



# Security Council

Fiftieth Year

## 3492<sup>nd</sup> Meeting

Wednesday, 18 January 1995, 10.30 a.m.

New York

*Provisional*


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<i>President:</i>	Mr. Cárdenas . . . . .	(Argentina)
<i>Members:</i>	Botswana . . . . .	Mr. Legwaila
	China . . . . .	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic . . . . .	Mr. Sporýš
	France . . . . .	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany . . . . .	Mr. Henze
	Honduras . . . . .	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia . . . . .	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy . . . . .	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria . . . . .	Mr. Gambari
	Oman . . . . .	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda . . . . .	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America . . . . .	Mrs. Albright

## Agenda

### An Agenda for Peace

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)

*The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.*

### **Expression of sympathy to the Government and people of Japan in connection with the recent earthquake**

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): At the outset of this meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Security Council, to extend deep sympathy to the Government and people of Japan in connection with the great tragedy it has experienced as a result of the major earthquake that has occurred in Western Japan. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Council in expressing profound shock and sorrow at the great loss of human life and extensive material damage suffered by Japan. I would request the representative of Japan to convey to his Government our grief and sincere condolences.

### **Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

### **An Agenda for Peace**

#### **Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)**

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): At this meeting, the Security Council begins consideration of document S/1995/1. It wishes to have the reaction of its members as well as the views of Member States of the United Nations in general. Bearing in mind today's debate, the Security Council will decide how best to continue consideration of this document.

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Butler (Australia), Mr. Reyn (Belgium), Mr. Valle (Brazil), Mr. Pashovski (Bulgaria), Mr. Fowler (Canada), Mr. Anderfo Garcia (Colombia), Mr. Elaraby (Egypt), Mr. Nathon (Hungary), Mr. Sreenivasan (India), Mr. Hayes (Ireland), Mr. Maruyama (Japan), Mr. Baumanis (Latvia), Mr. Muntasser (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Razali (Malaysia), Mr. Biegman (Netherlands), Mr. Keating (New Zealand), Mr. Bjorn Lian (Norway), Mr. Marker (Pakistan), Mr. Wlosowicz (Poland), Mr. Chirila (Romania), Mr. Bangura (Sierra Leone), Mr. Turk (Slovenia), Mr. Rodrigo (Sri Lanka), Mr. Batu (Turkey) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.*

**The President:** The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the document entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace; position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations", which has been published under the symbol S/1995/1.

The first speaker is the representative of the United Kingdom, on whom I now call.

**Sir David Hannay** (United Kingdom): It is a great honour to be the first to speak in a debate which it is clear from the length of the speakers' list is arousing a great deal of interest.

I should like to pay tribute to the Ambassador of France, who typified this last month as the sort of debate which we should have in open session before we get down to a serious discussion of the follow-up. I think it is very encouraging that there has been such a strong response and that the countries that will be speaking in this debate represent such a very broad cross-section of countries that have honourably contributed to United Nations peace-keeping over the years. It will be very important indeed to hear their views.

Just under three years ago, Mr. President, the British Prime Minister, John Major, sat where you now sit, and at the end of the first-ever Summit-level meeting of the Security Council, read out a Presidential statement that commissioned the report that has come to be known as

“An Agenda for Peace”. That report offered the United Nations a new vision of its role in international peace and security and a series of concepts, such as post-conflict peace-building, whose common usage today is witness to how far we have progressed in the last three years.

The position paper by the Secretary-General we are considering today updates the original “Agenda for Peace”. I should like to say at the outset that my Government warmly welcomes the paper. It is timely and important. It is timely, not only because of the United Nations fiftieth anniversary year, which has just begun, but because it is right, over two years after the publication of “An Agenda for Peace”, to reflect on the progress made and the distance that must still be travelled until the United Nations is as effective an organ for collective security as its founders hoped it would be. It is important because in the years since the publication of the first report the United Nations has faced increasing challenges, particularly in intra-State conflicts, and needs to learn both from its successes and its failures. It is important also because in this new paper the Secretary-General has offered a number of practical proposals to improve the United Nations performance in the light of that experience. My Government can wholeheartedly endorse many of those proposals, and does so in a manner complementary to what will be said on our behalf in this respect by the Ambassador of France, who will be speaking in the name of the European Union later in the debate.

The United Kingdom has long championed greater recourse by the United Nations to preventive action. More such action is taken now than was taken a few years ago, and the structure and practice of the Department of Political Affairs have evolved, in our view, in the right direction. But we believe the United Nations could still be more imaginative and more proactive. There should be greater coordination between the different parts of the United Nations system to identify potential crises, and a greater willingness to address such crises early, before they escalate into armed conflict. For our part, the British and French Governments have jointly expressed their willingness to provide for preventive missions’ equipment and personnel, ranging from the senior diplomatic figures mentioned by the Secretary-General in his paper to logistics experts and interpreters. We have already made illustrative lists of such people available to the Secretariat. I hope other Member States will follow our example and that the Secretariat will draw upon it and use it.

Preventing conflicts may be cheaper than resolving them after they break out, but, as the Secretary-General

notes, it is not cost-free. While we are not convinced of the case for a fixed sum contingency provision for preventive action in the regular budget, we would be willing to consider a small enlargement to the existing provision for unforeseen and extraordinary activities and for making it available for all preventive action and peacemaking. We could also consider greater use of voluntary contributions to finance longer term preventive missions. We are impressed by the value of small United Nations support missions of the sort the Secretary-General has deployed in Burundi, and believe that there will be further instances in which that model may usefully be followed.

Sadly, however, preventive action will not always be effective. There will continue to be a need for a substantial number of United Nations peace-keepers. And we agree with the Secretary-General that a clear line needs to be drawn between peace-keeping and peace enforcement. It is similarly quite clear to my country — currently the fourth-largest contributor of troops to United Nations peace-keeping operations — that peace-keeping is most likely to be successful when it is strictly impartial and based upon the consent of the parties. The United Nations, as well as a number of Member States, including the United Kingdom, has already done a lot of work to develop a military doctrine for modern, multidimensional United Nations peace-keeping based upon these key principles.

My Government would endorse most of the Secretary-General’s comments regarding command and control of peace-keeping operations. Unity of command is vital. But that must be complemented, as the Secretary-General recognizes, by the fullest possible information to troop contributors, in theatre as well as here in New York. In the case of Headquarters, I hope that, as soon as resources permit, the weekly situation report may again be made available to Council members and troop contributors. It served as a vital informational tool to them both. In theatre, more needs to be done to inform and consult contingent commanders, or national military representatives assigned to the mission headquarters, about operational planning and decision-making.

Nor is the need for better-quality information restricted to troop contributors. The populations of the territories in which United Nations operations are deployed must be given reliable and impartial information. This Council, as well as the General Assembly, has often called for a more proactive approach

to the public information function in peace-keeping operations. We therefore strongly welcome the comments made by the Secretary-General in his position paper and the instructions he has issued regarding planning for an information capacity, including United Nations radio facilities, in all future operations.

But it is not only the operational aspects of peace-keeping that deserve our attention. We must also continue our efforts, and we hope that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts, to improve its administration and management. We welcome the recent decisions by the General Assembly to streamline the budget cycle and to commission more transparent budgets that better reflect the operational requirements of peace-keeping missions. We believe that the management of field missions needs to be similarly transparent to help to ensure that the large sums of money that we and all other Member States spend on peace-keeping are used wisely and effectively.

The Secretary-General draws attention to the need to ensure more rapid deployment of United Nations peace-keeping operations, and we agree that this is a high priority. But the formation of a distinct rapid-reaction force is only one way of approaching that issue — and, in our view, not necessarily the most cost-effective or the most realistic way of doing it. The United Kingdom has already responded to the Secretary-General's stand-by planning initiative and is ready to send a force planning team to New York to provide greater detail of the assets that we might make available to the United Nations.

More needs to be done, we believe, to build on the embryo system of stand-by arrangements so far established, including on the provision of equipment to less well-equipped troop contributors. The sort of planning data base that the United Nations needs to develop requires a detailed and continuing dialogue and exchange of information with Member States. My Government stands ready to participate in such an exercise.

More thought could be given, too, to ways in which better-equipped contributors with high-readiness forces can be deployed quickly at the outset of a United Nations peace-keeping operation, being then replaced by other troop contributors that may need more time to prepare for deployment.

We wholeheartedly agree that the role of the United Nations does not end with the departure of a successful peace-keeping force. We therefore welcome the Secretary-General's comments regarding post-conflict, as

well as preventive, peace-building — particularly the emphasis on an integrated approach, making best use of the wide political and technical expertise of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. And we believe that there are further steps that need to be taken to achieve the proper coordination and coherence of those efforts.

In the section of the report on weapons proliferation the Secretary-General has focused attention primarily on what he describes as micro-disarmament — namely, practical disarmament in the context of conflicts that the United Nations is dealing with. The spread of small arms and anti-personnel land mines is indeed a matter of considerable and continuing concern and one that is of relevance to peace-keeping and, to a lesser extent, preventive action. We support fresh efforts to address these problems.

However, we would not wish to see the serious question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction neglected because of that. This is an area in which the Council has a fundamental role to play with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Steady progress is being made in efforts to prevent the spread of these weapons of mass destruction, and these efforts must be sustained. In particular, a successful conclusion to the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading to the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, is of fundamental importance.

In many of the areas I have referred to, United Nations cooperation with regional agencies and arrangements is crucial. The paper makes a number of wise points and suggestions in this area, and I welcome the Secretary-General's offer to assist regional organizations, particularly in the fields of peacemaking and peace-keeping. The need, in our view, is particularly pressing in Africa, where so many of the demands for preventive action and peace-keeping arise.

In his speech during the general debate in the General Assembly's forty-ninth session, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, made a number of specific proposals to enhance the capacity for peace-keeping and preventive action in Africa. They included the designation of peace-keeping training skills centres and logistics basing centres. We have been working up these and other ideas in consultation with a wide range of African countries and the Organization of African Unity, as well as the United Nations and a number of countries outside Africa. Those discussions are

producing practical ideas but also a political will to work together more closely to develop more effective capabilities in Africa to respond rapidly to crises in both the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. We look forward to working with others in the weeks and months ahead to carry this initiative forward.

Preventive action, peacemaking, peace-keeping — these are obviously the preferred tools: persuading, negotiating, cooling heads. But sometimes that is not enough. Aggression needs to be reversed, halted in its tracks or prevented from recurring, and support for terrorism must be halted. In these cases the Security Council has to have resort to the instruments provided by Chapter VII of the Charter. No such measures are taken lightly. Armed force should be used only as a last resort. We recognize the validity of the Secretary-General's argument that recent experience has shown that the United Nations as such is not well equipped to carry out such actions. But, short of that last resort, sanctions, to which the Secretary-General referred, remain, in our view, a valid and sometimes necessary option.

We attach importance to devising sanctions regimes that have the greatest effect on the target Government and its supporters and the least effect on innocent civilians. But we should not be blind to the ruthlessness of regimes that use sanctions to justify their own appalling treatment of the civilian population. Nor should we be seduced by what are called smart sanctions — sanctions that are partially and narrowly targeted. There may be opportunities for this sort of instrument, but in general they are notoriously hard to enforce and are therefore unlikely to have the desired effect of bringing about a change of policy.

The Secretary-General was right to point up some of the problems raised by sanctions. But the posing of paradoxes, such as the conflict between sanctions and development, is hardly a sound basis for making difficult policy decisions. Moreover, a decision to impose sanctions presupposes — because it is taken under Chapter VII — that there is a threat to international peace and security. Such threats are themselves inimical to the development objectives of both the transgressor and the victim. Is it, then, the threats and the unlawful actions that damage development, or is it the sanctions imposed to counter them? The Security Council must be able, if the international situation warrants it, to impose sanctions at short notice and without undue delay.

While we do not, therefore, agree with all the points made on sanctions by the Secretary-General, we do agree

that there is a need to strengthen the overburdened section of the Secretariat dealing with sanctions. This would allow the issues of monitoring the application and effects of sanctions and of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to be addressed in a more coherent and effective manner. We look forward to the Secretary-General's taking action to recognize this priority in the allocation of Secretariat resources.

Lastly, the Secretary-General is quite right to stress once again that none of the instruments he refers to can work unless the United Nations has a sound financial basis. We, the Member States of this Organization, cannot ignore the financial crisis of the United Nations or fail to find means to address it. It is crucial that we reach substantive conclusions through the open-ended General Assembly working group on finance during the first half of this year.

This Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace" provides much food for thought for the Council. But it provides food for thought also for the Assembly, including its Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations. My delegation will listen carefully to what is said here today, both by members and non-members of the Council. I hope that we can soon thereafter, on the basis of those views, start work on an early and positive response to the paper on the part of the Council.

**Mr. Mérimée (France)** (*interpretation from French*): The European Union will shortly be making a statement through its President. My delegation, which naturally endorses the views expressed in that statement, now proposes to emphasize the points to which we attach particular importance.

I should like at the outset to congratulate the Secretary-General on the excellent report he submitted on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, a direct follow-up to "Agenda for Peace", published two and a half years ago. The thinking it contains is fortunately enriched by the experience derived from peace-keeping operations during the interim.

I would like to discuss three subjects to which, in the view of my delegation, special attention should be given if we wish to improve the United Nations capacity to maintain international peace and security. I am referring to preventive diplomacy and peace-making, to the rapid deployment of peace-keeping operations and to the imposition of sanctions.

We attach particular importance to the use of preventive diplomacy for peace-making efforts to forestall the outbreak or aggravation of conflicts and to settle their underlying disputes. It was to this end that we transmitted last year, in coordination with the Government of the United Kingdom, a list of individuals, experts and means to help the Secretariat to carry out preventive diplomacy missions. We are pleased that this example has been, or is in the course of being, followed by other countries. Furthermore, we support in principle the idea that stable funding should be provided for the initiation and conduct of preventive diplomacy missions and peace-making, including long-term missions.

The preventive deployment of peace-keeping troops is one way to prevent the outbreak or worsening of conflicts and to help restore peace. My Government hopes that we can have recourse to preventive deployment to help stabilize tense situations whenever it is useful and possible, including deployment on one side of the border when there is a lack of consent by all the Governments concerned.

Peace-building activities are a necessary corollary to preventive diplomacy and peace-making. They can occur during or as a continuation of a peace-keeping operation in order to ensure the lasting restoration of peace. They can also be initiated independently of an operation, as a consequence of a preventive diplomacy mission or a peace-making mission. Actions to promote the creation of diplomatic institutions and economic and social development help to eliminate the underlying causes of conflicts, particularly internal conflicts. My delegation would like to see such measures implemented, particularly after a peace-keeping operation, when they prove necessary to promote the lasting restoration of peace.

We should follow up the major progress which has been achieved in the last two years in strengthening the ability of the Secretariat to plan, deploy and conduct peace-keeping operations. As experience has shown on many occasions, rapid deployment is essential for the success of operations. In this connection, it should be noted that the speed with which an operation is deployed depends not only on the capacity of the Secretariat, but also to a large extent Member States to respond to the demands made on them.

The concept of stand-by forces, which was developed by the Secretariat, is, if a sufficient number of Member States commit themselves to it, an excellent way of reducing the time required for deployment. My Government, which put forward this concept and which has

advocated and supported its implementation, very much hopes that the Secretariat will continue to develop and promote it among Member States. In the current circumstances, the only way to effectively initiate planning for an operation and guarantee its rapid deployment is to develop the data bank containing all the commitments for the contribution of forces and keep it up-to-date. By definition, these stand-by commitments, since they are not automatic, cannot in all cases necessarily ensure rapid deployment of an operation. Nevertheless, we cannot understand why the system developed by the Secretariat should fall into disuse due to lack of attention, on the pretext that its effectiveness is not guaranteed in all cases. We consider not only that arrangements regarding stand-by forces should be maintained, but that the inter-operational nature of the forces, in terms of equipment, deployment timetables and command structure, should be developed.

We took note with great interest of the proposal by the Secretary-General regarding the creation of a United Nations rapid reaction force, made up of national battalions trained under the same procedures and with integrated equipment which would constitute the strategic reserve of the Security Council. This proposal will be considered very closely by my Government. Its practical implications, political consequences and financial aspects raise issues. The main advantage of creating such a force, compared with the existing system of stand-by forces, would be the permanent availability of battalions in all circumstances. We would note, however, that questions concerning agreements between the Governments concerned and the United Nations, the command of the force and its financing have not been spelled out.

Implementing such a concept would obviously take a long time. The careful study which it deserves and the hopes it might arouse do not, in the opinion of my Government, justify any delay in developing the system of stand-by forces.

The measures outlined in Article 41 of the Charter — the imposition of sanctions — are the only enforcement instruments available to the Security Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security other from recourse to military force, which, as we know, is very difficult to implement. This is why their use is not subject to any restriction. The Charter only refers to the ability of third States to consult the Council over specific economic difficulties they may encounter.

On this subject, my Government does not entirely agree with the Secretary-General's proposals. Indeed, although experience teaches us that the imposition of sanctions must have a specific aim and that the means and criteria for lifting a sanctions regime and regular consideration of that regime must be stipulated from the outset, we also feel that it is necessary to preserve the Security Council's autonomy in decision-making. It would seem to us that the proposed establishment of a mechanism whose primary function would be to evaluate, before any decision is taken, the potential impact of the planned sanctions on the country in question and on third countries, of the planned sanctions and to measure the effects of those sanctions during their implementation would, unfortunately, lead to all sorts of pressures being exerted on the Council. We would therefore be unable to endorse that suggestion at this juncture.

Some of the questions I have raised, such as those concerning sanctions, are substantive. Others, such as those concerning the proposed rapid reaction force, address more particularly the real possibility of implementing the proposals before us in the near future. We believe that emphasis and efforts should be focused on progress that can be achieved now, allowing the development of existing means to improve the rapid deployment of United Nations operations.

In conclusion, I wish to recall that the basis of our thinking, "An Agenda for Peace", continues to be valid. The current inadequacy of the means available to the United Nations should not lead us to abandon in principle the goals which we may set ourselves for the future, and in particular the United Nations capacity to enforce peace when it is called upon to do so.

**Mr. Wisnumurti** (Indonesia): It is a distinct honour and privilege for me to deliver this statement on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM).

Let me begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General for presenting his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations" (S/1995/1).

The Movement has taken due note of the Secretary-General's Supplement. It offers many proposals and approaches which warrant our careful consideration. The Movement concurs with the objective of strengthening the capacity of the Organization in all fields, including the maintenance of international peace and security and the

promotion of economic and social development within the framework of and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Considering that the paper before us has still to be examined in depth by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, this statement offers only a few preliminary comments of a general nature.

The Movement has noted that a number of elements contained in the report "An Agenda for Peace" have been neither included nor elaborated in the present Supplement, to which the NAM member countries would give further consideration. In addition, we note that the Supplement is relatively silent on the role of the General Assembly in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security, as specified in the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolutions 47/120 A and 47/120 B. It is important that respect for State sovereignty be recognized as one of the basic principles in the conduct of international relations.

The Movement concurs with the Secretary-General's observation that:

"only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation." (S/1995/1, para. 22)

The Secretary-General has rightly focused his attention on economic and social issues which have long been sidelined. These have become all the more important today as conflicts are increasingly recognized to have socio-economic origins. The non-aligned countries fully agree that, as the Organization closes the first half-century of its work and stands poised to assume the challenges of the future, its primary mission will be to convey to the world a renewed vision and to fulfil its commitment to development as the best means to uproot the fundamental causes of conflicts which pose threats to international peace and security. Development should be brought to the forefront of the international agenda. We look forward to discussing further the Secretary-General's report on an Agenda for Development.

The Movement attaches particular importance to the issue of peace-keeping operations addressed in the position paper of the Secretary-General. It is to be noted that most of the United Nations peace-keeping operations are in the member countries of NAM and that most of the troop contributors are members of NAM. Considering some recent successes and setbacks in United Nations peace-keeping operations, and taking into account the fact

that such operations have moved beyond the traditional concept, NAM finds that there is an urgent need to review, take stock of and draw conclusions from recent experiences.

The Non-Aligned Movement is pleased to note that the Secretary-General has reiterated the validity and relevance of the traditional principles of peace-keeping operations. We suggest that these principles be strengthened, given prevailing conditions in this changing world. These include the support of the general membership of the Organization; the consent of the States involved; non-intervention in the internal affairs of States; impartiality; the non-use of force; equitable opportunity for all States to participate; and, above all, a clearly-defined mandate, time-frame and secure financing. Furthermore, we think it essential that all measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes be explored before launching peace-keeping operations. Primary emphasis should be on utilizing peaceful means for resolving conflicts; coercive measures and military means must remain the last resort to be used only after other measures have failed. They should be temporary in nature and create an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful and durable settlement, and should not be perceived as a substitute for other efforts to be made in endeavouring to reach a just solution. However, the Movement is of the view that the concept of multifunctional peace-keeping operations, in the light of the basic principles of traditional peace-keeping operations, requires further clarification.

Similarly, the idea of a rapid reaction force, put forward in the section on peace-keeping, requires greater clarity concerning the scope and circumstances under which it would be deployed. This far-reaching proposal needs a very careful scrutiny of its cost implications and even more of the modality of its establishment and use, of the need for consent before such a force may be deployed and of its command and control structure. It is not clear, for instance, what types of emergency are referred to and who will determine the existence of such crises. These ambiguities may lend themselves to interpretations that would challenge the sovereignty and independence of States. In addition, the concept of enforcement action needs to be further reviewed and evaluated, *inter alia*, on the basis of the contents of the Secretary-General's report.

The issue of command and control has now emerged as one of the central issues requiring the most careful consideration and study. We agree that unity of command and control is a *sine qua non* for peace-keeping to proceed effectively and safely. As a matter of principle, peace-keeping operations should be under the operational control of the United Nations. There must be a clear

delineation of functions between United Nations Headquarters and the field. While operational matters should basically be the responsibility of the force commander, United Nations Headquarters ought to be given the responsibility for overall control and political direction.

Another equally important aspect of peace-keeping operations is the consultations between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries. Such consultations should focus on political and military objectives, the responsibilities and expectations of their troops and the conduct of the operations in general. We believe that further specific improvements, including the possible expansion of this consultative mechanism to any other interested countries, will depend on how effective the new set-up will prove in its entirety.

The Movement notes with concern that expenditures on peace-keeping operations have far exceeded those committed to developmental activities. It considers that a similar emphasis should be given to development programmes and activities as the best contribution for the preservation of peace and security.

The costs of peace-keeping operations should continue to be calculated in accordance with the existing scale of assessments established by General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII), which takes into account the special responsibilities of some Member States and economic considerations. These arrangements should be institutionalized and must be in keeping with paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Charter. The Secretariat should also continue to consider ways to facilitate prompt reimbursement to troop-contributing countries as well as other related administrative and financial issues.

As regards the issue of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, the Movement has noted the proposal to establish in the United Nations regular budget a contingency provision and the enlargement of existing provisions for unforeseen peace-keeping activities. The proposal for small field missions, because of its possible implications, requires careful study by the appropriate intergovernmental organs. These ideas should be clearly defined — at least operationally — after thorough examination by the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General, in his report, refers to a norm for Member States to accept the offer of United Nations good offices. The adherence to such a norm will be practical only if a favourable climate of opinion, or



ethos, is created. The Movement feels that this ethos can be created only by the free will and consent of the States concerned.

The Movement takes note of the Secretary-General's view that:

“Progress (...) in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms”.  
(S/1995/1, para. 65)

Although recent changes in international relations have diminished the likelihood of a nuclear war, the issues of the non-use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of all nuclear arsenals deservedly continue to be a preoccupation of the international community. It is essential to reaffirm the importance of nuclear disarmament and its priority in disarmament negotiations, as contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is pertinent to recall the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament over negotiating and reaching the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We also should recall the lack of progress in either launching multilateral negotiations for a legally binding instrument on the production and the stockpiling of fissile materials or the work carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Likewise, the deadlock in the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty persists. Many other issues, including unhindered access to technology for peaceful purposes and negative security assurances to non-nuclear States, have not been resolved.

The Secretary-General's position paper also touches upon the question of sanctions. Member States are obligated to comply with the Security Council decisions concerning sanctions, in keeping with Article 41 of the Charter. There has been a threefold increase in the number of sanction regimes within the past two years. This expanding use of sanctions has not been accompanied by a thorough consideration of the short- and long-term effects.

Many critical issues need to be clarified before the imposition of sanctions. Their potential impact on the country that is targeted, as well as their time-frame, clearly defined objectives, humanitarian aspects and special provisions to minimize the collateral damage suffered by third parties, ought to be worked out in detail. Such an

approach would strengthen international support for the imposition and implementation of sanction regimes.

Sanctions have profound ramifications, not only for the target country, but also for the neighbouring States and trading partners. While Article 50 of the Charter has called for consultations in seeking a solution to these problems, a more extensive use of that provision as a means to limit the impact of sanctions has now become essential. The comprehensiveness of today's sanctions has also raised a different set of complex issues. Increasingly, the costs are being borne by the civilian population, without accomplishing the objectives of the sanctions. It is therefore imperative to rectify this situation, taking special precautions to ease the impact of sanctions on the vulnerable groups of society.

The Charter review Committee at its last session invited the Secretary-General to submit, before its 1995 session, a report on the question of the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. That report should include reference to Article 50, concerning special economic problems confronting States arising from the carrying out of sanctions mandated under Chapter VII. We look forward to receiving the detailed report of the Secretary-General on this issue, which we trust will include an analysis of the proposals and suggestions, as contained in the report of the Committee's 1994 session.

Regarding compensation, the Movement considers that the establishment of a sanctions mechanism, as proposed by the Secretary-General in his report, deserves to be explored further. Moreover, sanctions should be lifted as soon as their objectives are achieved.

Consultations with Bretton Woods institutions for the purpose of giving effect to Article 50 is not necessarily the most effective way of alleviating the damages suffered by third parties. The Security Council, which imposes sanctions, has the responsibility also to provide relief.

Within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, regional organizations can cooperate with the United Nations in the resolution of conflicts in their regions which are seen as threats to international peace and security, within their respective mandates and spheres of competence. In this context, the Movement welcomes close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations on the basis of the Charter.

The Non-Aligned Movement believes that the largest possible number of delegations should participate in the

debate on the Secretary-General's position paper. The Movement would like all Member States to give careful attention to the proposals contained therein so as to create the opportunity to collectively contribute to fostering a new era of true multilateralism. It is our view that the Secretary-General's position paper should be examined by the General Assembly, as it is the sole United Nations body to encompass all States, both in the discussion and in the decision-making processes. We would welcome the establishment of a working group of the General Assembly, at an appropriate time, to study the position paper.

**Mr. Legwaila** (Botswana): We fully endorse the comments of the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries, and we do not intend to repeat all that he has ably contributed. We will simply amplify some of the points he has made and place emphasis where we think it is necessary, particularly on those issues that affect my own country and Africa.

The report of the Secretary-General, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", could not have been more timely. The euphoria that led to the convocation of the first Security Council meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and all that it represented, has long evaporated. There was great optimism in the air at the time about the onset of the "new world order", characterized by the perceived central role the United Nations was to play in post-cold-war international affairs, as had been envisaged by its founding fathers.

The hopes and aspirations of the leaders who met in New York on 31 January 1992 have mostly been dashed — or, rather, the vision they had for the future of mankind after the fall of communism remains an elusive dream. It is in the context of this background of dashed hopes that we find the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" most timely. It affords us an opportunity to reflect on the experiences of the past years, to analyse what could have gone wrong with our vision of the post-cold-war era and to look to the future with new foresight, wisdom and renewed hopes of a world free of war. The report of the Secretary-General is rich in its analysis of the current situation and the prospects for the future, and it should form the basis for an informed debate here today and in the General Assembly later this year.

We have witnessed a democratization process that has extended from the northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere since the end of the cold war. In some cases, the democratization process has been smooth, while in others it has been accompanied by bloodshed and mayhem, creating serious challenges for the system of collective

security under the auspices of the United Nations. The blue helmets, in greater numbers than ever before, have been dispatched to help keep the peace. Yes, there have been successes, and there have been failures. In some cases, serious mistakes have been made, and it is important to learn from them.

The Secretary-General has gone to great lengths to emphasize the importance of greater international cooperation to overcome these great challenges facing humanity. I shall give examples of some serious mistakes that have been made. One issue of deep concern to my Government is the current creeping tendency to reduce or withdraw United Nations forces from seemingly intractable conflicts, particularly in Africa, before peace can be attained. We are certainly not unmindful of the enormous cost involved in the maintenance of peace-keeping operations all over the world, nor are we oblivious to the impatience and frustrations which are often engendered by long, drawn-out peace-keeping operations. Nevertheless, I wish to pose the following questions for consideration by the Council: is it not such impatience and frustration with slow-moving peace trains that send wrong signals to those intransigent parties that wish to see the United Nations fail, and to those who are quick to condemn the United Nations for its shortcomings? Are we not discouraging troop-contributing countries, like my own, from participating in future peace-keeping operations by the premature withdrawal of troops before they accomplish their mandates?

Let me illustrate what I mean by this. We believe the reduction of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), when more personnel would have been needed to deal with the resumption of hostilities that followed the election in Angola, was ill advised. The same applies with equal validity to the reduction of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In the tragic case of Rwanda, as we all know, when all hell broke loose every contingent except Ghana's withdrew, and this was followed by the worst bloodshed in Africa's recent memory. The United Nations is now winding down its operation in Somalia. I am afraid that not very long after 31 March there may come a time when the conscience of the Security Council is so troubled that the Council might be forced to send troops back to Somalia, but too late to save the situation.

Peace is indivisible, and so should be our efforts for its attainment. Every peace-keeping operation should be given an equal opportunity to succeed. We need persistence and perseverance. More importantly, we need

to approach issues in an even-handed manner. There is a long list of positive results in places where the international community has persisted and persevered, such as in the Cambodias of this world, and even in Yugoslavia, where the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has done much to bring under control a war which could have inflamed the whole of the Balkans.

Regionally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is trying its best, given the paucity of its resources, to respond to the many and varied crises that bedevil the African continent. A permanent Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution has been established, but it will remain a dead letter if the international community does not play its part to ensure its efficacy. There is a need for full implementation of Chapter VIII of the Charter, and this is why we think the Secretary-General's proposals on regional arrangements for conflict resolution deserve close examination in order to give this Chapter full effect.

Moreover, in his report the Secretary-General notes that

“The United Nations system is also better equipped than regional organizations or individual Member States to develop and apply the comprehensive, long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution of conflicts.” (*S/1995/1, para. 24*)

This is particularly true of Africa. In most cases Africa has the combination of political will and political commitment to resolve its own conflicts. However, its ability to deliver is hampered by a lack of the necessary financial and logistical wherewithal to transform such political commitment and will into realizable, durable political solutions. African countries have demonstrated a willingness to provide troops for peace-keeping operations both in Africa and abroad, and we appeal to the international community at large to play a role within the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter to help manage peace in Africa.

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are two of the most inexpensive tools in the whole arena of conflict prevention and resolution. We therefore support the Secretary-General's efforts to bolster this aspect of United Nations diplomacy. We are fully aware that sometimes parties are reluctant to seek help from the United Nations by way of the good offices of the Secretary-General, either because they doubt the impartiality of the United Nations or because one or both of the parties are not ready for

mediation. Obviously, this can make peacemaking and preventive diplomacy more difficult. Therefore, the United Nations should endeavour to create or cultivate the ethos that would make it possible for it to be readily called upon without misgivings to use its good offices.

One other important issue referred to in the “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” is the post-conflict resolution stage. It is right for the Secretary-General to bring up this point. Once a conflict has been resolved, there is a need to cooperate with authorities in the countries concerned to deal with problems of security, while duly respecting their sovereignty. In this respect, one important issue is the process of reintegrating former combatants into civilian life. In a majority of cases these former fighters, some of whom have been in the bush for most of their lives, do not have any technical skills. Hence, besides the unavailability of alternative employment, they are not employable. They have to be trained for conversion to civilian life.

With regard to disarmament, my delegation fully agrees with the Secretary-General's submission on “micro-disarmament”. The destructive nature of small arms and their destabilizing effect cannot be ignored. Most of the conflicts afflicting the world today are fuelled by the use of small arms because of the ease with which such weapons proliferate, particularly in countries bordering conflict areas. Even more alarming is the monumental scourge of mines, tens of millions of which are planted all over the world, resulting in senseless death and the exploding population of amputees in those countries where there has been endemic conflict.

We agree with the Secretary-General's report that, in terms of Article 41 of the Charter, sanctions are meant as instruments to change behaviour, not as punishment or retribution. We also agree with the report that sanctions have negative side effects, but we must also point out that sanctions have so far been a peaceful and viable alternative where peace enforcement, or any other means to secure international peace and security, has been untenable. We do not agree with those who say sanctions do not work. History has now registered cases where sanctions applied in conjunction with other means of persuasion have helped resolve seemingly intractable problems. We welcome the Secretary-General's suggestion for the establishment of a mechanism that would, *inter alia*, assess and monitor the application of sanctions.

We fully concur with the views expressed in the report on the question of command and control of United Nations forces. More often than not, the authority of force commanders is challenged by contingents that receive orders from their national authorities, sometimes at very critical stages of operations on the ground. Indeed, some fatalities have resulted from this lack of coordinated authority within the command structure. Botswana has participated in a few United Nations peace-keeping operations so far, and as a matter of practical experience we have come to appreciate the seriousness of this problem. What Governments have to understand is that by deciding to contribute troops to United Nations missions they cede the powers of command and control to the Secretary-General. This is not to say that contingents should completely sever all links with their capitals. Newly established procedures of consultation between troop contributors, the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General have greatly enhanced the process of communication, and it is only proper that Governments present their suggestions in New York, and not in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia or any other place.

I wish to conclude by paying homage to the Secretary-General for his tireless reaffirmation of the crucial interrelationship between peace and development. Continuous support has to be given to social and economic development because there can never be development if there is no peace and there can be no sustainable peace without development. In particular, in those countries where the United Nations has intervened to bring about peace the international community must spare no effort to ensure that desperate post-conflict conditions in these countries do not subject them to more war.

**Mr. Wang Xuexian** (China)(*interpretation from Chinese*): First of all, I should like, on behalf of the Chinese Government, to express our profound sympathy in connection with the severe casualties and damage caused by the strong earthquakes in the western part of our neighbouring country Japan. I would ask the Japanese Mission to the United Nations to convey our condolences to the Japanese Government and people.

The Chinese delegation has made a preliminary study of the Secretary-General's report entitled 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace', which is an important follow-up report to his Agenda for Peace concerning United Nations peace-keeping operations and activities in related areas. The report has provided us with some new and thought-provoking views and ideas which deserve our in-depth consideration and extensive discussion.

The world has undergone profound changes since the Security Council summit meeting in early 1992 and the transition toward multipolarity has accelerated. Relaxation of tension has become the main trend today, and yet the world is not tranquil at all. Hegemonism and power politics continue to exist. Regional hot spots flare up intermittently, and various destabilizing elements are increasing. All this poses a serious threat to international peace and stability. Meanwhile, international economic competition has intensified; and the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen. The maintenance of peace, the strengthening of cooperation and the promotion of development remain the major challenges facing the world and the United Nations today. There would be no development without peace and hardly any lasting peace without development, whereas both peace and development require international cooperation.

The world is now much preoccupied with how to eliminate regional hot spots and settle international disputes properly. In this connection, great expectations have been placed on the United Nations, which since the end of the cold war has made considerable efforts in promoting the settlement of regional hot spots and maintaining international peace and security, both with successes and with setbacks. The report submitted by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations is therefore of great practical significance.

As an old Chinese saying goes, 'Cognizance of one's divine mandate comes at the age of 50'. The United Nations is now almost 50 years old. We hope that it will reach this stage of sublime cognizance by summarizing the past and looking to the future, thus being better able to fulfil the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security entrusted to it by the Charter in the transit to the next century. This is not only the ardent expectation of the international community on the United Nations, but also a major test for this Organization.

We maintain that in fulfilling their responsibilities for maintaining international peace and stability the United Nations and the Security Council in particular must strictly abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter when engaged in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping or other activities in related areas. Particular attention should be given to the following principles:

First, the principle of respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in a country's internal affairs must always be observed. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization composed of sovereign States rather than a world government. I wish to emphasize that the United Nations is not a world government. Matters concerning a country should, in the final analysis, be settled by its own people, and those concerning a region by the countries in the region through consultations, in which the international community, including the United Nations, can play only a supplementary and promotive role.

Secondly, disputes should be settled by resorting unswervingly to such peaceful means as good offices, mediation and negotiation. As there are profound and complicated historical and social causes for the conflicts and disputes in the world today involving religion, ethnicity, culture or territory, it might be time-consuming and difficult to seek a peaceful solution. But this is the only effective way to peace in the long run. To wish for a rapid solution through military actions or other enforcement measures not only is politically undesirable, but will also sharpen contradictions, cause serious consequences and bring long-term damage to peace. There have already been quite a few lessons of this in recent years.

Thirdly, as the maintenance of international peace and security involves the work of the United Nations in various areas, the major United Nations agencies are required to carry out their respective mandates in accordance with the Charter and play their respective roles in a balanced and harmonious manner while strengthening their mutual coordination and cooperation. We support a more active and effective role for the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security and other related areas. We highly appreciate the unremitting efforts by the Secretary-General in mediating regional conflicts or disputes and support him in playing his role in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter as well as the mandates of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Fourthly, the Security Council is entrusted by the Charter with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, it acts on behalf of all Member States. We have consistently held that all Members, irrespective of their size, strength and wealth, are entitled to participate in the discussion and resolution of major United Nations issues on an equal footing. Therefore, the Security Council should hear their views extensively before making important decisions. Its resolutions and decisions must

reflect their common will and conform to their interests. This is also an important expression of the democratization of international relations.

Those principles are easier stated than truly implemented. However, the United Nations has no alternative but to adhere to them in order to maintain international peace and security in an effective manner.

The United Nations has encountered many new problems in fulfilling its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under the changed circumstances. Contradictions and defects which were inconspicuous have gradually come to the fore. This calls for the formulation, through careful consideration, of a whole set of practical policy measures and mechanisms to ensure the success of United Nations activities. We believe that the following questions deserve our particular attention:

In recent years we have witnessed the conditional involvement of the United Nations in the settlement of internal conflicts in some countries at the request of the Governments or factions of these countries, or that of other countries or parties in a few exceptional cases where there is an absence of a government in a country.

This is a new and highly sensitive issue, which, if handled improperly, will make the United Nations a party to the conflict or even make it become an instrument of a few countries in interfering in other countries' internal affairs, thus throwing United Nations operations into difficulties and failure. We therefore deem it imperative to establish certain principles to govern appropriate involvement by the United Nations in this regard, which should include the following: conflicts or disputes pose a real threat to international or regional peace; United Nations operations must be at the request, and obtain the consent, of the parties concerned; the United Nations role should be confined to assisting in the settlement of conflicts or disputes by peaceful means; and full play should be given to the role of neighbouring countries and the relevant regional organizations.

United Nations peace-keeping operations are faced with new challenges as they are undergoing both significant quantitative and qualitative changes in recent years, according to the report of the Secretary-General. We are of the view that in the new situation the United Nations should stick to the practices proved effective when engaged in peace-keeping operations — namely, the three principles as emphasized by the Secretary-General

in his report: the consent of the parties; impartiality; and the non-use of force, except in self-defence. A clear distinction should also be made between peace-keeping operations and peace enforcement actions. The United Nations is under unprecedented pressure in terms of human, financial and material resources, with the increasing expansion of the number and scale of peace-keeping operations and the scope of their mandates. How to address this problem appropriately also has a direct bearing on the success of the operations. We believe that the United Nations should act within the limits of its means and work to improve the effectiveness of the operations. Member States should fulfil in earnest the financial obligations set forth in the Charter to ensure a stable and sound financial basis for the operations. At the same time, such questions as the command and control of peace-keeping operations and the training of peace-keeping personnel should be properly addressed.

It is believed that United Nations activities in preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building, if carried out properly, can play a positive role in eliminating and defusing disputes. However, in playing this role, the United Nations must respect the will of the Governments and peoples of the countries concerned instead of imposing its views on them. It should especially be prudent on questions, such as early warning, that involve a country's sovereignty. It should obtain prior consent of the countries concerned before sending fact-finding or other missions, and major issues in this regard should be decided upon by the Security Council. More play should be given to the role of other United Nations agencies in post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and other follow-up activities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. The Security Council should not take over their responsibilities and get involved in what is beyond its terms of reference.

Since the end of the cold war there has been an increase in cases in which the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter on flimsy grounds, resorts to, or authorizes a few countries to take, enforcement actions. We have never endorsed such peace enforcement actions. We maintain that enforcement actions as set forth in Chapter VII of the Charter should only be used against acts of aggression that endanger and undermine peace. In case of necessity, they should have a clear-cut mandate as well as the political guidance of the Security Council and the unified command of the United Nations. Indiscriminate use of mandatory means will not help resolve problems. It will, rather, sharpen contradictions, aggravate conflicts and impair the reputation of the United Nations. It should be

pointed out that in the history of the United Nations there were a few cases of forced intervention in a country's internal affairs by a few big Powers, using the Security Council's mandate, with adverse consequences. These historical lessons should not be forgotten.

Sanctions are also included in United Nations mandatory means. Recent years have also seen an increase in cases of application of sanctions by the Security Council. We are not in favour of using sanctions to exert pressure, for, instead of helping resolve international disputes, it will only bring suffering to the people of the target countries and cause economic difficulties and losses to third countries, particularly the neighbouring ones that implement the sanctions. We appreciate the Secretary-General's proposal that practical and effective measures be taken to reduce the adverse impact produced by sanctions. In some absolute cases when sanctions have to be used, their objectives, scope and time-limit should be clearly defined. No sanctions should be used as a punitive means. At the same time, appropriate mechanisms should be established by taking humanitarian factors into full consideration to reduce the suffering of the people of the countries concerned and to resolve, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter, the problems brought to third countries by sanctions. The Security Council should carefully consider these factors in its future work and review the various existing sanctions regimes in the same fashion, with a view to gradually easing these sanctions as appropriate until they are completely lifted.

In recent years United Nations activities in maintaining international peace and security tend to be increasingly mixed up with those in the economic, social, development, humanitarian assistance and other areas. However, the absence of clear guidelines has resulted in confusion of concept and differences in interpretation of these activities. It is therefore necessary to define, on the basis of extensive discussions and under the guidance of the Charter, the concept and scope of these activities and their mutual relationship, so as to provide them with a solid legal base.

The Secretary-General's report covers a wide range of elements which touch upon the work of all the relevant departments of the United Nations and have a direct bearing on the interests of the entire membership. We are in favour of comprehensive, in-depth and full-range discussion and consideration in various forms of the report by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations agencies. The Chinese delegation

will take an active part in this process and continue to make contributions to United Nations activities in peace-keeping and other areas.

**Mr. Henze** (Germany): I should like to thank the Secretary-General for his valuable, stimulating and timely report supplementing "An Agenda for Peace". We believe it to be particularly important for the United Nations in its fiftieth year to re-examine its role in the maintenance of international peace and security in the light of the developments of the last years. The supplemental report sums up recent discussions and experiences in a very relevant way.

We fully share the positions set out in the statement to be delivered by the French Presidency on behalf of the European Union. I should like to concentrate my remarks on issues to which we attach particular importance. These are preventive diplomacy; post-conflict peace-building; sanctions; and certain aspects of peace-keeping.

We share the Secretary-General's appreciation of the paramount importance of preventive diplomacy. We also understand that practical mechanisms and measures to implement preventive diplomacy are more difficult to define. In this context, we support the suggestion of the Secretary-General, to establish, whenever necessary, small support missions for special envoys on the ground. The decisions would be taken by the Secretary-General, based on all available information and on the understanding that the Security Council be kept informed.

In all conflict and pre-conflict negotiating processes, sufficient time and a virtually constant presence on the ground are important conditions for success. In the past, formal United Nations missions were set up only when a conflict had reached a certain level of intensity. But even in these cases the preliminary dispatch of a limited number of observers under the authority of the Secretary-General can be required when negotiations have reached a certain stage and quick reactions are necessary, as was recently the case in Tajikistan.

In this context, I should like to mention that Germany has completed a list of personalities ready to perform tasks in the area of preventive diplomacy. This list is being presented to the Secretary-General, during his current visit to Germany, in response to his concern about a lack of experienced personnel. I should also like to point out that we have significantly stepped up our new programme for democratization aid and electoral assistance. In 1994 we granted substantial assistance in these fields to 12 countries.

In doing so, we accorded special attention to countries in which United Nations operations had taken place, such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Mozambique.

Another important element of preventive diplomacy is respect for human rights. Experience has taught us that societies in which human rights are upheld and where democratic structures exist are less prone to conflict. Therefore, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights deserves our unequivocal support, and the Centre for Human Rights should be strengthened. We welcome the increased attention that the United Nations is paying to the integration of human rights aspects into its development programmes. The importance of respect for human rights in regard to conflict prevention should also be increasingly considered in the context of peace-keeping and, even more so in post-conflict peace-building.

Economic and social development are basic elements of conflict prevention. We therefore support the Secretary-General in his efforts to complement an Agenda for Peace with an Agenda for Development.

In his report the Secretary-General rightly points to the goal of post-conflict peace-building — the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace. In order for this to be done successfully, the transition from a peace-keeping operation to the establishment of new structures that could consolidate the peace has to be well prepared. We have not yet developed a consolidated conceptual approach to this end. Until now, either United Nations peace-keeping operations have ended more or less abruptly without any significant period of transition, as in the case most recently of Mozambique, or the United Nations has pursued peace-building tasks for years thereafter, as, for example, most successfully in El Salvador. Naturally, each case is different, but we should attempt to elaborate ways and means to ensure a certain degree of follow-up after the formal end of a United Nations peace-keeping operation.

Especially in cases in which programmes for the reconstruction of political and administrative structures are part of a peace-keeping operation, we should avoid terminating them prematurely, before assistance in the field through other channels is assured. I refer in particular to the areas of police and justice. It is essential to provide a secure environment for the reintegration of refugees and for economic recovery. Frequently, countries re-emerging from conflicts have difficulties in recruiting civil servants, let alone in paying their salaries. Often,

democratic elections are not the true end of a conflict, as we have seen in Cambodia and Angola. It is contradictory, and not a good investment, to launch a costly peace-keeping operation and then withdraw without trying to consolidate the results of that operation.

In addition, we might study possibilities for funnelling development aid into post-conflict peace-building projects — in particular, those funds that are generally available but were blocked when a conflict began. To ensure smooth transition from a United Nations peace-keeping operation to an economic cooperation programme, close coordination between the peace-keeping operation and the relevant agencies is required. This need for coordination should be considered in the drafting of the initial mandate of a peace-keeping operation, as appropriate.

Institutional contacts should be established with relevant international financial and development organizations — if possible, at the beginning of a peace-keeping operation — in order to prepare, at an early stage, for the transition to post-conflict peace-building. Contacts should also be established with governmental and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, we should study the possibility of instituting, on a regular basis, very small transitional teams that would continue to be present in the country of conflict, ready to ensure and monitor the transition of the mandate, to observe, to counsel, to provide good offices and to sound the alarm when things go wrong.

Turning to the issue of sanctions, we support more precision in the definition of their regimes and closer monitoring of their impact, especially on third countries, as proposed by the Secretary-General. We remain convinced that the imposition of sanctions is a necessary instrument of coercion at the disposal of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, especially if the use of military force is to be avoided. Nonetheless, we feel that the time has come to consider ways and means to ensure more precise targeting. This will not only be more effective in bringing about the desired result, but will also strengthen the credibility and authority of the Security Council. Thought should also be given to whether sanctions could be targeted at those individuals who bear particular responsibility for the event that gave rise to their imposition.

In his report, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a mechanism to carry out, *inter alia*, impact assessment and monitoring functions. Inasmuch as we harbour some doubts as to whether, in the light of the urgency imposed by events giving rise to sanctions, it

would be practical to conduct an in-depth impact assessment before sanctions are imposed, we agree that a preliminary assessment should form a part of the basis for decision-making by the Security Council. An extensive impact assessment should, however, be conducted immediately following the adoption of sanctions so that necessary adjustments might be made in a timely fashion. To this end, it would indeed be useful to establish within the Secretariat a capacity to prepare such assessments and monitor the application of sanctions continuously, in close coordination with relevant international financial and development institutions and to report regularly to the Sanctions Committees.

In addition, we agree with the Secretary-General that it is necessary for the Security Council, in its resolutions, to define clearly the objectives of sanctions and the conditions under which they can be terminated. In our view, a high degree of clarity and predictability will also command a high degree of authority and implementation and, accordingly, of success.

Durable peace and international stability will to a large degree depend on the implementation of an effective system of collective security under the roof of the United Nations. To this end, the United Nations must be in a position to react with peace-keeping operations in a credible and efficient way. Germany supports the concept of stand-by arrangements proposed by the Secretary-General. German armed forces are at the moment being fundamentally restructured, a process that will lead, step by step, to more capabilities in the areas of crisis reaction and peace-keeping. Therefore, we are not yet in a position to earmark specific troop contingents, but we shall do so upon request. As Foreign Minister Kinkel declared in the General Assembly on 27 September 1994, we are prepared to contribute.

We also support the Secretary-General's proposal to create a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment for those national contingents that are not adequately equipped. Even before the creation of such a stock, Germany has in the past, through the United Nations, equipped such contingents — for example, the contingents from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the former Yugoslavia.

We once again thank the Secretary-General for his stimulating report. We agree with him that there is no reason for frustration or pessimism. Let us not forget the success the United Nations has had in, for example, Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. And



the Secretary-General's report itself and our discussion today are ample proof that the United Nations is capable and ready to respond to current challenges. In this spirit we look forward to continuing the review of the Secretary-General's report in the Security Council.

**Mr. Lavrov** (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Russian delegation would like to express its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the important report he has prepared on peace-keeping. This document is quite rightly considered a great contribution to studying the peace-keeping practices of the United Nations, an endeavour begun in 'An Agenda for Peace', in response to the decision taken by the high-level meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. The assessments contained in the report and the recommendations based on the Organization's various successes and failures also need to be carefully studied and taken into account in the Organization's daily activities.

In this period of evolution in international relations, the time is now ripe for a thorough dialogue on all aspects of peace-keeping and for reconsidering activities in this area. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Kozyrev, referred to this when he spoke in the Security Council on 17 October last year. In our view, the Secretary-General's report quite accurately describes the qualitative changes that have occurred in the nature of the United Nations peace-keeping activities, most of which now involve threats to international peace and security caused by conflicts within States. Resolving such disputes is more complex, more costly and more dangerous for international personnel than conducting traditional peace-keeping operations, though, naturally, they do not follow the same pattern in all situations.

We agree with the Secretary-General's conclusion that there should be greater use of preventive diplomacy; this will require broad support by Member States. In view of the concern expressed by the Secretary-General, Moscow is prepared to consider the possibility of having eminent personalities with considerable political and diplomatic experience perform various peace-keeping missions on behalf of the Secretary-General, as his special representatives.

We also see some rationality in the idea of creating small field missions for the purposes of preventive diplomacy, provided of course that the consent of the host country has been obtained. We also believe it would be useful for the Secretary-General to define the general criteria for establishing and making use of such missions.

We consider the determination of the primary conditions for conducting peace-keeping operations to be of fundamental importance.

We are particularly anxious about the fact that, despite decisions taken by the Security Council, it has so far been impossible to adopt standard criteria and conditions for involving the United Nations in extinguishing various hotbeds of tension. Sometimes this means that certain conflicts whose threat to international stability is not obvious swallow up considerable funds, with large contingents of peace-keeping forces being sent immediately, whereas in other instances we believe the Security Council is slow to act, sometimes taking months to study a situation and limiting itself in the final analysis to sending small groups of observers, despite the direct request made by the leaders of the States concerned. This was particularly true in instances connected with conflicts in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Such a practice gives us every reason to speak about double standards. Of course, we appreciate that the United Nations capacities are limited, but it is precisely for this reason that they must be properly used in settling conflicts in various parts of the world, including the CIS region. There should not be situations in which, to paraphrase Orwell's aphorism, some conflicts are more equal than others.

We share the views expressed in the report regarding the need to observe the principle of unity of command and to determine three levels of authority in carrying out operations. We assume in this connection that the Secretary-General, when taking executive leadership and command, will be ruled by the political instructions of the Security Council, will keep the Security Council fully abreast of developments and will consult it on any steps that are political rather than technical. At the same time, the Governments of contributing countries should be kept informed about all aspects of the operation at all times.

As regards the trend towards the immediate conduct of operations by the Security Council, referred to by the Secretary-General in his report, we would like to emphasize the Council's exclusive authority under the Charter and the need to more carefully weigh the pros and cons when elaborating the mandates for such operations. Of course, we are not talking about the micro-management of purely practical issues, such as the deployment of contingents, their establishment in the field, their field headquarters and so forth.

We have noted the disappointment expressed by the Secretary-General over the recently adopted concept of stand-by arrangements. We believe, none the less, that it is important to try to perfect the system of such arrangements, particularly as many countries, including the Russian Federation, have shown interest in it. Perhaps it would be a good idea, to this end, to hold a high-level meeting under the presidency of the Secretary-General to encourage action on this very useful idea.

The proposal to create rapid reaction forces involves a number of fundamental issues which will require very thorough consideration, both conceptually and practically. This consideration would obviously require us to take into account the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter. As President Yeltsin stated at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Russia is prepared to conclude an agreement with the Security Council to provide national military contingents for United Nations operations. If this example is followed by a sufficient number of other States, we could move towards realizing the concept of United Nations armed forces. In this case it is particularly important that we should give the Military Staff Committee, which is intended to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements, not only formal, but substantive work. It would also be useful to analyse the Committee's potential to further the work of the Secretariat in developing the Agenda for Peace.

The Russian delegation would like to express its support for the proposals in the report on ways to resolve problems relating to the material and technical supply of peace-keeping operations, the proper training and preparation of personnel, and the creation of effective information capacity when planning future operations. The influence on public opinion and political decisions of information disseminated about conflicts is too great for this problem to be underestimated.

The current definition of security cannot be separated from the idea of sustainable development. From this point of view, it seems to us that the Secretary-General is right to want further to develop the concept of post-conflict peace-building and to create structures that will make it possible to consolidate peace after the achievement of a political settlement. A certain impetus might be given by drawing up parameters and practical arrangements for post-conflict peace-building, whose tasks and significance can be compared in scope to the post-war international Trusteeship system. We also noted the new variation of this major issue proposed by the Secretary-General, described in the report

as preventive peace-building. We believe that this is a very far-sighted and justifiable approach. As the report indicates, it would be desirable to carefully study the whole range of possibilities open to the United Nations to carry out both preventive and post-conflict peace-building, based on major improvements in coordination and on the division of labour between all relevant organs and institutions, taking into account the sphere of competency of each.

We should also encourage the Secretary-General's efforts to implement "micro-disarmament". To this end, we could make use of the machinery of the Register of Conventional Arms, among others. We are convinced that in the field of "macro-disarmament", particularly with respect to non-proliferation, the United Nations and the Security Council can make a more active contribution. We hope that it will be possible to study the Secretary-General's ideas on these matters as well.

The report's analysis of the consequences of resort to sanctions reflects the concerns expressed by most members of the United Nations. Other speakers have already referred to this. On this issue, it is important that we be clear about the goals of the sanctions imposed, the need for a timely agreement on precise conditions and machinery for lifting them once they have fulfilled their purpose, the inadmissibility of tightening sanctions if that would hinder the process of a political settlement, and the vital need to consider humanitarian factors.

The report also indicates the urgent need to consider the problem of sanctions and to take concrete measures, particularly in connection with Article 50 of the Charter. We are prepared to consider the creation of a special mechanism within the Secretariat, with well-defined functions and tasks, to address sanctions issues. In such work, it is also important to call upon both the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and, at the intergovernmental level, the Economic and Social Council, taking into account the possibilities afforded by Article 65 of the Charter.

The future international security system will be truly stable only if we can find effective machinery for resolving problems at all their levels: national, regional and global. Sharing responsibilities among these levels will allow the United Nations to retain its flexible, efficiently operating structure.

In this connection, we support the further strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations

and regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, maintaining the statutory role and responsibility of the Security Council. We support the continued practice of the Secretary-General's convening meetings of the leaders of regional organizations with a view to broadening their experience of cooperation with the United Nations and between themselves. We believe that it is particularly important to establish working relations between the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is one such regional organization. Undoubtedly, in all instances of regional peace-keeping carried out on the basis of voluntary regional agreements and arrangements in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter, United Nations involvement should be on the basis of voluntary, equitable cooperation without any monitoring or attempt to interfere in the settlement process, without having responsibility — political and financial — for the outcome of that process.

As to financing, we support the report's ideas on a thorough evaluation of human, material and financial resources available for pursuing current operations or establishing new ones. In considering this sensitive issue in the future we might take an inventory of all United Nations peace-keeping activities. This would eventually help us to direct the available limited resources to issues that pose a real challenge to peace and security and to refrain from using funds where no such threat exists or where the parties themselves have for decades been reluctant to seek a political solution.

The Russian delegation believes that the discussion begun today on the Secretary-General's report will be continued, allowing the Security Council to take substantive and useful decisions on the future role of the United Nations in these matters.

**Mr. Martínez Blanco** (Honduras): I wish first, on behalf of the Central American countries, to convey our deepest condolences to the people and Government of Japan for the recent tragedy in that brotherly country. We offer that nation our solidarity and cooperation, within our modest resources.

We fully endorse the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia in his capacity as Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Central American delegations wish to thank the Secretary-General for submitting his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General

on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations".

It is an honour for my delegation to address this Council on behalf of the countries which make up the Central American Group.

In recent years the international community has witnessed profound changes in the work of this world Organization, such as its adoption of a new approach to, and new concepts on, the maintenance of international peace and security, the promotion of economic and social development as the foundation of lasting peace, and environmental sustainability. These activities currently shape the work of our Organization and will obviously determine the role which it will play in international relations in the years to come.

Of all these activities, the new peace-keeping operations monopolize a great portion of the United Nations agenda and, because of their complexity, a large share of its endeavours and financial resources. Although the Charter contains no provision defining those activities, they are the instruments which enable the Security Council, in coordination with the Secretary-General, to fulfil its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security once all the ways and means for the peaceful settlement of disputes envisaged in Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted.

We believe that its peace-keeping operations have made the United Nations an essential factor in international relations, since they enable it to contribute creatively to removing the root causes of conflict while upholding democratic values and ensuring respect for human rights. The tasks of the new peace-keeping operations are not limited to monitoring cease-fires or the cessation of hostilities between the parties in conflict, as was the case with traditional peace operations. They may include, depending on the circumstances, the participation of United Nations forces in the protection of humanitarian operations, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia, or in various matters pertaining to civil order provided for in agreements negotiated between the parties, or at the request of Governments, as with the operations in El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique, to name but a few.

In any event, whether in traditional or new operations encompassing a broad range of civil activities envisaged in negotiated agreements, the three principles on which peace-keeping operations are based must be

observed: the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence.

Mandates that may require the use of force should have the consent of the parties and should be extensively analysed by the Security Council, given their serious political and economic costs as well as the obvious risk they may entail for the peace-keeping forces, which may not have the necessary capability and training. In this regard, we agree with the Secretary-General's statement in the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" that international problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time and that it is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. Resorting to the use of force should be considered *a posteriori* and as a last resort in peace-keeping.

Since 1992, when the Secretary-General submitted his report "An Agenda for Peace", not only were the foundations laid for a systematic process of concrete reform in this Organization, but a conceptual framework also emerged in which to undertake in-depth reflection on the Charter's purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The report "An Agenda for Peace" continues to constitute the basis that has enabled Member States to propose consistent reforms aimed at formulating strategies and mechanisms leading to the early and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Some of the measures adopted by the Secretary-General, including the strengthening of permanent consultations with the Security Council, the establishment of an early-warning mechanism that could be used in situations that endanger international peace and security, the constitution of fact-finding missions and the establishment of regular meetings with troop-contributing countries are all measures that strengthen the capacity of the Security Council in carrying out its overall political direction of peace-keeping operations.

One of the measures that the Secretary-General has suggested to increase the peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations, given the seriousness of not having adequate troops and equipment available, is the setting up of a rapid reaction force as a strategic reserve of the Security Council, for deployment whenever there was an emergency need to prevent a crisis from escalating. On this point, the Government of Honduras and the Governments of the other Central American countries have taken note of the difficulties and obstacles faced by peace operations in particular instances and therefore share the idea of a rapid reaction force as well as the adoption of measures to

improve its capacity in terms of equipment, training and intelligence capability of troops intended for peace operations. At the same time, we believe that there should be further clarification of the circumstances and situations in which that force would be deployed.

We believe that an essential element throughout "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" is the decision-making process in the Security Council, which should be as transparent as possible. The Security Council must improve its consultation mechanisms and offer more opportunities for countries affected by Council decisions to present their positions and to make them known before informal consultations begin.

We support preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as techniques that make it possible to identify potential areas of conflict, the offer of good offices when conflicts are still developing and crisis resolution before they degenerate into armed confrontation. We believe that consolidating the tasks of preventive diplomacy in the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs was a measure of singular importance for achieving those ends. Equally important is its coordination with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, whether in terms of establishing a peace-keeping operation or of alleviating the suffering resulting from conflict.

We also believe that it is crucial to make extensive use of the services of Special Representatives or Envoys in fact-finding or good-offices missions, bearing in mind the current increase in intra-State conflicts, especially in Africa and Europe. Given the lower cost of these missions as compared with the enormous cost of war in terms of human suffering and material damage, we believe that financial support should be forthcoming for these activities, and we encourage the Secretary-General to continue to carry them out.

Timely information to all States represented at the United Nations about peace operations will no doubt contribute to substantial support by the international community for the actions of the Secretary-General and the Security Council. This information should not only be timely, but in an appropriate form, so that every State can express its point of view on each case, whether writing to the Secretariat or at plenary meetings of the Council, so that Members may have broad and general information at their disposal before they take decisions.

The activities involved in post-conflict peace-building are among the most important instruments available to the Organization in promoting peace and security, because they lay down the foundations for lasting peace. We agree with the Secretary-General that all the activities which constitute this phase should be entrusted to multifunctional operations until normality is restored, when these tasks may be taken over by the programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system active in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields.

Central America is today an example of a movement from war to peace and from peace to democracy, and now we are working intensively on regional integration programmes to achieve sustainable development. We hope that the United Nations and the international community will continue to support the efforts of our countries to that end.

With regard to disarmament as an instrument for international peace and security, we, together with the Non-Aligned Movement, adhere to the principle that general and complete disarmament can be attained only in the multilateral forum provided by this Organization. We believe that the elimination of the manufacture, use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction will help to foster regional and world peace and security, as the Council recognized in resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and reiterated in its Summit declaration of 31 January 1992, when it stated that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, we consider it essential that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) be indefinitely and unconditionally extended at the Conference of the Parties to be held this year.

In his supplementary report the Secretary-General refers to "micro-disarmament", which we consider relevant both for the prevention of outbreaks of conflicts and for the process of post-conflict peace-building. We agree with his statement that the proliferation, trade and use of light arms and anti-personnel mines not only fuel conflicts, but also sap the limited resources of the countries that acquire them, which are usually developing countries. In this respect, we endorse the Secretary-General's appeal for continued priority to be given to the problem of the proliferation and export of anti-personnel mines and for the States producing them to declare a moratorium on their production and export.

With regard to sanctions as coercive measures for the resolution of conflicts, we believe that when such sanctions

are imposed they should be accompanied by measures that curtail their adverse effect on the civilian population and third countries. We therefore agree with the recommendations that when the Council imposes sanctions it should at the same time adopt measures to facilitate the work of the humanitarian agencies that assist sectors of the population affected by sanctions, and that a mechanism should be established to assess the collateral damage to third States, with a view to assisting those States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter.

The United Nations has more experience in peace-keeping than any other body. It has the structures for establishing, financing and directing such operations. On the other hand, regional organizations, with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, lack these structures, and for the most part their financial situation is worse than that of the United Nations. This situation remains an obstacle to regional organizations' assuming, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, a leading role in peace-keeping functions.

Consultations, diplomatic support through what have come to be called "Friends of the Secretary-General" or contact groups, technical or operational support, joint deployment of field missions and joint operations have all given proof of valuable and varied cooperation. We believe that in this area the Secretary-General should continue to hold periodic meetings, such as the one held on 1 August 1994, with the heads of regional organizations that have cooperated in peace-making and peace-keeping activities in order to assess that cooperation, with a view to augmenting it in the future.

Financing is one of the most important factors affecting the implementation of peace-keeping operations. As we all know, the demand for peace-keeping operations has grown in recent years, and the more extensive and complex the operations are, the greater the need for financial resources to be invested. The statistics on the costs of peace operations provided to us by the Secretary-General speak for themselves: they show that the sizeable increase in such costs exceeds to an alarming degree the budget for development activities.

On this point, we wish to draw attention to some elements that should be given serious study: first, for developing countries, the financial burden of having to make *pro rata* contributions to peace-keeping operations; secondly, the diversion to these operations of resources intended for economic and social development activities

in those countries; and, thirdly, the cutbacks in the programmes of United Nations specialized agencies when developing countries find it impossible to make regular contributions to them.

These are some of the problems underlying the high cost of peace operations. We therefore believe that a balance should be sought between the cost of these activities and the cost of economic and social development activities.

Finally, it is fitting to recall today the statement of the Security Council on the occasion of the first Summit meeting, where the members of the Council agreed that the world now has its best opportunity to achieve peace and security since the very creation of the United Nations. At that meeting members of the Council undertook the commitment to work in close cooperation with the Member States of the Organization in their efforts to solve their problems, in particular those pertaining to economic and social development. They also acknowledged that peace and prosperity are indivisible and that lasting peace and stability call for effective international cooperation to eradicate poverty and promote a better life for all within a broader concept of freedom.

**Mrs. Albright** (United States of America): Let me join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for the Secretary-General's timely and thought-provoking paper on ways to improve the peace and security role of the United Nations. The Secretary-General's observations are instructive, and they provide a useful summary of where we now stand in our collective effort to make United Nations peace-keeping a more effective instrument of collective security.

I particularly want to echo the Secretary-General's praise for the courage of United Nations peace-keepers, both military and civilian. They have performed ably, under what are often harsh circumstances and at considerable risk and sacrifice. They have earned the gratitude of us all.

Today I want to expand on the preliminary assessment I gave to the Secretary-General when he first presented his report to us earlier this month. In offering my Government's perspective on past lessons and future challenges, let me begin by saying that the Secretary-General has correctly pointed out that we are still in a time of transition.

Transitions go on for a long time. Certainly we can all hope that the upheavals in global politics triggered by the

end of the cold war several years ago will soon pass. But the experience of the last six years suggests that, unfortunately, turbulence, unrest and sometimes violent change will be with us for a protracted period. This means that all of us — the Member States, the Secretary-General and regional organizations, as well as the public — must learn to accept a new reality.

As much as we might wish it and need it, a new order of international affairs is not just around the corner. Our task is to make sense of the current era and learn to adjust our policies so that we may pursue the goal of a more secure world despite the turbulence we see around us.

The 21 United Nations peace-keeping operations established since 1988 — some of which have now been shut down — attest to the leadership of the Council and the willingness of the international community as a whole to address security concerns. But the results of our efforts to date have been mixed: success in Namibia, Iraq, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique; accomplishments diluted by frustration in Bosnia and Somalia; slow progress in Western Sahara; disappointment, now overtaken by the beginning of hope, in Angola; and grim tragedy in Rwanda.

Each of these missions has its own unique history, with unique factors contributing to the outcome. But, taken together, they provide a number of lessons which we would do well to heed.

Perhaps the most important lesson is that peace-keeping operations inside a country make different and greater demands on peace-keepers than do missions that separate two hostile States. Here the rules of peace-keeping may be harder to apply. The contending parties can be difficult to define or identify and are often self-selecting. Their "consent" to the terms of a peace-keeping mandate may be given and withdrawn; factional leaders may be unable to control followers; peace-keepers may be forced to choose between passivity in the face of destructive breaches of a mandate and forceful responses they are ill equipped to carry out.

As the Secretary-General has pointed out, these conditions entail considerable risk to peace-keepers. They complicate prospects for mission success and they may result in missions that fail to meet expectations. The reality is that we will continue to face situations in which we will want to conduct peace-keeping in accordance

with the traditional rules but where there will be no guarantee that operations so conducted will be adequate.

The recent successfully concluded mission in Mozambique, however, may help point the way. An extremely able and activist Secretary-General's Special Representative was supported by a well-organized and tightly coordinated donor community willing to apply leverage at key points, by intense diplomatic activity on the scene by a handful of influential countries with long-standing relations with the parties, and by a strong and supportive community of non-governmental organizations.

More generally, United Nations experience from Angola, Liberia and Somalia, and elsewhere, suggests additional adjustments in tactics. One of these should be a willingness to delay the start of a mission until the parties accept and observe for a trial period military and political steps towards a negotiated settlement. Refinements in the composition and resources provided to peace-keeping missions in intra-State conflicts are also needed in order to increase their political capacity while reducing costly and sometimes less critical military elements.

Broadly speaking, this may mean more observers and others with specialized skills, and less infantry. At the same time, we must ensure that missions have adequate support in the areas of transportation, communications and logistics to ensure that timely and appropriate responses to developments occur.

Another important lesson of recent years is the need for rigorous decision-making in deciding whether, and how, to initiate a peace operation. Over the past year, the Security Council has begun, with my Government's strong support, to ask tough questions about the cost, mandate, scope, risk and duration of proposed operations before Council action occurs.

The goal is to ensure that United Nations missions have clear and realistic objectives, that peace-keepers are equipped properly, that money is not wasted and that an endpoint to United Nations action can be identified. The new policy is working, and has resulted in fewer and smaller new operations, and better management of existing ones.

The success of our policy is the result of hard work by the Member States, the Security Council and the Secretary-General. All of us should be pleased. But I also believe we need to work harder to define more clearly the relative

roles and responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the area of peace operations.

There should be no doubt about the Security Council's responsibility for peace operations. I cannot accept the statement by the Secretary-General that the Security Council is engaged in micro-management because it seeks information about a peace operation. It is the Council's responsibility to create peace operations, to extend them, to alter them if necessary, and to terminate them if warranted. Those decisions can be made only on the basis of complete, accurate and timely information provided by the Secretariat. There should be no question about providing such information.

As I indicated in my original comments, we must also guard against any inclination to suggest that every time a United Nations operation succeeds it is due to the United Nations as an organization but when a mission runs into trouble it is the fault of the Member States.

A third important area of United Nations experience in recent years relates to the appropriate use of force by United Nations peace-keepers. The Secretary-General's paper maintains, and we fully agree, that peace-keeping and peace enforcement are not adjacent points on a continuum.

The challenge of keeping peace is far different and far simpler than the challenge of creating a secure environment in the midst of ongoing conflict. The precedent of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, where peace-enforcement tasks were given to a lightly armed force equipped only for peace-keeping, should not be repeated. Instead, the Council may continue, at times, to look to regional organizations or to individual Member States or ad-hoc coalitions when peace enforcement is required. The recent French action in Rwanda helped to stabilize the situation there and saved thousands of lives. In Haiti, the multinational force led by the United States has restored democratic rule, eased the humanitarian crisis and created a stable and secure environment.

It is essential, of course, that when the Council does turn to individual Member States or coalitions it retain the capacity to monitor such operations to ensure that they are conducted in accordance with accepted international principles.

The Secretary-General's paper discusses only briefly one element of enforcement action that merits more

consideration: the collaboration of regional military bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with United Nations peace-keeping forces, such as UNPROFOR). Given the experience, it is important we work together to develop reliable procedures for making such coordination operate more smoothly and effectively in support of Council objectives.

Another potential tool of conflict resolution is peace-building: the use of economic and social measures directed at the seeds of conflict. While a component of several recent multi-functional missions and of various aid programmes, the strategy has not been fully developed or exploited. The obstacles are familiar ones. Reluctant Governments may resist preventive measures or a continuing United Nations role after a conflict. Independent donor organizations must be persuaded to adjust policies and programmes. When peace-building is an element of peace-keeping, the task of coordinating human rights activities, targeted aid such as jobs programmes, judicial and other institutional reforms, development of social organizations has been difficult for the United Nations. Moreover, when a peace-keeping mission ends and there is no special representative to serve as the focal point, the continuity and coherence of peace-building efforts can be lost.

None of these problems is insurmountable. We should, however, be realistic in our expectations. Some situations may require more assistance than the international community can reasonably provide. But even seeking to accomplish realistic objectives requires reorganizing the way the international community responds to security-related concerns.

We must widen the scope of related issues and increase options for addressing them. A modest, but consequential, step, which I proposed some 18 months ago, would be to explore a mechanism whereby the Economic and Social Council could work in partnership with the Security Council to better identify and address economic and social tensions before the outbreak of conflict or after its conclusion.

The Secretary-General's paper contains also a valuable discussion of the Security Council's use of economic sanctions. My Government shares the concern expressed in the paper about the desirability of avoiding or reducing unintended and harmful collateral effects of sanctions. It should be noted, however, that every sanctions regime approved by the Council permits delivery of humanitarian supplies. And if there is humanitarian

suffering as a result of sanctions, let us place blame where it belongs — not on the Security Council but on the Government whose policies caused us to act.

Procedures designed to mitigate the unintended effects of sanctions should not be allowed to obstruct or so mitigate their effect as to render them useless as a means for influencing the behaviour of a Government that is defying the international community and law. Sanctions may be a blunt instrument, but they can be a useful one, and they are less blunt than the alternative, which is, all too often, the use of military force.

My Government hopes that this fiftieth anniversary year of the United Nations will mark continued improvements in the overall capacity of the United Nations to conduct and manage peace operations. Much has been accomplished over the last two years. We now have a reinforced Headquarters staff, Offices of Operations, and of Planning and Support, a 24-hour Situation Centre, a Training Unit, a Policy and Analysis Unit, a Mission Planning Service, peace-keeping stand-by arrangements and a forward logistical base and storage depot.

Despite these advances, further major progress is required. Readiness, as our experience in Rwanda so sadly demonstrated, is another. On this point, my Government questions whether the rapid reaction force proposed in the Secretary-General's paper is the right course of action at this time. Setting aside national forces for this exclusive purpose may result in high continuing costs at relatively little benefit.

We do, however, welcome efforts to eliminate costly delays in deploying United Nations missions once they have been authorized. For example, we support a rapidly deployable Headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit and an effort to develop a contracted standing lift capability.

We also look forward to improvements in the quality and readiness of United Nations forces through regional initiatives and bilateral cooperative arrangements, and for improving United Nations public affairs support for peace-keeping in theatre. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations has highlighted the need for action in many of these areas.

Along with such enhancements in peace-keeping capacity, further steps to assure more efficient use of peace-keeping funds are necessary. In particular,



standardization of personnel costs and better systems for peace-keeping mission cost control, accountability and procurement must be adopted.

The question of finance is critical to the United Nations ability to meet its peace and security responsibilities. One important dimension of this relates to the authorization of expenditures for new peace-keeping missions. Since 1992 the Secretary-General and groups of Member States repeatedly have emphasized the need to streamline start-up funding in a way that preserves accountability but avoids costly and dangerous delays in beginning missions.

This remains essential; action should be taken this year. We also hope to see further movement towards annualization of peace-keeping budgets and the introduction of a unified budget for all peace-keeping activities.

On a related matter, as my Government explained in a detailed statement to the General Assembly on 12 December 1994, the United States will work with other Members to devise a more fair and reliable system for financing peace-keeping, including a reduction in the United States share to 25 per cent.

These remarks on the United Nations peace and security role would not be complete without underscoring the importance my Government attaches to the issue of proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the indispensable cornerstone for assuring a more stable environment.

The NPT entered into force in 1970, and today, with nearly 170 Parties, is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement that is global in scope. As such, it serves as the principle international legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation. It is my hope that those countries represented here today will join in giving the strongest support to the Treaty at the upcoming NPT Review Conference by voting for its unconditional extension. Few acts would go as far in promoting global peace and stability.

In addition, as the Secretary-General indicates in his report, we need to take steps to control the proliferation of weapons that may kill in smaller numbers but contribute hugely to the violence and destruction we see today in so many corners of the world. In this regard, my Government welcomed warmly the General Assembly resolution calling for a global moratorium on and eventual elimination of all anti-personnel landmines.

Finally, let me make a point that is sometimes overlooked. While it is common to talk about the dramatic rise in peace-keeping, beginning in early 1992, the reality is that the growth has slowed and levelled off. In 1994 total peace-keeping personnel peaked at over 90,000. But during the past year the Security Council voted to end three missions, no major new operations were begun, and by year's end peace-keeping personnel had declined to 63,000. Nearly two-thirds of those now deployed on peace operations are in the former Yugoslavia. More than half of the current missions consist of fewer than 200 observers or peace-keepers.

I emphasize this trend not because we expect peace-keeping forces and costs to fall to historic levels. After all, the imminent mission in Haiti and the potential one in Angola will temporarily reverse this decline. Rather, I want to stress that, as the Security Council has learned some of the lessons of successful peace-keeping, it has grown more determined to apply them to proposals for new missions, or extensions of existing ones.

At the same time, other tools and options, such as preventive action and diplomacy or regional initiatives within a United Nations framework, are emerging, and some have been effective.

This is the direction I see for the future: an international community that has more and better choices for peace and security action but that provides reliable support for actions it asks the United Nations to undertake.

In closing, let me say that I have listened carefully to the comments of other members of the Council and I will listen to those by other members this afternoon. I would hope that our discussion of peace-keeping will continue in both open meetings, such as this one, and in informal consultations. Clearly, this issue will also continue to be of great interest in my own Government. Our national dialogue will continue, and I commit myself to work to bring these discussions to the best conclusion possible.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): There are still several speakers on my list. In view of the lateness of the hour, with the Council's consent, I shall suspend the

meeting now. The Council will resume consideration of the item at 3.15 p.m.

*The meeting was suspended at 1.30 p.m.*