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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 4 February 1993, at 10.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 641st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As first order of business, I take pleasure in extending a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, who is addressing the Conference today. The Minister has had an outstanding parliamentary career. She has also held several high positions in the field of international relations, such as member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament, delegate to the Council of Europe and observer to the European Parliament. In addition, she has served as spokesperson for Foreign Affairs of the Moderate Party and as Chairman of the Swedish section of the European Union of Women. She has also had important responsibilities in the field of journalism. The Minister took up her present position on 4 October 1991. Her statement today, during her first visit to the Conference, will undoubtedly be an important contribution to our work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Poland, Indonesia, Argentina, Cuba, the United States and Brazil. I now give the floor to Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas.

<u>Baroness af UGGLAS</u> (Sweden): Allow me at the outset to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, as President of this Conference and wish you all success. As always, you can count upon the full support and cooperation of Sweden in your important task. I also want to pay tribute to Ambassador Berasategui, the Secretary-General of the Conference.

After the cold war, the main threat to mankind is no longer a massive confrontation between two heavily armed nuclear Powers. Today, the proliferation of weapons - in particular weapons of mass destruction constitutes a growing challenge to international peace and security. Another fundamental shift is that security is no longer considered an exclusively military matter. We now apply a broader concept, linking security with ethnic, economic, social and ecological problems, and the complex relations between them. This concept of security has been central to the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has also been emphasized in the recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General, entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Let me put it this way. The international community will have to deal with two categories of security issues: the first category primarily consisting of "traditional" military security issues; the second category comprising non-military security threats related to economic, ethnic, social and ecological problems. While security will always have a military dimension, we can now devote more attention to the non-military dimensions of security than we could in the past, and deal with international problems at their source.

The recent drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals constitute a watershed in the post-war history of disarmament and arms control. The conclusion of the START II agreement confirms the political courage and

determination of the United States and Russia in eliminating the most destabilizing class of strategic weapons - multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, the START agreements will not be complete without the adherence of all the nuclear Powers which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. In Lisbon last May, the four members of the Commonwealth of Independent States which have nuclear weapons on their territories - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine - agreed with the United States to carry out the provisions of START I.

In addition to assuming their responsibilities under START I, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are committed under the Treaty to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from their territories within the seven-year reduction period. The United States Congress and the parliaments of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan have consented to the ratification of START I. My Government urges the parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus to take similar action. We also urge Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede without further delay to the non-proliferation Treaty, as non-nuclear weapon States.

We have reason to celebrate the signing of the START I and START II agreements and we are hopeful about their speedy ratification by all the parties concerned. After this has been accomplished, the agreements will reach a state of implementation which offers new challenges. Only when implementation is well under way can we truly rejoice about recent achievements.

For decades, non-proliferation has been on the international agenda, particularly as regards weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have a special potential for escalating local conflicts, which may get out of control and result in unpredictable threats to peace and security. The highest priority should now be given to the non-proliferation of such weapons.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has raised concern regarding the increased risk of clandestine transfers of conventional weapons. And we cannot rule out the risk of such trade in weapons of mass destruction. It is thus of the utmost importance that we minimize the risk of an increase in black market sales of military arsenals at relatively low prices, particularly to areas of high political tension. Strong and determined action must be taken in order to protect borders - not least new borders - and ensure full control and openness in this respect.

Wherever possible, we should seek to establish mechanisms which serve as "early warning systems", ensuring openness and transparency, and indicating where and when national - or international - action is warranted. Sweden is currently involved in cooperation with several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, with the aim of strengthening administrative and legislative systems for effective border and customs control, providing financial support and training personnel. Moreover, Sweden is preparing to cooperate with the Russian Federation in the destruction of chemical weapons by providing expertise for such purposes. I note with satisfaction that the United States and other countries are prepared to give substantial

assistance, and I hope that concerted action by the international community will help to carry out, in practice, the destruction of chemical weapons as provided in the Convention recently signed in Paris.

It is imperative that we control transfers of weapons of mass destruction. But this is not enough. We must also control trade in essential components, equipment and weapon materials, such as uranium and plutonium. It is of equal and perhaps of even greater importance to prevent the proliferation of know-how for the production of weapons of mass destruction. We should also seek opportunities to utilize this vast expertise for peaceful purposes.

The initiatives to establish science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev are excellent examples of a constructive approach to this problem. Sweden is participating in the funding of these two centres and will take an active part in their work. It is my sincere hope that many countries will support the centres and help to give weapons experts the opportunity to contribute to peace and economic growth.

The non-proliferation Treaty is the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Today, there are 155 States parties to the Treaty. Adherence to the Treaty is firmly established as a norm for international behaviour. I urge all nations to become parties to the Treaty, and to act forcefully to implement existing safeguards systems. It is imperative that all States with nuclear weapons on their territory or States with significant nuclear programmes adhere to the NPT. Their willingness to do so and the commitment of the parties to the Treaty will be decisive in the work to successfully prepare for the NPT review conference in 1995 and to provide for the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Four of the five nuclear-weapon States are currently observing a temporary cessation of nuclear testing. Sweden urges all nuclear-weapon States to declare moratoria and to extend existing moratoria when they expire. It is to be hoped that this process could lead to an agreement in the near future on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The signing of the chemical weapons Convention in Paris last month was a historic event. I congratulate the Conference on Disarmament for having been instrumental in the process of reaching this agreement on a Convention which already has more than 130 signatories. The Convention on chemical weapons is an inspiration for the international community to achieve the same goal with regard to nuclear weapons.

Openness and transparency are fundamental confidence-building measures. One instrument in this respect is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established by the General Assembly in 1991. Sweden is now in the process of providing the information requested in the Register, and we hope that other countries will follow suit. Sweden will take an active part in the discussions in this and other forums to expand the scope of the United Nations Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and data as

regards military holdings and procurement. The General Assembly has requested that the Conference on Disarmament address the issue of destabilizing accumulations of arms, and elaborate practical means to increase transparency and openness in this field. These endeavours are one aspect of efforts at the United Nations to improve the reporting system for objective information on military matters. This task is relatively new for the CD, and the in-depth discussions which are required have been delayed considerably. I hope that these difficulties can be overcome and that a comprehensive report with proposals can be submitted to the next General Assembly.

The new opportunities for multilateral disarmament, arms control and security which are arising in a multipolar world will have to be explored further. The growing importance of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, shows that the international community can act jointly and with great responsibility. The meeting of the Security Council a year ago with the heads of State and government is clear evidence of the Council's political determination. This also applies to the United Nations Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", which clearly states that arms control and disarmament are integral aspects of peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building.

The various United Nations bodies must work effectively to support each other and promote progress in one of the most fundamental tasks of the United Nations: to enhance peace and security. The Security Council has ultimate responsibility for defining threats to international security and for trying to eliminate them. The General Assembly is a forum for normative discussions and resolutions. The United Nations Disarmament Commission is another instrument which should be used for a more focused debate, paving the way for substantive and conclusive discussions in the CD, and also for formal negotiations.

The Conference on Disarmament is now in the fourth decade of its existence. It is a child of the cold war, reflecting in its agenda and the composition of its membership the bipolar structure of a world that now is history. The CD was created to respond to the need for a multilateral negotiating body in a security environment created by two opposing military alliances. Its agenda was a reflection of the security concerns which prevailed at the time. Even the composition of the CD was determined by the realities of a bipolar world and this also applied to working methods, decision-making and group structures. The political changes of recent years and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact provide new opportunities for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. We must not only adjust to new realities but also use our prerogative to shape our common future by achieving increased cooperation in the disarmament field.

During the last few years, the Conference's work has largely focused on negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons. Having accomplished this task, the CD must now devote its attention to other issues of substance. For the near future, I suggest that the CD concentrate its efforts on four main areas.

First, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be given the highest priority. A test ban is an essential step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. It is my understanding that the existing moratoria might develop into substantial negotiations on this issue. Efforts in the field of non-proliferation should also include transparency and control regarding transfers of nuclear technology and sensitive expertise, a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities and possibly other issues.

Secondly, intensified efforts are required to address the problems of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. Such efforts should include, <u>inter alia</u>, the exchange of information, and also control and restrictions on transfers of conventional arms.

Thirdly, in the new security environment, confidence-building measures are crucial for the maintenance of peace and stability. Such measures can be developed in many different areas - conventional and nuclear arms and outer space, for example.

Fourthly, it might also prove useful to initiate deliberations on regional security arrangements. Current and potential conflicts demonstrate that most security problems today are of a regional or local nature. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe I consider that one of my tasks is to try to develop the CSCE efforts in this area, concentrating on the new security forum in Vienna. The CD could serve as a forum for the exchange of information and experience in this field and it could try to find ways to promote regional security arrangements.

The composition of the CD does not correspond to the present political map. Today, there are more countries with observer status than there are members of this Conference. Evidently there is a great and growing interest amongst the nations of the world in taking part in multilateral negotiations on disarmament. The CD should respond to these developments. I wish to recall that Sweden has already suggested that the CD should be open to all States which have applied for membership.

The efficiency of the CD could be greatly improved by a modification of the consensus rule, at least as regards procedural matters. It is not reasonable that one country may use the consensus rule to prevent the Conference from considering an issue which an overwhelming majority of States wishes to address.

I note with satisfaction that, during this session, the CD has already decided to establish ad hoc committees in four important areas: a nuclear test ban, negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency in armaments. This I find very encouraging and it clearly demonstrates the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to go to work on important issues of substance without losing time in procedural debates.

Today, disarmament agreements have been concluded which it would have been impossible to imagine only a few years ago. Let the CD use the momentum thus created to achieve definitive progress and results on these major issues of disarmament and non-proliferation which I have just enumerated in the not too distant future. What seem to be distant possibilities today may be the realities of tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden on behalf of the Conference for her important statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, first of all, let me associate myself with the congratulations which previous speakers have addressed to you on your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The skill and courtesy with which you have led this body to agree on and adopt its 1993 agenda make us confident that the important business of the CD is in good and competent hands. You will have my delegation's total support and co-operation in your endeavours. With your permission, I would also like to express to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, our admiration and appreciation for his leadership and indefatigable efforts during his extended term of office. I would also like to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, and I am particularly honoured to be able to take the floor immediately following her. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome the distinguished representatives who have recently taken their posts at the Conference on Disarmament: Ambassador Juan Archibaldo Lanús of Argentina, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Satish Chandra of India, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden. I look forward to close and constructive co-operation with them all and with their delegations. The words of greetings and appreciation are also addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and his able staff, on whose dedication and expertise so much depends in this conference room.

In my intervention today it is my intention to comment only on some issues on whose consideration this body is expected to report to the Chairman of the First Committee at its reconvened session early next March. This approach, of course, is without prejudice to issues not addressed at this time. Poland has welcomed with satisfaction the far-sighted and timely report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". In our view it is an important and inspiring document. It succinctly explores the complex problems of broadly conceived international security in a world on the threshold of the twenty-first century. My delegation subscribes to many comments on the report which the previous speakers have already put on record.

The international security environment is at a crucial moment, with both opportunities and challenges ahead. The opportunities opened by the collapse of the communist system as well as the transition from confrontation to cooperation are now confirmed and enlarged by the unprecedented advances in

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

the area of arms control and disarmament, nuclear and conventional. The latest and most welcome manifestations are, of course, the bilateral strategic arms reduction Treaty (START II), signed in Moscow on 3 January, and the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons signed in Paris barely 10 days later by as many as 132 States.

These accords are truly landmark accomplishments. The first, by reducing the current levels of strategic offensive nuclear arms of Russia and the United States by two thirds and by providing for the elimination of all land-based multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, enhances stability and confidence between the two signatory Powers. The latter has established unmistakable and unequivocal international norms against a whole category of weapons of mass destruction.

This bright picture of mankind's sanity is brought into fuller relief by the growing universalization of the NPT, now adhered to by over 150 States, including all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Political consistency and the logic of survival call for the Treaty, any defects notwithstanding, to be upheld and indefinitely extended, without any conditions or linkage whatsoever. In my country's firm view, they also call for the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear States as soon as possible.

In the conventional field, the 1990 CFE Treaty has eloquently demonstrated that conventional disarmament is not off limits in Europe or, indeed, anywhere else.

So much on the side of opportunities. Challenges are less clear-cut or predictable. Paradoxically, in the common perception of international security the fast-receding threat of global nuclear conflagration is being replaced by growing instability and threats deriving from rampant nationalisms reviving in Europe and beyond. The fierce regional conflicts erupting over ethnic, religious, political, economic and a host of other issues is a time bomb that rivals any explosive device.

If the international community is to be prepared and able to face this new category of threats to world peace and security, new mechanisms and procedures to deal with them effectively must be developed and put in place urgently. In this connection, we have noted with interest the Secretary-General's reference in his report to "the larger network of international cooperative behaviour which is designed to safeguard the security of all nations". We also consider that the concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization applied to disarmament merit closer examination as promising approaches to developing a new, international cooperative security system.

As the Secretary-General's report makes amply clear, in that regard the role of regional and subregional organizations, in close cooperation with the United Nations system and its mechanisms, can hardly be overestimated. The CSCE process in Europe and its results over the years as regards

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

confidence-building represent a striking example of a regional approach whose broader relevance cannot escape anyone. In our view, any consideration of new mechanisms in the area of international peace and security would be found wanting without stress laid on the mutual interdependence of the existing framework: the General Assembly and the Security Council, the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and other international bodies, whether global or regional in scope. We are in full accord with the Secretary-General that the United Nations system and international organizations in general should play a more significant role also in respect of the globalization of disarmament.

To turn to more substantive business at hand, my delegation finds it heartening that the Conference on Disarmament - by adopting its agenda and programme of work for 1993 - has displayed a commendable meeting of minds with the Secretary-General who urged in his report that "efforts [should] be focused by the CD on well-defined and urgent issues". The Conference on Disarmament has complied. Given the existing and emerging new threats, the Conference's focus is unmistakably on weapons of mass destruction. nuclear-test-ban issue, where substantive progress, let alone solution, has eluded this body for years, now appears to stand a fair chance of productive consideration. Indeed, we believe that by building on past achievements referred to above, especially the START II accord, it should be possible to proceed with a constructive pace of work in the Ad Hoc Committee concerned. The current nuclear test moratoria put into effect by several nuclear Powers create a climate conducive to meaningful progress towards a comprehensive and early ban on nuclear testing. Efforts in this regard - and in nuclear disarmament in general - would obviously stand a better chance if the negotiating process could be enlarged to include all nuclear-weapon States.

In this connection, it is hardly possible to disagree with the Secretary-General that at a time when disarmament on a substantial scale is becoming a reality, there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to reach for and acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction. Yet, as we know, this warning is unfortunately not necessarily heeded. Given this fact the question of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - continues to be of paramount concern to the global community. If and when the recently signed CW Convention gains universal adherence and enters into force, mankind will be able to congratulate itself on an auspicious beginning. The Republic of Poland, for its part, is determined to spare no effort in order to bring that moment closer. To this end, Poland will proceed without undue delay to open the requisite process of ratification of the Convention. We are also prepared to make a fair and meaningful contribution to efforts aiming at the elaboration of equally comprehensive instruments to prevent the spread of weapons and technologies of mass destruction as well as relevant delivery technologies.

My delegation strongly believes that efforts to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ban them altogether should go hand in hand with the endeavours commenced only last year in respect of transparency in armaments and conventional disarmament. While transparency and openness in military matters  $\underline{per}$  are no substitute for concrete arms cuts, they are in

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

the view of the Secretary-General "crucially important as part of the process of building confidence". Measures in that regard, by alerting the international community to excessive concentrations of armaments going beyond legitimate defence needs, would facilitate timely preventive action.

The Conference on Disarmament needs to approach this agenda item with dedication and a sense of purpose. As the distinguished representative of the Netherlands observed earlier in his intervention, we are only at an initial stage of examination of the issues involved. In considering the interrelated questions of transparency in armaments, conventional disarmament and confidence-building, the Conference on Disarmament should bring to bear its negotiating expertise and live up to its standing as the single, multilateral disarmament negotiating body, a standing so remarkably reaffirmed by the successful conclusion of the CW Convention.

In point of fact, in our consideration of the ways of improving the effectiveness of this body, its negotiating character as well as the principle of consensus must be reasserted again and again. As an effective organ with a broad and clear mandate to negotiate concrete arms control and disarmament instruments whose time has come, it should not allow its attention to be diverted or specific expertise dissipated. The accumulated experience of the CD, so remarkably enriched in the CW Convention negotiating process, proves that the singleness of purpose and concentrated, painstaking international efforts, coupled with the political will of States, can yield concrete and meaningful results. The negotiating ability and potential which this organ can legitimately be proud of should therefore be cherished and preserved to be available to the international community when the time is right to elaborate specific instruments. It is therefore essential that the CD should concentrate its efforts on specific, attainable goals. should avoid spending too much of its precious time discussing broad issues of international security which in the foreseeable future cannot be translated into the language of legally binding international instruments.

As many speakers have indicated (thus confirming some of the conclusions which Ambassador Servais arrived at following his inter-sessional consultations), the time of change has come for the CD, at least as far as its composition is concerned. The Polish delegation is open and flexible in that regard, although we certainly do not favour an extreme approach. We feel that a judicious middle ground must be found between the negotiating effectiveness of the CD, on the one hand, and the legitimate aspirations of States to have a say on matters which affect their security interests and concerns, on the other hand. It is for this reason, therefore, that Poland would support accommodating those States which by their consistent, long-standing and constructive participation as observers have demonstrated that they can and are prepared to contribute to our common endeavours in the interests of peace and security for all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dembinski for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, let me first congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have unreserved confidence in your able leadership to bring us to a smooth take-off toward a hopefully productive and fruitful 1993 session. We pledge to you our full support and active cooperation in the discharge of your demanding task. May I also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, and thank him for his most valuable contribution to our work? Allow me as well to take this opportunity to join others in welcoming our new colleagues, Ambassador Lanús of Argentina, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Chandra of India, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Norberg of Sweden. I trust that they will bring with them new ideas which will help refresh the Conference on Disarmament.

Last August, towards the end of our 1992 session, my delegation made a rather comprehensive statement before this plenary forum, covering a number of issues of particular relevance to us. Therefore, in the interest of saving time, I shall do my best in trying to avoid a rerun, and instead confine myself to some issues which need to be addressed urgently. Nevertheless it would be less than appropriate not to seize this occasion to express the satisfaction of my Government at the encouraging developments registered most recently. Here, I would like to refer in particular to the landmark signing of the chemical weapons Convention and the welcome conclusion of the START II agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

As a country which has for so long been firmly committed to the prohibition of such abhorrent weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons, Indonesia was proud to join more than 100 other countries in Paris to become the original signatories of the chemical weapons Convention. It is our sincere hope that, once it enters into force, the chemical weapons Convention will not only help alleviate human suffering in the event of war, but also facilitate development cooperation among nations in time of peace. We are looking forward to a fruitful session of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague next week.

With regard to the conclusion of the START II agreement, we congratulate and appreciate the two protagonists, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, for their very important achievement. It is obvious that the substantial reduction of strategic offensive weapons from the nuclear arsenal of the two countries is bound to have a positive impact on world peace and international security. My delegation only hopes that all the parties concerned in the agreement will spare no effort in making the entry into effect of this important agreement, together with its precursor - START I, concluded in July 1991 - a reality.

Let me now turn to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", by expressing at the outset our most sincere appreciation for this timely and pertinent initiative. We see merit in the suggestion of the Secretary-General that, because of the profoundly changing international

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

environment, many of the tasks and methods pertaining to disarmament used by the international community in the past should be reviewed and reformed. In this context, we note with keen interest his general idea on the "new dimensions" laid down around the three concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization. The following are our brief comments on each of these concepts.

With regard to the concept of integration, my delegation finds itself in general agreement with the basic premise that the process of global disarmament should be closely coordinated with efforts in other fields and should be part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour such as peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. However, we have to admit that, conceptually, it is still unclear to us how specific arms limitation or disarmament measures integrated into particular peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building operations in given countries could be generated and globalized toward the objective of general and complete disarmament, so as to safeguard the security of all nations, as intended by the concept itself. On the question of the use of disarmament measures in the enforcement of peace, we share the fervent hope of the Secretary-General that the global community will not have to witness again the same circumstances upon which the idea was developed. This means that we would prefer a suggestion to prevent such circumstances from recurring.

Another aspect in the concept of integration, as suggested by the Secretary-General, with which we find ourselves in agreement is the correlation between disarmament measures and economic conditions. However, on this matter, while we do not challenge the validity of the conclusion drawn in the report on the short-term costs of disarmament, we would have wished to be presented with an analysis of the longer-term gains of disarmament as well. In the broader context, we believe it would be useful to revisit the old concept of the linkage between disarmament and development, this time against a new and more complex backdrop in which security can no longer be defined solely in military terms but should also embrace economic and social factors.

On the concept of globalization, my delegation is gratified to note the reiteration in the report of the goal to extend disarmament efforts to include not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral arrangements in a worldwide process involving all States. However, unlike the Secretary-General, we still believe that the major military Powers should disarm more, if not first, for the simple reason that they have indeed more to disarm.

As to the regional approach to security, we are of the view that security problems which are region-specific are best addressed within an appropriate regional context. Such efforts could be realized <a href="inter-alia">inter-alia</a> through confidence-building measures, balanced security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces, and the elimination of destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances. We learned from experience that regional dialogues on security and cooperation could be very helpful in this regard. In sum, we do believe that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

Turning to the concept of revitalization, we only hope that the substantial achievements, in nuclear disarmament listed in the report will serve as an encouragement to build upon rather than a brake on further endeavours. In this post-cold-war era, the goal set by the international community for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains valid. In this context, we agree with the Secretary-General that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would be a significant step leading to that goal. With regard to the question of proliferation control we are looking forward to the non-proliferation Treaty review conference in 1995, which should provide an opportunity to redress the existing inequities and asymmetries. In this regard, the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to fulfil their solemn obligations will help ensure the success of the Treaty's extension.

My delegation shares the view that international security and stability would be greatly enhanced by increased openness and transparency in the military field, particularly in the area of arms transfers. In this connection the register of such transfers should be comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory and implemented in such a way as to facilitate input from all States. We also believe that meaningful progress in the whole exercise remains doubtful unless the pervasive role of the arms industry and the military establishment as well as the producers and suppliers of arms is taken into full account.

By the same token, our attention should be focused on enhancing the United Nations role to become the repository of objective data, primarily through the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on military matters. In line with the emerging trend toward greater openness in the military field, the establishment of a satellite communications system under the auspices of the United Nations would be particularly useful to compile data on armed forces and armaments production, military research and development, arms transfers, etc., all of which would make a significant contribution to confidence-building, remove apprehension and ultimately facilitate the process of disarmament in general.

Finally, with respect to the question of new machinery, to be honest we have been unable to find any really new proposal in the report. It seems that the Secretary-General considers it still appropriate to maintain the current basic institutional triad composed of the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, my delegation cannot agree more with him on the need to strengthen coordination amongst those three bodies. In the light of the broadening notion of security and disarmament, we would even venture to suggest the opening of inter-institutional channels of relationship with other bodies and organizations considered relevant to the context of the new dimensions. In this connection, however, while we see the logic in the Secretary-General's proposal for greater involvement by the Security Council in disarmament, in particular where the enforcement of non-proliferation is concerned, we feel it is absolutely essential to ensure that this body strictly conforms to its mandate as defined in the Charter, and avoids any

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

possible encroachment into the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the General Assembly concerning the formulation of principles governing disarmament and arms regulation.

On the other hand, we support the Secretary-General's view on the need for the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament to review in a comprehensive manner their structures as well as their work methods and practices, so as to be able to address disarmament problems promptly, flexibly and efficiently. We are encouraged to note that efforts along these lines are currently under way within these three bodies. This brings me to our own efforts in enhancing the effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament.

On this particular subject, without in any way prejudging the work currently undertaken under the leadership of the two most distinguished Friends of the President, we would like at this point to say the following few words. Firstly, on the question of the agenda, while standing ready to discuss its possible rationalization, my delegation remains convinced of the primacy of the nuclear items on the agenda. We would like to take this opportunity to stress the great importance that the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries continue to attach to the nuclear disarmament mandate of the Conference on Disarmament. Secondly, as regards the issue of membership, at this juncture we only wish to recall the general principle re-emphasized in the last non-aligned summit in Jakarta on the right and duty of all States to participate in multilateral efforts on disarmament on the basis of equality and mutual benefit in order to promote universal adherence. Thirdly and lastly, with respect to the Secretary-General's proposal to give a function to the Conference on Disarmament as a "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements", unless the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is made open-ended, we foresee practical problems of participation, since not all members of the Conference on Disarmament are parties to all existing agreements and vice versa.

Now to conclude, in facing the changing international environment, it is indeed our common concern and collective duty to review, readjust and, if necessary, restructure the existing international disarmament and arms control mechanism. But we should always keep in mind not to put the cart before the horse by doing this to the detriment of our work on substantive issues. After all, in the final analysis, important as it may be, a strengthened mechanism remains just a means to achieve the real goal, which is the substantive objective to which we all aspire.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

# (continued in Spanish)

I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Lanús.

Mr. LANUS (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As I make my first substantive statement as the head of the delegation of my country to the Conference on Disarmament, I do so under the presidency of Brazil in the person of a distinguished representative of the best diplomatic tradition of Itamaraty, you, Ambassador Celso Amorim. To my personal satisfaction and that of my delegation is added the satisfaction of being able to put on record once again before the plenary of this Conference the great importance Argentina attaches to the harmonization of its nuclear policy with Brazil. surprisingly short period of time, and thanks to the active support of other Latin American countries, this has allowed us to firmly commit our region to the non-proliferation endeavour. Today Latin America, thanks to accession to the chemical weapons Convention on a large scale and the forthcoming full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is on the verge of becoming the first densely populated region of the world to be absolutely and verifiably free from any kind of weapon of mass destruction. You yourself, Mr. Ambassador, have been one of the architects of this state of affairs, and so I am happy to be able to share these thoughts before the plenary of the Conference under your presidency.

I could not at this juncture fail to mention Ambassador Michel Servais, of Belgium, who not only skilfully brought the Conference to a close in 1992 but also, during the inter-sessional period, fully discharged the task we entrusted to him, along with you and the Secretary-General of the Conference, of beginning consultations aimed at solving such key questions for the functioning of our body as its expansion and the transformation of its agenda. We also most warmly welcome the new ambassadors and heads of delegation who recently joined the Conference. We wish their predecessors success in their new responsibilities.

The purpose of my statement this morning is to express my country's views on the recent report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7). These will not only reflect the specific analysis of the Secretary-General's document but will also set forth some more general considerations relating to the work of the multilateral disarmament machinery in the closing stages of the twentieth century following the end of a crucial period of contemporary history. Firstly, I must say that the Secretary-General's report is a timely document. I believe it is useful for the Secretary-General to reflect on the types of body we need in the field of disarmament and security in order to deal with the challenges of this new era, and especially I think it is necessary for the Member States of the United Nations to bring our ideas closer together as the true guiding forces of the process. I shall attempt to set out our ideas in a systematic fashion.

Firstly, any analysis of the present machinery and institutions in the field of disarmament must have as a starting-point the recognition of the need to preserve the primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context, the presence of a negotiating forum of limited composition (though adapted in its membership to the present dimensions of the international community) is and continues to be necessary. Regional arrangements, which are of undoubted and growing importance, constitute a

(<u>Mr. Lanús, Argentina</u>)

necessary complement to a multilateral organ in which all the regions of the globe are represented. Though today we congratulate ourselves on the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention, we must also realize that without a multilateral organ like the Conference its scope, the number of signatories and its usefulness as an instrument for the establishment of a new order characterized by peace and stability would have been simply impossible.

Secondly, we agree with the Secretary-General when he states that the Conference should address well-defined issues. This is something that brooks no procrastination, especially when we see that items of indisputable importance still await more specific and systematic consideration by the Conference. In our opinion, the Conference has an irreplaceable role to play in such areas as the prohibition of nuclear tests, transparency in armaments, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and non-proliferation, an item on which we have taken but a few timid steps and which requires the inputs that can be made from here and the bodies that are traditionally responsible in this area.

Regrettably, conventional disarmament is still not a feature of our deliberations in the Conference. The concrete and well-defined issues are at hand. All we require now is to take the necessary decisions to address them, without prejudice to other questions mentioned by the Secretary-General in his report, such as conversion, which he correctly defines as a "post-disarmament issue". Perhaps this type of issue, important but not urgent, could profitably be taken up by the Disarmament Commission in order to embark on an analysis of what we could do at the multilateral level in this respect.

Thirdly, the existing machinery is in our view adequate. It is true, as pointed out by the Secretary-General, that it was designed at the time of the cold war. The reassessment he proposes is a useful exercise provided that we recognize that it is first and foremost the political decision-makers and their attitudes that must change rather than the institutions that will serve as a channel for them. The family of institutions with a role to play in disarmament affairs provides an adequate balance between bodies responsible for negotiation (the CD), deliberation (the First Committee of the General Assembly) and pre-negotiation or analysis (the Disarmament Commission). The Conference is a negotiating forum; its rule of procedure are simple and flexible and have very recently stood the most severe test of their efficiency and adaptability by providing us with a satisfactory framework to negotiate an agreement of the complexity and scope of the chemical weapons The United Nations Disarmament Commission has already begun a Convention. reorganization and consolidation exercise and the first results are beginning to appear, as exemplified by the guidelines on confidence-building measures, verification and other important contributions which the United Nations has produced recently. The First Committee is finally moving towards rationalization, as the last session of the General Assembly clearly proved. We believe, however, that this process should be strengthened; the number of resolutions must reflect concrete security concerns rather than concepts of lesser interest whose final purpose is sometimes not clear.

(Mr. Lanús, Argentina)

Fourthly, we share the Secretary-General's view regarding the enhancement of the role of the Security Council in disarmament matters, most especially in the area of non-proliferation. The reference to this in the Convention on chemical weapons is an example of how we can gradually involve the Security Council in multilateral instruments so as to ensure effective compliance.

Fifthly, we must record our doubts about the idea expressed in the report of turning the Conference into a "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements" - I quote the Secretary-General's words. Our understanding is that the CD is a negotiating body and not a review and/or supervisory body. Moreover, multilateral agreements and their review are matters for the States parties to these agreements and, as is well known, the Conference is an organ of limited membership, so that there are objective differences in the membership of treaties with over 100 parties, such as the NPT or the chemical weapons Conventions, and the Conference on Disarmament.

Sixthly, as far as our Conference is concerned, we are engaged in a thoroughgoing analysis of its functioning, including the questions of its agenda and composition. In the area of composition Argentina believes that its enlargement cannot be delayed any longer. We agree with those who believe that the present membership of the CD reflects a political/military balance specific to the cold war and that this structure has been superseded by This is becoming increasingly evident in terms of the dynamics of the functional groups in to which the Conference is divided. However, as far as the more immediate problem of the number of members is concerned, we must come to grips with the problem from a practical and expeditious standpoint. embark on an exercise to define "parameters of eligibility" we will probably never reach agreement. Hence it is advisable that concrete proposals should be drawn up, perhaps by the Special Coordinator, my distinguished neighbour the Ambassador of Australia, putting forward alternatives including a generous number of States and preserving the limited character which any negotiating body should have, while giving satisfaction to all those - and there are not so many - who for years have shown a real wish to participate and a specific ability to make useful contributions to the strengthening of peace and stability through multilateral disarmament agreements. If an international community of 160 members was adequately mirrored in a CD of 40 States, we consider that with almost 180 members in the General Assembly, the Conference could well expand its membership without this entailing an opening up to all comers which would ultimately redefine the very foundations of the Conference - a move that would perhaps require a decision taken by the full General Assembly.

Finally, I should like to refer to the question of the agenda, which is undoubtedly more difficult. For the time being we accept the inevitability of working with an agenda which in my view is a little diffuse and includes items that are obsolete or are too broad to lend themselves to negotiation. Here and elsewhere Argentina has expressed its conviction that it does not make sense to continue mechanically to include in the CD's agenda items which had a logical place in the world of East-West confrontation when the threat of

(Mr. Lanús, Argentina)

nuclear war was real and the nuclear arms race a fact. Today all this has changed. No one with a modicum of intellectual honestly can deny it. To insist on items which are known in advance to be rhetorical and doomed to verbal jousting is to trivialize this body and, what is worse, to jeopardize its continuity, not to mention its leading role confirmed by the successful chemical weapons negotiations.

Argentina considers that the sole multilateral body for disarmament negotiations is too important to be turned into a battleground for polemics, a debating club or the venue for activities closer to academic seminars than to genuine disarmament negotiations. We are here for something more important. Let us demonstrate, as we did in the chemical weapons negotiations, that we are capable of making a contribution commensurate with this lofty responsibility.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Lanús of Argentina for his statement and for his warm and friendly remarks addressed to myself and my country. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We share the pleasure expressed earlier by other speakers at seeing you preside over the work of this Conference with the intelligence and careful judgement characteristic of the delegation of Brazil in this body. We appreciate the assistance you gave to your predecessor Ambassador Servais of Belgium during the process of inter-sessional consultations on the important issues of the agenda and composition of the Conference on Disarmament and we also wish to state clearly for the record how grateful we are for the untiring and enthusiastic efforts made by your predecessor during the time he bore such a complex responsibility. We are honoured by the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden this morning. We listened carefully to her statement. cannot neglect this opportunity to convey gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Vicente Berasategui, for his contributions to our daily work, or to say how highly we appreciate the distinguished work done by Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his team during the work that culminated in the conclusion of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. offer greetings which Ambassador Pérez Novoa will duly echo to his colleagues who have recently joined this body. We assure both you and them of the readiness of the Cuban delegation to offer its full cooperation. To those who have left us, we express the most sincere wishes for personal happiness and professional success.

Sir, you have invited us to comment on the Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C1/47/7), which refers to the need to review and reshape the tasks and the methods used up to the present in the sphere of disarmament, bearing in mind that with the end of the cold war and the East-West confrontation, there has been a radical change in international circumstances.

The pursuit of perfection has been a spur to mankind from ancestral times and goes a long way towards explaining many of the advantages enjoyed by

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

present-day civilization. Haste and improvisation have caused many of its set-backs. The basic premise to tackle this undertaking derives from awareness of the need for a calm and collective review of the prevailing rules in order to identify those which can be improved and those which remain valid. The phenomena cited by the Secretary-General in his report and other current events affect each of the regions of the globe differently, without our being able to assess their full impact for the moment. Nevertheless, and perhaps precisely for that reason, the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which have been helping to set priorities in disarmament matters, are still fully valid as far as our delegation is concerned, not merely as a guideline for action, but as guarantees that no set of interests will be given greater weight than any other. The report of the Secretary-General has triggered a process of reflection which, because of its scope, cannot but embrace the international community as a whole and culminate in multilaterally negotiated agreements. Preferably it should be the General Assembly which, in the light of the present situation, spells out the future ramifications of disarmament issues and decides on possible adjustments to the multilateral machinery.

The process of disarmament and arms limitation must enjoy the highest priority multilaterally. Even in the new circumstances there is justification for the existence and build-up of excessive quantities of nuclear and other weapons in the stockpiles of certain States. The importance of bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements should not be undermined by the process whereby the accuracy and effectiveness of these weapons are enhanced, nor by the existence and development of weapons for rapid large-scale attacks deep into the territory of third countries. Our delegation is persuaded that one of the best contributions that the multilateral body can make to the cause of disarmament, peace and security in the world is to promote the adoption in each State of a purely defensive military doctrine and structure.

While disarmament is different in substance from arms control, both stand at a distance from the problems involved in activities for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter which, with its full application, sets the scene for implementation in each of these areas of competence of the United Nations. It is essential for the benefit of all, and particularly for the credibility of the world organization, that in discharging its obligations in one sphere or another it should demonstrate the greatest possible respect for the sovereignty of all its members, refraining from the use or the threat of force, just as it should not allow attacks on territorial integrity or the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It must be stated that disarmament measures adopted as a result of peace-keeping operations are generally unilateral or limited in nature, whether they are imposed or negotiated, but in those instances only the parties concerned in the conflict are involved. Disarmament measures adopted as a result of a multilateral negotiating process tend to reflect the sovereign desire of the participants in them to eliminate or limit a type or a set of weapons' systems. In no way can the negotiating process be imposed by any United Nations body.

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

The disarmament and arms limitation process has its own momentum and must retain its independence in organization without neglecting the relationship between this process and others under way in international relations as a whole, as in the interrelationship between peace, disarmament and development. It is clear that there is a need for joint deliberation in order to achieve a common understanding about ideas put forward in the Secretary-General's document, including integration, globalization, revitalization and others. As the delegation of Mexico stated in the last plenary, we consider that the priorities set forth in the 1978 Final Document remain and that the conclusions set out in the Declaration adopted that year also remain valid. This does not exclude the possibility of identifying specific areas within those priorities on which to focus our efforts now, to help the Conference on Disarmament to achieve new results, particularly as the priorities laid down do not prevent the parallel analysis of any question seemed appropriate. Negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament must be carried out at every level, bilateral, multilateral and the two avenues of work should mutually and appropriately complement one another. In this process, the complete prohibition of testing must remain the top priority, and as long as talks are continuing in this field, all the nuclear Powers must adopt indefinite moratoriums on testing.

Non-proliferation is a pressing issue in the matter of nuclear weapons. In its broadest and non-discriminatory interpretation the concept could also be extended to certain sorts of conventional weapons, particularly those that can facilitate large-scale offensive operations. We agree that there is a need to eliminate the controversial aspects associated with the current non-proliferation regime to make it acceptable for those countries that are not party to it. The universality of the regime depends largely on the guarantee it offers that nuclear weapons will be eliminated in the shortest possible time scale.

It is not only the Conference on Disarmament, whose adjustment to the new circumstances is the matter before us today, which is a child of the past. There are other bodies within the United Nations system that are even more out of step with the present circumstances. If we are wearing ourselves out with conjectures about the best way to reflect the state of the world as it is today in the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, what can we say about the membership of the Security Council, which the Secretary-General suggests should play a greater role in the sphere of disarmament? Democratization, involving the developing South, is a prerequisite for thinking about expanding the powers of that body, whose role in the maintenance of international peace and security is clearly set forth in the United Nations Charter, although we might say in passing that it does not include interference in the internal affairs of States.

The issue of transparency in international arms transfers is of particular importance, but if we analyse this problem without addressing the problem of the production and storage of weaponry, military research and development activities, among other issues, we will overlook the main arms producers, who are also those who possess military power which substantially

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

exceeds their own defence needs. Consequently, it is not only essential to put into practice the Register of Conventional Arms, but also to guarantee that it will be duly extended in the immediate future as stipulated in the United Nations resolution on the subject.

It is true that once existing disarmament agreements are implemented and others are concluded, the job of conversion will be a new dimension to which efforts will have to be channelled. Meanwhile there are other challenges we will have to meet, most important among which to our mind is the need to take advantage of the favourable circumstances provided by the end of the cold war so as to finalize the work that the international community had assigned itself in the matter of disarmament. Examples are the conclusion of a treaty for the complete suspension of nuclear testing and the remaining negotiations on weapons of mass destruction. Thus it is doubly necessary to preserve the present institutional mechanisms on disarmament and their specific functions. The reasons for the lack of progress in this sphere do not lie with them but in reasons underpinning the negotiating stance of some nations. The Conference on Disarmament should continue functioning as the only multilateral negotiating body and it is for that very reason that the process of self-examination in which we are now absorbed is aimed at enhancing its effectiveness. We also consider that the United Nations not only can but must continue to occupy a prominent position in matters of disarmament. Hence, in order that there should be a proper correspondence between the objectives to be attained and the measures to achieve this, we feel like other delegations that the Department for Disarmament Affairs should be properly prepared to tackle the tasks that await it.

Mr. President, we do not wish to end without thanking you for designating the special coordinators on the agenda and composition of the Conference on Disarmament. In the next few days we shall take part in the discussions that will be held for those purposes. We are sure that under the leadership of the experienced Ambassadors Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico and Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, we shall shortly be able to take the first steps towards solving these complex issues which we will address at a subsequent plenary meeting.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and the kind words addressed to myself and my country.

# (continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): First of all I would like to join in the welcome expressed to new colleagues who have taken up their duties here amongst us since I last spoke in plenary. That was on 19 January and since that day a new President of the United States has been sworn in, the forty-second such peaceful transfer of power in the history of our Republic. During his campaign, President Clinton stressed his commitment to the interrelated goals of international peace and security. Arms control and disarmament are important components of that overall objective and, as the

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

successful completion of the chemical weapons Convention has demonstrated, the Conference on Disarmament has played an important role. As the new United States Administration proceeds to focus its energies on security and arms control problems, my delegation will have more to say on specific issues, particularly as they relate to this body.

Mr. President, my delegation is pleased that the Conference has been able to get down to work so quickly, for which we commend you. We look forward to the substantive work ahead of us and welcome the establishment of a new Ad Hoc Committee on the important subject of transparency in armaments.

Today, I would like to make some general comments on the reports the CD has been asked to provide on the occasion of the resumed session of General Assembly First Committee, namely a status report on the CD, and a report containing CD views on the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulations and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". First, we believe that, to be of any use, these reports should reflect this Conference's consensus. A compilation of differing, and perhaps opposing national views would provide nothing beyond views that will be provided anyway. concerning the CD status report, we believe it fully appropriate that the Conference on Disarmament, in the post-CWC and post-cold-war environment, is engaged in a self-examination. We welcome these reflections, as discussions continue, we intend to provide additional comments. As a multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the CD continues to be important, whether it is negotiating or seriously considering important issues. In our review of the CD we should look to how it can best be used to continue to serve the overall interests of the international community.

While the United States welcomes this wide-ranging review, we stand by the fundamental rules which guide us in conducting business. The CD works by consensus, thus providing a mechanism to protect vital national security interests, and which also serves to enhance the universal appeal of our products. Further, the CD is an autonomous body, with its own rules of procedure, working methods and decision-making authority. While we may welcome suggestions from elsewhere to focus our efforts, and may agree to follow up issues that have been commended to our attention, the decisions are ours to make.

The CD agenda should be reviewing in a realistic and pragmatic way. The agenda should reflect the move away from cold war rhetoric and old thinking. The world has witnessed much recent progress in arms control and disarmament, particularly in the nuclear arena. In our view, an enhanced focus on regional disarmament questions and such items as global confidence-building measures would be timely. The CD should tackle such topics as are "ready" for consideration, however, modest they may be.

The CD has long been seized with the question of membership expansion. The United States joined an earlier consensus for a limited expansion in the CD membership. The United States continues to support a limited expansion which would be reflective of new realities and requirements. In our view an

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

open-ended membership would not reflect realities and would impact detrimentally on CD autonomy, the rule of consensus, and thus our ability to make significant progress. The United States understands the desire of many to join the CD and are sympathetic to their interests. For this reason, we have fully supported participation in many of the CD activities by non-member participant States.

The CD has been asked to report to the resumed session on its review. It is obviously our choice what and how to report. The extent to which the CD has reached consensus decisions on important questions could be included. While our review and decision-making should not be dictated by the timing of the resumed session of the First Committee, we welcome the opportunity to provide such information. The session provides a useful impetus to the CD itself in tackling the difficult questions before us.

Turning to the Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions", I think we all agree with its timeliness as the world has recently undergone dramatic changes. International security has been enhanced by these changes, as well as by significant progress in disarmament and arms control. At the same time, we are witnessing increasing instability and insecurity in certain regions of the world. Inasmuch as disarmament is an element in pursuit and maintenance of security, it stands to reason that the disarmament agenda should be influenced by the changes in the international and regional security scenes. Indeed, the old cold war disarmament agenda no longer holds the same relevance to the emerging real-world security concerns. The world has changed; the new agenda has to change with it.

Secretary-General Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called for a "new agenda"; and this call has been endorsed by many, including the United States. He has recognized that the new global situation demands a new approach. The United States generally endorses his "New dimensions" report and welcomes it as a move toward a more realistic approach to security and arms control concerns. We hope that the resumed session will reflect a general endorsement of this by all United Nations Member States.

Specifically, we agree with the observations in that report that the time has come for an integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. Disarmament has never been an objective in isolation, but rather an element in securing peace, stability and security. Secondly, we agree the time has come for a globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament, which requires appropriate engagement of all States, not in dictating steps to others but in undertaking practical disarmament measures themselves. Indeed, the so-called super-Powers have responded to the injunction to take the lead; and, for a variety of reasons, the world is a very different place. The time has come for others to take appropriate steps as well. Thirdly, we agree the time has come to recognize the achievements to date in arms control and disarmament: achievements to be built upon and revitalized, as required. In this context, the United States welcomes the Preparatory Committee meetings which begin next week and the overall implementation of the chemical weapons Convention. We stress the need to give increasing emphasis to the overall problem of

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

non-proliferation in all its aspects and support the endeavours under way in appropriate forums in pursuit of this objective. We fully endorse the Secretary-General's call for universal adherence to the NPT, and for its unconditional and indefinite extension in 1995. We call on all States to provide data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms this April and endorse efforts to stem the destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons. We will support other appropriate efforts to encourage transparency and openness in military matters, including the development of confidence-building measures with specific regional applications. And finally we support appropriate regional efforts designed to redress tensions and insecurity in those areas, such as those under way in the Middle East peace process and in Europe.

The question of disarmament machinery is also addressed in the United Nations Secretary-General's "New dimensions" report. We support the notion of a "coordinated system" as identified in the report involving various elements dealing with arms control and disarmament issues. Coordination does not require establishment of some new overall umbrella disarmament organization; rather we should seek better rationalization of the work of these various elements. Disarmament machinery, including United Nations machinery, in our view, should be organized to meet realistic substantive objectives and needs. Such needs should be clearly identified prior to any premature tinkering with machinery. The challenge we now face is to seek a better understanding of the post-cold-war international security situation and its attendant arms control dimension. In examining specific elements of global disarmament machinery, we note the following.

Firstly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission has already taken welcome reform decisions and is now in the process of trying them out. experience is needed for an effective evaluation of its continued usefulness, as our Argentine colleague has pointed out. Secondly, as noted the Conference on Disarmament is an autonomous body, and master of its own fate. It is currently engaged in a self-generated review. The larger picture of how its work can be more effectively integrated into the overall multilateral disarmament machinery will have to be considered by the CD in this process. Thirdly, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee itself has all successfully initiated reform efforts over the past four years. A detailed review of its own agenda and work methods in light of these reforms might be an area to focus on in the resumed session. We will have a few suggestions in this context. And finally, the resumed session might also look into the status of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). We think that efforts could usefully be undertaken towards enhanced support for the Office within existing resources. It should be equipped to implement effectively the important responsibilities with which it has been charged.

These are just a few preliminary thoughts of the United States as we all prepare for the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee. We intend to provide our national views to the United Nations Secretary-General, as requested, and wish to contribute constructively to a consensus report by the CD to the resumed session.

Mr. BARBUDA (Brazil): Mr. President, first of all allow me to join all the previous speakers and personally congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament.

My comments at this plenary session are addressed to the report by the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of disarmament and arms regulation in the post-cold-war era". In the first place the delegation of Brazil values this document because it expresses the authoritative views of a privileged observer of today's international scene. We also keep in mind the serious responsibilities of the Secretary-General in dealing with matters of crucial interest to mankind.

The report has already awakened the attention of many, for it covers a wide range of issues of concern both to the international community and to each individual State. Therefore, it requires careful consideration, before decisions can be taken. This exercise is a timely and useful one. My delegation is prepared to join the others in a collective reflection on the relevant elements contained in the report, including the future of the disarmament machinery. We will then be ready to formulate proposals to be eventually taken up for decision at the appropriate forum. For this purpose, we would like to put forward some comments on specific aspects of the report.

One of the assumptions of the document is that new conditions are present in the world after the end of the cold war, which, in spite of new threats and challenges, make it possible to build an international system capable of guaranteeing peace and security, at a minimum level of armaments. The report states that in order to achieve this objective the current challenges must be overcome through concerted action and broad participation of all States. In this sense, it is suggested that the concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization should guide the efforts towards disarmament and those related to international security.

The concept of integration suggests that the disarmament measures should be associated with other measures in the economic and political fields, for the promotion of peace and international security. This line of thought is surely well taken. But we hesitate to accept that integration should also apply to the organizational framework of disarmament, in the sense suggested by the Secretary-General. This idea should be further developed and clarified before we accept to deal with disarmament matters in a different framework. As the delegation of Brazil stated in the First Committee of the General Assembly, "disarmament involves fundamental national security issues and complex technical aspects which have to be carefully negotiated .... Disarmament also requires a specialized machinery, both for the negotiating phase as well as for the implementation phase .... The process of disarmament and techniques used in the context of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace enforcement should never be confused."

The concept of globalization refers to the need for all States to be involved in the efforts towards disarmament through actions concerted

multilaterally. Addressing this subject, the Secretary-General mentions the fact that the reductions in nuclear weapons that have taken place until now

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

have been achieved either through bilateral agreements or by unilateral initiatives. While recognizing the importance of these bilateral and unilateral measures, we are not prepared to accept a role of mere spectators for the international community as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. As is known, the Brazilian Government has always held the view that nuclear disarmament, a matter that concerns the whole of mankind, is too important to have its consideration left solely to the nuclear Powers. The multilateral treatment of issues related to nuclear disarmament remains a priority in the field of disarmament. The international community should, on the other hand, constantly remind the nuclear Powers of their special responsibility in this context.

Finally, the concept of revitalization addresses the need of making full use of and further improving the existing instruments in the field of disarmament. The Secretary-General proposes a new system of international security, capable of dealing with the "new dimensions of insecurity". To be effective this system should be able, as stated in the report, "to instil sufficient confidence in the States to assure them that they no longer need abundant weaponry". The concepts presented under this section of the report need further clarification, and I would like to stress that the implementation of the proposed system would possibly require the strengthening and complementation of existing agreements. This might well be a complex task.

One of the questions mentioned by the Secretary-General that raises more worries in today's world is the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the related technologies. The Brazilian Government wholly shares the concerns of the vast majority of countries regarding this issue. On our side, we took important non-proliferation measures, widely known, and which I will not enumerate now. With respect to the international dimension of this problem, we do not think that the strengthening of the existing non-proliferation regimes would suffice. Some of the existing guidelines in this area still represent undue restrictions on the right of the developing countries to access to the so-called sensitive technologies for peaceful uses. Conscious of the complexity of this question, and willing to contribute in a constructive way to its consideration, the Brazilian Government presented at the UNDC the idea of establishing an international regime for the control of transfers of dual-use technologies. Such a regime assumes that technology in itself is neutral and that what varies are the ends to which it is applied. It would consist of multilaterally agreed, binding, verifiable and non-discriminatory instruments. It would not hamper transfers of dual-use high technology, but it would, through appropriate verification mechanisms, ensure they are employed exclusively to peaceful ends. It is our understanding that such a regime can provide the international community with increased security and effectively deter potential proliferators.

Recent events have shown insufficiencies in the NPT regime, which demonstrates that one treaty alone cannot guarantee non-proliferation. None the less this international instrument is considered in the report of

the Secretary-General as an essential pillar of the non-proliferation system. It is pertinent here to recall that, in this instrument, the renunciation of nuclear weapons on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States is not balanced

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

by a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States towards the elimination of such weapons. In other words, the NPT, while trying to avert horizontal proliferation, does not address, in an effective way, vertical proliferation.

Though we are not a party to the NPT, we hope that the 1995 review conference could provide the opportunity also for a reappraisal of the doctrinal foundations of the Treaty in order that it may reflect the realities of the post-cold-war era, in particular the circumstance that nuclear deterrence theories have lost their consistency. In this context, the conclusion of agreements banning nuclear tests and providing "negative security assurances" would be an appropriate corollary to the NPT, which would certainly turn the nuclear non-proliferation regime into a more balanced one. As to the role of the non-proliferation regime of the NPT, I would like to recall that the experience of my country shows that there are other effective means of ensuring non-proliferation.

Another threat to international peace and security mentioned by the Secretary-General in his report refers to the destabilizing accumulation of weapons in certain regions of the world. Here again we share the apprehensions of the Secretary-General. However, we should remark that out of the US\$ 1 trillion spent annually on armaments, 80 per cent corresponds to expenditure by the developed countries. On the other hand, the Secretary-General correctly observes that "production overcapacities and surplus equipment in industrialized States are now increasingly feeding arms markets in parts of the developing world". The Governments of the developed countries have a special responsibility in respect of the need to curb the arms trade and resist pressures from the military-industrial complex.

As regards the Register of Conventional Arms established by resolution 46/36 L, we fully support this initiative. We would like to see all relevant systems of armaments included in the Register, as recommended in that resolution. It must be reiterated that from our point of view also, transparency, though important, as it contributes to greater confidence among nations, is not an end in itself and cannot be conceived as a substitute for reduction in military expenditure.

Approaching the end of his report, the Secretary-General expresses his concerns about the resistance to conversion projects on the part of the arms industry. This resistance, as we all know, is likely to increase as the recession goes on in most parts of the world with unemployment having reached unacceptable levels. We also share this concern. Recent studies have indicated that conversion can be considered as an investment process. It implies sacrifices and more expenditure at the beginning but it pays in the longer run. Conversion initiatives should therefore be carried on in order that resources currently employed in the weapons industries be diverted to peaceful activities in the developed world and to economic and technological

cooperation directed to less favoured countries. Reallocation of resources to civil ends is a claim many times voiced in the United Nations. Conditions seem ripe now to translate this wish into reality.

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

With regard to the organizational framework of disarmament - a question to which the Secretary-General consecrates the final part of his report - the Brazilian Government maintains the view that the existing machinery (comprising basically the First Committee, the UNDC and the CD) should remain essentially as it is now. These bodies have distinct and complementary mandates, as well as different compositions and working methods. reference to the Conference on Disarmament, while acknowledging that some improvement in its working methods might be necessary, my delegation thinks that its role as the sole negotiating forum of the United Nations should in no way be diminished. We look forward to the results of consultations on the agenda and composition of the Conference, to be carried out by the special coordinators appointed by the President. In our view, however, a major step was already taken at the beginning of the present session when practical problems were solved and the Conference was put in a position to start soon substantive work on four agenda items expeditiously. As to the membership, my delegation is ready to consider a substantial increase, in order to accommodate as many interested candidates as possible, bearing in mind the need to preserve the efficiency of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating body. Another important aspect of this issue, in the light of the international reality, is the need to cope with concerns regarding balance not only among regions but also within each region.

As to the proposal for attributing to the CD the functions of a supervisory body over existing treaties, implicit in it seems to be the idea that the Conference should become an open-ended body, to which we do not agree. If, however, the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is to be kept limited, that proposal would be difficult to implement, since the composition of the CD would not correspond to that of the instruments it would supervise. Furthermore, disarmament treaties normally have their own review mechanisms, a fact that would raise problems of compatibility with the mechanisms to be established by the CD.

The final part of the report also contains one of the main proposals advocated by the Secretary-General, namely that for greater involvement of the Security Council in disarmament matters, in particular with regard to the enforcement of non-proliferation measures. Concerning this point, our understanding is that measures which result from multilaterally negotiated agreements should not be confused with measures which result from decisions that put an end to a conflict. Furthermore, any action by the Security Council must be fully backed by the Charter of the Organization and abide by the principles of international law.

To conclude with a general comment, I would like to say that the report of the Secretary-General contains interesting perceptions and proposals which can prove advantageous to the United Nations system once they have been developed and refined by the Member States in their collective deliberations.

On the other side, we do not believe that fundamental institutional changes are required in the field of disarmament in order to meet the present challenges. The progress in disarmament we expect in the near future can

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

be achieved through the existing machinery, provided there is sufficient political will on the part of the principal actors of the international system.

The PRESIDENT: I thank my colleague from Brazil for his statement. I can assure him that I will try to accommodate some of his views when I present the report to the Conference.

Before I turn to another subject, let me ask if there is any other speaker who wishes to take the floor at this stage. I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today a note by the President, appearing in document CD/WP.440, concerning requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. So far, no objection has been raised in connection with the communications attached to the note. This being the case, I suggest that we adopt the recommendation contained in the document directly in plenary, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for future occasions when an informal meeting may be necessary. May I take it that the Conference takes action as recommended?

# It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to announce that at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon, members of the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation in conference room I, adjacent to the Council Chamber, to continue our exchange of views on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". This is the meeting that was originally scheduled to take place immediately after this plenary session, which, in view of the late hour, I do not think it would be practical to have at this time. I wish also to announce that the non-members participating in the work of the Conference are invited to attend the consultation.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 11 February 1993, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.