:

— "Chinese delegation's proposal on the element of a comprehensive programme of disarmament";¹⁵

— "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned members;¹⁶

— "Proposal concerning the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme", submitted by Czechoslovakia on behalf of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR;¹⁷

— "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a number of countries.¹⁸

During the general exchange of views,¹⁹ there was broad agreement on the nature of the elements which the comprehensive programme should include and on its scope and objective. The Chairman of the Commission, in his opening statement, said that it was clear that the comprehensive pro-

¹² A/CN.10/1 and Add.1-6.

¹³ A/CN.10/3.

¹⁴ A/CN.10/4.

¹⁵ A/CN.10/5.

¹⁶ A/CN.10/6.

¹⁷ A/CN.10/7 and Add.1.

¹⁸ A/CN.10/8.

¹⁹ See A/CN.10/PV.10-22 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22, corrigendum.

gramme must necessarily cover both short-term and long-term objectives. In his view, it should deal not merely with measures of arms control and disarmament but should also encompass related issues of international peace and security and economic and social development.

The representative of the Soviet Union said that since the main danger to the cause of peace was the nuclear arms race, it was necessary to halt and then reverse it and achieve nuclear disarmament. Thus the Soviet Union favoured, among other practical measures, the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States and the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territories of States not yet possessing such weapons. In addition, it believed that the prohibition of chemical weapons as well as of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was extremely important and that increases in conventional weapons should be limited. Finally, it supported the taking of steps to convene a world disarmament conference at the earliest possible time.

France, speaking on behalf of the nine countries members of the European Economic Community, stated that, in considering the elements of a comprehensive programme, the Disarmament Commission should bear in mind that the measures making up such a programme should be balanced in such a way that the security of States was at all times guaranteed and that the global programme, to be realistic, had to bear in mind the needs of a regional approach. The nine also believed that there should be a balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament, and that adequate verification measures were necessary. Finally, a comprehensive programme should take into account measures to promote peaceful means of settling disputes and the strengthening of international peace-keeping machinery. The views elaborated by France were reflected by a number of other Western States. For instance, Italy felt that in parallel with efforts towards nuclear disarmament, there should be a substantial reduction of conventional weapons.

China, for its part, stated that in drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Commission ought to proceed from an accurate appraisal of the international situation — in that connexion it noted particularly the arms race between the super-Powers. China said that it supported all the reasonable proposals made by small and medium-sized countries. One of the main principles of the programme should be the safeguarding of international peace and security; thus, relations between States must be based on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. It added that the two States with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals had the primary responsibility for disarmament and should be first to reduce their armaments. Nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited and totally destroyed. Disarmament should benefit the economic and social development of States. China believed that all countries, regardless of their size or strength, were entitled to take part in the settlement of disarmament issues on an equal footing. And, among a number of other elements, China advocated that in addition to nuclear disarmament, conventional armaments also should be reduced.

Japan believed that in elaborating a comprehensive programme the Commission should take into account a number of principles including a due regard for the security of each State, a balance between the responsibilities and duties of the nuclear-weapon States and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States, and the formulation of a programme that would be feasible and not contain aspects of political propaganda.

Romania expressed the view that a comprehensive programme should provide a unified conception of how to organize disarmament negotiations and advocate a system of disarmament steps which would lead to general disarmament. It felt that nuclear disarmament problems should be given priority. The programme should also comprise intermediate steps in order to increase trust among States, including partial and collateral measures which should lead to a general improvement in the international climate. Romania believed that the programme should be based on certain principles, including the participation of all States in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing as independent States. It should also be based on the initiation of the disarmament process by the most heavily armed States; arrangements for the monitoring of each step; the non-use of force or the threat of force in relations among States; and the provision, through the United Nations, of general information on the situation prevailing in the armaments field.

Austria felt that, within a global and comprehensive concept, emphasis should be placed on the equilibrium to be sought in all disarmament measures. It also felt that more emphasis ought to be placed on institutional measures with regard to disarmament mechanisms, on measures for social and economic development, and on measures to strengthen existing peace-keeping and peace-making procedures.

Mexico noted that the question of the preparation of a comprehensive programme on disarmament dated back almost 10 years. In view of the mandate prescribed by the Assembly, it advised that, given the limited time available, the Commission should not be too ambitious and should confine itself strictly to the consideration of the "elements" of a comprehensive programme — not to the preparation of the programme itself, or even a preliminary draft programme.

Sweden believed that a comprehensive programme should embrace not only the work of the Committee on Disarmament but also that of other relevant United Nations organs and all negotiations and other important disarmament activities in whatever forum they might take place. The programme should facilitate the co-ordination of all such activities and ensure that the General Assembly would be kept informed of their progress. In the view of Sweden, the measures and priorities contained in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly should be accepted as the basis for elaboration of the elements of the programme. While strict time-frames might be justified in respect of short-term programmes, a relatively flexible approach seemed advisable for long-term objectives.

Yugoslavia understood the term "programme on disarmament" to mean an agreed document specifying all disarmament measures, phases of

their implication and measures of verification, that is to say, an instrument that would promote the process of negotiations on disarmament. It would differ from the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, but would at the same time maintain and further the momentum engendered by that session. In Yugoslavia's view, the programme should have an introduction and an operative part. The latter should elaborate the character, aims, principles and priorities of the programme as well as measures of disarmament, measures concerning international control and security and, among others, measures relating to disarmament and economic development. It would also cover the role of the United Nations in monitoring implementation of the programme. Yugoslavia stressed the importance of completing the elaboration of the programme not later than the beginning of the second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982.

Following the general exchange of views, the open-ended Working Group which the Commission established to deal with its recommendations on the elements of a comprehensive programme held four meetings and set up a drafting group which completed its task in 11 meetings. The Working Group reported to the Commission on 4 June 1979. Following a discussion of the Working Group's recommendations, the Commission, on 8 June, adopted, by consensus, its report²⁰ for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and subsequent transmission of its recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament.

The report consists of four parts: an introduction summarizing the decisions taken by the General Assembly relating to the mandate of the Commission, "Organization and work of the first substantive session", "Documentation" and "Recommendations". The last-mentioned part contains the "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" as elaborated by the Commission and is reproduced in its entirety in appendix II of the present volume.

A number of countries made statements on the draft report before its adoption, particularly with regard to the recommendations on the elements of the comprehensive programme. Most expressed satisfaction with the results achieved, but at the same time drew attention to certain elements or aspects of the question which, in the interest of achieving solutions by consensus, had not been dealt with in accordance with their specific views and preferences.

The representative of the Soviet Union, holding that the points contained in the paper²¹ submitted by Czechoslovakia on behalf of the USSR and other socialist countries were realistic and important, stated that it was unfortunate that the matter of non-emplacement of nuclear weapons in territories where there were no such weapons at the time was not included, and

²⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42).*

²¹ A/CN.10/7.

regretted that no consensus had been achieved regarding elimination of military bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States. At the same time, the Soviet Union held the view that the recommendations of the Commission contained a number of positive factors with regard to restraining the nuclear arms race and achieving disarmament.

The United States felt that the treatment of non-proliferation was quite inadequate in the document in view of the critical importance of halting the further spread of nuclear weapons. It also regarded the treatment of disarmament and development and the reduction of expenditures as inadequate. In that connexion it stressed that, without reliable information about what States were actually spending or adequate methods for comparing military expenditures internationally and verifying compliance with whatever reductions might be agreed to, there could be no basis for negotiation on the reduction of military expenditures, or the reallocation of such expenditures to development.

The United Kingdom regretted that the importance of non-proliferation was not more fully reflected in the document, in particular since that would be one of the major activities in arms control in the coming year. It also believed that a comprehensive programme would need to contain a systematic presentation of disarmament activities according to their relative importance and feasibility. And, among other items which it did not feel were adequately reflected, the United Kingdom expressed specific concern that the report did not recognize the fact that, for many States, nuclear disarmament could be undertaken only as part of a more general programme of disarmament. The United Kingdom made a specific reservation with regard to the fact that paragraph 11 (see appendix II) singled out the nuclear arms race for primary emphasis.

France, for its part, felt that there should be no surprise that the Commission was unable to reach agreement on certain proposals and felt that, in a spirit of compromise, very substantial conclusions had been reached. Regarding the elements noted in paragraph 19 (see appendix I), France stressed the necessity of taking regional situations into account and noted that in one part of the world nuclear weapons constituted an element working for balance and security; thus the problem posed by use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in its view, had to be resolved through nuclear disarmament. With regard to other points on which consensus was not reached, France again stressed the need for a global programme to take into account regional needs, as well as for it to embrace a balance between measures to be adopted, particularly between nuclear and conventional disarmament.

China emphasized that the recommendations did not reflect the responsibility of the two super-Powers in disarmament and in the maintenance of international peace and security. In that context, in stating its position and reservations on a number of points, it welcomed the fact that to some extent, the text had reflected that equal importance should be given to nuclear and conventional disarmament. Nonetheless, it felt that the document was still deficient in that it did not stipulate any concrete measures applicable to the super-Powers in the area of conventional disarmament.

Many delegations, including those of Algeria, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, regretted the absence in the document of reference to effective measures on some aspects of nuclear disarmament, and also regretted that consensus could not be reached on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. India recalled that during the special session it was the severe resistance of the nuclear-weapon Powers that had blocked the incorporation of that principle in the Final Document. Regarding the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, as far as India was concerned, there was no non-proliferation régime at the moment, and only when the implementation of adequate measures was under way in the area of nuclear disarmament would one be able to speak of such a régime. Along with other delegations, India also regretted that consensus could not be reached on the dissolution of military alliances and the dismantling of foreign military bases. Nigeria could not understand why, prior to the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the international community could not be spared the nightmare of the possible use of nuclear weapons. Since countries could consider the prohibition of the use of certain specific conventional weapons, Nigeria felt there should be no reluctance to consideration of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which were several times more destructive. Yugoslavia was also among those States which regretted that the document did not cover prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as prohibition of the development and deployment of conventional weapons or great destructive power, dissolution of military blocs, dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.

Japan, on the other hand, in referring to the points on which consensus had not been reached, considered that the inclusion of a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, under the present political and military realities, would risk destabilizing the international military balance in a way which might bring about results directly contrary to the goal of strengthening international peace and security.

Brazil, for its part, felt that despite a number of constructive initiatives, the Commission was still a long way from meeting the basic requirements for setting out a comprehensive programme. It felt that the stalemate on basic issues such as nuclear disarmament and verification explained a gradual shift of emphasis to questions of minor importance. It tended to believe that for the super-Powers peace had lost its meaning and was now considered as "an ideal state of tolerable tensions". Accordingly, Brazil questioned whether the central issues of disarmament should be abandoned for the acceptance of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons as part of the environment, and it also questioned the excessive use of semantics to obtain a consensus. In those contexts, it felt that a reasonable list of elements of a comprehensive programme should at least identify priorities if responsibilities and obligations were not duly identified and allocated. It regretted that the Commission had been subjected to so much work without achieving such results.

Sweden, on the other hand, felt that on the whole the text was a bal-

anced product and that, having worked out and reached consensus on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Disarmament Commission would prove worthy of its place in the international disarmament machinery. It regarded the report to the General Assembly as an important document which would offer guidance in the future negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

Most delegations participating in the debate on the report of the Disarmament Commission in the First Committee²² expressed gratification that the Commission had reached agreement on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Many also considered that the Disarmament Commission had carried out successfully the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in the Final Document of its tenth special session.²³ France, for instance, taking note of the thorough debates of the Commission and holding that the work of disarmament should be pursued in compliance with the Final Document of the special session, considered that it would be in the interest of all not to affect the balance achieved by modifying the elements of the disarmament programme. Argentina said that the elements for a comprehensive programme offered an excellent basis for negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, and Cyprus felt that the comprehensive programme would undoubtedly become the centre-piece of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1982. Italy, while observing that the elements did not reflect entirely the viewpoints of every State, felt that the Commission had achieved highly positive results and that the programme stressed the need for the disarmament process to develop in a balanced manner and by co-ordinated phases, thus taking into account reciprocal security needs.

Yugoslavia regarded the agreement in the Commission on the elements of a comprehensive programme as constituting the fulfilment of its first priority task. It observed that a large number of countries, individually or jointly, had made concrete contributions and stated that the atmosphere which prevailed during the Commission's work and the way in which positions were re-oriented had confirmed the political justification for reviving the Commission. The experience had also confirmed the belief of a great number of countries that the United Nations was capable of solving complex and difficult tasks. Sri Lanka stated that the Working Group established by the Disarmament Commission had made possible the achievement of consensus as to the elements of a comprehensive programme and that it looked forward to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the elaboration of the programme itself. Ireland, speaking on behalf of the nine members of

²² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee, 4th to 40th meetings*, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

the European Economic Community, noted their active participation in the work of the Commission, and stressed that the Community would continue to work for the successful utilization of both deliberative and negotiating machinery for disarmament.

Romania, for its part, while regarding the working out of the elements for a global disarmament programme as a step forward and as an important stage on the road to the preparation and adoption of the programme itself, nonetheless felt that the elements were inadequate in many respects; for example, they did not include measures aimed at prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, the outlawing of nuclear weapons, the banning of certain conventional weapons of great destructive power, the dismantling of foreign military bases, or the withdrawal of troops to within national boundaries. The Philippines expressed disappointment with the comprehensive programme as adopted by the Commission despite the useful and valuable point which it listed. It felt that it was neither comprehensive nor a programme for disarmament, but rather a "shopping list" of principles and priorities for action. The Philippines believed that no comprehensive programme of disarmament had been seen since the draft treaties of the Soviet Union and the United States on general and complete disarmament some eighteen years earlier, and stressed that the international community ought to do at least as well, if not better, in 1979. It felt that the efforts of the Commission ought to be directed to the elaboration of the elements of a true programme for achievement of disarmament together with the surveillance and security measures necessary at each step.

Some other delegations, among them those of Algeria, Australia, Brazil and Nepal, stressed the absence in the elements of any strong measures on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament. Brazil, for example, regretted that the comprehensive programme had failed to identify responsibility for disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. Brazil also noted the absence of agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, as well as serious imbalances in the items related to further steps designed to develop an international consensus on ways and means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in that no mention was made of ever-increasing vertical proliferation. Finally, with regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it noted that the document did not take into account the qualifications contained in the Final Document of the special session. Nepal emphasized that the non-aligned States had united in the Commission to resist attempts made by some nuclear-weapon States to dilute the urgency of achieving total nuclear disarmament and had succeeded in having the consensus document incorporate the decision that cessation of the nuclear arms race should receive special priority. Because of the refusal of the nuclear States to co-operate, however, the document did not include a call to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In the First Committee, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire sponsored a draft resolution on the report of the Disarmament Commission. In introducing the

draft resolution, the representative of Yugoslavia, noting that it had been revised, stated that its purpose was to confirm the adoption of the report and endorsement of the recommendations of the Commission so as to ensure the necessary conditions for the continuation of its work. He noted that by paragraph 1 of the draft the Assembly would endorse the recommendations of the Commission on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The remaining paragraphs, he noted, dealt with various aspects of the mandate and work of the Disarmament Commission. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 23 November without a vote.

Spain, in explaining its position, stressed that the Disarmament Commission should devote special attention to the question of conventional weapons and the conventional arms race and, in that context, that it was important for it to continue to function on the basis of consensus. In its view, the requirement for balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament was reflected in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, thus enabling the preparation of the agenda for the 1980 meeting of the Commission.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 34/83 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up of the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Welcoming the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus concerning the elements of a comprehensive programme on disarmament,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission can play and the important contribution it can make in examining and making recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling section II of its resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978,

1. *Endorses* the report of the Disarmament Commission and the recommendations contained therein on the elements of a comprehensive programme on disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set down in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and, to that end, to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1980, beginning on 12 May 1980;

3. *Further requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to submit a report on its work and its recommendations on paragraph 2 above to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on disarmament matters, and to render all the necessary assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the report and the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"

The Assembly also adopted resolution 34/75 under the item on the declaration of the 1980s as a second disarmament decade, which is the subject of chapter VI of the present volume. By that resolution, the Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission in 1980 to prepare a draft resolution on the question of the Second Disarmament Decade which will have a connexion with the programme because it is expected to embody an indication of targets for accomplishing the major objectives and goals of disarmament (see pp. 77-78 below).

Conclusion

The General Assembly at its tenth special session decided to establish the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body open to all States Members of the United Nations and to have it consider and recommend to the Assembly the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. By that decision the Assembly squarely placed the responsibility for accomplishing the first stage of the long-standing task of developing a comprehensive programme of disarmament with the new deliberative body and that for negotiating details with the Committee on Disarmament — a task which had been long attempted by its predecessor bodies.

The new deliberative body, the Disarmament Commission, was virtually fully occupied during its substantive session in 1979 with its responsibilities in connexion with the comprehensive programme of disarmament. To facilitate its task, the Commission had for guidance the Final Document of the special session reflecting the consensus position of the General Assembly, as well as information on a number of other proposals which was conveyed to the Commission so that it could take them into account.

In connexion with the programme, the Commission in 1979 successfully fulfilled its mandate by adopting by consensus the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It also recorded, in the context of its recommendations, the fact that in certain subject areas proposals were put forward on which consensus could not be reached. The achievement of the new deliberative body was widely regarded in a positive light, however. In fact, as a concrete follow-up action taken on the basis of the agreed inventory of items which the international community should deal with as portrayed in the Final Document adopted at the special session, the elements recommended by the Disarmament Commission comprise the first overall plan for disarmament which has been agreed to by consensus.

The Committee on Disarmament will attempt to negotiate the programme itself on the basis of the elements transmitted to it through the Assembly. The General Assembly has called in resolution 34/83 B (see chapter II above, p. 36) for that programme to be completed in time for its second special session devoted to disarmament which is scheduled for 1982. Should the Committee on Disarmament succeed in accomplishing that request of the Assembly, the international community will have at its disposal a disarmament strategy to guide its future efforts in the field of disarmament.

CHAPTER IV

Adoption of a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament

Introduction

ARTICLE I OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS states that one of the purposes of the Organization is "To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems. " ¹ Over the years, in all forums of the United Nations, repeated reference has been made to the vital importance of creating a climate of international co-operation in which the many urgent problems facing the international community, including important questions in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, could be discussed and peacefully solved.

In the Final Document of its special session devoted to disarmament,² the General Assembly further developed some of the ideas on the subject as expressed in the Charter. The Final Document of the special session, in paragraphs 12 and 13, notes that the arms race runs counter to the efforts by the United Nations to "develop broad international co-operation and understanding", and stresses that "Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

In an address made in Prague on 1 May 1979, President Gustáv Husák of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic stressed that there was a need for "concrete political principles for co-operation" and for the adoption of a document, preferably in the United Nations, that would outline these principles. Subsequently, by a letter dated 18 June 1979,³ Czechoslovakia drew attention to the President's appeal and requested that an item entitled "Adoption of a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament"

¹ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article I, para. 3.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

³ A/34/141.

be included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. The letter elaborated several considerations which had guided that request. It stressed that, in spite of the efforts being made and some of the important positive results produced, among which was the new agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms, no decisive move towards halting the arms race had as yet been made. Therefore, Czechoslovakia believed that it would be useful if the question of developing and intensifying constructive, fruitful international co-operation in dealing with disarmament problems were to receive comprehensive discussion as soon as possible in the broadest available forum, the United Nations, and that consideration of this question at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly should end with the adoption of a declaration on international co-operation.

By another letter, dated 12 September 1979,⁴ the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations forwarded to the Secretary-General the draft text of a declaration on international co-operation aimed at achieving the objectives of disarmament, with the request that it be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

Pursuant to the Czechoslovakian proposal, the Assembly decided to include on its agenda, for the first time, an item entitled "Adoption of a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament"

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

The agenda item dealing with international co-operation received considerable attention, both in the plenary meetings and in the First Committee.⁵ In introducing the draft text of the proposed declaration in the First Committee, Czechoslovakia reiterated its conviction that there was today practically no disarmament measure that could be implemented without mutual constructive co-operation; therefore it was firmly convinced that a spirit of co-operation should become the common denominator of all efforts aimed at halting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

In explaining the principal substantive ideas of the draft text, the representative of Czechoslovakia observed that the preamble stressed the importance of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the Assembly at its tenth special session. The preamble particularly elaborated two ideas, first, that it was necessary to develop détente in all spheres of international relations throughout the world, which would contribute to the achievement of disarmament and, secondly, that the arms race was in conflict with economic and social development.

⁴ A/34/141/Add.1.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 41st meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The representative then referred to the four sections of the operative part of the draft declaration. He stated that the provisions of section I were related to the active, honest approach of States to disarmament negotiations and measures. In that context, the section called for an acceleration of disarmament talks and emphasized the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Section II, the Czechoslovak representative said, concerned both joint and unilateral measures for the further implementation of the provisions of the Final Document, including an appeal for measures to reduce the danger of the outbreak of military conflicts. Section III urged all States to exercise political will and fulfil other fundamental requirements intrinsically necessary in all disarmament negotiations. Those requirements, in the view of Czechoslovakia, included solution of problems in accordance with the recognized principles of international law; the question of undiminished security for each party to disarmament negotiations, and ensuring the effectiveness of disarmament measures through appropriate verification measures. Section IV, the representative stated, was devoted to the relationship between the provisions of the declaration and the Charter of the United Nations.

In closing, Czechoslovakia pointed out that the draft declaration had been the subject of serious consultations for several months among a number of States and, accordingly, reflected many comments and ideas put forward during those consultations. It held the firm conviction that the adoption of the proposal could be a step towards ensuring that positive influences in the international climate — including the unanimous adoption of the Final Document by the General Assembly at the special session, the signing of the SALT II Treaty, and the proposal of the Soviet Union regarding a unilateral reduction of forces in Central Europe — were not wasted by a continuation of the arms race.

Both in the General Assembly and in the First Committee, the Eastern European States and a number of the non-aligned countries stressed their support of the Czechoslovak initiative. They expressed the view that adoption of a declaration of international co-operation for disarmament would be a concrete disarmament measure emphasizing the necessity for political goodwill in disarmament negotiations.

In explanation of its support, the Soviet Union pointed out that an important characteristic of the declaration resided in the organic combination of the basic ideas that had been built into both the Declaration and the Programme of Action of the Final Document adopted at the special session. It also stated that the declaration proposed by Czechoslovakia would be a sort of link between those two documents, since it would give substance to and develop the propositions contained therein and translate them into practical reality. The draft, it further emphasized, reflected the concept that the process of disarmament negotiations should be a continuous one and should proceed, as far as possible, at a rapid pace, encompassing all aspects of the problem which might lend themselves to discussion.

Poland also welcomed the declaration which, it stated, would stimulate the political will of States and at the same time create an appropriate frame-

work for the realization of genuine disarmament with its formulation of the basic requirements and principles that should determine the conduct of States in disarmament negotiations. It also believed that the most sound and convincing asset of the declaration was the presentation and, subsequently, the logical realization of the idea of the interrelationship between political and military détente.

Linking the proposed declaration with other declarations and documents that had already been codified in the United Nations or other international bodies, Afghanistan expressed the view that a declaration laying out the fundamental principles of mutual co-operation would be in accordance with the general principles of international law enshrined in the Charter and would be helpful in creating an atmosphere of trust and co-operation in the field of disarmament.

Mauritius noted that the Czechoslovak proposal deserved careful consideration, and hoped that States would use the opportunity to reaffirm their obligation to co-operate in bringing about significant disarmament measures. It felt, in particular, that the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important countries should be spelled out.

On 16 November 1979, a draft resolution which consisted of a revised version of the draft declaration was submitted by Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen; the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Qatar, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam later added their sponsorship.

In introducing the draft resolution at the 39th meeting on 21 November 1979, the representative of Czechoslovakia again stressed his country's conviction that the draft declaration was designed to help to create a favourable climate for the achievement of concrete disarmament results and should, *inter alia*, build the strongest possible bridge between the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the next one, scheduled to be held in 1982.

Several countries, in stating their intention to vote in favour of the draft, expressed positive views. Bulgaria, for example, believed that the development of international co-operation was an essential prerequisite for the solution of questions of disarmament. It further noted that the draft declaration elaborated the concept of international co-operation in the field of disarmament and reiterated that principle as a major tool for the practical implementation of the resolutions which the General Assembly customarily adopted on individual partial questions on disarmament. The Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR both stressed that the draft declaration was an important document which was fully in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and with the spirit and letter of the Final Document of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament.

Some non-aligned countries, among them Pakistan and Nigeria, while noting that the draft declaration repeated much of what was in the Final

Document, nevertheless welcomed any initiative that would promote cooperation and further the attainment of the objectives of disarmament.

Madagascar believed that the draft, rather than trying to create or replace political will where it did not exist because of the opposing interests of States, sought merely to nurture and encourage it by proposing a form of ethics in negotiations and a code of principles and political standards governing the conduct of States in order that all disarmament efforts be handled in a constructive spirit. It, therefore, strongly supported the draft.

Several delegations which abstained explained their positions either before or after the vote on the draft resolution in the First Committee. Ireland, speaking on behalf of the nine member States of the European Economic Community, expressed the view that the Final Document had already enunciated the principles for disarmament negotiations and therefore those States did not see the need for a further document on the matter. Also, since the Final Document was a consensus text, they feared that selective reformulation and reinterpretation of its provisions would only serve to cloud its meaning and complicate its implementation.

A similar opinion was echoed by Mexico, which abstained because it too felt that the substance of most if not all of the provisions of the declaration had been adequately covered by international instruments which, as a result of long and arduous consultations, had been adopted by consensus. To reiterate norms and principles would be, in its estimation, counter-productive.

Zaire, while praising the efforts made and the ideas contained in the draft resolution, considered that the proliferation of declarations of the type in question threatened to water down the very content of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

Other delegations disagreed more specifically with the draft declaration. The United States, for instance, stated that it would abstain because, even though it hoped that the media and educational institutions in the United States would see the need for promoting a better understanding of the arms race and the need for disarmament, it could not support the draft which, in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of section II (see below), stated the intention to impose an obligation on States to control their mass media and educational systems to comply with the purposes of the draft resolution. The United States added that its Government could not force such institutions in its own country to do so, and could not support a resolution which implied an obligation to apply such force. This difficulty was also expressed by Turkey which pointed out that the Turkish Government had no legal or administrative authority to utilize "the mass media" for any purpose whatsoever.

Finland, although it felt that the draft contained many positive elements, stated that, for constitutional and other reasons, it found difficulty in accepting operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of section II. It also shared a concern about the wording in paragraph 2 of section IV of the draft resolution; both Finland and Guatamala expressed the view that the wording of that paragraph would bestow a blessing on violence which was contrary to international law and therefore could not be endorsed.

At its 41st meeting, on 23 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by 98 votes to none, with 29 abstentions, and at its 97th plenary meeting, on 11 December 1979, the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 34/88 by 116 votes to none, with 27 abstentions (mostly Western countries).

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling once again the affirmation in the Charter of the United Nations of the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to this end to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security,

Stressing again the importance of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, and recalling the principles proclaimed in the Final Document of that session,

Convinced that there is an urgent need for active and combined efforts further to intensify the comprehensive implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session and that, to this end, a continuing and sustained effort by all States, in a more co-ordinated manner and on the basis of world-wide co-operation in the interests of security and peace, is essential,

Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in which the General Assembly proclaimed the duty of all States to pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal treaty on general and complete disarmament and to strive to adopt appropriate measures to reduce international tensions and strengthen confidence among States,

Stressing the inalienable right of every nation and every human being to live in peace, free from the threat of war, in freedom and independence, as was solemnly reaffirmed by the General Assembly in the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, the strict observance of which is in the highest interest of mankind and is an essential prerequisite for its full development,

Conscious that a dynamic development of détente in all spheres of international relations throughout the world would contribute to the achievement of the aims of disarmament,

Deeply disturbed by the fact that international peace and security of peoples continue to be threatened by the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and the accumulation of stockpiles of highly destructive weapons and that, at the same time, the continuation of the arms race conflicts with the interest of the economic development and the social and spiritual progress of mankind,

Noting, in particular, that the arms race is incompatible with and contrary to the efforts directed towards the establishment of the new international economic order,

Stressing the fact that the Governments of all countries, particularly of nuclear-weapon States, bear a historic responsibility for eliminating war from human life, primarily through the adoption of effective and decisive disarmament measures aimed at the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that special responsibility for achieving general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and for averting nuclear war rests with all States possessing nuclear weapons and other militarily significant States,

Proceeding from the principle that the effective, constructive and continuing co-operation among all States based on mutual confidence and political will, irrespective of their social system and level of economic development, is essential for the achievement of disarmament and the attainment of its goals,

Convinced that such co-operation must be demonstrated, developed and intensified in mutual contacts and in any forum where States conduct negotiations on disarmament, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament, in order that the aims of the negotiations may be achieved as speedily as possible,

Convinced also that such co-operation must express a common determination by States to bring about a decisive shift in disarmament negotiations and, at the same time, must be sustained by the creation of a favourable atmosphere of trust in relations among States,

Bearing in mind the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in promoting the uniting of efforts and the establishment of co-operation among States aimed at the solution of disarmament problems,

I

Solemnly calls upon all States actively to promote the development, strengthening and intensification of international co-operation designed to achieve the goals of disarmament, as defined by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, and to that end, in particular:

(a) To take initiatives aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war and adopting effective new measures to halt and reverse the arms race and pave the way for the ultimate objective of the efforts in the disarmament process, that is, general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(b) To exercise actively their inalienable right to take part in disarmament negotiations, as confirmed by the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

(c) To participate actively, as appropriate, in measures taken in the field of disarmament, bearing in mind the interests of maintaining both international and national security in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, and actively to promote such measures;

(d) To conduct disarmament negotiations in good faith on all priority items concurrently, including appropriate confidence-building measures, with a view to ensuring that such negotiations will complement one another and will be conducive to the early achievement of a decisive break-through in the sphere of disarmament;

(e) To make every effort to secure continuous and accelerated progress in the negotiations on halting the arms race and achieving disarmament and, to these ends, to refrain from impeding such negotiations, in particular with issues unrelated to disarmament;

(f) To strive in the course of disarmament negotiations to ensure that they will outstrip the qualitative development and stockpiling of weapons to which the negotiations relate and, wherever possible, to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons and weapon systems, particularly weapons of mass destruction;

(g) To ensure that multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations on disarmament questions will be consistently conducted in accordance with the respective provisions of the Final Document, bearing in mind that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;

(h) To develop joint efforts in achieving concrete disarmament measures whose implementation would progressively enable a significant portion of the resources made available through such measures to be used for social and economic needs, thus contributing to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries, taking into account the close relationship between disarmament and development;

II

Urges all States, with a view to improving further the international climate required for the full implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and accelerating the progress of the appropriate disarmament negotiations, in particular:

(a) To exert determined efforts to expedite measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States with a view to reducing the danger of the outbreak of military conflicts and facilitating decisive advance of the process of disarmament, including the creation of a favourable international atmosphere which would be conducive to the strengthening of international peace and security;

(b) To take effective measures for setting in motion the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and to strengthen it by eliminating tensions and settling disputes by peaceful means and, to these ends, in particular, to refrain from seeking military superiority

and from any other steps which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and accordingly to refrain from using their military potential for aggressive purposes, notably the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination which are striving to exercise their right to self-determination and the achievement of independence, or for interference in the internal affairs of other States:

(c) To strive consistently for the repudiation for all concepts which are based on military intimidation and policies of acting from a position of strength and which lead to the intensification or perpetuation of the arms race and the further accumulation of armaments;

(d) To affirm, wherever possible, in their constitutional norms or by any other appropriate means, their political will and determination to promote with all their strength the cause of peace and international security and the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament;

(e) To intensify steps, both through the United Nations system and individually, to promote a better understanding by world opinion of the danger of the arms race and the need for disarmament, and to ensure that world opinion will exert a positive influence on the efforts of Governments to resolve disarmament issues, utilizing to this end the educational systems, the mass media and all other appropriate institutions;

(f) On the basis of the principles of the Charter, to take all appropriate measures, including legislative ones, to prevent and prohibit propaganda for war and the arms race and the dissemination of views asserting their necessity or usefulness on political, economic or other grounds;

(g) To take vigorous measures, individually or collectively, to disseminate the ideals of peace, disarmament, co-operation and friendly relations between peoples;

III

Urges all States, in implementing the common political will expressed in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, to strive to achieve concrete measures of disarmament and, in that connexion:

(a) To be guided, in all disarmament negotiations, by the generally recognized principles of international law, as well as by their adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence;

(b) To ensure that the problems of disarmament will be solved in the spirit of the Final Document in such a manner that, as a result of the measures adopted, no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage and both the security of the States participating in the negotiations and the security of the entire international community will be strengthened and that the principle of undiminished security of each party will not be impaired;

(c) To consult with one another on disarmament matters at all levels, including the highest level, in order that, in a spirit of goodwill and in an endeavour to harmonize their positions, they may establish the political pre-conditions for the solution of those problems, and also, in the interests of disarmament, to make maximum use of all opportunities for co-operation created by States in other fields of their relations with one another;

(d) To consider in a fully responsible manner and in a spirit of co-operation all proposals and initiatives aimed at promoting the achievement of mutually acceptable concrete measures of disarmament and helping to accelerate progress in disarmament negotiations;

IV

1. *Declares* that the provisions of the present Declaration are interrelated in their interpretation and implementation and that each of them is a component of a joint approach by States in their determination fully to respect and apply all the principles of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to develop broad international co-operation for achieving the objectives of real disarmament as defined by the Assembly at its tenth special session;

2. *Declares further* that no provision of this Declaration may be interpreted as contradicting the purposes and principles of the Charter or superseding the Final Document and that no

provision of the Declaration may interfere with the immediate realization of the right of every State to individual or collective self-defence or its legitimate right to defend its territorial integrity, to liberate its occupied territories in accordance with the Charter, or with the right of colonial or displaced peoples to struggle by every possible means for their national freedom, independence and self-determination.

Conclusion

The Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament is a reaffirmation by the General Assembly, in one document, of the norms of international behaviour and specific elements of co-operation which must be observed for progress in disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security. In the Declaration, the Assembly attempts to enhance efforts towards those objectives by appealing to States to work together in good faith to promote disarmament.

The proposal by Czechoslovakia for the adoption of such a declaration by the United Nations generated a range of reactions among Member States. At one end of that range, as indicated by the extensive sponsorship of the draft resolution, many States, particularly among the Eastern European and non-aligned groups, regarded the Declaration as having the potential of reinforcing the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Final Document of the special session, and other resolutions and declarations which stress co-operative behaviour in international relations, particularly in the areas of disarmament and peace and security. Other States, whose degree of support fell short of willingness to sponsor the draft resolution, regarded the draft declaration as a repetition of norms of desirable behaviour of States which were already widely known, but spoke and voted in favour of the proposal because it was yet another initiative which might enhance prospects for disarmament. Still other States, including those of the European Economic Community, felt that a further repetition by the United Nations of principles of behaviour, as interpreted by only a limited number of member States and adopted on the basis of a vote, was not only unnecessary, but would cloud the meaning of texts or instruments which had already been agreed to by consensus and were in operation; thus the Declaration, in their view, would be counter-productive. Finally, some countries, including the United States, went further by identifying the specific points in the text to which they objected.

Although a significant number of States abstained in the voting, the Declaration, as adopted by the Assembly, may be viewed as recommending and reaffirming a code of conduct in disarmament negotiations and related areas which could enhance possibilities for achieving concrete results in the field of disarmament by providing the various bodies concerned with a comprehensive reference document.

CHAPTER V

World disarmament conference

Introduction

THE IDEA OF CONVENING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE was initiated at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961. That Conference, in its Declaration,¹ recommended, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly take a decision either to convene a special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament or a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations. The non-aligned States considered that a world disarmament conference, convened at an appropriate time, with the participation of all States, would be useful. They reiterated that view at their subsequent summit conferences, including the most recent one, held at Havana, Cuba, in 1979.² In 1965, on the basis of an initiative of a group of non-aligned countries, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2030 (XX) by which it endorsed the idea of convening a world disarmament conference. The proposal was not taken up further in the General Assembly until 1971 when the Soviet Union revived the idea and, on the basis of its proposal, the Assembly adopted resolution 2833 (XXVI), in which it expressed the conviction that careful consideration should be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States. The item has appeared on the agenda each year since that time.

In 1972 the General Assembly, by resolution 2930 (XXVII), set up a special committee on the question. In 1973, by resolution 3183 (XXVIII), it established an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of such a conference, including conditions for its realization. In 1974 and 1975 the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference submitted reports³ to the General Assembly in which, while stating that

¹ For an extract from the Declaration, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. III, document A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.

² See A/34/542, para. 223.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/9628)*, and *ibid.*, *Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/10028)*.

problems were preventing further progress towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, it noted the widespread view that a conference open to all States would be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

In 1976 the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee⁴ contained an analysis of the conclusions in its previous report to the Assembly which revealed, *inter alia*, that there existed a basic divergence of opinion among the nuclear-weapon States as to the time and conditions for convening a world disarmament conference. In the same report the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended that efforts towards the creation of appropriate conditions for the convening of such a conference should continue. The General Assembly that year adopted resolution 31/190 in which it requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons and consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made.

In 1977 the question of a world disarmament conference received attention in the context of preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, in its first report,⁵ recommended that the provisional agenda for the special session should cover the question of convening a world disarmament conference and that the General Assembly, at its thirty-second session, should request the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit a special report on the state of its work to the Assembly at its special session. The General Assembly, at its thirty-second session requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit such a special report, as well as a report to the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

During the final two sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 1978,⁶ the USSR and other Eastern European States stressed that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and a world disarmament conference should be complementary, and that the latter should become a forum for practical action leading to agreement on disarmament measures. Many Western States maintained that a world disarmament conference should only be held with the participation of all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, and with adequate preparation. The non-aligned States supported the convening of such a conference at an appropriate time with universal participation and adequate preparation. Mexico proposed reinforcement of the deliberative machinery of the United Nations through the

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/31/28). Details of the analysis referred to are contained in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), p. 30; *ibid.*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), p. 55; and *ibid.*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), p. 143.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 41* (A/32/41 and Corr.1), paras. 17 and 18.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, document A/AC.187/114, and vol. VII, 21st to 42nd meetings.

institutionalization of a world disarmament conference. All of those ideas were included as options in the draft resolution embodying a draft final document contained in the final report of the Preparatory Committee.⁷

In 1978, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference held two sessions; the first was devoted to the preparation of the special report⁸ for the special session of the Assembly. In that report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reaffirmed that there was wide support for a world disarmament conference, with varying views as to conditions for its convening and that consensus still had not been reached among the nuclear-weapon States. The second series of meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was held following the special session, during which it reviewed the situation and prepared its report⁹ to the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly.

At the special session of the General Assembly¹⁰ the representative of Iran, in his capacity as Chairman, introduced the special report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In the debate,¹¹ the Eastern European and a number of other States supported the convening of a world disarmament conference and urged that the General Assembly take appropriate decisions on the matter. Many non-aligned States emphasized the need for adequate preparation and the participation of all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States. Mexico held that, until there was general acceptance of the idea of institutionalizing a world disarmament conference, special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament should be held. Several Western States indicated a degree of scepticism as to the value of such a forum, but none the less stressed the importance of the participation of all States and of adequate preparation. China supported the establishment of fully representative deliberative and negotiating bodies for disarmament and held that there would then be no need for a world disarmament conference. In the Final Document¹² of the special session, the Assembly included the following paragraph in the section entitled "Machinery":

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

The General Assembly at its thirty-third session adopted resolution 33/69 in which it again requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, bearing in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. 1, para. 54, sect. IV, para. 10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 3* (A/S-10/3 and Corr.1).

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/33/28).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 2nd meeting, and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4).

***Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1979**

Pursuant to the mandate entrusted to it by General Assembly resolution 33/69, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held two sessions in 1979. During its first session, the Committee held two meetings, on 10 and 11 April. At the first meeting the representative of Iran informed the Committee that Iran no longer wished to hold the chair of the Committee, and the Committee elected the representative of Sri Lanka as its new Chairman. After a general debate and an exchange of views the Committee agreed, *inter alia*, that its working group should undertake the task of preparing the draft report for consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee during its second session.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee resumed its work on 10 September and, at its final meeting on 14 September, unanimously adopted its report to the General Assembly¹³ as drafted by the working group.

The Committee noted in its report that it was conscious of the fact that the idea of holding a world disarmament conference had been subject to consideration in other forums both within and outside the United Nations. These included the following:

(a) At its session held in May and June 1979, the Disarmament Commission adopted its recommendations under the heading "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", including, in the section entitled "Machinery and procedures", the recommendation that "At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation"¹⁴

(b) In the Joint United States-USSR Communiqué issued on 18 June 1979 following the meetings at Vienna of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Leonid I. Brezhnev, in connexion with the signing of the SALT II Treaty, a paragraph under the subheading "Other questions of arms limitations and general disarmament" reads:

... The sides noted their support for a second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and for that session to be followed by the convocation of World Disarmament Conference with universal participation, adequately prepared and at an appropriate time.¹⁵

(c) At its meetings held in September 1979 at Havana, the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries adopted a Political Declaration, in which a paragraph reads, in part:

The Conference welcomed the decision to hold a second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982. . . . It supported the proposal for a world disarmament conference at the appropriate time with universal participation and adequate preparation.¹⁶

The report also noted that, in compliance with its mandate, the Committee, through its Chairman, had maintained close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain cur-

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/34/28)*.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, sect. IV, para. 19, subsect. IV C, para. 17.

¹⁵ See A/34/414, annex.

¹⁶ See foot-note 2.

rently informed of their respective attitudes. The information regarding those contacts was included in the Committee's report. Based on the results of the contacts, it was evident that, in essential aspects, the positions of the five nuclear Powers concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference remained unaltered.

In that regard, China said its position remained unchanged and was reflected in the previous reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the General Assembly.

France stated it was always ready to act in favour of real and effective disarmament. It had accordingly upheld the idea of a world disarmament conference. Such a project could effectively contribute to the global disarmament process, once all of the five nuclear-weapon Powers had made known their support. Although the objectives of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held in 1978 or of the one to be convened in 1982 were not identical to those of a world disarmament conference, those sessions had to be taken into consideration.

The Soviet Union believed that the convening of a world disarmament conference was of great international importance. The forum should be a further step forward in combining the efforts of States in the field of disarmament, which would supplement what was expressed and agreed on at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. A world disarmament conference could elaborate effective decisions which would be a new incentive for all States for taking practical measures to halt the arms race. Universality of the world conference would ensure the joint participation of all countries of the world in the consideration of disarmament issues. It appeared, from the Final Document of the tenth special session and the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, that the idea of holding a world disarmament conference enjoyed increasingly wide support. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that the time had come to take concrete steps to begin thorough preparations for the conference. It added that, with this aim in view, the date of convening the conference should be determined and a preparatory body established.

The task of convening a world disarmament conference would be facilitated, the Soviet Union further stated, by the adoption at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the draft resolution entrusting the *Ad Hoc* Committee with starting preliminary preparatory work for the conference. Finally, the USSR believed that the conference would become a unique forum and that it should follow the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

The United Kingdom took the view that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference should not undertake any substantive work until all the militarily significant States had indicated that in principle they supported the convening of a world disarmament conference and would be prepared to participate in its work. Although the United Kingdom recognized that at an appropriate time, and if carefully prepared, such a conference would serve a useful purpose, it was not convinced that the condition outlined above had been fulfilled.

The United States expressed the view that it was premature to set a date and begin preparations for the convening of a world disarmament conference. As stated in the 1978 report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to the General Assembly, the United States believed that there was insufficient political agreement on the issues which would presumably be addressed at such a conference and that this lack of agreement would probably hinder rather than assist efforts to reach concrete arms control agreements.

In the conclusions and recommendations of the report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had received wide support among the States Members of the United Nations, however, with varying degrees of emphasis and differences of opinion with regard to conditions and certain aspects related to the question of its convening. No consensus with respect to the convening of a world disarmament conference under present conditions had yet been reached among the nuclear-weapon States, whose participation in such a conference had been deemed essential by most States Members of the Organization.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee added that the Assembly might wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening had been reached. The General Assembly might also wish to renew the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and to request it to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In its consideration of the question of a world disarmament conference at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the First Committee had before it the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee,¹⁷ the documents of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 4 to 9 June 1979,¹⁸ and the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979.¹⁹ The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was introduced by the representative of Sri Lanka in his capacity as Chairman. He noted that the conclusion of the report was the product of delicate negotiations among all delegations concerned.

Numerous Eastern European States, including Bulgaria, the Byelorus-

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/34/28)*.

¹⁸ A/34/357.

¹⁹ See A/34/542, annex.

sian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR emphasized the need to convene a world disarmament conference, referring to paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the tenth special session or the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries at Havana. Some of them also recalled the USSR-United States meetings held at Vienna in June 1979 on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II Treaty and, in light of the mention of support for the idea in the Joint Communiqué²⁰ issued at the time, called for a world disarmament conference to be held, following a second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The Eastern European States also stressed that measures had to be taken at an early stage to ensure adequate and thorough preparation of a world disarmament conference, and held that such measures included setting a date for the conference and establishing a preparatory body.

Poland stressed the need to undertake concrete preparations for convening, as soon as possible after the second special session of the Assembly on disarmament, a world disarmament conference with universal participation and with such terms of reference as would allow it to proceed to more radical solutions to the problem of disarmament.

The Byelorussian SSR held that a world disarmament conference, without competing with the efforts of the Assembly and its organs but supplementing those efforts, might elaborate a binding set of decisions and thereby promote the cause of disarmament, both from the point of view of general and complete disarmament and from that of partial measures to halt the arms race.

The USSR, reiterating its support, associated the holding of a world disarmament conference with universal participation and the binding nature of the decisions concerned, and stressed that it was necessary to proceed with the implementation of the recommendation made by the Assembly at its tenth special session concerning a world disarmament conference in order to determine specific dates for such a conference and for setting up an organ which would be responsible for undertaking the preparatory work.

Other socialist countries also reaffirmed their support for the convening of a world disarmament conference. Mongolia, for instance, was convinced that the consideration of the whole complex of disarmament problems in the widest and most authoritative international forum — a world disarmament conference — could facilitate the adoption of effective disarmament measures, and suggested broadening the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and endowing it with appropriate preparatory functions.

A number of non-aligned countries also expressed their support for a world disarmament conference. Mozambique stated that such a conference was needed to complement the ongoing substantive negotiations on disarmament issues. Nepal emphasized its support for holding the conference under

²⁰ See foot-note 15.

United Nations auspices, with a view to creating world interest in the subject of disarmament.

Yemen urged convening a world disarmament conference which would go beyond declarations and adopt practical measures for disarmament.

On 14 November, Burundi, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution, subsequently sponsored also by Mongolia and Viet Nam. In introducing the draft resolution on 15 November, the representative of Sri Lanka said that it followed the format and content of Assembly resolution 33/69 on the same subject, adopted in 1978, and that the only new element was the first operative paragraph, by which the Assembly would note with satisfaction the paragraph in the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report concerning a possible decision on the holding of a world disarmament conference following the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The representative of Sri Lanka pointed out that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had adopted that paragraph of its report unanimously. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 23 November by consensus, and by the General Assembly on 11 December, also without a vote, as resolution 34/81. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977 and 33/69 of 14 December 1978,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its belief that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could promote the realization of such an aim and that the cooperation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that in its report to the General Assembly the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated the following:

“Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly may wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening has been reached”;

2. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee;

3. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any possible relevant proposals and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled “World Disarmament Conference”

In explanation of the vote after the adoption of the draft resolution in the First Committee, Bangladesh stated that as a token of its support for a world disarmament conference it fully endorsed the recommendations and decision of the special session on disarmament, and believed that a second special session on disarmament would lend meaning to the eventual holding of a world disarmament conference.

Conclusion

In 1979, the USSR and the Eastern European States continued to call for a world disarmament conference to be held with a view to achieving substantive progress towards disarmament. A number of those States, reiterating their view that a date should be set and a preparatory body established for the conference, which would be held as soon as possible after the second special session, referred to their support for that session as well and to the mention of the subject in the Joint Communiqué of the June 1979 meetings of the Presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States held at Vienna. Most of the non-aligned States, while expressing support for a world disarmament conference, continued to emphasize the importance of universal participation and adequate preparation: those requirements had also been mentioned in their reference to the question in the Final Declaration of the sixth summit Conference of non-aligned countries held at Havana. The general position of Western States remained cautious, as indicated by the views of France, the United Kingdom and the United States contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee; none of them referred to the subject in the course of the General Assembly debates.

Pursuant to the Assembly resolution adopted in 1979, the *Ad Hoc* Committee is to continue its consideration of the question in 1980 despite the divergent views among the various groups and, particularly, among the nuclear-weapon States.

Consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade

Introduction

IN 1969, FOLLOWING A SUGGESTION initially put forward by Romania in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly, on 16 December, adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) by which it declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing negotiations on collateral measures, to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline for its negotiations. In the resolution the Assembly also recommended that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by disarmament measures to promote economic development of developing countries. Throughout the Disarmament Decade, various proposals were advanced for the implementation of its purposes and objectives, particularly with regard to elaboration of the comprehensive programme (see chapter III above). The question of disarmament and development and related matters also became the subject of considerable study (see chapter XXIII below).

In 1974, by resolution 3261 A (XXIX), the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General and Governments to report on steps taken to publicize and help implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade. The following year, the General Assembly, under the agenda item entitled "Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade" adopted resolution 3470 (XXX) by which it invited the CCD to review the work done in implementation of the purposes of the Decade with a view to accelerating negotiations for effective disarmament; it also called for intensified efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development. From 1976 through 1978, the General Assembly had on its agenda an item entitled "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade" and adopted resolutions on the question. The subject was discussed each year in the CCD as called for in the various resolutions of the Assembly, as well as in 1978 at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In general, in the discussions on the question, States have professed widespread disappointment with the meagre results achieved in the field of disarmament at each stage during the Decade. Such disappointment is reflected in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly¹ adopted at the conclusion of the session in June 1978.

Consideration of the effectiveness of the Disarmament Decade continued following the special session of the Assembly and continued to reflect that little progress had been made towards achievement of its objectives. Pursuant to resolution 33/62 of December 1978, the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session in 1979, had on its agenda an item entitled "Consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade"

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In the general debates in both the plenary meetings and the First Committee² of the General Assembly, the great majority of speakers who referred to the question of a disarmament decade, in whatever context, expressed disappointment or concern that the objectives of the first Disarmament Decade had not been achieved. Non-aligned and developing States were particularly disturbed by the apparent lack of progress.

China, Democratic Yemen, Kenya, and Papua New Guinea were among the States expressing general disappointment that there had not been any real progress towards the reduction of arms as envisaged in accordance with the objectives of the Decade, with Kenya regarding the arms race as a waste of scarce economic resources that no country could afford to ignore and in many cases as having reached absurd levels.

In his plenary address, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania recalled that the resolution by which the Assembly had declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade envisaged a relationship

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III; the paragraph relating directly to the question reads:

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been any real progress either that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, which are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries"

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 37th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

between disarmament and development, anticipating that the resources saved would be diverted to social and economic development for the benefit of the population of the world. His delegation regretted that that objective had not been achieved because considerable human and material resources were tied up in armament programmes. In its address, Uruguay stated that of late, and particularly during the Disarmament Decade, the arms race had become more intense than ever before; it held that the "mind-boggling" total of the arms trade alone was sufficient to explain the growing lack of transfer of resources to the developing countries. Similarly, Jamaica considered it ironic that the 1970s had seen unprecedented growth in the sophistication, volume and sale of weapons, while the social and economic needs of the vast majority of mankind had been growing increasingly urgent, and Zaire regretted that the Disarmament Decade had not achieved what it viewed as its main objective of freeing resources committed to the arms race for the benefit of economic and social development.

The delegation of India referred to the proposed second disarmament decade, saying that it would be fitting that it begin with measures aimed at mobilizing world opinion for international co-operative action to consolidate world peace. It suggested later that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should increase efforts to alert public opinion to the danger of nuclear war.

In the First Committee, China, in supporting the suggestion made by a number of countries that the United Nations declare the 1980s as a second disarmament decade, said that efforts should be made to avoid the same mistakes as were made in the first Disarmament Decade. In that connexion, China held that absence of a sincere desire for disarmament on the part of the super-Powers, the conclusion of conventions which did not in the least affect existing super-Power arsenals or dealt with weapons which did not yet exist, and super-Power rivalry for world hegemony prevented genuine disarmament.

Japan reviewed some positive achievements of the past Disarmament Decade, including the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (see chapter X below), progress in the strategic arms limitation talks, and the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex) and of the Convention on biological and toxin weapons (see chapter XV below). It viewed the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as an appropriate event to mark the end of the Decade and perhaps a first step towards a new disarmament era. Japan concluded, however, in the light of increasing military expenditures and meagre progress in such areas as a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and chemical weapons ban treaties, that the Decade had not met expectations.

Ireland referred to the lack of practical achievement in comparison with the volume and scope of the deliberations, analyses and recommendations that had been made, and pointed out that almost 10 years ago it had proposed, together with a number of other delegations, a comprehensive pro-

gramme of disarmament to facilitate the implementation of the objectives of the Disarmament Decade. The hope then had been that substantial progress would be made during the 1970s, at least on a number of the measures identified in that programme. Ireland was disappointed that the international community had not only proved unequal to the challenge set for it, but had allowed the possibilities offered by a decade dedicated to disarmament to slip into history with little real effort to come to grips with the complex problems involved.

Norway pointed out that, in spite of the Disarmament Decade, world military expenditures had continued to climb to ever more exorbitant levels. The two largest military alliances accounted for about 70 per cent of those expenditures, although their share of the total had decreased during the Decade. Norway referred to the fact that the arms race had also spread to the third world where military spending had doubled during the Disarmament Decade, and had increased faster than the gross national product.

Nigeria referred to resolution 33/62 by which the General Assembly had taken note of the preparations for the strategy for the third United Nations development decade, and stressed the need to continue to promote the link between the strategy for development and the strategy for disarmament. The delegation was of the view that steps should be taken to proclaim the 1980s as a second disarmament decade, simultaneously with the proclamation of the third United Nations development decade. Nigeria believed that the strategy for the second disarmament decade should include (a) the elaboration, within the first year of the decade, of a comprehensive programme of disarmament by the Committee on Disarmament, to be adopted by the General Assembly; (b) the active pursuit of negotiations on disarmament measures with a view to completing the priority items, if possible, during the decade; and (c) specific arrangements for the transfer of resources from military to economic and social purposes. The delegation proposed that the Disarmament Commission at its next session be required to prepare a draft resolution on the declaration of the 1980s as a second disarmament decade. Nigeria hoped that such a draft would be ready for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

The delegation of Democratic Yemen took a position similar to that of Nigeria with regard to the declaration of the 1980s as a second disarmament decade so that it could coincide with the third United Nations development decade and reconfirm the importance of the link between disarmament and development. It felt that the decade should involve a comprehensive review of the achievements of the previous 10 years and identification of the difficulties impeding the halting of the arms race and the rechanneling of resources to social and economic assistance.

Cyprus and Ethiopia felt that a meaningful gain realized during the first Disarmament Decade had been the convening of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Cyprus noted that at that session the Assembly had produced a Final Document which brought under world-wide focus the calamities of the arms race and the urgent need for its cessation, while Ethiopia regarded the Introduction to the Final Document on the one hand as

characterizing the manner in which the international community was closing the first Disarmament Decade, and on the other as constituting the bridge towards the second decade to be devoted to the same urgent and pressing issues of disarmament.

The representative of the Philippines declared that every decade must be a disarmament decade until the goal of disarmament was reached.

The representatives of numerous additional States, including those of Algeria, the Bahamas, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Turkey, Uruguay, Zaire, and Zambia, indicated their general support for the idea of the declaration of the 1980s as a second disarmament decade. The majority of them referred to increasing or excessive military expenditures or lack of reallocation of resources from armaments to social and economic development, or to both, during the 1970s, and several of them also expressed hope for greater progress during the approaching decade. The Bahamas, for instance, while regarding the international community in the 1970s as having moved closer to nuclear holocaust, hoped that the 1980s would mark the beginning of real efforts to create a more peaceful world, and Uruguay hoped that the new decade would begin with a better prospect for a more just world with weapons resources reallocated to the achievement of development goals and the solution of other basic problems.

On 12 November 1979, Egypt, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently revised and sponsored also by Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Mauritius, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Senegal, the United Republic of Cameroon and Venezuela. The representative of Nigeria, in introducing the draft resolution, recalled that there had been a universal expression of disappointment that the purposes and objectives of the first Disarmament Decade had not been realized. Not only had there been no significant measures of disarmament, he said, but not even a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been drawn up. The representative explained that the draft resolution was designed to lay the basis for the declaration of the 1980s as a second United Nations disarmament decade. It would direct the Disarmament Commission to propose elements of a draft resolution in proclamation of the disarmament decade to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for consideration and adoption. Operative paragraph 3 would provide guidelines for the Disarmament Commission for that draft resolution.

On 19 November, before the vote, the representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the sponsors, further revised operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution orally, changing the words "target dates" to "targets" (see below).

In explanation of its position, the United States stated that it would abstain in the voting, because experience had shown that target dates were misleading. The United States further said that it was one thing to vote for target dates, but it was a little harder to meet them. The Soviet Union shared the view that the establishment of target dates was not realistic, and would merely give rise to unjustified illusions; however, it would vote in favour of

the draft resolution since the word "dates" was removed. Similarly, France felt that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution in its original text was somewhat over-ambitious, and to a certain extent unrealistic, but, with the amendment, considered it acceptable.

The delegation of Japan, stating that it would vote in favour of the draft resolution after the two revisions, considered it unrealistic to set target dates for accomplishing disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that the changes proposed by the sponsors of the draft resolution met the points it had raised for the most part; it would vote in favour of the draft. The delegation of Italy had misgivings about the formulation of operative paragraph 3 despite the amendment, and stressed that, in its view, the word "targets" could not imply the fixing of specific dates for the goals of disarmament; it would vote in favour because it was in agreement with the general purpose and objectives of the resolution. Argentina, for its part, would vote in favour of the draft resolution despite the fact that it regretted the dropping of the word "dates" because, in its view, it was precisely that word which gave content to the draft resolution.

The First Committee, in a separate vote on operative paragraph 3 requested by the United States, adopted the paragraph, as orally revised, by 120 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. Thereafter the draft resolution as a whole was adopted without a vote.

The United Kingdom stated that it had abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 3 because, even without reference to dates, it still embodied a request to the Disarmament Commission that it establish a further negotiating framework which would be superimposed on other arrangements which were already requested for formulation in the Committee on Disarmament within the next three years. Finland stated that it had voted in favour of operative paragraph 3 and interpreted "targets" as including no time element.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, on 11 December, as resolution 34/75. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/62 of 14 December 1978,

Bearing in mind that the Disarmament Decade, declared by its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, is coming to an end,

Expressing its disappointment that the purposes and objectives of the Decade have not been realized,

Deeply concerned that a substantial part of world resources, material as well as human, continues to be wasted on armaments with detrimental effect on international security and on efforts to achieve the new international economic order,

Bearing in mind the preparations for the international development strategy for the third United Nations development decade,

Stressing again the close relationship between disarmament and development,

Convinced that effective disarmament measures should release resources from the unproductive arms race for economic and social programmes, in particular for international economic co-operation,

1. *Decides* to declare the decade of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade;
2. *Directs* the Disarmament Commission, at its substantive session of 1980, to prepare ele-

ments of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade" and submit them to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for consideration and adoption;

3. *Determines* that the draft resolution should embody, *inter alia*, an indication of targets during the Second Disarmament Decade for accomplishing the major objectives and goals of disarmament, as well as ways and means of mobilizing world public opinion in this regard;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views and suggestions of Member States and of relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency on possible elements in the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade;

5. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance, including the preparation of a working paper, to the Disarmament Commission in implementing the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade"

Conclusion

In 1979, there was a general atmosphere of disappointment that the purposes and objectives of the first Disarmament Decade had not been better realized. In that context, as well as in discussions on related topics, there were numerous expressions of concern in the various forums that a substantial part of the world's resources, material as well as human, continued to be allocated to armaments, with detrimental effects on security as well as on social and economic development.

The General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, decided to declare the decade of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, and directed the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1980 to prepare elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade" and to submit them to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for consideration and adoption. In the meantime, several Member States have provided suggestions relating to the strategy to be followed during the Second Disarmament Decade.

PART TWO

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

THE EMERGENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS in 1945 represented an unprecedented threat to the security of States and to the very survival of mankind. Since that time, there have been continuing efforts on the part of the international community to seek ways and means for the prevention, curbing and cessation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons.

From the very beginning of its work the United Nations has placed emphasis on solving the many problems associated with the advent of the nuclear age and threat of nuclear weapons. By its first resolution the General Assembly established an Atomic Energy Commission with the urgent task of finding out specific means for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

Over the years negotiations in different bodies have taken place and a great number of proposals have been submitted, both within and outside the framework of the United Nations, without arriving at a satisfactory solution, although a number of agreements have been reached¹ with a view to limiting nuclear armaments and their proliferation, reducing military tension and creating a political climate conducive to further and more significant achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament. In spite of all these efforts, the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons has continued unabated. The international community has witnessed unprecedented growth of nuclear arsenals and deployment of new and increasingly sophisticated nuclear-weapon systems as well as some increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. Lack of the political will to bring about genuine measures of nuclear disarmament has frequently been cited as the main obstacle to achieving adequate results. Many States have criticized the tendency to divert international disarmament efforts towards issues less important than nuclear disarmament.

¹ A detailed account of such achievements may be found in *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), and its supplement, *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 76.IX.1).

It is widely accepted that the nuclear-weapon States, especially the two major ones, have the primary responsibility for reaching agreement on specific measures conducive to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Bearing in mind their responsibilities, the Soviet Union and the United States have continued intensive efforts to seek acceptable solutions of the complex problem of the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear-weapon systems, as evidenced by their persistent efforts in the context of the SALT negotiations (see chapter VIII below).

During recent years new or revised proposals covering different aspects of nuclear disarmament have been put forward. These initiatives have included such ideas as the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and the cut-off of the further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the transfer of stocks of such material to peaceful uses. Without abandoning the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, a trend towards seeking agreement on specific partial measures has long since emerged. The widespread desire of States to build confidence and achieve progress in nuclear disarmament has directed efforts towards such questions as restriction or prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States,² non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and non-first use of such weapons,³ as well as such long-standing matters as the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another preoccupation has been to avert the danger of nuclear war. Bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, France and the United Kingdom, respectively, have led to separate similar agreements concerning measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.⁴

The view has also developed that all States have a legitimate interest and obligation to participate actively in the process of solving the complex problems connected with the question of nuclear disarmament. In that regard, the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament may be viewed as a milestone. With respect to particular measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the relevant parts of the Final Document of the special session identify nuclear disarmament as having the highest priority and recognize the legitimate interest of all States in nuclear disarmament, thus reflecting the consensus reached on a wide range of divergent views as to approaches to the question and specific measures to be adopted.⁵

² See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), p. 173.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp. 68-69.

⁴ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975*, p. 130; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, p. 71.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, paras. 45-50. Paragraph 50, which is referred to frequently in the present chapter, reads as follows:

At its thirty-third session in 1978, the General Assembly again reaffirmed the priority of nuclear disarmament, as established by the special session. At the same time it considered the remaining differences in viewpoints, which would require much further effort to be resolved. The General Assembly discussed and adopted resolutions on several specific questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, including the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing (resolutions 33/60 and 33/71 C); prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes (resolution 33/91 H); non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present (resolution 33/91 F) and non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war (resolution 33/71 B).

This chapter is designed to provide a review of the deliberations and negotiations in the field of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament during 1979 which are not covered separately in other topical chapters of the present volume.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

At its first substantive session in May 1979, the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with its mandate, dealt primarily with the consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.⁶ For details of its work on that item as a whole, see chapter III above.

After a detailed exchange of views, the delegates succeeded, within the framework of the comprehensive programme, in identifying the elements relating to nuclear disarmament and to make specific recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the Committee on Disarmament. In doing so, the Commission reached consensus on the need to curb the nuclear arms race and achieve gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, different views still remained as to priorities and approach.

50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, paras. 1-3, 9-10 and 18-19.

In that context, many States elaborated what should be taken into account in the preparation of the programme. A number of them emphasized that the nuclear arms race was the major threat to human existence and regarded nuclear disarmament as the most urgent task on the international agenda and the fundamental element of priority in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. They regretted that any reversal of the nuclear arms race still appeared distant. The nuclear-weapon States, in particular the major nuclear Powers, were looked upon as bearing a special responsibility in that regard. Not only quantitative but also qualitative limitation of strategic weapons was considered necessary, since qualitative improvements brought about by technological innovations overshadowed in importance the size of nuclear arsenals. As a first step towards that goal, it was widely held that the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was an essential prerequisite. The Commission also regarded the successful conclusion of negotiations on the SALT II Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States as encouraging and it felt that negotiations should commence on SALT III.

Several States put forward specific ideas. Austria suggested the adoption of appropriate and verifiable measures for the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing and for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; it also argued for a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles. Sweden dwelt on the need to constrain further technological development of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of further proliferation. It also considered it essential that the Committee on Disarmament should be a central forum for the initiation of consultations and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Yugoslavia assigned the highest priority to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. Egypt called for a timetable to be worked out to curb the production and development of nuclear weapons and to remove and destroy existing stockpiles; it also advocated treaties on a comprehensive test ban and on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. The Soviet Union felt that the keystone should be to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament; in that regard, it stressed the importance of halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons in order gradually to reduce and finally eliminate stockpiles. The USSR, along with other socialist States, expressed their support for the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and the non-employment of nuclear weapons in territories where there were no such weapons at present as means to help avert the danger of a nuclear war. They also favoured a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing, strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and non-use of force in international relations.

Hungary suggested that at different stages of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, consideration should be given also to cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

France, on behalf of the nine member States of the European Economic Community, in outlining the considerations which ought to be taken into account in the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, stated that it should be balanced in order to assure equal security at lesser levels of armaments, should accommodate the needs of a regional approach, and should maintain a balance between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament.

China, in explaining its position, maintained that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be carried out in conjunction with each other. The two States with the largest nuclear arsenals should immediately stop their nuclear arms race and begin to reduce and destroy their nuclear weapons by stages. When substantial progress had been made, the other nuclear-weapon States should then join them in negotiations for the total destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, the two major nuclear-weapon States should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The United Kingdom and other Western countries, in the context of the comprehensive programme, expressed the view that in the contemporary world nuclear disarmament could be undertaken only as a part of a more general programme of disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany, with regard to nuclear measures, advocated a comprehensive test ban; strengthening of the non-proliferation régime; strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; and limitation, balanced reduction and finally complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their launchers.

Japan considered that the main elements of the programme in the field of nuclear disarmament should include the SALT negotiations; a comprehensive test-ban treaty; non-proliferation while ensuring the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and cut-off of production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes and their diversion to peaceful uses.

Many delegations insisted that some kind of timetable for achieving nuclear disarmament should be agreed upon, while others held the view that the setting of deadlines would not facilitate the reaching of agreements.

At its 22nd meeting, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus its recommendations under the heading "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament". The relevant section of the programme, which places the question of nuclear disarmament first among the specific measures envisaged, reads as follows:

A. *Disarmament measures*

1. *Nuclear weapons*

(a) Nuclear-test ban;

(b) Cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and nuclear disarmament, which will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

- (i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;
- (ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- (iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time;
- (c) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (d) Continuation of the strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties concerned;
- (e) Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document;
- (f) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Commission could not reach consensus, however, on the question of prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In summing up the work of the Disarmament Commission, delegations generally felt that it had succeeded in reaching the highest possible degree of consensus, taking into account the complexity of the problem. A number of them made observations with regard to their particular views, including questions in the area of nuclear disarmament which they felt were not adequately reflected in the elements of the comprehensive programme.

In the view of the Soviet Union, for example, the following points should be included in any comprehensive programme of disarmament: conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, including the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; the question of the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where they are not to be found at present; and prevention of the emergence, development and deployment of a neutron weapon.

The United Kingdom made an express reservation on the point that the document singled out the nuclear arms race for first emphasis, contrary to the need for a balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament which had found expression in the Final Document of the special session. China considered that the document was deficient in not singling out measures applicable to the super-Powers and in not reflecting adequately that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be given equal importance and be carried out jointly. France pointed out that nuclear weapons constituted an element conducive to balance and security and therefore the problem posed by the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons was one which had to be answered by nuclear disarmament.

Japan held that the inclusion of the question of the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under the present political and military realities of the world would risk destabilizing the international military balance. Brazil, for its part, stressed the view that the nuclear-weapon States had to accept the undeniable priority of nuclear disarmament, and that concrete undertakings in nuclear disarmament and effective security assurances would justify more general initiatives for conventional disarmament.

India regretted that consensus could not be reached on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a feeling shared by several countries including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela. Finally, other delegations, among them Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, regretted that specific reference was not made to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" was considered by the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with its programme of work, from 19 to 23 April and from 2 to 6 July. In the discussion on the item as well as in their general statements the members of the Committee mainly reaffirmed their previous positions regarding the question of nuclear disarmament.⁷ Two documents outlining specific approaches were submitted to the Committee.

The first, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,⁸ concerned negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. Romania later joined the sponsors of the document. The other, submitted by the group of 21,⁹ comprised a working paper on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The representative of the Soviet Union, in introducing the Eastern European paper, pointed out that it recognized that the elimination of nuclear weapons could not be achieved all at once but would involve mutually agreed stages and verification measures. As examples, he cited cessation of qualitative improvements, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and gradual reduction of stockpiles. He regarded the Committee on Disarmament as a suitable forum for the negotiations involved but felt that participation of all the nuclear Powers was essential. He also held that the existing balance of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages; thus, he stated, the principle of the inviolability of the security of States would be upheld. Finally, the approach should be correlated with existing negotiations and arrangements already agreed upon to limit the nuclear arms race.

Later in the session, the Soviet representative stressed that the purpose of the socialist countries' initiative was to make the talks on nuclear disarm-

⁷ CD/53 and Corr. I, appendix IV, vols. I, II and III.

⁸ *Ibid.*, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/36. For explanation and listing of the group, see chapter I, foot-note 21.

ament comprehensive. With regard to questions which a number of delegations had raised on the proposal concerning the stages of nuclear disarmament, he stated that it would be premature to go into detail but suggested, by way of preliminary comment, that the Final Document of the special session provided the basis for reaching agreement, during the talks themselves, on specific measures to be taken at each stage. He stressed that the sponsors recognized that the negotiations would be difficult because they covered complex political, military and technical questions. In concluding, he suggested that the organizational matters and problems to be discussed should be defined in the course of preparatory consultations which, in the view of the sponsors, could be undertaken most expediently by a working group.

The representative of the United States explained that while his Government favoured elimination of nuclear weapons and did not disagree with the objective of the Eastern European paper, it disagreed with the method by which the proposal sought to eliminate nuclear weapons. In the United States view, it did not seem realistic to expect agreement on a blueprint and negotiating forum for the elimination of all nuclear weapons when there had not yet been agreement on getting rid of the delivery vehicles whose destruction could be most easily verified. The representative pointed out that a rough equilibrium had formed the basis for the negotiations on strategic arms limitation and that those negotiations demonstrated the delicacy of the process of devising agreements which would preserve the equilibrium while bringing the build-up in nuclear armaments under control. Moreover, nuclear arsenals could not be separated from the integrated defense posture of the nuclear-weapon States and those who depended on them for their security. General disarmament would require elimination of all kinds of weapons — nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and conventional. Elimination of one class of weapons without compensating reductions in other classes would give considerable advantage to States which possessed large arsenals of the other classes. Thus, in the United States' view, the proposal addressed the problem of nuclear disarmament without consideration of the effect it would have on the security of States.

The United States also held that the proposal did not give enough attention to the stages which had already been recognized, to the need for review of the implementation of measures taken in preceding stages before moving to subsequent stages, or to the verifiability of the respective measures. In conclusion, the United States took the position that reducing reliance on nuclear weapons was a long, difficult and serious task which had begun with SALT II, to be followed soon, it hoped, by a comprehensive test ban, by SALT III and by other appropriate and verifiable measures. It saw no reason to turn away from that approach.

The delegation of the United Kingdom expressed the view that proposals for the reduction of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of nuclear stockpiles until they were completely destroyed would make a major contribution to the common objective of general and complete disarmament if they could be realized. However, consideration had to be given to whether

such proposals, at the present time, would provide a sensible basis for progress or would risk diminishing the security of one nation or group, and to whether the measures involved would be verifiable. In its view, the concept of balance was particularly relevant to nuclear disarmament, and nuclear deterrence had proved by experience to be a decisive contribution to stability. Proposals for nuclear disarmament would have to be considered not only in their own right, but also in the context of the conventional balance, particularly in Europe. Measures which disturbed the balance in favour of those States with the most troops and conventional weapons would not be acceptable. Accordingly, the United Kingdom welcomed the importance which the USSR, in elaborating on the proposal, had attached to the principle of undiminished security, although it was not clear as to what trade-offs there might be between nuclear and conventional arsenals. In concluding, the United Kingdom expressed the belief that progress could best be made by continuing further along the lines of the existing approach.

The representative of France agreed with the Eastern European countries' recognition, as stressed in their proposal, that the problem of nuclear disarmament was complex. France also regarded it as common knowledge that in the northern hemisphere the nuclear weapon had become an integral part of the overall military balance and, therefore, abolition of nuclear weapons alone, without regard to the broader political and military context, would compromise that balance and jeopardize security. It also realized that results, in terms of effective reductions of nuclear armaments of the two principal Powers, would materialize only in stages and after long negotiations. If, as a result of substantial reduction in those arsenals, the disproportion between the nuclear forces of those two Powers, on the one hand, and of France, on the other, should change radically, France could decide to contribute to the process. As things stood at present, however, nuclear weapons could not be isolated from the general process of disarmament, which had to take account of all military resources, the diversity of regional situations and the right of all to security. Under this circumstance, France suggested that perhaps the appropriate organ to discuss the problem would be the Disarmament Commission.

Several Western delegations, including those of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, expressed similar views. Canada noted the great importance of the nuclear question and regarded the Committee on Disarmament as an appropriate forum to tackle certain of its aspects, while others might best be negotiated between the super-Powers or among the nuclear-weapon States. It emphasized the particular importance it attached to four measures — a comprehensive test ban, cessation of flight testing of strategic delivery vehicles, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and limitation and reduction of spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems — which, it held, would pave the way for the reduction of nuclear weapons. With regard to the ban on production, Canada noted the need for accurate information on the production of fissionable materials and related production facilities, for the dec-

laration by the nuclear-weapon States of ceilings on stocks, and for the expansion of facilities for verification.

The Federal Republic of Germany noted that the questions pertaining to nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the Committee were closely inter-linked. Accordingly, it saw the need for a carefully phased programme, which would take time and assure undiminished security for all States. It stressed the need for verification of agreements and advocated use of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Accordingly, the Federal Republic of Germany felt that the Eastern European proposal as formulated was perhaps too broad and imprecise. With regard to the comprehensive test ban and SALT, it felt that all the Committee could and should do was to follow the negotiations and be kept informed regularly of developments.

The Netherlands considered that it was not beyond the scope of the Committee to deal with the halting of the nuclear-arms race and to work for nuclear disarmament. It should, however, carefully select which questions could best be discussed bilaterally, regionally, and in a world-wide forum. To the Netherlands it seemed ill-advised to disturb ongoing negotiations with parallel and overlapping talks in the Committee. In addition, it noted that nuclear disarmament could not be separated from other disarmament discussions, and that security considerations of different regions had to be recognized. The Netherlands regarded the Eastern European proposal as being rather imprecise in that it mentioned cessation of production and destruction without indicating stages, who would participate, reconciliation of the process with SALT, or means of verification.

Australia, for its part, after noting the overall importance of the subject of nuclear disarmament, emphasized in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty that the issue before the Committee was the consideration of the actual reduction of existing arms. It regarded the Eastern European proposal as very significant, for at least three reasons: first, it set out the objectives of a powerful group of nations, including one of the two major nuclear-weapon States; secondly, it showed that there were common elements in the viewpoints of all groups in the Committee on Disarmament, and, finally, it recognized that there was a role in nuclear disarmament for the Committee and for the non-nuclear-weapon States. Noting that it was basically a proposal on what should be negotiated, Australia felt the best procedure would be to express views or ask questions about the issues it raised. The delegation agreed with the need to have a broad conception for nuclear disarmament, but believed that some specific elements, for instance the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, could be tackled initially. In that connexion, Australia associated itself with the Canadian view. With regard to the need for a special working group on the question, neither Australia nor the Federal Republic of Germany thought it was necessary.

The delegation of Japan believed that to achieve the goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons, the Committee should take various measures to arrest the nuclear arms race while strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

It specifically advocated progress in SALT; realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Romania, in according top priority to nuclear disarmament, endorsed the Eastern European proposal and supported the idea that, during the first stage, the Committee should organize a broad exchange of views and consultations on ways and means of commencing the negotiations. The Romanian delegation suggested four stages: (a) drawing up an inventory of the areas of concern and problems which might arise for various States concerning the initiation of concrete action to end and reverse the nuclear-arms race; (b) arranging the problems thus identified in a systematic sequence to be dealt with gradually; (c) establishing the modalities and the framework for the negotiations; and (d) drawing up a programme of negotiation.

The representative of Nigeria regarded the Eastern European initiative as a positive proposal and felt that it could provide a timely basis for starting negotiations; it had not ignored the need to maintain credible security of all States during the stage-by-stage process of cessation of production and gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. He hoped that the Committee would not unduly delay the commencement of negotiations by protracted discussions of what to negotiate, and believed that the issues identified at the special session could form a useful beginning. The Nigerian delegation shared the belief that negotiations should be undertaken outside the Committee on some aspects of nuclear disarmament provided that those negotiations did not inhibit the work of the Committee. It also agreed that certain basic factors were generally accepted as a prerequisite for any effective nuclear disarmament negotiations, among them the undiminished security of all States; adequate verification measures; negotiations in stages; and the special responsibilities of the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals. Against that background, the Nigerian delegation suggested that negotiations might first cover: (a) the freezing of levels of arsenals; (b) cessation of further tests; (c) cessation of further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and (d) placing of stockpiles of fissionable material under international safeguards. Later, negotiations could be held on the dismantling of present arsenals.

The representative of Mexico, in reviewing the parts of the Final Document concerning nuclear disarmament, came to the conclusion that the proposal submitted in the Eastern European working paper should receive serious study in the Committee. He drew attention to several aspects of the proposal which his delegation regarded as positive, namely, that the Committee on Disarmament was the most suitable forum for conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament; that the nuclear-weapon States could not all be placed on the same footing; that the principle of the inviolability of the security of States should be respected; that the multilateral negotiations should not preclude the possibility of conducting bilateral negotiations, provided that the Committee was kept duly informed; and that the approach should be very judicious and avoid any undue haste.

The delegation of Algeria, noting the unprecedented importance of the nuclear disarmament question, expressed particular gratitude to the Eastern European States for their initiative. Recognizing that nuclear disarmament would be difficult to achieve, it recommended the implementation of appropriate measures by stages, such as cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

In the light of the discussions in the Committee, the group of 21 submitted a second working paper on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament¹⁰ in which they summed up their views. In their working paper, the group noted with satisfaction the initiative of the Eastern European States. While maintaining their full adherence to the Programme of Action outlined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document¹¹ the group believed that such an initiative might become a stimulus for the commencement of exploratory consultations which would lead to effective negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The group expressed the view that the Committee on Disarmament was the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of such negotiations. The scope of the Committee's negotiations should be decided in preliminary negotiations concerning organizational matters. Although other negotiations could be carried on at the same time as the multilateral negotiations, the group believed that negotiations conducted outside the Committee should not in any way hinder negotiations within the Committee. The group noted that the need for the undiminished security of all States in meaningful disarmament negotiations had been recognized by all States, and that the agreements and measures included in paragraph 50 as part of the process of nuclear disarmament were closely linked.

The group concluded the paper with a proposal in the following terms:

...that the Committee on Disarmament, as a first step to be taken at its present session, endeavour, in informal meetings and consultations, to identify the prerequisites and elements of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to delineate the course of action for the achievement of the objective pursued. On the basis of the progress which may thus be achieved in the Committee, the establishment of a working group for negotiation of agreements and concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament may then be envisaged.

The Committee on Disarmament pointed out in its report to the General Assembly¹² that "While the exchanges of views on this item were most useful, they would need to be continued and intensified during the next session of the Committee in order that an agreed basis for progress might be found."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/36/Rev.1.

¹¹ See foot-note 5.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1).*

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly, both in the general debate and in the First Committee, continued the consideration of the problems of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament.¹³

The delegations, in their policy statements, generally reaffirmed previous positions on the undeniable importance of nuclear disarmament, as reflected in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and further elaborated in statements made during the course of the 1979 sessions of the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament. The statements once more revealed significant differences as to the approach and priorities recommended.

In the deliberations in the First Committee, much attention was focused on the urgent need to initiate the process of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and on the undertaking of concrete steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to prevent a nuclear war.

Many of the specific items considered were carried over from previous years, but particular emphasis was placed on items related to the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the Assembly at its tenth special session. In the latter connexion, several proposals were put forward; generally they are discussed in this chapter while previously established items are covered in the subsequent topical chapters of this section.

The Soviet Union initiated a proposal calling for consultations regarding the commencement of negotiations on the halting of the nuclear arms race and on a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. The draft resolution, entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", was sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The draft was subsequently revised and sponsored also by Romania and Viet Nam.

In introducing the proposal, the representative of the USSR recalled that the need for adoption of immediate concrete measures for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, was universally acknowledged. That approach, he noted, was stressed in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, which stated, *inter alia*, "the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements." ¹⁴ Bearing in mind the importance of the task, he said, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had submitted to the Committee

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁴ See foot-note 5.

on Disarmament the proposal contained in document CD/4 on negotiations to end the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reduce their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. In that document the sponsors had made a proposal for practical preparations for negotiation of the question.¹⁵ By the proposal, all nuclear-weapon States would be urged to proceed with consultations regarding the early initiation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to inform the General Assembly of the results of their consultations and eventual negotiations. The Committee on Disarmament would be requested to consider the item concerning nuclear weapons in all their aspects and submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. The Soviet Union believed that the practical initiation of consultations with regard to negotiations on nuclear disarmament was a task which should not be delayed.

The Soviet Union later explained that, as a result of consultations between the sponsors and other delegations, in particular those of the group of 21,¹⁶ the draft was revised, principally so that it would call for the negotiations to be conducted within the Committee on Disarmament, with preparatory consultations starting at the beginning at the 1980 session and, with regard to the substantive negotiations, so that it would ensure that all nuclear-weapon States would take part from the very beginning.

Before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, Mexico orally proposed further changes, whereupon the Soviet Union orally revised operative paragraph 1; Mexico therefore did not press its proposal to a vote. The draft resolution, as orally revised, was adopted by the First Committee at its 44th meeting by a non-recorded vote of 102 to 3, with 18 abstentions.

In explaining its objections to the draft resolution, France restated its position that nuclear disarmament could not be isolated from the general undertaking of disarmament, which had to take account of a whole complex of elements, *inter alia*, military capacity, diversity of regional situations, and everyone's right to security. In its view, the draft resolution did not meet the required conditions. Nuclear disarmament in the present circumstances remained the main responsibility of the two leading Powers which had defined a specific approach, namely, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. France therefore objected to the concept of preparations for negotiations with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers.

The United Kingdom recalled its previously stated position of attaching importance to the search for specific measures of nuclear disarmament and believed that such an approach had greater validity than one which envisaged generalized measures. In its view, the aim of undiminished security for all States could not be realized by concentrating on the question of nuclear disarmament in isolation, and such an approach would have a destabilizing effect.

¹⁵ For more detailed description of the consideration of document CD/4, see pp. 87-92 above.

¹⁶ See chapter I, foot-note 21.

China, which did not participate in the vote, reiterated its position that it was necessary for the super-Powers first to reduce their nuclear arsenals on a large scale and that, after they had made substantial progress in the destruction of nuclear weapons, the other nuclear-weapon Powers should join them in carrying out nuclear disarmament in reasonable ratios, until all nuclear weapons had been totally destroyed.

Other delegations which explained their reasons for abstaining included those of Brazil which, while commending the efforts of the sponsors of the draft to introduce a balanced text, held that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations introduced a discriminating element which amounted virtually to conferring a veto power on individual nuclear-weapon States in an area of paramount concern to all nations; of Japan, which held to the conviction that the only realistic way of promoting nuclear disarmament was to move in progressive stages, with the implementation of specific concrete measures; of Australia, which expressed concern about the number of issues being assigned to the Committee on Disarmament as high priority items and felt that the draft attached too high a priority to a proposal which had yet to be given a specific form; and of the Federal Republic of Germany, which considered it unrealistic for the Committee on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament problems in all their aspects, as opposed to concentrating on specific measures.

Some delegations which supported the draft resolution also made comments. Sweden stressed that the nuclear-weapon States which possessed the most important nuclear arsenals had a special responsibility for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and that the words "with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States" should in no way be construed as diminishing that responsibility. India believed that the Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating body, should urgently negotiate, first, an immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes; and, secondly, the attainment of nuclear disarmament as a time-related programme. Austria was of the view that the negotiations should be based on certain requirements; first, the work of the Committee on Disarmament should be placed within the framework of the Final Document, particularly paragraph 50; secondly, the negotiations should not jeopardize the existing balance of power; and thirdly, adequate verification was indispensable. Nigeria stressed that the request for participation of all nuclear-weapon States should not be interpreted to mean that no negotiations could take place in the Committee on Disarmament without the participation of them all. Cyprus stated that it was illogical to expect nations to reduce armaments while the arms race continued and proposed consideration of agreement on a temporary halt to the arms race or of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon competition as a necessary step towards reducing armaments.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 97th meeting, on 11 December, by a recorded vote of 120 votes in favour to 2 against (France and the United States), with 19 abstentions, as resolution 34/83 J. China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons, and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978,

Noting with satisfaction that in 1979 the Committee on Disarmament started to consider the substance of the item of its agenda entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects",

Noting also the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue, at the beginning of its 1980 session, consideration of the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and to undertake preparatory consultations on the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 below;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. *Further requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Another draft resolution, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, was sponsored by Argentina, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, and subsequently also by Qatar and Uruguay.

In introducing the proposal, India stated that the draft dealt with the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. In that connexion, it recalled that at its regular session in 1978 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 33/71 B on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament, and that pursuant to that resolution a number of States had submitted to the Secretary-General their views on the non-use of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of nuclear war.¹⁷ By the terms of the new draft resolution, which was of a procedural nature, the General Assembly would decide to transmit those views to the Committee on Disarmament and request the Committee to take them into consideration and report to the Assembly at its next session.

Before the vote in the First Committee, India made an oral amendment to operative paragraph 2 of the draft; thereafter the First Committee, at the

¹⁷ A/34/456 and Add. 1.

42nd meeting, adopted it, as revised, by a recorded vote of 100 to 16, with 14 abstentions.

In explaining its abstention in the voting, the Soviet Union stressed the view that the elaboration and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race should be part of the organic process of strengthening legal and political guarantees of the security of States. An important step in that direction would be the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, by which the parties would undertake to refrain from the use of any types of weapons, including nuclear weapons. That approach, it held, was in line with decisions already taken by the General Assembly on the subject. In the Soviet view, the draft resolution, unfortunately, artificially separated the non-use of nuclear weapons from the other measures which should be taken.

Two other delegations, which supported the draft resolution, made observations. Ireland regarded the draft as a procedural matter, but considered it none the less important that all views formally put forward should be taken into account in the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament. Sweden was convinced that, despite the role of nuclear weapons in the military doctrines of some States and alliances, the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited in all circumstances. That objective should be assured through gradual and balanced reductions in nuclear-weapon stockpiles with the aim of their total abolition.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 97th meeting by a recorded vote of 112 votes to 16 (mainly Western countries), with 14 abstentions (mainly Eastern European countries).

The resolution, 34/83 G, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, in which, *inter alia*, it called for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament,

Taking into account proposals submitted by States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters,

1. *Decides* to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the views of States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to take those views into appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

A proposal entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present" was sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Soviet Union recalled resolution 33/91 F, which had been adopted the previous year on the same subject, and stated that the intention of the sponsors was to suggest further concrete action concerning the realization of the purpose of reso-

lution 33/91 F, namely to prevent the further stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were currently no such weapons. One of the possible ways would be the conclusion of an international agreement that would place obligations, on the one hand, on nuclear-weapon States not to station nuclear weapons on territories where there were currently no such weapons and, on the other hand, on non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from measures which might result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories. Thus the proposal suggested an examination of the possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons, and included a request to the Secretary-General to call upon all States to transmit to him their opinions and suggestions regarding the possibilities of concluding such an agreement, and to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, Egypt proposed, and the sponsors accepted, an oral amendment to the fourth preambular paragraph. A suggestion by Yugoslavia for amendment of operative paragraph 1 was not accepted by the sponsors. The draft resolution, as orally amended by Egypt, was adopted by the First Committee at its 42nd meeting by a non-recorded vote of 85 to 18, with 22 abstentions.

In explaining its position, Japan recalled that as a matter of national policy, it had consistently upheld the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not manufacturing and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons. However, it would vote negatively on the draft resolution because it felt that under current circumstances in the world, any measure imposing restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons might destabilize the international military balance and thereby prove detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security. It noted also that the question of verification, vital to such an agreement, remained unclear. Japan believed that it was more important for the nuclear-weapon States to proceed step by step to realize concrete and effective nuclear disarmament measures.

Other delegations, while sharing the objectives of the draft resolution, were unable to find in it an adequate reflection of their own approach to non-stationing of nuclear weapons and therefore abstained in the vote. Yugoslavia held that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons should encompass the territories of all non-nuclear-weapon States, including those where there were nuclear weapons; otherwise it meant acceptance of the *status quo*. Non-stationing should also encompass the other areas where there were no nuclear weapons, such as international air and maritime space. For its part, Brazil noted that the draft omitted reference to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of countries which possess them; that omission, it held, could imply recognition or legitimacy in the case of such countries. Sweden, taking into account the general military situation in the world, expressed some doubts and reservations as to the idea of seeking a solution of a complex problem by dealing with only one of its aspects in an international agreement. In its view, the problem could best be dealt with in the context of regional disarmament arrangements. Austria felt that the relation-

ship between non-stationing and nuclear-weapon-free zones was not clear. Ghana found the idea of proposing an international agreement, as expressed in operative paragraph 1, to be premature.

Some delegations which supported the draft resolution also made observations. Nigeria would have preferred the scope of examination to be broader, to embrace the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of all non-nuclear-weapon States. Finland stressed the point that, in considering the possibility of an international agreement, it should be borne in mind that only the Governments of the countries concerned could be qualified to interpret their own security needs. Bangladesh regarded the draft resolution as relating, *inter alia*, to the question of the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but stated that its larger objective was the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from all States.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 97th meeting, by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 34/87 C.

It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind.

Recalling its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, in which it called upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and on all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

1. *Believes* it necessary to examine possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to this end to call upon all States to transmit to him their opinions and observations regarding the possibility of concluding the agreement mentioned in paragraph 1 above and to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present"

On the initiative of Canada, a draft resolution concerning the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes was submitted. It was sponsored by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Sweden and, later, Uruguay.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Canada recalled resolution 33/91 H of the previous year on the same question and

noted that the purpose of the present draft was to request the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question at an appropriate stage of its work. As to the substance of the problem, he pointed to the urgency of the question and to the importance of the objective of actually reducing stocks of fissionable materials for weapons by transferring them to peaceful uses, which could lead to a reduction in nuclear weapons. The Canadian representative noted that, under a multilateral treaty on the question, both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States would accept the same obligations, including safeguards, thus ensuring equity of treatment of both categories of States. While the question was obviously linked to nuclear disarmament, the sponsors felt that there was no need to wait for agreement on a programme of nuclear disarmament before taking specific steps which were not dependent on a general agreement.

In the First Committee, the draft resolution was adopted at the 41st meeting by a non-recorded vote of 107 to 10, with 11 abstentions.

In explanation of its position, the Soviet Union reiterated the view that the solution of the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes could not be considered in isolation from the question of the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons. It held that the problem of nuclear disarmament should be resolved in an integrated and comprehensive manner, and felt that the sponsors had not taken into account the views which it had proposed and which were based on the approach set out in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. For those reasons the Soviet delegation could not support the draft resolution. The United Kingdom, in supporting the draft resolution, recalled that the question was one of the items identified in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It also believed that the problem of verification would present difficulties; therefore the Committee on Disarmament, in any consideration of it, should give priority to the verification aspect.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its 97th meeting as resolution 34/87 D, by a recorded vote of 118 votes to 9, with 12 abstentions.

It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 H of 16 December 1978 in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its implementation of the proposals contained in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda adopted by the Committee on Disarmament includes the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the agenda for 1979 included the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on these items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would also be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Under a new item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" which was included in the agenda at the request of Iraq, a draft resolution was sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Djitouti, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahariya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The draft resolution was subsequently revised and sponsored also by Guinea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Niger and Sao Tome and Principe.

In the First Committee, Iraq expressed its concern about the overall situation and many specific problems in the regions of the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and Africa. In introducing the draft resolution, Iraq recalled resolution 33/71 A, which had been adopted by the Assembly at its thirty-third session, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel." It also recalled other actions and resolutions of the Assembly on related subjects which were noted in the preambular part of the draft. In the draft, the sponsors had indicated their deep concern at the increasing information and evidence that Israel planned to manufacture nuclear weapons or to acquire them, which, in their conviction, would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region of the Middle East.

Iraq further noted that by the draft resolution the Assembly would appeal to all States not to assist Israel in acquiring and developing nuclear weapons; call upon all States to prevent the transfer of fissionable material and nuclear technology to Israel; call upon Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency; condemn any attempt by Israel to manufacture, acquire, store, test or introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East; require the Security Council to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions; and request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on the question.

The representative of Israel, in addressing the agenda item, noted that it was the only item being dealt with by the First Committee which related to one country's allegations against another, which, he held, broke with tradition. He observed that 50 countries were not yet party to the non-proliferation Treaty; recalled that his Government had repeatedly stated that no collaboration existed between Israel and South Africa except in the minds of those who wished such an association for political reasons; and stated that

the charge that Israel was against a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was palpably untrue.

The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee at its 41st meeting by a recorded vote of 90 votes to 11, with 33 abstentions.

Some States, among them Guatemala, the Netherlands and the United States, while expressing the opinion that any State that introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East should be condemned, disagreed with the selective approach which singled out a particular country. For this reason, they would vote or had voted against the draft. In addition, they regarded it as essential that all the countries in the region agree to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Many States, among them Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy and Sweden, while accepting that States could have a legitimate preoccupation with the possibility of proliferation in their respective regions, found the text of the draft resolution unnecessarily restrictive in its emphasis and conclusions. They considered it counter-productive to single out a particular country in respect of actions as yet unproven. In general, their abstention reflected their concern about the possibility of proliferation among Middle Eastern States and their belief that all countries in the region should adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty or accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities.

A number of other States, among them the Bahamas, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Pakistan, Turkey and Zaire, explained their support of the draft resolution in terms of their awareness of the dangers involved in nuclear proliferation; some of them also expressed the view that States should be willing to accept IAEA safeguards.

At the 97th plenary meeting, before the vote was taken, Israel, which had not explained its vote in the First Committee, reviewed its extensive objections to the draft resolution. It emphasized particularly that no "increasing information and evidence" whatsoever had been produced to substantiate the sponsors' allegation that Israel was "aiming at the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons" It reaffirmed that it was conscious of the danger of proliferation and that it remained faithful to its commitment to prohibit and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It regarded the draft resolution in question as being in violation of the United Nations Charter.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 97th meeting by a vote of 97 to 10 (Belgium, Denmark, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and United States), with 38 abstentions, as resolution 34/89.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the increasing information and evidence regarding Israel's activities aiming at the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons.

Recalling its resolution 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 concerning military and nuclear collaboration with Israel.

Recalling its repeated condemnation of the military and nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa.

Reaffirming its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977 and 33/64 of 14 December 1978 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

Convinced that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region and further threaten international peace and security.

1. *Appeals* to all States to put an end to any co-operation with Israel which may assist it in acquiring and developing nuclear weapons and also to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any co-operation that may result in providing Israel with nuclear weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all States to take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer to Israel of fissionable material and nuclear technology which could be used for nuclear arms;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

4. *Strongly condemns* any attempt by Israel to manufacture, acquire, store or test nuclear weapons or introduce them into the Middle East;

5. *Requests* the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions concerning Israeli nuclear armament;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the work of the group of experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament"

Conclusion

In 1979, the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly attempted to work out an acceptable approach for implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

The deliberations revealed some progress towards achieving mutual agreement on adopting a comprehensive approach to a process of nuclear disarmament whose elements would be implemented in careful stages. A notable achievement was the agreement reached by the Disarmament Commission on the elements of the comprehensive programme. Divergent views persisted, however, on such questions as priorities, undiminished security at all stages, and the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament.

There was also some progress towards agreement that if nuclear disarmament was to be realized, it would have to be pursued in a global context through such bodies as the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, it was accepted that bilateral and other negotiations outside of that body should continue, with the participants in such negotiations keeping the multilateral

negotiating body informed. Both the desirability of the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and the special responsibility of the two leading Powers were recognized. Agreement was not reached, however, on how best to revitalize the negotiating process. Among the reasons no consensus was reached was disagreement as to how the negotiations should proceed and what they should cover as well as on the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament and the need for parallel progress on both.

The differences of viewpoints as to how best to proceed were evident also in the General Assembly, where the idea of dealing with nuclear weapons in all aspects was put forward and at the same time the established items concerning nuclear disarmament continued to receive concerted attention.

One factor that was agreed upon was that nuclear disarmament would enhance confidence among all States, particularly those not possessing nuclear weapons. In addition, there was full agreement that political will was needed to curb the nuclear arms race and implement nuclear disarmament measures in the context of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

CHAPTER VIII

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Introduction

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES have been engaged in bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) since late 1969. The first phase of the negotiations (SALT I) ended with the signing in Moscow on 26 May 1972 of two agreements: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974,¹ and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.² Both agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972.

In accordance with article VII of the Interim Agreement, which committed the two sides to continue active negotiations, the second phase of the negotiations (SALT II) formally began in November 1972. The primary goal of the negotiations was to replace the Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive agreement, providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. By late 1974, the two sides had reached an understanding as to the major provisions of the eventual agreement as well as the principles and guidelines upon which it should be based, and issued a joint statement in that regard on 24 November 1974,³ following a summit meeting at Vladivostok.

However, during the negotiations which were initiated in January 1975 to translate the Vladivostok guidelines into a specific agreement, differences arose with regard to several substantive issues, including the interpretation of the scope of the eventual agreement. It is understood that one of the main problems was whether or not, under the terms of the guidelines, it was necessary to count certain new weapons against the numerical ceiling for strategic delivery vehicles agreed upon by the two sides. The weapons in question were the Soviet supersonic bomber, the so-called "Backfire", and the American cruise missile. After prolonged negotiations, during which various

¹ See A/9698.

² See A/C.1/1026.

³ See *Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1974*, vol. 10, No. 49 (Washington, 1975), pp. 1514-1517.

options were considered, the two sides were able to overcome the differences which had stood in the way of agreement and to complete the second phase of the negotiations. The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) was signed at Vienna, Austria, on 18 June 1979 by the Presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Bilateral negotiations, 1979

Although numerous statements by both sides made throughout 1978 indicated that substantial progress was being made in the negotiations, it became clear only in early 1979 that they were within reach of an agreement. A statement by Soviet President L. I. Brezhnev in January was indicative of the state of the negotiations at the time. He said: "Work on the new agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic arms is drawing to a close, although it will obviously take some more time for the positions to be finally agreed. We trust that President Carter and I will be able, in the near future, to affix our signatures to the accord."⁴ A statement by American President Carter in February further reinforced hope for an early agreement. He said: "After more than six years of negotiations, conducted by three different Presidents, agreement has now been reached on most of the major components of a sound and verifiable SALT II Treaty."⁵ Subsequently, all the remaining points were resolved and on 18 June the two sides were able to sign the text of the agreement.

The Salt II agreement consists of three basic parts:

(a) The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Protocol attached thereto;

(b) Agreed Statements and Common Understandings associated with various provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol;

(c) The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.⁶

The Treaty consists of nine preambular paragraphs and 19 articles. The preamble, *inter alia*, recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, and states the parties' conviction that the Treaty will contribute to improving their relationship, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security. The preamble also acknowledges the obligations of the parties under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessa-

⁴ See press release No. 2 of 17 January 1979, issued by the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations.

⁵ See *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 79, No. 2024 (March 1979), p. 23.

⁶ For the texts of the Treaty, the Protocol, the Joint Statement of Principles and the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are contained in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III, vol. 1. (They are reproduced in appendix IX below.)

tion of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Related to those aims, in the last two paragraphs, the parties respectively reaffirm their desire to take measures for further limitation and reduction of strategic arms and declare their intention to undertake negotiations in the near future to this end.

Articles I, II and III of the Treaty set forth the basic undertakings of each party involving both quantitative and qualitative limitations on their strategic offensive arms. Article I reads: "Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty"

With regard to quantitative limits, the United States and the Soviet Union are committed to an equal overall total of strategic nuclear delivery systems. The systems included under the ceiling are land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with ranges of over 600 kilometres. Article II defines, for the purpose of the Treaty, the various launchers, missiles and the weapons and systems covered by the Treaty. According to article III, upon entry into force of the Treaty, each side will limit the systems covered to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400 — the level agreed to in the Vladivostok joint statement of 1974. This ceiling will then be reduced to 2,250 by 31 December 1981. Within this overall number, each Party is free to determine the actual composition of the aggregate.

Article IV deals with the undertakings of the parties regarding limitations on the construction, size, modernization, development and testing of launchers and ICBMs.

Within the aggregate ceiling, article V places a number of sublimits on specific types of nuclear systems. First, there is a sublimit of 1,320 for the combined total number of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometres. Within the sublimit of 1,320, each side further undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200. Finally, within the aggregate number of 1,200, each side undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to a total not to exceed 820. With regard to the overall total aggregate ceiling of 2,250, and also in the case of the sublimits, each party is free to determine the actual composition of the aggregate number.

In addition to these limitations, the Treaty provides for a number of other restrictions which are of direct relevance for the overall ceiling and the aggregate sublimits.

First, the restrictions concern, on the one hand, launchers for fixed ICBMs and, on the other, launchers for heavy ICBMs. Under article IV, the parties are prohibited from constructing any additional fixed ICBM

launchers or relocating existing ones — the existing levels are 1,054 for the United States and 1,398 for the Soviet Union. Under the same article, each party also undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs or of ICBMs of older types into launchers of modern heavy ICBMs defined, under the terms of paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty and the Third Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of article II, as ICBMs with a launch-weight (total weight of the missile) or throw-weight (weight of the useful payload of the missile) greater than that of the Soviet missile known to the United States as the SS-19, the heaviest of the currently deployed light ICBMs.

Secondly, several provisions of the Treaty deal with the number of warheads on different types of missiles. These limitations are also specified in article IV. Thus, the number of warheads on currently existing types of ICBMs is frozen at existing levels, i.e., at the maximum number tested on each particular type of ICBM (paragraph 10)⁷ and at 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted by the Treaty (paragraph 11). Concerning SLBMs, the number of their warheads is limited to 14, the maximum number that had been tested by either side as of 1 May 1979 (paragraph 12). The number of warheads on ASBMs is also limited to 10, which corresponds to the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested (paragraph 13). Further, the average number of long-range (i.e., over 600 kilometres) cruise missiles that can be deployed by either party aboard its airplanes equipped for such missiles can be no greater than 28 (paragraph 14). According to article II, any aircraft that is equipped for long-range cruise missiles is counted as a heavy bomber and is included in the numerical aggregate.

Concerning qualitative limitations, the Treaty places a number of restrictions on further improvements of the existing strategic nuclear systems as well as on the development and deployment of new types of such systems. Again, under article IV the two sides agree not to increase, in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers, the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than 32 per cent (paragraph 4). They further agree not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers (paragraph 5 (c)), and also not to develop, test or deploy ICBMs which would be heavier in terms of either launch-

⁷ According to First Agreed Statement on paragraph 10 of article IV, the two sides have flight-tested the following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs with the maximum number of re-entry vehicles as indicated below:

United States

- ICBMs of the Minuteman III type — seven re-entry vehicles;
- SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type — 14 re-entry vehicles;
- SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type — seven re-entry vehicles;

USSR

- ICBMs of the RS-16 type — four re-entry vehicles;
- ICBMs of the RS-18 type — six re-entry vehicles;
- ICBMs of the RS-20 type — 10 re-entry vehicles;
- SLBMs of the RSM-50 type — seven re-entry vehicles.

weight or throw-weight of the heaviest ICBMs deployed by either party as of the date of signature of the Treaty (paragraph 7). Under the same article each party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose (paragraph 8). A further undertaking concerns a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with the exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side (paragraph 9).

In addition, under article VIII, each party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles (paragraph 1), as well as not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the missions of a heavy bomber (paragraph 2). Finally, under article IX, each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy certain new types of strategic offensive systems which are technologically feasible, but which have not yet been deployed, such as ballistic missiles on surface ships, ballistic missile launchers on the sea-bed or beds of internal and inland waters and systems for placing nuclear weapons into earth orbit (paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c)). The Treaty also prohibits development, testing and deployment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs or ASBMs which have a launch weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest of the light ICBMs deployed by either party or launchers of such SLBMs (paragraph 1 (d), (e) and (f)). Each party also undertakes not to flight-test aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft (paragraph 2).

Subject to the limitations, both qualitative and quantitative, as specified in the Treaty, under article X, each party is permitted to carry out modernization and replacement of its strategic offensive arms.

Under article XI, however, strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers or those which are prohibited by the Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed (paragraph 1). Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate of 2,400 shall be completed within the following periods of time from the entry into force of the treaty: four months for ICBM launchers, six months for SLBM launchers, and three months for heavy bombers (paragraph 2). As far as dismantling or destruction of strategic arms in excess of 2,250 is concerned, this shall be initiated no later than 1 January 1981 and shall be completed, as noted earlier, no later than 31 December 1981 (paragraph 3).

In conjunction with all the foregoing undertakings, article XV stipulates that for the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law (paragraph 1) and that it shall not interfere with those means operating in accordance with the Treaty (paragraph 2). For example, that provision would prohibit use of anti-satellite systems against satellites of the other party that are used for Treaty verification. Article XV

also prohibits deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the Treaty (paragraph 3). The provisions of the article are adopted verbatim from the first three paragraphs of article XII of the ABM Treaty and article V of the Interim Agreement. However, paragraph 3 of article XV is further elaborated and its scope somewhat broadened by the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings associated with the new Treaty.

For the purpose of facilitating the verification procedure by national means, under article XVI the two parties agree to notify each other well in advance on a case-by-case basis before conducting each planned ICBM launch that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond the national territory.

In order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, under article XVII the parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding of 21 December 1972. The terms of reference of that Commission are specified in the article (paragraph 2). Basically, the Commission is empowered to address questions relating to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and to develop measures to implement these provisions.

The Treaty also makes reference to further negotiations. Under article XIV the parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. The article also states that it is the objective of the parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement to replace this Treaty upon its expiration. Under article XVIII either party may propose amendments.

With regard to entry into force, article XIX provides that the Treaty shall be subject to ratification and enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall remain in force through 31 December 1985 unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

As mentioned earlier, a Protocol is attached as an integral part of the Treaty. It sets forth limitations of shorter duration on certain systems, which will remain in force until 31 December 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures. Thus, by article I the parties undertake, for the period of the Protocol, not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs from such launchers. Article II commits the parties not to deploy long-range cruise missiles on sea-based or land-based launchers, and not to flight-test long-range cruise missiles equipped with MIRVs from sea-based or land-based launchers. Article III prohibits the flight-testing and deployment of ASBMs for the period of the Protocol. According to article IV the Protocol shall enter into force on the same day as the Treaty.

The second part of the agreement consists of the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms. It sets general goals to be achieved in the next

round of negotiations such as significant and substantial reductions in the number of strategic offensive arms; further qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; and resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty. The Joint Statement also sets forth the principle that further limitations and reductions must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using, additionally, as appropriate, co-operative measures to strengthen such verification.

In addition, as mentioned above, the SALT II agreement also includes some 50 Agreed Statements and 47 Common Understandings which clarify and/or supplement the obligations of the parties under particular articles of the Treaty and the Protocol. Most of them concern various technical aspects of weapons systems dealt with in the Treaty and the Protocol. Also, in connexion with clarification of certain issues and implementation of the agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the data base on the number of strategic offensive arms for the purpose of the Treaty, statements by both sides on the numbers of such arms possessed as of the date of signing, and a statement by the Soviet Union on the "Backfire" airplane (TU-22M) were transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament⁸ along with the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. The number of strategic weapons possessed as of the date of signing are given as follows:

	<i>United</i>	
	<i>States</i>	<i>USSR</i>
Launchers of ICBMs.....	1,054	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs.....	1,054	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs.....	550	608
Launchers of SLBMs.....	656	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.....	496	144
Heavy bombers.....	573	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres...	3	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs.....	0	0
ASBMs.....	0	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.....	0	0

The statement with regard to the "TU-22M" or "Backfire" informs the United States that it is a medium-range bomber and the Soviet Union does not intend to give to it the capability of operating at intercontinental distances, and will not increase the radius of action of the airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. It also states that the Soviet side will not increase the production rate of that airplane over the current rate, and confirms that the production rate will not exceed 30 per year. In connexion with this statement the United States said

⁸ See foot-note 6.

that it entered into SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of the commitments listed therein to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

The complete texts of the Treaty and its Protocol, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines, the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Soviet Backfire Statement are reproduced below in appendix VIII.

By the end of 1979 the Treaty had not been ratified. One of the parties — the United States — pursuant to its constitutional procedures, held, commencing in July, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. It was stated that the remaining ratification procedure would continue at an appropriate time.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

During the first part of the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament, discussion of the SALT negotiations was limited in view of reports that an agreement resulting from these negotiations was imminent. The comments made were mostly of a general nature and were expressed in the context of the agenda item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The underlying tone of the comments was that the SALT II agreement would be in line with the expectations of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and that it would facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament.

Following the signing of the agreement on 18 June, both parties made statements in the Committee. The United States, after describing the highlights of the agreement, stressed two of its particularly important effects. In its opinion, SALT II would strengthen strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war by providing a framework for preservation of essential equivalence in strategic offensive forces, while at the same time reducing the area of uncertainty, and thus the potential for miscalculation, about what the other side was doing. Secondly, it hoped that SALT would provide a powerful stimulus to other efforts to enhance the security of all nations through the limitation and reduction of arms, rather than through their continued accumulation. The Soviet Union, for its part, also summarized the main features of the agreement and stressed that it represented a significant achievement for a number of reasons. First, it was an important stage in the process of developing relations between the two parties, which in itself contributed to improving the international climate. Secondly, the agreement was not only in the interest of the parties, but of the entire world, because the achievement of the agreement led to the strengthening of international security in general. In the opinion of the USSR, the threat of nuclear war would be diminished and mutual trust would grow. Finally, it noted, SALT II was not an end but rather another significant step towards further curbing the strategic arms race. The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for

Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms was, in its opinion, evidence of the two sides' determination to continue the process.

A number of members of the Committee on Disarmament welcomed the agreement and expressed the hope that it would lead to further reduction and limitation in the strategic forces of the two major Powers as well as give an impetus to attempts to resolve other pressing problems in the field of arms regulation and disarmament on the agenda of the Committee. Statements to that effect were made by the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, Mongolia, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Similar remarks, in the context of the debate on the agenda item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, were made by those of Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, India and Japan.

The United Kingdom and Sweden, for instance, attached particular significance to the signing of the Treaty in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty, stating that it showed evidence of the desire of the two major nuclear weapon Powers to curb vertical proliferation. Poland felt, *inter alia*, that the signing of the Treaty augured well for prospects of important progress in the bilateral talks concerning chemical weapons and the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

India, for its part, emphasized that it considered SALT II only a first step, and that the nuclear-weapon States should promptly take further measures leading to actual nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Ethiopia stressed that the importance of the Treaty in creating a climate of mutual trust should not be underestimated. It felt that it constituted a major step forward in the arduous struggle for détente, and had opened up the prospect of co-operation between nations of different social systems.

Japan regarded SALT II both as a first step towards cessation of the nuclear arms race which would contribute to stability and peace and as an achievement which would provide an impetus to negotiations on nuclear and other matters, particularly the nuclear test ban.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

As in previous years, the SALT negotiations received particular attention at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee.⁹ This time, however, the consideration of the issue was markedly influenced by the results achieved in the negotiations.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States in their references to the SALT II agreement expressed their great satisfaction with their achievement, which they viewed as a major contribution to averting a nuclear war and to the deepening of détente. They repeatedly stated their determination to pro-

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

ceed with negotiations on the further limitation of their offensive strategic arms. In that connexion, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, stated at the 7th plenary meeting:

The signing of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons is convincing proof that, given goodwill and readiness to take into account each other's legitimate interest, it is possible to achieve agreements on the most difficult questions. The Treaty builds a bridge to the further limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. It also contains great potential for exerting a positive influence on other negotiations — and this is not without importance — on the limitations of the arms race and on disarmament.

In his statement in the First Committee, the representative of the United States noted that "SALT II is not the millenium, nor will it stop competition, nor will it guarantee permanent stability. But yet it is a remarkable accomplishment" He then emphasized the following basic elements of the Treaty:

The United States and the Soviet Union have established, for the first time, equal ceilings on strategic nuclear forces.

We have negotiated equal sub-ceilings on strategic systems carrying multiple independently targetable warheads.

We have begun the much desired progress on reductions.

We have taken major steps to control the technological arms race, such as limiting the numbers of warheads allowed on each missile.

We have broken new ground in verification procedures.

And we have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitations.

In crafting a framework of equality between two different strategic forces, SALT II has become an essential bridge to deeper reductions and further qualitative restraints that we look forward to in SALT III.

Concerning further measures, neither side left any doubts as to its position. Thus, the United States representative stated:

I want to reaffirm before this Committee the commitment of the United States and President Carter — as expressed in the SALT II agreement itself — to begin negotiations to achieve further limitations and deeper reductions in nuclear arms promptly upon entry into force of SALT II. We take this obligation with the utmost seriousness; it is an obligation between two nations and is an obligation of two nations to all nations.

The Soviet Union, for its part, was also explicit. It stated:

The Soviet Union believes that, immediately after the SALT II treaty comes into force, talks should begin on a SALT III agreement. Within the framework of such talks we are ready to discuss the possibility of the limitation not only of intercontinental, but also of other types of arms, taking into account, of course, all relevant facts and strict compliance with the principle of equal security for the parties concerned.

With regard to other Member States, the prevailing view indicated in their statements was one of satisfaction and hope. Statements to that effect were made in particular by Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and the United King-

dom. Australia, for instance, considered the conclusion of the SALT II negotiations as a major step forward which lessened the risk of nuclear war and placed verifiable limits on the strategic arsenals and delivery systems of the two super-Powers. Hungary, for its part, felt that the agreement, in addition to its inherent significance in terms of the limiting of the strategic arms, could also contribute to the strengthening of confidence and thereby to the achievement of other important disarmament agreements and to the acceleration of the disarmament process. Pakistan similarly noted that the agreement by the two sides to maintain strategic equivalence with each other might create greater stability in their relations, leading to a reduction in international tensions.

While welcoming the agreement, many Member States felt that its importance should be seen in terms of creating the necessary conditions for the future pursuit of effective measures of disarmament, rather than of immediately and substantially affecting the existing nuclear arsenals of the two Powers. In that connexion, Algeria stated that the agreement should be welcomed if it served to pave the way to negotiations that would provide for effective measures for the reduction of strategic weapons and not just for the control of the arms race. Nigeria, which held that nobody regarded the SALT II agreement as a disarmament measure, pointed out that its value lay in the promise of providing the basis for a more far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the SALT III negotiations. India similarly considered that, although the agreement would not result in any reduction of nuclear arsenals, it should be welcomed as evidence of the willingness of the super-Powers to continue the process of negotiations, but as only a first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Yugoslavia was also of the opinion that the significance and scope of the agreement would depend on the steps that followed, that is, on an early start of the next phase of negotiations, which should lead to the adoption of genuine measures of disarmament. Similar views were also expressed by Belgium, Brazil, Indonesia and New Zealand.

A number of States, placing emphasis on the importance of further negotiations between the two sides, also expressed the hope that those negotiations would deal with substantive reductions and limitations of nuclear weapons. Statements to that effect were made in particular by Argentina, Japan, Norway and Pakistan. In addition, Argentina hoped that future negotiations would not move at the same slow pace as the SALT II negotiations, since the rapid progress of military technology would turn their results into obsolete provisions even before they went into effect.

Concerning further negotiations, several States stressed the question of scope. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany attached great importance to the reduction of what it considered the existing disparities in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles and in that connexion welcomed the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to consider those weapons in the SALT III negotiations. India similarly urged the two parties to take into account in their further negotiations not only strategic nuclear weapons but also the thousands of nuclear warheads deployed on the European continent since, in

its view, given the indiscriminate and destructive effects of nuclear weapons, even the use of the so-called "theatre" nuclear weapons in Europe would have annihilating results in Asia. The Netherlands, for its part, stated that the growing imbalance, giving the Soviet Union a marked superiority over Western Europe, became even less acceptable as the overall strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union was being stabilized. In its opinion, the NATO countries showed a legitimate concern when they pointed to the regional imbalance in Europe. Therefore, a new element in the SALT III negotiations should be the balance of land-based, continental range, nuclear missiles in Europe. In that connexion, the Netherlands viewed as important the Soviet Union's indication that it might be ready to enter into negotiations on that question. A similar view was expressed by Norway, which pointed out that the so-called "grey-area" weapons should also be made a subject of disarmament negotiations.

Many Member States, irrespective of their assessment of the immediate impact of the SALT II agreement on the nuclear armaments of the two Powers, attached particular importance to its early ratification. In their opinion an expeditious ratification of the agreement would not only pave the way to SALT III negotiations, but would also provide an impetus for a more substantial and rapid progress in other disarmament negotiations, thus significantly contributing to an overall improvement in international relations. Views to that effect were voiced by Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. However, some of the same States expressed a certain concern in connexion with developments which, in their view, were related to the ratification of the agreement. Hungary, for instance, was alarmed at the measures that were being advocated, such as those providing for a considerable increase of military expenditures and the deployment of new weapons and new systems of weapons which, in its opinion, could undermine and even reverse the results of the SALT II agreement. In the opinion of the Swedish delegation, the SALT II agreement was supposed to herald the start of real nuclear disarmament and it was therefore paradoxical to see that the present ratification process seemed to have resulted in a new speeding up of the arms race and the procurement of yet deadlier and more invulnerable weapons. That process, Sweden noted, resembled a somnambulistic march towards mutual destruction. Pakistan, in a more general context, urged the two Powers to examine carefully the implications of taking decisions to develop or deploy new kinds of nuclear weapons and delivery systems which were not precluded by the SALT II agreement, since that could lead to a new spiral in the nuclear arms race.

Two other nuclear-weapon Powers, France and China, also made references in their statements to the SALT II agreement in the context of discussing nuclear disarmament in general. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement at the 9th plenary meeting, said:

France is well aware of the importance of the step that has recently been taken. It considers the agreement to be balanced as a whole and hopes that it will enter into force soon. The fact remains that even with this agreement we are still only at the preface of true disarmament. The

level of nuclear weapons held by the two signatory Powers is not only high now, it is to go still higher in the next few years. The future negotiations, for which SALT II has paved the way, will, I hope, bring this level down very substantially.

As for France, it would take appropriate action on the basis of such reductions only if there were a change in the extent of the disparity persisting between those two arsenals and its own arsenal, which France keeps at its disposal to ensure the security and credibility of its deterrent.

In a subsequent statement, France reiterated that as far as its Government was concerned, under present circumstances, nuclear disarmament remained the particular responsibility of the two greatest Powers.

China, at the 11th plenary meeting, speaking of the urgent need of nuclear disarmament and of the primary responsibilities of the two major Powers, stated:

When substantial progress has been made in this regard, the other nuclear countries shall join them in reducing nuclear armaments according to reasonable ratios until finally nuclear arms are totally destroyed. We consider this principle to be fair and reasonable. . . . It is obvious that only a genuine nuclear disarmament will contribute to international security, and a genuine nuclear disarmament must begin with substantial reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers. The SALT II treaty . . . neither calls for a significant numerical reduction of the strategic arms nor provides for a substantive qualitative limitation.

In the First Committee, as in previous years, a group of Member States proposed a draft resolution on the subject of SALT. The draft, submitted on 17 November by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and Sweden, was subsequently also sponsored by Australia and Uruguay. It was introduced by Mexico at the 42nd meeting on 26 November.

In introducing the draft, Mexico pointed to the three basic ideas which the draft reflected. First, the treaty did not go beyond certain limitations which, taken together, permitted considerable increments both qualitatively and quantitatively in relation to the levels of the existing nuclear arsenals. Secondly, SALT II was a necessary stage and point of departure for SALT III negotiations and not an end in itself. Thirdly, there was a continuing need to reiterate the idea, included by consensus in the Final Document of the special session, concerning the obligation to keep the United Nations duly informed of all disarmament measures — unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral — that may originate beyond the aegis of the Organization.

In the sponsors' opinion, the assertion expressed by the first idea was based on several articles of the Treaty which Mexico described in detail. It first pointed out that the number of nuclear warheads possessed by the United States, estimated on the basis of the most authoritative informal calculations to be 10,000, could be increased, in accordance with what was allowed by the provisions of the SALT II agreement, to 17,846. Referring to the lack of official information regarding the number of warheads possessed by the Soviet Union, Mexico noted that if one took into account the importance the Soviet Union attached to the principle of equality, it could be asserted that the situation must be very similar, if not identical, to that of the United States with regard to the proportional increase in warheads allowed by the agreement. Secondly, Mexico pointed out that the provisions of paragraph 9 of article IV of the agreement allowed both parties to flight test and

to station a new type of light ICBM, thus enabling the United States to proceed with the development of a mobile missile known as the MX, whose manufacture and deployment would entail a cost estimated at \$60 billion, and the Soviet Union to opt for a similar weapon. Thirdly, it noted that the so-called "cruise missiles", which neither side had so far deployed, were allowed up to a total of 2,400 for each party, that is, the equivalent of 20 missiles for each of 120 bombers. Finally, by Mexico's interpretation, limitations on the emplacement at land-based or sea-based launching sites of cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometres, and on the flight-testing of such missiles equipped with MIRVs from such launching sites, were due to expire on the not too distant date of 31 December 1981, the contemplated cut-off date for the term of the Protocol. Those examples, Mexico concluded, demonstrated clearly the validity of the assertion the first idea was based upon, which was expressed in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

At the 43rd meeting, before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, Mexico, with the agreement of the other sponsors, orally revised the draft by deleting at the end of operative paragraph 4 (a), the words "although it is an arms control rather than a disarmament measure", so that the subparagraph would end with the words "the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons" (see below). It also expressed the hope that with that change it would be possible for the two participants in the SALT negotiations to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The Soviet Union stated that the provisions contained in the draft resolution whereby the SALT II agreement was welcomed and the hope was expressed that it would enter into force at an early date, were bound, like other provisions, to have its full support and approval. Nevertheless, the draft contained certain provisions with which the Soviet Union could not entirely agree. It singled out operative paragraph 2 in view of the assertion contained therein that the SALT II agreement permitted considerable increments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to existing levels of nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union noted that such an assertion undermined the significance of the agreement and was in fact inaccurate, since the agreement, on the contrary, provided for a significant reduction in armaments, both at the time of its entry into force and in its future operation. It pointed out that provision was made for concrete, qualitative limitations in the strategic means available, as evidenced by the fact that upon the entry into force of the agreement each of the parties should limit the launching installations for land-based intercontinental rockets, launching devices for rockets from submarines, heavy bombers and also air-ground ballistic rockets with a range of more than 600 kilometres and in which no more than 2,000 units were involved. In its opinion, one of the most substantial merits of the new Treaty resided in the fact that the range of limitations under SALT II was considerably greater than had been the case in the previous Interim Agreement of 1972 which related only to launching devices of intercontinental ballistic rockets and of ballistic rockets from submarines. Moreover, the SALT II

Treaty provided that during the course of its operation — in other words, before the end of 1985 — there should be a reduction in the sum total of 2,400 units. Thus, from 1 January 1981 each of the parties would undertake to reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons to a figure of 2,250 units. Consequently, the new Treaty provided not only for limitation but also for reduction of strategic offensive arms by 150 units. Therein lay one of the principal features of the new Treaty which distinguished it from the Interim Agreement, which provided only for a freeze on strategic offensive arms — in other words, the maintenance of their levels without any change throughout the whole period of its effectiveness. The Soviet Union further pointed out that another feature of the SALT II agreement was the substantial limitation of strategic offensive weapons provided with independently-targeted warheads which was also in the nature of a qualitative limitation. Thus, each party agreed to 1,320 units, which would include the launching facilities of intercontinental ballistic rockets, of submarine-based ballistic rockets provided with individual MIRVs and of ballistic rockets of the ground-air type provided with such warheads, as well as heavy bombers carrying winged rockets (cruise missiles) with a range exceeding 600 kilometres. Furthermore, there was the mutual obligation concerning limitation on the number of warheads per rocket. In addition, the agreement also established that the armaments possessed by the parties over and above the quantities indicated would be subject to dismantling or destruction. In the light of those facts, the Soviet Union requested that a separate vote be taken on operative paragraph 2, declaring that it intended to abstain on that paragraph, but that it would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 106 votes to none, with 13 abstentions. The draft resolution, as a whole, as orally revised, was then adopted without a vote.

The United States pointed out that its acquiescence in the consensus was without prejudice to its domestic processes, which required Senate ratification before a treaty could enter into force. Consequently, the United States added, when it agreed to a consensus on a document which called for trusting that the Treaty would enter into force at an early date it could only express that trust pursuant to its domestic processes.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December, again without a vote, as resolution 34/87 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/189 A of 21 December 1976 and 32/87 G of 12 December 1977,

Reaffirming its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which, *inter alia*, it:

(a) *Reiterated* its satisfaction with the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete, total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons.

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms.

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

Noting that the SALT II agreement—which bears the official title of “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” — was finally signed on 18 June 1979 and that its text, together with the texts of a protocol and a joint statement, both signed on the same date as the Treaty, and a joint communiqué issued also on 18 June 1979, are reproduced in a document dated 27 June 1979 of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. *Shares the conviction* expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the “Joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms” that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war;

2. *Notes* that it has not been possible for the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) to go beyond certain limitations which, taken together, permit considerable increments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the levels of the nuclear arsenals existing at present;

3. *Welcomes* the agreement reached by both parties with a view to:

(a) Continuing to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation;

(b) Endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, *inter alia*, the following objectives:

(i) Significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms,

(ii) Qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;

4. *Trusts* that:

(a) The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) will enter into force at an early date in accordance with the provisions of its article XIX, inasmuch as it constitutes a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons;

(b) Such negotiations, intended to achieve, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, will begin promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty, as provided for in its article XIV, with the objective of concluding well in advance of 1985 the new agreement, which will replace the Treaty and which is usually referred to as SALT III;

5. *Trusts also* that the two contracting States will implement all the above-mentioned agreements and provisions and do their utmost in order that the SALT III agreement may constitute an important step towards the final goal described by their respective heads of State as that of achieving the complete and total destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and ensuring the establishment of a world free of such weapons;

6. *Invites* the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled “Strategic arms limitation talks”

Conclusion

The conclusion of the SALT II agreement represents an important step in the direction of arms regulation and disarmament. In the first place the agreement establishes an overall balance of the strategic nuclear forces of the two major military Powers which should enhance their mutual confidence and readiness to consider further reductions and limitations of those forces. The Treaty sets very strict quantitative limitations considerably curbing the ongoing arms race which would not be the case in the absence of an agreement. With regard to qualitative limitations, although the agreement does not close all the avenues for further improvements of the two sides' strategic forces, it narrows them to a certain extent. At the same time it defines the areas in which solutions must be sought for further qualitative limitations within the framework of the SALT III negotiations. The commitment by the two Powers, spelled out clearly in the agreement, to continue negotiations with a view to achieving further limitations and reduction of strategic arms significantly enhances the importance of the agreement and ensures the continuation of the process first initiated by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1968. That commitment, together with indications of the objectives to be sought in the future negotiations were of overriding importance in the decision of the General Assembly to welcome the agreement in spite of some misgivings as to its immediate impact on the slowing down of the arms race.

This chapter, which reviews developments through 1979, does not attempt to take into account the ratification process prerequisite to the coming into effect of the new Treaty.

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

SINCE THE MID-1950S THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS has been looked upon and discussed as a highly important measure of disarmament. The most significant achievement which has resulted so far from those discussions is the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,¹ which was signed on 5 August 1963 by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States and entered into force on 10 October of the same year. Since that time the overwhelming majority of nuclear tests have been carried out only in the underground environment and some 110 States have become parties to the Treaty, generally known as the partial test-ban Treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, are not parties, but, in 1974, France stated that it would continue only with underground testing, and since that time it has refrained from exploding nuclear weapons in the prohibited environments.

In addition, two bilateral treaties have been concluded between the major nuclear-weapon Powers with the effect of further controlling nuclear explosions. On 3 July 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,² known as the threshold test-ban treaty, by which they agreed to limit, subsequent to 31 March 1976, the yield of underground tests to a maximum of 150 kilotons, and to reduce the number of such tests to a minimum. By an integral protocol to the Treaty, they agreed to conduct all permitted tests within specified testing areas. As of the end of 1979 the Treaty had not entered into force, but it was generally understood that both parties were observing its basic limitations. On 28 May 1976, as a complement to the threshold test-ban Treaty, the parties signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explo-

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43; see also *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.78.IX.2), pp. 19-30; and appendix III below.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

sions for Peaceful Purposes,³ by which they agreed not to carry out any individual nuclear explosion having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosion could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures, and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons. A protocol to the Treaty sets out arrangements concerning the provision of information by the parties, the rights and functions of observers of peaceful nuclear explosions, and means of ensuring that no weapons-related benefits precluded under the threshold test-ban Treaty would be derived from any peaceful nuclear explosion. At the end of 1979 the Treaty had not entered into force.

Since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, concerted international efforts towards a comprehensive test ban have been made, particularly through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The question has also been raised in various other forums, both within and outside of the United Nations. The work has been marked by three problem areas which the nuclear-weapon States for a number of years were understood to have had difficulty in resolving completely, namely, the questions of whether the adoption of a comprehensive test ban should be made contingent upon the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, the control of the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under a ban, and that of verification; at the end of 1979, the latter question was still not fully resolved.

In 1975, the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration,⁴ appealed to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to take the lead in solving the technical and political difficulties involved and to make every effort to achieve a comprehensive ban at an early date. In 1976, the CCD established the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, in the hope that such measures could contribute to the solution of the verification question. In 1977 the Soviet Union and the United States, later joined by the United Kingdom, began negotiations on the subject and since then they have reported from time to time to the CCD and, in 1979, to the Committee on Disarmament and have made statements in the General Assembly on the status of their negotiations.

In 1978, the General Assembly, at its special session devoted to disarmament, placed the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States first among the specific measures of nuclear disarmament identified within the process of nuclear disarmament⁵ which it regarded as having the highest pri-

³ Text transmitted to the Secretary-General by the parties by a letter dated 7 July 1976 (see A/31/125, annex).

⁴ See NPT/CONF/35/1, annex 1; the text is also reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. I: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix V.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 49-63.

ority.⁶ Later in the same year, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the question; resolution 33/71 C by which it called upon all the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, to refrain from conducting any testing, and resolution 33/60 by which, *inter alia*, it urged the three States involved to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to endeavour to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration before the beginning of its 1979 session.

Since the special session, there has been growing support, particularly among non-aligned States, for the view that, in the absence of an early solution of the remaining differences among the nuclear-weapon States engaged in the negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament should commence separate negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

In 1979, the Disarmament Commission, in the "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" which it recommended in its report to the General Assembly,⁷ again reaffirmed the importance of the question by placing the item entitled "Nuclear-test ban" at the very top of the list of actual measures of disarmament included in its recommendations (see chapter VII above, p. 85). In the deliberations of the Commission,⁸ the question of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament fell among the items of the agenda which it was unable to consider in detail. None the less, in their exchange of views on the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, more than 20 of the Committee members singling out specific measures, including Austria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR and Venezuela, said that they regarded the question of a comprehensive test ban as the most important one of all. Several more, including Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador and Japan, mentioned the issue as an area of agreement which they hoped would follow closely upon the conclusion of a SALT II treaty. Still others regarded a comprehensive test ban, as well as the cessation of production and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as very important nuclear disarmament measures (Egypt, German Democratic Republic, New Zealand, Norway and USSR).

China, for its part, while acknowledging that nuclear disarmament was important, noted the differences between the arsenals of the super-Powers and other countries and held that a nuclear test ban, as well as a number of other proposals, were concocted to consolidate the supremacy of the super-Powers.

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*.

⁸ See A/CN.10/PV.9-22 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22/Corrigendum.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The discussions in the Committee on Disarmament with regard to its agenda item entitled "Nuclear-test ban" were marked in 1979 by expressions of disappointment at the failure of the three members engaged in negotiations on the subject — the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States — to produce a draft treaty or at least a comprehensive situation report.

The non-aligned members, or group of 21, in particular, voiced frustration over the continued deferral of results in an important area in which agreement among the three had seemed close at hand for the greater part of two years.

Although most of the detailed comments on the problem were heard at the summer session, where the item was the first as well as the final substantive item on the Committee's programme of work, a number of members also alluded to it in the early meetings of the Committee.

The representative of the United Kingdom, in his initial address, said that his Government was making strenuous efforts to achieve success in the negotiations with the Soviet Union and the United States, and that good progress had been made, with agreement having been reached on most of the major issues and the parties hoping for early resolution of the outstanding ones. The aim, he stated, was a multilateral treaty containing verification provisions providing maximum assurance of compliance and a protocol, integral to the Treaty, covering peaceful nuclear explosions. The United States also said that the three parties were pushing towards resolution of the issues standing in the way of an agreement and that substantial progress had been made in the past year. The USSR noted that general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was one of the questions of great importance requiring solution without delay.

Sweden recalled at the beginning of the session that a comprehensive test ban had for a long time been the highest priority item on the agenda of the CCD and stressed its Government's deep disappointment that, despite frequent appeals, it had not been possible for the three negotiating States to conclude their negotiations, which had made it impossible for the Committee even to initiate negotiations on a treaty. It suggested that the three Powers give a full account of their remaining difficulties if further delay was expected. Sweden subsequently submitted two working papers to the Committee on Disarmament, one on its international seismological data-centre demonstration facilities⁹ and one concerning the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Group established in 1976.¹⁰ Mexico, noting that the total cessation of nuclear-weapon testing had been sought by the United Nations for more than a quarter of a century, referred to the urgent need for the Committee on Disarma-

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III, vol. II, document CD/45.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/46.

ment to have before it a preliminary draft treaty at an early date. Japan held that it was the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States that had hindered the realization of a comprehensive test ban.

Among the Western States, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands expressed disappointment at the slow rate of progress and stated their desire to move on to negotiations on the testing of global facilities for verification of a ban by seismological means. The Netherlands presented a working paper on the subject.¹¹ Several Eastern European States, including Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland expressed somewhat greater hope about the negotiations, with Czechoslovakia perceiving them as being at an advanced stage and the German Democratic Republic crediting the USSR with having made proposals enabling achievement of important progress. The Eastern European States expressed the view that cessation of testing was linked to achievement of progress in nuclear disarmament as a whole. In that context, they referred to the proposal for negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles which they had submitted¹² to the Committee on Disarmament.

Early in the summer session, the representative of Cuba, on its own behalf and that of the group of 21, stated that the General Assembly had for several years accorded highest priority to the issue of a comprehensive test ban. Noting that the Committee had not been able to discharge the mandate requested of it by the General Assembly to negotiate a treaty on a ban because no draft treaty had been submitted, the group stressed that at the current session full attention should be devoted to the question, and urged the three negotiating States to present a comprehensive report on the state of their negotiations to facilitate negotiations in the Committee.

Mexico also emphasized the compelling need to bring about a nuclear test ban and recalled the many years that the subject had been under consideration as proof of that need. In that regard its representative quoted from a 1972 statement by the Secretary-General,¹³ in which he had said:

No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement. There is an increasing conviction among the nations of the world that an underground test ban is the single most important measure, and perhaps the only feasible one in the near future, to halt the nuclear arms race, at least with regard to its qualitative aspects. . . .

. . . Even if a few such tests could be conducted clandestinely, it is most unlikely that a series of such tests could escape detection. . . .

In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests. . . .

¹¹ *Ibid.*, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/7.

¹² *Ibid.*, document CD/4.

¹³ See CCD/PV.545.

The representative of Mexico expressed hope that the three Powers engaged in the negotiations on the subject would reflect upon the Secretary-General's views and submit, before the end of the session, a preliminary draft treaty.

Sweden, for its part, regarded a comprehensive test ban as an important prerequisite for the successful outcome of the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference scheduled for 1980, and pointed to the pledges and commitments which the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States had made to reach a comprehensive test ban. Noting that the Joint United States-USSR Communiqué of the Vienna meeting¹⁴ on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II agreement had referred to progress in the trilateral negotiations, Sweden at the same time regarded it as remarkable and ominous that there was no mention in the Communiqué of the role of the Committee on Disarmament in the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Sweden stressed that the Committee must have a substantial role in that regard if it was to be taken seriously.

Following its meeting in July, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events submitted its second report¹⁵ to the Committee. In examining and approving the report, the Committee expressed its appreciation to the *Ad Hoc* Group and decided to have it continue its work. The report was designed to elaborate on the Group's earlier one¹⁶ by showing how seismological data could be gathered co-operatively and exchanged internationally to contribute to the verification of a test-ban treaty and protocol on peaceful nuclear explosions. While the *Ad Hoc* Group endeavoured to report in non-technical language, the report together with its appendices is by its nature a rather technical document. The recommendations contained therein may be summarized as follows:

(a) That the *Ad Hoc* Group:

- (i) Continue the elaboration of instructions for an experimental test of the global system on the basis of the report;
- (ii) Continue further development of the scientific and technical aspects of international co-operative measures;
- (iii) Co-operate in the analysis of national investigations;

(b) Encouragement of national investigations into:

- (i) Use of the World Meteorological Organization communication system for seismic data exchange;
- (ii) Procedures to obtain desired data at individual stations;
- (iii) Analysis and data handling procedures;
- (iv) Methods of rapid exchange of wave-form data;

¹⁴ See A/34/414, annex.

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III, vol. II, document CD/43 and Add.1. For a progress report on the meetings held by the *Ad Hoc* Group from 19 February to 1 March 1979, see CD/53 and Corr.1, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/18.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/558 and Add.1.

(c) That the Group report to the Committee on Disarmament:

(d) That the Committee on Disarmament invite the World Meteorological Organization to continue its co-operation with the *Ad Hoc* Group.

Towards the end of the session, the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf also of the Soviet Union and the United States, provided a status report to the Committee in which he stated that the tripartite negotiations had continued intensively throughout the year. He reiterated that the parties were agreed that the treaty should ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment and cover peaceful nuclear explosions under an integral protocol. They envisaged that after a certain period, the parties to the treaty would hold a conference to review its operation. Negotiations during the year had concentrated on verification, which it was agreed would be by national technical means, with the possibility of on-site inspection. There would also be the exchange of seismic data, the use of which would be influenced by the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Group and involve establishment of a Committee of Experts drawn from the parties to the treaty. The British representative also noted that negotiations were continuing on detailed arrangements concerning the complex subject of verification. He recognized the interest of the Committee and the appeals of the General Assembly with regard to early completion of the negotiations, and gave the assurance that the three negotiating partners were determined to reach an agreement meeting international expectations and attracting the widest possible adherence, and that they would make every effort to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.

An atmosphere of disappointment followed the presentation of the status report described above. A number of States, including Australia, Canada, Egypt, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, criticized the report as being general, less than was hoped for, or similar to earlier ones. India commented additionally on the seeming reluctance of the States engaged in the trilateral negotiations to negotiate within the Committee. Views on the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts, however, were more positive, although some members had reservations about the global testing of the seismic data exchange system; Czechoslovakia, for example, felt that the idea could be considered "at an appropriate time". The Committee, however, approved the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group and decided that it should continue its work in accordance with the recommendations contained therein. Thus, in 1979 the subject of a comprehensive test ban was of great interest and concern, but the Committee was unable to begin substantive negotiations on a treaty.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

There was considerable discussion of the cessation of nuclear weapons testing during the thirty-fourth session.¹⁷ With regard to the trilateral negotiations, the USSR, referring to them in its general address, stated that progress

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 42nd meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

had been achieved but that, contrary to what it would have expected, complicating elements were still being introduced by the other parties. The United Kingdom said the three parties still had difficult problems to overcome, but hoped that the treaty, when completed, would not encounter objections from those who argued that the non-proliferation Treaty discriminated in favour of the nuclear-weapon States; it added that the nuclear-weapon States had also given various assurances of non-use to the non-nuclear-weapon States. The United States said that the goal of strategic stability would be served if the three negotiating States were able to agree on a comprehensive test ban.

Other States which referred specifically to the talks, including Australia, Brazil, Nigeria and Pakistan, urged their early conclusion, with Australia stressing that submission of a treaty text to the Committee on Disarmament prior to the 1980 non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference would contribute significantly to the success of that Conference. Many other States, representing all political and geographical groupings and regions, emphasized in general terms the importance and urgency of achieving a comprehensive test-ban.

In the First Committee the great majority of speakers addressed the comprehensive test-ban question and virtually all expressed concern that it had not been resolved. Among the themes frequently emphasized were the continuation and pace of testing, despite persistent efforts for its cessation, and the question of verification, which was widely viewed as the major outstanding problem and as a matter of political will rather than of technology.

Austria, for instance, noting that 16 years had passed since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, stated that, despite the commitments contained in various international instruments, including the non-proliferation Treaty, despite the number of General Assembly resolutions on the subject and the obvious significance of a comprehensive test ban, reliable sources indicated that the nuclear Powers were currently increasing their testing activities. It added that there appeared to be adequate answers to the verification problems which were generally presented as the major unresolved issue on the basis, in part, of the findings of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. Thus, Austria concluded, the urgently awaited breakthrough was primarily a matter of political decision making.

Sweden, on the basis of analyses by its Hagfors seismic observatory, said that in 1978 there had been at least 48 nuclear explosions and, in 1979, 45 explosions until 29 October. It added that testing in the USSR had been higher in 1978 than in any year since 1963, the United States rate remained high, and that France had doubled its testing rate in the Pacific in 1979. One test by the United Kingdom had been reported, and China, which had conducted two tests in 1978, had not carried out any so far in 1979. All this reflected about one test per week while the talks dragged on year after year. Such activity could only undermine present and future efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. Sweden also stressed that the technical problem of verification could be resolved, and that the key lay in political decisions — there could be no excuse once SALT II was ratified.

Other States, for example the Netherlands, held that even if SALT II were not ratified, that should not be an excuse to abandon the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Benin referred to a quarter of a century of discussions and expressed doubt about their coming to an early conclusion when there had been 48 nuclear explosions in 1978. Portugal observed that in 1978 there had been more nuclear-weapon tests than in any year since 1970. It hoped that ways and means would be found to surmount the problem of verification and that after the conclusion of a tripartite agreement the other nuclear Powers would adhere to it.

Bulgaria and Mongolia emphasized the need to manifest political will so that an agreement could finally be reached and Hungary found it deplorable that the tripartite negotiations had failed to make useful progress. It expected constructive efforts by all participants in the negotiations and said that, given the present level of technology and the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group, Hungary could not accept any reason — with regard to verification or any other matter — which would relieve anyone of the obligation to cooperate.

Other views expressed covered such areas as the connexion between a comprehensive test ban and the non-proliferation Treaty, the role of the Committee on Disarmament, the exchange of seismic data *per se*, the question of participation in a test-ban treaty, and a moratorium on tests pending the conclusion of an agreement.

The representative of Nigeria, for instance, said that an agreement would make a significant beginning to the nuclear-weapon States assuming their obligations relating to nuclear disarmament under the non-proliferation Treaty, while lack of progress before the Review Conference in 1980 would make it increasingly difficult to press for additional adherents to that Treaty. He went on to suggest that more progress might be made if the General Assembly were to give the Committee on Disarmament a primary rather than secondary role in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty, with the three negotiating States assisting by submitting any agreed joint initiative to the Committee. New Zealand expressed similar views and considerable sympathy for the Nigerian approach. Ethiopia felt that the continuing tests were gravely jeopardizing the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty.

India, besides noting the statistics on the continued testing and expressing disappointment over lack of progress in the negotiations, emphasized the imperative need for all nuclear-weapon States to become parties to a test-ban treaty, so that it would be truly universal and effective. India also regretted that the nuclear-weapon States had not heeded the call of the Assembly, in its resolution 33/71 C, for a moratorium on tests pending the conclusion of a treaty, despite the fact that one of them (the USSR) had voted in favour.

The States which specifically mentioned the exchange of seismic data invariably had a high regard for the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group, and Japan urged that the Group's proposal for an experimental exercise of the data exchange system be implemented before the entry into force of a treaty, while the Federal Republic of Germany stressed its willingness to participate in a seismological verification system.

Two proposals were dealt with by the First Committee during the session. The first, submitted under the agenda item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/60: report of the Committee on Disarmament", was designed to cover once more the Assembly's request to the negotiating body. On 8 November, 23 States sponsored a draft resolution on that item which was introduced by the representative of Australia. He recalled that the previous year the Assembly had regarded the negotiation of an effective comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of highest importance. The representative went on to illustrate various benefits to be derived from such a treaty, including the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty, the limitation and perhaps elimination of both vertical and horizontal proliferation, and reassurance to the international community that the nuclear programmes of non-nuclear States were in fact directed towards peaceful purposes. He also recalled that the Assembly had urged that the three nuclear-weapon States conclude their negotiations as a matter of urgency and submit the results to the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1979 session and expressed regret that that had not happened. In concluding, the Australian representative again stressed the urgent need for a treaty.

On 19 November, the original sponsors, joined by an additional 11 States,¹⁸ submitted a revised version of the draft clarifying the original text but similar in substance.

On 26 November, before the vote in the First Committee, China expressed the view that the super-Powers' clamour for a nuclear test ban was designed to restrict others and consolidate their monopoly position in nuclear weapons. It reiterated that nuclear disarmament had to start with major reductions in the nuclear arsenals of those Powers, and would abstain. The Soviet Union stressed that action which might impair the tripartite negotiations should be avoided. To make its position clear, it had proposed an amendment to paragraph 4 which had not been adopted; therefore, it requested a separate vote on that paragraph on which it would abstain. The United Kingdom took a similar position, making clear that it would support the draft resolution as a whole. The United States, although taking exception to several of its elements, said it would support the draft but would not want that to imply readiness to conclude the tripartite negotiations with any particular provisions or by any deadline. Its representative stated that the remaining questions were especially in the area of verification.

The Committee adopted paragraph 4 by a non-recorded vote of 111 to none, with 16 abstentions, and the draft as a whole by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 2 abstentions (China and France).

France explained its abstention on two counts: first, there had been over 30 underground tests during the first 10 months of the year, mostly by the Powers involved in the negotiations, and it found it difficult to believe

¹⁸ The final sponsors were: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Sweden, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay and Venezuela.

that they could continue tests which were health-endangering as the first pre-ambular paragraph stated; and secondly, a treaty concluded outside the framework of a process of nuclear disarmament would not, in its view, contribute significantly to the problems of nuclear weapons and their proliferation since, in the light of the data which the two most highly armed Powers had accumulated, there would be no qualitative or quantitative constraint for those Powers.

The General Assembly, at its 97th plenary meeting on 11 December, adopted paragraph 4 by a recorded vote of 124 to none, with 13 abstentions (the five nuclear-weapon States and the Eastern European States, except Romania), and the resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 2 abstentions (China and France), as resolution 34/73. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind as a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, as a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and as a contribution towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Recalling the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed in those Treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978 and section IV of resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978,

Emphasizing the urgent need for all nuclear-weapon States to cease the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the importance to a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing of the study being carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Recognizing the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Noting with dissatisfaction that that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty shows no progress in the consideration of this subject and that a full report on the status of the negotiations between the three nuclear-weapon States was not submitted.

1. *Reiterates its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. *Expresses its conviction* that positive progress in the negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on such a treaty is a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and will contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on such a treaty, as a matter of the highest priority;

5. *Calls upon* the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament;

6. *Invites* Governments of Member States to contribute to the further development of national and international co-operative measures to detect seismic events aimed at setting up a global verification system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for the fulfilment of its mandate;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

On 19 November, under the agenda item concerning follow-up of the special session, Mexico submitted a draft decision entitled "Study on a comprehensive nuclear test ban", which was subsequently sponsored also by Argentina and the Philippines. The Mexican proposal stemmed from a report of the Secretary-General¹⁹ entitled "United Nations studies on disarmament" which incorporated a recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies that a study should be made on the subject of a nuclear test ban,²⁰ to be completed in time for submission to the Committee on Disarmament at its 1980 session. The Secretary-General went on to state, as he had on previous occasions, that he considered the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban to be an indispensable step to halt the qualitative arms race and, notwithstanding past study on the subject, that any measures which might contribute to that end were welcome.

The proposal gave rise to considerable discussion both as to procedural and substantive aspects. Argentina and the Philippines expressed strong support for such a study; the United States held reservations because unclassified studies on the question already existed and it did not believe that material would be accessible for a classified study; the USSR was against carrying out the study primarily on the grounds that it seemed superfluous from a practical standpoint as nothing new could emerge from it, nor would it contribute to achievement of the goal of a world-wide comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On 21 November, the First Committee adopted the draft decision requesting that the Secretary-General prepare the study, as recommended, by a non-recorded vote of 84 to 9, with 6 abstentions.

After the vote, France stated that it had abstained for two reasons: it seemed belated to start studies on a subject which had been under negotiation for some time and had been thoroughly studied, and, as the United States had noted, it seemed that the elements of the study were common knowledge. Cyprus stated that it had voted for the draft because there was a widespread view that the obstacles to a ban were not technical but political, and it was vital that public opinion should be informed as to whether that was indeed the case.

The General Assembly adopted the draft decision on 11 December by a recorded vote of 126 to 9 (the USSR and the Eastern European States, ex-

¹⁹ A/34/588.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 13-14 and 16-17.

cept Romania), with 4 abstentions (France, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States). Decision 34/422 reads as follows:

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare the study on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban recommended by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and by the Secretary-General himself and that the study should include the chapters or sections described in paragraph 14 of the report of the Secretary-General, should be completed in time to be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament in the spring of 1980, as indicated in the same paragraph, and should be carried out in accordance with the procedure described in paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General's report.²¹

Conclusion

The pervasive difficulties in bringing trilateral negotiations to a successful conclusion, combined with a strong feeling of many States that the Committee on Disarmament should be more actively involved in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty marked the discussions on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests in 1979.

As the expectation for submission of a treaty by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States faded, increasing criticism was voiced. While appreciating both the delicacy and the complexity of the negotiations involved, other States found it increasingly difficult to accept that agreement should be held up indefinitely over such issues as verification, which, they felt, it should be possible to resolve, both politically and technically, when there existed such decisive arguments in favour of a test ban.

While there was some resurgence of hope for a breakthrough after the signing of the SALT II Treaty in June, it was short-lived. Considerable disappointment was expressed at what was considered to be the insufficiently informative nature of the report to the Committee on Disarmament on the tripartite negotiations. Later, as statistics became available on the pace of nuclear-weapon testing during the year, the view was heard increasingly that the lack of progress was due to an absence of political will on the part of the principals to stop their testing rather than to technical problems.

At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly for the first time specifically requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a treaty "as a matter of highest priority". Also for the first time it invited Governments to contribute to the development of co-operative measures to detect seismic events. At the same time the Assembly again called upon the three negotiating States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotia-

²¹ *Ibid.* The sections described in paragraph 14 of the report are an introduction; a brief background summary; an analytical summary of the negotiations which have led to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (partial test-ban Treaty); the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; proceedings in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament; three-Power negotiations; major unresolved issues; and conclusions. The procedure envisaged in paragraph 16 is that this study could be carried out in the United Nations Secretariat, with the help of consultant experts.

tions to a conclusion. The decision of the Assembly to have the Secretary-General carry out a study on the question for transmission to the Committee on Disarmament might help in promoting the negotiations to be initiated in that body.

In all, 1979 failed to produce tangible results in the quest for cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Consequently, at the thirty-fourth session of the Assembly, Member States attempted to provide maximum incentives for the principals involved in the tripartite negotiations and in the Committee on Disarmament and to make every effort to achieve concrete results in the nearest possible future.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

THE IDEA OF THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons emerged in discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere among other proposals addressing themselves to the consideration of measures needed to ward off the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation¹ and increased international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of initiatives taken in the General Assembly, negotiations started on a non-proliferation treaty in the early 1960s. After years of arduous debate, both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) and the General Assembly, agreement was reached and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature in 1968 (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, entered into force on 5 March 1970. It has since been the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the essential part of the foundation of measures that have, over the years, led to the emergence of a widespread international non-proliferation régime.

The Treaty sets out obligations for both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient whatsoever, either directly or indirectly. Non-nuclear-weapon States commit themselves not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept mandatory international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. The main provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty are aimed at: (a) preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (articles I and II); (b) providing guarantees, through international safeguards, to ensure that the peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States will not be diverted to producing such

¹ For an account of early efforts, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1, 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), pp. 98-100; for a more detailed review of events leading to the non-proliferation Treaty, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), part five.

weapons (article III); (c) promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and making available to non-nuclear-weapon States all the potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions (articles IV and V); and (d) ensuring that the Treaty will be conducive to progress on measures relating to cessation of nuclear disarmament at an early date and to disarmament in general (article VI).

The question of reliable guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was considered closely in connexion with the development of the non-proliferation Treaty. It was, however, not dealt with in the Treaty itself but, on the basis of an initiative of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, by Security Council resolution 255 (1968), adopted on 19 June 1968. By that resolution, the Council welcomed the intention expressed by the three nuclear-weapon States that they would provide support or immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.

The Treaty entered into force upon its ratification by the three nuclear-weapon States — the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States — and 40 non-nuclear-weapon States. Since then the number of parties to the Treaty has grown considerably and by the end of 1979, 68 more non-nuclear-weapon States had become parties to the Treaty, making 111 parties in all.

The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty include some which possess the most advanced nuclear technology, such as Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. On the other hand, several non-nuclear-weapon States with significant peaceful nuclear programmes have not become parties, among them Argentina, Brazil, India (which carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment in 1974), Israel, South Africa and Spain.

Since its entry into force, the General Assembly has repeatedly called for universal adherence to the Treaty. Of the five nuclear-weapon States, i.e. States which prior to 1 January 1967 had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, only three are parties to the Treaty. The two nuclear-weapon States not parties, China and France, have stated their positions in the context of related General Assembly resolutions. In 1968, upon the adoption of resolution 2373 (XXII), France stated that, while it would not sign the non-proliferation Treaty, it would behave in the future in that field exactly as did the States adhering to the Treaty.² When the General Assembly considered the implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty, France stated in the First Committee that it would not promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and would follow a policy of strengthening appropriate ar-

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1672nd meeting.*

rangements and safeguards relating to equipment, materials and technology.³ In 1973, when resolution 3184 B (XXVIII) concerning preparations for the first Review Conference was adopted, China stated that it had been compelled to develop a few nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defence and of breaking the nuclear monopoly and blackmail of the super-Powers. It added that it was firmly against using the non-proliferation Treaty to deprive non-nuclear-weapon countries or countries with a few nuclear weapons of their sovereignty and to damage the interest of the people of various countries.⁴ As for India, the Atomic Energy Commission of the Government of that country announced on 18 May 1974 that it had carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment.⁵ The Minister of External Affairs of India stated on 21 May 1974 that his country had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. He said that in performing its scientific test, India had not violated any of her international obligations.⁶ In addressing the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in 1978, the Prime Minister of India emphasized that his country was the only one that had pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of the world did so.⁷

The non-proliferation Treaty provides, in article VIII, for a conference of its parties to be held in Geneva five years after its entry into force to review its operation with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. It is also foreseen that at intervals of five years thereafter review conferences shall be held if a majority of the parties so wish. Accordingly, the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons met at Geneva 5 to 30 May 1975. The Conference adopted by consensus a Final Declaration in which it reaffirmed the strong common interest of the parties in averting the future proliferation of nuclear weapons and reviewed the operation of the various articles of the Treaty.⁸ In reviewing article VIII the Conference proposed to the depositary Governments that another conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980. On that basis the General Assembly placed an appropriate item on the agenda of its thirty-third session in 1978 and, following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee was established which commenced its work in 1979.

At the first Review Conference, much of the debate revolved around three matters that had been extensively discussed already in the course of negotiation of the Treaty, namely nuclear disarmament, security of the non-

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, First Committee*, 32nd meeting.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 1969th meeting.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/424.

⁶ *Ibid.*, document CCD/425.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 24th meeting.

⁸ See *Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, parts I and II (NPT/CONF/35/I and NPT/CONF/35/II), Geneva, 1975.

nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and peaceful uses of atomic energy. The debate indicated that the gap in perceptions and expectations that had been discernible upon its entry into force had not been bridged by the experiences of the first five years of the Treaty. The parties that tended to regard the Treaty as a single collateral measure of arms limitation primarily designed to constrain the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons felt, on the whole, that the Treaty had fulfilled its purposes. By contrast, those countries that viewed the Treaty primarily as an effort to strike a balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, felt that, in the implementation of the Treaty, the emphasis had been placed heavily on the obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, while scant attention had been paid to their rights or to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States. These different assessments were also reflected in the views expressed concerning the objectives of the Conference, the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and the measures that should be taken to strengthen it. The three nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern and Western countries felt that the principal purpose of the Conference was to strengthen the Treaty by encouraging wider adherence to it and by taking measures towards a more effective safeguards system. On the other hand, many non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly developing countries, held that the main objective of the Conference was to make a thorough, critical examination of the Treaty's operation in order to determine whether all its provisions were being realized and to adopt measures required to fill gaps and remedy inadequacies that might become apparent during such an examination. Most of these countries believed that, while it was vital that the Treaty should be strengthened and that all States should accede to it, that goal could be best achieved on the basis of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the Treaty.

In the discussion on the various provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, all participants agreed that articles I and II had been faithfully observed by the parties to it. However, with respect to the provisions of the Treaty on security guarantees, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, considerable dissatisfaction was expressed, and was reflected in various proposals submitted in the course of the Review Conference, some of which were included in the Final Document following the Final Declaration.

Since the first Review Conference, various issues related to the non-proliferation Treaty have continued to be topics of discussion in the General Assembly. In 1978, at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, attention focused also on the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1980. In the discussion it was agreed that the Review Conference should be carefully prepared so that it might successfully discharge its task of reviewing the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of its provisions were being realized. The General Assembly adopted, on the initiative of the three depositaries, resolution 33/57, by which it noted that, following

appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee had been formed of those parties to the Treaty serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or represented on the Committee on Disarmament.

The preparations for a quinquennial review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, together with other events such as the completion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) (see chapter XIII below), have provided particular incentives for recent debate on the subject of non-proliferation. The views and approaches discernible in this debate are of considerable significance because the Treaty is widely regarded as the most important instrument against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The key event in connexion with the Treaty in 1979 was the convening of two sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The deliberations of the Disarmament Commission leading to its recommendations under the heading "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" are discussed in chapter III above. In its recommendations concerning nuclear disarmament, the Commission, with regard to the question of non-proliferation, stated that the comprehensive programme should encompass the measures envisaged in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,⁹ and cited them as "Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document."¹⁰

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III, para. 14.A.I(e). For the elements recommended by the Disarmament Commission concerning nuclear weapons in general, see p. 85: the elements recommended are reproduced in their entirety in appendix II below. Paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document reads as follows:

65. It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of this Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

66. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament during its 1979 session the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation Treaty and the second Review Conference of the Treaty were topical in the context of various views expressed by the members of the Committee, particularly in connexion with its agenda items entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (see chapters VII above and XI below); it was also felt that achievement of a nuclear test-ban agreement would contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime (see chapter IX above). Views on these issues were voiced without any specific item on non-proliferation being on the agenda of the Committee. In the majority of cases the views expressed were similar to those brought forward later by the same States as well as by a number of additional States in the debates in the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, and are covered in the pertinent section of this chapter.

Meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference, 1979

The Preparatory Committee, formed on the basis of the Final Declaration of the first Review Conference and consultations among the parties to the Treaty, held its first session in Geneva from 17 to 23 April 1979. Thirty-nine States were represented. The Preparatory Committee decided that it

67. Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

70. In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

71. Efforts should be made to conclude the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the final communique of its Organizing Conference.

would hold three sessions to carry out the preparatory work needed for the second Review Conference, two in 1979 and one in 1980. Mr. Fernandez of Australia served, by general agreement, as Chairman of the first session, and Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic was elected to be Chairman of one of the future sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Pending the election of a chairman from the States known in the Preparatory Committee as the group of 19, consisting mainly of non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon countries, the Committee voted that Mr. Mihajlović of Yugoslavia, in his capacity as co-ordinator of the group, would assist the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee.

In its consideration of the work of the forthcoming Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee discussed dates and venue, rules of procedure, financing, background documentation, a provisional agenda and the question of preparation of a final document or documents of the forthcoming Review Conference. It was initially suggested, for the consideration of the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, that 3 June 1980 would be the tentative opening day for the Review Conference and that the Conference would take place in Geneva and last up to four weeks. The rules adopted by the first Review Conference in 1975 were agreed upon for use also as the rules of procedure for the upcoming Conference with one exception: Romania proposed the replacement of one of the rules of the previous Conference, rule 36 (2), with wording which would suggest that representatives of other delegations might attend the meetings of the Drafting Committee of the Conference and participate in its deliberations when matters of particular concern to them were under discussion. Following discussion in the Preparatory Committee, it was agreed that the matter should be brought up again at its next session.

The acceptance of the previous rules implied that the second Review Conference would establish two main committees. One would be the General Committee, chaired by the President of the Conference and composed of the chairmen of the Conference's two main committees, its Drafting Committee and its Credentials Committee, as well as the 26 Vice-Presidents of the Conference. The other would be a Drafting Committee which would be composed of a chairman and the two vice-chairmen elected by the Conference, and six other members appointed by the Conference on the basis of a proposal of the President. The rules agreed upon also provided for a secretary-general of the Review Conference, to be nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, and confirmed by the Review Conference itself.

A number of proposals were made regarding preparation of background documents for the Review Conference. In course of the discussion, it became evident that there was no consensus on the question and consequently the Chairman proposed that background papers should be prepared on the same subjects as those on which such papers had been prepared for the previous Review Conference. The papers, it was agreed, should take into account and reflect adequately the views expressed in the discussion taking place in the Preparatory Committee. Thus the Committee invited the Secre-

tary-General of the United Nations, the Director General of IAEA and the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to prepare the required background papers on the operation of the various articles of the non-proliferation Treaty for the Preparatory Committee at its second session.

In discussing the question of a final document or final documents, some delegations expressed the view that the work could be initiated as the Preparatory Committee was already in session, while some others stressed that there was still a lack of essential elements for such work to start. It was agreed that a more substantial discussion both on the preparation of a final document or documents and on the agenda of the Review Conference would be undertaken during the second session of the Preparatory Conference.¹¹

The second session was held from 20 to 24 August 1979 in Geneva. In addition to the original 39 States, Indonesia, by reason of accession to the non-proliferation Treaty had by that time become eligible to serve as a member of the Preparatory Committee and took its place at the second session. The Committee appointed Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic as its Chairman and elected Mr. Shitemi of Kenya as the third member of its Bureau.

Early in the session it became clear that technical considerations prevented the holding of the Review Conference in Geneva during June 1980 as had previously been suggested and it was therefore decided that it would be held from 11 August to 5 September 1980, still in Geneva. The rules of procedure were adopted in the form suggested at the first session of the Preparatory Committee. An initial discussion took place on the various background papers prepared by the respective officials of the United Nations, IAEA and OPANAL. The secretaries of those organizations were asked to revise the papers in light of comments made by the members of the Committee during the discussion.

The question of a provisional agenda for the Review Conference was considered, using the agenda adopted by the first Review Conference as a basis. That basic agenda was agreed upon with some changes. A proposal was made with regard to the item entitled "Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council" on the agenda of the 1975 conference so that for the 1980 conference it would read "Security assurances". Another proposal was made to add a subitem entitled "Related matters, including the report of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)". The Committee agreed to consider those proposals at its third session. It was also decided that the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty should be given the opportunity to submit proposals concerning additional items for possible inclusion in the agenda or any other comments relating to the agenda which they might wish to make in time for consideration by the Preparatory Committee at its third session.

¹¹ The decisions of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are contained in a report of its secretary (NPT/CONF.II/PC.I/3).

With regard to the question of preparation of the final document or documents, the Preparatory Committee reached the conclusion that at its third session it should undertake consideration of the structure and main elements of a final document or documents. The Committee would also hold further discussions at its third session on the background papers prepared for the second Review Conference. Finally, the Committee decided that, at its third session, it would take decisions on the provisional agenda and the question of the final document or documents.¹² The third session was to be held 24 March to 3 April 1980 in Geneva.

In general, the work of the Preparatory Committee during 1979 was characterized by a desire to proceed quickly with the decisions needed to initiate the substantive preparatory work for the Review Conference. The work of the Committee was facilitated to a certain degree by the precedent which was provided through the preparatory work for the previous Review Conference. An in-depth exchange of views took place with regard to decision-taking on the background documents, the provisional agenda, the question of the final document or documents for the Review Conference, and on the work of the respective secretariats.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee,¹³ it was evident that the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons was widely regarded as important. There were differences of degree as to the emphasis placed on the question and various views were put forward regarding approaches to the problem, but most of the opinions expressed were not widely divergent from each other. One factor that might have contributed to the apparent harmonization of views on the question on non-proliferation in 1979 was that the debate focused to a considerable degree on the implications of nuclear proliferation on regional security in the various regions. Another factor probably was the awareness that the question would be considered in all its aspects at the second Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Many speakers, particularly representatives of Eastern European and Western countries, indicated concern as to the strength of the non-proliferation régime and the possibility of further proliferation. Notwithstanding such concern, the non-proliferation Treaty was regarded as the main international instrument that the international community had forged to forestall an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. In the view of the United Kingdom, for instance, the non-proliferation régime

¹² The decisions of the second session of the Preparatory Committee are contained in a report of its secretary (NPT/CONF.II/PC.II/12).

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

based on the Treaty had given the world relative stability over a number of years; that stability was now in danger, it held, with the attendant risks of a nuclear arms race. The United Kingdom urged new political efforts to prevent the collapse of the non-proliferation régime, which would be a disaster indeed. Australia felt that the possibility of proliferation had to be regarded as one of the greatest threats to mankind; it was therefore deeply concerned that some non-nuclear-weapon States were improving their technological infrastructures in ways that would bring them closer to having a nuclear explosive capability. And Norway, while noting with satisfaction the greater acceptance of the Treaty, said that recent developments gave reason for concern that the non-proliferation régime might be in jeopardy and emphasized the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear-weapons capability.

A number of speakers felt that the non-proliferation Treaty had gained acceptance through the years and held that the constantly increasing number of parties to the Treaty testified to its significance. The Federal Republic of Germany stressed that every effort should be made to convince those countries that were still hesitating about signing or were opposed to the Treaty to become parties to it because only universal application could ensure its full effectiveness. In the view of the Netherlands, the recent accessions by Bangladesh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka further increased the support of the Treaty as the principal instrument of non-proliferation and demonstrated that the vast majority of States were in full agreement on the matter. The Netherlands felt that only universal adherence to the Treaty and the full implementation of all its articles would remove fears of new proliferation, a possibility which, in its view, had recently increased.

The Soviet Union noted that a whole series of States still refrained from acceding to the Treaty. Some, it added, had even pronounced themselves as being against the desire of the majority of countries to settle the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons once and for all, and had so far not abandoned their plans to acquire their own nuclear weapons. That state of affairs, it held, was bound to sound a warning, because the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly into the hands of racists and aggressors, would lead to an escalation of tensions in the regions of the world concerned, and would greatly increase the nuclear threat to mankind as a whole. The Soviet Union recalled the appeal which was addressed by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States in June 1979 to all States that had so far not acceded to the Treaty.¹⁴

¹⁴ The Soviet statement referred to the Joint United States-USSR Communiqué of 18 June 1979, issued at the end of the Vienna meeting between President Carter and President Leonid I. Brezhnev and contained in the annex to document A/34/414. In the Communiqué, the two sides reaffirmed the importance they attached to nuclear non-proliferation, and, *inter alia*, stated that they "consistently advocate the further strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and confirm their resolution to continue to comply strictly with the obligations they have assumed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". Both noted the profound threat posed to world security by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreed that the States already possessing nuclear weapons bore a special responsibility to demonstrate restraint. They also called upon all States which had not already done so to sign and ratify the non-proliferation Treaty.

The five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, in a joint memorandum¹⁵ in which they stated their views on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, welcomed the positive trend manifested by recently increased adherence to the Treaty, and expressed their firm conviction that early adherence to it by the largest possible number of additional States and their effective participation in the second Review Conference would markedly strengthen non-proliferation efforts.

The question of adherence to the Treaty was also approached from a somewhat different perspective, particularly among the non-aligned and developing countries. Nigeria, as a party to the Treaty, remarked that it found it increasingly difficult to press other non-nuclear-weapon States to become parties when, despite the pleas of the international community, the nuclear-weapon States proceeded at an alarming rate to conduct nuclear tests, and when negotiations on nuclear disarmament had not even begun. Iran regarded the non-proliferation Treaty, almost 10 years after its entry into force, as remaining a lopsided and unfulfilled instrument, and in that context it referred to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States parties under article VI.

Considerable discussion took place in connexion with the preparations for the second Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. A number of speakers regarded the forthcoming Conference as an opportunity for strengthening the Treaty by achieving universal adherence, and for continuing efforts to ensure that nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes were not diverted for military uses. Australia, for instance, thought that the Conference would provide a timely opportunity to lend weight to the objectives of the Treaty, to review its operation and to take into account the concerns of new parties to it. Mongolia stressed that the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime was assuming ever greater urgency in the light of reports concerning the intention of additional States to acquire nuclear weapons. It felt that the forthcoming Review Conference faced the urgent task of elaborating further effective measures aimed at promoting international co-operation in the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. Finland, expressing strong support for the Treaty both to prevent proliferation and to encourage co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, held that the second Review Conference should be approached as a further effort to broaden international consensus on non-proliferation. It held that, while emphasizing the importance of political commitment to non-proliferation, the Conference also should ensure that future applications of peaceful atomic technology and nuclear non-proliferation remained technically compatible with each other. Romania observed that the implementation of the Treaty was at the same stage that it had been during its first review and, accordingly, stressed the need for the

¹⁵ See A/C.1/34/4, annex.

most thorough and careful preparation of the Conference in order to direct it towards solution of the problems which it felt had been left pending in the course of negotiating the Treaty, and which had not subsequently been resolved. Austria regarded political will as more important than technical barriers to nuclear proliferation. In that connexion, and in view of the forthcoming Conference, it recalled that the Treaty was based on mutual rights and obligations of all parties. Austria held that only if the nuclear Powers recognized the interrelationship between their own obligations and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States would the Treaty have a chance of survival, and only under those conditions would it be possible to persuade additional countries to accede to it.

Of the various politico-military measures which were regarded as essential to the further implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, attention was drawn frequently to the SALT II Treaty and the start of the SALT III negotiations as well as the question of a comprehensive test ban. The United States viewed SALT II as reflecting the determination of the major nuclear Powers to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. It was deeply conscious of the obligations of those Powers to the parties to the Treaty which had foresworn nuclear weapons. It noted also that a comprehensive test ban would provide qualitative restraint on the nuclear arms competition and contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States further stated that nuclear non-proliferation and stability could be further enhanced by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It felt that certain recent developments could bring new impetus to the non-proliferation effort, including the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, the increased number of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, and the pledge by a number of nuclear Powers, under specific circumstances, to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. However, it also felt there were serious setbacks in the form of further demonstrations of intent to acquire nuclear weapons, in disregard of the inherent dangers to regional and international security. Thus, the forthcoming Review Conference would be a critical time for taking stock and for redoubling efforts to make progress.

The Netherlands, while regarding a comprehensive test ban and SALT II as mutually reinforcing yet standing basically on their own, thought that even if the ratification of SALT II should fail, that must not be accepted as an excuse to abandon the comprehensive test ban and even less to neglect the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In its opinion, statesmen should in that case have the wisdom and courage to follow through immediately with a comprehensive test ban because otherwise the Review Conference would find itself in considerable difficulties.

With regard to the question of security guarantees (see also chapter XI below), Japan, in speaking of various measures that the nuclear-weapon States should take to compensate for the unequal elements in the Treaty, believed that the most realistic course without upsetting the international security framework would be for the General Assembly or the Security Council

to take note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and on other occasions regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons, thereby investing such declarations with a more authoritative status. Romania remarked that the balance of obligations had not been brought about in the spirit in which the Treaty had been conceived with regard to the security guarantees which the nuclear Powers were supposed to provide to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Several countries, mainly Eastern European or Western, maintained that the Treaty provided the most suitable basis for strengthening international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (see also chapter XIII below). Ireland, noting that militarily significant Powers remaining outside the Treaty and arguing against it as being discriminatory benefited from less stringent controls than those accepted by the parties to the Treaty, expressed the hope that the objections of those countries would not last long into the next decade. In that connexion, it held that the uncertainties posed by the dangers of covert proliferation though technology transfer had produced an inevitable "recoil" on the part of the technologically advanced States upon which Ireland and others depended for the export of equipment and know-how. If that recoil appeared discriminatory or unacceptable to some, Ireland said, it had to be remembered that the danger of proliferation had been confirmed in the present decade as a reality and not a pretext.

Belgium regarded it as essential that the non-proliferation Treaty system remain the privileged framework for the discussion relating to the whole question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Australia, for its part, expressed concern that some countries were improving their technological infrastructures in ways that brought them closer to having a nuclear explosive capacity, and hoped that the countries which had remained outside the Treaty would reassure the international community by affirming their acceptance of either full-scope safeguards on their nuclear industries or of some other binding and verifiable commitment. A number of non-nuclear-weapon States, developed as well as developing, in respect of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, once again affirmed their right to share equally with the nuclear-weapon States in the benefits of those uses, and held that the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not become a hindrance to the exercise of that right. Yugoslavia, for instance, again opposed attempts—under the guise of prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons—aimed at denying or at limiting the sovereign right of all States to have access to nuclear technology and to use it for peaceful purposes. It continued to believe that it was necessary to achieve, on the broader international plane, solutions guaranteeing the free transfer of nuclear technology and its use in the interest of accelerated development of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly the developing ones, with an appropriate system of international control to be applied without discrimination.

India, one of the countries not party to the Treaty, expressed concern

over certain statements made in the First Committee to the effect that the second Review Conference should consider some sort of preferential treatment to be given to States parties to the Treaty with regard to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an "incentive" for adherence to the Treaty. It would consider any such move not only as being directed against the solidarity of the non-aligned countries but also as an attempt at coercion.

In his report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the Director General of IAEA stated, in speaking about the Treaty and the risks of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, that encouraging progress had been made, but there were still warning signals. He thought that the safeguards operation of the Agency was, as a whole, becoming more effective, although there were still three non-nuclear-weapon States — all in areas of political tension — that were operating without safeguards nuclear plants capable of producing materials for nuclear explosives. He pointed out that there might be a fourth country building a plant that would produce enriched uranium without safeguards and that if that were to happen it would reverse a trend towards bringing all civilian nuclear activities throughout the world under IAEA safeguards. Such a backward step might easily lead the world into a new spiral of the nuclear arms race with all that that implied in waste of resources and manpower, not to mention the danger to world peace. The Director General concluded that it seemed to have become a truism that where the non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards ended, the danger of proliferation began.

At its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly adopted several resolutions directly related to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but no specific resolution on the topic. By resolution 34/87 C, on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States, the General Assembly expressed the belief that it was necessary to examine possibilities for an international agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present (see chapter VII above, p. 99). By resolution 34/87 D, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the agenda item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration (see chapter VII above, p. 100). Several resolutions were adopted on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones (see chapter XII below). The General Assembly also adopted at its thirty-fourth session resolution 34/76 B on the nuclear capability of South Africa, and resolution 34/93 E on nuclear collaboration with South Africa (see chapter XII below, p. 177 and 178). Finally, by resolution 34/89 on Israeli nuclear armaments, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, called upon the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on the question (see chapter VII above, p. 102).

Conclusion

In 1979 preparations for the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons began and increased attention focused on the Conference to be held in August 1980. It was apparent that, as in the case of the first Review Conference, the task of reviewing the operation of the Treaty to assure that its various provisions are being implemented would be approached from differing perspectives. In the view of a number of States, including the three nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern European and Western States parties to the Treaty, the task ahead will be to make use of the opportunity to strengthen the Treaty and to avert the danger of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, many non-nuclear-weapon States parties, while agreeing to the need to strengthen the Treaty and encourage universal adherence, view the primary question as establishing a mutually satisfactory balance between the rights and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. They emphasize the need for cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and international co-operation in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In connexion with the last-mentioned consideration, the same States emphasize the need to ensure that measures adopted to minimize the risks of weapon proliferation associated with the development of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes do not prejudice the right of all States to benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy without discrimination.

In 1979, the discussions on non-proliferation and the non-proliferation Treaty revealed broad support for the Treaty as the central element of the international régime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The discussions reflected anxiety with regard to developments in some so-called near-nuclear countries and the implications which further proliferation would have for regional and world security. That sense of anxiety, combined with the awareness of the approach of the second Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty and the expected conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, perhaps contributed to a certain harmonization of views in the non-proliferation debate. While the established differences in approach prevailed, they were put forward with less force than in previous years.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY of non-nuclear-weapon States has been discussed at the United Nations and other international forums mostly in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).¹

During negotiations on the non-proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States felt that, given the obligations they were to assume pursuant to the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should take steps to assure their security. Consequently, various proposals were put forward by which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Some non-nuclear-weapon States were apprehensive about such "negative assurances"² because of the possibility that permanent members of the Security Council might use their veto, while others were willing to accept them.

Following the adoption of the non-proliferation Treaty by the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States sponsored a draft resolution on security assurances in the Security Council, as a matter outside, but closely connected with the Treaty. It was adopted by the Council on 19 June 1968 as resolution 255 (1968). By that resolution, the Security Council recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would call for immediate action by the Council, and above all by the permanent members, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter; welcomed the intention expressed by certain States that they would provide assistance to any non-

¹ For details see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chaps. 13 and 14; *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 78.IX.4), chap. VIII; and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 79.IX.2 or 3), chap. XI.

² By a "positive assurance" the nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, under specified circumstances, as envisaged, for example, by Security Council resolution 255 (1968) subsequently referred to.

nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that was a victim of an act or object of a threat of nuclear aggression; and reaffirmed the inherent right under the Charter of individual and collective self-defence against armed attack. Thereafter, the three nuclear-weapon States made declarations which warned that any State which committed or threatened aggression using nuclear weapons must be aware that its actions would be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the Charter to suppress such aggression or remove the threat of it. In that context, the three also affirmed their intention as permanent members of the Security Council to seek immediate Council action in accordance with the Charter should it be required.

Also in connexion with the Treaty, at the initiative of a group of mainly non-aligned countries, the General Assembly, by resolutions 2153 B (XXI) and 2346 B (XXII), decided to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Among the principal agenda items of the Conference were security guarantees and other questions which had been raised during the negotiations on the Treaty. The Conference adopted a Declaration which contained the principal conclusions of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding those questions.³ In the view of many non-nuclear-weapon States, the Security Council resolution and associated declarations fell short of the credible and effective guarantees which they felt were necessary.

Consequently, various proposals aimed towards stronger guarantees have been put forward since the coming into force of the Treaty, particularly at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1975 and in other forums such as the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.

In 1978, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,⁴ the question was dealt with primarily in statements concerning non-proliferation or nuclear-weapon-free-zones. Also at that session, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States made specific statements with regard to negative security assurances which may be summarized as follows.

The USSR declared that it would never use nuclear weapons against those countries where there were no such weapons at present and called upon the other nuclear Powers to do the same and recalled that President L. I. Brezhnev had declared: "We are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances—aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power—could compel us to resort to this extreme means of self-defence." The United Kingdom stated that its Government formally gave the assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, that it would not use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an actual attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. Simi-

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr. 1 and 2.

⁴ For details, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 221-223.

larly, the United States recalled that President Carter had declared that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty or to any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

The Final Document adopted at the special session contained the following paragraph among those dealing with nuclear disarmament:

59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

An item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,⁵ on the basis of the transmission of a letter from the Soviet Union to the Secretary-General, to which a draft international agreement⁶ on the subject was attached. The agenda item proposed by the Soviet Union was widely recognized as covering an important issue and in the course of discussion considerable support developed for the concept of concluding an international convention on the subject by which the parties concerned would grant appropriate guarantees of security to non-nuclear States. The General Assembly adopted two resolutions under the item. Both resolution 33/72 A, adopted on the basis of the Soviet proposal, and 33/72 B, an alternative initiated by Pakistan, referred to the substantive proposals submitted and views or suggestions expressed to the Assembly on the subject, and called for them to be conveyed to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration. Both also called for an item on the same question to be included in the Assembly's agenda at its thirty-fourth session. The main difference between the two resolutions was that the former emphasized consideration of the proposed drafts of an international convention by the Committee on Disarmament, while the latter, taking note of the proposals submitted, urged efforts to conclude "effective arrangements, as appropriate"

The substantive documents submitted on the subject⁷ were drafts of an international convention submitted by the USSR⁸ and by Pakistan⁹ respectively, and a letter sent by the United States¹⁰ to which was annexed an explanation of its position to the effect that because of the diversity of factors

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-228.

⁶ See A/33/241, annex.

⁷ The texts of the documents referred to are reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix IX.

⁸ See A/33/241, annex, or A/C.1/33/L.6, annex.

⁹ See A/C.1/33/L.15, annex.

¹⁰ A/C.1/33/7.

involved, it believed that the question could be dealt with in an effective and practical way through individual declarations.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

In 1979, at the first substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was referred to by a number of delegations, but did not become a controversial issue. Some speakers alluded to the matter mainly in the general context of the maintenance of the security of all States during the disarmament process, or of non-use of force or threat of force in international relations. Many referred specifically to the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, however, and regarded it as an important question among the elements of the comprehensive programme which should be included within the framework of the nuclear disarmament measures.

The Eastern European States generally stressed the importance of a binding international convention as the appropriate means to ensure the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Czechoslovakia, for instance, reiterated its full support for the Soviet proposal to conclude an international convention on the question, and Hungary considered that adequate attention should be accorded to the political, international, legal and security aspects of disarmament, which would include the elaboration of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and an international convention to strengthen the security guarantees to the non-nuclear States.

Pakistan called attention to paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the special session and stated that it was of the firm view that "effective arrangements" could best be provided in an international instrument with binding legal effect and, conversely, held that any other modality would not have the authority or binding force of a multilateral commitment, either incorporated in a Security Council resolution or in an international legal instrument. Ghana, for its part, suggested that the second phase of a comprehensive programme might include the conclusion of an agreement among the nuclear-weapon Powers, committing them never to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any State.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, reflecting a flexible position, simply cited the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as one of the elements to be negotiated for inclusion in the nuclear disarmament and arms control measures of the comprehensive programme; Japan added that each measure undertaken should correspond to the political and military conditions of the States or regions involved. China, for its part, said that pending agreement by the nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of nuclear weapons, the two with the largest arsenals should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

A measure entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" was included in the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission in the area of nuclear disarmament.¹¹ It should also be noted that the Commission listed "Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", i.e. in the overall sense, as one of the areas which it had considered but upon which consensus could not be reached.¹² In that context, the Federal Republic of Germany, late in the session, made the comment that such a prohibition did not seem to it to be a conceptual approach likely to contribute in a useful way to solving the problem of nuclear weapons while such weapons still existed; accordingly, it felt that the best guarantee against their use lay in the Charter of the United Nations and its general prohibition of the use or threat of use of force. In the same context, India deeply regretted that consensus could not be reached for the inclusion of such an overall prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons — an issue which it had raised specifically at the special session; India added that it continued to believe in such a prohibition, particularly while there was no progress whatsoever in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" was scheduled to be considered from 25 to 29 June 1979; however, views on the item were also expressed at other stages of the Committee's discussions on nuclear disarmament.¹³

Early in the session, the delegation of Pakistan reiterated its position in favour of uniform assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, stating that the formulation of assurances as indicated by the General Assembly in resolution 31/189 C provided the most viable basis for evolving such a "uniform obligation" by the nuclear Powers. By that resolution those Powers were requested to consider undertaking, without prejudice to their obligations arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon Powers. On 27 March, Pakistan submitted a document¹⁴ concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the question, and on 26 June it submitted a

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III, para. 14.A.1 (c); the recommendations of the Commission in their entirety are reproduced in appendix III below.

¹² *Ibid.*, para. 19, sect. V, para. 19 (a).

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix IV, vols. I and II.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/10.

working paper¹⁵ on effective international arrangements for such assurances.

The Soviet Union continued to hold that the most complete and effective solution to the problem of protecting non-nuclear-weapon States from the use of nuclear weapons would be through universal legal guarantees agreed to by the nuclear-weapon Powers. For that reason, the representative, referring to the working paper containing a draft international convention¹⁶ submitted by the socialist countries, said that the Soviet Union was a firm supporter of the idea of concluding such a convention with the participation, on the one hand, of nuclear-weapon States that were prepared to provide appropriate guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, of interested non-nuclear-weapon States which would renounce production or acquisition of nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territory. The Soviet Union urged the Committee to work on preparation of the text of a convention without delay. The position that an international instrument would provide the best solution to the question was generally supported by the Eastern European and a number of non-aligned members of the Committee, including Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico and Zaire.

The draft international conventions contained in the documents submitted by Pakistan and by the socialist countries are reproduced in appendix X below.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, noting the importance of reliable assurances protecting the non-nuclear-weapon States through a convention, stressed that those States, as parties to such a convention, would be offered a real equivalent for their renunciation of nuclear weapons. That would encourage a decision by those States not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons nor to allow their deployment on their territory.

Poland, in its statement, stressed the minimal differences in views on the question and the constructiveness and flexibility of the position of the socialist States. That position, it held, allowed for security guarantees in special agreements concluded with individual non-nuclear-weapon States, or for giving agreed, universal juridical guarantees contained in an international convention. It concurred with the view that effective security guarantees would reinforce the non-proliferation régime, and believed they would also encourage further development of IAEA safeguards and establishment of nuclear-free zones. Czechoslovakia emphasized not only that the nuclear-weapon States would have to assume obligations if a treaty were concluded, but also, of equal importance, that the non-nuclear States would have to observe their non-nuclear status. Thus they would not manufacture, possess or station on their territory nuclear weapons of any type, but would not be limited in any way with regard to utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Hungary, in introducing the socialist working paper containing the draft convention on behalf of its sponsors — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, document CD/25.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, document CD/23.

German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and USSR—emphasized that only achievement of the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, leading to the complete elimination of such weapons, could result in complete security in the nuclear era. The socialist countries thus viewed the taking of effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a partial arrangement, pending the attainment of universal nuclear disarmament.

Romania, for its part, also considered that nuclear disarmament would provide the most effective guarantee, and shared the view that a convention on security guarantees should be closely linked with legal instruments relating to the non-use or threat of force in international relations.

Early in the session, the delegation of the United Kingdom welcomed the statements made at the special session by the nuclear-weapon States on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Its position was that those assurances were so different in character that it would be immensely difficult to fuse them into a common form of negative security assurance in an international convention; moreover, it did not see how a convention would strengthen the assurance which it had given. Later, in the discussion of the specific item, the delegation explained in detail its doubts as to whether the path to a convention was a fruitful one to pursue. It felt that there were two distinct aspects to the question, namely, the nature of the security assurance itself, and the form in which it was expressed. The United Kingdom drew attention to a point raised by the Netherlands, that there would have to be assurance that the non-nuclear-weapon States concerned were indeed non-nuclear; adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty would provide the clearest commitments in that regard.

The United States, expressing its preference for solemn declarations rather than an international convention on security guarantees, held that the varied approaches by the nuclear-weapon States to the problem indicated very little hope that the differences among them could be worked out to enable elaboration of a single draft convention. Besides citing the declaration given by itself, the USSR, and the United Kingdom, it drew attention to the approach of China "to call for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and at no time and in no circumstances to be the first to use nuclear weapons" and of France "to participate in negotiating the necessary agreements with nuclear-free zones the terms of which preclude, according to a formula to be defined, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that are part of a nuclear-free zone." In the view of the United States, it was unlikely that the Committee on Disarmament would be able to devise a common formula that would satisfy each of the nuclear-weapon Powers. It suggested that one way of enhancing individual assurances would be for the Committee on Disarmament to recommend that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution which would recognize the legitimate security concerns of States which had undertaken legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices; take note of the individual assurances which were given by the nuclear-weapon States; and

set forth in its text the various individual assurances. The United States submitted a working paper¹⁷ explaining its approach and containing an illustrative United Nations General Assembly resolution which is reproduced in appendix X below.

France, while understanding the legitimate security concerns of States that had entered into commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons, did not believe that the concept of a convention of universal scope on negative guarantees corresponded to the present conditions of the international community, since security conditions—"a geography of security"—were too different, depending on regions and political and strategic situations, for it to be possible to enter into uniform commitments. It quoted from the statement made by its President concerning the commitments it would be prepared to negotiate with nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Federal Republic of Germany stressed that its position was that the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States in their unilateral declarations were self-executing, legally binding and recognized in international law, and felt that, at the present time, it would be difficult to conceive of a multilateral convention on the very sensitive element of the security of States. The Netherlands, however, while welcoming the unilateral statements made by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to security assurances, called for continuing endeavours to achieve a common formula or to take other steps in that field. It agreed that from a political and legal point of view, an internationally binding instrument was to be preferred to unilateral policy declarations. It also took note of the idea which had been put forward to enshrine the unilateral declarations in a Security Council resolution.

Sweden, for its part, after recalling that it could not accommodate any concept of "positive security guarantees" and reiterating its view that any country had the right to decide for itself the conditions under which assistance might be granted, stated that it supported negative assurances in principle but felt that it was too early to give preference to any specific model for their co-ordination. India noted that the non-aligned countries preferred an international convention on the question since such an instrument would provide an important incentive towards nuclear disarmament. It felt that security based on nuclear deterrence could not be lasting or genuine and, moreover, could not accept as legitimate the use of nuclear weapons which, in its view, was implicit in negative guarantees. Yugoslavia, explaining its sponsorship of resolution 33/72 B at the thirty-third session, held, in that context, that the issue of negative guarantees was linked not only to relations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States but to relations between the nuclear-weapon States themselves; it felt that the true way to world security as well as the security of non-nuclear-weapon States lay in the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and nuclear disarmament.

At its 39th meeting on 5 July, the Committee decided to establish an *ad hoc* working group open to all members of the Committee to consider and

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document CD/27.

negotiate on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It nominated the representative of Egypt as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which held seven meetings as well as some informal consultations between 13 July and 2 August and thereafter submitted a report¹⁸ to the Committee. In the conclusion of the report, the Group noted the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Its preliminary examination had clarified certain issues and at the same time underlined the complexity of elements requiring further consideration.

The Committee approved the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group that at the beginning of its 1980 session the Committee on Disarmament should continue negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

The items entitled "Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States: report of the Committee on Disarmament" and "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament" were included in the agenda of the thirty-fourth session pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 33/72 A and 33/72 B.

The debates at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on the subject¹⁹ reflected views and positions of States similar to those put forward in the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament and at the thirty-third session.

The Soviet Union, for instance, again emphasized the necessity of embodying the principles agreed to by the General Assembly in a binding international agreement. It recalled that, in his statement on 6 October 1979, President L. I. Brezhnev had once again solemnly confirmed that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons against those States which had refrained from the production and acquisition of such weapons and which did not have such weapons on their territories.

Poland believed that a unique situation existed in that the desires of non-nuclear-weapon States were matched by a corresponding readiness among the nuclear-weapon Powers to work out a solution acceptable to both.

The delegation of Pakistan maintained that it had submitted a formula-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/47.

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

tion which should circumvent the difficulties encountered by the major nuclear Powers by calling for assurances from those Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to nuclear security arrangements with the nuclear Powers. It pointed to the same formulation, contained in resolution 31/189 C, as providing the most feasible basis for an agreement on a common and uniform obligation by the nuclear-weapon States to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons which could be evolved through further negotiations.

Other statements supporting the proposals of the Soviet Union and Pakistan for an international agreement regarding security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States were made by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR among the Eastern European group, and by a number of other States including Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela and Viet Nam.

The delegation of the United States reiterated the proposal it had made in July in the Committee on Disarmament for a General Assembly resolution setting forth the various undertakings made by the five nuclear Powers to give assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons. It emphasized that the issue involved vital security interests of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and that those interests could not be changed by exhortations. In its view, the only way to arrive at a generally acceptable solution was through patient consideration of the different appraisals of the problem. The United Kingdom held that strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would give those States the knowledge that they were not under a nuclear threat and might remove one of the motives for them to decide to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Federal Republic of Germany repeated its concern that an international convention would not be able to do justice to the differing security conditions of the various regions, while the Netherlands felt that it might be possible to develop a common formula valid for all nuclear Powers, but, at the same time, stressed that it would not be an easy task.

Sweden, for its part, expressed reservations with regard to the various forms of assurances which had been discussed, including an international convention. Such assurances, it stressed, should entail the withdrawal or dismantling of nuclear-weapon systems that were aimed at or could be used mainly against the non-nuclear-weapon States whose security such assurances were intended to promote.

On 5 November 1979, under the agenda item entitled "Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States": Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently sponsored also by Guinea and Mali.

In introducing the draft resolution on 12 November, the representative of Bulgaria stressed that in the view of the sponsors favourable momentum existed conducive to the adoption of concrete measures seeking to strengthen guarantees to non-nuclear States. By the draft, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on this subject on a priority basis during its 1980 session with a view to their early conclusion through the elaboration of a convention.

Canada, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United States explained their abstentions in the voting in the First Committee on the grounds that the draft envisaged only the concept of an international convention to strengthen the guarantees of security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Albania explained its negative vote on the grounds that neither a convention nor other guarantees would resolve the danger posed by nuclear weapons, especially the weapons of the super-Powers.

On 27 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 91 to 1, with 25 abstentions, and on 11 December the General Assembly adopted it, as resolution 34/84, by a vote of 114 to 1 (Albania), with 25 abstentions, including the United States and other Western States. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent a nuclear holocaust,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to this objective,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop, as appropriate, effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements and observations made by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 33/72 of 14 December 1978,

Welcoming the in-depth consideration of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" by the Committee on Disarmament and the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group open to all States members of the Committee to conduct negotiations on the subject,

Noting with satisfaction that, pursuant to this item, drafts of an international convention were submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including the report of the *ad hoc* Working Group,

Noting with satisfaction that the idea of a convention has gained broad international support,

Desirous of promoting an early and successful completion of the negotiations on the elaboration of the convention,

1. *Welcomes* the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that it is urgent to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of such an international convention;

3. *Commends* the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on this subject at the beginning of its 1980 session;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on this subject on a priority basis during its 1980 session with a view to their early conclusion with the elaboration of a convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

With regard to the agenda item entitled "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" a draft resolution was submitted by Pakistan on 26 October which was later sponsored also by Mali, and was subsequently twice revised. By the revised draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, recommend that the Committee on Disarmament should conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during its 1980 session, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

On 16 November 1979, the United States, for its part, submitted a draft resolution under the same item by which the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, note the statements that the nuclear-weapon States had made on assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and request the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts at its next session with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements further to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Pakistan, in introducing its draft resolution on 19 November, again stressed that the most credible and effective way in which the threat from nuclear weapons could be averted was through nuclear disarmament, the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and strict adherence to the principle of non-use of force in international relations, and hoped that those objectives would soon be achieved.

On 27 November, before the vote in the First Committee, Ireland, on behalf of the European Economic Community, explained the nine countries' abstentions, again on the grounds that the draft resolution initiated by Paki-

stan, by focusing on an international convention, risked prejudging the outcome of future consideration of the subject. Austria and Japan gave similar explanations of their positions. Subsequently, India explained its abstentions on all the draft resolutions on the question in the light of its firm conviction that, pending nuclear disarmament, there should be a total, comprehensive prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. On the same date, the Committee adopted the draft resolution initiated by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 99 to none, with 21 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it on 11 December by 120 votes to none, with 22 abstentions (including France, India, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), as resolution 34/85. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about any possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop, as appropriate, effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter.

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolution 33/72 of 14 December 1978,

Welcoming the in-depth consideration of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" by the Committee on Disarmament and the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group under the aegis of the Committee to conduct negotiations on the subject,

Noting the drafts of an international convention submitted on this item in the Committee on Disarmament,

Further noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including the report of the *ad hoc* Working Group,

Noting the decision of the Sixth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, calling on the Committee on

Disarmament to elaborate the international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during its next session in 1980.

Also noting similar recommendations made in the relevant resolution of the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez from 8 to 12 May 1979.

Further noting the general support expressed during its thirty-fourth session for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Affirms* the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there is wide recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

3. *Endorses* the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on this subject at the beginning of its 1980 session;

4. *Recommends* that the Committee on Disarmament should conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during its 1980 session, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

5. *Decides* to consider at its thirty-fifth session the question entitled "Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

In introducing the United States draft resolution in the First Committee on 21 November, its representative referred to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the question, including that of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. He pointed out that the report of the Committee, which had been adopted by consensus, stated in its conclusion that at its 1980 session "the Committee on Disarmament should continue negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" but did not attempt to prejudice the further course or the outcome of further negotiations. It felt that the General Assembly should adopt a similar approach and that resolutions which sought to promote a particular point of view were not conducive to progress. In that context, it held that its draft resolution did not prejudice the position of any country.

The draft resolution of the United States was adopted by the First Committee, also on 27 November 1979, by 81 votes to 1, with 27 abstentions and by the Assembly, on 11 December, by 110 votes to 1 (Albania), with 29 abstentions (including the USSR and other socialist and non-aligned States) as resolution 34/86. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to promote international peace and security,

Recognizing the legitimate security concerns of all States,

Convinced of the importance of effective efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which the Assembly called upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the five nuclear-weapon States have recognized the significance of action to meet the concerns of the great majority of States, which have not sought to acquire or develop, alone or with others, any nuclear explosive devices,

Recalling that each of the five nuclear Powers has stated its willingness to take action to affirm its support for and to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Taking note of the various proposals and suggestions made in this regard,

1. *Notes* the statements that the nuclear-weapon States have made on assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Welcomes* the report of the Committee on Disarmament, in which it reported on the initial consideration of and negotiation on effective international arrangements further to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts at its next session with a view to reaching agreement on such arrangements and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion in the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session of the items entitled "Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States" and "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons";

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States"

Conclusion

The discussions on the question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States during 1979 revealed continued and strong support of the majority of States for arrangements aimed at strengthening such guarantees. Some non-nuclear-weapon States continued to express doubts concerning the effectiveness of unilateral declarations on security measures given by nuclear-weapon States.

The adoption of three resolutions by the General Assembly dealing with consideration of strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, including the possible conclusion of an international convention on the subject, indicates growing understanding among both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States on the need for further consideration of the question in order to reach agreement on suitable international arrangements for the stronger security guarantees which are being sought.

The question will no doubt be considered further in the Committee on Disarmament and will be among the issues raised at the second Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1980.

CHAPTER XII

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES, which has been developed in the course of disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and other international forums, continues to be regarded as one of the most practical means of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring the complete absence of such weapons from the designated areas. Moreover, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is considered to be an effective means of providing the non-nuclear-weapon States with negative security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, an important step which might contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, particularly nuclear disarmament.

With such ideas in mind, several proposals on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones have been made since 1957, and a number of them were reflected in the agenda as items for consideration at subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. The first nuclear-weapon free zone was established upon the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty on 23 June 1961.¹ Other important areas for which nuclear-weapon-free zones have at one time or another been proposed include Central Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Nordic Countries, Asia and the Pacific, and the South Pacific. In 1975 a comprehensive study of the question was carried out by an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts and transmitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;² in 1978 at its tenth special session the Assembly further reviewed the question and stated, in its Final Document,³ that such zones constituted an important disarmament measure. At its recent regular sessions

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 72; text and status are also given in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2); see also appendix III to the present volume.

² *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7); the study includes a review of early initiatives.

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 33 and 60-63.

and in 1979 at its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly has considered items concerning particular zones, namely, the full implementation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the establishment of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was considered by the reinstated United Nations Disarmament Commission at its first substantive session, held from 14 May to 8 June 1979, in connexion with its deliberations on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the course of the general exchange of views⁴ on the elements of the programme, which would be transmitted for further elaboration to the Committee on Disarmament, a number of member States attached great importance to the inclusion of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various geographical regions. Many countries, among them China, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Sierra Leone, the USSR, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia, expressed their support of the concept and considered the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be an effective fundamental step and principal method for the curbing of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus the promotion of nuclear and general disarmament. Elaborating on regional measures towards disarmament, China held that zones of peace or nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established in the light of the specific conditions prevailing in different parts of the world and the desire of the States in the regions concerned. Such zones should be free from rivalry for hegemony between the super-Powers, foreign military presence in all its forms, all armed occupation of the territory of other countries, and direct or indirect armed intervention and the threat of force. China specifically proposed that (a) nuclear States should respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them, (b) the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America should be respected by all States, and (c) in conformity with the common desires of the regional States, zones should be established in such regions as the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.

Emphasizing the significance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a contribution to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the representative of Ecuador referred to the recent statement by his Foreign Minister at the fourth regular session of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) at Quito in which he had said that the scepticism felt earlier about the future of the Treaty had fortunately been overcome and the instrument was now seen as a commitment that responded to the Latin American continent's pacifist mentality and desire to survive. The delega-

⁴ See A/CN.10/PV.10-17 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22/Corrigendum.

tion of Egypt emphasized the necessity of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and Africa in light of the possible danger of acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Africa and Israel, which would lead other States of those regions to engage in a nuclear arms race. Sierra Leone also urged the Disarmament Commission, through the comprehensive programme of disarmament, to take appropriate action that could thwart the instalment of nuclear weapons in Africa, particularly by South Africa. The representative of Pakistan stated that his Government had been working for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, believing that it would be in the interests of the entire people of the region. Since each South Asian State had unilaterally declared that it would not produce or acquire nuclear weapons, the next step, in the view of Pakistan, should be to translate those declarations into a multilateral and binding form.

After the general exchange of views, the subject was taken up in the working group set up to deal with and make recommendations on the comprehensive programme. As a result, the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was included within the framework of elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament⁵ as one of the disarmament measures in the area concerning nuclear weapons (see chap. VII above, p. 86).

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also considered by the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 in connexion with the broad question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as that of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Although no negotiations were held on any proposal to establish such zones, a number of delegations, including those of Egypt, Ethiopia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Kenya, Pakistan and the United States, expressed their concern about the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and reiterated their support of the establishment of zones in various regions as an effective means to promote international peace and security.

The representatives of France and the United States stressed the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to the security of the given region through a joint initiative declaration by the countries concerned, as was the case with the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In commenting on the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it was important to work out arrangements that were adapted to the specific conditions for security and stability which varied from region to region. The representatives of Egypt and Iran underscored the importance of

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, chap. IV, para. 19.

establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Egypt held that the proposal had so far been impeded by Israel's policies of refusal to be bound by the non-proliferation Treaty or to subject its nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, while Iran suggested, in the existing circumstances, that some initial steps towards such a zone should be taken through the United Nations Secretary-General and the Security Council.

In the context of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States, the representative of the USSR, noting that the only established nuclear-weapon-free zone was that embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, stressed that the draft convention on the strengthening of such guarantees formulated by the socialist countries⁶ would extend assurances to the largest possible number of non-nuclear-weapon countries and explained particularly that it would apply to non-nuclear-weapon States both within and outside of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

With regard to the possible development of a nuclear device by South Africa, the representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya expressed concern about South Africa's nuclear programme and collaboration with Israel. They also stressed the responsibilities of the great Powers, in particular the nuclear and certain Western Powers, to respect the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and to refrain from assisting South Africa's development of nuclear capability.

Regarding the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, the delegation of Pakistan reaffirmed its efforts towards that goal and suggested that India should accept the proposal which would involve the renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons as well as the international inspection of all nuclear facilities that exist in all the countries of the region. On a reciprocal basis, Pakistan would be ready to accept international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities and would accede to the non-proliferation Treaty if India also indicated its acceptance and accession. India, for its part, reiterated its position that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could not properly be regarded as a disarmament measure. It noted that the position of the General Assembly had always been that the establishment of such zones in various parts of the world should be initiated by the States of the appropriate regions concerned, taking into account their special features and geographical extent. Moreover, participation by the States of the regions in such zones should be voluntary and on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and negotiated among themselves; India believed that to be the proper procedure. In its view, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone did not guarantee lasting security and immunity from nuclear attack or threat of such attack, but India would not wish to go against the desire of the States of a well-defined region, if they were all in agreement on the establishment of such a zone. In the case of the proposal for South Asia, India's position continued to be that it was totally unacceptable. Pakistan noted later in the discussions that the absence of prior unanim-

⁶ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27), appendix III, document CD/23.

ity among all the States in a region should not preclude the international community from examining and encouraging the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was its belief that, in the case of South Asia, the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons was even more acute than in other areas since that region had already witnessed and felt the impact of a nuclear explosion. Pakistan called attention to its recent proposal for a joint declaration, having international status and a binding character, by the countries of South Asia renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

As at previous sessions of the General Assembly, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and proposals for their establishment continued to receive the overwhelming support of Member States during the general debate at plenary meetings and in the First Committee.⁷ Moreover, consideration of the subject in 1979 was highlighted by a number of new elements. First, a request was made by Iraq to include in the agenda a new item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" in connexion with the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The request led to adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 34/89 (see chapter VII above). Among other things, that resolution requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to conduct a study on the state of affairs of Israeli nuclear armaments and to submit a final report to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. Secondly, following reports that South Africa might have detonated a nuclear explosive device in September 1979, and in the context of the agenda item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa", the Secretary General was requested, by decision 34/404 taken by the Assembly on 26 October, to communicate with parties concerned with a view to clarifying the situation. Following an interim report⁸ and the report of the Secretary-General⁹ conveying the replies to his communications, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/76 B (see page 177 below) on the nuclear capability of South Africa as a disarmament resolution in connexion with the question of denuclearization of Africa. In the context of the item on *apartheid*, the Assembly also adopted a disarmament-related resolution, 34/93 E, entitled "Nuclear collaboration with South Africa" by which it requested the Security Council to consider action to prevent South Africa from detonating, developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, and called for various actions by States, international organizations and the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to promote the implementation of the resolution. Finally, after appeals for a number of years to the nuclear-weapon States regarding

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 43rd meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

⁸ A/34/639.

⁹ A/34/674 and Add.1 and 2.

the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Assembly was in a position to adopt resolution 34/74 by which it welcomed the ratification of the Protocol by the five nuclear-weapon States thus providing "negative" security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In addition to the above highlights, many non-nuclear-weapon States renewed their call to the nuclear Powers to respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and provide security assurances on the basis of such zones (see chapter XI above).

In the First Committee, delegations from all political and geographical groups reiterated their support of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the various regions — Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia and the South Pacific.

China reiterated its position of strong support for the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stressed that for such regions to be truly free from nuclear threat, commitments by the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons were indispensable. Additional necessary requirements, in China's view, were cessation of the various super-Powers activities of aggression, expansion and rivalry for hegemony, withdrawal of all foreign military forces and dismantling of all foreign military bases.

The United Kingdom affirmed the view that the regional approach to disarmament should be encouraged, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas where security was not founded on the basis of nuclear deterrence.

The Soviet Union reiterated its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as one of the measures for strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of diminishing the threat of nuclear war and of achieving regional military détente. It stressed that such zones should be truly free from nuclear weapons with the relevant agreements not allowing any loop-holes for the violation of the non-nuclear status of the zones.

The United States expressed strong support of efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, holding that such zones could buttress non-proliferation and nuclear stability. They should be established in accordance with criteria which would promote the security of the participants.

India referred to the importance it attached to the principle enunciated in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts convened under the auspices of the CCD in 1975,¹⁰ that the initiative for creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from the States within the region concerned and that participation must be voluntary. Venezuela, supporting the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, held that the existence of conditions in certain regions which might undermine establishment of additional zones should not serve indefinitely as a pretext to

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27A* (A/10027/Add.1).

reject efforts to solve problems that arise from weapons acquisition and increase tension and mistrust. In its view, no region was free of complexities but, with a willingness to overcome obstacles, no initiative was doomed to failure.

The United Republic of Tanzania, for its part, felt that the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace implied not only the absence of nuclear weapons from the areas but also the non-use of those weapons against the States of the regions. In its view, therefore, the guarantee of non-use of nuclear weapons against the States of the area was part and parcel of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone of peace. Accordingly, it felt that the proposed international convention on negative security guarantees did not explore new horizons, nor constitute a comprehensive approach towards disarmament or genuine security guarantees.

In addition to hearing general views on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the General Assembly took action, as summarized below, with regard to four specific regions under four separate agenda items.

A. *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America*

In accordance with its previous resolutions 33/58 and 33/61, two items, concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco respectively, were included in the agenda of the General Assembly. Additional Protocol I concerns the application of the Treaty to territories in the zone for which outside States have *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility, while Additional Protocol II provides for the nuclear-weapon Powers to respect the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty.

During the course of the deliberations, the representative of France reaffirmed his Government's support of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and recalled that on 2 March 1979 France had signed Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and thus completed the commitments it had assumed when it became an adherent to Protocol II. The Soviet delegation recalled that in 1978 the Soviet Union had become a party to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thereby consolidating the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, which encompassed the majority of the Latin American countries. The representative of the United States commented that the full realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America was drawing closer and hoped that the necessary steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force for all States concerned within the region would be taken in the near future. Many other countries, including Bahamas, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela welcomed the adherence of nuclear Powers to the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and felt that it would encourage the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world.

Two draft resolutions were submitted in connexion with Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

On 7 November, 23 Latin American countries submitted a draft resolution regarding Additional Protocol I. While introducing the text on behalf of other sponsors on 12 November, Mexico noted with satisfaction that France had signed Protocol I on 2 March 1979 and that for the instrument to acquire full effect it was only necessary to have two of the signatory countries, the United States and France, deposit their instruments of ratification.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee without a vote on 16 November, and by the General Assembly on 11 December 1979, also without a vote, as resolution 34/71. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977 and 33/58 of 14 December 1978 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Taking into account that certain territories lying within the zone of application of that Treaty which are not sovereign political entities are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively, and that the United States of America signed it in 1977,

Noting also with satisfaction that Additional Protocol I was signed by France on 2 March 1979,

1. *Invites* France and the United States of America to take all necessary steps in order to secure the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) at the earliest possible date;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

Following the vote in the First Committee, Brazil pointed out that the signature or ratification of Protocols I and II of that Treaty had been accompanied by declarations formulated by several of the signatory or ratifying States containing unilateral interpretations of the Treaty which might have detrimental implications for its effectiveness. The action taken by France on Additional Protocol I of the Treaty is covered in appendix III below.

A draft resolution regarding Additional Protocol II of the Treaty was also introduced by Mexico on 12 November on behalf of 23 Latin American countries. In the introduction, Mexico stated that as far as Additional Protocol II was concerned, one of the General Assembly's wishes, which had been expressed ever since 1967, had been fulfilled. He said, "The action taken on the appeals and exhortations to the nuclear-weapon countries, which have been persistently repeated for the past 12 years, will, it seems to us, reduce the scepticism of those who hold that the resolutions of the General Assembly are completely sterile."

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee without a vote on 16 November, and by the General Assembly, also without a vote, on 11 December 1979, as resolution 34/74. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3079 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3258 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3467 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/67 of 10 December 1976, 32/79 of 12 December 1977 and 33/61 of 14 December 1978, all of which contain appeals to the nuclear-weapon States regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Reaffirming its conviction, which now finds itself corroborated by international practice, that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol,

Welcomes the fact that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) has already been signed and ratified by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, thus fulfilling an aspiration of the General Assembly.

B. Denuclearization of Africa

The item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session pursuant to resolution 33/63. More than at previous sessions, various delegations expressed a sense of urgency concerning the question in the light of nuclear developments in South Africa, and particularly of recent reports¹¹ concerning a nuclear explosion in the vicinity of the southern part of the African continent. A number of African countries, including Benin, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia, expressed their serious concern about the security of the region and denounced the technological and military assistance which, they held, had been rendered to South Africa by certain great Powers and aided development of its nuclear capabilities. The African countries urged States to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration with South Africa and requested the Security Council to prohibit all forms of such co-operation and collaboration through effective enforcement action, bearing in mind the recommendations of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa,¹² held in London on 24 and 25 February 1979, which had dealt with the dangers posed by the South African nuclear programme. They maintained that the realization of denuclearization of Africa would contrib-

¹¹ See, for instance, *The New York Times*, 26 October 1979, p. 1.

¹² See S/13157, sect. VII.

ute greatly to the security of the African region as well as to the promotion of international peace and security as a whole.

On 26 October, expressing grave concern about the reports that South Africa might have detonated a nuclear explosive device, the representative of Nigeria, on behalf of a number of countries, made a proposal at the plenary meeting of the Assembly that the Secretary-General be requested to conduct an immediate investigation into those reports and to report to the General Assembly at the ongoing session on his findings. The proposal was adopted by consensus at the same meeting. Pursuant to that decision, the Secretary-General, in his report of 12 November 1979,¹³ stated that he had contacted the Governments of South Africa and the United States as well as other Member States requesting all pertinent information on the matter, and had received communications from South Africa and the United States. He stated that he would continue to convey to the General Assembly any further information made available to him. In its communication, South Africa stated: "the South African Government has no knowledge of any nuclear explosion having occurred in or in the vicinity of southern Africa recently." The United States stated: "The only indication it has to date that a nuclear explosion may have occurred in that region was a signal from a United States satellite at 0052 hours GMT on 22 September 1979. The United States has not been able to obtain any corroborating evidence that a nuclear explosion actually took place."

Two draft resolutions were submitted in connexion with the item of denuclearization of Africa. The first was submitted on 12 November by 26 African States and concerned the implementation of the Declaration. It was later sponsored by seven additional countries.¹⁴ In introducing the draft resolution, Nigeria stated that paradoxically South Africa was stepping up its nuclear blackmail at a time when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was considering further steps towards the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Deeply concerned about the possibility of the possession of nuclear weapons by South Africa, he urged that all efforts at preventing that régime from acquiring such weapons must be a priority item for consideration by the United Nations and its Members. By the draft, Nigeria noted, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly would reaffirm that the nuclear programme of the racist régime constituted a very grave danger to international peace and security particularly in respect of Africa; call upon States to halt collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field; and request the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 21 November by 85 votes to none, with 11 abstentions, and by the General Assembly

¹³ A/34/674 and Add.1 and 2.

¹⁴ The sponsors were: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire.

on 11 December 1979 by 128 votes to none with 11 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States), as resolution 34/76 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 32/81 of 12 December 1977 and 33/63 of 14 December 1978, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling also that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa should forthwith refrain from conducting any nuclear explosion on the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Alarmed by the report that, having bluntly and persistently refused to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, South Africa may have detonated a nuclear explosive device.

Convinced that such a situation constitutes a grave danger to international peace and security and a particularly dangerous threat to the security of African States,

Recalling its decision, taken at the tenth special session, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

Noting with appreciation the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, held in London on 24 and 25 February 1979,

Expressing its indignation that some Western countries and Israel have continued to collaborate with South Africa in the form, *inter alia*, of uranium extraction and processing, supply of nuclear equipment, transfer of technology, provision of training and exchange of scientists and external financial support for its nuclear programme,

Noting with satisfaction resolution CM/Res.718 (XXXIII) adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-third ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 6 to 20 July 1979, by which the Council took further steps towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,

1. *Strongly reiterates* its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Vigorously condemns* the reported explosion of a nuclear device by South Africa;

3. *Reaffirms* that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and a particularly dangerous threat to the security of African States, and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

4. *Condemns* any nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrates, *inter alia*, the objective of the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. *Calls upon* such States, corporations, institutions or individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration between them and the racist régime of South Africa;

6. *Requests* the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

7. *Requests* the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action, bearing in mind

the recommendations of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, against the racist régime of South Africa, so as to prevent it from further endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons;

8. *Demands* that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

The second draft resolution, which specifically concerned the nuclear capability of South Africa, was submitted by Nigeria. It was subsequently revised and in final form sponsored by 27 African countries.¹⁵ The revised draft was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on 21 November. By the draft, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, would request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of appropriate experts, to prepare a comprehensive report on the plan and capability of South Africa in the nuclear field.

The draft was adopted by the First Committee on 26 November without a vote, and by the General Assembly on 11 December, also without a vote, as resolution 34/76 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply alarmed at the report that South Africa may have detonated a nuclear explosive device in September 1979,

Recalling its decision on this matter taken at its 47th plenary meeting, on 26 October 1979,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for the action taken by him in pursuance of its decision of 26 October 1979;

2. *Appeals* to all Member States in a position to do so to provide all relevant information at their disposal to the Secretary-General;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the situation closely and in the light of further relevant information to be submitted by Member States;

4. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of appropriate experts, a comprehensive report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field and to submit the report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

As mentioned above, the General Assembly also adopted a disarmament-related resolution following its debate on the agenda item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa"¹⁶ The draft resolution, entitled "Nuclear collaboration with South Africa", was sponsored, in its final form, by 43 Member States, and was adopted without reference to a Main Committee by the General Assembly on 20 December by a vote of 119 to 4 (France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom and

¹⁵ The sponsors were: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia.

¹⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 54th to 60th and 100th meetings.

United States), with 18 abstentions, as resolution 34/93 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions concerning the denuclearization of the continent of Africa and nuclear collaboration with South Africa,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, in which the Council decided, *inter alia*, that all States should refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons,

Having considered the reports of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, held in London on 24 and 25 February 1979,

Taking note of the conclusions of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa and of the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in South Africa, held in London from 2 to 4 November 1979,

Gravely concerned at the reported detonation of a nuclear device in an area of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, including the southern part of Africa, in September 1979,

Noting with concern the supplies of materials, technology, equipment and other forms of assistance in the nuclear field furnished to the racist régime of South Africa by France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Considering any detonation of a nuclear device by the racist régime of South Africa, and the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by that régime, as a grave and unprecedented threat not only to the continent of Africa but also to international peace and security as a whole,

1. *Requests* the Security Council urgently to consider mandatory measures to prevent the racist régime of South Africa from detonating, developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, and to warn that the acquisition or testing of nuclear weapons by it would be met with enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* all States which have not yet done so, in particular France, Germany, Federal Republic of, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America:

(a) To cease forthwith all collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field and to terminate all supplies of nuclear materials and equipment or components thereof, transfer of nuclear technology, training and exchange of nuclear scientists and financial, technical or other assistance to the nuclear programme of South Africa, including the uranium enrichment facilities;

(b) To refrain from purchasing uranium or enriched uranium from South Africa;

(c) To take measures to prevent such collaboration and purchases by corporations, institutions and other bodies and individuals under their jurisdiction;

(d) To convey to the Secretary-General all information available to them on the efforts of the racist régime of South Africa to acquire nuclear-weapon capability;

3. *Requests* all States and international organizations to co-operate fully in the implementation of the present resolution and to act in accordance with its purposes;

4. *Requests* the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to take all appropriate measures to promote the implementation of the present resolution.

C. Proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Pursuant to resolution 33/64, the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" was again included in the agenda of the General Assembly.

During the general debate a number of delegations, including those of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, reiterated their support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. They expressed their concern on the danger of development of nuclear arms by Israel which would create a serious threat to the security of States and further stimulate the arms race in the area. In the context of nuclear disarmament and promoting international peace and security, they urged the international community, especially the United Nations, to take effective measures to prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons. Many representatives, in their statements, drew a comparison between reports of nuclear programmes in South Africa and Israel and particularly condemned their co-operation in that field.

Egypt proposed that the countries of the region should solemnly undertake, on a mutual basis, to renounce the further production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear equipment, while prohibiting the installation by any other country of nuclear weapons on their territory, and should agree to make all their nuclear activities subject to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Security Council should become the depository of the declarations of the countries of the region, and declare the Middle East to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone; according to Egypt, resolution 33/64 remained unfilled because Israel refused to heed the appeal to that effect which it contained. If Israel continued to impede the attainment of such objectives, the United Nations, in Egypt's view, would have to take the necessary measures under the Charter to prevent any threat to world peace in the region.

Israel, for its part, reiterated its position that it supported the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East through a formal, contractual and multilateral convention freely negotiated among all the States of the region. Israel stressed that the establishment of such a zone must be on the basis of voluntary and mutual agreement and the reciprocal commitment of all States concerned.

On 16 November, Egypt submitted a draft resolution on the question which it introduced on 21 November. Egypt stated that the Middle East differed from other regions of the world in two main aspects: first, it was a region that was strategically and economically extremely sensitive and therefore any escalation in the armament systems of the States of the region would have far-reaching repercussions on peace and security all over the world and, secondly, the region had been and continued to be the arena of a tragic conflict which had lasted for more than three decades despite efforts made to find a solution. Since conventional weapons of the most sophisticated kind had been used in wars there, the region was most deserving of international efforts to ensure that nuclear weapons would not be introduced into the arsenals of the region. In that connexion, the draft invited adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the countries of the region. Egypt stressed that adherence to the Treaty would have a very

specific meaning, which would extend beyond the geographical limits of the region and have a direct bearing on international peace and security.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 23 November by 130 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Israel). In explaining their votes or positions, certain delegations, namely those of Bhutan, Brazil, India, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, indicated that they had reservations on particular parts of the draft, especially the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 1 or 3 or both (see below).

Israel, for its part, reiterated its position of commitment to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and prevention of their spread and support of the establishment of the zone in the Middle East through direct negotiations leading to binding international guarantees. It added that the defined area concerned should be wide enough to include States bordering the Middle East which were not members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It further added that it was abstaining reluctantly.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 11 December 1979 by 136 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Israel), as resolution 34/77. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoyed wide support in the region,

Bearing in mind its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace in the region and in the world,

Considering its resolution 32/82 of 12 December 1977, in which it expressed the conviction that the development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and immensely damage the efforts to create an atmosphere of confidence in the Middle East,

Guided by its relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 33/64 of 14 December 1978.

Recognizing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Invites* those countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

3. *Calls upon* those countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. *Further invites* those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare their support for establishing such a zone in the region consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate;

5. *Reaffirms again* its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote these objectives;

6. *Renews its invitation* to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

D. Proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General" was included in the agenda of the thirty-fourth session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/65 which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

On 4 October 1979, the Secretary-General reported¹⁷ that he had been in contact with States of the South Asian region and that there had been no request by the States concerned for his assistance in connexion with the subject. He further noted that in the course of those contacts, a view was expressed that the Secretary-General should continue to be available for that purpose. As in previous years, during the debate a number of delegations, including those of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Chile, Kenya, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar and Zaire, reiterated their support for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

On 25 October, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution which it introduced on 6 November. In introducing the draft, Pakistan reaffirmed the belief that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was at present the most feasible way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. Accordingly, Pakistan had supported other initiatives for creation of such zones and had proposed the establishment of a zone in South Asia. While stating that most of the provisions of the draft resolution were similar to those of previous resolutions, it emphasized that an effort had been made to accommodate the objections which had been raised by certain States and emphasized Pakistan's flexibility and openness to suggestions. The speaker reiterated, *inter alia*, that Pakistan was prepared to accept

¹⁷ See A/34/527.

full-scope IAEA safeguards on a reciprocal basis, and was ready to explore other ways and means of mutually reassuring States in South Asia against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On 21 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by 86 votes to 3, with 38 abstentions. A number of delegations made explanations of their vote.

Explaining its vote against the draft, India maintained its position that, while it did not oppose the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the initiative for their establishment should derive voluntarily from all the States of the region concerned, avoiding prejudgement as to concept, features and delineation. South Asia, it held, was a sub-region and an integral part of the region of Asia and the Pacific, which could not be treated in isolation; rather, the security environment of the region as a whole had to be taken into account. A genuine nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region could only be established in the total absence of nuclear weapons. In its view, the existence of nuclear weapons in the region of Asia and the Pacific and the presence of foreign military activities and bases in the Indian Ocean complicated the security environment of the region and made the situation inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Bhutan and Mauritius explained their negative votes on grounds of lack of consultations and agreement among the States concerned.

Japan, voting in favour of the draft, reiterated its belief that the establishment of such a zone would require the agreement of all the countries concerned, including the nuclear-weapon States, on the basis of an initiative of the countries of South Asia; that it would not undermine the peace and security of the region and of the world as a whole; that it should be accompanied by safeguard measures embracing national and international inspection and verification; and that it should comply with the principles of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas.

In explanation of his affirmative vote, the representative of the United States held that effective nuclear-weapon-free zones, negotiated and supported by the appropriate parties, could enhance the security of the States concerned and reinforce the goals of non-proliferation on a regional basis. Also, for any nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement to accomplish its objectives, it would have to preclude the conduct of any nuclear explosions, whatever their declared purpose. In that connexion, the United States attached particular importance to operative paragraph 2 of the draft, which contained an admonition urging all States in the region of South Asia to refrain from any action contrary to the objectives of the resolution.

France, which abstained, considered that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could not be carried out against the will of States in the region concerned and, in the case of South Asia, the situation had registered no change from previous sessions; Italy expressed a similar view. Sweden also abstained, as it had the previous year, on the grounds that it appeared that insufficient consultation had taken place among the countries of the region. It urged the States concerned to continue to pursue all avenues which

could facilitate the attainment of the objectives contained in the draft resolution.

Among other States explaining their abstentions, Australia felt that the approach envisaged in the draft resolution could not meet the requirements of the situation in South Asia; Brazil stressed the need for consensus among the States concerned and clear geographical delimitation, as well as the need for nuclear-weapon Powers unequivocally to respect the status of such zones; Mozambique emphasized the necessity for the widest measure of regional agreement; and the United Kingdom, regretfully, stated that it would no longer support the implementation of that zone against the wishes of one of the major Powers in the area.

The General Assembly adopted the recommendation of the First Committee on 11 December 1979 by 96 votes to 2 (Bhutan and India), with 40 abstentions, as resolution 34/78. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977 and 33/65 of 14 December 1978 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolution 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote

the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. *Decides* to consider this item at its thirty-fifth session.

Conclusion

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and proposals for their establishment in various parts of the world continued in 1979 to receive support from the great majority of Member States. That support was clearly evidenced by the views expressed at various forums, including the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, as well as the General Assembly and its First Committee. The general belief is that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a feasible and effective means of preventing the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and of enhancing security of the countries concerned. However, certain differences in views still exist with respect to the application of the concept in some specific areas.

During 1979, with regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there were positive developments in that France signed Additional Protocol I and the Soviet Union ratified Additional Protocol II, thus providing further steps toward full implementation of the Treaty. In particular, with the Soviet action, all nuclear-weapon States became adherents to Additional Protocol II, thus fulfilling an aspiration of the General Assembly. With regard to the denuclearization of Africa, although the desire for implementation of the Declaration continued, the States of the African region expressed serious concern about their security on the basis of reports that South Africa might have detonated a nuclear explosive device. The discussions led to the adoption of an additional resolution under the item, and of a disarmament-related resolution on the question of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East also continued to receive widespread support, and an item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" was added to the disarmament agenda (see chapter VII above). With regard to the proposal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, the established differences in views among various States, particularly India and Pakistan, continued to exist.

The developments during 1979 concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones indicate that the concept is widely regarded as a practical approach which can contribute to nuclear disarmament. Thus, discussion of current proposals will continue and proposals for establishment of additional zones may be expected to mature in the future.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Introduction

IN RECENT YEARS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY for peaceful purposes has become the subject of intense debate within and outside the United Nations. A variety of views are being advanced reflecting the different needs and interests of different countries in the light of such considerations as resource endowment, energy requirements and options, level of scientific, technological and economic development and environmental factors. Essentially, however, two trends of thought dominate the debate, one focusing on the link between the dissemination of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes and the spread of nuclear weapons, and the other on the benefits that may be derived from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. These trends clash in two separate but related areas. One disagreement concerns the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes. Here changes in nuclear export policies in the direction of more stringent export controls and a stricter safeguards régime have sparked controversy between supplier and recipient countries. The other disagreement, involving mainly the United States on one side and a number of developed countries on the other, originates in differing evaluations of the prospective dangers and expected benefits of the "plutonium economy", i.e., the use of plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle.

Against this background of conflicting approaches, the need to forge an international consensus in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy became apparent in view of the fact that the development of peaceful nuclear programmes appeared to an increasing number of countries as a compelling requirement to further national independence and economic and social progress. One attempt towards that end was the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), launched in October 1977 at the initiative of the United States, which opened a dialogue at the technical level among developed and developing countries, suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology, equipment and materials. That technical exercise was designed to provide data and options regarding less proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles

and thus facilitate the search for widely acceptable solutions to the political problems arising from differing approaches to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The evaluation will be completed in 1980 and, in 1979, the questions of where and how such solutions might be achieved gained prominence in the debate.

The international transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes

In the mid-1970s, the major nuclear suppliers began to pay increasing attention to the relationship between export policies and the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities. Concern about the nuclear-weapon-proliferation risks attendant on the dissemination of nuclear technology, equipment and materials focused on what were considered the "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as reprocessing and enrichment, which would provide ready access to materials usable in nuclear weapons: plutonium and uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235.

In 1974, a number of suppliers reached an understanding on common safeguard requirements.¹ These requirements were further developed in the framework of a Nuclear Suppliers Conference which began meeting in London (thus becoming known as the "London Club"). In September 1977, the 15 countries² participating in those meetings agreed on a set of principles and guidelines to govern nuclear exports. The guidelines are based on a list of equipment and materials whose transfer to a non-nuclear-weapon State triggers the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition, the transfer of items on the "Trigger List" requires formal assurance from recipient countries that they will not employ such items for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device and the application of effective physical protection measures to prevent unauthorized use. These requirements also apply to facilities utilizing technology directly transferred by the supplier, or derived from transferred facilities or major critical components thereof. The guidelines call for restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities and technology and weapons-grade materials. The control measures agreed to also include restrictions on re-export and on reprocessing and enrichment.³

Some suppliers have adopted national export policies going beyond the requirements set out in the London guidelines — the most recent and com-

¹ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), pp. 123-124.

² The initial membership of seven countries was increased later to 15: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

³ A detailed presentation of the London guidelines may be found in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp. 132-134.

prehensive being the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The additional controls imposed by individual suppliers involve, singly or in varying combinations, an embargo on the transfer of sensitive facilities and technologies; the application of IAEA safeguards to all the peaceful nuclear activities of recipient non-nuclear-weapon States; and conditions in respect of enrichment levels, transfers to third countries, reprocessing and disposition of spent fuel, the supplier's consent being required in some cases.⁴

It may be noted that in 1979, the Board of Governors of IAEA approved a revision of the guiding principles and general operating rules governing the provision of technical assistance by the Agency. The revised guiding principles provide, *inter alia*, that technical assistance shall be given only for peaceful uses of atomic energy, which exclude the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the furtherance of any military purpose and any uses that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, such as research, development, testing or manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. To this end and to the extent required by the Board of Governors, Agency safeguards shall be applied to all forms of technical assistance in all "sensitive" technological areas in accordance with the provisions established by the Board of Governors. This provision raised considerable controversy and the Board, in a departure from its tradition of reaching decisions by consensus, adopted it by a vote. Negative votes were cast by Argentina, Brazil and India, which held that the above formulation did not conform to the provisions of the IAEA statute. In view of its adoption, India stated that it was no longer interested in receiving technical assistance from the Agency. Subsequently, Argentina announced that it had decided to forgo such assistance because it did not meet the real needs of that country.

The trends on the supply side have been criticized by many present and potential recipients of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, particularly by developing countries. The critics stress that the starting point for these countries is access to modern science and technology as a vehicle of economic and social development and self-reliance in view of the growing importance of nuclear power as an alternative energy source; hence their belief that peaceful nuclear technology should be made widely available and that the fear of misuse for military purposes should not be used as justification for measures that impede or restrict full access to such technology on a non-discriminatory basis. This viewpoint is reinforced by the belief that it is not the peaceful applications of nuclear energy that are endangering the survival of mankind, but, rather, existing nuclear arsenals and their continuous quantitative and qualitative development. In that light, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons are two aspects of the same problem and, consequently, the non-proliferation régime must entail restraints on vertical as well as on horizontal proliferation. In addition to criticizing suppliers' policies, devel-

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the export policies of individual suppliers, see: *ibid.*, vol. 1: 1976, pp. 124-128; *ibid.*, vol. 2: 1977, pp. 134-139; and *ibid.*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), pp. 250-253.

oping countries, particularly non-aligned, are increasingly emphasizing the idea of self-reliance and mutual assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, highlighted those themes.⁵ The Conference stressed the need for observance of the principles of non-discrimination and free access to nuclear technology and reaffirmed the right of each country to develop programmes for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their own freely determined priorities and needs. Noting that concern for non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to prevent States from exercising the right to acquire and develop peaceful nuclear technology, the Conference expressed its concern at the monopolistic policies of nuclear supplier countries restricting and limiting the transfer of technology and imposing conditions which were incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of the developing countries. It called for full observance of the principles mentioned above, which, it stated, had been endorsed unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly. Further, the Conference stressed the exceptional importance of international co-operation among the non-aligned and other developing countries in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is of special significance in the fields where those countries can achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiency. In that connexion, the Conference, in the Programme of Action for Economic Co-operation, noted with satisfaction the work done by the Group of Co-ordinating Countries, which had been formed in 1978 following the Belgrade Conference of Foreign Ministers, to examine in detail the question of mutual co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁶ The Conference stressed the importance of implementing the conclusions of the Group, singling out those concerning the adoption by the non-aligned countries of a co-ordinated approach in IAEA to strengthen the role of the Group of 77 in the Agency and the need to convene an international conference on the use of nuclear energy for economic and social development in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/50.

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

As noted above, the United States in 1977 advanced the idea of an international evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle to explore the proliferation resistance of alternative fuel cycles with a view to finding ways in which increasing interest in the development of nuclear energy could be met while minimizing the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation.

INFCE was organized at a Conference held in Washington, D.C., from

⁵ See A/34/542, paras. 227-233.

⁶ The work of this Group is examined in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 253-254.

19 to 21 October 1977, with the participation of 40 countries.⁷ INFCE was open to all interested States and 66 have participated in the evaluation work in one form or another.

It was agreed that INFCE should be a technical study, not a negotiation, and Governments are in no way committed to accept its results. It was decided that the evaluation should be carried out in a spirit of objectivity, with mutual respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field, without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that agreed safeguards measures are applied.

Eight working groups were established to carry out studies in the following areas: fuel and heavy water availability, including uranium and thorium supply; enrichment availability, including comparison of the proliferation risks of various enrichment techniques; assurances of long-term supply of technology, fuel and heavy water and services in the interest of national needs consistent with non-proliferation; reprocessing, plutonium management and plutonium recycling; fast breeder reactors; spent fuel management; waste management and disposal; and advanced reactor and fuel cycle concepts, including improved once-through fuel utilization in present thermal reactors. These subjects were to be examined with reference to a number of assessment factors, such as technical feasibility, economics, resource utilization, health and safety, the environment and non-proliferation, so that Governments, when they come to making decisions, will have an extensive basis of agreed assessments to work from.

A Technical Co-ordinating Committee, composed of the co-chairmen of the eight working groups, acted as a steering group.

In 1979, the working groups completed their work and their voluminous reports, together with summaries, will be presented to the final Plenary Conference, which will be held in February 1980. In addition, the Technical Co-ordinating Committee is to submit a summary and overview.

International arrangements for nuclear fuel cycle services

International approaches to the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services and supplies have attracted attention in recent years. Underlying this interest is the idea that international or multinational arrangements would help to make nuclear energy widely available while minimizing the risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation by limiting the spread of nationally-owned facilities that provide access to weapons-grade nuclear materials. Possibilities in this area were considered at a technical level in the framework of INFCE, the different working groups having examined institutional arrangements relevant to their segment of the study. Clearly, any multinational or international arrangement raises delicate questions — membership, financing, deci-

⁷ For the final communiqué of the Organizing Conference, see A/C.1/32/7.

sion-making, conditions of access, dispute settlement — the answers to which, ultimately, will have to be found at the political level.

(a) *Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel, services and technology*

International mechanisms to ensure the reliability of supply of nuclear fuel, services and technology are seen as a means of inducing consumer nations to accept restraints on their peaceful nuclear programmes with respect to the acquisition, in particular, of reprocessing and uranium enrichment technology and facilities. At the Organizing Conference of INFCE, the United States proposed the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank to provide assurances against the interruption of bilateral supplies and indicated that it was willing to contribute its technical capability and a part of its own enriched uranium. Further, the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 contemplates the establishment of an international nuclear fuel authority and, pending that, the creation of an interim stockpile of low-enriched uranium to which the United States and other supplier nations would make contributions for the purpose of assuring the continuity of nuclear fuel supplies to nations that “adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation” This means, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States, those that accept safeguards in respect to all their peaceful nuclear activities, do not acquire any nuclear explosive device, do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and place existing ones under effective international auspices and inspection.

As noted earlier, one of the INFCE working groups was entrusted with the task of examining the question of assurances of long-term supply. In its report, that working group stated that it was recognized that disagreements between supplier and consumer countries about changes in non-proliferation conditions of supply could give rise to particular concern about long-term security of supplies if they were associated with the interruption of export permits under existing contracts or the unilateral imposition of new conditions on them. A number of possible mechanisms were suggested for updating non-proliferation conditions when necessary. It was noted that assurance of supply could be enhanced if the adoption of such mechanisms were to be complemented by guarantees regarding continuity of supply during the process of renegotiations and various suggestions to that effect were discussed. To meet the concerns of consumer countries about differences in non-proliferation conditions of bilateral agreements, it was agreed that common approaches would have to be sought. At the same time, it was noted that some fundamental matters which should be considered in such common approaches were the object of divergent attitudes among exporting, as well as importing countries, although the principal and preferred mechanism for assured supply was the competitive market. Nevertheless, it was recognized that there was need for alternative mechanisms to provide protection against interruptions of supply. The possibilities considered included a uranium

emergency safety network based on a mixed consumer-producer pool concept, and an international nuclear fuel bank. A number of matters concerning the establishment and operation of such arrangements were recognized as requiring further consideration, in particular, the conditions for membership and access that should be imposed from the point of view of non-proliferation.

(b) *Regional nuclear fuel cycle centres*

The potential for misuse of plutonium recovered from spent fuel is one of the chief factors underlying interest in the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres. The concept envisages a multinational approach to the planning, establishment and operation of facilities necessary to service what is often referred to as the "back end" of the nuclear fuel cycle covering transport, storage, processing and recycling activities starting from the time the spent fuel leaves the reactor until the recycled fuel is returned to the reactor.

Regional nuclear fuel cycle centres were the subject of an IAEA study published in 1977.⁸ The Commission of the European Communities has also made a study of the concept, taking account of the particular situation of the countries of Western Europe. The subject has been further examined in INFCE as a possible institutional arrangement to strengthen the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle.

(c) *International storage of plutonium*

An international régime for plutonium storage in another institutional arrangement that has been the focus of attention for its contribution to minimizing potential proliferation risks in national stockpiling of separated plutonium.

In 1976, IAEA, whose statute provides a possible basis for plutonium storage under the Agency's authority, undertook a study on international plutonium management. The study was circulated in July 1978 and in December an expert group began meeting to prepare proposals for an international plutonium storage system within the provisions of the statute.

(d) *International storage of spent fuel*

Non-proliferation concerns also contribute to interest in the idea of international or multinational repositories for spent reactor fuel.

⁸ *Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres* (International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1977), STI/PUB/445.

At the Organizing Conference of INFCE, the United States offered to assume the responsibility for the storage and ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel from foreign as well as domestic reactors. As far as foreign spent fuel was concerned, the United States stated its willingness to accept limited quantities when that would contribute to fulfilling non-proliferation objectives.

The question of regional or international storage of spent fuel was included in the IAEA study on international management of plutonium mentioned above. The matter has also been examined in INFCE.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the deliberations on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy followed the pattern of discussions in previous years.⁹ For some countries, particularly Eastern European and Western, the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons once again constituted the frame of reference for addressing questions related to the dissemination of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes. In this context attention focused on the need for universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty or, failing that, the application of IAEA safeguards to all the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States, the technical improvement of IAEA safeguards, strict export policies to assure that nuclear transfers did not contribute to the development of a nuclear-weapon capability, and multinational arrangements to service the "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Thus, the Soviet Union held that genuinely successful and fruitful co-operation in the field of atomic energy in the interest of all countries could be ensured only on condition that the international community had a guarantee that such co-operation would not become a channel for the spread of nuclear weapons. In the same context, Poland stressed its participation in IAEA and the London Club. Australia and Canada commented on the stringent conditions which they imposed on their nuclear exports to guard against any non-peaceful use. The Netherlands considered that the introduction of the peaceful application of nuclear energy in a growing number of countries and the expansion of the number of sensitive nuclear installations called for additional safeguard measures because in its view the safeguards provided for in the non-proliferation Treaty did not offer sufficient guarantees. In its opinion, the measures urgently needed included, in particular, the application of the IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in all non-nuclear-weapon States and the further refinement and development of the IAEA safeguards system, among other things by the implementation of article XII

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th to 32nd, 52nd to 54th, 82nd and 97th meetings; ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee, 4th to 41st meetings, and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

of the Agency's statute on the storage of excess plutonium under the IAEA auspices. Other countries, including Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Ireland, Norway and Sweden, also urged the application of full-scope safeguards to the peaceful activities of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Developing countries, on the other hand, approached the matter from the standpoint of the importance of peaceful nuclear technology for scientific, technological and economic advancement and self-reliance. From that perspective, they again laid stress on the need to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, criticized the restrictions imposed by supplier countries on the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials as an obstacle to development and an ineffective approach to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and reiterated the view that too much emphasis was being placed on the regulatory activities of IAEA to the detriment of its functions in the area of technical assistance.

Romania, for instance, stressed the need to respect the principles of non-discrimination and free access to nuclear technology as the indispensable corollary to the absolute right of each State to undertake and develop programmes for the peaceful use of atomic energy, in keeping with its freely chosen priorities and needs. Without underestimating the importance of policies and actions aiming at the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Romania considered that non-proliferation concerns must not in any way affect the exercise of the inalienable right of all non-nuclear weapon States to carry out their own programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In the view of Pakistan, the proliferation of nuclear weapons arose basically from the security concerns of States and the tensions and conflicts that existed in many parts of the world and could not be prevented by the imposition of technological restraints and restrictions. Pointing out that by resolution 32/50 it had been affirmed that each State had the right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Pakistan commented that that right included, in particular, the advanced technologies for reprocessing nuclear fuel and breeder reactors which would permit the optimum use of fuel. It observed that in a situation where supplies of nuclear fuel were growing scarcer, where the price of uranium had increased eightfold in the last five years and was expected to rise further, the acquisition of a modicum of self-reliance had become indispensable for all countries with substantial nuclear energy requirements. Recalling that the report of IAEA indicated that most developed countries had embarked on projects such as reprocessing plants and breeder reactors in order to reduce the vulnerability of their countries to uncertain external fuel supplies and prices. Pakistan held that it was quite inequitable that some of those very countries should deny those technologies to the developing countries.

A number of developing countries, including India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania and Yugoslavia, called for an increase in the resources allocated to IAEA technical assistance activities. India, for example, expressed its dissatisfaction at the increasing stress being laid upon regulatory rather than

promotional aspects of the Agency's functions. It agreed that mankind had to be protected from the misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes, but pointed out that the Agency was financing limited non-proliferation activities rather than the comprehensive non-proliferation activities which were required to arrest the increase in nuclear weapons. India observed that expenditures on the safeguards activities of the Agency had been increasing steadily over the years without any corresponding increase in expenditures on technical assistance to developing countries and noted with concern that the Agency's budget for 1980 envisaged a reduction in development programmes, such as those concerning nuclear power reactors, food and agriculture and physical sciences. India also referred to the revised guidelines governing the provision of technical assistance approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. It noted its objections to the principles governing those guidelines on the grounds that they were not only discriminatory but also contrary to the IAEA statute. India considered that technical assistance should be free of restrictive and preferential preconditions. It pointed out that in view of the adoption of the revised guidelines, it had decided to forgo all technical assistance from the Agency. However, India would continue to participate in the Agency's technical assistance programme in the capacity of donor.

INFCE was generally viewed with favour, although different countries highlighted the significance of different aspects of the programme. A number of Western countries, including Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, emphasized in particular the contribution that the study could make to minimizing the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation. For instance, United States Secretary of State Vance, in his address to the General Assembly, pointing to developments in recent years that could bring impetus to the non-proliferation effort, mentioned the progress in INFCE which, in his view, could help to find safer ways to develop nuclear energy. Australia commented that useful ideas had emerged from the study which could lead to important new institutional barriers to proliferation, such as schemes for international plutonium storage and international spent-fuel management. It further noted that in connexion with the examination of supply assurances useful ideas had also been put forward on possible common approaches to non-proliferation conditions to apply in nuclear trade.

Yugoslavia expressed confidence that INFCE would contribute to the clarification and harmonization of many technical problems with respect to the utilization and development of nuclear energy and technology, particularly in the solution of many questions concerning spent fuel and radioactive waste and effluents produced at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, in the dismantling of old nuclear plants, and other problems regarding the safe use of nuclear power sources for peaceful purposes.

Looking beyond INFCE, some countries focused on the follow-up that would be required in the post-INFCE phase. The United Kingdom believed there was a pressing need for nuclear supplier and customer countries to come together to forge a new and reinforced consensus on nuclear trade for

the 1980s. In its view, the matters for discussion included improved supply assurances, improved safeguards to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear materials, the management of plutonium under international control and arrangements for spent fuel storage. Like the United Kingdom, Australia stressed the need for the widest possible agreement on an appropriate framework for the management and operation of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the further development, over time, of a consensus among both nuclear supplier countries and nuclear importing countries on the non-proliferation conditions which should apply to the world nuclear industry. In its view the best way, in the short term, to capitalize on and develop the positive consideration of those issues which marked the deliberations of INFCOE was to seek to establish "building blocks"

Examples of such "building blocks" included possible international arrangements for plutonium storage and spent-fuel management — under consideration in IAEA — and the possibility of rationalizing non-proliferation conditions, now applied bilaterally, on a multilateral basis. A number of countries, such as Japan, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States, were of the opinion that IAEA was the appropriate forum for follow-up action.

Austria also stressed that a consensus would have to be found in the years ahead, but held that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was in the first instance a political problem, and, therefore, needed first and foremost a political solution. In its opinion, the main elements of a political consensus were general agreement on the dangers of any form of proliferation both vertical and horizontal; the elaboration of generally acceptable non-discriminatory safeguards; an unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to engage in nuclear disarmament; and recognition of the legitimate interest of many industrialized and developing countries to take advantage, if they so wished, of the various possibilities offered by the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Developing countries generally believed that new efforts should be made to achieve an international consensus on a non-discriminatory and universal régime to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons based on the inalienable right of each State to develop or acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with its national priorities, interests and needs. Their views were expressed in connexion with the question of the convening of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations system, to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, which is discussed below.

As in the previous two years, the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session had before it two draft resolutions under the item "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" One of them led to the resolution adopted annually to take note of the Agency's report and was sponsored by Hungary and Saudi Arabia. When introducing the draft resolution, Saudi Arabia proposed the addition of a new operative paragraph to reflect the fact

that negotiations on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials had been successfully concluded a few days earlier and that the Convention would be open for signature and ratification on 3 March 1980. That addition made necessary the deletion of a reference to the negotiations on the Convention in another operative paragraph. Subsequently, India proposed an amendment to the revised draft resolution, calling for the inclusion, in the last preambular paragraph, of a specific reference to the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. India's suggestion was accepted by the sponsors and the draft, as amended, was adopted by consensus as resolution 34/11.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1978,

Taking note of the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 2 November 1979, which provides additional information on developments in the Agency's activities during 1979,

Conscious of the urgent need to develop all sources of energy, with a view to helping both developing and industrialized countries to mitigate the effects of the energy crisis, and bearing in mind the fact that nuclear energy remains the main readily available alternative to fossil fuel for the generation of electric power in the coming decades,

Considering that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be called upon to play an increasingly important role in making the benefits of nuclear power available to all nations, in particular the developing countries,

Conscious of the continuing need to protect mankind from the perils resulting from the misuse of nuclear energy and noting with appreciation in this connexion the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives,

Appreciating the assistance given by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which will be completed in February 1980,

Noting the excellent safety record of nuclear power generation but aware of the need to pay continuing attention to the question of nuclear safety and waste management,

Bearing in mind the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. *Notes with satisfaction* the continuing efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen further its activities in the field of technical assistance to developing countries and urges all States to help the Agency to achieve this objective by increasing their voluntary contributions;
3. *Notes with appreciation* that the negotiations on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials were concluded successfully at Vienna on 26 October 1979 with the signing of the final act and that the Convention will be opened for signature on 3 March 1980 at United Nations Headquarters in New York and at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna;
4. *Commends* the International Atomic Energy Agency for its continuing efforts to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world and notes with satisfaction the steady improvement of the Agency's safeguards system;
5. *Notes with appreciation* the special measures taken by the International Atomic Energy

Agency to expand and strengthen its programmes in nuclear safety, particularly aimed at helping Member States to develop their nuclear regulatory framework, to acquire adequate cadres of trained personnel and to deal effectively with any emergency that may occur;

6. *Urges* all States to support the endeavours of the International Atomic Energy Agency, pursuant to its statute, in furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear power, improving the effectiveness of safeguards and promoting nuclear safety;

7. *Notes with satisfaction:*

(a) The continuing work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in keeping under review the world's uranium resources, production and demand, the expansion of the Agency's International Nuclear Information System, the setting up of the International Tokamak Reactor workshops, intended to prepare a project for demonstrating the technical feasibility of generating electricity by nuclear fusion, and the assistance given by the Agency to Member States in assessing the role that nuclear power can play in their energy development;

(b) The progress made by the International Atomic Energy Agency towards establishing a system of international storage of plutonium and the action it has taken in regard to the international management of spent fuel;

8. *Notes* that the recommendation contained in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 33/3 of 2 November 1978 will be considered by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its twenty-third regular session and expresses the hope that the matter will be brought to an early conclusion;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

The other draft resolution concerned the question of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development and was submitted by a number of non-aligned countries — Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia — for the most part the same ones that had sponsored resolutions 32/50 and 33/4). In connexion with that question, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General¹⁰ prepared pursuant to resolution 33/4 which had requested the Secretary-General to urge all States to communicate to him their views, observations and suggestions on the convening, at an appropriate stage, of an international conference or conferences, under the auspices of the United Nations system, with a view to promoting international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 32/50. In accordance with a similar request contained in resolution 32/50, the Secretary-General had submitted a report¹¹ to the Assembly at its thirty-third session. Including the initial set of replies contained in that report, a total of 47 States expressed views on the question in 1978. In 1979, the replies followed the pattern established by those of the previous year.

In general, developed countries either did not see the need to convene such a conference in view of the many ongoing or planned activities in the

¹⁰ A/34/197 and Add.1 and 2.

¹¹ A/33/332. The report is discussed in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 272-273.

field, or believed that a decision on the matter should be taken in light of the results of those activities. Among the former were the USSR and the United States, which considered that the international conference on nuclear power and its fuel cycle, which IAEA planned to convene in Salzburg in 1981, would serve as an appropriate forum for the consideration of the matters raised in resolution 33/4. Among the latter were a number of Western countries, including Australia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Norway and Sweden. For example, Japan was of the opinion that the question of the advisability of convening a conference or conferences, as proposed in resolution 32/50, should not be examined before the conclusion of INFCE, the second Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Conference in order to make it possible to take into account the results of those activities. Some countries, including the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while sharing the view that a decision on the convening of the proposed conference should be deferred, considered that a conference under the auspices of the United Nations system might provide a framework for the search for a consensus in the post-INFCE phase. The United Kingdom, noting that there were a number of issues relating to nuclear trade and non-proliferation which would need further international discussion after the conclusion of INFCE and that it would be necessary in the coming months to consider how best that discussion should be organized, said that the holding of a special conference within the United Nations system, as envisaged in resolution 32/50, would be one option. At the same time it pointed out that other options should also be carefully considered before any final decision was reached, as it was desirable to secure the widest possible agreement on the issues involved.

Developed countries were generally of the opinion that, should an international conference be convened pursuant to resolution 32/50, it should be held under the auspices of IAEA.

The developing countries which submitted replies were virtually unanimous in favouring the holding of the international conference in question and some of them made detailed suggestions regarding its agenda. For example, Indonesia considered that the conference should deal, among other things, with the following: (a) measures guaranteeing access, without discrimination, for all States to technology concerned with the peaceful application of nuclear energy; (b) economic aspects of nuclear energy; (c) legal aspects of development and utilization; (d) questions relating to safety and environmental protection; (e) scientific and technical co-operation, including a substantial increase in aid and technical assistance both in quantity and quality, to the developing countries; (f) an improved safeguards system; and (g) the role of the United Nations and IAEA. In the view of Pakistan the conference should address itself, *inter alia*, to the following issues: (a) the global energy situation, with particular emphasis on the role of nuclear energy in meeting the shortfall between supply and demand; (b) co-operation among developing countries, as well as at regional levels, for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (c) transfer of nuclear technology, bearing in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions and article IV of the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which embodies an obligation to contribute to the fullest development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world; (d) the role of IAEA in promoting the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses in developing countries and evolving a universal and non-discriminatory system of safeguards against nuclear proliferation; (e) the question of assured and adequate supply of nuclear fuels to developing countries at a reasonable price; (f) problems relating to waste disposal, safety of operation and environmental questions; (g) establishment of a comprehensive programme of action embracing scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field; and (h) establishment of a fund within IAEA to finance the programme of action.

The draft resolution on the subject was introduced by Yugoslavia, which pointed out that the sponsors, in proposing that the conference should be held in the first half of 1982 at the latest, had been guided by several important and closely connected considerations. In the first place, they had borne in mind the fact that there already existed a political consensus regarding the need to hold such a conference. The holding of the conference would crown the numerous efforts exerted by the international community in its search for solutions to the complex problems imposed by the very development and application of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that connexion, they had borne in mind that the second Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty would be held in August 1980 and that, among other matters, it would consider the problems of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Yugoslavia explained, however, that the framework of the Treaty was narrower than that offered by the proposed conference and that, therefore, regardless of the possible contribution to be made by the Review Conference, it was necessary to search for frameworks that would embrace all countries and where their interests would be considered on a basis of equality. The sponsors also had had in mind the fact that INFCE would be completed in 1980 and that the results of the study would no doubt exert considerable influence on countries at the time of adoption of positions on the issues raised by their draft resolution on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The same applied to the forthcoming international conference of IAEA which was expected to meet in Salzburg in 1981. Each of those conferences would contribute towards the clarification of the problems to be dealt with by the proposed conference and, therefore, the sponsors considered that those gatherings would be, to a certain extent, preparatory phases or complementary actions of the international community, the results of which would converge at the proposed conference. In addition, they had in mind another very important element, namely, the problems which are closely linked with the use of nuclear energy in general. The holding of the proposed conference on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would also be of the utmost importance to efforts in the field of disarmament. Beyond that, the conference should meet the obvious need of the international community to find, on the basis of equality, solutions to achieve the unhampered development of nuclear

technology, to overcome the present system of monopoly, to eliminate restrictive practices and to establish a generally acceptable and genuinely democratic system of control over the use of nuclear technology. Yugoslavia concluded by saying that in the view of the sponsors of the draft resolution, IAEA had an important role to play in the preparations for and realization of the conference and that they expected that the Agency, as part of the United Nations system, would make its full contribution to that undertaking.

The draft resolution was subsequently revised and also sponsored by Indonesia, Mexico, Qatar and Romania. Apart from some changes in the pre-ambular part, the operative paragraph by which the Assembly would decide to convene the conference was modified as follows: (a) language was added to the effect that IAEA would fulfil its appropriate role; (b) concerning the expected date of the conference, the words "in the course of 1981 or early 1982" were replaced by the words "in principle by 1983"; and (c) in the context of a reference to resolution 32/50, the words "and to promote its objectives" were deleted. The revised draft resolution was adopted by consensus at the 82nd meeting of the Assembly as resolution 34/63.

A number of countries made statements to explain their positions. The United States reiterated the views it had expressed in its reply on the question of convening an international conference on peaceful nuclear co-operation for economic and social development, but said that after serious review and careful study it had agreed to join the consensus to decide, in principle, to convene the international conference in accordance with the terms of the resolution. The United States continued to believe, however, that the objectives of both resolution 32/50 and the proposed international conference would be most effectively promoted through utilizing IAEA. The Soviet Union noted that the text of the resolution provided that in the convening and holding of the conference, IAEA would fulfil its appropriate role. That was in line with the Soviet position that the principal role of IAEA, which organically combined the functions of promoting economic co-operation and of exercising control and inspection to ensure that that co-operation did not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, was the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union attached great importance to the role played in the field of nuclear co-operation by IAEA, and considered that, by the extensive use of the Agency's facilities in the holding of the conference, it would be possible to avoid a situation in which questions concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy might be taken artificially out of the context of the technical and economic aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and of the task of strengthening the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While it agreed in principle to the convening of the conference, the Soviet Union continued to believe that the most appropriate forum for discussing questions of the use of atomic energy for economic and social development would be provided by the conference already planned for 1981, under the aegis of IAEA, on the problems of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, a view shared by Hungary. Sweden, referring also to resolution 34/11, commented that the uncritical and unproblematic approach reflected in both resolutions did not satisfacto-

rily reflect the fact that general understanding of the complexity and the risks involved in the use of nuclear energy for all countries, developed and developing, had increased dramatically in recent years. It was willing to participate in the consensus regarding the holding of an international conference aimed at discussion of the modalities for international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy but said that further consideration of the matter should take fully into account the various problems raised by the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the consideration of those problems in other bodies or forums, as well as the necessity for further consideration of generally agreed objectives and modalities for the conference.

On behalf of the nine member States of the European Community, Ireland said that those States believed it essential that continued progress should be made in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, in that connexion, recognized that the role of the planned conference could be important in that it would provide a further basis for co-operation in that sphere. They also believed that the conference should be thoroughly and carefully prepared and stressed the importance of the widest possible participation in the conference. For their part the members of the European Community were ready to make a positive contribution at all stages in order to ensure its success. They attached importance to agreed and effective measures to prevent the danger of proliferation and, within that context, considered that the conference should draw fully on the expertise and experience which IAEA had acquired in the areas of its competence over the years, in order to develop research in, and production and utilization of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well as co-operation in that field. In their opinion, therefore, IAEA should play a fully appropriate role. Adding to the remarks of Ireland, the Netherlands said that while it fully endorsed the concept of the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it also stressed the need of effective measures to minimize the danger of proliferation. Recognizing that there seemed to exist tension between those two goals, the Netherlands considered that the tension could and should be removed with the active participation of all States involved. It recalled that when the first resolution on the conference was voted upon in 1977, the Netherlands had advocated a constructive dialogue. At the same time it had pointed to some basic shortcomings of resolution 32/50. Those same shortcomings caused the problems it still had with the present resolution. Moreover, the Netherlands doubted the wisdom of fixing a date at that stage for a conference on whose principles and objectives diverging views were still held, since it was not then possible to know at what stage a conference could play a positive role in the development of a new international consensus in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Resolution 34/63 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1978,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/4 of 2 November 1978,

Recognizing again the importance of enhancing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and of augmenting its resources for technical assistance to the developing countries in this field,

Having in mind the increasing significance of nuclear energy for economic development and, in particular, its important role in accelerating the development of the developing countries,

Recalling the principles and provisions of its resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977 concerning international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries,

Recalling the contents of the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Taking note of the support of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, for the convening of an international conference for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

1. *Decides* to convene the International Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy under the auspices of the United Nations system, with the International Atomic Energy Agency fulfilling its appropriate role, in principle by 1983, in accordance with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 32/50;

2. *Invites* all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda, date and duration of the Conference and other matters relevant to its preparation;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to urge all States to communicate to him their views on the matters referred to in paragraph 2 above and requests him to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Consideration by the General Conference of IAEA, 1979

The various matters examined above were also discussed at the General Conference of IAEA which this year was held from 4 to 10 December in New Delhi, after the General Assembly had concluded its consideration of the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In general, the debate proceeded along the lines of the discussion in the General Assembly. A development worthy of note was that, in line with the recommendation of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the Group of 77 for the first time acted as such in the IAEA framework.

Emphasis on the potential dangers posed by international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy marked the comments of Eastern European and Western countries. In that context, those countries again stressed the importance of the technical improvement of IAEA safeguards and called for their application to all the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States. Some of them noted with concern that according to the Agency's annual report,¹² the number of States in which unsafeguarded fa-

¹² See International Atomic Energy, *The Annual Report for 1978* (GC(XXIII) 610), paras. 6-10.

cilities were in operation might increase rather than decline in the years ahead.

Developing countries, for their part, continued to emphasize the importance of nuclear power as the most viable alternative source of energy in the coming decades and the consequent need to promote the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes. They invariably pointed to the imbalance that existed between the funds available for technical assistance and those devoted to safeguards activities. It was stressed that whereas the former have been financed by voluntary contributions, the latter were funded from the Agency's regular budget. It may be noted that the Agency's budget was approved only after the adoption of a resolution requesting the Board of Governors to study all possible effective means of financing technical assistance.

In addition, a number of developing countries, among them Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Zambia, held that no distinction should be made in the provision of technical assistance between parties and non-parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. India and Pakistan also criticized a tendency of certain States to accept as inspectors only nationals of States parties to the Treaty. Beyond that, India¹³ commented on the application of safeguards to certain nuclear civilian activities of some nuclear-weapon States, which in its view was largely a cosmetic measure which failed completely to mitigate the discrimination inherent in the non-proliferation Treaty safeguards régime. India believed that there was a danger that the Agency would miss the wood for the trees if it continued to engage in such limited safeguards activities which served no realistic purpose.

Some countries commented on ongoing or planned programmes for plutonium processing and recycling and/or breeder reactors. The Soviet Union¹⁴ pointed out that there had been no change in its strategy, which consisted of a combination of thermal and fast nuclear power stations and the radiochemical reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium and unused uranium for recycling. The United Kingdom¹⁵ noted that the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay had continued to operate and had proved to be a development facility of considerable flexibility. A series of experiments had demonstrated the ability of the fast reactor to withstand total power loss and had enhanced existing confidence in the safety of the system. The fuel had performed particularly well and the designers were confident that it would withstand the requirements of a commercial reactor. In September, the Prime Minister had formally opened the fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant at Dounreay. That plant was now reprocessing the enriched uranium fuel from the first Dounreay fast reactor, which had been shut down in 1977, and would then go on to reprocess the plutonium fuel from the prototype fast reactor. That would represent a very significant step towards closing the fast reactor fuel

¹³ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.215, para. 68.

¹⁴ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.213, para. 17.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 80-83.

cycle. It was the United Kingdom's policy to reprocess irradiated fuel from thermal reactors as well as fast reactors on the grounds of both efficient energy usage and the efficient management of radioactive waste. Design and development work on the reprocessing plant at Windscale was progressing rapidly and contracts had been secured for the full rated capacity of the plant. Japan¹⁶ pointed out that, aware of the limits of uranium resources, it was striving to make the best use of them and was working on an advanced thermal reactor and a fast breeder reactor.

On the other hand, the United States¹⁷ observed that in view of the possibility of improving fuel utilization in thermal reactors, plutonium recycling appeared unnecessary, only marginally economic and imprudent for the time being from the standpoint of non-proliferation. Although some countries were proceeding with breeder reactor research and development, for which reprocessing was required, the United States believed that there were reasons, from both the economic and non-proliferation points of view, for limiting the number of reprocessing plants to a few large-scale facilities and gearing reprocessing capacity to the short-term plutonium demand for research and development on advanced reactors. Furthermore, it would become extremely important to ensure that the resultant plutonium was subject to rigorous international control. In the United States it was thought that breeder reactors were likely to be economically viable only in those countries which had an advanced infrastructure and a distribution grid of suitable size. In the opinion of the United States that did not mean that the use of breeders must be limited to certain countries at the expense of others, but there would be time, before selecting an advanced technology, to look at the various options and modernize the international non-proliferation arrangements.

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation figured prominently in the debate. A large number of countries commended the positive contribution that the evaluation would make to the consideration of outstanding issues relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the years ahead, although there were differing assessments of the results achieved.

Australia¹⁸ considered that INFCE had been a most productive exercise and had provided a sound basis for achieving greater stability and predictability in peaceful nuclear co-operation through the gradual development of an international consensus. A measure of common agreement had emerged in INFCE on the problems associated with the various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of Australia, one important result already apparent was the greater attention which possible new institutional barriers to proliferation were receiving. Some countries, such as France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, were of the opinion that the evaluation had shown that no single criterion, including proliferation resistance, could be applied in deciding for or against a particular fuel cycle and that the strategies to be adopted had to vary from country to country.

¹⁶ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.212, para. 6.

¹⁷ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.210, paras. 13-15.

¹⁸ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.213, paras. 114-115.

Considerable attention was devoted to the question of follow-up action. Many countries emphasized the importance of IAEA's role in the post-INFCE phase. The Director General of IAEA, in his statement to the General Conference,¹⁹ commented that two concrete projects had emerged from INFCE, namely, consultations intended to develop a system of international plutonium storage under the auspices of the Agency in implementation of article XII.A.5 of the statute and a study on international spent fuel management. He observed that there were, however, still problems requiring attention, especially the problem of constructing an internationally acceptable framework of assured supplies of nuclear fuel and equipment under adequate safeguards. He suggested that the Board of Governors might wish to establish a committee comprising the whole membership of the Agency and entrusted with the task of developing a set of guidelines which would provide adequate assurance of continued supply of nuclear material, and also ensure the willingness of the recipient States to accept the IAEA safeguards régime and to adhere strictly to a non-proliferation policy. He held that it was legitimate for a country — in particular a developing country — which invested resources of the order of one billion dollars in a nuclear power plant and was prepared to accept the non-proliferation Treaty or comparable safeguards to expect an uninterrupted supply of fuel during the lifetime of the plant. He believed that although it was certainly an ambitious task to attempt to secure the long-term provision of nuclear fuel and fuel-cycle services, because of the long lead time required to increase capacity and the very high investment costs for nuclear power, such an endeavour was desirable. In his opinion, success in achieving international agreement in that area would be another example of the progressive role of nuclear energy in shaping international relations in the domain of technology.

Some countries, such as Japan, the Netherlands and Yugoslavia, welcomed the Director General's suggestion concerning assurance of supplies. Many other countries, developing as well as developed, pointed to the importance of that question, with some, particularly a number of major suppliers, stressing also the importance of non-proliferation conditions of supply.

Other multinational arrangements were also a subject of interest. The Soviet Union²⁰ considered that among measures aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation régime, the Agency's programme for development of the concept of international or regional nuclear fuel cycle centres deserved serious attention. It pointed out that it was willing to assist in setting up such centres on the basis of the experience acquired in the USSR and the technical facilities that were available. Various countries, among them Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom, favoured the development of an international plutonium storage régime. Italy,²¹ stating that it was currently contributing to the studies concerning international plutonium storage and spent fuel management, commented that the political, legal and economic prob-

¹⁹ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.209, paras. 78-81.

²⁰ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.213, paras. 11-12.

²¹ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.214, para. 23.

lems involved could be solved only with the assistance of all concerned. It was prepared to consider the outcome of the activities undertaken with respect to plutonium storage in a spirit of co-operation, provided that the new mechanism was objective, reliable and non-discriminatory. Yugoslavia²² considered that in seeking a solution to the problem of plutonium and spent fuel storage, the Agency should take into account the right of States to assured supplies of fuel and equipment. In that connexion, it supported the Director General's proposal. The Republic of Korea²³ felt that it was necessary to establish a multinational reprocessing centre which would serve the needs of the participant countries until national centres were one day created. It urged the Agency's secretariat to continue its study of the establishment of such a centre, which would be of benefit to both the developing countries and the industrialized countries from the point of view of non-proliferation.

Some countries attached importance to technical measures to lessen the risks of nuclear-weapon proliferation, which had been discussed in INFCE. Among them, the Federal Republic of Germany²⁴ pointed out that in the course of the evaluation, a variety of measures had been identified and it now seemed necessary to move from the stage of study to that of technical development and demonstration, for example with respect to the use of low-enriched fuel for research reactors and modifications of reprocessing technologies. In its opinion, when discussing new technical solutions which would make it possible to use nuclear energy to satisfy demand while minimizing proliferation risks, it was not only necessary to determine whether those solutions were technically feasible but also to demonstrate to users that they conformed to their needs. Some other countries, for instance, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, felt that the evaluation had shown that technical measures alone could not solve the basic questions at issue. The Netherlands²⁵ held that measures of a more political nature were needed if nuclear energy was to be used for peaceful purposes without increasing the danger of proliferation.

The Republic of Korea and Yugoslavia also stressed that political solutions were necessary to harmonize the requirements of both supplier and recipient countries. In that context, Yugoslavia²⁶ noted with satisfaction that an international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be held under the auspices of the United Nations. In its view such a conference would make it possible to take account of the aspirations of the developing countries.

²² See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.210, para. 62.

²³ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.212, para. 41.

²⁴ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.210, para. 51.

²⁵ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.215, para. 38.

²⁶ See IAEA document GC(XXIII)/OR.210, para. 60; it states, in part. ". . . The question of the holding of an international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was considered at the IAEA General Conference along the lines of the discussion in the General Assembly."

Conclusion

Divergent approaches continue to mark the consideration of the questions of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is clear that there is general recognition of the pressing need for an international consensus in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But, equally clear, there are differences as to the direction in which the international community should move to arrive at such a consensus.

The potential benefits and dangers of the "plutonium economy" continue to be matters of controversy, although the differences between the United States and other developed countries concerning breeder reactors seem to have been narrowed.

The major suppliers remain convinced that stringent export policies must govern the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes to ensure that international co-operation does not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, a number of Western countries lay emphasis on strengthening the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle through technical measures and the development of institutional arrangements to limit the dissemination of "sensitive" technologies and facilities and of weapons-grade materials. Developing countries, on the other hand, consider that the principles of non-discrimination and unrestricted access to nuclear technology and the right of all countries to develop peaceful nuclear programmes in the light of their interests, needs and priorities constitute the foundations on which the new international consensus must be built. Those countries, particularly the non-aligned, are now attaching increasing importance to the possibilities offered by mutual assistance, self-reliance and co-ordinated action in the United Nations and other international organizations, such as IAEA. Furthermore, they tend to stress the political nature of the problems involved and the consequent need to inject a political dimension into the search for a consensus.

In 1979, as INFCE was coming to its end, attention turned to the question of ways and means by which it might be possible in the years ahead to reconcile the different interests that are at stake to the satisfaction of all concerned. A number of conferences will be held in the coming years which, together with the deliberations in the United Nations and IAEA, will provide opportunities for further discussions. The process of consensus-building will of necessity be lengthy and difficult and will require negotiations at various levels, bilateral as well as multilateral. The obstacles lying in the way of agreement are formidable, for a wide range of countries in varying situations are concerned and the questions at issue have a direct bearing on such fundamental matters as the spread of nuclear-weapon capabilities, energy security, scientific and technological self-reliance and economic development.

CHAPTER XIV

IAEA safeguards and related activities

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN PROVIDED by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It deals primarily with safeguards and other activities of the Agency during 1979 and describes the situation existing as of the end of the year. It should be noted, however, that IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and other equipment or information for military and other prohibited activities have been evolving almost since the establishment of the Agency in 1956. Accordingly, the chapter also describes briefly the authority and methodology involved in the Agency's functions.

Authority for IAEA safeguards, objectives, criteria, practical application

Authority for IAEA safeguards

Article III.5 of the IAEA statute authorizes the Agency:

To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy.

States agree to accept safeguards through:

(a) "Project agreements" for the supply of specific materials, equipment and facilities made available by or through the IAEA;

(b) "Safeguards transfer agreements" in which States transfer to the IAEA their safeguards responsibilities set forth in their co-operation agreement;

(c) "Unilateral submissions" by a State to IAEA safeguards of certain facilities, nuclear material or all the State's nuclear activities; or

(d) Agreements pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (non-proliferation Treaty), or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The IAEA safeguards system is laid down in two IAEA documents, INF-CIRC/66/Rev.2 and INFCIRC/153. The first document forms the basis for project agreements, transfer agreements and unilateral submission agreements under which equipment, facilities, nuclear material and/or other material and information are subject to safeguards. The second document forms the basis for all agreements concluded pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of a State is subject to safeguards.

Objectives and criteria

The basic undertaking by the State in the INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements is to

... accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices.

The objectives of safeguards are further defined in those agreements to be

... timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices or for purpose unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

The notions "timely detection" and "significant quantities" have been quantified in the course of the implementation of safeguards agreements. Moreover, the essential effectiveness parameters "significant quantity" and "detection time" have been discussed by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), which has confirmed on a preliminary basis values used by the secretariat of IAEA for quantities of safeguards significance.

In addition to these general guidelines for timeliness and significant quantities, IAEA must strive for a safeguards system which has a certain probability of meeting its goals. The degree of probability with which these goals are to be met must itself be defined. Neither INF-CIRC/66/Rev.2 nor INFCIRC/153 specifically mentions the concept of degree of certitude of detection, but IAEA has interpreted those documents as implicitly embodying that concept. The *a priori* probability of detection which is sought is usually 90 per cent or higher and is most often 95 per cent.

Practical application

The existence of a domestic accountancy and control system is a prerequisite to the application of efficient international safeguards but cannot replace the

latter. The Agency takes due account of the technical effectiveness of the State's system in performing its verification. Agreements of the INFCIRC/153 type require that "the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards"

Agency verification is accomplished by two basic means; (a) material accountability and (b) containment and surveillance.

IAEA inspection activities include examining pertinent records; making independent measurements on safeguarded nuclear material, using IAEA equipment, as well as the State's or operator's equipment and verifying its proper functioning, calibration and procedures; obtaining samples and ensuring their proper collection, treatment, handling and shipping; using and servicing IAEA surveillance equipment; and affixing, inspecting and removing IAEA seals.

In practice, the above procedures are continually refined in the field to achieve the IAEA goal of safeguards which are credible, effective and unobtrusive.

Recent developments

The potential for the further spread of nuclear-explosive capacity is, of course, strongest where there are unsafeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing or processing significant quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Thus, two goals should be the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material in all facilities in all non-nuclear-weapon States, and the encouragement of universal ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty and full application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Safeguards coverage under the non-proliferation Treaty

As of 31 December 1979, non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements had entered into force for 67 of the 109 non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty at that time. The non-nuclear-weapon States having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty are shown in annex I to this chapter. For 42 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the relevant safeguards agreements had not yet entered into force; however, 39 of those States had no significant nuclear activities. Thus there were three non-nuclear-weapon States, including Indonesia and Venezuela, with significant nuclear activities which had not yet completed the procedures required for bringing their agreements with the Agency into force. However, all nuclear activities of which the Agency was aware in the States concerned were covered by safeguards under previous agreements.

In the nuclear-weapon States, safeguards agreements have been negotiated pursuant to offers made by the United Kingdom and the United States for the Agency to apply safeguards to all nuclear installations except those related to national security.

Although not a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, a similar agreement has been negotiated with France, pursuant to which selected facilities of the nuclear-fuel cycle would be submitted to safeguards.

Agreements providing for safeguards other than those in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty

By the end of 1979, the Agency was applying safeguards in 11 non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty but which had substantial nuclear activities, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain and Turkey.¹ In seven of the 11 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Turkey), all substantial nuclear activities of which the Agency was aware were covered by a mosaic of individual safeguard agreements. For a complete list of the status of the agreements concerned as of 31 December 1979, see annex II to this chapter.

Safeguards agreements concluded under the Treaty of Tlatelolco

It should be recalled that article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco requires States parties to that Treaty to enter into full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency. The terms of the safeguards agreement under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are practically identical to those of non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements, with some variations to take account of the different terms of both Treaties. States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are under an obligation to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. The material contained in INFCIRC/153, which was developed for the situation of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, was deemed more suitable for use in that context than INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 and the safeguards agreements were concluded on that basis. One State has concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Related activities

International plutonium storage

For many years plutonium has been separated for peaceful uses in the nuclear-fuel cycle, and significant stocks of it already exist, albeit in a limited

¹ Turkey became a party to the non-proliferation Treaty on 17 April 1980.

number of States. As States work towards fast-reactor programmes, the separation of plutonium will inevitably not be matched by immediate requirements. Plutonium may have to be stockpiled, either under national or international auspices. The Agency has, therefore, been studying the possibility of introducing a system of international plutonium storage in accordance with article XII.A.5 of its statute. A first study was circulated to all member States in July 1978, and an Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, consisting, at present, of experts from 25 countries, was established in December 1975. The Expert Group is now approaching agreement on principles and procedures for the deposit and release of plutonium and on the practical aspects of a scheme. It seems likely that the study will produce proposals for a scheme which would contribute to internationally shared objectives, both to ease the problems of assurance of supply and to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

Spent-fuel management

The subject of international co-operation in spent-fuel management has also gained importance during recent years. Spent-fuel storage will be needed, regardless of how a country chooses to structure the back end of its nuclear-fuel cycle. For the foreseeable future a shortage of both reprocessing capacity and spent fuel-disposal capability will dictate that large quantities of spent fuel be placed in storage. In the near term, the problem could be handled by expansion of capacity at existing facilities and by further national storage facilities. But for the longer term, multinational co-operation in spent-fuel management might offer advantages over purely national solutions, particularly in the case of those countries that may have problems in the economic and technical management of spent fuel.

IAEA has established an Expert Group to examine the technical/economic as well as the institutional issues involved in the management of spent fuel. Based on the progress made to date, it is likely that this project will continue through 1981 and that a final report can be completed by the end of that year.

Physical protection of nuclear material

For some time, there has been growing recognition of the need for an appropriate multilateral international convention on physical protection. While physical protection of nuclear material is not part of IAEA safeguards, some physical protection and safeguards measures may overlap, for example, containment and surveillance. In 1977, the Agency published recommendations prepared by experts from member States on the physical protection of nuclear material. Since that time, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which, among other things, establishes levels of physical

protection to apply to nuclear material in international transport, has been concluded.² Parties to the Convention will co-operate in preventive measures and information exchange with regard to such acts as theft, sabotage and extortion involving nuclear material.

Outlook

Today, more than 86 per cent of the nuclear facilities in all the non-nuclear-weapon States are under non-proliferation Treaty safeguards, and more than 11 per cent are under non-Treaty safeguards. Moreover, the safeguarded facilities include almost all the more complex and sophisticated facilities in the countries concerned. Universalization of the non-proliferation Treaty régime to include those countries that have not yet accepted the Treaty would, therefore, add relatively little to the technical safeguards responsibilities of the Agency. In fact, in most cases it would merely represent a transition from non-Treaty to Treaty safeguards. The few unsafeguarded plants, although potentially of great proliferation significance, would entail only a very minor additional effort to be safeguarded.

The future growth and development of the safeguards operation, therefore, depends, first, on expanding its resources so as to enable it fully to achieve the targets of effective safeguards or existing plants, and, second, on the future development of nuclear energy in the countries parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

The non-proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of all non-proliferation efforts. Another important point is that all States should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy — or, in other words, there must be adequate assurances of supply of nuclear materials for those nations that have agreed to submit all their nuclear activities to full international control. Concerns of this kind will probably underlie many of the discussions to be held at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be held in Geneva from 11 August to 5 September 1980, which could also give added impetus to negotiations on the basis of mutually acceptable restraints in building the various blocks necessary to institutionalize a world-wide non-proliferation régime.

² The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was opened for signature on 3 March 1980.

ANNEX I

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty

The following 67 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty:^a

Afghanistan	Hungary	New Zealand
Australia	Iceland	Nicaragua
Austria	Iran	Norway
Belgium	Iraq	Paraguay
Bulgaria	Ireland	Peru
Canada	Italy	Philippines
Costa Rica	Jamaica	Poland
Cyprus	Japan	Portugal
Czechoslovakia	Jordan	Republic of Korea
Denmark	Lebanon	Romania
Dominican Republic	Lesotho	Samoa
Ecuador	Liechtenstein	Singapore
El Salvador	Luxembourg	Sudan
Ethiopia	Madagascar	Suriname
Fiji	Malaysia	Swaziland
Finland	Maldives	Sweden
Gambia	Mauritius	Switzerland
German Democratic Republic	Mexico	Thailand
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mongolia	Uruguay
Ghana	Morocco	Viet Nam
Greece	Nepal	Yugoslavia
Holy See	Netherlands	Zaire
Honduras		

^a In 34 cases, the application of safeguards has been held in abeyance because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or plant requiring the application of safeguards.

ANNEX II

Agreements providing for safeguards, other than those in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty, approved by the Board as of 31 December 1979

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA docu- ment No.. INF/CIRC</i>
<i>Bilateral agreements</i>			
<i>(a) Project agreements</i>			
Argentina	Siemens SUR-100	13 March 1970	143
	RAEP Reactor	2 December 1964	62
Chile	Herald Reactor	19 December 1969	137
Finland ^b	FIR-1 Reactor	30 December 1960	24
	FINN sub-critical assembly	30 July 1963	53
Greece ^b	GRR-1 Reactor	1 March 1972	163
Indonesia	Additional core-load for TRIGA Reactor	19 December 1969	136
Iran ^b	UTRR Reactor	10 May 1967	97
Japan ^b	JRR-3	24 March 1959	3
Mexico ^b	TRIGA-III Reactor	18 December 1963	52
	Siemens SUR-100	21 December 1971	162
	Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant	12 February 1974	203
Pakistan	PRR Reactor	5 March 1962	34
	Booster rods for KANUPP	17 June 1968	116
Peru ^c	Research Reactor and fuel therefor	9 May 1978	266
Philippines ^b	PRR-1 Reactor	28 September 1966	88
Romania ^b	TRIGA Reactor	30 March 1973	206
Spain	Coral I Reactor	23 June 1967	99
Turkey	Sub-critical assembly	17 May 1974	212
Uruguay ^b	URR Reactor	24 September 1965	67
Venezuela	RV-1 Reactor	7 November 1975	238
Viet Nam ^b	VNR-1 Reactor	16 October 1967	106
Yugoslavia ^b	TRIGA-II	4 October 1961	32
	KRSKO Nuclear Power Plant	14 June 1974	213
Zaire ^b	TRICO Reactor	27 June 1962	37
<i>(b) Unilateral submissions</i>			
Argentina	Atucha Power Reactor Facility	3 October 1972	168
	Nuclear material	23 October 1973	202
	Embalse Power Reactor Facility	6 December 1974	224
	Equipment	22 July 1977	250
	Nuclear material, material, equipment and facilities	22 July 1977	251
Chile	Nuclear material	31 December 1974	256
China, Republic of	Taiwan Research Reactor Facility	13 October 1969	133
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Research Reactor and nuclear material for this reactor	20 July 1977	252

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No., INF/CIRC</i>
India	Nuclear material, material and facilities	17 November 1977	260
Pakistan	Nuclear material	2 March 1977	248
Spain	Nuclear material	19 November 1974	218
	Nuclear material	18 June 1975	221
Switzerland	Nuclear material		
United Kingdom	Nuclear material	14 December 1972	175
<i>(c) Tlatelolco Treaty</i>			
Colombia	All nuclear material		
Mexico ^b	All nuclear material, equipment and facilities	6 September 1968	118
Panama	All nuclear material		
<i>(d) Agreements concluded with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary offers</i>			
France	Nuclear material in facilities submitted to safeguards		
United Kingdom	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	14 August 1978	263
United States	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency		
<i>Trilateral agreements</i>			
(While the Agency is a party to each of the following agreements, the list only mentions the States parties to them.)			
Argentina/United States of America		25 July 1969	130
Australia ^b /United States of America		26 September 1966	91
Austria ^b /United States of America		24 January 1970	152
Brazil/Germany, Federal Republic of ^b		26 February 1976	237
Brazil/United States of America		20 September 1972	110
China, Republic of/United States of America		6 December 1971	158
Colombia/United States of America		9 December 1979	144
India/Canada ^b		30 September 1971	211
India/United States of America		27 January 1971	154
Indonesia/United States of America		6 December 1967	109
Iran ^b /United States of America		20 August 1969	127
Israel/United States of America		4 April 1975	249
Japan ^b /Canada ^b		12 November 1969	85
Japan ^b /France		22 September 1972	171
Japan/United States of America		10 July 1968	119
Japan ^b /United Kingdom		15 October 1968	125
Japan ^b /Australia ^b		28 July 1972	170
Korea, Republic of/United States of America		19 March 1973	111
Korea, Republic of ^b /France		22 September 1975	233

<i>Parties^a</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No., INFCIRC</i>
Pakistan/Canada	17 October 1969	135
Pakistan/France	18 March 1976	239
Philippines ^b /United States of America	19 July 1968	120
Portugal/United States of America	19 July 1969	131
South Africa/United States of America	28 June 1974	98
South Africa/France	5 January 1977	244
Spain/United States of America	28 June 1974	92
Spain/Canada ^b	10 February 1977	247
Sweden ^b /United States of America	1 March 1972	165
Switzerland/United States of America	28 February 1972	161
Turkey/United States of America	5 June 1969	123
Venezuela/United States of America	27 March 1968	122

^a An entry in this column does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariat of IAEA concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is reconsidering adherence to the commitments of the former Administration under international agreements.

^b Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended, as the State has concluded an agreement in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^c The requirement for the application of safeguards under this agreement was satisfied by the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement concluded by Peru in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty.

PART THREE

Prohibition or restriction of use of other weapons

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Introduction

ALL WEAPONS OF WAR ARE DESTRUCTIVE OF HUMAN LIFE, but chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons stand in a class of their own as armaments designed solely to affect living matter. The idea of bacteriological (biological) weapons being used deliberately to spread disease generates a sense of horror. The fact that certain chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents are potentially unconfined in their effects, both in space and time, and that their large scale use could conceivably have deleterious and irreversible effects on the balance of nature adds to the sense of insecurity and tension which the existence of those classes of weapons engenders. The complete prohibition and elimination of the poisonous and toxic weapons of warfare has been an important goal of the international community for many years.

Generally speaking, chemical agents of warfare are taken to be chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their toxic effects on man, animals and plants. Bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare are living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective materials derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.

The most significant result of the technical development and refinement of such agents is the great variety of injurious effects which they can induce and the consequent increase in the number and types of situations in which there might be a temptation to use them for military purposes.

The subject of chemical and biological warfare was discussed in the 1950s and early 1960s as one aspect of various comprehensive disarmament proposals. In 1968 the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) recommended that a study be undertaken on the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. At its twenty-third session the same year, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2454 A (XXIII) by which it requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a concise report on the subject. The following year, the report, entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Bio-*

logical) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use,¹ was submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly and discussed by ENDC (later the CCD) during its session the same year.

Among the issues that long impeded progress on the question was whether chemical and biological weapons should be considered jointly. In 1969, the United Kingdom submitted to ENDC a draft convention² which dealt with the elimination of biological weapons, as distinct from chemical weapons. The same year, a draft convention which concerned both chemical and biological weapons was proposed by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries³ and considered by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union contended that both types of weapons should continue to be considered jointly. A separate biological weapons convention, it argued, might only result in an intensification of the chemical arms race. The United States, supporting the position of the United Kingdom, held that biological weapons presented less intractable problems, and therefore an agreement on banning them should not be delayed pending an agreement on reliable prohibition of chemical weapons.

In 1971, agreement on separating the two issues was reached when the Eastern European States consented in the CCD to the conclusion, as a first step, of a separate convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Separate but identical drafts of such a convention were submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR and by the United States.⁴ After considerable discussion in the Committee, consensus was reached on a revised text, which was annexed to the reports of the CCD.⁵ On 16 December 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2826 (XXVI), to which was annexed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and in which it commended the Convention. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

Since 1971, the question of chemical weapons has been discussed as a separate issue. The discussions have involved a number of highly complex issues. Briefly, the principal questions have been the scope of a prohibition, i.e., whether it should be comprehensive or initially of a partial nature; the activities that should be banned and the agents that would be subject to prohibition; and the question of verification.

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 20.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971*, document DC/234, annex C, sects. 19 and 20 respectively.

⁵ *Ibid.*, document DC/234, annex A.

As to the question of scope, a comprehensive prohibition would extend the ban to all chemical means of warfare from the stage of their development up to their use. In addition, in the comprehensive approach, not only chemical weapons themselves would be banned, but also the chemical agents they make use of and their means of delivery. In the gradual approach, the ban would initially be limited, for instance, to lethal chemical agents that can be identified on the basis of agreed criteria. The ban would be extended, by a series of carefully defined steps, so as to achieve eventually a comprehensive prohibition.

With regard to the activities to be prohibited, the issue was whether the ban should extend to development, production and stockpiling or only to one or some of those activities, and whether one or more of those activities should be banned with respect only to the weapons themselves or also with respect to the chemical agents used in them. An important difficulty is posed by the fact that chemical substances, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, may serve more than one purpose, thus necessitating agreement on criteria for determining activities and substances to be prohibited.

As to verification, various arrangements have been proposed, in particular the use of national means, combined with international monitoring measures of varying degrees of intensity, including on-site inspection.

From 1972 to 1978, a number of proposals and working papers were considered by the CCD, including a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction⁶ by the Eastern European members of the CCD in 1972; a working paper calling for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons,⁷ by 10 non-aligned States members of the CCD in 1973; a draft convention by Japan⁸ in 1974, and a working paper⁹ in 1976; and a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction by the United Kingdom¹⁰ in 1976. Also, since 1971, the General Assembly has each year adopted a resolution¹¹ by which it has expressed the need to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

On 3 July 1974,¹² the Soviet Union and the United States announced to

⁶ *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1972, document CCD/361.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9141)*, document CCD/400.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627), annex II, document CCD/420.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), annex III, document CCD/515.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document CCD/512.

¹¹ Resolutions 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972; 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974; 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/65 of 10 December 1976; 32/77 of 12 December 1977; 33/59 of 14 December 1978; and 34/72 of 11 December 1979.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

the CCD that they had agreed in principle to consider a joint initiative with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention, dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. Since then, bilateral negotiations on the question have been held between the two Powers in an effort to reach agreement on a text of such a convention for submission to the CCD.

In 1978, the General Assembly, in the Final Document¹³ which it adopted at its tenth special session in 1978, stated that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently it considered the conclusion of a convention to that end as one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

A. Chemical weapons

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

The question of chemical weapons was taken up by the Disarmament Commission in its general exchange of views,¹⁴ with representatives of virtually all States looking upon the question as very important and advocating early conclusion of a treaty banning such weapons. The Soviet Union stressed that it was extremely important to prohibit chemical weapons. China said that all chemical and biological weapons should be completely prohibited and totally destroyed; pending attainment of that goal, all States should unequivocally undertake not to use any chemical or biological weapons. The German Democratic Republic held that weapons such as chemical weapons were fraught with a serious threat and it was important to ensure that success in the field of nuclear disarmament was not nullified as a result of the invention of new weapon systems. Other delegations calling for an early completion of an agreement on chemical weapons included the Byelorussian SSR, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Sweden and the Ukrainian SSR.

Japan, also calling for the early realization of an agreement, hoped that such an instrument would not hamper peaceful industrial activities. Ireland held that action was needed now to halt the development and deployment of such weapons and, in that regard, placed the primary responsibility with the Powers which had the capacity to build such weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the fact that the international dialogue on the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons had continued at various levels and hoped that the chemical weapons workshops held in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic had contributed to finding solutions to the problem of an adequate system of verification by showing, *inter alia*, that

¹³ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), paras. 21 and 75.

¹⁴ See A/CN.10/PV.10-17 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22/corrigendum.

verification through on-site inspection of civil production was possible without hampering the interests of the chemical industry.

On 8 June 1979, the Disarmament Commission adopted, by consensus, its report to the General Assembly¹⁵ containing its recommendations relating to the elements of a comprehensive programme on disarmament. Among the disarmament measures recommended is an element entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction" as the first item under the heading "Other weapons of mass destruction"

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

In pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 33/59 A and 33/71 H, the Committee on Disarmament continued its efforts towards elaborating an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As indicated in its report to the General Assembly¹⁶ and by its programme of work and the number of informal meetings and consultations held, the consideration of the item became one of the major substantive issues of the Committee's deliberations in 1979. The discussions ranged from the consideration of procedural arrangements for negotiations to such substantive issues as the scope of a ban, the agents to be prohibited, and the verification of compliance as well as possible provisions of a future convention on the subject. The urgency and importance of negotiating an international convention on chemical weapons was stressed by all members of the Committee who participated in the discussions. France expressed the view, shared by other delegations, that, given the present political and strategic situation, the dictates of balance and security, and the technical facts, chemical disarmament might offer the best chance for progress and for that reason priority should be given to the conclusion of a convention on the subject. The view of Poland, that the question brooked no further delay, was echoed by a number of delegations. Several of them, for instance the Federal Republic of Germany, stated that they had every interest in a chemical weapons convention in view of their geostrategic positions.

Sweden felt strongly that the point had been reached where negotiations in a concrete way could be started in the Committee without hampering the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Czechoslovakia stated that negotiations on chemical weapons had reached a stage where the Committee might start discussing the outlines of a treaty. The Netherlands proposed that the Committee should start negotia-

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III, para. 14. A.2; the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission in their entirety are reproduced in appendix II below.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*.

tions on the drafting of a convention at the 1979 session while the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States were still in progress.

Most delegations that took the floor were in favour of a comprehensive approach, that is, a convention covering prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemicals for weapons purposes, and of the chemical weapons themselves. Although it was generally agreed that a prohibition of chemical weapons should not detract from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹⁷ different opinions were expressed regarding inclusion of prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in a ban. Some delegations questioned whether the proposed convention should include a provision renewing or confirming commitments already entered into under the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

France held that prohibition of use should be based on a combination of two criteria: the toxicity threshold (the minimum dosage producing a toxic effect in the organism) and the safety factor, which might be defined as the ratio between the effect threshold (the minimum dose producing transient physiological effects without consequences for the organism) and the lethal dose.

Poland deemed it necessary to differentiate chemical weapon agents on the basis of levels of toxicity so that one could easily distinguish between chemical agents with military potential and those which are commonly used in agriculture (herbicides, defoliants, pest control agents) which, because of their low toxicity levels, had no practical military significance.

Canada stated that the best hope of early progress would be to go in the direction of an agreement based on the concept of "excluded activities" rather than of "excluded agents". Although comprehensive in all respects, the treaty should provide for its own gradual implementation by successive stages, each subject to appropriate control. The first stage would be to ban production, and the second would see to the destruction of production facilities and stockpiles. Each stage would be linked with carefully designed (and acceptable) verification techniques.

Denmark, a non-member participating in the discussions, said that a ban on chemical weapons should be as comprehensive and as well defined as possible and thus should also include the military use of herbicides and defoliants, not only because of their immediate effect on the battlefield but also, in the case of the latter, because of the possibly prolonged and presently unknown distant ecological effects on man, animals and soil. It was generally agreed in the Committee that activities would be permitted for non-hostile purposes (industrial research, medical or other peaceful purposes) as well as for military purposes not related to chemical warfare.

The question of verification presented one of the most difficult and thorny problems in the Committee's discussions. A broad range of proposals

¹⁷ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

was advanced in that respect, with many delegations expressing an awareness of the extremely complicated nature of the issues raised by the question of verification of compliance with the provisions of the proposed convention.

While it was agreed that effective verification of the destruction of chemical weapons was a crucial aspect of the convention, views differed on whether or not effective on-site verification measures were technically feasible. A number of delegations, including those of France, Italy, Kenya and Venezuela, stated that it was indispensable that the system of verification be of an international character to give assurances to the parties to the agreement that its provisions were being observed. Australia stated that a chemical weapons convention would only be as good as the verification procedure written into it. In its view, it was essential that they should include an exchange of information about chemical weapons and the manufacture of substances, consultations and, above all, on-site inspection to certify not only the destruction of stocks, but also that proscribed chemicals were not being manufactured by units producing similar chemical substances.

Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany suggested that verification should be as unintrusive as possible and that the possibility of making use of modern technology, including observation satellites, should be explored so as to rule out the disclosure of commercial and industrial secrets. Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy shared the view, however, that some forms of physical access to the territory of the State being verified was unavoidable. In that regard, several delegations, including those of Australia and Romania, welcomed such confidence-building measures as the workshops on chemical weapons hosted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom during 1979 that had shed light on the feasibility of applying on-site verification measures without sacrificing industrial secrets. Mongolia, on the other hand, stated that it was possible to secure effective control on the basis of national means of verification, in combination with a few international measures. The latter, it stressed, must not be used to the detriment of the national interests of States.

Hungary noted a growing trend towards the establishment of international machinery for verification which might easily begin to function independently from the actual disarmament agreements. It stated that methods of verification based on national means, supplemented by international arrangements in a mutually acceptable form and attached to concrete disarmament instruments, could become an efficient method of verification.

In respect of organizational arrangements, Brazil, on behalf of the countries known as the group of 21, introduced, on 10 April, a proposal¹⁸ to establish an *ad hoc* working group open to the participation of all member States of the Committee, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on chemical weapons. The group believed that negotiations within the Committee might proceed in parallel with the bilateral contacts which were under

¹⁸ See citation in foot-note 16, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/11.

way between the USSR and the United States on the issue. The proposal received support from several other delegations, including, for instance, those of Canada, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had serious doubts concerning the proposal, with the United States holding that such a group would hinder rather than assist the bilateral process. The socialist countries preferred Poland's suggestion for the setting up of a contact group which would be open-ended and would seek to define further the most appropriate methods and forms of the Committee's work and to harmonize them with the bilateral efforts in order to accelerate progress towards early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Supporting Poland's proposal, Hungary stated that the Committee should under no circumstances undertake an enterprise which might have a disadvantageous influence on the on-going bilateral negotiations. It was not convinced that the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group would facilitate an advance in the bilateral talks. The Committee was not able during its 1979 session to reach an agreement on the methods and procedures that should be followed in dealing with the question of chemical weapons.

An important development during the 1979 session, however, was the submission of a substantial joint report on 31 July by the Soviet Union and the United States on the progress achieved in their bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons.¹⁹ The report was submitted shortly after the Joint United States-USSR Vienna Communiqué of 18 June 1979²⁰ in which the leaders of the two countries had reaffirmed the importance of a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and had agreed to intensify their efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal for submission to the Committee on Disarmament.

The 26-paragraph report, which went into more detail and was more precise than previous reports submitted to the CCD by the two Powers, stated, among other things, that the two sides believed that the scope of the prohibitions should be determined on the basis of a general purpose criterion²¹ and that parties to the convention should assume the obligations never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, or retain supertoxic lethal chemicals, other lethal or highly toxic chemicals or their precursors (with certain exceptions, e.g. chemicals intended for non-hostile purposes) as well as chemical munitions or other means of chemical warfare. The report added that negotiations were continuing on several issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

According to the report, the two sides had agreed that parties to the proposed convention should assume an obligation not to transfer to anyone, whether directly or indirectly, the means of chemical warfare, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States, or any organi-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/48.

²⁰ See A/34/414, annex; the Communiqué was issued on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II agreement.

²¹ That is, any lethal chemical agent having no peaceful purpose would be banned.

zation to carry out activities which parties would undertake not to engage in pursuant to the convention. The two sides had also come to an understanding regarding the necessity for States to declare, immediately after they became parties to the convention, both the volumes of acquired stocks of means of chemical warfare and the means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. Plans for the destruction of declared stocks and means of production should also be declared. Agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States that stocks of means for chemical warfare should be destroyed or diverted for permitted purposes within 10 years after a State became a party.

The USSR and the United States believed that the fulfillment of the obligations to be assumed under the future convention should be subject to the important requirement of adequate verification. They also believed that measures with respect to such verifications should be based on a combination of national and international measures. International verification measures should include the creation of a consultative committee. National measures would include the use of national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally accepted principles of international law. The USSR and the United States also reached agreement that a future convention should reflect the obligation of each party to take appropriate internal measures in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent any activity contrary to the provisions of the convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control. Finally, it was agreed that a future chemical weapons convention should include a withdrawal provision of the type included in other arms control and disarmament agreements.

The report also noted certain areas concerning which the two Powers had been unable to reach agreement so far, for example, the questions of certain aspects of international verification measures, and of conditions for entry into force of the convention.

The Committee, in its report to the General Assembly, noted the report "with satisfaction" and termed it a "substantial" joint statement. It added that "taking into account the fact that the prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the most urgent and vital problems in the area of disarmament", it would proceed with negotiations at its 1980 session.

In addition to the joint report, a number of other documents and working papers on various questions were submitted to the Committee. These included:

- (a) A working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations, submitted by Italy;²²
- (b) Procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons, submitted by Netherlands;²³
- (c) A working document entitled "Chemical identification of chemical weapons agents—a Finnish project", submitted by Finland;²⁴

²² See citation in foot-note 16, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/5.

²³ *Ibid.*, document CD/6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, document CD/14.

(d) A working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted by Poland;²⁵

(e) A compilation of material on chemical weapons from the working papers and statements of the CCD and the Committee on Disarmament, 1972-1979, made by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee;²⁶

(f) A working paper on some aspects of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons; experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany;²⁷

(g) A paper on the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents—an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data, submitted by Finland;²⁸

(h) Two working papers, one containing questions and the other answers, relevant to a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, submitted by the Netherlands;²⁹

(i) A working paper on an outline of a convention on chemical weapons, submitted by Poland;³⁰ and

(j) A paper entitled "Chemical weapons: evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to a prohibition of chemical weapons", submitted jointly by France, Italy and the Netherlands.³¹

These documents and working papers constitute a substantial basis for the future work of the Committee in identifying elements for possible inclusion in a draft convention.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In its consideration of the question of chemical weapons, the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session had before it the report of the Committee on Disarmament.³² While references to the question were made in the general debate in the plenary meetings³³ by a number of delegations, including those of Australia, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Morocco and Yugoslavia, most of the discussion, as in past years, took place in the First Committee.³⁴ Delegations from all regions stated that the elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States was a question of primary importance and deserved priority consideration and solution. There was general agreement that there should be an international convention banning their development, production and stockpiling.

As in the Committee on Disarmament, the statements centered on the main issues relating to the prohibition of such weapons, in particular on the

²⁵ *Ibid.*, document CD/21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, document CD/26.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/37.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, document CD/39.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, documents CD/41 and CD/49.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/44.

³¹ *Ibid.*, document CD/52.

³² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (AJ/34/27 and Corr.1)*.

³³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 40th meetings; and *Ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

questions of the scope of a treaty and verification of compliance to it by parties. Many speakers regretted the slow pace of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. The Netherlands, for example, said that the Assembly should request the Committee on Disarmament to take up substantive negotiations on chemical weapons as a matter of high priority and continue to do so throughout 1980. Ireland believed that an early prohibition was within reach if pursued with the necessary vigour, courage and imagination.

The United States noted that, while a large measure of agreement existed on the complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, significant and substantive differences remained. Those differences were so great that attempts to elaborate the text of a multilateral treaty at the present time would not be helpful and could well bring about a delay. The United States pointed out that it was difficult to reconcile divergent views when positions of many delegations on specific substantive issues were unknown. Consequently, the United States supported efforts in the Committee on Disarmament designed to identify and clarify such concrete issues as the necessary initial stage of negotiations on the subject.

The Soviet Union stated that it attached great importance to a chemical weapons ban since it believed that to be a realistic step by which tangible results in the field of disarmament could be achieved in one of the most important directions. The Soviet delegation added that it intended to resume the bilateral consultations in Geneva in mid-January.

The United Kingdom expressed the opinion that a multilateral convention could not be prepared until the two States most closely involved had established a basis of agreement. France, on the other hand, stated that the Committee on Disarmament should exercise its responsibility fully, as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and could not remain satisfied with negotiations in that body being given a subordinate or complementary position vis-à-vis other negotiations.

China, calling for an acceleration of negotiations so that a treaty could be concluded at an early date, said that it was firmly opposed to the use of weapons by an aggressive and expansionist force, either directly or through agents and mercenaries, to massacre people fighting for national liberation in defence of their independence and sovereignty.

Zambia stated that, consistent with its opposition to South Africa's acquisition of nuclear military power, it was mindful of the danger of chemical weapons now in the hands of minority régimes in southern Africa. It held that rebel forces in Southern Rhodesia, with the collaboration of South Africa, and that of certain states in the West, had unleashed chemical weapons on front-line States such as Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana. Accordingly, it wished to underscore the urgency which the General Assembly had expressed the previous year in resolution 33/59 A on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

A number of non-nuclear-weapon States expressed views on the role of the Committee on Disarmament. Canada said that it was important that all members of the Committee should know what were the main questions in

the dispute concerning the scope of the treaty and its verification if they were to have a hand in resolving those issues and especially if they were to accept fully the obligations which a treaty would impose on the signatories. Japan believed that early conclusion of a treaty would be facilitated if the Committee were to enlist the assistance of experts and begin to draw up a list of possible substances to be prohibited. Australia, while urging the two major Powers to continue their work in the hope that they would shortly be in a position to table a joint initiative, stated that it was not necessary to await such a step before serious negotiations on the subject could take place in the Committee on Disarmament. Denmark recognized the overriding importance of the bilateral negotiations but believed it should be possible at the present stage to identify certain aspects on which discussions in the Committee might usefully focus, without unduly complicating the bilateral negotiations.

India, Spain and Sweden all held that it was imperative that multilateral negotiations or a chemical weapons convention start in the Committee on Disarmament at its next session. Sweden expressed the view that among the issues requiring special attention were the scope of the convention; restrictions on the organization, planning and training for chemical warfare; and time-limits for the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities.

On the question of scope, Ghana called for a ban on all means of chemical warfare, including lethal chemical-weapon agents, incapacitating agents and others which might cause temporary disability. However, toxic agents that might be necessary for legitimate technological, prophylactic or other non-military purposes should be excluded from the ban. It was also the view of Ghana that the destruction of the existing stocks should be undertaken within a specified time-frame. Denmark stated that chemical warfare agents not covered in a convention might prove attractive for inclusion in what could be called "a permissible chemical inventory". It was therefore essential that a ban on chemical weapons should be as comprehensive and as well defined as possible and should include the military use of herbicides and defoliants.

With regard to verification, the Soviet Union expressed the belief that the problem of control should not be a stumbling block. The matter could be resolved successfully on the basis of national means of verification, supplemented by properly planned international procedures. The German Democratic Republic said that the solution of the problem ought not to be complicated by means of artificial barriers, such as unrealistic demands for control.

Indonesia believed that the question of verification was not an insurmountable problem. The Federal Republic of Germany was of the view that effective on-site controls of civilian chemical plants were possible without prejudicing industrial interests. Ghana was in favour of a verification system that comprised a judicious combination of national and international means and which did not interfere in the political or social affairs of any country.

Canada stated that it continued to attach importance to methods of verification which would give confidence that agreements were being observed.

They were more likely to do so if impartial and competent international agencies were also involved. In that regard, Canada cited the administration of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by IAEA as a good example. Canada said that it would accept the principle of an international satellite monitoring agency, under United Nations authority, even if there were financial and political obstacles.

Many delegations, including those of Afghanistan, Australia, Indonesia and Poland, welcomed the joint progress report submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament in July on their on-going bilateral negotiations. Mexico, for example, said that the report was a step in the right direction. Venezuela, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the control and total elimination of these weapons could not indefinitely be predicated upon the results achieved by the two Powers in their negotiations. It supported the proposal to establish an *ad hoc* working group in the Committee on Disarmament as it would provide an important contribution towards the speeding up of negotiations towards a convention.

Nigeria noted the relatively detailed information which had been reported by the Soviet Union and United States but regretted that the rather late timing of the report detracted from the seriousness with which it would have been considered by the Committee. Austria, while noting that the joint report gave a clear picture of areas of agreement and disagreement, expressed deep concern that nine years after the conclusion of the negotiations on the biological weapons convention, the actual negotiations on chemical weapons still remained within the domain of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that despite very serious efforts on the part of several member States of the Committee, it had not been possible to embark on multilateral negotiations.

The draft resolution on the item, submitted on 16 November, was sponsored by 46 countries representing all political and geographical groupings.³⁵

In introducing the draft resolution on 21 November, the representative of Canada noted particularly that the co-operation and work of the Polish delegation had contributed greatly in the preparation of the draft which was sponsored by so many countries. He pointed out that the 1979 draft resolution was different from those previously adopted, at least with respect to form; the sponsors had wanted it to be more concise and more explicit. He expressed the hope that, as affirmed by the draft resolution, the Committee on Disarmament, after all its preparatory work in the field of chemical weapons, would undertake the final phase of negotiations. He acknowledged the need for the co-operation of major Powers, and hoped that they would soon be able to submit a joint proposal on the prohibition of chemical

³⁵ Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

weapons. The representative also noted that a number of obstacles remained to be overcome before agreement could be reached.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 26 November without a vote, and by the General Assembly, also without a vote, on 11 December 1979, as resolution 34/72. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978 and 33/59 A of 14 December 1978, relating to the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. *Expresses its regret* that the agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

2. *Urges* the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at the beginning of its 1980 session, negotiations on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

B. Bacteriological (biological) weapons

Preparations for 1980 Review Conference of parties to the Convention

At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly, in resolution 33/59 B, noted that, after appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was to be arranged.³⁶ Following such consultations, it was agreed that a Preparatory Committee open to

³⁶Article XII of the Convention provides that:

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a Conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the pro-

States parties to the Convention would meet at Geneva on 9 July 1979 for a session lasting from one week to 10 days.

The Preparatory Committee held eight meetings from 9 to 18 July 1979 with 40 States parties³⁷ to the Convention participating. The Committee decided to dispense with summary records and to maintain only records of its decisions. In a report approved at the end of the session, the participants agreed that the Review Conference should be held from 3 to 21 March 1980, and requested that the States parties to the Convention should be notified and their views sought. The Secretariat was asked to prepare a background paper to serve as a basic working document for the Review Conference. It was to consist of two main sections: one on compliance by the States parties with all obligations embodied in the Convention concerning the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons; and the other on the status of efforts to reach agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Depositary Governments of the Convention — the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States — were asked to prepare a background paper on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention for distribution to all States parties before the Review Conference. Other organizational arrangements on which the Committee reached agreement concerned rules of procedure, a 13-point provisional agenda for the Review Conference, and procedures for preparation and adoption of its final document.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

The discussion of bacteriological weapons in the General Assembly in 1979 was rather truncated due to the realization that the matter would be considered in depth at the forthcoming Conference.

Among the statements made on the subject, Bulgaria expressed confidence that the Review Conference would again confirm the effectiveness of the Convention and the absence of any violation of its provisions on the part of States parties. That would provide further convincing proof that verification methods based on national means and complemented by generally ac-

visions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

The Convention entered into force on 26 March 1975 after ratification by the twenty-second party, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. As of 31 December 1979 there had been 86 ratifications and 34 signatures to the instrument.

³⁷ The following States participated: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Egypt, as signatory to the Convention, participated in the discussions of administrative matters before the Committee.

ceptable international procedures corresponding to the pertinent agreement on disarmament were quite sufficient.

Mongolia hoped that the convening of the Conference would serve as an encouragement to those States which had not yet done so to take appropriate measures to subscribe as soon as possible to the Convention.

In the only resolution which referred to the subject, resolution 34/72 on chemical weapons discussed above, the General Assembly reaffirmed the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the adherence by all States to the Convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

Conclusion

Chemical weapons remain the principal category of weapons of mass destruction which is still not subject to a régime of control. The urgency and importance of negotiating an international convention on the subject was again repeatedly emphasized in 1979 in various international disarmament forums. A draft agreement, which has been the subject of negotiations between the two major Powers for some time, was not put forward during the year. However, the joint statement of 31 July by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Committee on Disarmament on the status of their ongoing bilateral negotiations was one of the important developments of 1979 and as such was generally welcomed.

The General Assembly expressed regret that no agreement on these weapons had yet been elaborated and urged the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at the beginning of its 1980 session, as a matter of high priority, negotiations on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Bacteriological weapons did not figure prominently in the discussions in 1979, given the expectation that an opportunity would be provided for in-depth consideration of the subject at the 1980 Review Conference of the parties to the Convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

CHAPTER XVI

New weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

AS EARLY AS 1948 THE POSSIBILITY that new types of weapons of mass destruction might be invented was foreseen in the first resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. By that resolution, the Commission stated that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.¹

In 1969, as the result of an initiative of Malta, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions related to possible new weapons, 2602 C and D (XXIV). By those resolutions, the CCD was invited to consider certain implications of radiological warfare and military applications of laser technology. At that time the CCD did not find those areas to be of immediate concern.²

In 1975, the Soviet Union transmitted a letter to the Secretary-General³ requesting that an item on the question of new weapons of mass destruction be placed on the agenda of the Assembly at its thirtieth session and enclosing a draft international agreement on the subject. The draft treaty indicated that the definition of the new types or systems of weapons to be prohibited would be specified through negotiations. It also provided that new areas of development emerging after the entry into force of the agreement would be the subject of negotiations to extend the prohibition. That year, the General Assembly, by resolution 3479 (XXX), asked the CCD to proceed with work on the text of an agreement.

Since 1976, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries have

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.IX.1), chap. 2, and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), chap. XVII.

² See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), pp. 201-202; see also chapter XVII below.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-38, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243.

advanced the view that it is essential to adopt a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction since it is more difficult to eliminate weapons once they are deployed than to ban their development and manufacture while they are still at the stage of research or experiment. A number of Western States, on the other hand, have held that new scientific developments should be dealt with as they arise and that some potential new weapons of mass destruction fall within categories of weapons that already exist and should be covered in that context.

The USSR has stated that according to its approach new types of weapons of mass destruction would include any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action, according to the method of use, the target to be attacked, and the nature of their impact. The Western States have sought further clarification in respect of the definition of the weapons to be covered in a draft treaty as proposed by the Soviet Union.

At the 1977 session of the CCD the USSR submitted a revised draft agreement⁴ which included a provision whereby, parallel to a general agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of such weapons, and a list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and could be supplemented if new areas of development emerged. In subsequent discussions of the item, the Eastern European States and some non-aligned countries continued to stress the necessity of a treaty on a general prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Western States generally adhered to their view that it was not possible to deal with new weapons of mass destruction in a single international convention before each such weapon had been defined, and advocated specific agreements prohibiting specific categories of new weapons when they could be identified. They agreed that the CCD should keep the question under close review.⁵

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1978, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was considered among the whole complex of disarmament issues.⁶ More than 60 States and 17 non-governmental organizations expressed their views on the question, thus reflecting the importance with which it was regarded. Again, the USSR, other Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries stressed the urgency of the conclusion of a general treaty. The USSR felt that such a measure of disarmament was among the most important of the measures urgently awaiting implementation. The Western States continued to adhere to the view that the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/511/Rev.1; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), appendix X.

⁵ See, for instance, *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. XIII.

⁶ For details, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XVII.

had to be prevented by specific agreements on each identifiable weapon. In the Programme of Action of the Final Document which the General Assembly adopted by consensus at the conclusion of the special session, it included the following paragraph on the subject:

77. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

The subject was given substantial consideration at the 1978 session of the CCD,⁷ with members adhering generally to the established positions. The USSR, in response to the Western view that it was difficult to reach a comprehensive agreement because possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction could not be foreseen, stressed that it was precisely an agreement in principle that was needed, which could be followed, when necessary, by additional specific agreements to ban particular types of weapons. In that connexion, it drew attention to the new initiative of the Eastern European countries concerning the conclusion of a convention on a prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.⁸

Also, Hungary submitted a working paper to the Committee on infra-sound weapons.⁹ The United States and other Western States reiterated their conviction that the most effective approach to the question of new weapons of mass destruction would be through negotiation of individual agreements on specific types of weapons as they were identified.

The debates at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly on the question once again displayed the same approaches and positions of States as had the special session and the CCD.¹⁰

The two approaches were reflected, for the second year in succession, in separate General Assembly resolutions, 33/66 A and B. By resolution 33/66 A, the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, while taking account of its existing priorities, to pursue its examination of the subject with a view to reaching agreement on the prevention of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and to the speedy preparation of specific agreements on individual types of weapons which may be identified. In its resolution 33/66 B, the Assembly requested the Committee to actively continue negotiations

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 188-211.

⁸ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. X.

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/575.

¹⁰ See foot-note No. 6.

with a view to agreeing on the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to expedite the preparation of specific agreements on particular types of such weapons. Both resolutions requested the Committee to report to the Assembly on the subject at its thirty-fourth session.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

At the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in 1979 the question of prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction was non-controversial. During the general exchange of views,¹¹ most speakers called for the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to include an item on prevention of the emergence of such weapons and none disagreed.

China proposed specifically that the two super-Powers should immediately stop research, development and production of all such weapons and also renounce their use. Peru also mentioned that the use of weapons of mass destruction as well as their development and manufacture should be effectively forbidden. The Federal Republic of Germany and Ghana called for prevention of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles, while Nigeria urged the prohibition of such weapons and new systems of such weapons whether based on new or existing principles. The Byelorussian SSR attached particular significance to the problem and stated that simple prohibition of new varieties of weapons of mass destruction as they appeared was not sufficient since it would not guarantee an end to the race for more sophisticated weaponry. Ecuador and Mongolia, in referring to the question, stressed that scientific endeavour must be used for solving problems of poverty and disease and in other interests of mankind.

The elements recommended by the Commission¹² included, under the heading "Other weapons of mass destruction", the measure entitled "Prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

In the course of its 1979 session, the Committee on Disarmament continued to give considerable attention to the question,¹³ which, combined with radio-

¹¹ A/CN.10/PV.10-17 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22/Corrigendum.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III, para. 14, A.2.(b); the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission in their entirety are reproduced in appendix II below.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, p. 17.

logical weapons, was one of the specific items on its programme of work for the year.

From the beginning of the session, the Soviet Union urged the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and called upon the Committee to continue negotiations to that end. The Soviet position was strongly supported by Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, and Poland. Those States stressed their intention to rule out once and forever any misuse of scientific findings and technological potential for the invention of new means of mass destruction which could be achieved by a comprehensive ban of a preventive nature. They rejected the theory that the best time for action would come when and if specific types of weapons of mass destruction were proven feasible.

Also supporting negotiation of an agreement on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, Yugoslavia held that such a prohibition should apply to all weapons of mass destruction, because the essential principle was to put an end to the qualitative proliferation of armaments. Kenya called upon the Committee to lend its support to all efforts which would be directed towards narrowing the differences between the two approaches to the question.

In the general discussions; Western States which referred to the question continued to stress that the most effective approach to the problem of new weapons of mass destruction would be by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they were identified. The United Kingdom, supporting that view, held that the question should be kept under constant review and the desirability of formulating separate agreements be considered in respect of any specific new weapons which might be identified. Arms control treaties, in its view, had to be precise if they were to be effective; vagueness, it held, invited evasion. Similarly, Italy believed that the Committee on Disarmament should keep the problem under constant review, acquire all the data available, and draw up the legal instruments for banning particular types of new weapons of mass destruction as soon as they could be identified.

During consideration of the specific item, the Federal Republic of Germany reiterated its position that the weapons in question had to be dealt with not in a general agreement, but on a case-by-case basis. It stressed that a significant prohibition of weapons of mass destruction could be achieved only by defining such weapons in separate agreements and at the same time by defining an adequate verification system which would guarantee the observance by all parties of their commitments.

Egypt, for its part, stressed that it fully subscribed to paragraph 77 of the Final Document (see p. 239 above) which called for effective measures aimed at the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and prevention of the emergence of such weapons, and urged that the question be kept under review.

The Soviet Union stressed that the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction threatened peace and security and believed that the Committee might achieve tangible results on the subject at the current session. Since a number of countries attached importance to the identification aspect of the question, the USSR reiterated a proposal it put forward in 1978¹⁴ for the establishment under the auspices of the Committee of an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of the possible areas of development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It believed that such a group would ensure a thorough study of the possibility of the emergence of such weapons. In the view of the Soviet delegation, the group could continuously observe developments in the field and, at the very earliest stage of the possible emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, make appropriate recommendations to the Committee concerning their prohibition. On 10 July, the USSR submitted a working document¹⁵ summarizing the principal results of the Committee's discussion of the question.

The Soviet Union recalled its original initiative, and pointed out that to accommodate various comments and wishes, its expanded draft agreement of 1977 contained provisions for a comprehensive prohibition listing examples, the possibility of supplementing that list, and the possibility of prohibiting specific types and systems of weapons of mass destruction on the basis of separate agreements. While expressing its readiness to adopt the same constructive approach in the future in the search for measures to prevent the emergence of separate new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the USSR emphasized that the conclusion of separate agreements, notwithstanding their importance, did not offer a solution to the problem of completely sealing off specific avenues of the arms race.

Hungary, Mongolia and other Eastern European States agreed with the Soviet position, with Hungary stressing that in order to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, a broader approach was required, namely, the elaboration of a comprehensive ban on the development and production of such weapons; that would constitute a legal barrier to the transformation of technological achievements into military applications; neither Hungary nor Mongolia objected to the possibility of working out specific agreements.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In the debate at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/564.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III, vol. II, document CD/35.

States displayed the same approaches and positions as they had at the thirty-third session and in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979.

During both plenary meetings and in the First Committee,¹⁶ Eastern European States and some non-aligned countries continued to advocate the conclusion of a universal and comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and called for the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the help of qualified experts for the purpose of preparing the draft of such a treaty and, where necessary, draft agreements on specific types of such weapons. Thus, they generally concurred with the approach of the USSR and referred to the recommendations on the subject adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

The Western States also reiterated their established viewpoint that the conclusion of an all-encompassing treaty on the prohibition of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would not lead to a realistic solution of the problem. They advocated the conclusion of specific agreements prohibiting particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which might be identified. Their general interpretation was that such an approach was preferred according to the Final Document of the tenth special session.

The USSR stated in the First Committee that the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was an important aspect of the disarmament negotiations which required a special impulse from the General Assembly. It felt that a positive contribution to progress on this question might be an appeal by the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the help of qualified experts, to prepare the draft of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, where necessary, draft agreements on specific types of such weapons. Czechoslovakia believed it necessary for the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its work substantially on the whole question and held that after four years it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to request the Committee to speed up further negotiations. The German Democratic Republic called on all States to act jointly in order to ensure that the achievements of science and technology did not lead to elaboration of new and dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction. Poland said that while the preliminary agreement to outlaw radiological weapons constituted an important step in the endeavour to ban the development of specific types of new weapons of mass destruction, it could not relinquish the idea of a universal and comprehensive treaty that would decree once and for all that no scientific or technological breakthrough could ever be used for purposes of mass destruction.

Statements supporting the Soviet proposal were also made by the Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR.

¹⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 41st meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

With regard to the over-all question of new weapons of mass destruction, the United Kingdom observed that while the Eastern European countries had continued to call for a treaty to prevent the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction not covered by the 1948 definition, they had not convinced many people outside of their own group that any such weapon existed or that the various scientific principles which they had described could produce a weapon of value. Accordingly, the United Kingdom said that it continued to see merit in the idea of tackling the development of any such weapon once it had been identified.

Uganda welcomed the joint United States-USSR initiative on agreed proposals on a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and expressed the hope that that agreement would not lead the Committee on Disarmament to overlook the urgency of negotiating a convention or a treaty banning all new types of weapons of mass destruction. It held that that was an area where the international community was focusing most of its attention out of fear and anxiety over the impact that the manufacture or production of such types of weapons could have on the already existing stockpiles of deadly weapons. Some other non-aligned and developing countries, including the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Somalia, also supported the concept of a comprehensive prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

On 2 November, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted a draft resolution which subsequently was also sponsored by Bulgaria, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam and was introduced by the Byelorussian SSR at the 40th meeting on 23 November. By that draft resolution the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament in the light of its existing priorities to actively continue negotiations with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, where necessary, specific agreements on particular types of such weapons.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, on behalf of the sponsors, stressed that their proposal was very comprehensive and took into account the various approaches to solving the problem of preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction: it provided for the conclusion of both a comprehensive and specific agreements.

Before the vote, the United States, in the First Committee, reiterated its opposition to a general prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. From its viewpoint, the idea of the conclusion of a general treaty on the subject in general would not lead to a realistic solution to the problem. It maintained that dealing in a loose or vague manner with principles which were not currently understood, or with relationships among principles not yet conceived, would probably merely create the illusion of having dealt with the potential problem in question.

The United States further believed that if such a general treaty were to be given the verification procedure necessary to make it more than an illusion, it would threaten to obstruct scientific development in areas where that would be neither necessary nor advisable. It stated that in recent years there had been attempts to distort the concept of new weapons of mass destruction with particular regard to certain nuclear weapons, the horrible nature of which had been known for over 20 years; in that connexion, it noted that since the United Nations had approved the definition of weapons of mass destruction in 1948—over 30 years ago—no new types of such weapons had emerged.

The United States supported the concept of keeping the question under review, however, and of concluding agreements prohibiting any specific new weapons which were identified. It also drew attention to the consensus language which had been agreed upon at the special session of the Assembly and regarded it as unfortunate that it had not proved possible to continue such a consensus approach. The United States also continued to believe that the best approach to precluding effectively the threat of potential new weapons of mass destruction was the negotiation of individual agreements on specific new types of weapons as they were identified.

Ireland, explaining the abstentions on behalf of the nine States members of the European Economic Community, noted that in 1978, two separate draft resolutions had been presented on the subject and that they differed in the details of their approach to the solution of the problems involved. Rather than confront the General Assembly again with two drafts, the sponsors of resolution 33/66 A had refrained from submitting their own text in 1979, Ireland stated.

The nine agreed that there was no disagreement on the need to prohibit any and all new weapons of mass destruction which were identified. The point at issue was simply the choice of the most effective means of pursuing that objective. The nine States believed that new weapons of mass destruction and their technologies, if they were to be effectively and permanently prohibited, must be the subject of separate, verifiable controls. That fundamental consideration, according to the nine States, had not received sufficient emphasis in the draft resolution.

Moreover, the special importance given to the negotiation of a single blanket prohibition on such weapons was, in their view, not warranted. Each weapon and weapons system had its own particular characteristics which required detailed separate negotiations.

Japan, while emphasizing the significance of the effort to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, did not consider it appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate the preparation of a draft comprehensive agreement on those weapons, because the scope of such an agreement and the types of weapons that would be encompassed were far from clear and verification difficulties would arise. Japan further held that it was more appropriate at that stage to keep the question under review in the Com-

mittee on Disarmament so that negotiations could be started whenever any specific new weapons of mass destruction that might be identified came into the picture.

Following the vote, Czechoslovakia and Finland explained their support of the draft resolution in view of their agreement with its purposes and overall aim and the belief that all approaches to the problem of preventing the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction should be explored. Czechoslovakia noted that the authors had provided for specific agreements on particular types of weapons where necessary. Austria, Sweden and Turkey explained their abstentions. They all recognized the importance of the question, but believed that a more widely acceptable approach was necessary. Sweden had doubts about the concept of a general agreement and saw a need for a generally accepted, clear definition of scope before starting negotiations. Turkey felt that the draft resolution put forward an overly limited and restrictive approach for dealing with a complicated question whose outcome could not be decided in advance.

On 23 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a vote of 88 to none, with 25 abstentions and on 11 December, the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 34/79 by a vote of 117 to none, with 24 abstentions, mainly Western States. China did not participate in the vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977 and 33/66 B of 14 December 1978 on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provision contained in paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly to the effect that qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and that efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at its tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the submission on 9 July 1979, for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, of the joint proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, agreed upon during the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,

Noting that in the course of the session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 a discussion took place on the agenda item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Taking into consideration the section of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, actively to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, where necessary, specific agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-fifth session;

3. *Once again urges* all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament"

Conclusion

During the consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons in 1979, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament and at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the necessity for action aimed at the banning of such weapons received wide recognition.

The two established approaches on the subject still remained, however, and even became more distinct from one another. The Soviet Union, other Eastern European States and some non-aligned countries continued to call for conclusion of a general comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to accept the concept of specific agreements when appropriate.

The Western States continued to oppose a general agreement and to support the idea of keeping the question under review and dealing with the conclusion of separate conventions on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction as and when such weapons could be identified.

The further consideration of the subject is likely to continue to reflect the same two approaches, at least in the near term.

Radiological weapons

Introduction

Radiological weapons are those which make use of the dispersal of radioactive substances in the target area to cause injury to personnel independently of nuclear explosions.

The question of controlling the use of radiological weapons was first considered by the General Assembly in 1969 when it adopted resolution 2602 C (XXIV) concerning radiological warfare.¹ By that resolution the Assembly invited the CCD to consider methods of control against radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions and the need for effective control of nuclear weapons that maximize radioactive effects. In 1970, the CCD reported,² on the basis of a paper prepared by the Netherlands,³ that possibilities of radiological warfare existed theoretically, but did not seem to be of much practical significance and, therefore, discussion of measures related to radiological warfare did not appear to be useful.

In 1976, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the United States re-opened discussion of the subject by suggesting that an agreement should be concluded prohibiting the use of radioactive materials for weapons purposes. Consideration of the question in the Assembly was again limited, however, and no draft resolution was submitted.

The question of the prohibition of radiological weapons, however, became the subject of bilateral negotiations in 1977, when a working group on the subject was established during the meeting of the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, of the USSR and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, of the United States.⁴ Since 1977, the question of prohibition of ra-

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 4, and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), chap. XVI; the resolution is also discussed briefly in the chapters entitled "Radiological weapons" of the 1977 and 1978 Disarmament Yearbooks.

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission. Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, para. 26.

³ *Ibid.*, annex C, document CCD/291.

⁴ See *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. LXXVI, No. 1974 (April 25, 1977), pp. 401, 404 and 410.

biological weapons has been mentioned in the CCD in the context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons as an example of a specific type of weapon; the possibility of the development of such weapons was foreseen, however, as early as 1948 in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments.⁵ Although the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons has not been among the main topics of discussion either in the General Assembly or in the CCD, many States regard the conclusion of a convention on the subject to be important.

In the CCD in 1978, the USSR referred to the fact that the general question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, and that of radiological weapons, were being examined bilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States. It stressed the need for concluding agreements on the prohibition of specific types of weapons which were not yet in the arsenals of States, but clearly could be developed and produced. The United States noted that progress had been made towards a joint initiative on radiological weapons and that such a prohibition, while less significant than a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons convention, would be a logical step to fill a gap in the panoply of existing arms control measures and head off possible development of hitherto untried weapons of mass destruction. The two Powers also referred to their progress on the question at the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978, and the Assembly included a paragraph in its Final Document⁶ stating that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

At the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, discussion of the question reflected two possibilities, namely, that a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons might be achieved either within the Soviet concept of a general agreement on new weapons of mass destruction, or under the Western approach as a specific agreement, although the latter did not regard radiological weapons as a new type of weapon. Although no draft resolution was submitted on the question of radiological weapons, both resolutions 33/66 A and 33/66 B, adopted under the item on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, alluded to the continuing bilateral negotiations on the subject.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

In the Disarmament Commission few comments were made on the specific question of radiological weapons. Speakers who referred to it at all — those

⁵ See *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970*, chap. 2.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, para. 76.

of Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Nepal and Nigeria — did so in the context of including radiological weapons among the measures which they felt must be dealt with in any comprehensive programme of disarmament. Bulgaria and the Ukrainian SSR referred to the ongoing bilateral negotiations on radiological weapons, with the Ukrainian SSR stating that the work on an agreement should be expedited. Italy and Japan expressed support for agreements on well-defined and identifiable weapons of mass destruction.

The Commission, in its recommendations relating to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, included a measure entitled "Prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons"⁷ under the heading "Other weapons of mass destruction"

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

As in the CCD in the previous year, the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons was considered in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 mainly in the context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.⁸ In fact, the Committee included in its programme of work the combined item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" and decided to deal with it from 10 to 13 July.

At the beginning of the session, the USSR, noting that the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States on the prohibition of radiological weapons would resume in the near future, emphasized that the prohibition of one or another new variety of weapons of mass destruction was not enough as it did not provide any guarantees against the continuation of the chase after super-weapons. Mongolia held that in advocating the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, it also had in view in that context the conclusion of special international agreements prohibiting particular types of such weapons, including radiological weapons.

On 25 January, the United States reported that the USSR and the United States, in their efforts to achieve bilateral agreement on the elements of a treaty banning radiological weapons, appeared to be closer to success and that the next stage of the bilateral negotiations would resume on 6 February. The United States held that while the threat of radiological weapons was more potential than actual, an agreement on such weapons would close a gap in the application of arms control measures to identified weapons of mass destruction, and would shut off any future development of weaponry in

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III, para. 14.A.2.(c).

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 57, and appendix IV, vols. I-III.

that field. The United Kingdom and Italy regarded the idea of a ban on radiological weapons as a sensible measure and first realistic step which could be followed by others, as the need arose.

On 10 July, at the beginning of the consideration of the item in the Committee, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted an agreed joint proposal⁹ on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. In presenting the proposal, the delegations of both the USSR and the United States emphasized that at the meeting between Presidents L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, which took place at Vienna from 15 to 18 June 1979, the leaders of the two States confirmed with satisfaction the achievement of bilateral agreement on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

The Soviet Union reiterated that it considered the prohibition of radiological weapons as a part of the solution to the problem of the comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and stressed that the treaty prohibiting radiological weapons would constitute yet another important contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to saving mankind from the danger of the development and use of one of the possible new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States explained that while all nuclear explosive weapons produced radiation along with other destructive effects, they constituted a category of weapons of mass destruction separate from radiological weapons and were therefore not covered by the joint initiative. The delegation of the United States also made clear its understanding that no obligations undertaken by States in the projected treaty would be interpreted as covering the use of radioactive materials or of any sources of radiation except with respect to such uses as the parties to the treaty would undertake not to engage in pursuant to the provisions of the treaty.

The delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States both explained the details of the proposal and provided additional clarifications and explanations with the assistance of experts. The text of the proposal, as agreed to by the Soviet Union and the United States, is reproduced below in appendix X.

On 23 July 1979, the delegation of Hungary submitted to the Committee a working paper¹⁰ on the draft preambular part of the treaty on the prohibition of development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, and on 25 July, the German Democratic Republic submitted a working paper on draft paragraph IX, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the treaty (see appendix).

The Committee noted with satisfaction the submission by the USSR and the United States of the agreed joint proposal. A number of delegations, however, including those of France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and sev-

⁹ *Ibid.*, appendix III, vol. II, documents CD/31 and CD/32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/40.

eral of the group of 21 observed that time would be needed for their Governments to examine it. Accordingly, following a preliminary discussion, the Committee on Disarmament decided that it would continue consideration of the agreed joint proposal as soon as possible at its next annual session.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the question of radiological weapons was considered mostly in the debate in the First Committee, although a few speakers made brief references to the subject in plenary meetings.¹¹

The Soviet Union expressed its belief that all necessary factors existed for an agreement on the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons to be made ready for signature at an early date, and urged the General Assembly to ask the Committee on Disarmament to conclude as early as possible its work on a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons on the basis of the fundamental elements submitted to the Committee by the USSR and the United States.

The Hungarian delegation regarded the submission of the agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on the prohibition of radiological weapons as an important contribution to the disarmament process since it was aimed at elimination of potential weapons of mass destruction, and also as a significant step towards the realization of the Final Document of the tenth special session. Hungary stressed that the Committee on Disarmament should do everything possible to elaborate and adopt a common text of the treaty, taking into account the fact that the matter was ripe for action and the real possibility of reaching an early agreement. The German Democratic Republic, while welcoming the progress achieved with regard to the agreement on radiological weapons, emphasized the urgent need for a universal prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and felt that such a prohibition should be the subject of negotiations. Similarly, Mongolia felt that a decision by the General Assembly to propose that the Committee on Disarmament begin work immediately in order to reach agreement on the text of a treaty on radiological weapons would be of considerable help; at the same time, it held that the talks on the subject should not be allowed to divert attention from the attainment of the major goal of preparing a draft treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction.

The delegation of the United States expressed its hope that the General Assembly would encourage the Committee on Disarmament to build on the

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 4th to 36th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

achievement of the joint initiative to ban all radiological weapons and to draft an international convention.

The delegation of the United Kingdom expressed pleasure at the presentation of the joint text containing the elements of a draft treaty to ban radiological weapons and noted that those weapons were the last category of weapons in the 1948 definition of the Commission for Conventional Armaments to be tackled in the disarmament negotiations. It believed their prohibition would be a useful, if modest, step in the arms control and disarmament process.

Argentina expressed satisfaction concerning the agreement reached between the USSR and the United States and reiterated its view that it was the duty of the Committee on Disarmament to make a thorough and detailed examination of any proposal submitted to it in order to introduce possible modifications or amendments as it deemed fit before submitting it to the General Assembly for consideration.

Sweden expressed the view that the emergence of militarily useful radiological weapons did not seem to be an immediate and serious threat and thus the proposed treaty was not a substitute for genuine nuclear disarmament. It expressed its readiness, however, to study the draft text and discuss its substance in the Committee on Disarmament. India, mentioning its support of Sweden's view, held that the proposed treaty on radiological weapons should in no way be a substitute for genuine nuclear disarmament and that "monstrous" arsenals of nuclear explosive weapons constituted the greatest radiological danger.

The delegation of Ghana, in welcoming the joint proposal, pointed out that it would bring the international community into a field of arms control which had not been substantially entered by any country and would serve as a basic document on which the Committee on Disarmament could start work. Ghana hoped that the joint initiative would effectively contribute to the general scheme of control and ultimate disarmament. Algeria regarded the agreement as the best demonstration of the fact that progress could be made in the field of disarmament, and hoped that that agreement would act as a catalyst in the discussions that were taking place in other fields, in particular those on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

On 2 November 1979, the USSR and the United States submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", which they introduced in the First Committee on 6 November. On 15 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution which added a phrase "through negotiation" to paragraph 2 (see below). By the revised draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieve agreement, through negotiation, on the text of such a convention and to report to the General Assembly on the results achieved for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Soviet Union emphasized that the importance of preventing the appearance of the radiological weapon was also connected with the fact that the speedy development of nuclear energy and technology in many countries of the world was creating objective conditions for the broad dissemination of radioactive materials which could be used in radiological weapons. The Soviet Union believed there was a need for additional momentum in the talks on the question and in that context suggested that the General Assembly could request the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as early as possible, its work on reaching agreement on the text of an appropriate convention.

The representative of the United States referred to the increased potential threat posed by radiological materials since it had first been recognized in 1948 that they could cause immense damage and destruction of human life. He expressed the satisfaction of the United States Government that the verification provisions incorporated in the joint United States-USSR initiative on radiological weapons met the necessary requirements which had been long recognized as essential to any arms control or disarmament measure. The representative again emphasized the point that the agreement would close a gap in the application of arms control measures to identified weapons of mass destruction.

The First Committee adopted the draft resolution on 16 November at its 36th meeting without a vote. The General Assembly adopted it on 11 December as resolution 34/87 A, also without a vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which the Assembly stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radioactive materials to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to radiological weapons and, particularly, its stated intention to continue consideration of proposals for a convention banning these weapons at its next session;
2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieve agreement, through negotiation, on the text of such a convention and to report to the General Assembly on the results achieved for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"

Conclusion

The submission by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed joint proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament will certainly facilitate the achievement of a convention on the question. It is to be hoped that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to recommend the draft of such a convention to the General Assembly within the very near future.

United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING THE USE of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects has been considered by the international community in various forms over the years, particularly under the aegis of the United Nations, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

In the United Nations, the subject has been discussed by the General Assembly since 1972, in the First Committee under various agenda items concerning disarmament, and in the Sixth Committee with regard to legal considerations.¹ On the basis of the invitation of the General Assembly contained in its resolution 3076 (XXVIII), the Diplomatic Conference took up the subject during four sessions from 1974 to 1977, with regard to the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which might be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects. The aim of the Diplomatic Conference in that connexion was to seek agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons; the question was dealt with by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the Conference. The International Committee of the Red Cross also made a considerable contribution to the study of the subject at the expert level from 1973 to 1976. In 1977, following a recommendation of the Diplomatic Conference, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/152, by which, *inter alia*, it decided to convene in 1979 a United Nations conference, with a view to reaching agreements on prohibi-

¹ For a brief review of early initiatives and considerations, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), pp. 348-349; for a more detailed account, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. X.

tions or restrictions of use of such conventional weapons. Towards that end the Assembly decided to convene a preparatory conference for the United Nations Conference and to request the Secretary-General to transmit invitations to all States and parties which had been invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference.

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly, a number of States from various regions welcomed the decision of the Assembly to convene a United Nations Conference on the specific conventional weapons concerned. As a result, the General Assembly, at its special session, agreed in its Final Document² that there should be prohibitions or restrictions of use of such weapons and called upon all States to contribute towards the implementation of that goal.

The first session of the Preparatory Conference for the 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was convened at Geneva from 28 August to 15 September 1978. At its meetings, the Preparatory Conference considered various matters relating to organizational work, including questions of participation and rules of procedure, as well as some substantive matters, such as the scope of possible agreements, the weapons to be included and machinery for follow-up. During the course of the work of the Preparatory Conference, a number of proposals were made and 12 documents were submitted in connexion with substantive issues,³ including the preliminary outline of a treaty submitted by Mexico. The Preparatory Conference decided to hold another session before the 1979 United Nations Conference in order to complete the organizational and related issues.

By resolution 33/70, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Preparatory Conference contained in its report to the Assembly⁴ that it should hold another session and reaffirmed its decision to hold a United Nations Conference at Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979.

The second session of the Preparatory Conference, 1979

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/70, the second session of the Preparatory Conference for the 1979 United Nations Conference was convened from 19 March to 12 April 1979 at Geneva, with a view to completing the work required for the forthcoming Conference. The officers of the Preparatory Conference elected at its first session continued to serve

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 86, 87 and 88.

³ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 355-362.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/33/44)*.

throughout the second session. Representatives of 68 States,⁵ as well as three national liberation movements — the Palestine Liberation Organization, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) and the Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe) — participated in the session. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, the World Federation of United Nations Associations and a number of other non-governmental organizations also attended.

The Preparatory Conference again took up the question of the rules of procedure, especially those concerning decision-making, but, as had been the case at the first session, no agreement could be reached on that particular item. Consequently, the Preparatory Conference recommended the previously agreed provisional rules of procedure⁶ to the United Nations Conference, with the exception of chapter VI of those rules, entitled "Decision-making" and with necessary adjustments and modifications to reflect the deletion of that chapter.⁷ The Preparatory Conference also approved the provisional agenda for the United Nations Conference.⁸

With regard to substantive questions, the Preparatory Conference decided to establish a working group to consider the draft proposals on non-detectable fragments and on the regulation of the use of land-mines and other devices, a drafting group on incendiary weapons, and an informal working group on small-calibre weapons systems. Unanimous agreement was reached on a draft proposal on non-detectable fragments.⁹ A proposal on the regulation of the use of land-mines and other devices resulted in general agreement on an amended text,¹⁰ but some areas of disagreement remained. Regarding incendiary weapons, after an exchange of views covering the various proposals and suggestions put forward, a composite text on elements of an agreement on incendiary weapons was elaborated, including definitions and rules, but, despite the agreement reached in a number of areas, several areas of difficulty remained and were indicated in the text.¹¹ With regard to small-calibre weapons systems, the informal working group held several meetings for technical discussions and to exchange views but did not seek to reach agreement on specific texts. By the end of the Prepara-

⁵ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

⁶ A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./7 and Corr. 1 and 2.

⁷ A/CONF.95/2.

⁸ A/CONF.95/1.

⁹ See A/CONF.95/3, annex II, appendix A.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, annex II, appendix B.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, annex III.

tory Conference, there were still differences of viewpoint on technical matters, and the informal working group felt that further continuation of its discussions would be useful. Accordingly, it made certain recommendations, with a view to facilitating the work of the main United Nations Conference.¹²

Matters concerning fuel-air explosives, anti-personnel fragmentation weapons and flechettes were discussed only in the plenary meetings of the Preparatory Conference owing to the pressure of time and the complexity of the questions involved. It was recommended that those subjects be studied further nationally, so that discussion on them could begin at the main Conference.

A number of delegations supported the proposal of Mexico made at the first session of the Preparatory Conference to work for a general and universally applicable treaty with optional protocols or clauses which would embody agreed prohibitions or restrictions of use which might be negotiated in respect of certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. A number of delegations felt that such an umbrella treaty would be useful. However, it was noted that the structure and content of such a treaty would depend on the number and scope of the prohibitions or restrictions that were eventually agreed upon for specific categories of weapons under consideration. There was a general feeling that the Mexican proposal provided a good basis for further work, and, in view of the importance of the issue, the Preparatory Conference recommended that it be taken up as early as possible by a subsidiary organ of the forthcoming Conference.

At the second session of the Preparatory Conference, revised versions of three of the 12 proposals submitted at the earlier session were presented, namely: (a) a draft proposal on incendiary weapons, submitted by Indonesia,¹³ (b) a draft proposal on the regulation of the use of small-calibre weapon systems, submitted by Mexico and Sweden,¹⁴ and (c) a draft proposal on incendiary weapons, submitted by Australia and the Netherlands.¹⁵ Thus, the Preparatory Conference during the course of its work had a total of 15 proposals submitted to it, all of which were annexed to its report to the Conference covering both sessions.¹⁶

Indonesia stated that its revised text sought to strike a balance between those who supported the concept of military utility and those who were more concerned with humanitarian considerations. In its view, anti-personnel weapons should be prohibited because they would cause particularly painful

¹² For the text of the recommendations, see A/CONF.95/3, annex IV.

¹³ For the text, see A/CONF.95/3, annex I, document M.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, annex I, document N.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, annex I, document O.

¹⁶ A/CONF.95/3; the 12 proposals submitted to the Preparatory Conference at its first session in 1978 are contained in annex I of the report as documents A to L. For a brief description of those proposals, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XIX, pp. 356-362.

injuries often requiring long-term treatment and could result in psychological trauma in addition to physical disability and disfigurement. The use of such weapons against combatants was inhumane because of the availability of other equally effective weapons. The only exception should be in "cleaning-up" operations against bunkers or pill-boxes, where the use of other weapons might cause a larger number of casualties. Accordingly, the use of incendiary weapons against cities or heavily populated areas should be prohibited altogether, since no precautions could prevent civilians from being victims of such weapons. On the other hand, the use of incendiary weapons against well-defined military targets, such as aircraft on military airfields, stockpiles of ammunition etc., should give rise to no objection. Moreover, weapons which had a primary effect of penetration and fragmentation and a secondary incendiary effect, and which were used solely for defence purposes against aircraft and armoured vehicles, should not be banned.

In introducing the revised proposal on the use of small-calibre weapon systems, submitted jointly with Mexico, Sweden stated that the regulation of use of such weapon systems, which were the first to be used in any conflict, would constitute an important aspect of the work of the Conference. Sweden noted that the proposal focused on the energy transfer characteristics of such weapons, without singling out any particular existing weapon, and included a testing method to ensure that weapons and projectiles would conform with rules designed to prevent any increase in wounding power. Mexico stated that the new proposal was of a purely technical nature, and did not set any maximum level for average energy transfer since further research was needed on that question. In the Mexican view, it was absolutely essential, in the context of the development of humanitarian law, to adopt a system of control which would make it possible, given full knowledge of the facts, to decide on the restriction or prohibition of the use of certain weapons which were excessively injurious. Mexico also observed that the proposed text would be an optional protocol and therefore did not prejudice the ultimate form of the general and universal treaty to which it would be attached.

In speaking on the revised proposal on incendiary weapons submitted jointly with the Netherlands, Australia pointed out that, despite international concern about use of such weapons, there was expressed doubt that the Mexican position, which called for a complete prohibition of such weapons, would meet with broad agreement. Fire, for instance, had been used in warfare for millenia because of its effectiveness. It appeared that only restrictions of some uses of some types of incendiary weapons would be feasible and practical. Therefore, Australia and the Netherlands had decided to make special mention of napalm bombs, which were well known and which, more than any other weapon, had led to the decision to hold the forthcoming Conference. Among the incendiary weapons, napalm bombs were especially feared by the public, and their military and medical effects were clearly understood. Prohibition of the use of such bombs against civilian populations would be of great importance and would allay the fears of the public.

Towards the end of the second session, a number of delegations noted that through intensive efforts a wide measure of understanding had been

reached on certain issues and it had been possible to ascertain the views of delegations on various aspects of many problems. In particular, it was noted that unanimous agreement had been reached on the prohibition of the use of weapons which injured by fragments that were non-detectable by X-ray and that considerable progress had been made on the prohibition or restriction of the use of mines and booby-traps. However, some delegations noted with regret that the Preparatory Conference had been unable to reach agreement on several important matters of substance and procedure. In the view of some delegations, it was particularly disappointing that no agreement had been reached at the preparatory stage on the prohibition or restriction of the use of incendiary weapons.

The United Nations Conference, 1979

A. Organization and general debate

In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977 and 33/70 of 14 December 1978, the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was convened on 10 September 1979 at Geneva for a three-week session. During the session, the Conference held eight plenary meetings.¹⁷

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that, although the international community had rightly accorded priority to nuclear disarmament, there was increasing concern about the dangers posed by the development and application of weapons which, though conventional, obliterated the distinction between military and non-military targets or objects. Moreover, rapid advances in weapons technology threatened to nullify the considerations underlying international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts. The Secretary-General further stated that the deliberations preceding the Conference had yielded the conclusion that that threat could be effectively averted by striking a judicious balance between humanitarian concerns and the requirements of military security. He urged the Conference to build upon the work of the Preparatory Conference and thus make a distinct and concrete contribution to the cause of disarmament, world peace and security. Noting that the task of the Conference was not an easy one, the Secretary-General none the less expressed the hope that, through a combination of realism and compassion, the Conference would prove that its objectives were eminently attainable.

The Conference appointed Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria as its President and representatives of Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United States, Yugoslavia and Zaire as Vice-Presidents. It also appointed a rapporteur (Netherlands) of

¹⁷ Documents A/CONF.95/SR.1-8, and A/CONF.95/SR.1-8/Corrigendum.

the Conference. Representatives of 82 States¹⁸ and a number of observers participated in the Conference.

In his statement at the opening meeting, the President said that he did not underrate the complexity of the task before the Conference since it would not be easy to strike the necessary balance between humanitarian concerns and military requirements. It could be done, however, and participants owed it to humanity to exert their best endeavours to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. He further pointed out that great benefit had been derived from the work done by the Preparatory Conference.

The Conference adopted its provisional agenda¹⁹ and rules of procedure²⁰ as recommended by the Preparatory Conference. The Conference had before it for its consideration the draft proposals and reports of pertinent working and drafting groups submitted to it by the Preparatory Conference.²¹ Regarding the organization of its work, the Conference assigned to the Committee of the Whole, which held nine meetings,²² the consideration of those proposals; the Committee, in turn, established two working groups: the Working Group on Land-mines and Booby-traps, which considered draft articles for a protocol on the regulation of the use of land-mines and other devices as proposed by the Preparatory Conference, and the Working Group on Incendiary Weapons, which considered the report of the Preparatory Conference's Drafting Group on Incendiary Weapons, as well as the proposals submitted on the subject. In addition, at a plenary meeting, the Conference established a Working Group on a General Treaty, which was given the task of preparing the text of a convention to which optional protocols or clauses would be attached embodying prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

In the general debate,²³ many delegations noted with satisfaction the efforts made at the two sessions of the Preparatory Conference towards reaching agreements on various issues, particularly the agreement reached on weapons producing non-detectable fragments — that is, fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-ray — and the progress made on the text of a draft protocol on land-mines and booby-traps. However, concern was expressed at the lack of progress in reaching agreement on the important question of incendiary weapons, and a number of speakers stressed the importance of concluding an agreement on those weapons on the basis of the various proposals made at the Preparatory Conference, with some countries urging that napalm be totally eliminated from military arsenals. Many

¹⁸ In addition to the States listed in note 5 above, China, Colombia, Democratic Kampuchea, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Grenada, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia were represented.

¹⁹ A/CONF.95/1.

²⁰ A/CONF.95/2.

²¹ See A/CONF.95/3, annexes I-IV.

²² See A/CONF.95/CW/SR.1-9.

²³ See A/CONF.95/SR.2-6.

delegations also called for the Conference to take up the questions of small-calibre weapons, fragmentation weapons, flechettes and fuel-oil air explosives, so that negotiations on those types of weapons could start and some measure of agreement be reached.

Further, there was considerable interest in the idea of an "umbrella" treaty that would combine in a separate protocol general legal principles common to the separate protocols on specific weapons and establish a review mechanism. In that connexion, a number of delegations supported the draft proposal submitted by Mexico at the Preparatory Conference. Many delegations, including those of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, proposed the establishment of a periodic review and follow-up mechanism to ensure continuing study of proposals relating to additional categories of weapons not covered by an agreement or to extend existing agreements. Ireland, for instance, stated that if the international community were to continue to deepen and develop the principles and practice of humanitarian law, it would be necessary to establish a review mechanism with three functions: to consider issues which might arise with respect to the objectives set out in the final document of the Conference; to make a further examination of the proposals submitted but possibly not resolved at the Conference; and, finally, to facilitate the study and consideration of any new developments in weapons systems which might be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. In its view, a review conference should be held at an appropriate time after the entry into force of agreements contained in the final document of the current Conference. Moreover, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be asked to assist in furthering the objectives and the application of the provisions of the final document, and a consultative committee of experts should be established with the task of ensuring respect for the provisions of that document.

Poland held the view that instead of establishing a new mechanism to conduct a periodic review of the implementation of the protocols or to elaborate new texts, it would be preferable to request the Committee on Disarmament to assume that task, as the alternative was likely to raise more questions than it would resolve. In its view, the Committee on Disarmament would be almost as representative as the proposed committee; in that connexion, it noted that most of the States participating in the Conference were members of the Committee and that the others were entitled to participate in its proceedings.

Mexico stated that the concept of a general treaty which it had put forward was intended to ensure that any "self-imposed limits" by countries in the matter under consideration would be internationally recognized and protected. It felt that asking for such self-imposed limits was a more realistic approach than attempting to conclude international agreements. It also felt that the work of the Conference should not be continued within the framework of disarmament but should be carried out by an independent review system, as had been requested by the General Assembly. In that connexion, it regarded negotiations on disarmament to be of capital importance and felt

that if they were extended to include the problem of protecting victims and the civilian population during armed conflicts, there was a risk of results being delayed indefinitely.

In expressing its view, the Soviet Union stated that it was ready to limit or ban the use of weapons of any type, without prejudice to the security of States and on the basis of reciprocity among States possessing the weapons in question. Regarding the form of any agreements that might be reached at the Conference, it noted, in particular, the Mexican proposal that such agreements should be in the form of an international treaty containing general provisions and optional protocols dealing with certain types of weapons. It felt that the proposals on types of weapons on which agreement was not reached should be referred to the Committee on Disarmament for further study and consideration, since it was basically a widely representative body and, moreover, its meetings were open to non-members with an interest in the solution of specific problems.

China stated that it was deplorable that two super-Powers were taking part in an accelerated conventional weapons race and strengthening their conventional armed forces. Since the use of conventional weapons constituted a threat to international peace and security, disarmament in that field was, in its view, as important as nuclear disarmament; accordingly, the success of the Conference would, in fact, depend on the attitude of those two countries. In order to be effective, an agreement on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons should be linked to the struggle of the world's peoples against aggression, expansion, colonialism and hegemonism, and should guarantee the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all countries. In those circumstances, China would wholeheartedly support any proposals which adhered to humanitarian principles.

The United States felt that the structure of any treaty should be such as to permit the formulation and conclusion of separate agreements, one for each of the three main categories of weapons under consideration on which there was hope of achieving agreement in the time available. In its view, the "umbrella" treaty proposed by Mexico appeared to be a good basis for work but was not the only solution. The Conference could also conclude a single treaty or several separate treaties, but it could not take a final decision on that point until it had completed its negotiations on the substantive questions. The United States also pointed out that any treaty should clearly state that amendments or future agreements on new categories of weapons would have to receive the widest possible support of the parties to the original treaty, in particular, the major Powers. On the question of incendiary weapons, the United States stated that it was in favour of maximum protection for the civilian population against use of incendiary or flame weapons, but it could not accept restrictions on the use of such weapons against combatants or the prohibition of all air-delivered incendiary weapons.

Yugoslavia, for its part, regarded the work of the Conference as being concerned, not with disarmament but, for humanitarian reasons, with the restriction or prohibition of the use of certain conventional weapons which had

been employed indiscriminately against civilian populations and, to some extent, against military personnel. In Yugoslavia's view, one of the difficulties encountered in addition to the reluctance of certain military Powers to relinquish options in the weapons field was the fact that for many small countries, renunciation of any of the weapons in question might jeopardize their national security. Thus, Yugoslavia believed that all decisions to be taken should be based on the principle of reciprocity and should also respect the requirements of national security.

B. Work of the Conference

In the course of the Conference, the Committee of the Whole and the three Working Groups, in both formal and informal meetings, devoted their attention to both procedural and substantive issues, with a view to concluding agreements on the categories of weapons under primary consideration.

The Working Group on Land-mines and Booby-traps was asked by the Committee of the Whole to consider the "Proposal on the regulation of the use of land-mines and other devices: draft articles for a treaty", as set out by the Preparatory Conference.²⁴ In the course of its work it also considered additional documents, including a proposal from Morocco, and relevant material prepared by the Secretariat. On 25 September, the Working Group approved its report²⁵ for submission to the Committee of the Whole, including a text of the substantive provisions of the draft protocol,²⁶ which indicated that agreement had been reached on such issues as the scope of application; definitions; general restrictions; protection of the United Nations personnel on peace-keeping, observation, fact-finding or similar functions; and international co-operation in the removal of mines and booby-traps.

The proposed scope of application related to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices defined in the draft protocol, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings. It would not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways. The draft protocol would totally prohibit the use of the weapons in question either in offence, defence or by way of reprisal, against civilians. The indiscriminate use of these weapons would also be prohibited and States parties would take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from their effects, the term "feasible precautions" being defined as those which would be practicable or practically possible taking into account humanitarian and military considerations. The draft protocol would provide also for recording and publication of the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps. However, the question of making available to an occupying adversary party the details of the location of those weapons was not resolved, nor was agreement reached on the restriction of the use of remotely delivered mines. The text of the ar-

²⁴ See A/CONF.95/3, annex II.

²⁵ See A/CONF.95/8, appendix B.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, attachment 1.

ticle as drafted allowed the use of such mines if their location could be accurately recorded or if each such mine was fitted with an effective neutralizing mechanism designed to render it harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it no longer served the intended military purpose. A number of delegations, however, supported complete prohibition of the use of remotely delivered mines, and Yugoslavia reserved its position on the whole article. The proposed draft would also place restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices in populated areas and prohibit the use of certain specific booby-traps.

The Working Group on Incendiary Weapons had before it proposals on the subject submitted at the Preparatory Conference²⁷ as well as a new proposal submitted by Argentina concerning the definition of flame weapons. The Group elaborated a "Draft protocol on prohibitions or restrictions of the use of incendiary weapons"²⁸ but due to the complexity of the issues involved, a number of areas of disagreement could not be resolved. Agreement was reached, however, on the definition of incendiary weapons, although the question of whether munitions which relied for their principal effect upon fragmentation, penetration or blast and had secondarily an incendiary effect should be excluded from the definition remained outstanding. Also, agreement could not be reached on the definition of "flame weapon". The Draft Protocol contained three alternatives. Two of them defined flame weapons with reference to napalm. The third was a revised version of the proposal submitted by Argentina and included hydrocarbons and organometallic substances and mentioned napalm as an example. Some delegations were of the opinion that such a category should be excluded on the grounds that its scope was not clear and that flame weapons were already encompassed in the definition of incendiary weapons. The Draft Protocol also defined such items as "concentration of civilians", "military objectives", "civilian objects" and "feasible precautions".

With respect to the rules applicable to incendiary weapons, there was no agreement on a complete prohibition, protecting both civilians and combatants against their use. With respect to the protection of the former, the Draft Protocol contained a rule reaffirming existing international law applicable in armed conflicts to the effect that the civilian population as such cannot be made the object of attack by incendiary weapons, and there was agreement that there should be increased protection to civilians against attacks directed at military objectives located within a concentration of civilians. Disagreement remained, however, on the scope of the relevant prohibition, for instance on the desirability of limiting such a prohibition to air-delivered weapons. Finally, agreement was not reached with regard to the protection of combatants.

The Working Group on a General Treaty, which had been established by the Conference to prepare the text of a convention to which optional pro-

²⁷ See A/CONF.95/3, annex I, documents A, D, K, L, N, O and annex III.

²⁸ See A/CONF.95/8, appendix C, attachments 1 and 2, and appendix D.

protocols or clauses embodying prohibitions or restrictions of use would be attached, had before it a number of proposals²⁹ pertaining to the convention or to its specific provisions, as well as a number of conference room papers suggesting various formulations emerging from informal consultations for the different provisions of the general treaty. Although there was a general understanding that the elaboration of a convention to which optional protocols or clauses would be attached was a possible solution, the question of a follow-up or review mechanism became controversial in respect of a general treaty because few agreements on weapons were likely to be concluded at the Conference. It was felt that efforts to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons should continue either by way of amendments to rules which might be agreed upon at the Conference or by the adoption of new rules for other categories of specific weapons on which agreement might not be reached or which might not be considered at the current Conference. The following suggestions were put forward: (a) convening periodic conferences to consider new rules; (b) charging the Committee on Disarmament with the task of negotiating the new rules; (c) convening periodic conferences which would review existing rules, consider amendments and elaborate new rules; and (d) entrusting the Committee on Disarmament with a role in the negotiation of new rules, although the possibility would exist for convening a conference to negotiate such rules — such a conference, if convened, would take account of the work of the Committee but its convening would not depend on prior agreement in the Committee.

With regard to amendments, there was general agreement that only States parties to a protocol might initiate amendments thereto, though non-parties should be permitted to attend a periodic conference established for that purpose. The Working Group concluded its work with an outline of a draft convention³⁰ containing brackets around certain provisions or formulations to indicate alternatives and areas on which general agreement had not been reached.

The discussions on categories of weapons for which specific working groups were not set up concentrated mainly on the question of small-calibre weapons. According to one viewpoint, the development of assault rifles with a calibre of less than the traditional 7.62 mm might produce extensive wounds and massive tissue destruction outside the wound channel as a result of the increased velocity of the flatter projectiles. It was pointed out that the amount of energy transferred to tissue was decisive for the extent of the resulting injury. While the idea of relating wound capacity to energy transfer appeared to be promising to some delegations, others felt that there were many questions which required clarification and further research, from both medical and ballistics aspects. On 27 September, a draft resolution on small-calibre weapon systems was introduced by Sweden and co-sponsored by Egypt, Ireland, Jamaica, Mexico, Switzerland and Uruguay. During its con-

²⁹ See A/CONF.95/3, annex I, document H, and A/CONF.95/8, annex II.

³⁰ See A/CONF.95/8, annex II, appendix A.

sideration by the Committee of the Whole, a number of amendments³¹ were proposed. On the recommendation of the Committee of the Whole, the Conference adopted the draft resolution on small-calibre weapons systems on 28 September.³² It reads as follows:

The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.

Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 32/152 of 19 December 1977,

Aware of the continuous development of small-calibre weapon systems (i.e., arms and projectiles).

Anxious to prevent an unnecessary increase of the injurious effects of such weapon systems,

Recalling the agreement embodied in The Hague Declaration of 29 July 1899, to abstain, in international armed conflict, from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.

Convinced that it is desirable to establish accurately the wounding effects of current and new generations of small-calibre weapon systems, including the various parameters that affect the energy transfer and the wounding mechanism of such systems,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the intensive research carried out nationally and internationally in the area of wound ballistics, in particular relating to small-calibre weapon systems, as documented during the Conference;

2. *Considers* that this research and the international discussion on the subject has led to an increased understanding of the wounding effects of small-calibre weapon systems and of the parameters involved;

3. *Believes* that such research, including testing of small-calibre weapon systems, should be continued with a view to developing standardized assessment methodology relative to ballistic parameters and medical effects of such systems;

4. *Invites* Governments to carry out further research, jointly or individually, on the wounding effects of small-calibre weapon systems and to communicate, where possible, their findings and conclusions;

5. *Welcomes* the announcement that an international scientific symposium on wound ballistics will be held in Gothenburg, Sweden, in late 1980 or in 1981, and hopes that the results of the symposium will be made available to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and other interested fora;

6. *Appeals* to all Governments to exercise the utmost care in the development of small-calibre weapon systems, so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation of the injurious effects of such systems.

With regard to other types of weapons, no conclusions were reached on proposals concerning anti-personnel fragmentation weapons, flechettes, or fuel-air explosive weapons, as they had not been considered in depth.

C. Closure of the Conference

In view of the limited agreement reached and the questions remaining, the Conference decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it convene for another session to meet in Geneva for a period of up to four weeks, start-

³¹ See A/CONF.95/6, annex V.

³² A/CONF.95/SR.7.

ing on 15 September 1980, with the understanding that the issues on which agreement had already been achieved should not be reopened, so that all efforts might be concentrated on working out agreements on the outstanding questions. It was also understood that at the second session the United Nations Conference would not have a general debate. At the closing meeting, a number of delegations expressed the hope that the Conference would be able to complete its task at the 1980 session.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/70 of 14 December 1978, the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Conference" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, and the report³³ was disseminated to the Assembly.

During the course of the general debate and in the First Committee,³⁴ many countries underlined the importance and political impact of the Conference and reaffirmed their support of its objectives. A number of delegations, including those of Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Chad, Democratic Yemen, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Oman, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United Republic of Tanzania, regretted that the Conference had failed to conclude a formal agreement. In particular, some delegations expressed disappointment that it was not possible to bridge the existing gap in the positions of Governments concerning restrictions of the use of incendiary weapons. However, they were encouraged by the fact that the Conference came close to elaborating a draft agreement on land-mines and booby-traps and that a consensus had been reached on the convening of a second session of the Conference in 1980.

Sweden stated that in light of the lack of progress on various disarmament issues it was encouraging to note at least one area where some progress was being made, namely that concerning particularly inhumane weapons. Sweden shared the view of those who maintained that far-reaching protection against the use of incendiaries was necessary, especially for civilian populations, and urged that all States contribute to the finding of a solution during the second session of the Conference in 1980. Sweden also said that it would continue to argue against the unnecessarily injurious effects of certain small-calibre projectile systems and found it gratifying that the Conference had adopted a unanimous resolution on that subject by which, among other things, it had enjoined States to take utmost care in their small-arms development in order to preclude unnecessarily injurious effects from such weapons.

³³ A/CONF.95/8.

³⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 30th and 38th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Brazil, noting that there was considerable debate at the Conference on review mechanisms for protocols to an agreement, and particularly on their follow-up through additional protocols, supported the view that review machinery should be open to all Member States, in light of the military and humanitarian aspects of the issue involved. A possible solution might be to make fuller use of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where the entire membership of the United Nations was represented, and to set up within it appropriate arrangements to deal with such questions.

On 12 November, Argentina, Austria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Madagascar, Mauritius, Norway and Uruguay. In introducing the draft on 14 November, the representative of Nigeria stated that although great efforts had been devoted to the question of the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons, there were still outstanding issues, such as the question of how to balance military requirements with the need to develop humanitarian law in warfare, as well as the matter of a follow-up mechanism in connexion with any agreement which might be needed. The representative pointed out that substantial progress had been made at the 1979 Conference both as to its consideration of agreements on specific weapons and with regard to the legal framework for those agreements. However, it had become clear that, even with the spirit of accommodation shown by the participants in the Conference, its mandate was such that it could not be fully discharged in the limited time available; hence the recommendation of the Conference that the General Assembly authorize it to hold another session. On behalf of the sponsors, Nigeria expressed the hope that more States would be represented at the 1980 session and that the draft could be adopted by consensus.

In supporting the draft resolution, Sweden expressed the view that it would be difficult to term the Conference a success unless a substantive ban on the use of incendiary weapons, including napalm, was achieved. It further stressed that the Conference was an event of great importance because it provided a unique opportunity to establish a future follow-up mechanism to check, from a humanitarian point of view, the development of certain new weapons insofar as those weapons were of an anti-personnel character.

On 19 November, the previous sponsors and, in addition, Cyprus, France, Guinea-Bissau, Mexico, Sierra Leone and Somalia submitted a revised draft resolution which was adopted by the First Committee on 21 November without a vote. At its 97th meeting, on 11 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 34/82. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/70 of 14 December 1978, in which it expressed its conviction that the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants could be significantly reduced if general agreement could be reached on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Reaffirming its belief that positive results as regards the non-use or restriction of use for humanitarian reasons of specific conventional weapons would serve, in addition, as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament,

Also recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977 and 33/70, in which it decided to convene in 1979 the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and established the mandate of the Conference.

1. *Takes note* of the report of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects on its session held at Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979;

2. *Notes with appreciation* that the Conference reached agreement with regard to a draft proposal concerning non-detectable fragments;

3. *Notes also* that the report indicates a wide measure of agreement in respect of land-mines and booby-traps, and that there was a further convergence of views in relation to the prohibition or restriction of use of incendiary weapons;

4. *Takes note* of the progress made by the Conference Working Group on a General Treaty entrusted with the preparation of the text of a convention to which optional protocols or clauses embodying prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, would be attached;

5. *Takes note also* of the resolution of the Conference concerning the development of small-calibre weapon systems, in which, *inter alia*, the Conference stressed the need to exercise the utmost care in their development so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation of the injurious effects of such systems;

6. *Endorses* the recommendation of the Conference to hold another session at Geneva for a period of up to four weeks, starting on 15 September 1980, with a view to completing negotiations in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 32/152 and 33/70;

7. *Takes note* of the understanding of the Conference that issues on which agreement has already been achieved should not be reopened at the forthcoming session, so that all efforts may be concentrated on working out agreement on outstanding issues;

8. *Invites* States to continue to participate actively in the Conference and to be represented, in so far as possible, by the required legal, military and medical expertise;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide necessary assistance to the Conference;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Conference"

Conclusion

The work of the Preparatory Conference and of the United Nations Conference on certain specific conventional weapons during 1979 indicates that all countries support prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain inhumane or indiscriminate weapons. However, the question remains one of striking a balance between humanitarian considerations and military requirements.

The detailed discussions on alternative proposals on incendiaries, mines and booby-traps and advanced small-calibre weapons during the two sessions of the Preparatory Conference facilitated the negotiations on those categories of weapons at the United Nations Conference itself. Consequently, the Working Group on Land-mines and Booby-traps reached virtual agree-

ment as to the text of a document covering such issues as scope of application, definitions, general restrictions, protection of United Nations personnel in peace-keeping or similar functions and international co-operation in the removal of mines and booby-traps.

Regarding incendiary weapons, however, little progress was made, and important questions, such as the definition of flame weapons and the scope of the prohibition or restriction of the use of such weapons as a whole, or of napalm, in particular, remained as areas of disagreement.

There were also a number of issues connected with small-calibre weapons that were considered as needing clarification and further research from both the medical and ballistics points of view, and the Conference recommended that Governments carry out further research, either jointly or individually, on the wounding effects of such small-calibre weapons systems.

No detailed discussions were conducted on such issues as fuel-air explosives, anti-personnel fragmentation weapons and flechettes.

Finally, the legal framework for an agreement or agreements and the form of a general treaty could not be finalized because of differences of opinion concerning substantive aspects of that question.

Since it became clear during the Conference that further negotiations would be required in many areas, a second session of the Conference was recommended and, on the basis of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in that connexion, will be held from 15 September to 10 October 1980 with a view to concluding an international agreement on those categories of weapons on which the most detailed discussions have taken place.

PART FOUR

Other approaches to disarmament and arms limitation

Limitation of the build-up and transfer of conventional arms on a world-wide and regional basis

Introduction

AS SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER CRISES with massive potential for degenerating into armed conflict continued and in some respects escalated around the world in 1979, the instruments of war most requiring increased attention and regulation, because of their continuing use and negative effects on global socio-economic development efforts, were conventional weapons. While nuclear weapons, by their sheer destructive potential, remain the central focus of disarmament efforts, it is noteworthy that conventional armaments have been used in every armed conflict in the post-war era up to now, while nuclear weapons have not. Furthermore, the conventional arms race has continued to consume a significantly larger proportion of world military expenditures than the nuclear arms race. Statistically, annual expenditures on conventional forces consume about 80 per cent of the estimated 450 billion dollars currently spent on armaments and armed forces globally.

The quantitative and qualitative expansion of the international trade in conventional arms is one of the most significant indicators of an evident international trend towards increased global militarization. One of the most important features of the arms trade has been its phenomenal growth in recent years. Ironically, the decade of the 1970s, declared as the Disarmament Decade by the General Assembly, experienced more arms transfers to more countries than the two preceding decades combined. In fact, according to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the value of major arms transfers during the years 1970 to 1976 alone equalled that of the two decades between 1950 and 1970.¹

Another significant characteristic of arms transfers in the 1970s was the growing role of the developing countries in such transfers, both as importers and exporters. For instance, while just over 50 per cent of the global arms

¹ SIPRI, ed., *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (London, Taylor and Francis, 1978), p. 223 and passim. Cited from Wolfgang Mallmann, "Arms Transfers to the third world: trends and changing patterns in the 1970s", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 10, No. 3, 1979, p. 301.

trade went to the third world in 1965, by the close of the 1970s, that figure had risen to an estimated 75 per cent.² In addition, more and more developing countries have undertaken domestic weapons production and some have already become suppliers.³ According to recent SIPRI estimates,⁴ a group of so called "third world suppliers" comprising Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Israel, North Korea, Libya, Singapore and South Africa collectively reached the position of seventh largest supplier of armaments to third world countries between 1970 and 1978, selling weapons valued at close to one billion dollars.

The expansion of the number of arms producers and suppliers, together with the growing volume and quality of weapons traded, significantly aggravated and further complicated the arms transfer picture during the 1970s and rendered efforts aimed at its limitation and regulation even more difficult. In this connexion, within the multilateral framework of the United Nations for example, three attempts so far — the first initiated by Malta in 1965,⁵ the second by Denmark in 1968⁶ and the third by Japan in 1976⁷ — to have the General Assembly adopt a resolution on the specific question of arms transfers have been unsuccessful, due largely to opposition by the developing countries which generally feel that the super-Powers and other heavily armed industrialized countries should first initiate restraint and reductions in their armaments before serious discussions or negotiations could begin on the arms transfer issue. Nevertheless, an increasing number of developing countries have in recent years expressed growing concern over the galloping conventional arms trade. In this connexion, it is worth noting that 11 developing countries sponsored the Japanese draft resolution referred to above, which, *inter alia*, would have requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive expert study on the problem.

In general, however, it seems clear from the discussions on the subject in the General Assembly at its thirty-second and thirty-third regular sessions as well as at the 1978 special session on disarmament, that most Member States agree that the question of limiting the widespread and expensive conventional arms race involves several complex factors.⁸ For example, while several States—mainly Western—propose that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be considered simultaneously and with equal attention,

² *Ibid.*

³ For further discussion of domestic arms production, see SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971).

⁴ SPIRI, ed., *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1979*.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/L.347; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), pp. 400-401.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27 to 29, 94 and 96, document A/7441, para. 5 (d); see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, p. 401.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda items 34 to 50 and 116, document A/31/386, para. 6; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 401-402.

⁸ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XXII.

another group of mostly non-aligned and developing countries stresses that such equal treatment of nuclear and conventional matters would detract from the urgency with which what they view as the priority disarmament concern, namely nuclear disarmament, should be considered. Furthermore, several developed arms-producing Western countries, among them Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, regard the transfer of arms, in particular their importation, as the prime cause of the conventional arms race. The developing and arms-purchasing countries, for their part, treat the question of arms transfers together with the question of the production, and hold that the conventional arms race is promoted by the producers and suppliers for their economic and political benefit. The non-aligned and developing countries, supported by the Soviet Union, have also emphasized what they believe is the incontestable right of States to legitimate defence and national security and of peoples under colonial and racist domination to use the means available to them, including arms, to achieve and secure their freedom and independence.

On the question of the approach towards realizing reductions in weapons transfers, there is a general recognition that significant responsibility rests with the major military powers, although the importing countries tend to regard that responsibility as "primary" while the exporters look upon it as "special".⁹ Importing countries feel that since the major Powers, in particular the super-Powers, are responsible for most of the weapons produced and transferred throughout the world, they should be the first to initiate meaningful disarmament action and should take the lead in reducing conventional armaments. In that connexion, the Soviet Union and the United States, which together account for an estimated three quarters of total world arms sales, have, since 1977, been holding bilateral talks on the arms transfer problem. Also in 1977, the United States Government announced its conventional arms transfer policy¹⁰ which it said was aimed, *inter alia*, at imposing unilateral restraints on United States arms supplies under certain specified conditions and at promoting co-operation between supplier and recipient nations as well as encouraging regional co-operation among the latter towards curtailing the arms traffic. However, at the tenth special session in 1978, some supplier nations, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, pointed to the ineffectiveness of a unilateral approach and urged multilateral action by all supplier countries in limiting arms transfers.¹¹

Another concept that in recent years has gained attention in the search for a solution to the question of conventional arms transfers is the regional

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 406-407.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 403; see also *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 13, No. 21, (23 May 1977), p. 756.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, paras. 83-85; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, p. 407.

approach. The idea that such an approach can contribute towards the improvement of international relations in general and the achievement of world-wide disarmament in particular reflects a growing view that the regional approach, not as a final goal in itself, but as an aspect of the step-by-step process towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, can complement wider multilateral efforts to realize that objective. Moreover, it has appeared increasingly that in some cases the complex questions of arms limitation and disarmament might be handled more easily within a narrower or regional framework than by attempting to apply broad concepts to widely differing situations and locations.

Within the United Nations, several Member States have put forth various initiatives to promote both the general concept and various specific aspects of the regional approach. One of the earliest such efforts was made by the United States on 19 April 1966 at the 257th meeting of the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC)¹² where it first elaborated, in a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, its approach to the conventional arms race problem and, in that context, emphasized the regional approach. In August 1970, it submitted a working paper¹³ in the CCD in which it again emphasized the potential role of regional measures in curbing the conventional arms spread. It suggested that such measures might prohibit the acquisition, by the regional States concerned, of certain types of conventional weapons and require potential suppliers to undertake not to transfer the proscribed equipment to the affected region. Again in the CCD in 1976¹⁴ the United States pointed out that it had unilaterally undertaken certain measures of self-restraint in the arms transfer field such as restricting the transfer of missiles and high performance aircraft to most regions. It held, furthermore, that the regional approach to arms transfer restrictions offered more promise than a world-wide scheme because States tended to establish their military requirements primarily on the basis of the military capabilities of neighbouring States.

During the 1970s, a number of other Member States, among them Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Venezuela, also supported the regional approach to conventional arms limitation with most of those States regarding such an approach mainly as a step towards a wider and more comprehensive global scheme to limit both the supply and the accumulation of such weapons.¹⁵

At the General Assembly's tenth special session in 1978,¹⁶ Denmark

¹² See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 402-403.

¹³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, annex C, sect. 36, document CCD/307.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27)*, vol. I, paras. 209-213.

¹⁵ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chaps. XX and XXII.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 405-406.

and the United States urged regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States to play a major role in limiting the flow of conventional arms and in dealing with local conflicts which can sometimes significantly fuel the arms traffic. France suggested the holding of a combined meeting of all arms-importing countries in the same region with all supplier countries and declared, in that connexion, that in the event of the realization of regional agreements to limit the arms traffic, France would adjust its arms sales policy accordingly. Pakistan, also supporting the regional approach, stressed at the same time that its use should not become an excuse for delaying global disarmament, both nuclear and conventional.

Towards the close of the 1970s, supporters of the regional approach increasingly referred to the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe and to the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho¹⁷ as important examples of such an approach which could be studied and attempted elsewhere. The Declaration of Ayacucho represents continuing efforts by its eight Latin American signatory States — Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela — to limit conventional armaments in their region.

At the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly in 1978, the overall question of the regional approach to arms limitation and disarmament received significant encouragement with the adoption by the Assembly of resolution 33/91 E. By that resolution, which had been initiated by Belgium, the General Assembly decided to undertake "a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament" and requested the Secretary General, with the assistance of experts, to prepare the study and submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1980.

While no States have formally opposed United Nations action on the question of a regional approach to disarmament, a large number of countries, mainly non-aligned, have continued to express reservations about the general concept; they appear, however, to be willing to give any idea that could promote the disarmament objective a chance to prove its usefulness.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

During its first substantive meetings in 1979, the Disarmament Commission considered the question of the limitation of the build-up and transfer of conventional armaments on a regional and world-wide basis.¹⁸

Most speakers who referred to the subject did so within the context of the Commission's discussion of the components of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It was generally felt that such a programme should incorporate disarmament measures in all spheres including nuclear and con-

¹⁷ See A/10044, annex.

¹⁸ See A/CN.10/PV.10-17, 21 and 22 and A/CN.10/PV.9-22/Corrigendum.

ventional, and at all levels, including bilateral, regional and global, with the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament. While sharing the general view that conventional arms regulation should be included in any comprehensive disarmament programme and require equal and undiminished security for all States, a number of delegations expressed views stipulating certain factors to be taken into account in promoting the limitation of conventional armaments, including their transfer. Egypt, for instance, referring to conventional weapons as the basis upon which non-nuclear countries built their security and defence systems, held that the reduction of such weapons should be considered within the framework of general and complete disarmament, including confidence-building measures and the resolution of existing political problems. Nigeria stated that while measures for the control of conventional armaments should be undertaken, it was essential to bear in mind the inalienable right of peoples under colonial and racist domination to self-determination and independence.

Brazil considered that only concrete undertakings towards nuclear disarmament and effective security assurances would justify the taking of more initiatives for conventional disarmament. For their part, a number of largely Western developed countries, including Austria, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom, emphasized the concept of balanced disarmament in both the nuclear and conventional fields. In explaining that position, Italy stated that while the importance of nuclear disarmament was evident, such disarmament, if achieved in isolation from a ban on other types of weapons, would leave certain countries in a position of superiority with respect to conventional arms, thus creating imbalances bound to aggravate suspicions and nourish tensions and thus increase the risk of conflict. The real disarmament thrust, Italy felt, was to control and eventually remove the capacity of States to wage wars of any kind.

As in other forums where the subject was discussed in 1979, the question of how best to deal with the conventional arms race problem continued to elicit a variety of suggestions from speakers.

A number of delegations, including those of Ghana, Italy, New Zealand and Venezuela, which among others supported the regional approach as one of the ways of dealing with the problem, stressed the importance of co-operation and consultations between suppliers and recipients of conventional arms in efforts to restrain the conventional arms race and in particular the transfer of such arms. Italy reiterated its proposal for the establishment of a United Nations agency for the regulation of conventional arms transfers on a regional basis. China maintained its position that the two super-Powers should take the lead in reducing their conventional armaments to be followed by other militarily significant States, while a number of Eastern European countries, among them Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, shared the view that the permanent members of the Security Council and the States linked to them by military alliances should halt the expansion and work towards the reduction of their conventional armaments and armed forces, as well as restrict their con-

ventional arms transfers. Some other States, including Egypt and Peru, took the position that countries with the largest arsenals of conventional weapons should take the initiative for the limitation and reduction of those weapons.

In view of the complex nature of the conventional arms race problem, Denmark and Italy suggested that the United Nations should study the question. Denmark considered further that the subject should be placed on the agenda of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament bodies, including the Disarmament Commission.

At its 22nd meeting on 8 June, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the recommendations relating to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.¹⁹ Among the elements developed and incorporated into the programme were the following provisions in the section entitled "Measures":²⁰

14.A.3. *Conventional weapons and armed forces*

(a) Cessation of the conventional arms race;

(b) Agreements and measures, multilateral, regional and bilateral, on the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces;

(c) Prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, taking into account the result of the 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;

(d) Consultations among major arms suppliers and recipients on the international transfer of conventional weapons.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

Meeting for the first time since the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament, the revitalized Geneva-based multilateral disarmament body, gave heightened consideration in 1979 to the vexing international problem of the build-up and transfer of conventional weapons.²¹

Although no concrete action was taken to deal with the problem, the growing expression of concern in the Committee about the quantitative and qualitative expansion of conventional armaments as well as appeals and proposals aimed at limiting both the accumulation and transfers of such weapons indicated the seriousness with which the problem was regarded and the desire for effective approaches and measures for its control and resolution, including possible action by the Committee.

Speakers generally deplored both the accumulation and trade in such weapons which the United States representative said made up 90 per cent of

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19.

²⁰ The subject of para. 14.A.3(c) is discussed in chap. XVIII above.

²¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix IV, vols. I, II and III.

total world-wide military arsenals, and which the representative of Australia noted consumed the bulk of global military expenditures and had inflicted the suffering and destruction experienced in conflicts in many parts of the world since the end of the Second World War. Several speakers, including those of Australia, Belgium, Italy, Yugoslavia and Zaire, saw the steady build-up of conventional armaments and armed forces as a symptom of the tension and conflict in many parts of the world and also as a development which tended to exacerbate such tension. Italy, Kenya, Venezuela and Yugoslavia regarded the escalating conventional arms race as especially harmful, socio-economically and otherwise, to the developing countries; Yugoslavia regarded those countries as constantly threatened by aggression, neo-colonial pressures, bloc rivalries and competition, and other forms of domination. Yugoslavia further expressed the view that the elimination of such disconcerting elements in international relations would establish the necessary conditions for the adoption of effective measures of conventional disarmament. A number of other States, among them Belgium, Italy, Kenya and the United Kingdom, while calling for effective conventional arms restraint, emphasized that such action must take into account the right of States to assure their security. In that connexion, Australia and the United Kingdom urged the limitation of both the production and the transfer of conventional arms so as not to place the non-producers at a security disadvantage.

On the issue of how to approach the search for solutions to the conventional arms race problem there was again a wide range of views, although Australia's stated preference for approaches that were practical, achievable and could contribute to security at lower levels of armaments represented the general thrust of most ideas put forward. The differences of opinion heard in recent years, largely between Western and non-aligned States, on the order of priority between nuclear and conventional disarmament emerged also in the Committee's deliberations, with Venezuela stressing that despite the growing seriousness of the conventional arms race problem, nuclear disarmament remained the priority disarmament objective, while Belgium and Italy called for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and conventional disarmament as equally important objectives. In Belgium's view, any nuclear reductions which did not lead to parallel reductions in conventional armaments, or served, on the contrary, as a pretext for increasing them, would ultimately lead to a further disquieting military disequilibrium.

In considering specific measures and approaches towards the realization of conventional arms limitations, Yugoslavia suggested that the first step towards that end should be taken by the major military Powers, while the United Kingdom and the United States called for co-operation between the suppliers and recipients of such weapons in order to achieve restraint, especially in the transfer of the weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, pointed to its unilateral efforts to curb the arms trade and explained, in that regard, that it maintained a restrictive arms export policy which did not allow any arms or other military equipment to be exported to areas of

tension. That policy, it added, was reflected in the small proportion of its exports accounted for by armaments: 0.7 per cent in 1977.

Although most delegations generally welcomed any ways and means that could lead to restraint in the build-up and transfer of conventional arms, the suggested approach that received the widest attention was the regional approach; in fact very limited reference was made, for instance, to the bilateral talks begun in 1977 between the two largest arms suppliers, the United States and the Soviet Union, on limiting arms transfers, although the United Kingdom stated that it had followed those talks with great interest.

Various aspects of the regional approach were considered, including the general concept of such an approach, conventional arms regulation within a regional framework, and regional security and détente in specific areas, particularly Europe.

With regard to the general concept, Sweden noted that the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its thirty-third regular session in 1978 had emphasized the importance of exploring regional solutions to arms race problems and pointed out that the Swedish Government fully supported such an approach, the implementation of which should take into account the characteristics of each situation. Belgium explained that its well-known support for the regional approach to disarmament was based in part on its view that the link between security and disarmament varied from region to region, and thus the paths leading to disarmament were many and varied. Belgium re-emphasized, however, that the taking of a regional path in no way precluded the use of a wider or global approach towards the same goal. Both Belgium and Sweden specifically welcomed the approval of the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, of the Belgium initiative calling for a systematic study of all aspects of regional disarmament (resolution 33/91 E). Holding, furthermore, that the advantage of regional measures lay mainly in the flexibility of their implementation and adaptation to local conditions, Belgium emphasized that the study should establish a list of rules and principles for use by regional States interested in reducing their military expenditures while maintaining a balance among the States of the region concerned, at as low a level of armaments as possible.

Several States, including France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, expressed support for the regional approach as a step towards a wider, global approach. Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States suggested that the use of the regional approach in the conventional arms control field should involve both the suppliers and recipients of such weapons, and should also take into account the need for the maintenance of mutual confidence and security for all the States of the region concerned. In that connexion, a number of references were made to the ongoing efforts for regional arms regulation in Europe and in Latin America, with speakers generally welcoming such initiatives as important and encouraging. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that the Latin American countries would agree on a common approach to restrict armaments of different kinds and expressed a willingness to consider favourably the question of participation in

discussions resulting from their initiative. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, said that the Latin American initiative, which it supported, was in line with its own restrictive arms export policy.

France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, the United States and Yugoslavia called specifically for regional arms restraint in Europe and a number of the delegations, including those of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United States, stressed the importance of the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe. Several speakers also emphasized the important role of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Security and Co-operation in Europe in enhancing regional peace, security, co-operation and confidence-building and urged the further consolidation and expansion of détente. Yugoslavia suggested further that the Mediterranean should be turned into a zone of peace, security and international co-operation. France, for its part, expressed certain reservations with regard to the Vienna talks which, it believed, would result, *inter alia*, in a redeployment rather than in a reduction of armaments; it reaffirmed its proposal for a European disarmament conference with the object of putting an end to over-armament with conventional weapons and the imbalances involved therein. Such a conference would bring together all States with military forces in Europe to discuss on an equal footing, free of bloc confrontations, ways and means of achieving genuine disarmament in Europe, specifically in the conventional field.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

The convening of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1979 coincided with the close of the Disarmament Decade (see chapter VI above). Thus, the Assembly in 1979 approached the question of disarmament with an added sense of solemnity and seriousness, as speaker after speaker decried the lack of substantive progress in disarmament and the ironic escalation of the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, during the Decade.

With regard to the conventional arms race, a large number of States, developed as well as developing, both during the general debate in plenary meetings and in the First Committee,²² continued to stress the view that the increasing international transfers of conventional weapons and the accompanying accumulation of such armaments contributed to or exacerbated conflict situations and wastefully diverted scarce resources from more productive socio-economic development efforts, especially in the developing countries. In that connexion, several references were made to relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General

²² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Assembly calling for action to limit the build-up and transfer of conventional arms.²³

The role of developing or third world countries in the conventional arms race — including the production, transfer and accumulation of weapons — was specifically referred to during the General Assembly's consideration of the overall question. Several delegations, including those of Chile, Costa Rica, Ireland, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea and Suriname, expressed particular concern over the growing involvement of the developing countries in the conventional arms race, and some of them, along with a number of other, largely third world, States, including Djibouti, Jamaica and Lesotho, stressed the negative economic and social consequences, especially to developing countries, of the arms race. Trinidad and Tobago, for its part, considered that the conventional arms race also negatively affected the socio-economic situation in the developed and major military countries where the production of consumer goods was reduced in favour of military production. Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago held that the growing conventional arms build-up among the major Powers tended to limit the amount of development assistance that those countries provided to the developing countries. Chile said it was particularly concerned about the competition among third world countries in the production of conventional armaments. Furthermore, such developing countries as Argentina, Iran, Lesotho and Papua New Guinea specifically deplored the transfer of conventional weapons by the developed to the developing countries, a practice which Iran regarded as a new form of domination and exploitation of those countries. Papua New Guinea explained that it was concerned about arms transfers to the third world both because the practice represented an extension of the East-West conflict to other areas, and because the weapons supplied to third world countries had been and were being used in conflict. Pakistan expressed the view that the arms race among the advanced countries was far more serious and threatening in the global context than third world military spending. Thus, Pakistan wondered why the bilateral United States-USSR talks on conventional armaments should be focused on the transfer aspect rather than on the more urgent and priority issue of the reduction of those two countries' conventional weapons arsenals.

On a related aspect, some developing countries, among them Argentina, Burundi, Mauritania, Nepal, Sudan and Tunisia, strongly regretted the conventional arms build-up in various areas of tension in the world. Argentina held that the increasing deployment of conventional weapons in such critical areas as Central Europe, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean created permanent security imbalances as the States in the regions concerned tried to balance and to counter-balance their military strength vis-à-vis that of their neighbours, and called for détente and self-restraint in military spending in those areas as well as the resolution of regional political problems. Malawi felt that the great Powers exported weapons to the developing countries to

²³ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), paras. 22, 81 and 85.

advance the great Powers' "propaganda" interests, since it was obvious that what the developing countries really needed was economic assistance, while Cuba, expressing a similar view, held that manufacturers and suppliers used conventional arms transfers to maximize their commercial and political advantages at the expense of the recipient developing countries. Elaborating on the political aspect of its view, Cuba held that conventional arms transfers were used, both legally and illegally, to promote local conflicts, to seek the destabilization of sovereign Governments which did not uphold the interests of the supplier-States, and to thwart the efforts of peoples fighting against exploitation and for liberation. Burundi considered that one cause of war was great-Power military rivalry in the third world.

Several delegations, including in particular those of African States, criticized external, especially Western, arms transfers and other aspects of military collaboration with the racist régime in South Africa and urged the termination of such ominous relations which the speakers stressed endangered not only regional but also international security as a whole. Nepal, in supporting the limitation of conventional arms transfers, held that such transfers created unstable conditions at the regional level.

The representative of Israel, noting that the character of the conventional arms race had changed, since 1960, from a race mainly among the great Powers to one involving different regions and geared increasingly towards the developing countries, expressed his country's view that this new situation was "the result of the concomitant effects of the proliferation of conflicts in the post-colonial era, the scientific revolution and, above all, the availability of unprecedented financial resources to Middle Eastern oil-producing countries" which had accelerated the production and widened the world-wide spread of sophisticated armaments. He stated further that there was a "tragic" discrepancy in the third world between the lack of socio-economic development on the one hand and the availability of modern means of destruction on the other and wished that those providing technology to the third world would be as generous with aid in agriculture as they were in modernizing warfare. Sweden, while acknowledging that there was a concentration of conventional armaments in certain regions of high tension, observed that that trend was noticeable everywhere, and thus the need to limit armed forces and conventional weapons existed everywhere.

Iraq pointed out, however, that third world countries had to import weapons for their defence, and India, noting that efforts were being made by certain countries to control international conventional arms transfers, stressed its view that such action would operate against the non-aligned countries as controls would not be applied to members of military alliances or States parties to special arrangements with the nuclear-weapon States. India emphasized that many non-aligned countries still faced grave threats to their independence. It supported the concept of conventional disarmament as long as it was within the framework of general and complete disarmament and took into account the central arms race between the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shared India's view and

stated that technological and other problems compelled developing countries in present world conditions to spend their badly needed resources on armaments.

In general, both developed and developing countries, among them Benin, Canada, Chad, Congo, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom, specifically supported the limitation of conventional arms transfers. The Netherlands, explaining its support, held that the process of disarmament and peace could be jeopardized unless effective measures to control international conventional arms transfers were realized. Spain, declaring that it attached great importance to the question of conventional disarmament and had been alarmed by the build-up of arsenals of conventional weapons and the recent increase in their "fraudulent and uncontrolled" transfer, considered that legal controls would to a large degree benefit the States concerned and contribute effectively to the strengthening of their security. For its part, the United Republic of Tanzania, while saying that it supported initiatives aimed at regulating international conventional arms transfers, emphasized at the same time that efforts in that direction should not serve to deny legitimate arms acquisitions "necessary for the security of nations, peoples or liberation movements fighting against colonialism and *apartheid* in the exercise of their right to self-determination and independence."

As in other recent years, there was a difference of opinion, largely between a group of developed Western countries on the one hand and a group of developing and non-aligned countries on the other, over which sphere of disarmament — nuclear or conventional — deserved priority consideration. The former, including Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and the United Kingdom, as well as China, expressed the view that conventional and nuclear disarmament should be given equal importance and be pursued simultaneously, while the latter, among them Argentina, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Peru, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania held that nuclear disarmament remained the priority question and should be pursued first, before attention was focused on conventional disarmament. Uganda emphasized that it could not accept the argument that because four-fifths of world military expenditures were spent on conventional armaments and armed forces and because millions of people had died as victims of conventional weapons, it was therefore necessary to consider the elimination of those weapons as a matter of priority. Such arguments, in Uganda's view, were calculated to detract from the priority consideration of nuclear disarmament. Uganda therefore called upon the Committee on Disarmament to abide by the disarmament priorities established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session in 1978.

As to responsibility for conventional arms restraint, a number of developing and non-aligned countries, among them Argentina, Pakistan, Peru and Yugoslavia, took the position that the leading role should be taken by the super-Powers and other major military Powers. The Netherlands, on the other

hand, expressed a view shared by a number of developed Western States to the effect that the developing countries bore the same responsibilities as the industrialized countries in the field of conventional arms limitation.

In the search for solutions to the problems of the build-up and transfer of conventional weapons on a global and regional basis, a number of views were expressed, both of a general as well as of a more specific nature. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, supported all international efforts to limit conventional arms exports and expressed the conviction that responsibility for the success of such endeavours rested on the recipient as well as on the supplier countries in both East and West. Spain proposed that the United Nations should draft a code of conduct with clear, precise and universal validity to govern, under United Nations control, the sale of conventional weapons to third-party countries. Asserting that such action would effectively control the conventional arms trade by eliminating the illegal and fraudulent traffic in such weapons, Spain explained that the rules it was proposing would: (a) establish the cases in which trading in weapons would not be permitted; (b) establish by means of a certificate of final destination and other relevant requirements the necessary guarantees that the weapons being sold would not be illegally transferred to a third party; and (c) call upon the United Nations to set up the necessary machinery to ensure compliance with those rules.

The Congo expressed the view that the only limitations on the transfer of conventional weapons in existence were embargoes which, even in the case of the broadly supported arms embargo against South Africa, had proved to be ineffective. Moreover, when measures of restraint were decided upon unilaterally, they were usually arbitrary; they did not generate real disarmament and were endured largely by third world countries. The Congo regretted the lack of a forum and the absence of expanded international negotiations on the question.

The idea of the United Nations undertaking study of the problem of conventional arms transfers was supported by Belgium, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Sweden considered it "essential" that the United Nations should study ways of reducing the arms trade and arms transfers, while the United Kingdom, for its part, regretted the lack of agreement, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978, on the proposal for a study on arms transfers.

Other suggestions for action on conventional arms-related subjects included a call by New Zealand for the United Nations to devote greater attention to the problem of conventional arms. New Zealand felt that, although the problems were complex and sensitive since they were related to the security of States, the United Nations should nevertheless make a start in the discussion of conventional arms control in all its aspects. It was specifically suggested by several delegations, including those of Denmark, Spain and Yugoslavia, that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should begin playing a direct role in the examination of the question of conventional disarmament. In that connexion, Denmark, expressing the view that it was time

that the United Nations considered the problem of the conventional arms race including the related issue of international arms transfers, believed that the appropriate United Nations body for initial action was the Disarmament Commission. Denmark therefore favoured the inclusion of the issue in the agenda of the Commission's second substantive session in 1980. Consideration of the problem by the Commission, Denmark hoped, might facilitate the identification of ways and means of dealing with the problem within the United Nations framework. Yugoslavia, expressing a similar view, suggested that the United Nations Disarmament Commission could, in addition to performing its other tasks, work out principles and elements relevant to a comprehensive consideration of the problem of the conventional arms race. Spain, for its part, proposed that during the Disarmament Commission's second substantive session, it should deal only with all aspects of disarmament and control of conventional weapons, a subject which, in Spain's view, had not, as yet, been adequately addressed. With regard to the involvement of the Committee on Disarmament, the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago regarded it as "vital for international peace and security" that the Committee, in addition to working for a halt to the nuclear arms race, consider effective measures to control conventional armaments, including their transfer.

Discussion on the regional approach involved references to the general concept of regional arms limitation and disarmament, conventional arms control within a regional framework, questions of regional security, détente and co-operation in various areas, in particular Europe, and specific examples of regional arms limitation efforts such as the efforts by several Latin American States to regulate and reduce the conventional arms flow to and within their region. In general, the regional concept was supported by countries of all geographical, political and socio-economic backgrounds. Regional measures were seen not as ultimate disarmament goals but as supplements to other approaches, including bilateral and global initiatives, towards disarmament. Supporters continued to stress in regional arms limitation and disarmament efforts the importance of taking into account the special characteristics as well as the existing security situation of the regions concerned. A number of speakers, among them the representatives of Belgium, Finland, Poland and the United States, specifically referred to the ongoing expert study which the General Assembly, by resolution 33/91 E, had called for on all the aspects of regional disarmament. During 1979, the group of experts appointed by the Secretary General to assist him in preparing the study held two sessions, both at Geneva (see chapter XXII below, page 347).

Also, especially in recent years, questions of peace, security, co-operation, confidence-building and détente have increasingly been viewed as vital components of and incentives for arms control and disarmament, particularly at the regional level. Thus, a wide range of non-aligned, Eastern European and Western States urged the building and strengthening of regional détente and its extension to the military field. In that context, several speakers supported the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, recommending specific confidence-building measures, taking regional conditions and requirements into account and calling for a study on the question,

which led to the adoption of resolution 34/87 B (see chapter I above, page 21). Citing the European region as a specific example, the Federal Republic of Germany noted that confidence-building for that area was developed within the context of the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The importance of that Conference was referred to by many speakers since Europe was to a considerable extent regarded as the centre of both the world arms race and global momentum for disarmament. Efforts being made to promote arms limitation and disarmament in Europe include the proposal by France for a European disarmament conference, the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty States made in May 1979 for a conference of all European States and the United States and Canada in order to lessen the risk of military confrontation in Europe,²⁴ and the ongoing talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, being held in Vienna between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty military alliances.

Several Warsaw Treaty members, among them Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, re-emphasized the relevance of their May proposal, pointing out that lessening the possibility of military confrontation would lead to a reduction of the concentration and numbers of armaments and armed forces in Europe. Austria also supported the Warsaw Treaty proposal and France referred to it along with its own proposal as illustrating the "realism of a move designed to give the policy of détente in Europe the precise content that will show its dynamism." Other States, including Finland and Greece, supported the idea of holding a European disarmament conference, with Finland suggesting that it should promote disarmament both in Europe as a whole and at the subregional level and that future negotiations should involve all the Governments concerned and cover all categories of weapons.

A large number of speakers, particularly the representatives of the participating Eastern European and Western countries, continued to stress the relevance of the Vienna negotiations to the goals of peace, security and stability in Central Europe and to hope for results which would spur further progress in disarmament in Europe as a whole. The announcement of 6 October by President Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Union that his country would, over the period of a year, unilaterally reduce its forces and armaments in Central Europe by withdrawing up to 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks and other military equipment from the territory of the German Democratic Republic, was positively referred to by several speakers, particularly from Eastern European and non-aligned countries, including Austria, Bulgaria, Burma, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Malta, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The representative of the German Democratic Republic, for example, stated that the Warsaw Treaty members would expect a constructive response from the NATO countries to the "goodwill gesture" of

²⁴ See press release No. 79 of 16 May 1979, issued by the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations.

the Soviet Union. Sweden held that while the Soviet Union's announced action would not, in itself, alter the military balance in the region, it could nevertheless have a beneficial effect on current European negotiations. Austria hoped that the decision of the USSR would prove to be a first sign of renewed efforts on the part of the negotiating partners to accelerate the Vienna talks. The United Kingdom, while welcoming the initiative, stressed that, even after such reductions, the superiority of Warsaw pact troop and tank strength over those of NATO would be little changed: it believed, however, that realistic, balanced and verifiable arms control measures could enhance security. China regarded the Soviet decision as "nothing more than a gimmick" since, in China's view, the Soviet Union enjoyed an "overwhelming military superiority in Europe."

The Declaration of Ayacucho,²⁵ signed by six Latin American States in 1974, is aimed at limiting importation and transfers of conventional weapons in Latin America. That initiative was supported in the Assembly by a number of States, including Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Peru. Peru, as host country of the 1974 meeting that produced the Declaration, believed that, although progress had so far been limited, Latin America could take the lead, as it had in establishing a denuclearized zone, in formulating a regional agreement on conventional arms control that would lay the basis for a joint policy by the parties concerned.

In addition to Europe and Latin America, references were also made to military developments in other specific regions, including Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and South-East Asia, generally in the context of the political tensions in those areas. In that connexion, a number of States called upon the major Powers, in particular the Western States, to abide by relevant United Nations decisions, in particular Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, prohibiting the transfer of weapons to, and other aspects of military co-operation with, South Africa, Malta and Morocco reiterated the suggestion for a Mediterranean peace zone and Viet Nam called for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia.

Several, mainly Western, States, among them Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom supported the general concept of the regional approach in the search for resolution of the conventional arms race problem, including the question of transfers. Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom held that such an approach appeared to offer the best prospects for success, and Austria and France felt that the arms transfer problem did not lend itself easily to broad or world-wide approaches. Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom stressed that effective solution of the arms transfer problem required the co-operation of both supplier and recipient countries, particularly within a regional framework. Italy repeated its proposal for a United Nations body which would be divided into regional committees wherein both the major

²⁵ See A/10044, annex.

conventional arms supplier and recipient countries of a given region would be represented.

A number of other countries, mainly non-aligned, among them Nigeria and Pakistan, took a less supportive position on the regional approach to conventional arms control and disarmament. Pakistan held that the regional approach could help assure the security of regional States as long as it did not deprive any of those States of a level of forces essential for their national security. It was ready to explore the possibility of mutual force reductions in the regional context. In Nigeria's view, the global quest for general and complete disarmament should not be broken down into regional compartments with each region deciding what measures it wished or did not wish to undertake. Such a development, Nigeria believed, would distort the universal programme for disarmament and would de-emphasize the priority disarmament concerns that had been established by the international community. Nigeria also stressed that any initiative for regional disarmament should emanate from the countries of the region concerned, since they were the best judges of regional security requirements. Nigeria also held that if regional efforts were to contribute effectively to the global disarmament effort, then the United Nations would, whenever requested, have to assist a region in the maintenance of its peace and security.

Despite the intensive consideration of questions of conventional arms regulation and disarmament and the regional approach at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, no specific resolution was initiated on any of those questions. However, a number of disarmament and disarmament-related resolutions adopted referred to certain aspects of those questions. Resolution 34/80 A, for instance, adopted under the agenda item on the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace concerned a regional initiative dating back to 1971 (see chapter XX below). By resolution 34/83 C, entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session" the General Assembly expressed its deep concern about the continued arms race, nuclear as well as conventional, and escalating military budgets, and urgently called for steps leading to world disarmament in accordance with the Programme of Action agreed upon at the Assembly's tenth special session (see chapter II above, pages 36-38). On the question of the reduction of military budgets the General Assembly also adopted resolution 34/83 F (see chapter XXI below).

Finally, a disarmament-related resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and pertinent to the question of the limitation of the build-up and transfer of conventional armaments was resolution 34/93 D entitled "Arms embargo against South Africa." By that resolution, adopted under the general agenda item entitled "Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of South Africa" the Assembly considered that the full implementation and reinforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa (as declared by the Security Council in its resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977) was an essential first step in international action against *apartheid*, noted with serious concern and regret that certain Western and other Governments and transnational corporations continued to co-operate with the

racist South African régime in the military field, and requested the Security Council once again to ensure that all States, *inter alia*: (a) revoked all licences granted to South Africa for the manufacture of arms and related equipment; (b) prohibited corporations within their jurisdiction from any involvement in the manufacture in South Africa of arms and related equipment for military and police use, and in the transfer of technology and capital for that purpose; (c) terminated the exchange of military, air, naval and scientific personnel with the *apartheid* régime; and (d) prohibited the supply of aircraft, aircraft engines and parts, electronic and telecommunications equipment and computers to South Africa.

Conclusion

While nuclear weapons, because of their massive destructive capability, remain the top target of international disarmament efforts, the escalating conventional arms race, including the production, accumulation and transfer of the weapons involved, is generating increasing anxiety and concern. This aspect of the arms race consumes an estimated 80 per cent of total annual world military expenditures and involves a great number and diversity of countries, developed and developing. Moreover, the conventional arms race problem, which involves a wide range of economic and security factors, is further complicated by the fact that it is conventional weapons which have been used in all the armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War. Thus, the main area of contention appears to be how to realize limitations fairly and effectively in the build-up and transfer of conventional arms without jeopardizing any State's vital interests, rather than whether States support the idea of conventional arms restraint.

In the examination, within the United Nations framework, of ways and means to achieve progress in this field, several differing views and approaches have been advanced but no consensus has yet emerged as to a particular approach upon which concrete negotiations aimed at agreed limitations could be based. Nevertheless, the increasing international consideration of the question of conventional arms limitation and disarmament, both overall and on a regional basis, has been useful in revealing the diversity of positions, concerns and anxieties of a large number of States on various important aspects of this problem.

There is no doubt that there will be further consideration, both within the United Nations and in other forums, of the problem of the build-up and transfer of conventional armaments, including the General Assembly's examination, at its thirty-fifth session, of the expert study on the regional aspects of disarmament which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare. It is to be hoped that continuing intensive discussion of the question will help not only to clarify issues further, but perhaps also to lead to the finding of practical ways of approaching the problem and concrete progress towards its solution.

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A ZONE OF PEACE in the Indian Ocean, although not a new idea, was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly for the first time in 1971, under an item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", at the request of Sri Lanka and, later, the United Republic of Tanzania. The General Assembly that year adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) in which it solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. In conformity with the Declaration, the Assembly called upon the great Powers to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the area all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great-Power military presence conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry. It also called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, with the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of the Declaration and taking of necessary action to ensure that: (a) warships and military aircraft might not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral and hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations was unaffected; and (c) appropriate arrangements were made to give effect to any international agreement that might ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The following year, the General Assembly, by its resolution 2992 (XXVII), established an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania,

Yemen and Zambia, to study the implications of the Declaration with special reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States and other States consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

In 1973, the Assembly adopted resolution 3080 (XXVIII), by which it, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean with special reference to their naval deployments conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry. The statement was annexed to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report to the General Assembly at its following session.¹ At that session the Assembly, by resolution 3259 A (XXIX), called upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean and invited all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee. And by resolution 3259 B (XXIX) it added three new members to the *Ad Hoc* Committee — Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.

The General Assembly, in 1975, by resolution 3468 (XXX), *inter alia*, noted that an agreement in principle on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean had emerged among the littoral and hinterland States² and requested them to continue their consultations to that end.

At its thirty-first session, in 1976, by resolution 31/88, the General Assembly once again invited all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions.

In 1977, at its thirty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/86 by which, among other things, it decided that, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean would be convened in New York at a suitable date. It requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make the necessary preparations for that meeting. Further, the Assembly decided to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the addition of Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique and Oman.

In 1978, the General Assembly, at its tenth special session, endorsed the concept of the establishment of zones of peace by including, in the Programme of Action of its Final Document,³ the statement that under appropriate conditions such zones could contribute to strengthening the security of States; in that regard it noted, *inter alia*, the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9629 and Add. 1).*

² *Ibid.*, *Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/10029)*, para. 31.

³ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 64.

and relevant resolutions of the Assembly, and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

Subsequently, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly, by resolution 33/68, decided to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean for the implementation of the Declaration contained in original resolution 2832 (XXVI), such States being listed in the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth, thirtieth and thirty-third sessions. It also decided that other States not falling within that category, but which had participated or had expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Committee, could attend upon the invitation of the Committee. The Assembly also decided that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, performing the functions of a preparatory committee, would make the necessary preparations for convening the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and that the Committee would set up informal working groups as necessary.

Besides appearing on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1971, the proposal to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has also received consideration at other international conferences, in particular, the conferences of the Islamic and the non-aligned States, which have consistently supported the concept of the zone of peace and the implementation of the Declaration.

Work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee performing the functions of a preparatory committee, 1979

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, performing the functions of a preparatory committee for the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean pursuant to resolution 33/68, held three sessions between February and May 1979 concluding its work in 33 formal and informal meetings. The *Ad Hoc* Committee also established two working groups which met intersessionally.

In the first phase of the preparatory work in February, the Committee Chairman, the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, stressed that, both at the preparatory stage and at the Meeting itself, future progress towards the implementation of the objectives set forth in the Declaration depended on the outcome of that work. He pointed out that the Committee's work assumed even greater importance when viewed from the perspective of the ultimate goal, as well as in the context of recent developments in the Indian Ocean region.

At the outset of its work, the Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare a number of documents pertaining to relevant items on the agenda. Later, the Secretariat prepared additional papers, including an analysis of the views of Governments on relevant aspects of the Meeting, background

papers, and a preliminary framework for the draft final documents of the Meeting.

During the preparatory sessions, the *Ad Hoc* Committee discussed all the relevant aspects of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, including its purposes, the provisional agenda, the rules of procedure, the question of participation, and the Final Document. In February, the Committee set up a working group, consisting of the officers of the Committee and its Secretary, and entrusted it with the task of preparing the draft of a provisional agenda for the Meeting. Subsequently, the *Ad Hoc* Committee decided to recommend the draft provisional agenda submitted by the working group for adoption by the Meeting. The substantive parts of the provisional agenda read as follows:

5. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, performing the functions of a preparatory committee for the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean
6. Review and assessment of developments since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI)
7. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
8. Adoption of the Final Document
9. Adoption of the report of the Meeting to the General Assembly

The *Ad Hoc* Committee also considered a set of draft rules of procedure prepared by the Secretariat, and adopted them, with certain modifications, as the provisional rules of procedure to be recommended for adoption by the Meeting. The provisional rules provided that the Meeting should make every effort to ensure that substantive decisions would be adopted by consensus and that, in the absence of consensus, the Meeting should proceed to take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

On the question of participation at the Meeting, resolution 33/68 specified that the States concerned had been listed in several previous reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee (see pp. 294-296 above), and that certain other States could also attend the Meeting upon the invitation of the Committee. With regard to the latter category of States, the Committee agreed to invite the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean with which the Committee had already held consultations during previous years. Following extensive deliberations on the question, it decided that a total of 59 States,⁴ consisting of the 44 littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean;

⁴ (a) Littoral and hinterland States: Afghanistan, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia; (b) Members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee which are not littoral and hinterland States: China, Greece and Japan; a State which participated in an observer capacity in the Committee: Panama; (c) great Powers and major maritime users with which the *Ad Hoc* Committee had previously held consultations: Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Liberia, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

four States which were not littoral and hinterland States but of which three were members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and one had participated in an observer capacity in the Committee; and 11 great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean would be invited to participate in the Meeting. With respect to the scope of their participation in the Meeting, the Committee decided that the last mentioned States would be invited to participate at the inaugural session of the Meeting and would also be welcome to participate as observers in all formal meetings of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

With regard to the level of representation at the Meeting, the Committee decided that participation should be, at least, at the ambassadorial level.

A great deal of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's preparatory work was devoted to consideration of a draft final document of the Meeting. At its second session, the Committee set up a working group consisting of the officers and the Secretary of the Committee, but open to all members, to prepare a draft of the document. The Working Group carried out its work between 3 April and 1 May under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Also during the Committee's second session, Iraq proposed that the Committee should take an urgent decision, renewing the invitation to the States concerned, for implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and that the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should convene an urgent meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the situation in the Indian Ocean as a result of recent developments in the region, especially the movements of American warships. A number of delegations, including Australia and Japan, however, questioned the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to convene such a meeting, while others, including Ethiopia, India, Iran and Madagascar, requested further clarification and amplification of Iraq's proposal. Following discussions, the Committee decided to request its Chairman, pursuant to its decision of 18 April 1977, to continue his consultations with the United States and the Soviet Union, with a view to ascertaining the status of the bilateral talks on their military presence in the Indian Ocean and to discuss with them the co-operation they would give the Committee in the discharge of its functions.

The Chairman introduced the draft final document of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean at its third session, on 14 May. After extensive deliberations, the *Ad Hoc* Committee decided to submit a draft resolution embodying a draft final document⁵ to the Meeting for its consideration. In addition to a preambular draft resolution which embodied elements from the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as well as other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the document consisted of three parts: introduction, declaration, and a section dealing with future work or implementation of the Declaration. The substantive sections contained bracketed portions indicating areas where different views existed or areas where alternative versions were proposed for inclusion in the Final Document.

⁵ A/AC.199/4.

The introduction provided a summary of the relevant decisions taken on the subject.

The draft declaration consisted of two sections, one on the review and assessment of developments since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the other dealing with certain principles which could possibly form the basis of a common agreement at the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

The section on principles, which contained the greatest number of brackets, thus reflecting a wide divergence of views, covered, *inter alia*, the following elements: limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; halting the further escalation and expansion and eliminating the military presence of the great Powers conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry; elimination of military bases and other military installations of the great Powers from the Indian Ocean; denuclearization of the Indian Ocean; non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes; strengthening of international security through regional and other co-operation in the context of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; and free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean peace zone by the vessels of all nations in accordance with the norms and principles of international law and customs.

The part concerning future work or implementation provided three versions. One of the alternatives would, *inter alia*, call for a committee or council to be established under the supervision of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, to oversee and co-ordinate the process of achieving the objectives of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The other two alternatives were formulated to follow more specifically the terms of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, including consideration of the question of convening a conference on the Indian Ocean.

At the Committee's final preparatory session in May, the Chairman reported that, as requested by the Committee, he had continued consultations with the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union and had urged them to resume their bilateral talks. He further reported that on 10 May 1979, the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union had communicated to him the views of his Government as follows:

1. The Soviet Union has been a consistent supporter of military détente everywhere in the world and in the region of the Indian Ocean in particular, and approaches with understanding the idea of creating a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. The achievement of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the question of limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean would contribute to the realization of this idea.

However a year ago the United States suspended the Soviet-American bilateral talks and until now has avoided reaching an agreement on the date of their resumption. At the same time, the American side has tried to link artificially the question of the resumption of the talks with developments elsewhere in the world.

Such a stand of the United States makes it impossible to talk in definite terms with regard to the prospects of these talks.

The Soviet side in the course of the past year has more than once put forward concrete proposals concerning the timing for the resumption of the talks but in every instance it was confronted with a negative response on the part of the United States.

The Soviet Union as before is prepared in a responsible and concrete manner to continue the Soviet-American talks on this question. The position of the USSR is completely in accordance with the recent resolution of the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, which contains an urgent call to resume without delay the talks between the USSR and the United States concerning their military presence in the Indian Ocean.

2. As the Mission of the USSR has already informed the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union will express its views on the situation in the Indian Ocean and on the Soviet-American talks in that regard at the opening session of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Besides that the Soviet Union would be ready to participate as an observer in the whole course of the Meeting.

The Chairman also reported that on 11 May, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States had communicated to the Chairman the views of the United States as follows:

1. That the United States Government has not yet discussed the resumption of bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean arms limitation with the Soviet Union.

2. The United States expects that this matter would come up during the projected summit meeting for signature of the SALT agreement.

3. The United States hopes that it would be possible to reach an agreement to resume the talks.

The Chairman also stated that he was persisting in his efforts to secure the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and to enlarge thereafter the scope of their talks as well as enter into negotiations with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, with a view to fulfilling the objectives of the Declaration.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee concluded its preparatory work on 23 May 1979, by adopting its report⁶ to the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, 1979

The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, which met at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Colombo from 4 to 9 June 1979, in its final communiqué,⁷ deplored the reported decision by the United States to establish a Fifth Fleet and the strengthening of existing military bases such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. It also noted with deep concern the deployment of United States naval units in the Arabian Sea in connexion with the recent development in the area. These and other similar acts of coercion, provocation and manoeuvres, it added, as well as the escalation of the repeated United States threats against oil-producing countries, especially in the Arabian Gulf, constituted a direct threat to the independence, security and stability of the littoral and hinterland States. It noted that the objectives of

⁶ A/AC.199/1.

⁷ See A/34/357, annex I, paras. 82-85.

the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1971, were to free this region of great-Power rivalries and competition for influence which resulted in increasing military presence threatening the peace and stability of the area. The Bureau therefore affirmed that the presence in the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions of foreign bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great-Power military presence conceived in the context of great-Power rivalries constituted a flagrant violation of the Declaration. It expressed satisfaction that certain littoral and hinterland States had withdrawn from membership in military alliances and pacts conceived in the context of great-Power rivalries.

Further, the Bureau stated that it was a cause of great regret that, despite the wishes expressed by the littoral and hinterland States, great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean, instead of decreasing, had actually increased over the years. Most recent developments indicated that the great Powers intended to intensify their rivalry in the area and to station military and naval forces there on a permanent basis. These developments corresponded to a set-back in the relaxation of international tensions and to the intensification of the arms race between the great Powers. Consequently, contrary to the principles of peaceful co-existence, the great Powers continued to seek and enlarge their respective spheres of influence.

The Bureau noted with satisfaction that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean had made preparations for a Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. The hope was expressed that all the States concerned would actively participate in the deliberations and would contribute significantly towards harmonizing the common position to be taken by the littoral and hinterland States and the early convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. The Bureau deplored the lack of response from the great Powers and noted that the United States-USSR talks on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, despite their limited scope, had been halted. It called upon those countries to resume their talks forthwith, on the basis of the Declaration. Finally the Bureau expressed the hope that the great Powers and the major maritime users would co-operate effectively with the *Ad Hoc* Committee to implement United Nations General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI).

The Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean

The Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean held its session between 2 and 13 July 1979 in New York. A total of 62 States participated in the Meeting.⁸ Of that total, 14 States, including the great

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45)*, paras. 12 and 13; the States were those listed in foot-note 4 plus Finland, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean concerned, were invited to participate at the inaugural session of the Meeting and as observers in all formal meetings during the session.

The Meeting was opened by the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, who read a message from the Secretary-General. In his message, the Secretary-General said that the General Assembly's decision to hold the Meeting had been a significant advance in the efforts of the United Nations to promote regional peace and security within the broader framework of the international community's search for global stability, co-operation and peaceful development. He pointed out that the regional co-operative approach had now assumed its rightful place among the measures that could be instituted in the field of disarmament. Although the realization of such measures could not be viewed as the final goal, it was none the less an important component of the step-by-step approach to the eventual achievement of disarmament on a global scale. The Secretary-General expressed his sincere hope that the participants in the Meeting would make every effort to achieve a just solution that would be satisfactory to all parties concerned. Such an outcome, he stated, would strengthen the collective position of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in their long and sustained drive towards furthering the objective of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, as set forth in the 1971 Declaration of the General Assembly.

At its opening meeting, the Meeting elected the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka as its President, the representatives of Australia, Indonesia, Iraq, Mozambique and Swaziland as Vice-Presidents and the representative of Madagascar as Rapporteur. At the same meeting, the Meeting adopted the agenda and the rules of procedure recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee and took note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

In his opening statement, the President stated that the Meeting marked a major step towards convening a conference that would have as its ultimate objective the implementation of the General Assembly's 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Since the adoption of the Declaration, the general concept of zones of peace had acquired increasing viability as a useful avenue towards achieving disarmament. In the Indian Ocean, in particular, that concept had come to crystallize the hopes and aspirations of the countries and peoples of the area for peace, security and tranquility which were much needed for the task of economic and social reconstruction. In a world plagued by conflict and confrontation, a demilitarized and peaceful Indian Ocean would constitute an innovative approach in the disarmament field and could generate a highly welcome momentum towards regional peaceful coexistence, security and confidence with beneficial effects ranging beyond the region.

Continuing, he said that a central requirement for genuine peace in the Indian Ocean was demilitarization. There could be neither genuine nor permanent peace in the area as long as the arms race there continued to escalate and the Indian Ocean continued to harbour foreign military installations and

other manifestations of great-Power military presence conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry. Nor could military alliances, involving the regional countries in great-Power rivalries, be conducive to a harmonious existence for the States of the region. He added that he knew of no country in the region which would oppose or interfere with the peaceful naval activities of external Powers in the Indian Ocean.

The President pointed out that over eight years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and yet the implementation of the goals embodied therein was still awaiting further constructive co-operative efforts on the part of all parties concerned. The littoral and hinterland States must now consider how they should proceed to chart the future course towards the realization of the central objectives of the Declaration. Despite the complexity of the task ahead, they were as determined as ever to work towards a conference of all States concerned at which a suitable treaty on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace could be finally concluded. Accordingly, he wished to propose that the Meeting should consider initiating the process of drafting the treaty. He pointed out that the *Ad Hoc* Committee, with its experience in that field, afforded a ready and useful instrument for assuming such a function. He suggested that, in order to have as wide an input as possible in the work of drafting the treaty, the Committee should maintain appropriate consultations with all parties concerned and perhaps be expanded.

During the course of the Meeting, a wide range of views emerged with respect to different aspects of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Several littoral and hinterland States, including Bhutan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan, subscribed to the view that those States had to endeavour to forge a common position in their negotiations with the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean at a future conference on the question. India, however, emphasized that to maintain the unity and solidarity of the littoral and hinterland States, it would be necessary to avoid insistence on proposals on which there clearly existed differences of opinion among the participants. Furthermore, the delegation added, the littoral and hinterland States should not be asked to assume obligations and commitments which were not assumed also by the great Powers.

Australia, pointing out that the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean were a diverse grouping of nations, emphasized that if any moves to create a zone of peace were taken without the agreement of all Indian Ocean States, they would lack utility. Iran stated that, in the approach to the delicate issues involved, the development of consensus would serve the large interest of the area and would be politically useful for the promotion of the peace zone idea in the region and beyond it. Pakistan maintained that the Meeting should seek the balanced achievement of two fundamental objectives, namely, elimination of great-Power presence and rivalry from the region, and arrangements among the Indian Ocean States for a viable system of security within the region through the adoption of a code of con-

duct. Such a code of conduct, the delegation elaborated, should include a commitment to the basic principles of the Charter.

The great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, including Greece, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, while reiterating their support for the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, stressed that the establishment of such a zone should be consistent with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and the right of innocent passage in conformity with the recognized principles of international law and custom. Japan further emphasized that the establishment of such a zone should be based on a consensus among all the States concerned, with the resumption of the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning arms limitation measures in the area being indispensable; establishment of the zone should be accompanied by effective verification where necessary and should not jeopardize the security of any of the States concerned.

In elaborating what it considered to be its interests in the Indian Ocean region, the Soviet Union stated that it was, first of all, interested in extending the relaxation of international tension to that region. The fundamental elements of détente, such as the establishment of normal and equal relations between States, the settlement of questions arising between them not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means, with a certain degree of trust and mutual respect for the legitimate interests and rights of each State, must be decisive in relations between countries in every region of the world, including the region of the Indian Ocean. The delegation pointed out that the Soviet Union had a direct interest in the development of a situation such as it had described. Its interest was related, in part, to the fact that the only year-round sea route between the European part of the Soviet Union and the Far Eastern or East Asian part passed through the Indian Ocean; thus, it had a legitimate interest in the security of that route. Furthermore, its territory, in particular, the trans-Caucasian and Central Asian Republics, lay in the immediate vicinity of the Indian Ocean. That geographical fact had its strategic consequences. Military access to Soviet territory with modern systems was easier from the Indian Ocean than from any other region of the world. That, according to the delegation, caused the Soviet Union concern about its security to the south. After outlining what it perceived as the legitimate interests of the littoral and hinterland States as well as of other States, including the United States, Japan and some European States which made extensive use of the Indian Ocean sea routes, the Soviet delegation stressed that it saw the theoretical possibility of reconciling the interests of the different groups of States in a manner that would ensure the legitimate interests of all concerned.

The United States noted that while it appreciated and shared many of the goals of the supporters of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, it believed that zones of peace could only come into effect through an agreement of all States concerned, wherever situated. It could not accept the proposition that a regional group of States could declare a legal régime for the seas to which other States were expected to adhere or which could be

binding on other States without their consent. Nor could the General Assembly by itself take meaningful action to establish such a legal régime, beyond endorsing what might have been negotiated and agreed upon among Member States by consensus.

In the debate, a number of delegations addressed themselves to the question of the limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Thus, Kenya believed that, whatever definition was eventually adopted, it should be in the context of the extent to which activities in the zone would affect the landed territories as well as the water area. The delegation pointed out that compromises emerging from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea might be useful in defining the geographical scope of the zone. Australia noted that it was bounded by three oceans and four seas, which made its international rights and obligations perhaps more extensive and complex than those of most other States in the region. It, therefore, could not regard understandings relating to one ocean as affecting its activities in other oceans. Moreover, it could not accept the concept of the zone of peace as extending to the landed territories of States.

A large number of delegations made comments concerning the halting of the further escalation and expansion or on the elimination of the military presence and bases of the great Powers from the Indian Ocean. Several littoral and hinterland States, including Burundi, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, the Sudan and Zambia, either implicitly or explicitly, criticized both the United States and the Soviet Union for the escalation of great-Power military presence and rivalry in the Indian Ocean, which had led to a deterioration of peace and security in the area. Kenya further expressed its concern that some countries contiguous to the Indian Ocean had tended to see the problem of rivalry from an ideological point of view and consequently had condemned activities on a selective basis. Indonesia maintained that in order to implement the Declaration all foreign Powers should forthwith halt any expansion of their military presence in the region.

India felt that it was ironic that, in spite of the wishes expressed by the littoral and hinterland States, great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean had actually increased since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It stressed that there was no place in the scheme for the military presence of States whose national territories were thousands of miles away from the ocean.

A number of other littoral and hinterland States, among them Ethiopia, Iraq and Mozambique, specifically denounced United States military activities in the Indian Ocean, especially what they considered to be its expansion and reinforcement of the facilities on Diego Garcia, and its planned establishment of a special naval fleet and a military strike-force for possible deployment in the area. Commenting in that regard, the United States declared its opposition to any arms race in the Indian Ocean area and agreed that warships and military aircraft should not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of

any littoral or hinterland State in contravention of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, it supported the prevention of the competitive expansion of great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean and favoured prevention of the proliferation of bases and logistical support facilities in the region. The delegation stressed, however, that it did not support the complete elimination of all logistical support facilities.

In its statement, the Soviet Union took issue with the thesis that it was great-Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean that was the source of military tension. According to the delegation, the use of the word "rivalry" implied that Powers were competing for the purpose of achieving selfish ends, gaining an advantage over the other party and attaining some unsavoury, dishonourable goal vis-à-vis the littoral States of the Indian Ocean. With respect to the Soviet Union, that view was factually inaccurate, lacking in objectivity and unjust. The Soviet Union had never taken part and had no intention of taking part in any sort of military rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. It had never established and was not at present establishing military bases in the region. The delegation stated that Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean had always been and continued to be on a smaller scale than that of the United States and its allies. It further pointed out that for the Soviet Union, the situation in the Indian Ocean was either a factor of security or a threat to its national territory, which was not true for the United States. Under those circumstances, it was not objective to speak of "rivalry", the delegation maintained.

China stated that the main obstacle to the realization of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was the escalation of military presence and rivalry in the region on the part of the two super-Powers, particularly the "later-coming super-Power" which had resorted to the "despicable means of professing support for, but actually obstructing in every possible way, the just proposal of the numerous States and peoples of the region for establishing the peace zone." Such an approach had been most recently exemplified by that super-Power's attempt to further dismember a sovereign State in order to open up a land corridor for its passage to the Indian Ocean. What was even more striking was its open use of the naval and air bases of Cam Ranh Bay, Haiphong and Da Nang in Viet Nam. This had pushed the activities of its Pacific fleet more than 2,000 nautical miles southward, thus greatly quickening the pace of its "southward drive" policy.

Among the other important issues which were considered at the Meeting were those related to the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean in the context of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes; the strengthening of international security through regional and other co-operation in the context of the implementation of the Declaration; and, the implementation of the Declaration.

The question of denuclearization evoked considerable debate. Indonesia, for instance, affirmed that one of the essential prerequisites to the establishment of a zone of peace was a commitment by the States of the region to

uphold the fundamental objectives of a non-proliferation régime and to reaffirm their conviction that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would be detrimental to the peace and security of the region. They might accede either to existing international instruments or to future agreements devised to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Indian Ocean. In choosing the latter option, however, zonal States should be assured that there would be no discrimination against them in terms of either their security or their development. Australia considered it important that there should be widespread compliance with existing international instruments in bringing about the implementation of the Declaration. A major contribution to that end would be accession by all littoral and hinterland States to existing international treaties designed to prevent the development and spread of nuclear weapons, the most important of which was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. States would not have the necessary degree of confidence in their security unless the apprehension that their neighbours might seek to develop nuclear weapons was firmly put to rest. Pakistan declared that a zone of peace could not be created unless the regional States assumed an unambiguous joint commitment to keep the region denuclearized. Not only would the nuclear Powers have to be asked not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region but the regional States should themselves reach a solemn agreement not to manufacture, introduce or acquire such weapons. Regarding the possible presence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the area, the delegation of Mozambique expressed the view that such a presence created tension, violated United Nations resolutions and provided the racist régime in South Africa with the necessary encouragement and assistance to build up armaments constituting a serious threat not only to the peoples of southern Africa but also to international security and all mankind.

The United States held that it would be prepared, under appropriate conditions, to give assurances concerning the non-use and non-introduction of nuclear weapons in such areas. It could not, however, support a prohibition on nuclear weapons aboard naval vessels. Until the common goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth was reached, nuclear deterrence would remain essential to the national security of the United States. That deterrence would also remain an important element of global stability. As part of its defence posture, the United States neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its naval vessels or aircraft, the delegation added. On the same issue, the Soviet Union supported the position taken by the littoral States of the Indian Ocean that no nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction should be deployed in the Indian Ocean and that the nuclear Powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. As was well known, the Soviet Union had made a broader proposal for the conclusion of an international convention or agreement for strengthening the guarantees of security for non-nuclear States; it was prepared to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which had no nuclear weapons in their territory and also favoured an international agreement not

to deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of those countries in which they were not deployed at present. Having advanced those proposals on a global scale, the Soviet Union fully favoured their application in the Indian Ocean region.

Addressing itself to the issue, China observed that all nuclear States should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Indian Ocean region and all the countries of that region.

Among the Indian Ocean States themselves — the major protagonists in the debate being India and Pakistan — the issue was resolved by the inclusion in the Final Document of a subparagraph⁹ to the effect that such weapons should not be introduced in the area and a foot-note in the Final Document to the effect that some delegations had voiced objections on the matter and that the Meeting had recommended that further negotiations should take place in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

Many of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, including Mauritius, Kuwait, Oman and Yemen, expressed their regret at the suspension of the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they welcomed the recent announcement by the two Powers at the summit meeting in Vienna that they had agreed to discuss the resumption of those talks. Mozambique and Swaziland called for the expansion of those talks to include other Powers who maintained a military presence in the Indian Ocean and requested the parties concerned to keep the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean informed of the progress of their negotiations.

With respect to the bilateral talks, the United States observed that the other party therein had significantly increased the size of its naval forces in the Indian Ocean in connexion with its military involvement in the Horn of Africa and that that particular development had led to the suspension of the negotiations. The Soviet Union characterized the United States' assertion as untrue and said that the Soviet assumption was that the talks had been suspended for a completely different reason, namely, that the United States had changed its plans and embarked on the course of stepping up its military activity in the Indian Ocean, including a marked increase in activity at the military base on Diego Garcia.

A number of States, among them Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Pakistan and Qatar, supported the proposal made at the opening meeting by its President to initiate the drafting of a treaty on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Kuwait further stated that the proposed draft treaty might not prove to be immediately acceptable to all the maritime users of the Indian Ocean. However, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean could become parties to such a convention, while the maritime users would be called upon to respect the provisions of the convention by adhering to a separate protocol, as was the case with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

⁹ See the annex to this chapter, paragraph 18 (b).

With respect to the convening of a future conference on the Indian Ocean, Kuwait stated that such a conference should be held in 1981, while Zambia suggested that it should be convened before the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. To prepare a draft final document of the Meeting, a working group, consisting of the officers of the Meeting but open to all participants, was established.

The working group held nine meetings between 5 and 11 July under the chairmanship of one of the Vice-Presidents, that from Indonesia, and the President introduced the draft final document of the Meeting at the 7th plenary meeting. After protracted negotiations, and taking into account the various statements and proposals, the Meeting adopted its Final Document¹⁰ without a vote at its 10th and final plenary meeting on 13 July. The text is reproduced as an annex to the present chapter.

The Final Document is generally similar in structure to the draft which the *Ad Hoc* Committee had submitted to the Meeting, consisting, in addition to a preambular resolution, of four parts, entitled "Introduction"; "Review and assessment of developments since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"; "Principles of agreement for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"; and "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"

The introduction provides a summary of relevant decisions taken on the subject. The second part covers developments since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, while the third enumerates seven principles for implementation of the Declaration (see annex to this chapter). The fourth part deals with further steps to be taken, including the Meeting's recommendation to the General Assembly to fix the date and venue of the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

The report of the Meeting to the General Assembly, which embodied the Final Document, also contained statements submitted by some States regarding adoption of the Document, as follows:¹¹

Australia

Australia was unable to accept the document. The reasons for the inacceptability of this document are as follows:

Australia, as an island continent bounded by three oceans and four seas, is unable to accept, in the context of the Indian Ocean, undertakings and obligations which would bind it in other regions. In the same context, it cannot consider entering into any arrangements which would preclude it from entering into other arrangements with Powers outside the Indian Ocean region. One must look to the security of the whole of the territory, not only the Indian Ocean littoral. Australian territory is not divisible. The Australian delegation cannot therefore accept the present formulation in principle 1.

As regards principle 2, the Australian delegation is unable to subscribe to calls upon the great Powers to assume obligations unless it is made clear, beyond doubt, that the actions in re-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 33.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45)*, para. 29.

spect of which those obligations are to be assumed are related to the context of great-Power rivalry or are in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations. It cannot therefore accept the deletions from subparagraphs (a) and (c) of the words: "conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry" and from subparagraph (c) of the words: "and in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations"

In addition, this principle, and the document as a whole, carried the implication that the present level of great-Power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean is the only threat to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Australia has argued that this is neither an accurate nor realistic claim. The Australian delegation believes that a major responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security of the region lies with the countries in the region itself and has sought reference in the Document for the recognition of this responsibility.

Greece

The representative of Greece pointed out that the language of the document reflects to a great extent the desire of delegations to look upon the future work in a spirit of realism and a result-oriented manner. This language should be interpreted within the context of the Declaration contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) and in accordance with the spirit of the last paragraph of document A/AC.199/L.1.

The ultimate success depends on the follow-up of the present work by an expanded body, in which the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean will participate. Consequently, the delegation of Greece believes that decisions on crucial points should not be finalized without the concurrence of such States.

This remark applies especially to paragraph 14 of the document, which leaves the final delimitation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace to a later stage, as well as to paragraphs 15 and 19.

Japan

The delegation of Japan has actively participated in the work of this Meeting in a spirit of mutual understanding, co-operation, and a great deal of compromise, in order to accomplish fruitful results on a realistic and balanced basis.

However, it is a source of deep regret to the delegation of Japan to have to express serious reservations on some of the substantive part of the Final Document, especially paragraphs 14, 15 and 19. The delegation of Japan is prepared to submit its versions as substitutes for the paragraphs 14, 15 and 19 in a spirit of co-operation and compromise. The delegation of Japan refrains from explaining in detail the reasons for its reservations because they are self-evident from the opening statement of Japan on 3 July, and the views expressed by the delegation of Japan in the course of drafting the Final Document and from the following substitute versions of paragraphs 14, 15 and 19 of the Final Document:

"14. In the context of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace would cover the Indian Ocean itself, its natural extensions, the ocean floor subjacent thereto, and the air space above. The final limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace have yet to be agreed upon.

"15. The great-Power military activities, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry, are inconsistent with stability and security in the Indian Ocean, and, therefore, the great Powers are called upon to:

"(a) Halt forthwith the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and, in this context, undertake not to further strengthen their existing military bases nor to acquire new military bases conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry.

"(b) Refrain from conducting military manoeuvres, exploding nuclear devices and the deployment of military forces for the purposes of threatening or using force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

“(c) Enter into consultation, as appropriate, with the littoral and hinterland States with a view to formulating an agreed programme for the elimination of their military bases, military installations and other logistical supply facilities, the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and every manifestation of their military presence conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry and in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations.

“19. The establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean presupposes the recognition of the primary role, if not the exclusive role, of the countries of the region in the maintenance of peace and security in the Indian Ocean.

“The concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would be strengthened and maintained by a system of universal collective security without military alliances and without the use of force in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and without interference with the existing regional arrangement. The littoral and hinterland States should also undertake among themselves negotiations with a view to promoting or enhancing stability of the Indian Ocean area at a lower military level, based on the principle of undiminished security of the States concerned and taking into account the need of all States to safeguard their security.

“The nuclear-weapon States, to contribute to this climate of security, are called upon to work towards individual or joint arrangement, in conformity of the Charter of the United Nations, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean which have given binding commitments not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons, particularly through adhering to the non-proliferation treaty.”

China

The Chinese delegation maintains that the “great-Power rivalry” referred to in the Final Document precisely means the “super-Power rivalry”

Subsequent to the adoption of the Final Document, the Soviet Union observed that while it supported the objectives of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the thesis of “great-Power rivalry” was factually inaccurate, lacked objectivity and was unjust with regard to the Soviet Union. Since that unfounded thesis had not been eliminated from the Final Document, it constituted an unwanted political framework for further steps, including talks, aimed at turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. And the United States noted that as long as it was understood that observers were not associated with decisions taken by the Meeting, it would not insist on any specific reference to that effect in the report to the General Assembly.

Also at its final meeting, the Meeting adopted its report¹² without a vote. The report included, as one of its substantive recommendations, that the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session fix the date and the venue of the Conference on the Indian Ocean as called for in General Assembly resolution 33/68, and entrust the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, which should be expanded for the purpose, to undertake the preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as referred to in para-

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45).*

graph 3 of Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI). The Meeting also requested the General Assembly to invite the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean which had not yet done so to serve on the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee in order to facilitate preparations for the Conference.

Havana Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, 1979

At the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, the non-aligned countries set out their views on the question of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.¹³ The Conference recalled that the non-aligned nations, which at their Lusaka summit Conference first called upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, had since then consistently extended their unanimous support to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

The Conference reaffirmed the determination of the non-aligned States to continue to work towards the attainment of the objectives embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and reiterated its conviction that the presence in the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions of foreign bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great-Power military presence, conceived in the context of the great-Power rivalries, constituted a flagrant violation of that Declaration.

The Conference expressed its deep concern at recent developments that had resulted in further intensification of great-Power military presence and rivalry, thereby leading to the deterioration of peace and security in the Indian Ocean area, hindering the struggle to free the region from foreign domination and seriously threatening the inalienable right of the littoral and hinterland States to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. There were also indications that, instead of decreasing their military presence, the great Powers intended to escalate their competition in the area and were stationing military and naval forces there on a permanent basis. Those developments hindered the struggle of liberation movements to eliminate colonialism, racism and *apartheid*.

Convinced of the desirability of strengthening the concept of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean through a system of universal collective security without military alliances, the Conference called upon the littoral and hinterland States to refrain from participating in military alliances or pacts and expressed satisfaction that certain littoral and hinterland States had withdrawn from such arrangements conceived in the context of great-Power rivalries.

¹³ See A/34/542, annex, paras. 142-151.

The Conference denounced the existence of the Simonstown and Silvermine military bases in South Africa, the Advokaat project, and South Africa's stepped up military activity in the area, one of whose aims was surveillance of the African national liberation movements, and condemned also the close military co-operation between Pretoria, Israel and certain Western Powers in the region. It also urged the dismantling of foreign military bases and installations in the area which might endanger security or obstruct the exercise of the inalienable right to self-determination of peoples.

The Conference reaffirmed the right of all States to use the Indian Ocean for navigation and other peaceful uses in conformity with international law.

While noting that the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States were limited in scope and did not fully meet the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the Conference expressed regret over the suspension of those talks and failure to resume them, and urged their resumption at the earliest possible date.

The Conference regarded the recent Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean as having been instrumental in providing an opportunity for the further harmonizing of the common position to be taken by the littoral and hinterland States, and endorsed the results of the Meeting. It also welcomed the Meeting's recommendations to the General Assembly to fix the date and venue of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, to entrust the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean with the preparatory work for the Conference, and to request the General Assembly to invite the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean concerned to participate in the preparation. Finally, the Conference invited all States concerned to extend their co-operation in the context of the recommendations of the Meeting, with a view to effectively implementing the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee at its regular session, 1979

Subsequent to the Meeting, the *Ad Hoc* Committee, pursuant to resolution 33/68 by which the General Assembly, *inter alia*, renewed its general mandate, held four formal as well as a number of informal meetings between 3 and 19 October 1979, and concluded its work by adopting its report to the General Assembly.¹⁴ The report contained, *inter alia*, two draft resolutions unanimously recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee for adoption by the Assembly.

The Chairman reported on further consultations which he had held with

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Supplement No. 29 (A/34/29).

the Soviet Union and the United States, in accordance with the practice established in 1977, with a view to ascertaining the status of their bilateral talks and in order to discuss with them the co-operation they would give the Committee in the discharge of its functions. The text of the Chairman's report on those consultations¹⁵ was included in the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report to the General Assembly.

The Chairman pointed out that the General Assembly of the United Nations and many other international conferences had expressed their regret at the suspension of the talks on the Indian Ocean between the Soviet Union and the United States and had repeatedly urged the two sides to resume the talks without delay. He noted that in the Joint United States-USSR Communiqué issued on 18 June 1979 at Vienna,¹⁶ the two sides had agreed that their respective representatives would meet promptly to discuss the resumption of the talks. The Chairman stated that he had made repeated inquiries in that regard and had also urged, on behalf of the Committee, that the talks be resumed without delay. He regretted that to date the talks had not been resumed.

The Chairman reported that the representative of the USSR had sent him the following communication:

The position of the Soviet Union with respect to the results of the Meeting of the Indian Ocean States, of which these States were recently informed, remains unchanged. This position is well known to you. Our approach to the substance of the problem of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has been explained in detail in our statements on the above-mentioned Meeting and also during the discussions with you.

The Soviet Union supports the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and generally considers positively the principles of the establishment of such a zone, which have been worked out by the Meeting. But on the way to practical co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean countries there are certain difficulties in this question, emerging from the position of the Indian Ocean countries. These difficulties arise from the use by the Indian Ocean countries of the thesis of the so-called "great-Power rivalry" in the Indian Ocean as a source of military tension in the area, which is factually untrue and unobjective with regard to the Soviet Union.

At the present time, the key question is to eliminate this obstacle to our co-operation during the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. It depends to a large extent on you, as the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, as well as on the representatives of other littoral and hinterland States.

As far as the consultations are concerned, the Soviet side always welcomes them and believes that it would be useful to conduct such consultations on the question of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace at a later stage and with regard for the results of the consideration of this question in the General Assembly.

Undoubtedly, the representatives of the Soviet delegation will be ready to maintain contact with you on this matter at the session.

The Soviet Union is certainly in favour of implementing the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union is actively working for an early resumption of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean, talks which were interrupted through no fault of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is willing to resume talks at any time.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

¹⁶ See A/34/414, annex.

The Chairman further stated that the representative of the United States had sent him the following communication:

The United States is continuing to consider carefully whether it should participate in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean. As we have stated in the past, our support for an Indian Ocean zone of peace depends on the characteristics of the proposed zone. The Final Document of the July Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States contains language, particularly with respect to great-Power presence in the Indian Ocean, that the United States cannot accept. Furthermore, the document itself was adopted without consensus, a move which casts doubt on the usefulness of the present approach the Committee is adopting.

We remain committed to the preservation of the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the States of the Indian Ocean area. In this spirit, we will continue our careful consideration of the Committee's invitation.

As regards the bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, (1) the United States would like to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean; (2) as a result of the Vienna summit, there was a meeting of the heads of delegation in July to discuss the question of bilateral talks; we suggested that the heads of delegation should have a follow-up meeting in the fall of this year.

In concluding his remarks, the Chairman suggested that, in conformity with repeated General Assembly resolutions, the opportune stage had also been reached for consultations between the great Powers and other maritime users of the Indian Ocean and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

Commenting on the Chairman's report on his consultations, China stated that the bilateral talks were lacking in sincerity and had hitherto not been in conformity with the spirit of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and therefore it had been unable to take a positive attitude towards them. Madagascar felt that the Chairman's account of his consultations had not been reassuring, nor had recent indications that one of the super-Powers had taken steps contrary to any commitment to negotiate on a reduction of its military presence in the Indian Ocean.

A number of delegations also addressed themselves to what they considered to be an intensification of great-Power military presence and rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. Thus, Iran observed that the very premise on which the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was based, namely that peace and security could be achieved only through the exclusion of the super-Powers' competitive and escalating presence in the Indian Ocean, was in jeopardy and often violated. To make matters worse, the delegation continued, one super-Power had resorted to bullying and intimidating tactics in the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Recent events had revealed imperialist initiatives in the form of bases, manoeuvres and general intrigue that could potentially destabilize the Indian Ocean region and undermine the sovereignty of the littoral States. Democratic Yemen deplored the announcement of the deployment of the United States Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean which constituted an escalation of United States activities in the region and a violation of support for the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Iraq expressed concern over the escalation of the United States military presence in the Indian Ocean and its continuing threat to use force in the Indian Ocean and its natu-

ral extensions. Mozambique also condemned the increasing reinforcement of the imperialist military presence in the islands of Diego Garcia, Reunion and Mayotte and the development of the South African military base at Simons-town and strongly repudiated the American Government's decision to deploy its Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean. Somalia said that the efforts of the international community to implement the Declaration had been seriously undermined by the actions of the super-Powers, which had increasingly used the Indian Ocean to further their own strategic aims, and had thus jeopardized the right of the Indian Ocean States to dispose of their natural wealth as they saw fit, and endangered their independence and national sovereignty.

Referring also to the question of escalation and expansion of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, China stated that one super-Power had falsely expressed its willingness to co-operate with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and to participate in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, while, at the same time, it had refused to acknowledge the activities in which it was engaged in its rivalry with the other super-Power in the region, and had vainly attempted to delete any reference to major-Power rivalry in the Final Document of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

Various delegations commended the valuable results achieved at the July Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, including the recommendations of the Meeting to the General Assembly. It was pointed out that the Meeting had succeeded in registering considerable progress in harmonizing views on several issues where there had once seemed to be unbridgeable differences. In that connexion, the Chairman noted that the Final Document adopted at the Meeting reflected the willingness of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to put aside certain national positions and work collectively for the common purpose of peace and security in that region. He added that in a broader sense, the document also reflected the increasing preoccupation of a large segment of the international community with concrete and effective movement towards a demilitarized and peaceful world.

Concerning the Meeting's recommendation that the General Assembly fix the date and venue of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, the majority of delegations, including those of Bangladesh, Iran, Indonesia, Madagascar and Pakistan, proposed that the Conference be held in 1981. Japan, on the other hand, felt that it might be preferable not to specify a date for the Conference since it was important that its timing should be such as to enhance the prospects for a successful outcome. Similarly, Australia took the position that a decision concerning the date of the proposed Conference should be postponed until the Committee could be assured of the participation of the great Powers, especially the super-Powers. Greece also believed that before deciding on the date of the Conference, the question of participation of the great Powers should be first resolved. A number of other delegations, while sharing the view that the Conference should be convened in 1981, expressed the hope that the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean would respond to the Committee's invitation to associate them-

selves actively in the work of the Committee in order to facilitate preparations for the proposed Conference. On this point, India maintained that as far as it was concerned, no preparatory session could be held without the attendance of all five permanent members of the Security Council.

As far as the venue of the Conference was concerned, the Committee decided on the basis of a proposal by Pakistan to recommend that the Conference be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The delegation of Pakistan pointed out that by agreeing to that proposal, the General Assembly would be according recognition to the efforts made by the Government and people of Sri Lanka to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

During the course of the session, the Committee, in accordance with its decision of 10 April 1978 to enlarge its bureau by the appointment of an additional Vice-Chairman, elected, by acclamation, the representative of Mozambique to fill the post.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In its consideration of the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the General Assembly had before it the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean; the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean; the documents of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo from 4 to 9 June 1979;¹⁷ the text of the resolution and final communiqué of the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez from 8 to 12 May 1979;¹⁸ and the documents of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979.¹⁹

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was introduced at the 33rd meeting of the First Committee by its Chairman, who stressed that the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean had not been a full-fledged conference on the Indian Ocean, but rather a further step towards an international conference to consider the effective implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The process of preparing and holding the Meeting had led, however, to a detailed and wide-ranging consideration and assessment of developments relating to the proposed establishment of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone. The Chairman also elaborated on various understandings that had been reached among members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee concerning some elements of the Committee's recommendations to the General Assembly. First, it had been the understanding of the Committee that the language used in one of the draft resolutions to refer to the context in which great-Power military presence was manifest in the

¹⁷ A/34/357.

¹⁸ A/34/389.

¹⁹ See A/34/542, annex.

Indian Ocean did not preclude the reconsideration of that question at future sessions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It was the expectation of the Committee that this as well as other important matters would be considered by the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee, which would, hopefully, secure the participation, as full members, of all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. In the same context, the Chairman emphasized that the Committee was entirely mindful of the preoccupations and apprehensions, expressed over the years, regarding various elements embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It was precisely for that same reason that the Committee had felt that the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean in the *Ad Hoc* Committee's work was required and would provide a full opportunity to iron out the differences and arrive at a common understanding of how to implement the Declaration through a process of genuine consultation and negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. With respect to the projected date of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, the Chairman expressed the view that the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, as well as the conclusion of the preparatory work in due time, would be necessary for the creation of appropriate conditions for the Conference to take place. However, he was confident that the necessary conditions could be fulfilled and the Declaration could be implemented at the proposed Indian Ocean Conference in 1981.

In its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended adoption of two draft resolutions. By draft resolution A, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, take note with satisfaction of the issues on which the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean had succeeded in harmonizing a common position; express the hope for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; urge that the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean be resumed without delay and renew the general mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. By draft resolution B, the Assembly would, *inter alia*, decide to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee; invite the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that had not yet done so to serve on the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee; decide to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka, for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; and request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to undertake the preparatory work for the convening of the Conference, including consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached.

During the course of the debate in the First Committee,²⁰ various delegations underlined the validity of the concept of the zone of peace in the In-

²⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 5th to 44th and 50th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

dian Ocean and urged all States, particularly the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in taking effective action towards the realization of that goal.

Democratic Yemen recalled that it had constantly confirmed the importance of action for the implementation of the Declaration and emphasized that the time was now ripe for the attainment of that objective and for the avoidance of anything that would impede the efforts to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean. India stated that the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace would not only strengthen international peace and security but, in the long run, would be in the interests of the great Powers themselves. The delegation added that, in an interdependent world, those Powers were as much in need of international co-operation as the weaker States.

Several delegations expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of more substantial progress in measures to implement the Declaration, especially because, they held, most of the major Powers had failed to accord greater co-operation to the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Iraq, for example, pointed out that there had been no noticeable or practical progress towards the implementation of resolutions of the General Assembly and other international forums on the question due to the fact that certain major Powers had not held serious negotiations among themselves and with the littoral and hinterland States concerned to achieve the objective of the Declaration.

In their statements, many delegations referred to the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and expressed gratification at the progress achieved by the Meeting in successfully harmonizing positions on various measures required to establish the zone of peace. On the other hand, in the opinion of Australia, the results of the Meeting were only partially satisfactory and the Final Document of the Meeting contained important elements which had proven unacceptable to the Australian Government. Although harmonization had been reached on a number of issues, the overall results had demonstrated that there were still fundamental differences to be resolved among the States of the Indian Ocean region before a conference on the Indian Ocean could be held. Nevertheless, the Australian delegation was hopeful that with the continuing goodwill of the States involved, those outstanding differences could eventually be resolved. Many States expressed support for the recommendations of the Meeting and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean concerning the holding of a Conference on the Indian Ocean. Various comments were also forthcoming regarding the recommendation for the expansion of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, and a number of delegations, among them those of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and Tanzania, appealed to the great Powers and major maritime users concerned to participate in the work of the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee in order to facilitate the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

On that question, Australia and Japan reiterated their position that participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and of the major maritime users and the conclusion of the preparatory work were neces-

sary conditions for a conference to take place in 1981. Moreover, both delegations believed that it would be necessary to secure the participation of those States before preparatory work for a conference could commence. India expressed a similar belief with regard to the need for the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Several permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users concerned also addressed themselves to the same question. The Soviet Union, starting from the premise that creation of a true zone of peace required elimination of all military bases in a region, announced its readiness to join the *Ad Hoc* Committee and added that the willingness of its Government to participate in the process of working out an agreement to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace clearly demonstrated its adherence to the idea of peace and disarmament. The United States said that it recognized the legitimate desire of the members of the Committee to involve the permanent members of the Security Council and other relevant maritime countries in the attempt to find out where areas of consensus lay and to see if there was a basis for a successful conference. If it were to join in such preliminary work in a manner that reflected the fact that it was neither a littoral nor a hinterland State, it wished to make it clear at the outset that it would insist on modest and realistic goals, such as regional military restraint and improved regional pacific settlement measures. France stated that although the balance sheet of the activities and negotiations on the question in the past was not categorically positive, nevertheless, as a coastal State of the Indian Ocean, France was aware of its responsibility and the need to contribute to the search for the establishment of greater security in that region and would consider any invitation to take the place that properly belonged to it in the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

On behalf of the nine member States of the European Community, Ireland also spoke on the issue of participation of the Powers concerned and stated that while the nine would abstain on the two draft resolutions recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, they wished to make clear that such an abstention did not prejudice their attitude towards the enlargement of the Committee and participation in its work.

Elaborating on the difficulties which had impeded the realization of the goals embodied in the Declaration, a number of States, including Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Somalia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, cited the growing military presence and rivalry and the maintenance of military bases in the area as constituting major obstacles preventing the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. According to the delegation of Kuwait, a new and ominous manifestation of such rivalry was the attempt to prevent the States concerned from freely disposing of their wealth and natural resources.

A number of delegations, including Cuba, Iran, Madagascar, Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania, specifically denounced what they considered to be the escalation of the American military presence as well as American statements and declarations threatening to use military

force in the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions. Iran stated that recent escalation of United States presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf was a glaring example of imperialistic pursuits aimed at harassment and intimidation of people who were striving to protect their dignity and independence. Madagascar cited what it termed the creation of the Fifth Fleet and the establishment of task forces whose theatre of operations was mainly in the Indian Ocean, the strengthening of the base on Diego Garcia, and the militarization of certain islands regarding which questions of sovereignty were still pending as among the actions that were a denial of the aims and principles of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Mozambique also expressed its deep regret at the growing strength of imperialist military bases at Diego Garcia, Reunion and Mayotte and denounced the strengthening of the South African military base of Simonstown and the American decision to station its Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean.

A large number of delegations expressed disappointment at the suspension of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and several, including those of Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Greece, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Somalia, advocated an early resumption of those talks. India emphasized that the bilateral talks had so far been limited in scope and nature and did not fully meet the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace which envisaged the total elimination of great-Power military presence. Pakistan also hoped that the scope of the talks would be enlarged to bring about a phased reduction of the military presence of the super-Powers, leading to its total elimination from the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union claimed that the bilateral talks had been broken off by the United States and that, despite repeated proposals on its part, the United States had refused to agree to the resumption of the talks. The delegation further noted that at the summit meeting held in Vienna agreement had been reached that both sides would meet immediately to discuss the question of their resumption. While such a meeting had taken place, the United States had once again failed to agree on specific dates for the resumption of talks. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it was still ready to continue the Soviet-American talks responsibly and in a positive spirit.

Draft resolution A was adopted in the First Committee on 30 November by a recorded vote of 102 votes to none, with 23 abstentions (including the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, the United States and other Western countries, and Israel).

Draft resolution B was adopted on the same day by a recorded vote of 111 to none, with 14 abstentions (United States, other Western countries and Israel).

A number of countries made statements to explain their abstentions in the vote. Speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, the delegation of Ireland observed that while, in their opinion, the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian

Ocean had marked an important stage in the development of the proposal on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, a number of States had registered reservations about certain elements in the Final Document. It further noted that the nine States had previously expressed reservations concerning the lack of a clear and agreed definition of the area of the Indian Ocean peace zone and the activities to be excluded from it, and that they had emphasized the need for firm assurances that freedom of navigation by sea and air would be guaranteed to all nations and that the provisions of the law of the sea would not be contravened. They therefore believed it would be premature to move on to a conference until those questions had been resolved.

The Soviet Union stated that it was compelled to abstain on draft resolution A because of certain elements it contained. Referring to the term "great-Power rivalry" in the resolution, the delegation was unable to subscribe to the presupposition that the Soviet Union, among other States, bore responsibility for the tension prevailing in the Indian Ocean, or to the interpretation that the main cause of that tension was military competition between the two major Powers. It maintained that, taking into account the Soviet Union's natural and legitimate interests, it did not threaten anyone or anything in the Indian Ocean. It had not installed any launchers of strike weapons, and did not carry out large-scale manoeuvres or use naval force for military manifestations, and did not seek to establish military bases or to form military contingents designed to interfere in the internal affairs of States in the region. Accordingly, there could be no question whatsoever of rivalry or competition. Concerning the appeal for resumption of the bilateral talks, the delegation maintained that the relevant paragraph was worded in such a way that it was impossible to determine who was actually responsible for the interruption in the talks and the fact that they had not been resumed.

In explaining their abstentions on draft resolution A, the delegations of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and Poland cited reasons similar to those advanced by the Soviet Union.

France fully associated itself with the explanation given by the delegation of Ireland on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, and added that it would consider in a most constructive spirit any invitation to participate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

The United States, abstaining on both draft resolutions, stated that it had never agreed with certain basic aspects of the Committee's mandate and could not associate itself with a firm decision to call for a conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981, or even at some later date, until it was clear that a promising basis existed for a consensus to emerge at such a conference. Briefly summarizing its difficulties with the Committee's mandate, the delegation emphasized that it was not prepared to agree with explicit or implied abridgements of the right, under the United Nations Charter, of individual or collective self-defence, or with the idea of eliminating great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean or eliminating logistical support facilities for those forces.

In explaining its abstention on the two draft resolutions, Israel referred

to a letter from its Permanent Representative, dated 29 June 1979, in which he had, *inter alia*, noted that the failure to invite Israel to the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean was not only a breach of the spirit of a General Assembly resolution, but was also in complete disregard of Israel's geographical qualification as one of the hinterland States of the region.

Draft resolution A was adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1979, by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 23 abstentions, as resolution 34/80 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978 and 33/68 of 14 December 1978,

Encouraged by the continued support extended to the Declaration by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned at the intensification of great-Power military presence, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry, leading to an increase of tension in the area,

Considering that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry, with the danger of a competitive escalation of such a military presence, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires cooperation among the regional States to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, as envisaged in the Declaration, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Further considering that, at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, it noted the proposal for establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, taking into account its deliberations and its relevant resolutions, as well as the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region,

Noting that talks were initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and that the two countries have kept the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean informed of the current situation concerning these talks,

Regretting, however, that the talks remain suspended,

Encouraged by the holding of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, which provided an opportunity for the further harmonization of the positions of the littoral and hinterland States,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean;

2. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the issues on which the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean succeeded in harmonizing a common position;

3. *Expresses its hope* for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI);

4. *Urges* that the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean should be resumed

without delay and that the parties should refrain from any activity prejudicial to the implementation of resolution 2832 (XXVI);

5. *Renews* the general mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

6. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a full report on its work;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

On the same day, the General Assembly also adopted draft resolution B, by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 34/80 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the recommendations contained in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the report of the Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

1. *Decides* to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean by the addition of new members to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee;

2. *Invites* the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean referred to in paragraph 12 (c) of the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean that have not yet done so to serve on the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee;

3. *Decides* to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI);

4. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to undertake the preparatory work for the convening of the conference, including consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, as referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 2832 (XXVI), and to hold its preparatory sessions at United Nations Headquarters and at least two such sessions, including the final one, in Mauritius;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary provision for the conference, including the essential background information, relevant documentation and summary records, and to render all necessary assistance to the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee, including interpretation in the languages of the General Assembly, as required.

It may also be noted that the General Assembly, in paragraph 9 of resolution 34/100, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", reaffirmed the provisions of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and invited the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to prepare for the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981.

Conclusion

For the proponents of the concept of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, 1979 proved to be one of the most active years as well as a highly decisive one. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, besides

holding its regular session, met in three preparatory sessions in connexion with the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean which was held from 2 to 13 July 1979. The Meeting was not a full-fledged conference on the Indian Ocean but rather the next logical step towards such an international conference. But despite its limited mandate and the many complexities involved, the Meeting succeeded in achieving a harmonizing of views on many relevant issues concerning which there once appeared to be unbridgeable differences. It also adopted, with some reservations, a Final Document and conveyed recommendations to the General Assembly concerning the convening of a Conference on the Indian Ocean and the expansion of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The sense of optimism generated by those events was, however, at the same time tempered by recognition of deterioration in the international political situation which could engender problems for future efforts and prospects concerning the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the General Assembly was able to adopt two resolutions on the subject by a wide margin. By one of them it was decided to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 and, in that connexion, to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and invite the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean concerned to serve on the expanded Committee.

ANNEX

Final Document of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean

The Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquility,

Concerned at recent indications of further escalation of great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean area and the intensification of great-Power rivalry which pose a serious threat to the security of the littoral and hinterland States,

Convinced that the extension of the arms race, *inter alia*, into the Indian Ocean area, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding; that the arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States; and that it also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development and to dispose of their own natural wealth and resources and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation,

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting this development, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security,

Recalling resolution 2832 (XXVI) adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1971, paragraphs 1 to 3 of which read as follows:

"1. *Solemnly declares* that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace;

"2. *Calls upon* the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

"(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

"(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

"3. *Calls upon* the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean; in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

"(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

"(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;

"(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace."

Further recalling resolution 2992 (XXVII) by which the General Assembly decided to establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Also recalling resolution 33/68 by which the General Assembly decided to convene a Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI),

Adopts the following Final Document of this Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970, in a resolution on the United Nations, called upon the General Assembly to adopt a declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which great-Power rivalries and competition, bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, as well as nuclear weapons should be excluded.

2. The following year, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971.

3. In 1972, by its resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, the General Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean with the mandate to study the implications of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

4. Subsequently, at its twenty-ninth, thirtieth and thirty-first sessions, the General Assembly adopted relevant resolutions in which, *inter alia*, it requested the littoral and hinterland

States of the Indian Ocean to undertake consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean.

5. The General Assembly, at its tenth special session devoted to disarmament, noted the proposal for establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace taking into account its deliberations and its relevant resolutions, as well as the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

6. At its thirty-second session, by its resolution 32/86 of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly decided that, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean be convened in New York, and at its thirty-third session, by its resolution 33/68 of 14 December 1978, the General Assembly decided, *inter alia*, to convene the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, which other States not falling within this category, but which had participated or had expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Committee, could attend upon the invitation of the Committee.

II. REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

7. Since the adoption of its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, the General Assembly has repeatedly expressed its deep concern at developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean, and at the competitive escalation of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, thereby increasing tension in the area and posing a serious threat to the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

8. The non-aligned countries which, through the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970, first called upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, have since then consistently extended their unanimous support to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, through other meetings of Foreign Ministers and summit conferences of their heads of State or Government.

9. Similarly, the Organization of African Unity and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers have repeatedly called for and consistently reiterated the commitment of their member States to the objective of the early establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean free of military bases and nuclear weapons.

10. The General Assembly has, since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, been inviting the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to extend their practical co-operation in implementing the Declaration. So far, some of the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean have not been able to co-operate effectively with the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

11. The General Assembly has noted that talks were initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and that the two countries have kept the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean informed of the current situation concerning their talks. These bilateral talks, it is noted, were limited in scope and were not primarily designed to and did not fully meet the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In this regard, the General Assembly has expressed its regret over the suspension of these bilateral talks. It was encouraging to note that recently the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have agreed to meet promptly to discuss the resumption of these talks and the Meeting expressed the hope that these talks would fully meet the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

12. The General Assembly has also considered that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region as envisaged in the Declaration and to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these States.

13. The Meeting notes that, despite the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and that of the General Assembly, the military presence of the great

Powers in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry has intensified and that there has been a deterioration of peace and security in the Indian Ocean area. The escalation of the great-Power military presence, as well as other military preparations, continues to threaten the peace and stability of the area, hinders the struggle of the liberation movements to eliminate colonialism, racism, *apartheid* and foreign domination from the area and seriously threatens the inalienable right of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to dispose freely to their natural wealth and resources. This situation gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

III. PRINCIPLES OF AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

1. *Limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace*

14. In the context of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should cover the Indian Ocean itself, its natural extensions, the islands thereon, the ocean floor subjacent thereto, the littoral and hinterland States and the air space above.

15. The final limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace have yet to be agreed upon.

2. *Halting the further escalation and expansion and eliminating the military presence of the great-Powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry*

16. The great-Power military activity, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry, is a threat to stability and security in the Indian Ocean and, therefore, the great Powers are called upon to:

(a) Halt forthwith the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and, in this context, undertake not to strengthen further their existing military bases nor to acquire new military bases;

(b) Desist from conducting military manoeuvres, exploding nuclear devices and the deployment of military forces for the purposes of threatening or using force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) Enter into immediate consultations with the littoral and hinterland States with a view to formulating an agreed programme for the elimination of their military bases, military installations and other logistical supply facilities, the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and every manifestation of their military presence.

3. *Elimination of military bases and other military installations of the great Powers from the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry*

17. Recognizing the determination of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve and protect their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, all littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean are called upon to:

(a) Take action to ensure that warships and military aircrafts as well as other military forces may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral and hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Undertake, in this context, not to assist the great Powers in their military activities in contravention of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

4. *Denuclearization of the Indian Ocean in the context of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace*

18. (a) The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to undertake not to establish nuclear bases in the Indian Ocean and to refrain from conducting nuclear test activities in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Similarly, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should agree not to acquire or introduce nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean themselves or to allow their introduction of an external Power.^a

(c) The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean uphold the fundamental objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by all States and reaffirm their conviction that production, acquisition and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security of the world and call upon nuclear-weapon States to undertake concrete measures of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. *Non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes*

19. The creation of the Indian Ocean peace zone requires, *inter alia*, the following:

(a) The renunciation by the States of the Indian Ocean area of the threat or use of force against any other State of that area and the affirmation of their resolve to settle their disputes with one another by peaceful means and without resort to force, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant United Nations resolutions or bilateral agreements or other decisions taken among themselves by the States of the area;

(b) Reiteration of the commitment by the States of the area to conduct their relations on the basis of the principles, purposes and provisions of the Charter, especially those concerning sovereign equality, respect for the territorial integrity and political independence and non-interference in each other's internal affairs;

(c) The reaffirmation of the right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

6. *Strengthening of international security through regional and other co-operation in the context of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace*

20. The concept of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would be strengthened and maintained by a system of universal collective security without military alliances and without the use of force except in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and without interference with the existing regional arrangements. The littoral and hinterland States should also undertake to consider negotiating measures for promoting or enhancing the stability of the Indian Ocean area at a lower military level based on the principle of undiminished security of the States concerned and taking into account the need of all States to safeguard their security. The nuclear-weapon States, in order to contribute to this climate of security, should undertake effective arrangements to assure the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

7. *Free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean zone of peace by the vessels of all nations in accordance with the norms and principles of international law and custom*

21. The Meeting reaffirms the right of all States to use the Indian Ocean for navigation and other peaceful uses, freely and without hindrance, in conformity with international law and custom, provided no threats are posed to the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations. In this regard, the States of the region also reaffirm their right to refuse to grant to the great Powers facilities for their warships or military aircraft which are or could be used in the context of great-Power rivalries or for any other purpose that may be detrimental to the sovereignty, territorial integrity or security of the States in the Indian Ocean.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

22. The Meeting recommends to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth regular session to fix the date and the venue of the conference of the Indian Ocean as called for in Assembly

^a Some delegations voiced objections against this subparagraph and the Meeting recommended that further negotiations on it should take place in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

resolution 33/68, and to entrust the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, which should be expanded for this purpose, to undertake the preparatory work for the conference, including consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as referred to in paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI). The Meeting requests the General Assembly to invite the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, who have not yet done so, to serve on the expanded *Ad Hoc* Committee in order to facilitate preparations for the conference.

23. All States concerned, especially the littoral and hinterland States, are called upon actively to explore in particular parts of the Indian Ocean area regional arrangements for the realization of the principles and objectives of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with international law.

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF THE LIMITATION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES has for a long time been a preoccupation of the United Nations. As early as 1950 the General Assembly adopted resolution 380 (V) by which it determined that for the realization of lasting peace and security it was indispensable that every State agree to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare. The work of the General Assembly in this area has been reflected in a number of subsequent resolutions¹ as well as in the conclusions and recommendations of studies dealing with the need to reduce military expenditures through disarmament and with the link between disarmament and development.²

On the basis of a 1973 initiative of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly began consideration of specific approaches to the reduction of military budgets. The original Soviet proposal, which led to the adoption of resolution 3093 A on the question, called for 10 per cent reductions by the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the funds thus saved to provide development assistance. Three of the permanent members, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, objected to the Soviet proposal on the basis, among others, of the difficulties involved in measuring different military budgets, while China held that it was inappropriate to call for proportionally equal reductions in the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Council. The same year, resolution

¹ The resolutions adopted up to 1978 were the following: 914 (X) of 16 December 1955; 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960; 1837 (XVII) of 18 December 1962; 2387 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968; 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969; 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2685 (XXV) of 11 December 1970; 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3462 (XXX) and 3470 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/68 of 10 December 1976; 32/75 of 12 December 1977; and 33/67 of 14 December 1978.

² *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1).

3093 B was adopted, on the basis of a Mexican initiative, by which the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the question.³ Since the Soviet initiative, the General Assembly has, in accordance with resolutions adopted on the question, carried out surveys and studies aimed at development of an acceptable international measurement and reporting system.

At its thirty-first session in 1976, the General Assembly considered the report entitled *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures*,⁴ which elaborated a reporting formula, or matrix, as an instrument for a standardized reporting system. Thereafter, it invited all States to comment on the proposed standardized reporting instrument; and requested preparation of a further report containing an analysis of the comments received. In that report,⁵ an intergovernmental group of experts analysed the comments which were provided by 14 States, considered the further development of the reporting instrument, drew attention to certain problems which could be foreseen and submitted conclusions and recommendations. On the basis of those recommendations, the General Assembly, in 1977, requested the Secretary-General to ascertain which States would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument and to prepare a background report compiling the proposals and recommendations put forward under the resolutions on the question for the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

Virtually all speakers at the special session deplored the high level of military expenditures in the world. Several pointed to the fact that world military expenditures, some 400 billion dollars a year, represented 5 to 6 per cent of the world's total gross national product or two thirds of the gross national product of the countries where the poorest half of the world's population lived. The special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States and other States with large military expenditures was repeatedly emphasized. It was recognized, however, that the process of reduction of military budgets should be balanced and gradual. Suggestions were also made for setting the process in motion.

In his address at the opening of the special session, the Secretary-General suggested that one million out of every billion, or one one-thousandth, of the dollars spent on armaments be given for national and international disarmament efforts.

The Final Document of the special session, in the Programme of Action, includes two paragraphs on the question as follows:

³ The report, document A/9770, was subsequently published under the title, *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by Ten Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10).

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.I.6.

⁵ A/32/194 and Add. 1.

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

At its thirty-third session the General Assembly, on the basis of an initiative by Sweden, adopted resolution 33/67, by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an *ad hoc* panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting: (a) to carry out a practical test of the proposed reporting instrument with the voluntary cooperation of States from different regions and representing different budgeting and accounting systems; (b) to assess the results of the practical test; and (c) to develop recommendations for further refinement and implementation of the reporting instrument. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the resolution.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1979

In May and June of 1979, the Disarmament Commission, at its first substantive session, agreed without controversy that military expenditures should be reduced. During its general exchange of views, the statement made on the question by the representative of Austria was illustrative of the kind of ideas put forward. He stated that the reduction of military budgets, particularly of the nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States, had been recognized as a disarmament measure which would increase the possibilities of the reallocation of resources used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly of developing countries. Accordingly, he added, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should contain concrete steps for such reductions on the basis of an instrument for standardized reporting on military expenditures. The Austrian representative also felt that greater openness regarding military budgets could constitute an important confidence-building measure. The representatives of Cuba and of the Ukrainian SSR, among others, suggested that reduction of military budgets might be carried out either in absolute terms or in percentages, and the former stressed that there should be no delay in implementing such a measure in the interest of development.

A number of developing countries, including Bangladesh, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador and Nepal, laid particular emphasis on the connexion be-

tween reduced military expenditure and increased funds for economic and social purposes. Peru stressed that the sophistication of the concept of military expenditures would have to be taken into account in working out agreed procedures for the reduction of expenditures and that good faith and adequate means of verification would be necessary elements in such agreements. Ireland suggested, as it had before, that countries should study the possibility of adopting voluntary ceilings in defence expenditures expressed as a proportion of gross national product.

The Commission included in its recommendations on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the "Reduction of military expenditures."⁶

In commenting on the Commission's recommendations, the United States observed that they contained no reference to the need for reliable information about States' actual military expenditures or methods for comparing such expenditures internationally and verifying compliance with agreed reductions, all of which were required as a basis for negotiation on reduction of such expenditures and therefore constituted a serious omission.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1979

The question of the reduction of military budgets was discussed in the Committee on Disarmament by several Member States, particularly during its spring session. Sweden, for instance, reviewed the general situation of military expenditures by noting that the two military alliances accounted for some 70 per cent of the world total annual military expenditures, while the United States and the Soviet Union alone, it said, stood for 60 per cent. Sweden and the United Kingdom both drew attention to a rapid increase in military expenditures among developing States. Sweden stated that the developing countries' share of world military outlays had increased from 6 per cent to around 14 per cent in ten years. The United Kingdom noted that the burden of military expenditures was particularly hard on the developing countries, and that their military expenditures amounted to \$56.3 billion in 1976, almost three times the amount they had received in development assistance, despite the continued efforts of many donors to increase their aid.

Pakistan announced that it had recently taken a decision to unilaterally reduce its defence budget for 1979 by 5 per cent, and hoped that its example would be followed by other States in the region. Iran stated that its military budget in 1977-1978 was comparable to that of the United Kingdom and that the former régime had devoted annually more than 30 per cent of the State budget to its armed force; it underlined its present efforts to allocate more financial resources to development purposes.

Romania stressed the need to put an end to the allocation, by all States, of any additional financial resources for the purpose of increasing military

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III, A, para. 4; also appendix II below.

potential, and reiterated its proposal for freezing military budgets, as well as military forces and arms, with a view to their subsequent gradual reduction by 10 to 15 per cent in the first stage. It added that countries reducing their military budgets could channel the funds thus made available into the implementation of programmes for their own development and into support for the efforts of developing countries, with a view to enhancing their economic and social progress.

The United Kingdom and the United States expressed their support for the General Assembly resolution initiating a pilot test of the reporting instrument as a useful step forward in the search for a reliable data base on military expenditures. The United Kingdom stressed that a standard form for reporting military expenditures was the only practical basis for universal, balanced and verifiable reductions, and that it was an attractive aim for many reasons, not least because it would have an impact on the whole spectrum of military activities. In the view of the United States the development of reliable and standardized international reporting of military expenditures could have a double value: by lifting the veil of secrecy which shrouds much of the world's military spending, it could dampen the action-reaction cycle, based on worst-case estimates, which helps drive expenditures ever higher; it would also satisfy one of the preconditions for negotiated agreements to limit or reduce military spending.

***Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting**

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/67, the Secretary-General established the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting composed of experts from seven countries, namely Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sweden and the United States.⁷ The *Ad Hoc* Panel held two sessions in 1979, the first from 14 to 18 May and the second from 27 to 31 August. At the outset of the first session the Panel elected the expert from Peru as its chairman and agreed on the following points to be discussed: (a) advising the Secretary-General as to the countries which would participate in the practical test; (b) preparing the guidelines to assist respondents, in filling in the proposed reporting instrument; (c) providing expert advice, upon request, by countries participating in the test; (d) assembling the information on military expenditures submitted by the participating countries and analysing its compliance with the proposed reporting instrument; (e) discussing the problems of intertemporal and international comparisons; and (f) preparing a report containing an assessment of the results of the test as well as recommendations for further refinement and implementation of the proposed reporting system.

During the two sessions held in 1979, the Panel devoted its work to the first three of the above six points. After intensive discussions the Panel finalized the elaboration of the steps necessary for the initiation of its practical test for the standardized reporting on the military expenditure of Member

⁷ For the composition of the Panel, see annex I of this chapter.

States. The Panel agreed to a set of guidelines to assist Member States in filling in the proposed reporting instrument. It also adopted a time-table for the carrying out and evaluation of the test, as well as for the preparation of its report to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

At the end of its second session, the Panel submitted a document entitled "Proposed reporting matrix and instructions" to the Secretary-General, who subsequently conveyed it to Member States to permit the carrying out of the practical test of the reporting instrument envisaged in resolution 33/67. The document is reproduced in annex II to the present chapter.

As can be seen, the vertical axis of the matrix provides for details of expenditures by type of resource costs and the horizontal axis by types of forces. The vertical axis consists of three main cost categories, namely, (1) operating costs, (2) procurement and construction, and (3) research and development. In the introduction to the document, the Panel pointed out that the reporting instrument had been slightly modified, for convenience of presentation, from the form in which it was previously submitted to the General Assembly.⁸

A general guideline in the instructions requested Member States to report actual military expenditures for the fiscal year most closely coincident with calendar year 1978, or for the nearest fiscal year available. The amounts were to be reported in the respondent's national currency and at current prices. To help in the interpretation of some items in the reporting instrument and its further refinement, specific detailed guidelines explained the intended use or scope of the items in question and requested Member States to provide information as to any technical or other difficulties they might encounter in filling in the matrix, and suggestions for its improvement.

In the note verbale dated 28 September 1979, by which the Secretary-General circulated the document among all Member States, he invited them to return the complete reporting instrument not later than 31 March 1980. He also stated that if Member States required additional explanations, they should submit their inquiries to the United Nations Secretariat, Centre for Disarmament, to be brought to the attention of the *Ad Hoc* Panel, which in turn would assure the necessary assistance.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

A large number of States continued during the debates in the General Assembly⁹ in 1979 to express concern over the ever-increasing military ex-

⁸ See *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.1.6), sect. II; the earlier format is also reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), pp. 420-421.

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 38th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, Corrigendum*.

penditures, and to stress the need to curb the increase and to reallocate financial resources from military to development purposes. During Disarmament Week, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General also drew attention to the same subject.

Many non-aligned States, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Chile, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zaire, pointed out that world military expenditures were nearing an all-time high and several of them underlined the adverse effect of this on international security as well as on economic and social development.

Several countries noted that world military expenditures had risen in 1978 to the sum of \$450 billion, a large part of which was accounted for by the nuclear-weapon and other major, militarily significant States. The disparity between military expenditures and the total of development assistance by those States was also pointed out. Benin, for instance, stated that annual expenditures on armaments had increased from 200 billion dollars to 450 billion dollars a year over a period of 10 years, while only 23 billion dollars a year were devoted to international assistance during the same period. Senegal noted that, according to one 1978 report, world military expenditures cost \$92 per inhabitant whereas the humanitarian programmes of the United Nations cost only 57 cents per inhabitant. Chile stated that if the 20 per cent of the military expenditures allocated to nuclear weapons were to be invested, in co-operation with other States, in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it would lead to considerable development in third-world countries.

Several non-aligned States, including Chile, India, Kuwait and Nigeria, as well as China, noted that about 50 per cent of the military expenditures in the world was spent by the Soviet Union and the United States and stressed that it was important for the two major nuclear Powers to begin reducing their military budgets.

Some non-aligned States also expressed concern over the increase of military expenditures for conventional weapons in the third world. Ecuador stated that insane military expenditures were not the monopoly of the developed countries. Iran noted that arms imports by developing countries had reached \$14 billion in 1978, and Nigeria regretted that world military expenditures in 1978 were some \$50 billion over the 1977 level and that the developing countries were not excluded from the increase.

A number of Western States, including Italy, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom, drew attention to the large share of military expenditures allocated to conventional weapons, and emphasized the importance of reducing conventional as well as nuclear aspects of military budgets. Several Western and some non-aligned States also emphasized that the reduction of military budgets should be carried out under a gradual, balanced and verifiable agreement. Ireland held that agreed reductions of military expenditures and systems of targets and incentives to control those expenditures, based on verifiable and generally applied budgetary criteria, would help to stifle arms

competition and release resources for necessary economic programmes. It recalled its earlier proposal for the study of the possibility of ceilings on defence expenditures, which could be adjusted downwards as progress was made towards disarmament.

With regard to the on-going test of the proposed reporting instrument, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States referred to the test and underlined the importance of solving various technical problems facing the development of that instrument as well as the questions of the international comparison of military budgets and adequate measures of disclosure or verification. The United Kingdom, for instance, noted that the reduction of military budgets would need to be tackled by international agreement and that, before negotiations could begin, there would have to be a standardized method for measuring and reporting military budgets; it hoped that the practical test of the reporting instrument designed by the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting would lead to the adoption of the standardized reporting instrument by the United Nations for general use.

On the other hand, the USSR and several other Eastern European States, as well as some non-aligned States, expressed reservations on the testing of standardized reporting systems, and maintained that such a test diverted attention from specific and tangible tasks of reducing military budgets.

The Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR, for instance, continued to emphasize their support for the 1973 Soviet proposal for the reduction of military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council and others with large military potential by 10 per cent and reallocation of some of the money saved to development purposes, particularly in developing countries. The USSR noted that its proposal had not been implemented because a number of States had refused to translate it into a practical agreement on grounds of incomparability of military budgets. Accordingly, in 1978 it had stated its readiness to agree to reductions either by equal percentages or in absolute terms of the same order of magnitude. That approach had met with support and understanding at the special session on disarmament. In principle, the USSR emphasized, it categorically supported a reduction of military budgets.

Romania believed that the freezing and the gradual reduction of military expenditures was a priority measure which the United Nations should promote more firmly and that the funds which would be thus released could be used both to stimulate the progress of all countries and to help the developing countries. Romania recalled that it had presented a specific proposal to the General Assembly at its tenth special session suggesting a reduction of budgets by 10 to 15 per cent in a first phase and held that the adoption of such measures would open the way to a more thorough approach to disarmament problems and would create conditions for the carrying out of a long-term disarmament programme.

On 14 November, Austria, Indonesia, Nigeria, Peru, Romania,

Rwanda, Senegal and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Freezing and reduction of military budgets", which was introduced by the representative of Romania on 15 November. The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Ireland, Mauritius, Niger and Uruguay.

On 21 November, before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, the representative of Romania orally revised paragraph 3 of the draft by changing the words "and to reallocate" to the words "with a view to reallocating" (see below, page 340).

The USSR requested a separate vote on the fourth preambular paragraph and paragraph 1, which were adopted by a non-recorded vote of 109 to none, with 14 abstentions. Thereafter, the draft resolution as a whole, as orally revised, was adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to none, with 1 abstention (India).

Following the adoption of the draft resolution, Belgium, Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United States explained their affirmative votes. Belgium noted with satisfaction that the sponsors recalled in the text the need for an instrument for standardized reporting on military expenditures and, moreover, had requested the Disarmament Commission to undertake to examine and identify ways and means of reaching agreement to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures in a balanced manner with adequate verification. The references to those considerations had enabled Belgium to vote in favour of the draft. The Federal Republic of Germany expressed its support for the draft resolution on similar grounds. Brazil, noting that the main responsibility lay upon the nuclear-weapon Powers, reiterated its hope that they would take the necessary measures to reduce their military expenditures and enable resultant savings to be allocated to development. Japan noted the indispensable need for fair comparison of military expenditures on the basis of a standardized reporting system and thus considered that the Member States should take a step-by-step approach to the question. The United States recalled its position in favour of a systematic approach to the problems involved in any limitation of military expenditures and its support for the practical test of the standard reporting instrument. It stressed, however, that any agreed limitation on its military expenditures, whether a ceiling, freeze or reduction, would vitally affect its security and that under the present circumstances no limitation was practical. That was all the more reason why all States should rededicate their efforts towards creating conditions in which it would be possible to halt the disturbing rise in world military expenditures.

India, in explaining its abstention, stated that the call contained in the draft resolution should properly be addressed to the five or six States which had large military budgets. It doubted whether the Disarmament Commission was the proper organ to identify ways and means of achieving such diverse agreements as were envisaged in the draft resolution.

On 11 December, the General Assembly in separate votes adopted the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 127 to none with 10 abstentions, and paragraph 2 by a vote of 127 to none

with 9 abstentions (in both cases, mainly the Eastern European States, except Romania). The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted without a vote as resolution 34/83 F, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly according to which gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Recalling also its decision, inscribed in the Final Document, to continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets,

Reaffirming that it is possible to achieve reductions in military budgets without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State,

Recognizing the need for the availability of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on the military expenditures of Member States, such as the one currently being tested within the framework of the United Nations,

Aware of the proposals submitted to date by States and of the activities carried out thus far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Taking into account that world military expenditures continue to grow at an alarming rate, in stark contrast with the acute development needs of States, in particular those of developing countries,

1. *Considers* that, in the light of the above-mentioned provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned;

2. *Requests*, to this end, the Disarmament Commission to undertake during 1980 to examine and identify effective ways and means of achieving such agreements;

3. *Appeals* to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

4. *Decides* to consider at its thirty-fifth session, under the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" to be included in its provisional agenda in pursuance of its resolution 33/67 of 14 December 1978, the most effective ways and means of adopting practical measures in this field.

Conclusion

There was no separate agenda item on the reduction of military budgets for the General Assembly in 1979, but there was nonetheless extensive general discussion of the issue and of the initiative of Romania on the freezing and reduction of military budgets. While there was no controversy about the need to curb the growing world military expenditures as an important disarmament measure, the non-aligned, Eastern European and Western States continued to stress different aspects of, and approaches to, the issue.

Many non-aligned States, for example, believed that the nuclear-weapon and major military Powers should take the first step to reduce their

military budgets and laid particular stress on the reallocation of resources from military to development purposes, particularly in developing countries. Most Eastern European States maintained that the reduction of military budgets was possible in terms of either absolute figures or percentages without further technical studies. Western States stressed the need to solve the question of international comparison among military budgets and their support of the testing of a standardized reporting instrument. They also pointed to the high percentage of military expenditures in developing countries' national budgets and called for the balanced reductions in military expenditures on both nuclear and conventional weapons and forces.

The carrying out of the test of the reporting instrument proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting and the detailed study of the results of the test are expected to introduce new elements into the discussions on the subject in 1980.

ANNEX I

Ad Hoc Panel on Military Budgeting

- Mr. Hans Christian Cars, Ph.D., Head of Division
Ministry of Defence, Planning and Budget Secretariat, Fack, Stockholm, Sweden
- Prof. José A. Encinas Del Pando, Dean, School of Economics
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- Mr. Daniel Gallik, Senior Economist
U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., United States
- Col. Dr. Traian Grozea, Principal Scientific Researcher
Centre for Studies and Research of History and Military Theory, Bucharest, Romania
- Professor Akira Kumagai, Director, Planning and Co-ordination Division
National Defense College, Tokyo, Japan
- Lt. Col. Victor O. Odeka, Principal Staff Officer, Paymaster General's Office
Headquarters Nigerian Army (PAY), Lagos, Nigeria
- Mr. Benjamin Parwoto, First Marshal TNI, Deputy Assistant for Planning
Department of Defense and Security, Dephankam, Jakarta, Indonesia

[Annex II overleaf]

ANNEX II

Proposed matrix for international reporting on military expenditures
(Actual outlays, current prices)

(Table A of United Nations document A/31/222)

Country: Fiscal year: // day month year day month year day month year
(The reporting or fiscal year most closely coinciding with calendar year 1978 for which data are available)

National currency and unit of measure: (The unit of measure should not exceed one ten thousandths of the total military expenditure)

Force groups Resource costs	Strategic forces (1)		Land forces (2)		Naval forces (3)		Air forces (4)		Other combat forces (5)		Central support administration and command			Military assistance			Total (1-12) (13)		
											Support (6)	Command (7)	Paramilitary forces (8)	Civil defense (9)	Home territory (10)	Abroad (11)	UN peace-keeping (12)		
1. OPERATING COSTS																			
1.1 Personnel																			
1.1.1 Civilian																			
1.1.2 Conscripts																			
1.1.3 Other military, inc. reserves																			
1.2 Operations and maintenance																			
1.2.1 Materials for current use																			
1.2.2 Maintenance and repair																			
1.2.3 Travel expenses etc.																			

	Strategic forces (1)		Land forces (2)		Naval forces (3)		Air forces (4)		Other combat forces (5)		General support administration and command		Paramilitary forces (8)		Civil defense (9)		Military assistance			Total (1-12) (13)		
											Support (6)	Command (7)			Home territory (10)	Abroad (11)	UN peace-keeping (12)					
<i>Force groups</i>																						
<i>Resource costs</i>																						
2.2.7 Training facilities																						
2.2.8 Warehouses, depots etc.																						
2.2.9 Command and adm. facilities																						
2.2.10 Fortifications																						
2.2.11 Shelters																						
2.2.12 Land																						
2.2.13 Other																						
3. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT																						
3.1 Basic and applied research																						
3.2 Development, testing and evaluation																						
4. TOTAL (1 + 2 + 3)																						

PART FIVE

Studies, information and training

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and studies in progress

Introduction

IT WAS STATED RECENTLY that one of the important, although unspectacular, means used by the United Nations to further the process of disarmament and arms limitation consists of the studies it carries out on a range of aspects of that extremely complicated topic.¹ These studies have two basic purposes: first, they provide information of a general nature to facilitate better understanding of the problems of the arms race and disarmament; and, second, they support the negotiating process through the analysis of specific matters related to negotiations in process. Such studies have been made under United Nations auspices since the early 1960s, most of them with the assistance of consultant or governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General or experts appointed directly by Governments. This procedure has permitted the Organization to draw on as wide as possible a range of expertise and political outlook. The United Nations Secretariat has also made relevant analyses at the request of various bodies.

In recent years, interest in such studies has been growing. In 1976, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament considered the question of additional functions which the Organization should assume and recommended, among other things, that the General Assembly should consider making increased use of in-depth studies on disarmament and related matters carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts nominated by Governments or selected on the basis of their qualifications in disarmament and related matters.² The recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976.

¹ United Nations studies were so described by Agha Shahi, at the time Advisor for Foreign Affairs to the President of Pakistan and presiding at the first session of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and, at the time of this writing, Foreign Minister of Pakistan; cited from his article in *Disarmament*, vol. II, No. 1, May 1979 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.1).

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36)*, para. 18, "Agreed proposals" (para. 6).

The importance of disarmament studies was also fully recognized by the General Assembly in 1978 at its tenth special session. In the Final Document of that session, the Assembly included a number of references to disarmament studies in general, as well as to several specific studies which the Secretary-General was asked to carry out. At the special session, the General Assembly also decided that it should determine the guidelines for specific studies and requested the Secretary-General to make annual reports on the subject to help it in that regard.

It has become obvious in recent years that studies should be planned and executed in a more integrated fashion. In that connexion, at the special session, the Secretary-General expressed the view that it was important to develop a comprehensive approach and to relate the studies to a strategy for disarmament and negotiations towards the implementation of that strategy. The Secretary-General proposed setting up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. That proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly and, as a result, the Secretary-General called into being the body now known as the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

The Advisory Board held its first session from 14 to 22 November 1978 at United Nations Headquarters in New York, with 26 members participating. As recorded in the Secretary-General's report³ to the General Assembly regarding that first session, the Board attached special importance to the Secretary-General's remark that its work could have a stimulating effect on current and future disarmament negotiations. It also attached particular importance to his comments regarding the independence of the Board and its freedom to conduct discussions on any aspect of its work without publicity and without the constraint of formal decision-making. The Board noted the Secretary-General's view that it might, among other things, make recommendations for updating or complementing earlier United Nations studies and investigating areas which had not been adequately studied as yet. The Board further took note of certain specific functions which the Secretary-General envisaged that it would perform.

The Board discussed the purposes to be served by United Nations studies in the area of disarmament and arms limitation, and agreed that they included (a) assisting in ongoing negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation; (b) assisting in the identification of specific topics with a view to initiating new negotiations; (c) providing the general background to current deliberations and negotiations; and (d) assessing and promoting public awareness of the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race and its impact on both international security and development.

³ A/33/312/Add. 1.

At its first session, the Board concentrated in particular on the way in which it would approach its work. The Board specifically agreed that it was within its mandate to suggest subjects for United Nations disarmament studies.

With regard to specific studies being undertaken in 1979 or called for as a result of decisions of the General Assembly, two of them—the ongoing work on the international reporting of military expenditures and the study on the relationship between disarmament and development—are discussed in chapters XXI and XXIII respectively, while the others are dealt with below in separate sections of the present chapter.

1979 sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies held its second and third sessions at United Nations Headquarters from 30 April to 9 May and from 2 to 15 October 1979, respectively. The former session was attended by 24 members and the latter by 25.⁴ Both sessions were chaired by Mr. Agha Shahi of Pakistan.

The second and third sessions of the Advisory Board were devoted principally to the consideration of (a) a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies; (b) possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research; and (c) ways and means whereby the objective of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 N, concerning the formulation of a new philosophy on disarmament, could be accomplished. With regard to the last-mentioned item, the Board felt that, in the current situation, the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly contained the essence of a new philosophy and provided an integrated framework for action. Its conclusions to that effect, including the suggestion that the widest possible publicity should be given to the Final Document, were recorded in a report of the Secretary-General⁵ which had been requested by the Assembly in the resolution.

In the report of the Secretary-General on United Nations studies on disarmament,⁶ it is stated that the Board, during its 1979 sessions, continued the discussion it had begun at its first session on the manner in which it could best fulfil its advisory role. In that regard, it agreed that it could clarify the direction which various disarmament studies might take and that it could give useful advice on the way studies should be carried out. The Board agreed that the programme of disarmament studies should be not only comprehensive but “integrated”, that is, the studies chosen should form part of a cohesive whole. At the same time, it recognized that the coverage of the study programme might differ from the scope of a comprehensive pro-

⁴ For the composition of the Advisory Board, see annex 1 to this chapter.

⁵ A/34/590.

⁶ A/34/588.

gramme of disarmament. The Board was of the opinion that topics would have to be selected on the basis of priorities and that in drawing up an integrated programme of studies careful account should be taken of past and current studies. The Board would then determine what needed to be done. The Board realized that in determining what further studies were needed, particularly considering the purpose of assisting ongoing negotiations, it would not be realistic to attempt to fill all gaps at once.

Accordingly, the Board believed that for the selection of studies, it should apply criteria that were foreseen at its first session. Among the selection criteria that could be followed were the importance of a given study for the United Nations, its urgency, its timeliness, the need to avoid unnecessary duplication, the financial means available, and the question of whether the subject of the study could be effectively dealt with under United Nations auspices. The Board noted that the concept "under the auspices of the United Nations" need not in all cases mean "by" the Organization itself, and in that connexion it was pointed out that the burden on the United Nations might be lightened by making appropriate use of the assistance of other bodies, both inside and outside the United Nations system.

With respect to the areas of study, the Board was of the view that studies on disarmament would have to include consideration of the related armaments aspects, including the dynamics of the arms race, as well as the questions of national security and political, economic and social factors. There was also a need to consider the dynamics of technological innovations, with a view to identifying the points at which disarmament or arms-control measures could be introduced. In addition, it would be necessary to look ahead to potential directions the arms race might take, so as to avoid their development, and to attempt to identify circumstances which make arms-control agreements feasible.

In its report, the Board took note of the current status of the six studies under way on (a) a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons; (b) the international reporting of military expenditures; (c) the relationship between disarmament and development; (d) the relationship between disarmament and international security; (e) the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency; and (f) all the aspects of regional disarmament.

The Advisory Board had an extensive exchange of views on a number of proposals for further studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations. In that regard, it agreed to consider at its next session, in the spring of 1980, a number of topical issues as possible subjects for new studies: for example, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; fissionable material for weapons purposes; and the way in which each Government was organized to consider arms control and disarmament. The Board also noted that at the 1980 spring session a proposal would be submitted on zones of peace and co-operation.

In particular, a study on the basic facts of a nuclear-test ban was proposed in light of the fact that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all

States was considered to be an item of the highest priority and in the hope that such a study would be helpful to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Although the view was expressed that the proposed study was unnecessary since the subject had already been thoroughly studied and the obstacles to agreement were political rather than technical, the Board nevertheless recommended that a study on the subject should be carried out and should consist of the following: introduction; brief background summary; analytical summary of the negotiations which have led to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (partial test-ban treaty); the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; proceedings in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament; three-Power negotiations; major unresolved issues; and conclusions. The study was to have appendices on current nuclear arsenals, nuclear-weapon tests from 1945 to 1963, and nuclear-weapon tests from 1965 to 1979. It was to be completed for submission to the Committee on Disarmament at its session in the spring of 1980. The General Assembly's action on the recommendation of the Board is described above (see chap. IX, p. 133).

The Board, at its 1979 sessions, also discussed possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research under the auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 K. By that resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the matter⁷ and in that regard to seek the advice of the Board.

The Board had an extensive exchange of views on the general aspects of the establishment, operation and financing of the proposed institute. Mindful of its limited administrative mandate, the Board concentrated its discussions on the purposes which such an institute could and should meet.

Among other ideas, it considered a specific proposal that such an institute should be set up within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). Several alternative proposals were made during the discussions, including the possibility of establishing a pilot project, for a limited time, to verify the effectiveness of an international institute on disarmament research so as to permit a decision on its feasibility and usefulness. It was further suggested that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament was the logical body to undertake the research envisaged in the Assembly's resolution. The view was also expressed that the most urgent task of the moment in the field of disarmament was the adoption of practical measures to halt and reverse the arms race, and therefore the expansion of research activities and establishment of an institute would be an unnecessary diversion of effort and resources from that goal.

The Board agreed that the institute should have a simple, pragmatic mandate to carry out research for the purposes of assisting in ongoing negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation, stimulating initiatives for new

⁷ The report is contained in document A/34/589.

negotiations and providing a general insight into the problems involved. It should work on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The institute should be able to function with a high degree of scientific independence and autonomy, but it would have to be so established and operated as to ensure in its output a balance of political views. Towards that end, the recruitment of staff and the choice of the researchers to be associated with its work should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution.

The Board also made a number of recommendations with respect to the manner in which the institute should function, the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies as the institute's advisory council on disarmament research and, in that connexion, the composition and the tasks of the Advisory Council. The Board also made recommendations as to the functions and programme of the institute and how it would be financed. It was agreed that in the initial stage the institute should be of modest size; it was envisaged that it would carry out studies itself and also arrange for studies to be carried out by other research institutes. Finally, the Board agreed that it would be necessary to ensure a strong and effective link between the work of the institute and that of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. In that connexion, it noted that the Assistant Secretary-General of the Centre would serve on the Board of Directors of UNITAR when that body dealt with questions regarding the institute.

* * *

In the First Committee, on the basis of resolution 33/71 K and noting the report of the Secretary-General, 31 States⁸ sponsored a draft resolution on the question of the institute by which the General Assembly would ask the Secretary-General to hold consultations with UNITAR and hope that appropriate steps would be taken as soon as possible to implement the recommendations expressed in the report.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of France noted that the main features of the proposal were to establish the institute, initially on an interim basis, for the period until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. He noted that UNITAR had been consulted on the proposal and expressed the hope that a final arrangement would be endorsed at the second special session in the light of experience acquired.

He added that scientific independence was a basic element of the proposal, as stressed by the Advisory Board, and, in that connexion, felt that UNITAR provided an appropriate framework. The representative noted that

⁸ Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

the French Government planned to make a substantial contribution to the relatively low operational expenses involved and expressed the hope that other Member States would also contribute.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 26 November by a non-recorded vote of 106 to none, with 10 abstentions. In the Committee, the Soviet Union expressed its conviction that the draft resolution reflected a trend towards an unjustified increase in studies and research on disarmament, though the main task in the field was to achieve practical agreements. While necessary studies could play a useful though auxiliary role, the USSR considered it superfluous to establish an independent institute whose studies would be divorced from practical results. However, noting that the institute would come within the framework of UNITAR and be financed on the basis of voluntary contributions, and that it would be established on a temporary basis, the USSR would not object to a consensus on the establishment of the institute.

At its 97th plenary meeting, on 11 December, the Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 34/83 M; it reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Referring to its resolution 33/71 K of 14 December 1978, in which it requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its thirty-fourth session on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research, under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. *Notes* the information relevant to the matter contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the programme of research and studies on disarmament;

2. *Welcomes* the recommendations concerning the United Nations institute for disarmament research submitted by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and set forth in the report of the Secretary-General;

3. *Notes* that, under those recommendations, the United Nations institute for disarmament research would be set up within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research as an interim arrangement, for the period until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to hold consultations with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research regarding the establishment of the United Nations institute for disarmament research;

5. *Expresses the hope* that appropriate steps will be taken as soon as possible with a view to implementing the recommendations set forth in the report of the Secretary-General;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons

A comprehensive study on nuclear weapons was commenced in 1979 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/91 D of 16 December 1978. The main reasons for having such a study were contained in the preamble of that resolution where it was stated that (a) the General Assembly, in the Final Document of its tenth special session, had recommended increased dissemi-

nation of information concerning the arms race and disarmament; (b) the only study on nuclear weapons carried out by the United Nations⁹ was more than 10 years old and there had since been important developments in nuclear arms; and (c) a broad study on nuclear weapons, carried out by the United Nations, would make a valuable contribution to the dissemination of factual information and to international understanding of the issues involved.

On the basis of the mandate for the study as defined by the resolution, the Secretary-General, in the course of 1979, appointed a group of 12 experts from Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ghana, India, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia to assist him in the preparation of the study.¹⁰ The fact that no experts from any of the five nuclear-weapon States participated in the study reflected the position taken by those States in the recorded vote on resolution 33/91 D, in which they had abstained, except for China, which did not participate.

The group of experts held two sessions in the course of 1979, one from 9 to 13 July and the other from 15 to 19 October, under the chairmanship of Anders I. Thunborg, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations. At those sessions, the group discussed its mandate, organized its work and commenced preparation of the study, which, in accordance with the Assembly's request, will be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1980.

The mandate calls for a "comprehensive study" providing factual information on present nuclear arsenals, trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems, the effects of their use and the implications for international security, as well as for negotiations on disarmament of (a) the doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons, and (b) the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems.

The outline and structure of the study, as worked out by the group, closely reflected those basic points of the mandate. Thus, the group agreed that the study would provide:

(a) A factual description of the world's nuclear arsenals, as well as data on their rate of increase and, possibly, on the economic aspects of the acquisition, development and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon capability;

(b) A description of the trends in the development of new nuclear-weapon systems, i.e., future nuclear forces, their characteristics and effectiveness;

(c) The effects of the use of nuclear weapons in various possible modes of employment;

(d) The implications for international security of doctrines relating to the possible use of nuclear weapons, as well as of other doctrines;

(e) The security implications of the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of nuclear-weapon systems;

(f) The implications of doctrines, technology and the development of nuclear-weapon systems for the process of disarmament.

⁹ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1).

¹⁰ For the composition of the group, see annex II to this chapter.

Despite the complexity of the issues involved, by the end of 1979 the group had made significant progress in the drafting of the study.

Study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security

By resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and requested him to submit an initial progress report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament. The Secretary-General submitted the progress report to the General Assembly at that session on 23 May 1978, and in the Final Document of the session, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue the study with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him and to submit it to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

At its thirty-third session on 16 December 1978, the General Assembly, by resolution 33/91 I, requested the Secretary-General to expedite action for the continuation of the study, with a view to submitting a progress report to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and the final report at its thirty-fifth session.

Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a 12-member Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security.¹¹ The Group held two sessions in 1979, both under the chairmanship of Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, one from 5 to 8 June in Geneva and the other from 3 to 14 December in New York.

At its first session, the Group discussed the scope of the study and the programme and methodology of work, and agreed on an initial outline for the study. The results of its work were summarized in the progress report submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.¹²

At its second session, the Group discussed draft texts submitted by the experts under the various items in the outline and agreed on a more detailed outline for use as a guide in the preparation of its final report.

The outline agreed upon by the Group consisted of seven chapters on the following subjects:

- (a) the detrimental consequences for international security of the arms race in all its aspects;
- (b) a general analysis of the interrelationship of disarmament and international security;
- (c) the process of disarmament and international security;
- (d) *détente*, international security and disarmament;
- (e) an exploration of the relationship between specific disarmament measures and international security;

¹¹ For the composition of the Group, see annex III to this chapter.

¹² A/34/456 and Corr. 1.

(f) international co-operation as a means of strengthening international security and promoting disarmament; and

(g) disarmament, international security and the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and in the implementation of the system of international legal order and security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

The outline emphasized a conceptual framework of the subject-matter by calling, for example, for the investigation of the nature of the arms race, the concept of verification, the principle of equal security and the concept of détente. It further concentrated on classifying interconnections, such as the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and between political and military détente. At the same time, the outline agreed upon by the Group of Experts considered specific solutions and remedies. For instance, it referred to matters like the presence of the United Nations in conflict situations, the role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and methods of co-operation among States with different economic and social systems.

At the thirty-fourth session, no further action was requested in connexion with the study, since it had already been agreed that the final report would be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. However, by resolution 34/83 A (see chap. II, p. 33), the Assembly took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General. The Group scheduled two further sessions for 1980.

Technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency

The proposal to establish an international satellite monitoring agency was made by France in 1978 at the General Assembly's special session devoted to disarmament. In elaborating its proposal, France submitted a memorandum in which it envisaged the establishment of such an agency in three stages.¹³ In the first stage, the agency would analyze the data provided by countries which operate surveillance satellite systems. In the second stage, the agency would establish data-receiving stations directly linked to observation satellites of various nations. As a third stage, the agency would be provided with satellites of its own to supplement data made available by States and to minimize the demands imposed upon suppliers of data. In the memorandum, France also suggested that a committee of experts be set up to conduct "a study on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency"

The General Assembly took action on the proposal at its thirty-third session with the adoption of resolution 33/71 J, by which it requested the Secretary-General to obtain the views of member States on the proposal con-

¹³ A/S-10/AC.1/8, annex.

tained in the French memorandum. A total of 38 Governments submitted comments.¹⁴ Most of the replies were, in principle, favourable to the proposal to conduct the study, although two Governments, the United States and Cuba, expressed negative views, and the Soviet Union was one of the Governments that did not submit a reply.

Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a Group of Governmental Experts,¹⁵ which held two one-week sessions in 1979, both in Geneva. On 14 September, the Group of Governmental Experts submitted a progress report to the Secretary-General, who conveyed it to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.¹⁶ The report, comprised essentially of preliminary conclusions reached unanimously by the Group, contained the following summary and recommendations:

The Group fully recognized the valuable contribution which monitoring by satellites could make to the verification of certain parts or types of arms-control and disarmament agreements. This contribution from satellites to the verification process must not in general be seen as excluding other means of verification. The Group also appreciated the positive role that satellite monitoring could play in preventing or settling crises in various parts of the world and thus contributing to confidence-building among nations. The Group considered the gradual approach to the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency technically feasible and saw in it a way to limit and control the financial commitments required from the international community. With respect to the legal nature of the agency, it appeared that action would have to be taken to ensure its independence, which would constitute an essential guarantee for the objectivity of its analyses.

The Group felt that many of the questions raised required further in-depth study and recommended that a comprehensive report on the subject should be completed in time for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Since the Preparatory Committee for the special session will begin work in 1981, the comprehensive report, the possible outline of which appears in appendix I, should be completed by June 1981, in order that the Preparatory Committee may take it into consideration.

The appendix referred to dealt with three main aspects: the technical implications, legal implications and financial implications of establishing such an agency.

Regarding technical implications, the Group, in its preliminary conclusions, stated that to verify arms-control and disarmament agreements and to monitor crisis areas, two kinds of data would be needed: data generated by area-surveillance satellites with a ground resolution of about 5 to 3 metres and data from close-look satellites with a ground resolution of about 0.5 metre. The first type of data would make it possible to detect large weapon systems and facilities, and the second would provide for a fairly correct description of most types of armaments.

Some treaties could not be verified by satellites, the Group said, and satellites alone would not provide complete verification of treaties. It was agreed, however, that "data supplemented by satellite surveillance could

¹⁴ A/34/374.

¹⁵ For the composition of the Group, see annex IV to this chapter.

¹⁶ See A/34/540, annex.

provide essential and timely information on possible non-compliance with the provisions of disarmament or arms-control agreements” In monitoring crisis situations, satellites could provide “crucial and timely, though not exclusive, information in arriving at an over-all picture of a crisis situation”

Concerning the legal implications, the Group said that various alternatives existed as to the nature of the agency. It could be envisaged as a specialized agency of the United Nations or be attached to an existing United Nations body or to a United Nations disarmament agency. More detailed analysis would be required, but the Group agreed that “the legal nature of the Agency should ensure independence in the execution of its functions, taking into account the decision-making procedures to be established”

The Group further concluded that the financial implications of creating an agency would also require detailed study. Cost indications would be needed on setting up an image-processing centre (stage 1), establishing ground stations (stage 2) and launching satellites (stage 3).

* * *

Taking into account the Group's preliminary conclusions and the report containing the views expressed by Member States in the First Committee, 42 States¹⁷ sponsored a draft resolution entitled “Monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security”, by which the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the expert Group already constituted, to continue with the in-depth study as recommended by the Group. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of France expressed gratification at the support for its proposal and, noting the report and conclusions of the Group, stressed that the international community should have access to satellite monitoring as a means of verification of disarmament agreements and for possible observation and control of crises.

In the First Committee, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 113 to none, with 14 abstentions. The United States stated that its position remained as it had the previous year; at that time, it had expressed the view that the concept envisaged was not feasible, necessary or desirable in the foreseeable future and that such an agency would be affected by political considerations and perhaps ill-suited to its tasks.¹⁸ The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 124 to none, with 11 abstentions (including the USSR and the United States). The resolution, 34/83 E, reads as follows:

¹⁷ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

¹⁸ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), p. 87.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/71 J of 14 December 1978, in which it requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a study on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency,

Reaffirming the essential role to be played by appropriate monitoring measures, satisfactory to all interested parties, in establishing and implementing disarmament agreements, and in strengthening international security and confidence,

Considering the important contribution which earth observation satellite technology can make in this field,

Noting the views expressed by Member States, as compiled by the Secretary-General, on the proposal to establish an international satellite monitoring agency, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 J,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General, to which are annexed the preliminary conclusions of the study that he has undertaken, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, of the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing such an agency,

Considering it necessary, in the light of the recommendations made by the Group of Government Experts on the Question of the Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency in its preliminary conclusions, that the study should be continued in depth,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out such an in-depth study with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Question of the Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency previously constituted;

2. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the subject in time for the General Assembly to take a decision at its special session devoted to disarmament in 1982;

3. *Draws the attention* of the Secretary-General to the fact that, in pursuance of paragraph 2 above, the study should be submitted no later than June 1981 to the preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Study on regional disarmament

The General Assembly, by its resolution 33/91 E of 16 December 1978, initiated by Belgium, decided to undertake a systematic study of all aspects of regional disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts to be appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis. In accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed 10 experts from Argentina, Belgium, Egypt, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and Poland.¹⁹

The resolution specified that the study should cover, among other things, the following subjects: (a) basic conditions governing the regional approach, particularly from the standpoint of security requirements; (b) definition of measures which, on the initiative of the States concerned, might lend themselves to a regional approach; and (c) the link between regional measures and the process of general and complete disarmament.

¹⁹ For the composition of the Group, see annex V to this chapter.

During 1979, the Group held two sessions, one in June and one in October, both at Geneva. The Belgian expert served as Chairman. At its first session, the Group discussed the scope of the study and the programme and methodology of its work. It also adopted a provisional outline for the study which envisaged an introduction and chapters on historical background, regional approaches to disarmament, non-exhaustive list of conceivable measures open to selection by States in any "region" and conclusions. At its second session, the Group considered a draft composite text of the substantive parts of the study prepared on the basis of contributions of the experts.

The General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, had before it a progress report on the work of the Group²⁰ submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 33/91 E. In the debates in plenary meetings and the First Committee a number of States referred to the study in the context of the discussion on regional measures of disarmament in general (see chap. XIX above). They hoped and felt that the study might contribute to the efforts being undertaken in various areas of the world for regional measures of disarmament and to a better understanding of the issues involved. No resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the subject of the study inasmuch as the Group, in accordance with resolution 33/91 E, would submit the study, through the Secretary-General, to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session; it would therefore continue its work in 1980.

Studies initiated by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session

In addition to the ongoing studies, the General Assembly, in 1979, authorized five further studies on disarmament in respect of (a) the nuclear capability of South Africa; (b) confidence-building measures; (c) institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament; (d) Israeli nuclear armament; and (e) a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

(a) *Nuclear capability of South Africa*

On the basis of a draft resolution submitted by Nigeria and co-sponsored in its final form by 27 African States, the General Assembly, on 11 December 1979, adopted resolution 34/76 B (see chap. XII, above p. 177). By that resolution, the Assembly, deeply alarmed at the report that South Africa might have detonated a nuclear explosive device in September 1979, appealed to Member States to provide all relevant information at their disposal to the Secretary-General and requested him to follow the situation closely and take account of the information submitted. The Assembly further requested the

²⁰ See A/34/519, annex.

Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of appropriate experts, a comprehensive report on South Africa's plans and capabilities in the nuclear field and to submit the report to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

(b) *Confidence-building measures*

At the thirty-fourth session, a draft resolution on confidence-building measures was sponsored by 26 countries and introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, which drew attention to the support that resolution 33/91 B, adopted on the same question in 1978, had received. The new proposal suggested further development of the concept of confidence-building and the carrying out of a study on the question. The General Assembly endorsed the proposal with the adoption of resolution 34/87 B (see chap. I, p. 21). By that resolution, the Assembly, taking into account the views submitted by Member States in response to a request contained in the 1978 resolution²¹ and relevant statements made at the thirty-fourth session of the Assembly, decided to undertake a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis. A progress report is to be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, and the study at its thirty-sixth session.

(c) *Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament*

Sweden initiated the proposal for a comprehensive United Nations study of institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament, which was authorized by the Assembly in resolution 34/87 E (see chap. I, p. 23). By that resolution, the Assembly, *inter alia*, noted the growing disarmament agenda and complexity of the issues involved, and consequent increasing demands for United Nations management of disarmament affairs. It also recalled the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission that requirements of an institutional and procedural nature should be examined so as to facilitate the disarmament process and to ensure the implementation of disarmament agreements and proposals (see appendix II below, sect. IV D, para. 18).

Accordingly, the Secretary-General was requested, with the assistance of qualified experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing the present and future institutional needs of the United Nations in the management of disarmament affairs and outlining the possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those needs, including legal and financial implications. The Assembly recommended that in carrying out the study, the Secretary-General should seek the views of Member States.

²¹ A/34/416 and Add. 1, 2, and 3.

The Secretary-General was requested to submit a final report on the study to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in 1981.

(d) *Israeli nuclear armament*

On the basis of an initiative by Iraq, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/89 (see chap. VII, p. 102, above). By that resolution, it was noted that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region of the Middle East, and the Assembly appealed to all States to end any co-operation with Israel which might assist it in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. By the same resolution, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament and to report to it at the thirty-sixth session, in 1981, and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

(e) *Comprehensive nuclear-test ban*

By decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979 (see chap. IX, p. 133 above), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare the study on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, to be completed in time for transmission to the Committee on Disarmament in the spring of 1980. In the First Committee, Mexico proposed the study on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "United Nations studies on disarmament" (see p. 349 above),²² which incorporated the recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, including the specific recommendation for such a study as a measure which might contribute to the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

Conclusion

Interest in studies on disarmament and arms limitation has been increasing in recent years. This has been especially so since the tenth special session of the General Assembly which fully recognized their value and the contribution they could make towards the achievement of objectives in the disarmament field.

In addition to the on-going work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, six studies were being carried out in 1979 pursuant to various mandates of the General Assembly from previous years, studies on the relationship between disarmament and development; international reporting of

²² A/34/588.

military expenditures; nuclear weapons; the interrelationship between disarmament and international security; the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency; and regional disarmament. In 1979 the Assembly decided to authorize five further studies as outlined above.

The results of these studies will lead to a broader and more accurate understanding of the questions involved, and thus have a significant bearing on disarmament and arms limitation efforts in the future. Every indication is that in-depth studies on particular issues will be a continuing aspect of the search for disarmament.

ANNEX I

Membership of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1979^a

- Mr. Erich Bielka-Karltau, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria
Mr. Abdulla Yaccoub Bishara, Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations
Mr. Frank Edmund Boaten, Ambassador of Ghana to Denmark
Mr. Constantin Ene, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva; representative of Romania to the Committee on Disarmament
Mr. Alfonso García Robles, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament
Mr. John Garnett, Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies, Department of International Politics, University of Aberystwyth, Wales, United Kingdom
Mr. Enrique Gaviria-Liévano, Deputy Permanent Representative of Columbia to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Ignac Golob, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia
Mr. A. C. S. Hameed, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka
Mr. John W. Holmes, Director of Research, Canadian Institute of International Affairs
Mr. William E. Jackson, Jr., Executive Director of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC, United States of America
Mr. Hussein Khalaf, Professor, University of Cairo, former Minister and Ambassador of Egypt
Mr. Akira Matsui, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Mr. Kauska S. Mutukwa, Deputy Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations
Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Adviser to the Foreign Minister of Argentina; Chairman of the Argentine delegation to the Committee on Disarmament
Mr. José Luis Pérez, Division for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba
Mr. Radha Krishna Ramphul, Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations
Mr. Klaus Ritter, Director, Foundation of Science and Politics, Ebenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Alejandro Rovira, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay
Mr. Agha Shahi, Adviser on Foreign Affairs for Pakistan
Mr. Vladimir Shustov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations
Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, Senator and former Minister of the Republic of France

^a Some members were unable to attend one or both of the 1979 sessions.

- Mr. Oscar Vaernø, Director-General for Planning and Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway
- Mr. Milous Vejvoda, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia
- Mr. M. A. Vellodi, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India
- Mr. Piero Vinci, Ambassador of Italy, Rome
- Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner, Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland
- Mr. Alejandro D. Yango, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations
- Mr. Alexander Yankov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations

ANNEX II

Membership of the Group of Experts on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, 1979

- Mr. K. F. Allotey, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana
- Mr. Milutin Civic, Special Adviser on Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia
- Mr. F. Correa-Villalobos, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations
- Mr. N. Haffad, Ambassador of Algeria to Nigeria
- Mr. Owen Harries, Policy Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs of Australia
- Mr. Ryukichi Imai, Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan
- Mr. Albert Legault, Director-General of CQRI, University of Laval, Quebec, Canada
- Mr. J. K. A. Marker, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva
- Mr. José María Otegui, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations
- Mr. Gheorghe Tinca, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania
- Mr. A. I. Thunborg, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations
- Mr. M. A. Vellodi, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India

ANNEX III

Membership of the Group of Experts on the study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, 1979

- Mr. Evgheni Alexandrov, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria
- Mr. Leopoldo Benites, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador
- Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Technical Counsellor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
- Mr. Evgeniy V. Bougrov, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Ms. Betty G. Lall, Cornell University, New York
- Mr. Jorge Morelli, Ambassador of Peru to Argentina
- Mr. Janus A. W. Paludan, Ambassador of Denmark to Iceland
- Mr. Carlos P. Romulo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Philippines
- Mr. Zenon Rossides, Ambassador, Special Adviser, Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations
- Mr. Winston Tubman, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations

ANNEX IV

Membership of the Group of Experts to study the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency, 1979

- Mr. Cesare Albanesi, National Council of Research, Space Activity Service, Rome, Italy
Mr. Hubert Bortzmeyer, Conseiller technique, Centre national d'études spatiales, Paris, France
Mr. Sune Danielsson, head of Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden
Mr. Mohammed Gammar, Ingénieur géographe chargé des problèmes géographiques et hydrographiques de l'Armée, Tunisia
Mr. Enrique Gaviria Liévano, Deputy Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Eugeniu Mandescu, Inspector-General and Secretary of the Romanian Commission for Space Activities
Mr. Carlos Passalacqua, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina
Mr. Krishnamurthy Santhanam, Scientist, Indian Space Research Organization, Bangalore, India
Mr. Mohamad Sidik, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Obrad Vucurovic, Ingénieur, Institut militaire de l'Armée, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Mr. Hans Winkler, Assistant Legal Adviser, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Austria

ANNEX V

Membership of the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 1979

- Mr. Olu Adeniji, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Antonio Gonzáles de Leon, Director and Chief, Department of International Organizations, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Mexico
Mr. Wolfgang Heisenberg, Scientific Adviser, Foundation for Scientific and Political Studies, Eggenberg, Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Niaz Naik, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations
Mr. José Maria V. Otégui, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations
Mr. Stanislaw Przygodzki, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland
Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Egypt in the United States of America, Washington, DC.
Mr. Purbo S. Suwondo, Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations
Mr. Klaus Törnudd, Director of Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Mr. Albert Willot, Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Belgium

CHAPTER XXIII

Disarmament and development

Introduction

IN 1977, THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament included in its recommendations to the General Assembly that it initiate, on the basis of a proposal submitted by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, a study on the relationship between disarmament and development.¹ That recommendation was taken up in the course of the disarmament debate at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. A draft resolution concerning such a study was introduced by Norway and adopted by consensus in the First Committee and by the General Assembly as resolution 32/88 A.

The notion of establishing some form of link between disarmament and development has a substantial history in the United Nations. The opportunity for a highly advantageous revision of priorities in global resource allocation away from armaments towards economic and social development has been clearly apparent since the early years of the postwar era and has been recognized, for example, in the periodic proposals concerning the reduction of military budgets (see chapter XXI above) and in a series of reports on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and related matters.² Thus, while the traditional attitude of the international community used to be that both disarmament and development were urgent goals which should be pursued independently, there has for some time been a growing feeling, particularly evident in recent years, that the interrelationship between the two goals is intimate and that there may be much to be gained from an explicit

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 41 (A/32/41 and Corr. 1)*, para. 32.

² *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.1.10); *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.1.6); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1).

recognition of that fact. This was one of the primary rationales behind the proposal for a new study.

Resolution 32/88 A specified that the terms of reference for the study should be determined by the General Assembly itself at its special session devoted to disarmament and, to that end, the Secretary-General was requested to appoint an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts for the purpose of elaborating a possible framework and terms of reference for the study. As general guidelines, it was stated in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group³ that the study should be made in the context of the current situation in the field of disarmament and the reciprocal relationship between disarmament on the one hand and détente, international peace and security, economic and social development and the promotion of international co-operation on the other. It was further stated that the study should be made in the context of how disarmament could contribute to the establishment of a new international economic order. With regard to the terms of reference for the study, the *Ad Hoc* Group recommended that research should be focused on three main areas: (a) present-day utilization of resources for military purposes; (b) economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures; and (c) conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes.

It was particularly stressed that the study should serve as the basis for decisions on concrete actions to reallocate resources released through disarmament measures to economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. To that end, the *Ad Hoc* Group urged that the study be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of and, most particularly, the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation of resources.

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Group was considered by the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in May and June 1978 and received widespread endorsement. In the Programme of Action in the Final Document,⁴ the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to initiate the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts.

A group of 24 governmental experts was duly appointed and met for the first time in September 1978 in New York. In order to secure the broadest possible participation in the study, the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development decided to establish a list of the researchers and research institutes around the world with relevant expertise and to invite them to submit research proposals on the various subjects detailed in the Group's mandate. It also decided to recommend that the Secretary-General appeal to all Governments to make voluntary

³ A/S-10/9, annex.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), paras. 94 and 95; the Final Document is also reproduced in its entirety in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.74.IX.2 or 3), appendix 1.

contributions to a special fund—the Disarmament Project Fund—that had been established for the study to supplement the financial resources from the regular budget of the United Nations. The Group further decided to recommend that the Secretary-General invite Governments to submit their own data and information relevant to the study. These and other matters related to the organization of its work were set out in a report submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.⁵

The General Assembly, at that session, reaffirmed its support for the study and, in resolution 33/71 M, appealed to Governments to make voluntary contributions to the Disarmament Project Fund and to make available data and information relevant to a meaningful completion of the study. In another resolution, 33/71 I, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group, for its consideration, the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development in the context of the follow-up to a proposal which had been submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session by the Government of France and referred to in the list of proposals contained in paragraph 125 of the Final Document⁶ of that session.

Work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1979

The Group, whose membership had expanded to 27,⁷ held three meetings in 1979 and the evaluation and selection of research proposals was an important item of business at each one. The invitations sent out in September 1978 resulted in the submission of 56 research proposals. In the selection of those that could be commissioned within the available resources, the Group endeavoured to meet a number of criteria. The primary considerations were that the commissioned proposals should collectively cover the areas of research in the Group's mandate as completely as possible; that the proposals be original and well-constructed and that the researchers responsible be manifestly competent for the task. In addition, the Group endeavoured to ensure that the research would focus on as many countries and geographical regions as possible and that those responsible for it would come from countries at different stages of development and be representative of different economic and social systems. Further, preference was given to proposals that placed emphasis on the real human and material resources absorbed by armaments

⁵ See A/33/317, annex.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, para. 125 (p).

⁷ The countries represented were: Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

and potentially available for development needs. Finally, the Group considered the problem of the conversion of resources from armaments to economic and social development to be of particular importance, and that also had an influence on the selection of proposals.

The outcome of the first review of the 56 proposals under consideration was that a total of 19 projects were commissioned, 12 to be financed from the Disarmament Project Fund and seven to be nationally financed. The Group also drew up two new lists of researchers and research institutions to be invited to submit research proposals. One list was drawn up by the new members of the Group—Canada, Jamaica and Sri Lanka—and those on that list were to be invited to submit research proposals on the basis of the Group's original mandate. The second list was drawn up by the Group as a whole and was designed to attract research proposals concerned specifically with the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development.

At its second meeting for 1979, held in Geneva in May, the Group followed the same procedure, reviewing both the newly submitted proposals and those outstanding from the first round. The outcome was that the Group was able to commission an additional 23 studies. Of those, four were to address the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development. Finally, in September 1979, a new contribution to the Disarmament Project Fund enabled the Group to commission three projects that had been short-listed in May pending the availability of additional financial resources.

Thus, as a result of its work in 1979, the Group has commissioned 45 research projects of which 24 are to be financed from the Disarmament Project Fund and 21 are to be financed nationally. The project titles are listed below, in the annex to the present chapter. The research teams involved come from 20 different countries. Ten countries—Cyprus, Ethiopia, France, India, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, the United States of America and Venezuela—have made voluntary contributions to the Disarmament Project Fund totalling \$593,180. In addition, 10 countries—Canada, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America—have undertaken to finance projects nationally, either completely or in part. The completed studies are to be submitted to the Centre for Disarmament over the period 1 January – 1 June 1980.

During 1979, the Group also acted on its earlier decisions to take advantage of United Nations expertise in its areas of interest, particularly in development issues, and to establish contacts with non-governmental organizations. Accordingly, invitations were extended to United Nations institutions, regional commissions, research institutes and specialized agencies and, to date, observers from UNCTAD, UNDP and UNESCO have participated in the Group's meetings. Similarly, at its meetings in May and September of 1979 the Group exchanged views with the representatives of 11 non-governmental organizations.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

In paragraph 94 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and also in resolution 33/71 M, the Secretary-General was requested to submit an interim report on the subject of disarmament and development to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. The Group prepared such a report⁸ for the Secretary-General who, in turn, transmitted it to the Assembly.

In the report the Group surveyed its activities since its formation in September 1978. Further, the Group reaffirmed its conviction that, first, relevant data and information from Governments would be of great value and, second, that strong support from suitably qualified research consultants in the Centre for Disarmament would be indispensable for the successful execution of its mandate. The report indicated that a minimum of three such consultants would be required for the period extending from January 1980 to September 1981.

The issue of the potential relationship between disarmament and development attracted widespread but generally brief comments, both in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the First Committee.⁹ The brevity of the remarks was scarcely surprising in view of the fact that, at the Assembly's initiative, a major study on the subject was well underway. It is noteworthy, however, that several countries, including the Bahamas, India, Nigeria, Norway, Togo and Zaire, expressed the strong hope in the First Committee that the study would provide the basis for a concrete plan of action and lead to the establishment of machinery for the rechanneling of resources from armaments to economic and social development.

India, for example, expressed the conviction that the diversion to development of even a part of the resources devoted to armaments would both accelerate economic and social progress in the developing countries and enhance global security. It further expressed the hope that, in formulating a concrete plan of action, the study would also alleviate the apprehensions in some developed countries about the adverse economic and social consequences of disarmament. The Bahamas saw the establishment of a link between disarmament and development as a means of giving concrete expression to the deep concern of all countries over the huge gap in economic and social well-being between developed and developing countries.

On 23 November, a draft resolution entitled "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development" acknowledging the Group's interim report and endorsing the two main requests contained therein was introduced in the First Committee by Sweden and sponsored also by Canada, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-

⁸ A/34/534, annex.

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 32nd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 43rd meetings; and *ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

many, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. The continued strong support for the study was reflected in the fact that the draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee without a vote on 26 November and by the General Assembly on 12 December as resolution 34/83 K, also without a vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling the provisions contained in paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling further its resolution 33/71 M of 14 December 1978, in which it took note of the organizational report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General to assist him with the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, and its resolution 33/71 I of the same date in which it requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group of Governmental Experts, for its consideration, the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development,

Re-emphasizing that one of the principal aims of this study should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures,

1. *Takes note* of the interim report of the Secretary-General with respect to the above-mentioned study;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take appropriate action to provide the resources and expertise necessary to complete successfully the study in accordance with paragraph 23 of the interim report;

3. *Appeals* to Governments to make available data and information relevant to a meaningful completion of the above-mentioned study;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development: report of the Secretary-General"

Conclusion

At the end of 1979, the study on the relationship between disarmament and development was roughly at midpoint. The response to the appeal to the Governments of Member States either to make voluntary contributions to the Disarmament Project Fund or to finance projects nationally was particularly generous and the 45 research projects commissioned should provide the Group with an abundance of raw material for its final report. Similarly, the provision of three research consultants to assist the Group in the drafting of its final report should help to ensure that the best possible use is made of the new research material.

It appears clearly from the various actions taken by the General Assembly in support of the new study that it is determined to take the issue of the relationship between disarmament and development beyond the stage of conjecture and rhetoric.

[Annex overleaf]

ANNEX

Research projects commissioned for the study on the relationship between disarmament and development

A. PROJECTS FINANCED FROM THE DISARMAMENT PROJECT FUND

<i>Project leader</i>	<i>Project title</i>
1. Mr. A. Bolaji Akinyemi Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Nigeria	Disarmament and development: utilization of resources for military purposes in Black Africa
2. Miss Graciela Chichilnisky Department of Economics Columbia University United States of America	The role of armament flows in the international market and in development strategies in a North-South contest
3. Mr. Pierre Dabezies Centre for Defence Policy Research (CEPODE) France	A study of the problems raised by the French Government's memorandum concern- ing the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development
4. Mr. Ali El-Din Hillal Dessouki Faculty of Economics and Political Science Cairo University Egypt	The effects of arms race and defence expenditures on development: a case study of Egypt
5. Mr. José Antonio Encinas del Pando Economic and Social Research Centre University of Lima Peru	Declaration of Ayacucho
6. Mr. Dieter Ernst University of Hamburg Federal Republic of Germany	Arms production and technological dependence of developing countries. Methodological guidelines for sector case studies
7. Mr. Ibrahima Fall Faculty of Law and Economics University of Dakar Senegal	Disarmament and development in Africa
8. Dr. Jacques Fontanel Faculty of Economic Sciences University of Grenoble France	A formalized and econometric study of the interrelationship between military expenditure and economic development. Examples: France and Morocco
9. Mr. David Greenwood Centre for Defence Studies University of Aberdeen United Kingdom	West European defence efforts in the later 1970s and early 1980s
10. Mr. Godfrey Gunatilleke Marga Institute Sri Lanka	The armament culture—the diffusion of the values of militarization
11. Mr. Helge Hveem International Peace Research Institute Norway	Military utilization of natural resources and some policy suggestions on utilization control and conversion

<i>Project leader</i>	<i>Project title</i>
12. Mrs. Mary Kaldor Institute of Development Studies University of Sussex United Kingdom	The role of military technology in industrial development
13. Mr. Wassily Leontief Institute for Economic Analysis New York University United States of America	A study of world-wide economic and social implications of a limitation on military spending (an input-output approach)
14. Mr. Seymour Melman Department of Industrial Engineering Columbia University United States of America	Three models for economic conversion from military to civilian economy
15. Mr. Ikenna Nzimiro Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of Nigeria Nigeria	Economic and social effects of (military) arms build-up in Nigeria: implications for development of the country
16. Mrs. Swadesh Rana The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses India	Reallocation of military resources in OECD areas to primary sectors in least developed countries: mutuality of interests: a third world perspective
17. Mr. K. Nagaraja Rao Mr. Jack Ruina Center for Policy Alternatives Massachusetts Institute of Technology United States of America	Disarmament and development: the case of relatively advanced developing countries
18. Mrs. Emma Rothschild Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Humanities United States of America	Scientists, technicians and disarmament
19. Mr. Bruce M. Russett Yale University United States of America	The effects of arms transfers on developing countries
20. Mr. Ignacy Sachs International Research Centre on Environment and Development France	Exploring reconversion strategies
21. Mr. Dan Smith Department of Economics Birkbeck College United Kingdom	International resource costs of armament: macro- and micro-economic perspectives
22. Mr. Finn Sollie Mr. Daniel Heradstveit, respectively, of the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Norway	Outline for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development
23. Mr. Marek Thee International Peace Research Institute Norway	Outline for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development

<i>Project leader</i>	<i>Project title</i>
24. Mr. Peter Wallenstein Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University Sweden	Conversion measures in a Swedish arms industry: experiences and attitudes

B. NATIONALLY FINANCED PROJECTS

<i>Project leader</i>	<i>Project title</i>
1. Mr. Jean Thomas Bernard University of Laval Canada	Impact of disarmament on the Canadian economy
2. Mr. Olav Bjerkholt Mr. Nils Petter Gleditsch International Peace Research Institute Norway	The redeployment of arms expenditures in Norway with particular emphasis on the scope for additional transfer to developing countries
3. Mr. Michael Brzoska Mr. Peter Lock Mr. Herbert Wulf University of Hamburg Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Dan Smith Birkbeck College University of London United Kingdom	Disarmament and the transnationalization of production
4. Mr. Michael Brzoska Mr. Peter Lock Mr. Herbert Wulf University of Hamburg Federal Republic of Germany	Alternative systems of military indicators
5. Centre for Economic and Social Studies of the Third World Mexico	Conventional arms in Latin America
6. Mr. Ekkehard Ehrenberg Bonn University Federal Republic of Germany	Political and economic obstacles to disarmament efforts in developing countries: Egypt, India and Iran
7. Mr. Klaus Englehardt Institut für International Politik und Wirtschaft German Democratic Republic	The influence of the arms race and disarmament on the employment situation in countries with differing social systems
8. Institute for African Affairs USSR Academy of Sciences Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Present-day utilization of resources for military purposes
9. Institute of Oriental Studies USSR Academy of Sciences Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	The economic and social consequences of the arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures for the developing countries of Asia and Africa

<i>Project leader</i>	<i>Project title</i>
10. Institute for United States and Canadian Affairs USSR Academy of Sciences Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Preamble A. Present-day utilization of resources for military purposes B. Economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures
11. Institute of World Economics and International Relations USSR Academy of Sciences Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures
12. Mr. Krengel Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung D-1000 Berlin-Dahlem	Macro-economic effects of disarmament policies on sectoral production and employment in the Federal Republic of Germany, with special emphasis on development policy issues
13. Mr. Lutz Köllner Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr Federal Republic of Germany	Disarmament and development: disarmament, stability and equilibrium of world monetary systems
14. Mr. Wassily Leontief Institute for Economic Analysis New York University United States of America	Study of the world-wide implications of hypothetical changes in military spending
15. Mr. Zbigniew Matkowski Institute of Political Economy Poland	Armaments and market distortion, instability and inflation in different socio-economic conditions
16. Mr. Jorgen Randers Resource Policy Group Norway	Stabilizing raw material prices through reallocation of armament funds
17. Mr. Ernie Regehr University of Waterloo Canada	The impact of United States defence procurement and Canadian defence expenditures, sales and production on the utilization of resources and industrialization in Canada
18. Mr. Lance Taylor Massachusetts Institute of Technology United States of America	Macro impacts of defence spending in less developed countries
19. Mr. Constantin Vlad Institute of Political Sciences and the Study of National Questions Romania	Disarmament and the new international order
20. Mr. Raimo Väyrynen University of Helsinki Finland	The role of transnational corporations in the transfer of military technology to the third world
21. Mrs. Katarzyna Zukowska Polish Institute of International Affairs Poland	Armaments and disarmament and the global socio-economic problems of the contemporary world

Mobilization of public opinion and the observance of Disarmament Week

Introduction

A MAJOR FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS is to increase the flow of information on the arms race and disarmament to governments, non-governmental organizations and news media and, through them as well as directly, to the general public. The aim is to facilitate a better understanding of the problems of the arms race and disarmament, stimulate the interest of organizations and individuals and generate wider public support of disarmament efforts.

A fresh stimulus was given to this endeavour in 1976 when the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament recommended that the United Nations publish a disarmament yearbook and other publications, including a periodical, to present, in readily readable form, current facts and developments in the field of disarmament.¹ It also recommended that the Secretariat continue to disseminate information on disarmament to the general public. Those recommendations were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976.

A number of proposals were also put forward during the preparatory stages of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which led to the adoption at that session of several measures designed to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. Those measures included the intensification of activities in the area of dissemination of information, particularly those of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designed to encourage or facilitate study and research.

The general topic of disarmament information and related matters was discussed intensively during the special session in connexion with both the programme of action and the machinery for disarmament. The consensus

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36)*, "Agreed Proposals", para. 7.

achieved with regard to information activities was reflected in the Final Document, in several paragraphs in the Programme of Action,² calling for specific measures designed to increase the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it. Governmental and non-governmental as well as various United Nations organs involved in the dissemination of information were asked to give priority to the preparation and distribution of material relating to the danger represented by the arms race as well as to the ongoing disarmament efforts and questions under negotiation. Among the other provisions of the Programme of Action there was a call for steps to develop education programmes for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

In the part entitled "Machinery",³ emphasis was placed on the research and information functions of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and there was recognition of the consequent need to strengthen the resources of the Centre. The valuable contribution that other United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations, particularly research institutes, could make in connexion with the dissemination of disarmament information was also recognized and their role in that regard was encouraged.

By the Final Document the General Assembly also proclaimed a week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.⁴ The idea for such an event was advanced particularly by Japan and Mongolia. During the special session, 500 representatives from the Japanese Liaison and Coordinating Conference (of non-governmental organizations) submitted a petition supported by 20 million signatures, calling for wider and more accurate publicity regarding the horrors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and for the outlawing of the use and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons "as soon as possible". Thereafter, Japan, in a note verbale addressed to the Secretary-General,⁵ proposed the insertion in the Final Document of a paragraph by which the General Assembly would proclaim 6 August as "disarmament day". On the basis of Mongolia's alternative proposal, after discussion during the session, agreement was reached on the broader concept of observing a disarmament week to explain the threat of the arms race and disarmament objectives. Finally, the week of 24 October was decided upon. Many countries observed Disarmament Week in 1978 by arranging special events such as rallies and seminars, and issuing special publications and articles, both through Governments and non-governmental organizations.⁶

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 99-107.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 123.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 102.

⁵ A/S-10/AC.1/14.

⁶ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), chap. XXV, annex I (p. 468).

In 1978 the United Nations, through its Centre for Disarmament, undertook the publication of a periodical entitled *Disarmament* and, in 1979, through the Centre in co-operation with the Information Service at Geneva, it began to issue "Disarmament Fact Sheets"—brief summaries covering specific current disarmament topics. Since the special session, the Centre for Disarmament has also increased its contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in keeping with the wishes of the General Assembly.

Finally, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its first substantive session in 1979, indicated the value it attached to public opinion by including in its recommendations to the Assembly on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, under the heading "other measures", the item "Implementation of the provisions contained in the Final Document intended to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament"⁷ Thus the Commission endorsed the consensus reached on the subject by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

Observance of Disarmament Week, 1979

In the United Nations family of organizations—the specialized agencies, regional commissions, information centres and the International Atomic Energy Agency—as well as in the integral United Nations bodies, broad support was expressed for Disarmament Week and the occasion was observed in many cases by the showing of films and the distribution of information on disarmament. Details of the material produced in connexion with Disarmament Week are contained in the annex to the present chapter.

In messages from heads of organizations and agencies, reference was made to the respective organizations' concerns over the arms race. The Director-General of the World Health Organization, in a message addressed to the Centre for Disarmament, stressed that it was "a universally recognized fact that progress towards disarmament . . . could release resources that could be used to accelerate socio-economic developments, including primary health care and also benefit the populations suffering from the effects of armed conflict". He further noted that the World Health Assembly had adopted a resolution, WHA.32.24, in which it had called for the attainment of disarmament to release resources for the development of public health in the world. The text of the resolution is reproduced in appendix VII below.

The Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in his message, compared what Governments spent each year on weapons of war and the small amounts available to reach millions of infants and children lacking in such areas as medical care, sanitation, drinking water, food and education. In connexion with the International Year of the

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19, sect. III B., para. 4.

Child, UNICEF made a special effort to make public opinion aware of the link between disarmament and development to benefit the young, and drew attention to the costs of the arms race and the aim of the United Nations in its disarmament efforts. UNICEF also produced a school kit, "Disarmament and the Child", including graphic materials and teachers' notes.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1979

Dissemination of information

In connexion with the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session," the Assembly had before it a number of documents relating to the dissemination of information, most of them in implementation of requests by the General Assembly contained in resolutions adopted at its thirty-third session in 1978.

One of them, compiled on the basis of resolution 33/71 G by which the Assembly requested Member States to report, through the Secretary-General, on their activities in the field of dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament, contained replies from 20 States: Belgium, the Byelorussian SSR, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.⁸

A number of countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand and Poland, referred in their replies to magazines and other publications on disarmament which were brought out in their respective countries for distribution to schools, libraries and the general public. India referred to a non-official international workshop on disarmament conducted in Delhi in March 1978, and the Netherlands drew attention to the existence in that country of several specialized study centres such as the Institute for Polemology at the State University of Groningen and at the John F. Kennedy Institute, a centre for international studies associated with the University of Tilburg. The German Democratic Republic stated in its reply that in February 1979 it had hosted a special session of the World Peace Council at which the questions of détente and disarmament and of action against the arms race, the neutron weapon and all weapons of mass destruction were dealt with and broadly publicized. The appeal, "Away with weapons of mass destruction! Stop the arms race!" was launched and a message from the participants to the five nuclear Powers was published.

A number of countries also responded to the invitation from the General Assembly contained in resolution 33/71 E to inform the Secretary-

⁸ A/34/458 and Add. 1.

General of all measures adopted outside the aegis of the United Nations regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly at its tenth special session.⁹ Some of the replies submitted referred to activities concerning dissemination of information. Egypt, for instance, stated that, at the national level, its Ministry of Education was preparing a comprehensive programme to promote education on and the dissemination of information relating to the arms race and disarmament in compliance with the decisions of the special session. Japan stated that the Final Document of the special session had been translated into Japanese and the translated text circulated among various groups including governmental agencies, academicians and media representatives. In addition, the 1977 *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* would be translated into Japanese and the translated texts would be similarly disseminated in 1979.

Poland stated that it was making a full effort to popularize among the Polish public the knowledge of the Final Document, promote the awareness of the danger of the arms race and provide information on actions aimed towards disarmament. The United Kingdom stated that greater public interest in arms control and disarmament had been stimulated through parliamentary debates. Government Ministers and officials had addressed meetings and articles had been contributed to specialized journals. The United Kingdom also intended to launch a disarmament newsletter which would include important documents and other materials on current developments in arms control. In addition, copies of the Final Document of the special session were made available to many non-governmental organizations.

Pursuant to a provision of resolution 33/71 G, by which the Assembly requested the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions and requested the Secretary-General to report on other ways of encouraging the role of such organizations and institutions in the field of disarmament, the Secretary-General reported¹⁰ that the Centre had increased contacts with such organizations with a view to providing information on all aspects of the arms race and disarmament. The Centre had also made arrangements for the non-governmental organizations to submit contributions to various disarmament bodies, and provided speakers more frequently than in previous years to various non-governmental groups. The report stated that the contacts between the Centre and research institutions had developed to an unprecedented degree since the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

The Director-General of UNESCO, pursuant to resolution 33/71 G, reported on the preparations for the World Congress on Disarmament Education scheduled for June 1980.¹¹ The report stated that the arrangements for the Congress constituted UNESCO's most important contribution to the implementation of the Final Document of the tenth special session. A meeting

⁹ A/34/495.

¹⁰ A/34/547.

¹¹ See A/34/147, annex.

of experts was held in Prague from 4 to 8 June 1979, at the invitation of the Czechoslovakian Government, to undertake preparations for the Congress. The report of the Director-General contained relevant excerpts of the final report of the Prague meeting. Details of the activities of UNESCO related to disarmament are summarized in appendix V below.

In the debate in the First Committee, the importance of an informed public mobilized in support of disarmament was emphasized by the many delegations that spoke on the subject.¹² Most notably, the continuation of efforts to mobilize public opinion along the lines set out in the Final Document of the special session on disarmament was referred to by many representatives and was being encouraged by their respective Governments.

For instance, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Romania, Somalia and Venezuela attached great importance to encouraging a full understanding of the problems of disarmament by the public the world over.

Venezuela stated that, in the crusade against the arms race, and particularly against nuclear weaponry, the international community must muster all resources at its disposal. While the participation of peoples from all parts of the world was of fundamental importance, their contribution would be significant only to the extent that they duly understood the magnitude of the ethical and material crisis inherent in the arms race. Referring to the UNESCO report¹³ regarding the need to encourage public opinion in support of disarmament, Venezuela concluded that the international community should ensure that public information and education, through mass communications media and competent institutions, were employed as an effective instrument to enhance the principles and values of disarmament. Japan believed that, in order to achieve the disarmament objectives, it was imperative that public opinion be fully mobilized to urge the leaders of States to take political decisions on disarmament issues. Czechoslovakia and Somalia commended UNESCO for its plan to hold a Congress on Disarmament Education in 1980. India and Nepal hoped that the United Nations would be able to play a powerful role in generating world public opinion on disarmament through sincere and concerted efforts on the part of all its members.

Some delegations referred to efforts being made at the national level. The United Kingdom, for instance, noted that in 1979 it had co-operated with the United Nations Association of that country in producing a United Nations Day leaflet for mass circulation, with the emphasis on securing a better future for the world's children. As a new initiative, it had also launched a regular newsletter designed to increase public understanding of the urgent tasks in the field of disarmament.

Canada noted that it had formed a consultative group of representatives of prominent non-governmental organizations to give advice on matters of education and research, as well as to exchange views on policy questions

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹³ See A/34/147, annex.

concerning disarmament. Canada also intended to promote research into public opinion on the grounds that, while it was often assumed that disarmament goals were popular, that might not always be the case.

Disarmament Week

In connexion with Disarmament Week, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General¹⁴ containing the elements of a model programme for Disarmament Week which was compiled in accordance with resolution 33/71 D. In the report it was noted that the Secretary-General had been guided during its preparation by relevant decisions and resolutions of the Assembly, especially those taken at its tenth special session and its thirty-third session, and that the suggested programme was not intended in any way to limit the scope of observance of Disarmament Week which might be arranged by governmental authorities, non-governmental organizations and the general public. The elements of the model programme¹⁵ were set out in five parts: (a) introduction, (b) suggested governmental activities, (c) suggested activities for academic institutions, research institutes and non-governmental organizations, (d) the role of the media and (e) the relationship between Disarmament Week and other international observances.

The Assembly also had before it a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 33/71 D by which it had called on Governments to provide information on their activities to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week in 1978. Replies were received from 22 States: Belgium, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.¹⁶

Among the replies, Cuba and Czechoslovakia referred to radio and television broadcasts prepared in furtherance of the disarmament goal. A number of countries, including Denmark, Japan and Mongolia, mentioned the holding of seminars, conferences and symposiums on disarmament. Romania and the USSR stated that special articles on the subject had been published in the press. The Federal Republic of Germany, among others, made reference to the various activities of non-governmental organizations in the area of disarmament.

On 24 October, to mark the inauguration of Disarmament Week, the Chairman of the First Committee read a message from the President of the General Assembly in which the President stated that all nations, in observing Disarmament Week, should resolve to take concrete measures to mobilize public opinion and thereby generate the international atmosphere conducive

¹⁴ A/34/436.

¹⁵ A/34/457 and Add. 1 and 2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, annex.

to implementing practical steps leading towards disarmament. He also stated that the world community should "seek to promote dialogue and cooperation and be guided by the inherent desire for peace of the citizens of the world" and "work to ensure that the significance of the occasion is not diminished by its being permitted to degenerate into a mere annual symbolic gesture"

The Assistant Secretary-General of the Centre for Disarmament conveyed the message of the Secretary-General, who observed that any belief that security was best assured through superior military power no longer corresponded to realities in the contemporary age. The Secretary-General regarded Disarmament Week as a time for reflection and stock-taking, and noted that to allow a loss of the impetus which had been created by the special session would cause widespread disappointment. While admitting that disarmament issues were complex, the Secretary-General reminded the Committee that those issues together involved "nothing less than the shape and, indeed, the survival of human society on earth"

Speaking on behalf of the Eastern European States, the Ukrainian SSR stated that the Governments and peoples of the socialist countries reaffirmed their resolve to continue their tireless struggle to strengthen peace, guarantee security, and deepen the process of détente in international relations. Paraguay, on behalf of the Latin American States, said that those States were fervent believers that there could be no development without peace, and no peace without disarmament. On behalf of Western European and other States, Canada stated that public discussion and debate on disarmament was vital if there was to be understanding of the issues underlying national and international security. The Philippines, on behalf of the Asian States, hoped that the time would come when all Member States would have their own programmes in observance of Disarmament Week, thus resulting in the total mobilization of world public opinion. Finally, on behalf of the African States, Lesotho stated that the people of Africa shared the concern of the rest of the world at the ever-increasing arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons of States.

A draft resolution on Disarmament Week was sponsored by Afghanistan, Burundi, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Guinea, India, Japan, Jordan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela and Zambia, and was introduced by Mongolia, the initiator of the proposal. In the introduction, Mongolia explained that the draft resolution assessed the implementation, by Governments and national and international organizations, of the Assembly's decision to observe a Disarmament Week and indicated future tasks to be undertaken by the international community to mobilize public opinion in support of disarmament more effectively. Mongolia also noted that the draft resolution supplemented the previous year's resolution 33/71 D by inviting reports on information activities from the relevant specialized agencies and IAEA as well as from Governments.

Before the vote, the Federal Republic of Germany proposed an oral amendment which was accepted by the sponsors, namely, the insertion of the words "within their areas of competence" (see below) in the last preambular paragraph. The Federal Republic of Germany considered that it was important for the agencies concerned to concentrate on their major tasks, and noted that the change would clarify the text by making that paragraph correspond with paragraph 3.

The draft resolution, as amended, was then adopted by the First Committee without a vote. It was adopted by the General Assembly at its 97th meeting, also without a vote, as resolution 34/83 I, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continued arms race,

Emphasizing the urgent need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race in all its aspects,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support of Governments, international and national organizations for the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 D and G of 14 December 1978,

Recognizing the need for active involvement of the relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, within their areas of competence, in promoting the cause of disarmament and, in particular, in holding Disarmament Week,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction of the reports of the Secretary-General on measures taken by governmental and non-governmental organizations to foster the objective of disarmament and elements of a model programme for Disarmament Week;*

2. *Invites all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme prepared by the Secretary-General;*

3. *Invites the relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to intensify activities, within their areas of competence, to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race and requests them to inform the Secretary-General accordingly;*

4. *Invites Governments, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objective of Disarmament Week;*

5. *Invites international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in holding Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;*

6. *Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a report containing the information referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.*

Conclusion

The importance attached to the area of activity dealt with in this chapter is reflected in the statement of the Secretary-General in which he said that public opinion should be actively aware of the dangers of developments in the armaments field and not adopt a fatalistic attitude about the arms race; on

the contrary, people as well as nations should be involved if public opinion is to be brought to bear effectively on disarmament.

The continuing effort of the United Nations to mobilize public opinion in support of disarmament was given fresh impetus in the late 1970s in the light of growing concern with the arms race and the consequent decisions taken by the General Assembly, particularly at its tenth special session, aimed towards better informing the public about the dangers and effects of the ever-growing arms race. The expansion of activities in pertinent areas is still gaining momentum and further increases may be expected both in the dissemination of information on the part of the United Nations and in programmes and observances of individual Governments, institutions and organizations aimed at contributing to the cause of disarmament.

ANNEX

Material produced for the observance of Disarmament Week, 1979

By the Centre for Disarmament and the Department of Public Information

The Centre for Disarmament, in co-operation with the Department of Public Information, disseminated the first package of ten Fact Sheets (see above, page 378) in collated form for the information of interested organizations and the public in connexion with Disarmament Week activities.

The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly was reprinted and widely distributed. Organizations in a number of countries produced translations of the text in local languages.

In addition to continued use of the film "Nuclear Countdown", which was released in 1978, an animated cartoon film entitled "Boom" was made available through United Nations Information Centres in 1979.

A poster, based on a design donated by a Polish artist, on the theme "Mankind must choose: Halt the arms race or face annihilation—United Nations Disarmament Week 24-30 October 1979", was produced in the official languages of the United Nations and widely distributed. Overprinting in local languages was encouraged.

By other United Nations agencies

Special arrangements were made through the co-operation of UNESCO for large-scale distribution of the special issue of the UNESCO *Courier* (April 1979) devoted to disarmament. Copies were distributed through United Nations Information Centres.

The October 1979 issue (No. 57) of the journal, *Development Forum*, features, on its front page, an article entitled "24-30 October: Disarmament Week—Arms into artefacts: an historical inevitability"

UNICEF produced a poster with the theme "Children need peace" on the basis of a design donated by a Swiss artist.

The United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

Introduction

THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING A UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME of fellowships on disarmament was proposed initially by Nigeria at the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Nigeria's suggestion led, after its consideration, to the inclusion in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly¹ of paragraph 108 by which the Assembly decided to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The stated aim of the programme was to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, and in that regard the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare guidelines for the programme and to determine the financial requirement of awarding 20 fellowships a year. The guidelines were outlined in a report of the Secretary-General² to the Assembly at its thirty-third session. Subsequently, by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978, the Assembly approved the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, and requested him to make adequate arrangements to commence the programme of fellowships on disarmament during the first half of 1979.

The guidelines clearly indicate that the primary objective of the programme is to promote expertise in disarmament, that is, to enable the holders of fellowships to derive from their training the knowledge and professional competence which will help increase their ability to deal with specific problems of disarmament.

The guidelines for United Nations fellowships in general make clear that they are primarily intended for persons already or soon to be entrusted with responsibilities related to the development of their respective countries. In the case of disarmament fellowships, candidates are expected to be individuals involved in or expected to work on disarmament and related matters; accordingly, fellowships are not awarded for the pursuit of academic studies

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

² A/33/305.

leading to degrees. Other criteria set by the guidelines are that disarmament fellowships will normally be awarded to candidates nominated by their Governments and that, in considering applications, particular attention will be paid to the background of the candidates, their position in the home country and, on their return home, the practical use they expect to make of the knowledge and experience gained. Other factors taken into account in the selection process are the greater needs of developing countries and the reflection of an overall geographical balance among the candidates. The duration of the course is not to exceed six months.

The United Nations Centre for Disarmament was charged with the task of organizing and carrying out the programme, drawing on expertise from the United Nations system as well as Member States and relevant research institutes and, in particular, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), for assistance.

The first programme of fellowships on disarmament, 1979

Thirty nominations for candidature were received from Member States. A selection panel, composed of senior officials of the Centre for Disarmament and UNITAR, reviewed the applications and decided to recommend 20 candidates for the fellowship programme. Nineteen of those recommended were able to participate in the 1979 course. In selecting the candidates, the panel paid great attention to the candidates' academic qualifications, their work experience and the practical use they expected to make of the knowledge gained as participants in the programme. An effort was made to ensure that the broadest possible geographical representation was reflected among the 20 fellowships available.

The nations represented by the 19 participants in the 1979 programme were Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, the United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. All the recipients of fellowship awards in 1979 were foreign service officials, working with their Governments either in the foreign ministries of their home countries or at their Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York.

The 1979 course started in Geneva on 26 June, at the beginning of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, and ended in New York on 29 November, when the First Committee of the General Assembly concluded its consideration of the disarmament items on the agenda of the thirty-fourth session.

In Geneva, the participants held daily meetings during which they explored the basic aspects of the question of disarmament, followed the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, and debated major issues being considered by the Committee. That phase of the course was followed by a one-week visit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vi-

enna, where the participants were given a series of lectures by senior officials covering, from the perspective of IAEA, such topics as the non-proliferation Treaty, safeguards on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (see chapters XIII and XIV above). Thereafter, the training continued in New York. During the final period, the course members participated in various seminars, followed the proceedings of the General Assembly in its plenary meetings, and intensively audited the work of the First Committee and assessed its progress.

Lectures were given by ambassadors and other senior members of the diplomatic corps, staff members from the Centre for Disarmament, lecturers from UNITAR, IAEA and UNESCO as well as from universities, international research institutes, in particular the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and non-governmental organizations. The lecturers were drawn from as wide a group of countries as possible—both developed and developing—in order to expose the participants to various viewpoints on the issues of disarmament.

The lectures covered a very wide variety of topics, including historic and general ones such as the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; developments in plenary sessions and in the First Committee of the General Assembly; disarmament negotiations in the framework of the United Nations from 1945-1979; the evaluation of the disarmament machinery; approaches to disarmament; and verification. They also covered the specific issues of disarmament such as those dealt with in the various chapters of the present volume, as well as some relevant additional subject areas including arms control in outer space, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations and of non-governmental organizations in the field of disarmament.

The library facilities of the United Nations, and in particular those of the Centre for Disarmament, both at Headquarters and in Geneva, were of great help to the participants in their research in connexion with lectures and seminars and in the writing of papers and reports.

At the end of the course, the 19 Fellows were awarded certificates of attendance by Mr. Jan Mårtenson, Assistant Secretary-General, Centre for Disarmament. In making the awards, Mr. Mårtenson noted the successful completion of the programme, which, he stated, had been made possible through the generous efforts of representatives of Member States and of agencies, institutes and other organizations, as well as the active interest and participation of the Fellows themselves throughout the course.

Consideration by the General Assembly

At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly had before it, in connexion with the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, the report of the Secretary-General³ on the implementation of the programme

³ A/34/640.

called for in resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978. A number of speakers, particularly from developing countries, referred to the programme during the First Committee debate.⁴

The representative of Nigeria specifically noted the inauguration of the programme which his country had proposed, and mentioned that the first group of Fellows were following the ongoing proceedings of the Committee. The representatives of Jamaica, Syria and the United Republic of Cameroon expressed pleasure at the fact that their countries had candidates in the 1979 programme and those of Jamaica and the United Republic of Tanzania advocated the continuation of the programme on an annual basis.

The United Republic of Tanzania pointed out also that a reservoir of qualified personnel in the developing countries would enable them to establish national policies supportive of the process of global disarmament and to participate more actively in the complex negotiations entailed in that process.

The Bahamas similarly welcomed the introduction of the programme of disarmament fellowships which, it held, would give nationals of developing countries experience which could help promote greater understanding in those countries and thereby ensure their more meaningful involvement in disarmament affairs. The Congo in a similar vein, believed that the information and training involved would give the majority of States a mastery of questions pertaining to disarmament. Turkey, for its part, emphasized the need to spread the knowledge that had been acquired on disarmament to as wide an audience as possible and felt that activities such as the fellowship programme were not only profitable to the participants, but were also profitable to the international community.

On 12 November 1979, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently sponsored also by Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Mali, Mauritius, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Cameroon and Venezuela, and was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on 14 November.

In his introduction, the Nigerian representative noted that the great interest shown in the programme by member States had been reflected in the fact that 40 applicants were sponsored by their Governments. The Secretariat had had the not-so-easy task of selecting 20. His country felt that the programme had been inaugurated on a very sound basis, with the participation of a group of men and women candidates whose background had set a high standard for the discussions which took place during the course. Their experience from the programme, he said, would no doubt enhance their usefulness to their Governments in the field of disarmament. Concluding, the representative noted that, under the draft resolution, the General Assembly would continue the programme and request the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements for 1980.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

While expressing satisfaction with the draft resolution, the delegation of Greece suggested that it might include a reference to the fact that in its first application, the fellowship programme on disarmament had had very encouraging and positive results.

On 21 November, the draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee without amendment and without a vote.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany subsequently observed that the participants had demonstrated a great deal of interest in the programme and stated that his delegation felt they had been carefully selected.

The Chairman of the First Committee, in a congratulatory and farewell statement, said that he had had the opportunity of meeting many of the Fellows who had participated and felt that they had exhibited the high calibre and talent expected of representatives selected for the programme. He also expressed the hope that the Fellows would be assigned to posts involving disarmament matters, and return to the First Committee to continue making worthy contributions.

The draft resolution was adopted on 11 December, also by consensus, by the General Assembly, as resolution 34/83 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision at the tenth special session to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament,

Recalling also its resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978, by which it approved the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General for the programme,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament for 1979,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;*
2. *Decides to continue the programme;*
3. *Requests the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements regarding the programme for 1980 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;*
4. *Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a report on the implementation of the programme.*

Conclusion

The United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament is very widely regarded as having been a success in its first year. All the Fellows demonstrated great interest in the disarmament subjects discussed, made valuable contributions through their active participation, and worked with dedication to come to grips with the complex subject of disarmament.

In his first report to the General Assembly⁵ on the subject, the Secretary-General summed up the situation with these words:

⁵ A/34/640.

“The experience of the first year indicates that the programme is fulfilling its aim. The high calibre of the candidates nominated by Governments for the awards of disarmament fellowships is indicative of the importance attached to the programme. All the Fellows were found to be highly qualified for advanced training in disarmament. All have demonstrated a good knowledge of the disarmament subjects discussed and made valuable contributions. Advantage will be taken of this year’s experience in the organization of future fellowship programmes on disarmament.”

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament

*(Adopted at the 15th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1979)**

Introduction

These rules of procedure have been adopted taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during that session which the General Assembly welcomed in the Final Document.

I. Functions and membership

1. The Committee on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) is a disarmament negotiating forum open to the nuclear-weapon States and 35 other States (see annex).
2. The membership of the Committee will be reviewed at regular intervals.
3. All member States of the Committee shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

II. Representation and accreditation

4. The delegation of a member State of the Committee shall consist of a head of delegation and other representatives, advisers, and experts, as may be required.
5. Each delegation shall be accredited by a letter on the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the member State addressed to the Chairman of the Committee.
6. The delegations shall be seated following the English alphabetical list of membership.

III. Sessions

7. The Committee shall have an annual session divided into two parts. The first part shall begin on the first Tuesday in February. The Committee shall decide, as soon as practically possible, the opening date of the second part and the closing dates of both parts of its annual session, taking into account the requirements of its work.
8. The Chairman of the Committee, in full consultation with and with the agreement of all its members, may convene the Committee in special session.

* See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27)*, vol. I, appendix I.

IV. Chairmanship

9. When the Committee is in session, the Chairmanship of the Committee shall rotate among all its members on the first day of the calendar month, a rotation which began in January 1979 following the English alphabetical list of membership.

10. If the head of the delegation which performs the function of Chairman cannot be present, he may be replaced by a member of his delegation. If no member of the delegation holding the Chair is able to perform the function of Chairman the delegation next in order of rotation shall temporarily assume this function.

11. Apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the Chairman shall, in full consultation with the Committee and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, with the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations.

12. During the period when the Committee is not in session the functions of the Chairman shall be carried out by the representative of the member State which chaired the last plenary meeting of the Committee.

V. Secretariat

13. At the request of the Committee, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee, will appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee.

14. Under the authority of the Committee and its Chairman, the Secretary shall, *inter alia*, assist in the preparation of both the provisional agenda of the Committee and the first draft of the reports of the Committee to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

15. At the request of the Committee the Secretary shall provide professional assistance to the Committee by preparing background papers and bibliographies on issues which are the subject of negotiations in the Committee as well as by compiling data and information relevant to the conduct of negotiations.

16. The Secretary shall also perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these rules or by the Committee.

17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Committee and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish.

VI. Conduct of work and adoption of decisions

18. The Committee shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus.

VII. Organization of work

19. The work of the Committee shall be conducted in plenary meetings as well as under any additional arrangements agreed by the Committee, such as informal meetings with or without experts.

20. The Committee shall convene in plenary meetings in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. These meetings shall be held in public unless the Committee decides otherwise. In the event that it is decided to hold a private meeting, the Committee shall also decide whether to issue a communiqué of the meeting. The communiqué shall adequately reflect the substance of the proceedings and decisions taken by the Committee.

21. If the Committee is unable to take a decision on the substance of an item under negotiation, it will consider the subsequent examination of that item.

22. The Committee may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When

requested by the Committee, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages.

23. Whenever the Committee deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the Committee may establish subsidiary bodies, such as *ad hoc* sub-committees, working groups, technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all member States of the Committee unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Committee shall define the mandate for each of such subsidiary bodies and provide appropriate support for their work.

24. The Committee shall decide if its own rules of procedure may be adapted to the specific requirements of its subsidiary bodies. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies shall be informal unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Secretariat shall provide assistance to the subsidiary bodies, as requested, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the subsidiary bodies' proceedings in the working languages of the Committee.

25. The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs.

26. The Committee and its subsidiary bodies shall normally meet at the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

VIII. Agenda and programme of work

27. At the beginning of each annual session the Committee shall adopt its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Committee shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by member States of the Committee and the decisions of the Committee.

28. On the basis of its agenda the Committee, at the beginning of each part of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that part of the session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27.

29. The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption.

30. The subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work. However, it is the right of any member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

31. While the work of the Committee is in progress member States may request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda. The Committee shall decide whether and when it should be considered.

IX. Participation by States not members of the Committee

32. Representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during plenary meetings and, if the Committee so decides, at other meetings.

33. Interested States not members of the Committee may submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and may participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents.

34. The Committee will invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion. Having considered such a request, the Committee will, through its Chairman, transmit an invitation to that effect to the State or States concerned.

35. The Committee may also decide to invite the States referred to in rules 33 and 34 to

participate in informal meetings and in meetings of its subsidiary bodies, in which case the procedure of rule 34 is applicable.

36. The provisions of rules 4 and 5 shall also apply to delegations of non-member States participating in the work of the Committee.

X. Languages, records and documents

37. Simultaneous interpretation, verbatim records of public plenary meetings and documents shall be provided in the languages used within the United Nations system by member States of the Committee who are participating in its work.^a Any representative may speak in his own language provided he makes available simultaneous interpretation into a working language.

38. Numbers shall be given in the order in which documents are received by the Secretariat. Check lists of all documents reproduced by the Secretariat shall be available from time to time.

39. Documents of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) series may be referred to without their re-submission.

40. Verbatim records and formal and other relevant documents of the Committee shall be distributed to States Members of the United Nations normally within two weeks. Official documents of the Committee will be made available for public use.

XI. Invitations to organs of the United Nations system

41. The Committee may decide to invite specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organs of the United Nations system to provide information as appropriate if the Committee decides that doing so would advance its work.

XII. Non-governmental organizations

42. All communications from non-governmental organizations to the Committee, to the Chairman or to the Secretariat shall be retained by the Secretariat and be made available to delegations upon request. A list of all such communications shall be circulated to the Committee.

XIII. Reports to the United Nations General Assembly

43. The Committee shall submit, through the Chairman, reports to the United Nations General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate.

44. The drafts of such reports shall be prepared by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and shall be made available to all member States of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for their adoption.

45. The reports of the Committee shall be factual and reflect the negotiations and work of the Committee. Unless the Committee decides otherwise, the drafts shall contain:

(a) The agenda;

(b) A summary of specific requests addressed to the Committee by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;

(c) Sectional headings in accordance with items comprised in (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Committee during the year;

(d) Conclusions and decisions;

(e) A table of contents and an index of verbatim records, by country and subject, of the period covered by the reports;

^a In accordance with this provision the Committee reached an understanding to use, for the time being, Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish.

- (f) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;
- (g) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year, distributed as a separate annex;
- (h) Other relevant documents.

46. The Committee shall adopt the annual report at the end of its session. This report shall be made available to all Member States of the United Nations before the opening of the regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. All other reports shall be circulated without delay.

XIV. Amendments

47. These rules of procedure may be amended by decision of the Committee.

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The following is the text of the Chairman's interpretative statement referred to in paragraph 15 of the report:

"It is the understanding of the Chairman, following consultations with members of the Committee, that the rules set forth in paragraph 18, chapter VI, entitled 'Conduct of work and adoption of decisions', will also apply to any subsidiary organs the Committee may establish."

ANNEX

(Adopted at the 26th plenary meeting, held on 10 April 1979)

Algeria	Japan
Argentina	Kenya
Australia	Mexico
Belgium	Mongolia
Brazil	Morocco
Bulgaria	Netherlands
Burma	Nigeria
Canada	Pakistan
China ^b	Peru
Cuba	Poland
Czechoslovakia	Romania
Egypt	Sri Lanka
Ethiopia	Sweden
France	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
German Democratic Republic	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Germany, Federal Republic of	United States of America
Hungary	Venezuela
India	Yugoslavia
Indonesia	Zaire
Iran	
Italy	

^b At the time of the adoption of the rules of procedure China had not participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Recommendations of the Disarmament Commission concerning elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament*

19. At its 22nd meeting, on 8 June, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the recommendations recorded below, concerning item 3 of its agenda relating to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and agreed to submit them to the General Assembly for examination and transmission to the Committee on Disarmament, pursuant to paragraph 118 (a) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly . . . :

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

"I. Introduction

"1. Advocated by the General Assembly of the United Nations for nearly two decades, general and complete disarmament under effective international control must continue to be the ultimate goal of all endeavours undertaken in the sphere of disarmament.

"2. In 1969, the General Assembly, after declaring the decade of the 1970s as a 'Disarmament Decade', requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 'to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control.'^a

Although this appeal was reiterated by the General Assembly in later years, it was not possible for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to discharge this mandate.

"3. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament laid the basis in its Final Document, adopted by consensus, for an international disarmament strategy, in which the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is an important element. The Disarmament Commission was entrusted with the task of considering 'the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament', which was requested by the Assembly to 'undertake the elaboration' of such a programme.

"4. The comprehensive programme of disarmament, which would provide the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, should be a carefully worked out package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, which

* Excerpt from *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*.

^a General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV).

would lead the international community towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"5. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be based principally on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. It should lay down an agreed framework for sustained international action in the field of disarmament, including negotiations at different levels, that is, multilateral, bilateral and regional, on specific measures of disarmament. The elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not in any way impair the commitment entered into by Member States, in the Final Document, to make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth therein.^b

"6. The Committee on Disarmament should commence work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme at the earliest possible date and all efforts should be exerted so as to submit it for consideration and adoption not later than the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled to be held in 1982.

"7. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should:

"(a) Define the objectives of the comprehensive programme of disarmament together with the principles that should guide the negotiations and priorities which should be applied in the negotiations;

"(b) Encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevails and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated;

"(c) Include, as parallel measures accompanying progress in disarmament, measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means as well as measures necessary to bring about the effective application of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

"(d) Establish appropriate procedures for:

(i) The implementation of the programme;

(ii) A continuing review of the implementation of the programme;

"(e) Cover measures aimed at encouraging international and national efforts to promote knowledge and information about disarmament, in order to create an international atmosphere conducive to the implementation of measures needed to be taken to bring about the halting and the reversal of the arms race and the achievement of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"II. *Objectives, principles and priorities*

"8. The immediate objective of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to initiate and expedite urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, to open a process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis and to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension.

"9. The long-term objectives should be, through the co-ordinated implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to avert the danger of war and to create conditions for a just and stable international peace and security and the full realization of the new international economic order.

"10. The elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should take place as urgently as possible and parallel with the negotiations on concrete disarmament measures, particularly those agreed in the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth spe-

^b General Assembly resolution S-10/2, sect. III.

cial session of the General Assembly. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should contain a phased programme covering measures in the different fields in which the implementation of the first stage should effectively contribute to the halting of the arms race and to the opening of the process of genuine disarmament.

"11. During the first stage of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, special attention should be given to the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the removal of the threat of a nuclear war.

"12. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be elaborated and implemented on the basis of the strict observance of the principles contained in the Final Document and in accordance with the priorities stated in paragraph 45 thereof, it being understood that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

"III. Measures

"13. The process to be outlined in the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be conceived and implemented in accordance with the fundamental principles enshrined in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. It should take place in such an equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security, *inter alia*, through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals and the necessity for adequate measures of verification.

"14. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should encompass the following measures as envisaged in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session:

"A. Disarmament measures

"1. Nuclear weapons

"(a) Nuclear-test ban;

"(b) Cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and nuclear disarmament, which will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

"(i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;

"(ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

"(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time;

"(c) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

"(d) Continuation of the strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties concerned;

"(e) Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document;

"(f) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

"2. Other weapons of mass destruction

"(a) Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction;

"(b) Prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

"(c) Prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons.

"3. Conventional weapons and armed forces

"(a) Cessation of the conventional arms race;

"(b) Agreements and measures, multilateral, regional and bilateral, on the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces;

"(c) Prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, taking into account the result of the 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;

"(d) Consultations among major arms suppliers and recipients on the international transfer of conventional weapons.

"4. *Military expenditures*

"Reduction of military expenditures.

"5. *Verification*

"Verification methods and procedures in relation to specific disarmament measures, to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence among States.

"6. *Related measures*

"(a) Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques;

"(b) Consideration of further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;

"(c) Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space;

"(d) Establishment of zones of peace.

"B. *Other measures*

"1. Confidence-building measures, taking into account the characteristics of each region.

"2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension.

"3. Measures aimed at preventing the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

"4. Implementation of the provisions contained in the Final Document intended to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament.

"5. Disarmament studies under the auspices of the United Nations.

"Note:

"With reference to the measures dealt with in the present section, explicit mention was made of the following United Nations declarations:

"1. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;^c

"2. Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security;^d

"3. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace.^e

"C. *Disarmament and development*

"Bearing in mind the close relationship between disarmament and development and taking into account the United Nations studies carried out in this field, the comprehensive

^c General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

^d General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

^e General Assembly resolution 33/73.

programme of disarmament should include measures aimed at ensuring that disarmament makes an effective contribution to economic and social development and, in particular, to the full realization of the new international economic order through:

“(i) Reallocation of resources from military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries;

“(ii) Savings from the reduction of military expenditures particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should increase the flow of resources to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries;

“(iii) Strengthening of international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 68 to 70 of the Final Document.

“D. *Disarmament and international security*

“Strengthening of international procedures and institutions for:

“(i) Maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

“(ii) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

“(iii) Effectiveness of the security system of the Charter of the United Nations;

“(iv) United Nations peace-keeping in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

“IV. *Machinery and procedures*

“A. *Role of the United Nations*

“15. (a) The United Nations should play a central role in the consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It must also play an adequate role in its implementation. It is essential, therefore, that the General Assembly and, through it, the Commission are regularly kept informed of the results of the negotiations on and elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is also essential that the United Nations be kept duly informed through the Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

“(b) Convening, as necessary, of special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

“(c) The United Nations should sponsor programmes to promote public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, its effects on international peace and security, its economic and social consequences and its effect on the attainment of the new international economic order.

“(d) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

“B. *Form of negotiations*

“16. The negotiations of the measures envisaged in the comprehensive programme of disarmament can be conducted on a bilateral, regional or multilateral level, depending on how, in each case, effective disarmament agreements can most readily be achieved. The international disarmament machinery should ensure that all disarmament issues are being dealt with in an appropriate context.

“C. *World Disarmament Conference*

“17. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

"D. Review and verification of agreed measures

"18. Examination of the requirements of an institutional and procedural nature to facilitate the disarmament process and to ensure implementation of disarmament agreements, including the relevant proposals referred to in paragraph 125 of the Final Document, or made elsewhere.

"V. General

"19. During the consideration of the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Commission considered the following, on which consensus was not reached:

- "(a) Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- "(b) Dissolution of military alliances and the dismantling of foreign military bases;
- "(c) Prohibition of the development, production and deployment of conventional weapons of great destructive power."

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements: actions taken in the period 1 January to 31 December 1979

The following list provides the basic information concerning the agreements contained in the special supplement to the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, volume 2: 1977, updated in appendix II of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, volume 3: 1978,^a and shows the action taken, if any, with regard to those agreements in the period subsequent to publication of volume 3, that is, from 1 January to 31 December 1979.^b No further agreements were concluded or opened for signature during the period.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions

take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: Bhutan — 6 July 1978 with effect from 6 February 1979 (a)

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Federal Republic of Germany — 5 February 1979 (a)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW:

5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

^a *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2); *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 and 3).

^b Accession is indicated by (a) and succession is indicated by (s).

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Democratic Yemen — 1 June 1979 (M)(a)

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Democratic Yemen — 1 June 1979 (M)(a)

Peru — 28 February 1979 (M)

1 March 1979 (L)

21 March (W)

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

TREATY — NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I — NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II — NEW PARTIES: USSR — 8 January 1979*

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Bangladesh — 31 August 1979 (M)(a)

27 September 1979 (W)(a)

Democratic Yemen — 1 June 1979 (M)

* With the following statement:

“The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that it has ratified the following document:

“The Additional Protocol to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow, on 18 May 1978, accompanied by a declaration made by the Government of the USSR when signing this Protocol, and by the following statement:

“The Soviet Union affirms that the obligations accepted by it in accordance with Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco also extend to those territories to which denuclearized zone status applies, in accordance with Additional Protocol I of the Treaty.

“Moreover, the Soviet Union reaffirms its position with respect to the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on this question (General Assembly resolution 1415 (XV) of 14 December 1960).”

Indonesia — 12 July 1979 (M)(W)
Sri Lanka — 5 March 1979 (M)(W)
St. Lucia — 28 December 1979 (L)(s)^d
Tuvalu — 19 January 1979 (L)(s)^d

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Democratic Yemen — 1 June 1979 (M)

Sao Tome and Principe — 24 August 1979 (M)(a)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Argentina — 23 November 1979 (W)

5 December 1979 (L)

27 December 1979 (M)

Belgium — 15 March 1979 (L)(M)(W)

Honduras — 14 March 1979 (W)

Democratic Yemen — 1 June 1979 (M)

Romania — 25 July 1979 (W)

26 July 1979 (L)

27 July 1979 (M)

Seychelles — 11 October 1979 (L)(s)^e

16 October 1979 (W)(s)

24 October 1979 (M)(s)

Spain — 20 June 1979 (L)(W)

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Bangladesh — 3 October 1979 (a)

Cape Verde — 3 October 1979 (a)

Norway — 15 February 1979

Sao Tome and Principe — 5 October 1979 (a)

^d Succeeded to the Treaty by virtue of the ratification of the United Kingdom.

^e Succeeded to the Convention by virtue of the ratification of the United Kingdom.

Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme related to disarmament*

Introduction

The Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in June 1972 and endorsed by the General Assembly, clearly states in principle 26 that "Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons". Since the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), its Governing Council has adopted a number of resolutions and also some of the UNEP's activities are related to that principle for the enhancement of the environment. A brief review of such resolutions and activities is given in this appendix.

Resolutions and reports

1. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its sixth session in May 1978, requested the Executive Director of UNEP to continue to gather, through the International Referral System, sources of information on methods of dealing with environmental problems caused by the material remnants of wars, to render assistance to Governments in preparing their programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories and to carry out and promote studies on the environmental effects of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fourth session in April 1976 and at its fifth session in May 1977, had requested the Executive Director of UNEP to render assistance in the field of environmental protection to States in preparing their own programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories.

2. The Executive Director of UNEP submitted a report (A/32/137) entitled "Material remnants of wars and their effect on the environment" to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly highlighting the adverse effect of remnants of wars on the environment.

3. The United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in 1977, adopted a resolution concerning the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. It noted that the use of chemical and biological weapons during wars was one of the factors contributing to desertification in certain parts of the world and that those factors were most seriously felt in developing countries, including those which were currently engaged in armed struggle for independence and those which had recently achieved independence through armed struggle. It condemned the use of any techniques that cause the desertification of the environment and denounced the effects of destructive weapons and practices on the ecosystems of all countries. The use of chemical and biological weapons which destroy or diminish the potential of ecosystems and are conducive to desertification was also condemned and the prohibition of the use of poisons in water

* Text contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme.

as a weapon of war was demanded. In implementation of the resolution, the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.⁴

4. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fifth session in May 1977, took note of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques annexed to General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976 and requested Member States to facilitate exchanges of information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.

5. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its seventh session in May 1979, decided to include the topic "Environmental effects of military activity" in the state of the environment report 1980.

Ozone research and monitoring

UNEP organized a meeting of experts designated by Governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations at Washington, D.C., in March 1977. The outcome of the meeting was an agreed World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. Following the recommendations contained in the Action Plan, the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer was set up. It was composed of representatives of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations participating in implementing the Action Plan as well as representatives of countries with major scientific programmes contributing to it. The Committee met in November 1977 and November 1978 to review the progress made in implementing the Action Plan, identified deficiencies and made recommendations for future work. At its first meeting, held at Geneva in November 1977, it was agreed that UNEP should issue a half-yearly bulletin (January and July) giving information on ongoing and planned research activities on the ozone layer relevant to the Action Plan. The publication of the bulletin was begun in January 1978. At the second meeting, held at Bonn in November 1978, the Committee issued "An assessment of ozone depletion and its impacts — December 1978"

UNEP is supporting a Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project meant to provide advice to Member States, to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone.

Weather modification

UNEP is co-operating with the World Meteorological Organization in the Precipitation Enhancement Project, whose objective is to obtain scientifically accepted information on the feasibility of precipitation enhancement with an assessment of the environmental impact of such enhancement.

UNEP has also co-operated with WMO in preparing draft principles of conduct for the guidance of States concerning weather modification. The first of these principles calls for considering the atmosphere as a global resource whose protection and use is the legitimate concern of the international community. The second calls for dedicating any technique developed to modify the weather to peaceful purposes. Plans are in progress to have the draft principles accepted by Governments.

⁴ A fuller version of that report is available in *UNEP Studies*, vol. 1, "The effects of weapons on ecosystems", by J. P. Robinson of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, England. (Published for the United Nations Environment Programme by Pergamon Press).

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

1. On 22 November 1978, the General Conference, at its twentieth session, adopted, on the proposal of the Drafting and Negotiating Group, Resolution 20 C/11.1 entitled "Role of UNESCO in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and transition to disarmament".^a At the same session, the General Conference adopted resolution 3/2.1/1.^b Those two resolutions establish the mandate for UNESCO's activities in 1979 relating to disarmament.

2. The activities involved may be summarized under the four themes:

- Research and publications
- Promotion of disarmament education
- Promotion of disarmament information
- Co-operation with the United Nations, Member States and non-governmental organizations.

Research and publications

3. As requested by the General Assembly in paragraph 103 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, UNESCO intensified its activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on disarmament, particularly in developing countries. Assistance was provided for the pursuit of research activities in developing countries and several publications were prepared and research projects begun. The related activities fall within Objective 2.1 of the medium term plan ("Promotion of peace research, in particular on manifestations of violation of peace, causes preventing its realization, ways and means to eliminate them and proper measures to be taken in order to maintain and reinforce a just, lasting and constructive peace at the level of groups, societies and the world"), of which one of the principles of action is the following:

"(c) Increased emphasis should . . . be placed on studies which can be used to explain the origin of the tensions in the world and the factors determining the arms race, and which can be used to promote disarmament and eliminate the obstacles to it."

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

^a For text of resolution, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 or 3), appendix IV, pp. 501-503.

^b *Ibid.*, p. 501, para. 26 (the resolution is summarized).

^c 19 C/4 Approved, para. 2125.

4. First of all, preparations were made for the publication of a multidisciplinary study entitled *Obstacles to Disarmament and Ways of Overcoming Them*. This publication contains the papers of a meeting of experts held in 1978 and additional material of interest both to specialists in international relations and to the general public.

5. The annotated bibliography and report of research trends on the social and economic consequences of the arms race and disarmament, which was published in English in 1978 as No. 39 in the series *Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences*, was published in French and Spanish in 1979. Another annotated bibliography, *The Threat of Modern Warfare to Man and his Environment*, was also published in 1979 in three languages as No. 40 in the series *Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences*.

6. Two new multidisciplinary research projects were launched, one dealing with military research and development and its impact on the scientific community and on scientific and technological development, the other dealing with strategic doctrines and their effects on disarmament prospects. The former study is also the theme of an issue of *Impact of Science on Society*, prepared in 1979-1980 for publication in 1981. The first part of the research project will cover the domestic dimensions of military research and development, including the involvement of the scientific community in military research and development and the impact of the latter on both scientific education and training and on science and technology. The second part concerns the international dimension, such as transnational relations between military communities involved in military research and development, transfer of technology and the arms race. It will conclude with a section on the potential role of the scientific community in reconversion, in the establishment of a new international economic order and in disarmament. The second project will cover strategic doctrines in an historical and epistemological perspective, strategic doctrines and the arms race in modern times and prospects for doctrines conducive to disarmament.

7. With regard to the activities carried out under Theme 3/2.1/01 (development of national and regional centres and other facilities for space research) of the objective quoted in paragraph 3 above, mention may be made of the publication of the *Directory of Peace Research Institutions (Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences, No. 43)* and the preparation of the first issue of the *UNESCO Yearbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*. The former contains a trend report on institutions dealing with peace and disarmament questions and detailed entries concerning each institution, including titles of publications on research and disarmament. The latter contains, *inter alia*, an annotated bibliography on the relation between disarmament and development. Both these publications aim at encouraging studies and research on disarmament issues.

8. In 1979 UNESCO decided to devote a publication to aspects of disarmament related to international law. This publication will appear in the series *New Challenges to International Law*, produced within the framework of Objective 2.2, and will deal specifically with the theme "the international law of disarmament as a new branch of international law"

Promotion of disarmament education

9. Pursuant to a recommendation made by the meeting of experts convened in April 1978 on the obstacles to disarmament and the ways of overcoming them, the idea of "disarmament education" as a distinct field was submitted by UNESCO to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and was incorporated into the Final Document of that session in paragraphs 106 and 107.

10. During 1979, UNESCO promoted disarmament education through the preparation of the World Congress on Disarmament Education, the preparation of teachers' guides and teaching materials and other educational activities.

(a) World Congress on Disarmament Education

11. The principal activity of UNESCO in promoting disarmament education in 1979 has been the preparation of the World Congress on Disarmament Education. Numerous background

papers have been prepared and meetings held at the initiative of member States and non-governmental organizations. Several of such activities are mentioned below in the section dealing with co-operation with the United Nations, member States and non-governmental organizations. The main preparatory activity was a meeting of experts which was organized in Prague, Czechoslovakia, from 4 to 8 June 1979, through the generous hospitality of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Sixteen experts and eighteen observers as well as the Chief of the Geneva Unit of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament participated in this meeting and worked out detailed recommendations for the organization, conduct and follow-up of the Congress. A report on the meeting was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.^d

12. The work of the Prague meeting is reflected in a background paper prepared by the Secretariat and distributed to all Member States along with a circular letter from the Director-General concerning the Congress. The text of the Secretariat paper, containing complete information on the present plans concerning the Congress, is reproduced in annex I to this report. The results of the Congress, which will take place on 9-13 June 1980, will be presented in a report to the General Conference of UNESCO and to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

(b) Preparation of teachers' guides and teaching materials

13. Paragraph 107 of the Final Document of the tenth special session calls upon UNESCO to step up the disarmament education programme through the preparation, *inter alia*, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials.

14 Pursuant to that request, a reader on armament, arms control and disarmament, prepared as an aid to the teaching of disarmament at the university level, and a guide entitled *Disarmament: A Teacher's Guide*, which was prepared for use in Associated Schools, will be published in 1980. The original manuscript of the latter publication was referred to an international editorial committee meeting held in Aix-en-Provence in August 1979. The final manuscript, incorporating comments and suggestions made by the editorial committee meeting, contains five chapters entitled "Past attempts", "Causes of the arms race", "Effects of the arms race", "The last chance?" and "Teaching material". A handbook, intended for the Associated Schools, *World Problems in the Classroom: Suggestions for Teachers*, published in English, French and Spanish, lays particular stress on education for peace, security and disarmament, and its first three chapters are devoted to those three topics respectively. Finally, a *Handbook for Classroom Teachers on Implementation of the Recommendation on Education for International Understanding*, which is being prepared under a contract with a non-governmental organization has a chapter devoted to "International peace, security and disarmament"

(c) Other educational activities

15. The UNESCO programme for the promotion of education concerning human rights, peace and international understanding, which contributes to Objectives 1.5 and 2.3 of the medium-term plan for 1977-1982 and the approved programme and budget for 1979-1980, also covers disarmament education. The main element in that programme is the implementation of the recommendation concerning education for international understanding, co-operation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms adopted by the General Conference at its eighteenth session in 1974. Other important elements are the conducting of experimental projects and studies, the holding of multilateral consultations on secondary school history textbooks, the continuation of the Associated Schools Project, and the running of regional seminars on the role of social studies in education for peace and respect for human rights.

16. The 1974 recommendation places particular emphasis, *inter alia*, on the role of education for the maintenance of peace and for disarmament, and its paragraph 18 is specifically

^d See A/34/147, annex.

related to the subject. For the implementation of the recommendation, a regional seminar in Europe was held in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1979. That regional seminar followed an earlier one for Europe held in Helsinki in 1978 and others are to be held in the Arab States and in Latin America.

17. Greater emphasis is being given to disarmament education in special programmes and experimental projects being carried out in the educational institutions taking part in the Associated Schools Project. For example, a newsletter, sent in September 1979 to some 1,300 primary and secondary schools and teacher training institutions participating in the project, urged them to carry out appropriate activities on the occasion of Disarmament Week in 1979.

Promotion of disarmament information

18. In paragraph 4 of resolution 20 C/11.1, the General Conference invited the Director-General to consider for the implementation of the programme and budget for 1979-1980 as well as for the preparation of the draft programme and budget for 1981-1983 whether or not certain activities or studies could be initiated or encouraged, including interdisciplinary research or symposia on such themes as the "possibility of increasing the dissemination and publication of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt it and reverse it, in conformity with paragraphs 99 and 100 of the Final Document" of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. The Secretariat was guided by those paragraphs as well as by paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 20 C/11.1, by which the General Conference invited the Director-General to consider "extending the use of UNESCO's information channels in order to mobilize world public opinion about the dangers of the arms race and the need for disarmament, for example, by increasing the publication of UNESCO brochures and books on this subject, holding arts exhibits and film festivals."

19. The text of the address which the Director-General delivered at the tenth special session of the General Assembly on 26 May 1978 was reproduced as a brochure under the title *The Will for Peace* and was widely disseminated in French and English during 1979.

20. As a follow-up to the adoption by the General Conference at its twentieth session (1978) of the "Declaration on fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media to strengthening peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and to countering racialism, *apartheid* and incitement to war", the text was published in English and French and is to be published in Spanish, Russian and Arabic. Translations were undertaken by National Commissions in languages like Serbo-Croat, German, Hungarian, Vietnamese, Korean, Maltese, Greek, Danish and Dutch, and other National Commissions were invited to translate it into their languages. Studies were also undertaken on how the media in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the United Kingdom had reflected and reported on the adoption of the Declaration, and consultations were held on ways to promote the inclusion of the principles of the Declaration in the curricula of institutions teaching communication. Furthermore, a study was undertaken on the "historical background of the Declaration" which will be published in the series *Reports and Papers in Mass Communication* in 1980.

21. The UNESCO *Courier* devoted special attention to disarmament and in particular to the arms race in a special issue in April 1979. This issue contained long extracts from a United Nations publication entitled *The economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures*⁶ prepared by an international group of experts and was specifically intended to alert world opinion to the arms race as a problem of universal concern.

22. The usefulness of this issue was noted with appreciation by the United Nations Secretariat, which requested the co-operation of UNESCO in its dissemination through United Nations information centres around the world on the occasion of Disarmament Week (24-30 October 1979). In response to that request, the Director-General approved a supplementary expenditure of \$24,000 in order to provide the United Nations with 50,000 copies in English, 20,000 in French and in Spanish, 10,000 in Arabic and 5,000 in Russian, which were distributed in various parts of the world.

⁶ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.

23. Disarmament Week 1979 provided a special opportunity for information activities on disarmament. The Director-General issued a message on this occasion which was widely disseminated. The message was sent to the United Nations and its information centres, National Commissions, Associated Schools and National Federations of UNESCO, Permanent Delegations and staff members. It was also issued as a press release and published in the *UNESCO Chronicle*, vol. XXV (1979), No. 5. The text is reproduced as annex II to this document.

24. Thirty UNESCO Clubs and National Federations of UNESCO Clubs, responding to a special invitation by telegram to include as part of the celebration of Disarmament Week the distribution of the April 1979 issue of the *Courier* and of the Director-General's message, were able to disseminate this information in the national and regional press and in their newsletters.

25. Among the other activities of Disarmament Week were the daily showing of the two United Nations films, "Boom" and "Nuclear Count-down" and the exposition of UNESCO publications dealing with disarmament in special display cases set up in various places throughout the buildings at Headquarters. Special articles on disarmament also appeared in *UNESCO Features*.

26. Radio broadcasts on UNESCO's participation in Disarmament Week were sent to numerous stations in the Member States, including a programme in English called "War is out of date" and one in Spanish called "La Semana del Desarme". The six-part special series of radio programmes devoted to disarmament, "The Angel of Nagasaki", was disseminated to various radio services.

27. Finally, the attention of visitors to UNESCO during Disarmament Week was drawn to the films projected on that occasion and the Director-General's message was communicated to them.

28. A major public information activity organized during the biennium was the Peace Forum ("Assises pour la paix"), which took place at Headquarters on 12-16 November 1979. Fifty-six eminent persons from all parts of the world participated in their personal capacities. The forum was widely covered by the media in numerous countries. Peace and conflict resolution, peace-building and peace in the minds of men were the three themes of the Forum. Issues relating to disarmament were major concerns of all three, as may be seen in the final declaration reproduced as annex III to the present document. The proceedings of the Peace Forum will be published in 1980 by UNESCO and in a special issue of the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* of the International Peace Research Institute at Oslo.

Co-operation with Member States of the United Nations and with non-governmental organizations

29. International co-operation was developed in 1979 in the following three areas:

(a) Reinforcement of co-operation in the field of disarmament within the United Nations system and, in particular between UNESCO and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament;

(b) Assistance to and co-operation with member States, with the view to developing their activities on disarmament; and

(c) Co-operation with and encouragement of international non-governmental organizations in their activities aimed at promotion of disarmament.

(a) Co-operation with the United Nations

30. The question of co-operation and development of relations between UNESCO and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament was discussed on several occasions during the informal consultations between specialists in charge of disarmament programmes which were held at UNESCO Headquarters, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York and at the United Nations Office in Geneva.

31. The representative of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament participated actively in the Prague meeting mentioned above and, as a result of subsequent discussions, the

Centre has agreed to prepare a background document for the World Congress on Disarmament Education and to organize a display at the Congress of printed and audio-visual materials concerning disarmament prepared by the United Nations.

32. Extensive co-operation with the United Nations was established within the framework of Disarmament Week proclaimed by the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, as summarized in paragraphs 22-27 above.

33. Pursuant to paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, the United Nations established a programme of fellowships on disarmament for which it requested UNESCO to provide a lecturer on the subject of disarmament education. A UNESCO staff member spoke on that subject to the Fellows in August 1979 at Geneva.

(b) Co-operation with Member States

34. With the assistance of the Czechoslovak National Commission for UNESCO, a meeting of experts for the preparation of the World Congress on Disarmament Education was organized by UNESCO and was held at Prague from 4 to 8 June 1979 (see para. 11 above). Financial assistance of \$15,000 was provided to the Czechoslovak National Commission for the meeting.

35. Financial assistance of \$10,000 was provided to the National Commission of Romania for UNESCO to organize, jointly with the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy and the Association of International Law and International Relations, a round table on "the role of UNESCO in generating a public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and transition to disarmament". That activity was supported also by National Commissions of Egypt, Sweden and Yugoslavia. UNESCO was represented at the round table which brought together numerous eminent scholars from Romania and various other countries. Following the round table, the participants were received by the Vice-President of the State Council who underlined the importance his government attached to the work of UNESCO in that role.

36. Under the Participation Programme, a request of the Finnish National Commission to UNESCO, supported by Hungary, Norway, Sweden, the USSR and Yugoslavia, was granted for the launching of the international research programme on the role of military research and its impact on the scientific communities (see para. 6 above). The grant, which amounted to \$12,000, will enable a meeting of the contributors to the project to take place in Helsinki in 1980.

37. A contract for the amount of \$500 was concluded with the United States National Commission for UNESCO to prepare a study on the relationship between disarmament education and human rights teaching, which will serve as a background paper for the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

38. At the request of the Norwegian National Commission for UNESCO, supported by Denmark, Finland and Sweden, financial assistance of \$6,000 was provided under the Participation Programme for the promotion of the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, which published numerous materials concerning disarmament issues. In particular, issue No. 1 (1979) was devoted to European security and the arms race, No. 3 (1979) to disarmament and development, and No. 4 (1979) to peace education. As mentioned (para. 28 above), in 1980 the *Bulletin* will publish the proceedings of the Peace Forum held in November 1979.

39. Financial assistance of \$18,000 was provided to the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) at the request of the Finnish National Commission for its VIIIth General Conference held in Königstein, Federal Republic of Germany, in August 1979. Particular attention was devoted during this Conference to the questions of disarmament and militarism as well as disarmament education. It will be recalled that IPRA enjoys Category "B" relations with UNESCO and is affiliated to the International Social Science Council. The Peace Education Commission of the Association is preparing a study on the status of and prospects for disarmament education and another study on its relationship with development education which will be submitted to the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

(c) *Co-operation with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*

40. Co-operation between UNESCO and international non-governmental organizations has taken the form of either initiating, stimulating and assisting activities to be implemented by such organizations, on the one hand, or encouraging them to play a large part in UNESCO's activities, on the other.

41. UNESCO has assisted in several activities implemented by non-governmental organizations relating to disarmament. As mentioned (para. 39 above), UNESCO assisted the International Peace Research Association in its disarmament-related activities, and made available to the participants at the VIIIth General Conference of that organization full UNESCO documentation on disarmament matters. UNESCO also encouraged the initiative of the Peace Education Commission to prepare a manual for disarmament education.

42. The UNESCO Secretariat has been represented regularly at the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and encourages that organization's efforts to promote disarmament.

43. A financial contribution of \$5,000 was given to the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, to organize jointly with the Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Finland, an international symposium on research and teaching on disarmament in various disciplines of higher education, which was prepared in 1979 and will take place in Vienna on 26 and 27 January 1980, with the participation of the UNESCO Secretariat. A report based on the work of the Symposium and containing appropriate recommendations will be submitted to the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

44. The World Peace Council, which has Category "A" relations with UNESCO, has undertaken, with the encouragement of UNESCO, numerous activities to promote disarmament and disarmament education. For example, it devoted a major part of the agenda of the meetings of the Bureau of its Presidential Committee to those themes, particularly in Panama on 28-30 September 1979, and made plans for various other activities in preparation of the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

45. The Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED) organized at Colgate University in Hamilton, New York, on 11-14 October 1979, with the support and participation of UNESCO, a conference on teaching disarmament and alternative international security systems. The conference, held on the occasion of the annual meeting of COPRED, adopted a motion commending UNESCO for organizing the Congress and urging COPRED members to participate.

46. In addition to the above-mentioned initiatives by non-governmental organizations, such organizations have been associated with other UNESCO activities in the field of disarmament, in particular with those concerning the preparation of the World Congress on Disarmament Education. Fourteen such organizations participated in the Prague preparatory meeting (para. 11 above) and numerous background documents for the Congress have been prepared by non-governmental organizations at UNESCO's request.

47. While co-operating with other groupings of non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament, in particular the NGO Committees on Disarmament in Geneva and New York, UNESCO has associated the NGO Standing Committee (UNESCO) closely with the preparation of the Congress. Pursuant to resolution 9, adopted at the 17th Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations, a collective consultation entitled "Education for Disarmament and Peace" was planned in 1979 and will be held at UNESCO on 14-16 January 1980. Drawing from the work of three preparatory subgroups which met in October and November 1979, the collective consultation drafted a document on education for disarmament and peace which will be one of the working papers of the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

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48. In order to be effective, UNESCO is convinced that its efforts to contribute to disarmament depend to a large degree on the active commitment of Member States and non-governmental organizations to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. On the eve of the Second Disarmament Decade, proclaimed by the General Assembly

in resolution 34/75, UNESCO intends to draw upon that commitment in order to provide, through the World Congress on Disarmament Education, a new impetus to the marshalling of public awareness of the necessity of active support for the United Nations efforts to free humanity from the intolerable burden of the arms race.

ANNEX I

World congress on disarmament education

A. Introduction

1. In 1978, UNESCO convened a meeting of experts on "the obstacles to disarmament and the ways of overcoming them". The meeting, which took place in Paris from 3 to 7 April 1978, recommended that UNESCO should organize a world congress on disarmament education to be held in 1980 (see final report of the meeting of experts SS-80/CONF.401/INF.2). This recommendation received the support of the UNESCO Executive Board in decision 7.1.5, adopted at its 104th session. In his subsequent address to the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, the Director-General of UNESCO informed the General Assembly of the proposal to organize a world congress on disarmament education. The General Assembly welcomed this initiative and urged UNESCO "to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study".

2. The Director-General submitted the proposal for the organization of a world congress to the Executive Board at its 105th session and to the General Conference at its twentieth session. The proposal was approved by both bodies in decision 105 EX/7.1.2 and in resolution 20 C/11.1 respectively. The General Conference also adopted resolution 20 C/32.1/1 relating to UNESCO's programme in social sciences concerning peace research. The corresponding work plan (paragraph 3152 of the Approved Programme and Budget for 1979-1980) indicated that a world congress on disarmament education would be organized in 1980, in consultation with the Education Sector, with a view to identifying practical measures whereby disarmament education may be developed in Member States, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1978).

3. At the invitation of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, an expert meeting for the preparation of the World Congress was held in Prague from 4 to 8 June 1979.

4. The information provided in this document is based on the work of that preparatory meeting and on subsequent planning by the Secretariat of UNESCO.

B. Nature and aims of the Congress

5. Under the Regulations for the general classification of the various categories of meetings convened by UNESCO, a "Congress" belongs to the category of meetings whose participants act in a private capacity and not as representatives of States. The participants are either designated individually by the Director-General or admitted by him on the suggestion of Member States or of the organizations or learned societies of which they are members. Non-governmental organizations may be invited to send observers to the Congress. In accordance with the usual practice for meetings in this category, travel expenses and subsistence allowance of participants are not normally borne by UNESCO.

6. The aim of the Congress is to achieve disarmament education rather than disarmament itself. This should be done by taking concrete steps to inform and mobilize forces capable of contributing effectively to the halting of the arms race and the transition to disarmament. The ultimate objective of the Congress is thus to increase the place given to disarmament issues in the educational process and to encourage a critical and inquiring attitude among pupils and students so that they will be better prepared to resist propaganda for war and militarism and to apply their own judgement to the problems involved.

7. The preparatory meeting stressed in this regard that the exchange of experience, materials and methods originating in different regions or countries should occupy an important place on the agenda of the Congress; so too should the dissemination of principles, ideas, values, knowledge and data relating to disarmament in the context of the preservation and consolidation of international peace and security. That is why the participants felt it was not enough to think in terms of disarmament as opposed to the arms race; it was also and above all necessary to think about non-military alternatives capable of ensuring security and bringing about an atmosphere of mutual trust. They also felt the Congress might consider the possibility of establishing a network for the exchange of information and experience with a view to the effective development of disarmament education. The preparatory meeting also considered that the Congress would present different perspectives on disarmament and could include an element of debate with experts who are critical of the concept of general and complete disarmament as commonly conceived. Open discussion was to be welcomed, as oversimplified perspectives of the problems of disarmament would be self-defeating.

C. Structure and functioning of the Congress

Commissions to be established

8. Following the recommendations of the preparatory meeting, UNESCO proposes that at least two commissions should be established which, if need be, could be organized into working groups, thus ensuring better participation in the discussions. The mandate of these two commissions will be as follows:

Commission I: Education — formal and non-formal education at different levels; the training of teaching personnel; the working out of appropriate teaching material; the revision of existing textbooks, particularly history and geography, etc.

Commission II: Information — the training of professional workers in the field of information, information ethics relating to questions of armament and disarmament, methods of informing the general public, scientific circles, military personnel, etc.

9. It is understood that research questions should be examined in both commissions, in relation both to education and to disarmament information.

D. Preliminary draft programme

1. Opening of the Congress (plenary)
2. The situation of disarmament education at all levels of formal and non-formal education (to be examined in plenary)
 - (a) The present status of disarmament education at primary and secondary levels
 - (b) The present status of disarmament education at university level
 - (c) The present status of disarmament education in teacher training
 - (d) The present status of disarmament education in adult education and non-formal education
 - (e) The present situation concerning disarmament education through the mass media
3. Problems of and prospects for the development of disarmament education within the school system (to be examined by Commission I)
 - (a) Curriculum and materials
 - (b) Teaching methods
 - (c) Teacher training
 - (d) Teaching of military personnel
4. Problems of and prospects for the development of disarmament education outside of the school system (to be examined by Commission I)
 - (a) Informal education approaches
 - (b) Non-formal education
 - (c) Education within the family

- (d) Education within trade unions
- 5. Problems and prospects for the development of disarmament education through the mass media (to be examined by Commission II)
 - (a) Formation of public opinion on disarmament questions through the media
 - (b) Approaches to problems of professional ethics in relation to disarmament education through the media
 - (c) Improvement of media coverage of disarmament problems
 - (d) Development of audio-visual materials
- 6. Promotion and development of research on disarmament (to be examined by both Commissions as indicated)
 - (a) Research as part of education (Commission I)
 - (b) Research as part of information (Commission II)
 - (c) Co-operation among research bodies (both Commissions)
 - (d) Problems of documentation (both Commissions)
- 7. Structural questions (to be examined in plenary)
 - (a) Co-ordination of efforts among educators, education officials and the scientific community to develop disarmament education
 - (b) The role of UNESCO and its National Commissions
 - (c) Co-operation and co-ordination with other United Nations agencies
 - (d) The role of non-governmental organizations
- 8. Adoption of the Final Document (plenary)
- 9. Closing of the Congress (plenary)

E. Results of the Congress

Documents to be adopted by the Congress

10. Taking the example of the Final Document of the Congress of Vienna on the Teaching of Human Rights, it is proposed that a similar document be adopted by the Congress, giving high priority to the programme and practical aspects of the subject. Such a document might consist of two parts and one annex:

- (i) the principles and guidelines which should govern disarmament education;
- (ii) a limited number of major recommendations aimed at developing such education;
- (iii) an annex containing different proposals, recommendations and suggestions made during the Congress.

11. The different measures proposed could be addressed both to UNESCO and its Member States and to governmental organizations and, above all, to the United Nations, as well as to non-governmental organizations, religious bodies, scientific associations and all those who would like to unite their efforts in the struggle for this cause.

F. Follow-up of the Congress

12. The ultimate aim of the Congress being to give a decisive impetus to the development of disarmament education, the Congress should:

- elaborate several major recommendations that could be included in UNESCO's Programme and Budget for 1981-1983;
- elaborate proposals which could be brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- suggest measures to be taken within Member States and especially by their educational institutions, information media and other appropriate bodies;
- identify possible concrete activities which could be put into effect by different governmental and non-governmental organizations.

G. *Concluding remarks*

13. At the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade, UNESCO intends to devote considerable efforts to developing disarmament education in co-operation with Member States, governmental and non-governmental organizations and scientific circles concerned with disarmament education and disarmament research. The active participation of all such interested parties in the World Congress on Disarmament Education and in the follow-up is crucial to the success of those efforts.

ANNEX II

Excerpt from UNESCO *Chronicle*, Vol. XXV (1979), No. 5

Disarmament

The date of 24 October 1979, anniversary of the founding of the United Nations Organization, also marks the beginning of Disarmament Week for which the Director-General issued the following message:

The effort to build a world of justice, peace and progress for all peoples is hindered by the proliferation of ever more sophisticated means of mass destruction. The consequences of this situation are alarming for two reasons. First, the threat of an unprecedented hecatomb hangs over the entire world and, as atomic radiation knows no frontiers, there is not a single country or people today that is secure from the effects of a major nuclear conflict.

Secondly, the vast human and material resources allocated to arms industries and military research and development are thereby denied to those who are engaged in the world struggle against the poverty which afflicts so many peoples. The talents and energies of 500,000 engineers and research workers are being used to perfect the technology of death and 60 thousand million dollars are invested every year for that purpose. A mere fraction of these intellectual, financial and technological means would suffice to reverse the present trends and make it possible to start reducing the gap between industrialized nations and developing nations, as well as between privileged groups and underprivileged groups within each nation.

The choice before us is therefore crystal clear. Either we carry on the arms race with all its attendant injustices, and this perpetuates egoistic attitudes and contributes, in its turn, to increasing the causes of conflict and the risk of conflagration. Or the nations of the world unite, placing their awareness of a shared future above their short-term ambitions and individual interests. The tremendous scientific and technological potential of the world could then be used more often to serve peaceful ends and help to forge relations based on justice and a sense of solidarity.

UNESCO is doing all in its power to help to prepare the way for disarmament and bring about a gradual change in mental attitudes. But it is urgently necessary that Governments, and first and foremost those of the great powers, should take steps to put an end to the vicious circle of distrust — resolutely putting their faith in the like-minded wisdom and mutual understanding of nations.

ANNEX III

Final Communiqué of the Peace Forum held at UNESCO House

12-16 November 1979

The Peace Forum, organized by UNESCO and the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, gathered together and heard the voices of individuals from many dif-

ferent countries of divergent political systems and viewpoints, and a pressing concern with the preservation of peace and respect for human rights was unanimously expressed, as was a condemnation of torture in all its forms.

For once, in a debate, every participant was on the same side. There were no apologists for armaments and all recognised that the general search for security had led to a world by now perilously insecure. The causes are not only arms but prejudice, irresponsibility and misinformation.

It was generally agreed that the situation is being aggravated by the enormous expenditure on arms, which is equal to the Gross National Product of 75 countries of the world. Concerns were voiced, not merely about the absurd harvest of armaments, now representing three tons of TNT for every inhabitant of the globe, including babies, but also about the economic ruin threatened by the astronomic cost of this unnecessary luxury. The rate of inflation was linked directly to the cost of weapons, which stands at the moment at around \$1,000,000 a minute.

There was unanimous agreement that, however eloquent they may be, words alone cannot prevent the deterioration of the present situation. Actions are necessary. An implementation of a new world order is one of such actions, correcting a dangerous imbalance in which 30 per cent of the world's countries use 80 per cent of the world's resources, a situation in which the imbalance in trade, combined with the effects of inflation, hinder the development of the Third World. Another grave concern voiced, especially by participants from developing countries, is the indiscriminate trade in arms in the Third World and the divergent priorities in the interpretation of human rights. Respect for human rights was generally regarded as a condition for peace, while racism, colonialism and external intervention as violations of human rights, are necessarily flagrant causes of conflict.

There have been many isolated initiatives from governments to control and reduce armaments, but no concerted initiative has yet been possible to coordinate all these isolated efforts. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is long overdue, as is a ban on the testing of new nuclear delivery systems. Initiatives have been taken, but never implemented on a high political level, for the reduction of military budgets with an initial goal of 10 per cent, a substantial percentage of this saving to be placed in funds for additional financial assistance to developing countries. The great concern of the Forum was how to translate its various ideas into practical terms, both by recommendations to governments and an appeal to the peoples of the world to participate in their own survival, this being a human right without which other rights have no relevance.

Inherent in the respect for human dignity is the respect for the inalienable rights of women to an equal participation and responsibility at all levels of decision-making.

The rights of children must equally be respected and the Year of the Child extended indefinitely. The influence of the young in initiatives for peace was sought by many participants. Education for peace and disarmament was generally felt to be a high priority. The role and responsibility of the mass media in this context was regarded as crucial.

A working group will be formed to extend the work of the Forum and all the many recommendations of this first meeting will be published and circulated. In this sense, the Forum has not ended but only just begun.

Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations related to disarmament*

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has to report that in 1979 the question of disarmament was brought up on two occasions:

1. In its Declaration of Principles, the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, which took place in Rome from 12 to 20 July 1979, reaffirmed:

"... United Nations General Assembly resolutions on world peace and disarmament and resolutions 3201 and 3202 of the VI Special Session relating to efforts 'to put an end to all forms of foreign occupation, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, colonial, neo-colonial and alien domination and exploitation through the exercise of permanent sovereignty over all natural resources' and recognizing their bearing on agrarian reform and rural development"

2. On the occasion of Disarmament Week in October 1979, the Director-General of FAO issued a statement in which he expressed deep satisfaction for the unstinted efforts of the United Nations to end the arms race and to strengthen international peace, security and the well being of mankind. He noted that significant developments in the disarmament field were underway and the initiation of the United Nations Expert Group on Disarmament and Development which he followed with particular interest in view of the most pressing need to correct the disproportion between resources allocated to the expenditure on armaments and those devoted to development. The Director-General stressed his concern that whereas food production, agriculture and rural development need top priority and the full backing of the scientific and the financial communities, weapons research occupies over half a million scientists and engineers throughout the world and absorbs more public research money than all research on food, energy, health, education and other civilian needs combined. He said that he was convinced that universal acceptance of the need to direct economies of all countries without exception from armament to constructive ends will serve the cause of peace and make substantial funds available to improve the quality of life and speed development so that at least the scourge of hunger can be banished from the planet.

* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Activities of the World Health Organization related to disarmament*

Resolution WHA32.24 of 24 May 1979 adopted by the Thirty-second World Health Assembly

Co-ordination of activities with other United Nations agencies and attainment of health for all by the year 2000

The Thirty-second World Health Assembly.

Recalling resolution WHA30.43, in which it is proclaimed that the attainment by all the peoples of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life is the main social target of governments and of WHO;

Reaffirming the statement in the Declaration of Alma-Ata to the effect that an acceptable level of health for all the peoples of the world by the year 2000 can be attained through fuller and better use of the world's resources, a considerable part of which is now spent on armaments and military conflicts, and that a genuine policy of independence, peace, détente and disarmament could and should release additional resources that could well be devoted to peaceful aims and in particular to the acceleration of social and economic development, of which primary health care is an essential part;

Noting resolutions 33/72 A, 33/91 E, 33/71 H and 33/66 B and other resolutions adopted in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly on maintenance and strengthening of peace, extension of détente, averting the threat of nuclear war, prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, banning of aggressive military conflicts, and attainment of the objectives of true disarmament;

Recalling also the contribution that WHO has already made to the strengthening of peace and co-operation between nations, notably resolution WHA15.51 on the role of the physician in the preservation and promotion of peace, resolution WHA20.54 on weapons of mass destruction, and resolutions WHA22.58 and WHA23.53 on prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons;

1. *Calls upon* Member States to redouble their efforts towards the establishing, maintaining and strengthening of peace throughout the world, the consolidation of international détente and the attainment of disarmament, with a view to creating the conditions for a large-scale release of resources which could be used for the development of public health in the world;

2. *Requests* the Director-General to:

(1) prepare a report on the further steps which WHO, as a United Nations special agency, would be able to take in the interests of international socioeconomic development, and also with the aim of assisting in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on strengthening of peace, détente and disarmament;

(2) conduct a study for consideration by the Executive Board on the subject of strengthening the co-operation of the World Health Organization with other organizations within the United Nations system in order to achieve the objective of health for all by the year 2000.

* Text contributed by the World Health Organization.

Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

The World Meteorological Organization is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization, however, have some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto.^a A brief review of such activities in 1979 is given in the present note. Before describing those activities, it should be noted that the World Weather Watch, which is the basic programme of WMO, contains the following provision:

"The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization."

Weather Modification

The Eighth Congress (1979) of WMO re-affirmed the organization's commitment to continued studies in weather modification, the main component of which is the Precipitation Enhancement Project. The project consists of an internationally planned and executed scientifically evaluated field experiment to obtain scientifically accepted information on the feasibility of precipitation enhancement under given conditions. The first year of field measurements of the clouds' characteristics were conducted between March and May 1979, and the second year will be conducted from February until May 1980, over the proposed experimental site. It is expected that a third year of measurements will start in January 1981.

The Eighth Congress of WMO also approved a project on hail-suppression research aimed at reducing the enormous losses caused by hail in numerous countries around the world. In its initial stages this project will concentrate on the poorly understood physical hail formation processes.

In connexion with WMO's weather modification activities, discussions continued with appropriate bodies, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), on studies of the environmental consequences of weather modification experiments. A WMO/UNEP Meeting of Experts designated by Governments on the Legal Aspects of Weather Modification (Septem-

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization

^a See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix IX.

ber 1979) agreed on a Draft Document Concerning Co-operation Between States in Weather Modification.^b

The Fifth Register of National Weather Modification Projects, relating to 1979 activities, is being compiled and will be distributed as requested by the WMO Congress.

Ozone research and monitoring

Action was continued in implementing the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, the objective of which is to enable WMO to provide advice to member countries and to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone. The project is being carried out with support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The main activities are related to the improvement of the global network of ground-based total-ozone measuring stations and the organization of meetings of experts for discussion of specific problems relating to the project in accordance with the UNEP World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer.

World Climate Programme

Following approval of a draft plan for implementation of the World Climate Programme (WCP) by the Eighth World Meteorological Congress (1979) action is now underway for its implementation. The WCP comprises four component parts: the World Climate Data Programme (WCDP) and the World Climate Applications Programme (WCAP) for which WMO has assumed responsibility in co-operation with concerned United Nations organizations and other international organizations, the World Climate Impact Studies Programme (WCIP) for which UNEP, in co-operation with WMO, has assumed responsibility, and the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) which will be carried out jointly by WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The WMO Executive Committee is responsible for overall co-ordination of the Programme.

^b The document has since been approved by the UNEP Governing Council.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 29 May 1972,

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of 26 May 1972.

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament,

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty.

* Transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the Protocol to the Treaty, the Joint Statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations, and the Joint US-Soviet Communiqué, by the letter dated 27 June 1979 from the representatives of the United States and the USSR; documents circulated as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/28. The Joint Communiqué (p. 436 below) was circulated in document A/34/414.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometres.
2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.
3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:
 - (a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types;
 - (b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above;
 - (c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres; and
 - (d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.
4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.
5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.
6. ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs.
7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article IX.

Article III

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.
2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from 1 January 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.
3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.
4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.
5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI.

Article IV

1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.
2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.
3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.
4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two per cent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.
5. Each Party undertakes:
 - (a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements;
 - (b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers;
 - (c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.
6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.
7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose.
9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.
10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date.
11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, that is, ten.
12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, that is, 14.
13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, that is, ten.
14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy bombers.

Article V

1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320.
2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party

undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200.

3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

Article VI

1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) in the final stage of construction;
- (c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.

2. Those arms in the final stage of construction are:

- (a) SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea trials;
- (b) ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped for such missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed;
- (c) other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility after they have been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed.

3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows:

- (a) fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first definitely indicates that they are being so converted;
- (b) SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine first goes to sea after their conversion has been performed.

4. ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such conversion has been performed.

5. A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres. A bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article VII

1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training.

2. The Parties agree that:

(a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training;

(c) there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in Article III.

Article VIII

1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres of ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3 (b) of Article II.

Article IX

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;

(d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or

(f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.

Article X

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

Article XI

1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following periods from that date: four months for ICBM launchers; six months for SLBM launchers; and three months for heavy bombers.

3. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated no later than 1 January 1981, shall be carried out throughout the ensuing twelve-month period, and shall be completed no later than 31 December 1981.

4. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time, but not later than six months after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XII

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner.

Article XIII

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration.

Article XV

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XVI

1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory.

2. The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article XVII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of 21 December 1972.

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling or destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of 18 June 1979.

Article XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XIX

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through 31 December 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Vienna on 18 June 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the
United States of America

President
of the United States
of America

For the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary of the CPSU,
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRA-
TEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty,

Have agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs from such launchers.

Article II

1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers.

3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, respectively.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through 31 December 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

DONE at Vienna on 18 June 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the
United States of America

President
of the United States
of America

For the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary of the CPSU,
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security.

Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Have agreed as follows:

First. The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation.

In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.

Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, co-operative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties.

Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives:

- (1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms;
- (2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;
- (3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein.

Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Vienna, 18 June 1979

For the
United States of America

President
of the United States
of America

For the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary of the CPSU,
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Joint United States-USSR Vienna Communiqué

Following is the Joint United States-USSR Communiqué issued at Vienna 18 June following the meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev:

By mutual agreement, President of the United States of America Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev held meetings in Vienna, Austria, from 15 to 18 June 1979. President Carter and President Brezhnev conducted their discussions with the participation of:

On the American side, Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States of America; Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense of the United States of America; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On the Soviet side, A. A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs; D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU and Minister of Defence; K. U. Chernenko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Also participating in the talks were:

On the American side, George Seignious, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President; Jody Powell, Assistant to the President; Malcolm Toon, Ambassador of the United States of America to the USSR; and Ralph Earle, Chief of the United States Delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

On the Soviet side, A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; L. M. Zamyatin, Section Chief of the Central Committee of the CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America; V. G. Komplektov, member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; and V. P. Karpov, Chief of the USSR delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

President Carter and President Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Basic issues of United States-Soviet relations and pressing international problems were also discussed. The exchange of views was characterized by the desire to expand mutual understanding and to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems of interest to both sides. In their discussions, they devoted special attention to reducing the risk of war through further limits on strategic arms and through other endeavours in arms limitation and disarmament.

The two sides expressed their appreciation to the Government of Austria for its hospitality and for providing all necessary facilities for the success of the meetings.

1. General aspects of United States-Soviet relations

There is agreement between the sides that the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is of great importance for the fundamental interests of the peoples of both countries and that it significantly affects the development of the international situation as a whole. Recognizing the great responsibility connected with this, the sides have expressed their firm intent to continue working toward the establishment of a more stable and constructive foundation for United States-Soviet relations. To this end, the two sides acknowledged the necessity of expanding areas of co-operation between them.

Such co-operation should be based on the principles of complete equality, equal security, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, and should facilitate the relaxation of international tension and the peaceful conduct of mutually beneficial relations between States, and thereby enhance international stability and world peace.

The sides reaffirmed their conviction that full implementation of each of the provisions of the "Basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" as well as other treaties and agreements concluded between them would contribute to a more stable relationship between the two countries.

The two sides stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and of efforts so that conflicts or situations would not arise which could serve to increase international tensions. They recognize the right of the peoples of all States to determine their future without outside interference.

Recognizing that an armed world conflict can and must be avoided, the sides believe that at the present time there is no more important and urgent task for mankind than ending the arms race and preventing war. They expressed their intention to make every effort to attain that goal. To that end, they also recognized the value of consultation between themselves and with other Governments, at the United Nations and elsewhere, in order to prevent and eliminate conflict in various regions of the world.

The sides note with satisfaction the growing practice of contacts between Government officials of the United States of America and the USSR in the course of which key questions of United States-Soviet relations and pressing international issues are discussed. The progress of developing useful ties between the United States Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and of exchanges between non-governmental organizations is continuing.

The talks again confirmed the specific significance of personal meetings between the leaders of the United States of America and the USSR in resolving the basic questions in the relations between the two States. In principle, it has been agreed that such meetings will be held in the future on a regular basis, with the understanding that the specific timing will be determined by mutual agreement.

Agreement has also been reached on broadening the practice of consultations and exchanges of opinion between representatives of the sides on other levels.

II. Limitations of nuclear and conventional arms

The two sides reaffirmed their deep conviction that special importance should be attached to the problems of the prevention of nuclear war and to curbing the competition in strategic arms. Both sides recognized that nuclear war would be a disaster for all mankind. Each stated that it is not striving and will not strive for military superiority, since that can only result in dangerous instability, generating higher levels of armaments with no benefit to the security of either side.

Recognizing that the United States of America and the USSR have a special responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear war and contribute to world peace, President Carter and President Brezhnev committed themselves to take major steps to limit nuclear weapons with the objective of ultimately eliminating them, and to complete successfully other arms limitation and disarmament negotiations.

SALT — In the course of the meeting, President Carter and President Brezhnev confirmed and signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Protocol thereto, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms and the document entitled Agreed Statements and Common Understandings regarding the Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

At the same time, the sides again stressed the great significance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and strict compliance with its provisions and of other agreements previously concluded between them in the field of strategic arms limitation and reducing the danger of nuclear war.

Both sides expressed their deep satisfaction with the process of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations and the fact that their persistent efforts for many years to conclude a new treaty have been crowned with success. This Treaty sets equal ceilings on the nuclear delivery systems of both sides; to begin the process of reductions it requires the reduction of existing nuclear arms; to begin to limit the threat represented by the qualitative arms race it also places substantial constraints on the modernization of strategic offensive systems and the development of new ones.

The new Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Protocol thereto represent a mutually acceptable balance between the interests of the sides based on the principles of equality and equal security. These documents are a substantial contribution to the pre-

vention of nuclear war and the deepening of détente, and thus serve the interests not only of the American and Soviet peoples, but the aspirations of mankind for peace.

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment strictly to observe every provision in the Treaty.

President Carter and President Brezhnev discussed questions relating to the SALT Three negotiations and in this connexion expressed the firm intention of the sides to act in accordance with the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — It was noted that there has been definite progress at the negotiations, in which the United Kingdom is also participating, on an international treaty comprehensively banning test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment and an associated protocol. They confirmed the intention of the United States of America and the USSR to work, together with the United Kingdom, to complete preparation of this treaty as soon as possible.

Non-proliferation — The two sides reaffirmed the importance they attach to nuclear non-proliferation. They consistently advocate the further strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and confirm their resolve to continue to comply strictly with the obligations they have assumed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They stressed the importance of applying comprehensive international safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency and pledged to continue their efforts to strengthen these safeguards.

They noted the profound threat posed to world security by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and agreed that the States already possessing nuclear weapons bear a special responsibility to demonstrate restraint. To this end, they affirmed their joint conviction that further efforts are needed, including on a regional basis, and expressed the hope that the conclusion of the SALT Two Treaty will make an important contribution toward non-proliferation objectives.

Both sides further committed themselves to close co-operation, along with other countries, to insure a successful conclusion to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1980, and called upon all States which have not already done so to sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Vienna negotiations — President Carter and President Brezhnev emphasized the great importance the sides attached to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe in which they are participating with other States. A reduction of the military forces of both sides and the implementation of associated measures in Central Europe would be a major contribution to stability and security.

ASAT — It was also agreed to continue actively searching for mutually acceptable agreement in the ongoing negotiations on anti-satellite systems.

Conventional arms transfers — The two sides agreed that their respective representatives will meet promptly to discuss questions related to the next round of negotiations on limiting conventional arms transfers.

Chemical weapons — The two sides reaffirmed the importance of a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and agreed to intensify their efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal for presentation to the Committee on Disarmament.

Radiological weapons — President Carter and President Brezhnev were pleased to be able to confirm that bilateral agreement on major elements of a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons has been reached. An agreed joint proposal will be presented to the Committee on Disarmament this year.

Indian Ocean — The two sides agreed that their respective representatives will meet promptly to discuss the resumption of the talks on questions concerning arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean.

Other questions of arms limitations and general disarmament — In discussing other questions connected with solving the problems of limiting the arms race and of disarmament, the sides expressed their support for the final document adopted at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament. The sides noted their support for a second special

session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and for that session to be followed by the convocation of a world disarmament conference with universal participation, adequately prepared and at an appropriate time.

The United States of America and the USSR will continue to co-operate between themselves and with other Member States of the Committee on Disarmament with its enlarged membership for the purpose of working out effective steps in the field of disarmament in that forum.

In summing up the exchange of views on the state of negotiations being conducted between the United States of America and the USSR, or with their participation, on a number of questions connected with arms limitation and disarmament, the sides agreed to give new impetus to the joint efforts to achieve practical results at these negotiations.

III. International questions

There was a broad exchange of views on major international issues. The sides expressed their support for the process of international détente which in their view should become increasingly specific in nature and spread to all areas of the globe, thus helping to promote increased international stability.

President Carter and President Brezhnev devoted particular attention to situations of tension which complicate the international situation and interfere with positive developments in other areas. The two sides believe that all States must conduct themselves with particular responsibility and restraint in order to contribute to the elimination of present situations of tension and to prevent new ones from arising.

The two sides noted the importance of increasing international co-operation on such global issues as the promotion of world-wide economic development, the protection of the environment, and the peaceful use of space and the world ocean for the benefit of all mankind. They expressed their support for the efforts of the developing countries to deal with the problems they face.

Noting the important role of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining peace, security and the development of international co-operation, the United States of America and the USSR confirm their intention to promote the improvement of the effectiveness of this organization on the basis of the United Nations Charter.

The sides noted with satisfaction the positive developments which have taken place in recent years with respect to the situation on the European continent; they underscored the significance of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The two sides agreed that continuation of the CSCE process is important to promote security and co-operation in Europe. They called attention to the need for full implementation of all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The United States of America and the USSR will work to facilitate a constructive meeting of the representatives of the participating States of the all-European conference, which is scheduled to take place in 1980 in Madrid.

Each side reaffirmed its interest in a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East and set forth its position on ways and means of resolving the Middle East problem.

There was an exchange of views concerning developments in Africa. They noted some normalization of the situation in certain areas of that continent, and the efforts of the independent States of Africa toward co-operation, economic developments and peaceful relations and the positive role in this respect of the Organization of African Unity. They also indicated their respective views regarding the situation in southern Africa.

The sides recognized the importance to world peace of peace and stability in Asia. They agreed that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations in the area must be fully respected. They also indicated their respective views regarding the situation in south-east Asia.

IV. Co-operation in bilateral matters

The importance of co-operation between the United States of America and the USSR on the basis of mutual benefit, in accordance with the agreements which exist between the two countries, was emphasized. The sides took note of positive developments in the wide range of

cultural, academic, scientific and technical exchange programmes, which are continuing between the two countries.

Proceeding on the established principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit as the basis for the conduct of such programmes, the sides reaffirmed their commitment to continue and intensify co-operation in these areas.

The two sides confirmed that economic and commercial relations represent an important element in the development of improved bilateral ties. Both sides stated their position in favour of strengthening these relations and recognized the necessity of working toward the elimination of obstacles to mutually beneficial trade and financial relations. The two sides expressed their determination to encourage the relevant organizations and enterprises in their respective countries to enter into mutually beneficial commercial agreements and contracts on a long-term basis.

President Carter and President Brezhnev expressed mutual satisfaction with the results of the talks which were held. They are convinced that the deepening of mutual understanding between the sides on several issues as a result of the meeting and the consistent implementation of the agreements which have been reached will facilitate the development of United States-Soviet relations and represents a joint contribution of the two countries to strengthening détente, international security and peace.

Additional documents relating to the Treaty^a

AGREED STATEMENTS AND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

In connexion with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

To paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers", as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. The 177 former Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty.

^a Transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the letter dated 2 July 1979 from the representative of the United States; documents circulated as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/29. The documents are (a) Agreed statements and common understandings regarding the Treaty, (b) Memorandum of understanding, (c) Statements of data on numbers of strategic offensive arms, and (d) Soviet "Backfire" statement.

Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date.

To Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type.

To Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers", as used in paragraph 3 of Article II and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty; in this connexion the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties further agree that:

(a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber;

(b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres; and

(c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs.

First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related ob-

servable differences shall be verifiable by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate, co-operative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.

Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is, in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes.

Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its 31 Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner:

Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52 and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations;

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Tupolev-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear type; and

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bison type.

To Paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable re-entry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle or with multiple re-entry vehicles which are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon C-3 SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs.

Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with MIRVs when first flight-tested.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs correspond in the following manner:

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman III and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C-3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Re-entry vehicles are independently targetable:

(a) if, after separation from the booster, manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the re-entry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

(b) if manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty.

Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM and SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs on the basis of externally observable design features of the submarines.

This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or construction programmes, or to programmes including significant changes to the principal observable structural design features of launchers, under way as of the date of signature of the Treaty.

To Paragraph 6 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently

targetable re-entry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle or with multiple re-entry vehicles which are not independently targetable.

Second Agreed Statement. Re-entry vehicles are independently targetable:

(a) if, after separation from the booster, manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the re-entry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

(b) if manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

To Paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

(a) its re-entry vehicle or re-entry vehicles;

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one re-entry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more re-entry vehicles or for targeting one re-entry vehicle, which cannot provide their re-entry vehicles or re-entry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second.

To Paragraph 8 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometres, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

To Paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of 26 May 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, whichever is later.

Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM silo launcher by 32 per cent solely through an increase in one of these dimensions.

To Paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements", as used in paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher.

To Paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty

Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

To Paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

- (a) its re-entry vehicle or re-entry vehicles;
- (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one re-entry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and
- (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more re-entry vehicles or for targeting one re-entry vehicle, which cannot provide their re-entry vehicles or re-entry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second.

To Paragraph 8 of Article IV of the Treaty

Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single re-entry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the re-entry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the re-entry vehicle of that missile.

To Paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs", as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight-tested as of 1 May 1979 in any one or more of the following respects:

- (a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile;
- (b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.

First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different", referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of 5 per cent.

Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.

A party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other Party of the date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different", referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of 5 per cent from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last 12 of the 25 launches or during the last 12 launches before deployment begins, whichever 12 launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than 10 per cent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those 12 launches.

Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of re-entry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than

the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of re-entry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction of the quantity of propellant.

To Paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of re-entry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type	—	7 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type	—	14 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type	—	7 re-entry vehicles;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ICBMs of the RS-16 type	—	4 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-18 type	—	6 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-20 type	—	10 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the RSM-50 type	—	7 re-entry vehicles.

Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America have been deployed with no more than three re-entry vehicles. During the term of the Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy missiles of this type with more than three re-entry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles, of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with re-entry vehicles the weight of any of which is less than the weight of the lightest of those re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date;

(b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single re-entry vehicle and without an appropriate device for targeting a re-entry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with a re-entry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of the lightest re-entry

vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flight-tested by that Party as of 1 May 1979; and

(c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single re-entry vehicle and with an appropriate device for targeting a re-entry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with a re-entry vehicle the weight of which is less than 50 per cent of the throw-weight of that ICBM.

To Paragraph 11 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

To Paragraph 12 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of re-entry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type	—	7 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type	—	14 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type	—	7 re-entry vehicles;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ICBMs of the RS-16 type	—	4 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-18 type	—	6 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-20 type	—	10 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the RSM-50 type	—	7 re-entry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

To Paragraph 13 of Article IV of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum

number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

To Paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B-52 or B-1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for more than 20 cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

To Paragraph 4 of Article V of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, all bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

To Paragraph 3 of Article VI of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force.

To Paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission, shall include:

(a) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Article V of the Treaty, of ICBM and SLBM launchers which are being converted from launchers of a type subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, into launchers of a type not subject to that limitation;

(b) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty, of bombers which are being converted from bombers of a type subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty or in Articles III and V of the Treaty into airplanes or bombers of a type not so subject.

Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers from the aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be based upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

To Paragraph 1 of Article VII of the Treaty

Common Understanding. The term "testing", as used in Article VII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

To Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "significant increase", as used in subparagraph 2(a) of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of 15 per cent or more. Any new ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training launchers at test ranges will be located only at test ranges.

Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located: for the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that Party to test ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms, including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested.

Second Common Understanding. Of the 18 launchers of fractional orbital missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, 12 launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization.

Dismantling or destruction of the 12 launchers shall begin upon entry into force of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. These 12 launchers shall not be replaced.

Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the Treaty. After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be removed and shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX and of Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, except in the case of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization. After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such conversion, any activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed. These six launchers shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if converted, to the provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty.

To Paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles, capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or for ASBMs no more than 16 airplanes, including airplanes which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flight-test ASBMs from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flight-test ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty shall not apply to such airplanes.

The aforementioned airplanes may include only:

(a) airplanes other than bombers which, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, have been converted into airplanes equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or for ASBMs;

(b) airplanes considered to be heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraphs 3(c) or 3(d) of Article II of the Treaty; and

(c) airplanes other than heavy bombers which prior to 7 March 1979 were used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or for ASBMs.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement shall not be used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres after the expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

First Common Understanding. The term "testing" as used in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing.

Third Common Understanding. None of the 16 airplanes referred to in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced, except in the event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of the dismantling or destruction of any such airplane. The procedures for such replacement and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its conversion, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

To Paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Treaty

Common Understanding to subparagraph (a). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IX of the Treaty do not affect current practices for transporting ballistic missiles.

Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

Common Understanding to subparagraph (c). The provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX of the Treaty do not require the dismantling or destruction of any existing launchers of either Party.

First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The launch-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of:

- (a) its re-entry vehicle or re-entry vehicles;
- (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one re-entry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and
- (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and 1(f) of Article IX of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more re-entry vehicles or for targeting one re-entry vehicle, which cannot provide their re-entry vehicles or re-entry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second.

To Paragraph 2 of Article IX of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if manoeuvring or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

To Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. Deliberate concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. The obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures, provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, does not preclude the testing of antimissile defence penetration aids.

First Common Understanding. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions associated with testing. In this connexion, the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

Second Common Understanding. Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. In addition to the obligations provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be used over ICBM silo launchers.

To Paragraph 1 of Article XVI of the Treaty

First Common Understanding. ICBM launches to which the obligations provided for in Article XVI of the Treaty apply, include, among others, those ICBM launches for which advance notification is required pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed 30 September 1971, and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed 25 May 1972. Nothing in Article XVI of the Treaty is intended to inhibit advance notification, on a voluntary basis, of any ICBM launches not subject to its provisions, the advance notification of which would enhance confidence between the Parties.

Second Common Understanding. A multiple ICBM launch conducted by a Party, as distinct from single ICBM launches referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty, is a launch which would result in two or more of its ICBMs being in flight at the same time.

Third Common Understanding. The test ranges referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty are those covered by the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty.

To Paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; fixed launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs; launchers of SLBMs; launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs; heavy bombers;

heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres; heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

To Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Protocol

Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if manoeuvring or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

To Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Protocol

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometres, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

DONE at Vienna, on 18 June 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the
United States of America

President
of the United States
of America

For the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary of the CPSU,
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATA BASE ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have considered data on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of 1 November 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today.

	<i>United States</i>	<i>USSR</i>
Launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550	576
Launchers of SLBMs	656	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	496	128
Heavy bombers	574	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres	0	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0	0
ASBMs	0	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0	0

At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed data in the categories listed in this Memorandum.

DONE at Vienna on 18 June 1979 in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the
United States of America

Chief of the
United States Delegation
to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks

For the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chief of the
USSR Delegation
to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The United States of America declares that as of 18 June 1979, it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs	1,054
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,054
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550
Launchers of SLBMs	656
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	496
Heavy bombers	574

Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	3
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0
ASBMs	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0

18 June 1979

Chief of the
United States Delegation
to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks

**STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF
THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY**

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of 18 June 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	608
Launchers of SLBMs	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	144
Heavy bombers	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0
ASBMs	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0

18 June 1979

Chief of the
USSR Delegation
to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks

SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT

On 16 June 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement:

“The Soviet side informs the United States side that the Soviet ‘Tu-22M’ airplane, called ‘Backfire’ in the United States, is a medium-range bomber and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connexion, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refuelling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate.”

President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year.

President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

Proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament relating to its agenda item entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States^a

The States Parties to this Convention.

Conscious of the fact that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Prompted by a desire to take all possible steps to reduce and ultimately to eliminate the danger of such a war,

Wishing to contribute to the prevention of the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the cessation of the nuclear armaments race and the adoption of effective measures directed towards nuclear disarmament,

Welcoming the desire of States in various regions of the world to keep their territories free from nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain peace, to refrain from the threat or use of force and to live in peace with each other as good neighbours,

Having regard to Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 and the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 30 June 1978, including the request made therein that urgent efforts be made to conclude effective agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Regarding guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear States as an important means of strengthening peace and universal security and wishing to give such guarantees an international legal character,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties to this Convention which re-

^a *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27), appendix III, vol. 1, document CD/23.*

nounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.

Article II

The obligation set forth in article I of this Convention shall extend not only to the territory of non-nuclear States Parties, but also to the armed forces and installations under the jurisdiction and control of such States wherever they may be, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.

Article III

Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that the actions of any other State Party are contrary to the provisions of articles I and II of the Convention may request that consultations be held between the States Parties with a view to clarifying the actual circumstances of the matter. Such a request must include any information relating to the matter and also all possible evidence to support it.

Article IV

1. This Convention shall be concluded for an indefinite period of time.
2. Each Party to the Convention shall, in the exercise of its State sovereignty, be entitled to secede from the Convention if it decides that exceptional circumstances relating to the content of the Convention have placed its higher interests in jeopardy. It shall notify all the Parties to the Convention and the Security Council of the United Nations of its secession, giving three months' notice. Such notification must include a statement of the exceptional circumstances which it regards as having placed its higher interests in jeopardy.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of each proposed amendment must be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.
2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Convention which accepts the amendment after the documents concerning its acceptance have been deposited with the depositary by the majority of States Parties. Subsequently, the amendment shall enter into force for each of the remaining States Parties on the date of the deposit by them of the document concerning its acceptance.

Article VI

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification or the documents concerning accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the depositary.
3. This Convention shall enter into force following the deposit of the instruments of ratification by States which have signed the Convention, including at least nuclear-weapon States.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession.
5. The depositary shall immediately notify all States which have signed or acceded to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratifica-

tion or document concerning accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, and also of the receipt by him of other notifications.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention, the Russian, Arabic, Chinese, English, French and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall duly forward certified copies of the Convention to the Governments of the States which have signed or acceded to the Convention.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, which was opened for signature on.

Pakistan: Draft International Convention to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons^b

The States Parties to this Convention,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that only nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, will assure complete security in the nuclear era,

Desirous of safeguarding the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Bearing in mind the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Also bearing in mind that the non-nuclear-weapon States have called for legally binding and credible assurances from nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention, as a first step towards the complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States.

This undertaking is without prejudice to the obligations of States Parties to this Convention arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Article II

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention also undertake to avoid the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any contingency and to achieve nuclear dis-

^d *Ibid.*, document CD/10.

armament, resulting in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in the shortest possible time.

Article III

Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that there has been or is likely to be a breach of the obligations of the States Parties arising from articles I and II of this Convention may request an urgent meeting of the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to preventing such a breach or redressing the situation arising therefrom.

Article IV

This Convention shall be concluded for an indefinite period of time. It shall lapse once nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of each proposed amendment must be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.

2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Convention which accepts the amendment after the documents concerning its acceptance have been deposited with the depositary by the majority of States Parties. Subsequently, the amendment shall enter into force for each of the remaining States Parties on the date of the deposit by them of the document concerning its acceptance.

Article VI

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification or the documents concerning accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force following the deposit of the instruments of ratification by . . . States including the two leading nuclear-weapon States, i.e. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession.

5. The depositary shall immediately notify all States Parties to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or document concerning accession; the date of the entry into force of this Convention or of any amendments thereto, and also of the receipt by him of other notifications.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention, the Russian, Arabic, Chinese, English, French and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall duly forward certified copies of the Convention to the Governments of the States which have signed or acceded to the Convention.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, which was opened for signature in .

United States of America: proposal for a Committee on Disarmament recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly concerning the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack'

ILLUSTRATIVE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to promote international peace and security,

Recognizing the legitimate security concerns of States that have undertaken firm obligations not to acquire nuclear explosive devices,

Taking note of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament, which called upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Noting that the five nuclear-weapon States recognize the significance of action to meet more fully the concerns of the great majority of States which have not sought to acquire or develop, alone or with others, any nuclear explosive devices,

Recalling that each of the five nuclear Powers has stated its willingness to take formal action to affirm its support for and to adhere to appropriate regional arrangements establishing defined nuclear-free zones,

1. Welcomes the declaration of the nuclear-weapon States providing assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons;

2. Takes note of the following undertakings by each of the five nuclear powers:

A. By China: To call for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and at no time and in no circumstances to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

B. By France: To participate in negotiating the necessary agreements with nuclear-weapon-free zones the terms of which preclude, according to a formula to be defined, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that are part of a nuclear-free zone;

C. By the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: To offer a binding commitment in a new international convention not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to such a convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control, and to consult whenever any party to the convention has reason to believe that the actions of any other party are in violation of this commitment;

D. By the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Not to use nuclear weapons against States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State;

E. By the United States of America: Not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack;

3. Recognizes these solemn declarations as important contributions to strengthening international peace and security.

Ibid., document CD/27.

Agreed Joint USSR-United States Proposal on Major Elements of a Treaty Prohibiting the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons*

I

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, or use radiological weapons.

II

For the purpose of the Treaty, the term "radiological weapon" means:

1. Any device, including any weapon or equipment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.
2. Any radioactive material, other than that produced by a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

III

Each State Party to the Treaty also undertakes not to employ deliberately, by its dissemination, any radioactive material not defined as a radiological weapon in paragraph II, subparagraph 2, and not produced by a nuclear explosive device, to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

IV

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to assist, encourage, or induce any person, State, group of States or international organization to engage in any of the activities which the Parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to engage in under the provisions of paragraphs I and III.

V

Provisions of the Treaty shall not hinder the use of sources of radiation from radioactive

* Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 9 July 1979 by the representative of the USSR as document CD/31; the identical text, submitted on the same date by the representative of the United States, was entitled "Agreed joint US-USSR proposal . . .", and numbered CD/32. Texts were also circulated as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, appendix III, vol. II, documents CD/31 and CD/32.

decay for peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to any generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning such use.

VI

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to take any measures which it deems necessary to prevent loss of and to prohibit and prevent diversion of radioactive materials that might be used in radiological weapons and any activities contrary to the provisions of the Treaty in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or under its control.

VII

Nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflict.

VIII

1. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Treaty. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this paragraph may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of Experts as provided for in subparagraph 2 of this paragraph.

2. For the purposes set forth in subparagraph 1 of this paragraph, the Depositary shall, within one month of the receipt of a request from any State Party, convene a Consultative Committee of Experts. Any State Party may appoint an expert to this Committee, whose functions and rules of procedure are set out in the Annex, which constitutes an integral part of the Treaty. The Committee shall transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all views and information presented to the Committee during its proceedings. The Depositary shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.

3. Any State Party to the Treaty which has reasons to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Treaty may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

4. Any State Party to the Treaty undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Treaty of the results of the investigation.

5. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any Party to the Treaty which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Treaty.

IX

1. A State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. Each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, which shall promptly transmit it to all States Parties.

2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment after the deposit with the Depositary of documents of acceptance by a majority of the States Parties. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for each remaining State Party on the date of the deposit by it of the acceptance document.

X

1. The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

XI

1. Ten years after entry into force of the Treaty, or earlier if requested by a majority of States Parties, a conference of States Parties should be convened to review the operation of the Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review should take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Treaty.
2. Thereafter, a majority of the States Parties could obtain the convening of a conference with the same objectives.
3. If no review conference has been convened within (blank) years following the conclusion of a previous review conference, the Depositary should solicit the views of all States Parties on the holding of such a conference. If (blank fraction) or (blank number) of the States Parties, whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the Depositary should take immediate steps to convene the conference.

XII

1. The Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. A State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with subparagraph 3 of this paragraph may accede to it at any time.
2. The Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by (blank) Governments in accordance with subparagraph 2 of this paragraph.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of the Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of entry into force of the Treaty, as well as of any amendment to it and of the receipt of other notices.
6. The Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

XIII

The Treaty, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit duly certified copies of the Treaty to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Annex to the Treaty

Consultative Committee of Experts

1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to any problem raised pursuant to paragraph VIII, subparagraph 1, of the Treaty by the State Party requesting the convening of the Committee.

2. The work of the Consultative Committee of Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this Annex. The Committee shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall be no voting on matters of substance.

3. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as the Chairman of the Committee.

4. Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or more advisers.

5. Each expert shall have the right, through the Chairman, to request from States, and from international organizations, such information and assistance as the expert considers desirable for the accomplishment of the Committee's work.

APPENDIX XII

List of resolutions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, held from 18 September 1979 to 7 January 1980 (including voting)

	<i>Reference in text</i>
<i>Resolutions on disarmament questions</i>	
34/71	173
Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/58 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
34/72	234
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	
<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
34/73	132
Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/60	
<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follow:</i>	
<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of	

America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: China, France.

- 34/74 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 174

Adopted without a vote

- 34/75 Consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade 82

Adopted without a vote

- 34/76 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa
Resolution A — Implementation of the Declaration 176

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

- Resolution B — Nuclear capability of South Africa 177

Adopted without a vote

- 34/77 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 180

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bot-

swana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel.

34/78 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

183

Adopted by a recorded vote of 96 to 2, with 40 abstentions,^a as follows:

In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Bhutan, India.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Norway, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sweden,

^a The delegation of Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been against the resolution.

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia.

- 34/79 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons 246

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

- 34/80 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace Resolution A 323

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 23 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Re-

public, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Resolution B

324

Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

34/81	World Disarmament Conference <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	70
34/82	United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	270
34/83	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session Resolution A -- Disarmament and international security <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	 34

Resolution B — Report of the Committee on Disarmament

36

Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

Resolution C — Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session 37

Adopted without a vote

Resolution D — United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament 390

Adopted without a vote

Resolution E — Monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security 359

Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to none, with 11 abstentions,^b as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Leba-

^b The delegations of Iraq, Israel and the Netherlands subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour.

non, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Viet Nam.

Resolution F — Freezing and reduction of military budgets

340

Adopted without a vote

Resolution G — Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

97

Adopted by a recorded vote of 112 to 16, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Mongolia, Poland, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Resolution H — Report of the Disarmament Commission

52

Adopted without a vote

Resolution I — Disarmament Week

Adopted without a vote

Resolution J — Nuclear weapons in all aspects

96

Adopted by a recorded vote of 120 to 2, with 19 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: France, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.^c

Resolution K — Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

371

Adopted without a vote

Resolution L — Committee on Disarmament

25

Adopted without a vote

Resolution M — Programme of research and studies on disarmament

353

Adopted without a vote

34/84 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

161

Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 1, with 25 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African

^c The delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been against the resolution.

Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

34/85

Conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

163

Adopted by a recorded vote of 120 to none, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

34/86 Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 164

Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 1, with 29 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam.

34/87 General and complete disarmament

Resolution A — Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 254

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B — Confidence-building measures 22

Adopted without a vote

Resolution C — Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present 99

Adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 19 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New

Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Benin, Brazil, Burma, Congo, Cuba, Ghana, Ireland, Israel, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Resolution D — Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes 100

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 9, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Congo, Cuba, France, India, Mozambique, Viet Nam.

Resolution E — Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament 24

Adopted by a recorded vote of 121 to 9, with 9 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-

Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Brazil, Congo, Cuba, Ivory Coast, Niger, Sierra Leone, Viet Nam.

Resolution F — Strategic arms limitation talks

119

Adopted without a vote

34/88

Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament

59

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 27 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,^d Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

^d The delegation of Kenya subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.

34/89 Israeli nuclear armament

102

Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 10, with 38 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Belgium, Denmark, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United States of America.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Haiti, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Upper Volta, Uruguay.

Resolutions on related questions

- | | | |
|-------|---|-----|
| 34/11 | Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency
<i>Adopted without a vote</i> | 196 |
| 34/12 | Effects of atomic radiation
<i>Adopted without a vote</i> | — |
| 34/63 | Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development
<i>Adopted without a vote</i> | 201 |
| 34/93 | Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of South Africa
Resolution E — Nuclear collaboration with South Africa
<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 4, with 18 abstentions, as follows:</i> | 178 |

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana,

Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Togo, Turkey.

34/99 Development and strengthening of good neighbourliness between States —
Adopted without a vote

34/100 Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 25

Adopted by a recorded vote of 104 to 2, with 24 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

* The delegations of Liberia, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Republic of Cameroon subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

34/101 Non-interference in the internal affairs of States

Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 11, with 14 abstentions,^f as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey.

34/102 Settlement by peaceful means of disputes between States

Adopted without a vote

34/103 Inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations

Adopted by a recorded vote of 111 to 4, with 26 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

^f The delegations of Liberia, Mauritius, Sierra Leone and the United Republic of Cameroon subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

publics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Canada, Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela.

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