


UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-FOURTH YEAR



2118th

MEETING: 28 FEBRUARY 1979

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MONTREAL AE/VIU

2118th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 28 February 1979, at 6 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdalla Yaccoub BISHARA (Kuwait).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2118/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in South-East Asia and its implications for international peace and security. [Letter dated 22 February 1979 from the representatives of Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council (S/13111)]

The meeting was called to order at 6.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in South-East Asia and its implications for international peace and security. [Letter dated 22 February 1979 from the representatives of Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council (S/13111)]

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken at the previous meetings, I invite the representatives of Angola, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Anderson (Australia), Mr. Kostov (Bulgaria), Mr. Barton (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Thiounn Prasith (Democratic Kampuchea), Mr. Florin (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Hollai (Hungary), Mr. Jaipal (India), Mr. Anwar Sani (Indonesia), Mr. Abe (Japan), Mr. Sangsomsak (Lao People's Democratic Republic), Tan Sri Zaiton Ibrahim (Malaysia), Mr. Dashtseren (Mongolia), Mr. Francis (New Zealand), Mr. Naik (Pakistan), Mr. Yango (Philippines), Mr. Jaroszek (Poland), Mr. Koh (Singapore), Mr. Guna-Kasem (Thailand), Mr. Ha Van

Lau (Viet Nam) and Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Democratic Kampuchea. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

3. Mr. THIOUNN PRASITH (Democratic Kampuchea) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you most sincerely for having allowed me to speak for the second time. This shows the importance you attach to the situation in my country, the result of the aggression and invasion of the Vietnamese armed forces.

4. With the exception, of course, of the representative of Viet Nam and his companions, who have all come to sing the same refrain—incidentally with different degrees of conviction—all representatives of independent and sovereign States who have spoken in the debate in the Council over the last few days have been unanimous in saying that the deep-lying and fundamental cause of the aggravation of the present situation in Kampuchea and the aggravation of the threat of war which it poses to the whole of South-East Asia derives from the invasion and occupation of Democratic Kampuchea by the colonialist Vietnamese armed forces.

5. The criminal activities of Viet Nam, its arrogance and its inveterate perfidy are the sole causes of the situation currently prevailing in Kampuchea and throughout South-East Asia. The representative of Viet Nam has come before the Council to weep here and pretend that his country is the victim, but that does not mislead anyone.

6. Viet Nam has sent troops to invade Democratic Kampuchea in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of non-alignment and international law. This crime has been condemned by the whole world. Viet Nam has allowed itself to get caught up in violence and war. It should disengage itself, it should withdraw all its armed forces from Kampuchea in accordance with the demands of all peoples that love peace, justice and independence throughout the world and the solution would be easy. Peace, security and stability would be restored in South-East Asia. The Vietnamese people themselves would then be able to live in peace finally because they would no longer have to serve as cannon-fodder to satisfy the expansionist and annexationist ambitions of their unbridled leaders. But Viet Nam persists in pursuing its criminal acts which are now familiar to everyone.

7. In my statement of 24 February [2115th meeting] I said that Viet Nam was the only country in the world capable of combining arrogance, perfidiousness and criminality to a degree which far transcended the level achieved by Nazi fascism. The Security Council, the United Nations and all peoples that love peace and justice, particularly those in South-East Asia and Asia, have learnt that. They are perfectly well aware that Viet Nam lied to them and cruelly deceived them by pretending, in spite of obvious evidence, that there were no Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, and in pledging in front of all the leaders of South-East Asia to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of South-East Asia. Yesterday evening the representative of the Vietnamese colonialists had the audacity once again to display arrogance and contemptuous scorn for the Council, not only by the gross slanders, calumnies and lies against the people and Government of Democratic Kampuchea that he uttered for a full half-hour but also by his distortion of history to the point where certain representatives here must have blushed or been forced to laugh, particularly those who were perfectly aware of the animosity and age-old hatred always felt by the people of Kampuchea for the Vietnamese invaders, aggressors and annexationists. For those who do not yet know, or are imperfectly aware of the history of relations between Kampuchea and Viet Nam, I should like to give them an explanation which will show that the representative of the Vietnamese colonialists is nothing but a criminal and an arrant liar.

8. In the first place, the representative of the Vietnamese colonialists spoke of "idyllic" relations between the people of Kampuchea and the people of Viet Nam. However, everyone knows that the two peoples have nothing in common. Their civilizations, their language, their customs, their habits and their beliefs are totally different. The people of Kampuchea has an age-old civilization and customs and habits which are more akin to those of the Thai, the Burmese and the Lao peoples. With Viet Nam, the people of Kampuchea has only one thing in common: by the dictates of history it came under the domination of the same colonial Power and, subsequently, under that of the same imperialist Power because, geographically, Kampuchea is contiguous with Viet Nam. There are two things we cannot choose in life—our parents and our geographical neighbours. The people of Kampuchea has always had an implacable hatred for Viet Nam because the Vietnamese have aggressive natures and are annexationists and swallows-up of the territory of others. The annexation by Viet Nam of the Kingdom of Champa and the territory of Kampuchea Krom belonging to Kampuchea is testimony to this. The Kingdom of Champa, founded in the second century, had an ancient and brilliant civilization in South-East Asia. The Vietnamese hordes from the north committed aggression and gradually annexed that territory. In 1471 the Vietnamese conquered the capital of Champa, which at that time was known as Vijaya, and they gave it the name of Bin Din. In 1693 they swallowed up Champa completely after having annexed the region of Phan Thiet. The Champa nation and people were exterminated by the Vietnamese and today there is no longer a Champa nationality. Viet Nam has formed the present Central Viet Nam out of what was formerly Champa. After the absorption of Champa, the Vietnamese hordes continued their expansion towards the territories of Kampuchea situated in the Mekong

delta. That is part of the present territory of South Viet Nam and is made up of the western region of the rivers Donai and the delta of the Mekong, formerly called Cochin China. That territory had been an integral part of Kampuchea for more than 2,000 years. The Vietnamese began to encroach on that territory from the very beginning of the seventeenth century so that by the time of the Second World War they had annexed about 65,000 square kilometres of southern Kampuchean territory, known as Kampuchea Krom, and absorbed about 1 million inhabitants of Kampuchea. In South Viet Nam right now those inhabitants number more than 4 million.

9. Those are the acts of aggression and annexation committed by the Vietnamese in the past. At the present time, in the twentieth century, the Vietnamese are continuing to act in the same way. Like a python, Viet Nam is swallowing up certain countries, territories and peoples, like Laos for example, and trying to do the same thing with Kampuchea. Just as in the time of the feudal lords, the colonialists and the imperialists, and right up to the time of Ho Chi Minh, that is, up to the present time, the Vietnamese have not changed their true nature: they are aggressors, annexationists and swallows of others' territories.

10. Kampuchea, a victim of acts of aggression and annexation by the Vietnamese that has successively lost important tracts of its territory and of its population in Kampuchea Krom, harbours profound national hatred of the aggressive Vietnamese, the annexationists and swallows of territory.

11. The people of Kampuchea are very familiar with the perfidy, subterfuge and hypocrisy of the Vietnamese. We bear them a very serious grudge. To maintain its vigilance, therefore, the people of Kampuchea has an expression which it keeps fresh in its memory. That expression is "Be careful you don't spill the boss's tea". That expression recalls the barbarous crimes of the *Yvon*—as the people of Kampuchea called the Vietnamese at that time. "*Yvon*" means savage. The names of "Viet Nam" and "Vietnamese" are very recent and are very little used by the people of Kampuchea. That expression recalls the barbarous crime of the *Yvon*, committed in 1813 near the Vaico canal. The *Yvon* buried Khmers alive up to the neck and on their heads lit fires of kindling over which they boiled tea for their chiefs. The victims in their pain would shake and move their heads in agony and it was then that the *Yvon* torturers would say to them "Be careful you do not spill the boss's tea".

12. All those bitter and painful experiences which have been accumulated by the people of Kampuchea have taught them to discern clearly the insatiable expansionist and annexationist ambitions of the Vietnamese, their political manoeuvrings, their military and diplomatic subterfuges and their efforts at seduction. But what are the factors which prompted the Vietnamese to pursue a policy of expansion and annexation? There are three.

13. The first factor is an economic one. Viet Nam is a poor country economically. Central Viet Nam has an area of roughly 148,000 square kilometres but only possesses small sandy plains along the sea coast. Away from the sea, there are only rocks and mountains along the frontier with Laos. That region is therefore very poor.

Tonkin, or North Viet Nam, covers an area of more than 100,000 square kilometres. It is also poor. There are plains along the Red River and in its delta, but their area is small compared to the size of the population. Furthermore, North Viet Nam has to face national disasters like floods, droughts and typhoons, and its land is not very fertile so it needs a lot of fertilizer. The Ho Chi Minh régime was unable to overcome the floods and other catastrophes and, 15 years after the departure of the French, only one or two provinces can reap more than seven tons per hectare of paddy. As for draught animals, there is an average of one ox and one water-buffalo for four families. In Kampuchea, on the other hand, each peasant family has about five hectares of land and one to two pairs of oxen or water-buffalo. With 181,000 square kilometres and 8 million people, Kampuchea can feed 15 to 20 million. That is why our country is coveted by the Vietnamese; that is why the Vietnamese want to seize the territories of other countries. In the north they are confronted with one stronger than they are; there are mountains to the west; consequently they came towards the south. After having swallowed up Champa, they came to Kampuchea Krom. After having swallowed that they went towards the north-west, that is to say, towards Kampuchea.

14. The second factor is the political one. This factor is to be found in Viet Nam's history from feudal times, but it is a much more weighty factor at present. After their revolution, the Vietnamese enjoyed a certain prestige in South-East Asia. At that time the international community gave them aid and support. Europe supported them; China helped and supported them. The Vietnamese at that time took advantage of that aid and used it as political support with a view to putting into effect their plans for expansion and annexation. They wanted to dominate the whole of Indo-China. They wanted to pose as Big Brother in Indo-China. In their country the Vietnamese obliged everyone, whatever their age, to call Ho Chi Minh "Uncle Ho". In Kampuchea they also had the people calling him "Uncle Ho". That fact, although it seems a minor detail, highlights the fact that at the time of Ho Chi Minh the ambition of the Vietnamese to dominate Kampuchea was even stronger than in feudal times. The Vietnamese want to seize Kampuchea to use it as a spring-board for their expansionism in South-East Asia. They have stated that after liberating Kampuchea and Laos they will also liberate South-East Asia. That voracious ambition is inculcated in all Vietnamese, whether they are officers, simple soldiers or mere civilians and as a result they all talk the same way. The Vietnamese want to satisfy their ambitions progressively because they have nationals in Kampuchea, Laos and Thailand. They want to swallow up Laos and Kampuchea so as to become a great Power and then extend their influence to South-East Asia. They are trying to create propitious conditions for dominating those countries through parties and by their control over the armed forces.

15. The third factor is the military one. This factor flows from the economic and political factors. The Vietnamese want to have a powerful military base in Indo-China on which they can rely in order to carry out their ambitions in South-East Asia. They have organized and gradually built up their forces and their military bases for the purpose of satisfying their political and economic ambitions. It might be objected that the Vietnamese are not able to build military bases because they are not rich

like the Americans. But past experience has shown that the Vietnamese, by directly penetrating the countries concerned, have carried out political and espionage activities and have created their own armies in those very countries. In Kampuchea, for example, they have on several occasions created an army composed of Khmers in their pay, to be used as a tool for their policy of annexation. They have acted thus not only in Kampuchea but also in other countries, there where they have nationals and there where they have been able to win the sympathy of the local population. Their objective is to create an armed organization devoted to their cause, and with such an armed organization in those countries they can gradually develop their activities and subsequently introduce their own forces from the outside, depending on the circumstances of the time. The Vietnamese acted in that way during Ho Chi Minh's time and at present they are continuing to act in this way.

16. It is after having properly identified these factors that one can understand that the cause of the conflict between Viet Nam and Kampuchea lies in the policy of expansion and annexation systematically pursued by the Vietnamese by every possible means—by gentle and surreptitious means, such as taking over parties, the army and State power, and by cruel and barbarous military means, as they are doing now.

17. In the second place, I should like to speak of the Indo-Chinese federation and Viet Nam's criminal activities aimed at setting it up. The Vietnamese party was set up in 1930 under the name of "The Indo-Chinese Communist Party". First, the name given to the Indo-Chinese Communist Party makes it clear that it was a party for the three countries of Indo-China. The choice of name for a party has political significance. Lenin did not call his party "the European Communist Party", as far as I know. So the name given to the Vietnamese party signifies that that party was both Vietnamese and for Laos and Kampuchea too. The choice of such a name reveals that the goal aimed at was the domination of the three countries. Secondly, the status of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party stipulates that that party was to build a totally independent Indo-China. The Party's slogan was to fight for an independent Indo-China with a view to creating an Indo-Chinese federation. Consequently, the strategic political programme of the Vietnamese Party was the creation of the Indo-Chinese federation, whose mission was to lead Kampuchea, Laos and Viet Nam in the struggle against French colonialism, to liberate the three countries, to build a federation with a political, economic and military entity; in other respects too it would constitute an entity built by a single Party, the Indo-Chinese Communist Party—which means just one country, one people and one army.

18. In the 1950s, since such an ambition could not be realized at one fell swoop, Viet Nam sought to present the problem in the guise of special solidarity and friendship, to be celebrated in agreements or treaties of special co-operation, without any limitation in all fields of domestic and external policy, in the military, economic and cultural fields. In other words, frontiers would be abolished so as to join Kampuchea to Viet Nam within an Indo-Chinese federation under the yoke of the Vietnamese. In that way, Viet Nam would take over the Party, the power, the army, the economy and the domestic and foreign policies of the country to the point that Kampuchea

would become an integral part of Viet Nam and the people of Kampuchea a national minority which would gradually disappear like the Chams. That is what Viet Nam is aiming at in Laos and what it is trying to do in Kampuchea.

19. What exactly is the meaning of the Indo-Chinese federation? It is nothing more than the application of the famous doctrine of limited sovereignty, that is to say, the subjugation of small States by a large world or regional Power. Thus, the struggle which has always been going on between Kampuchea and Viet Nam, particularly since 1930, is the struggle between, on the one hand, the people of Kampuchea to defend and safeguard its national independence, its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and its right to decide its own destiny, to defend the honour and national dignity of the nation as well as the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of non-alignment, and, on the other hand, the Vietnamese policy of annexation, of an Indo-Chinese federation, of limited sovereignty, of expansion in South-East Asia, the Vietnamese ambition to become a great regional Power and the brazen violation of the Charter and the principles of non-alignment. Since 1930 the Vietnamese have done everything in their power and have undertaken all kinds of activities—sabotage, infiltration, murder, attempted coups d'état, open aggression and invasion such as that which is taking place now—in order to achieve their goal, namely, the setting up of an Indo-Chinese federation under Vietnamese domination and, using that spring-board, to aim at South-East Asia as a whole.

20. In the third place, I should like to offer some explanations of the so-called assistance given by the Vietnamese to the Kampuchean revolution. I do not want to take up too much time and shall therefore confine my remarks to the major facts which have occurred since 1954. After the Geneva Agreements,¹ Ngo Dinh Diem exerted fierce repression against the members of the Vietnamese party and eliminated about 70 per cent of them in 1957-1958. The Vietnamese revolution had practically lost control of the situation and many present Vietnamese leaders at that time took refuge in Kampuchea, which was neutral and which became a base where they could hide out and cross over to Hong Kong or Canton, China. In 1957, Le Duan himself, the present head of the Vietnamese colonialists, escaped with his life only because of the refuge he was able to find in Phnom Penh and because he was able to pass through Kampuchea with the assistance of the Kampuchean revolution.

21. In order to escape total annihilation, the Viet Cong arrived and installed themselves in the Khmer territory along the Kampuchean frontier from Kamong Trach, in the province of Svay Rieng, up to Snuol, in the province of Kratie. In 1965 there were 150,000 Viet Cong installed in Kampuchea to a depth of from 2 to 5 kilometres from the frontier, from Romeas Hek, in the province of Svay Rieng, to Rattanakiri, in the region called the Naga's tail, in the extreme northeastern part of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese continue to utter lies everywhere in order to have it believed throughout the world that they have won "crushing victories". In fact, they were already on the territory of Kampuchea. Those who were unaware of this reality thought that the Viet Cong had come to "help" the

Kampuchean revolution. But in fact, the Viet Cong could not remain in South Viet Nam because of the policy of strategic villages carried out by Ngo Dinh Diem on the advice of Robert Thompson.

22. Thus, the Viet Cong benefited in Kampuchea—first, from sanctuary, which included sanctuary for the committee directing the revolution in South Viet Nam; secondly, from economic factors, for in fact the Vietnamese depended totally on Kampuchea in this field; and thirdly, from the fact that communication lines to the north-east and east of Kampuchea were linked to those coming from Laos and the seaport of Kompong Som. The transport of arms and munitions from that port in one month was equivalent to what had been transported in three years over the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos.

23. The Viet Cong had installed in Kampuchea their armed forces, their hospitals, their artists' groups, their transport and support services and all leading organs, from the Central Committee down to the provincial and district committees. For example, the provincial committee of Quang Duc was installed at Koh Nhek in the province of Rattanakiri. In 1970 the number of Viet Cong installed in Kampuchea varied between 1.5 and 2 million men. There were 80,000 wounded Vietnamese who were cared for permanently in Viet Cong hospitals installed on Kampuchean territory.

24. The people and the revolution of Kampuchea were always the benefactors of the Vietnamese. They always accorded them aid and assistance, hid them and gave them refuge, food, rice and so forth. They acted in that way because they believed that the Viet Cong were friends and revolutionaries. But, in installing themselves in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese had not left behind their ambition of swallowing up Kampuchea through the Indo-Chinese federation. To that end, they secretly organized agents whom they infiltrated into the ranks of the Kampuchean revolution, secretly created a State power against the leadership of the Kampuchean revolution, attacked and constantly vilified the Kampuchean revolution because it was independent and refused to subjugate itself to them and sabotaged the economy of Kampuchea, particularly through smuggling, corruption and the pillaging of natural resources. They created disorder and strife everywhere and carried out espionage and sabotage. From 1967 on, the people and cadres of Kampuchea vigorously opposed all the criminal activities of the Viet Cong, because the latter used their presence in Kampuchea and the so-called special solidarity propagated by them to implement their strategy for an Indo-Chinese federation. Thus, in spite of the difficult situation in which they found themselves at that time, the Viet Cong had not abandoned that strategy.

25. All those experiences were very harsh for the people of Kampuchea. From 1965 on, the struggle between the people of Kampuchea and the Viet Cong became very hard and bitter, because in coming to Kampuchea the Vietnamese not only wanted to live there but also were preparing the strategic forces to overthrow the revolutionary power at the right time and to swallow up Kampuchea. In 1970, when the coup d'état took place in Kampuchea, the Viet Cong, instead of fighting the American army and the Saigon army, fled like a tidal wave and took refuge even deeper in Kampuchean territory. They

¹ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

practically invaded Kampuchea. Their headquarters were installed on the west bank of the Mekong, to the west of the city of Kratie. At that time the Kampuchean army was not strong enough to resist them. In the course of their invasion, the Viet Cong literally pillaged everything in their path.

26. For the duration of the war of liberation of 1970, the Viet Cong incessantly carried out manoeuvres and activities with the aim of profiting from their presence in Kampuchea to prepare for the annexation of the country after liberation. Yesterday, the representative of Viet Nam spoke of the military operations of Chen La which took place at the end of 1970 and claimed that Kampuchea had appealed to the Vietnamese army for assistance. That is another new and big lie. In fact, the Vietnamese army which had invaded Kampuchea in 1970 and 1971 conducted itself as if it were at home. It had to defend itself against the attacks of the Americans and Lon Nol. We told the Viet Cong army to go and fight in Viet Nam, but they were frightened of the American army and of the Saigon army. We needed two years of effort and patience before we could prevail upon them to go and fight in Viet Nam.

27. Indeed, the fundamental position of the Kampuchean revolution was that the revolution in each country must be carried out by the people of that country, without outside intervention. That is a position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. This position was always resisted by Viet Nam because it always ran counter to its own doctrine of limited sovereignty and its strategy for an Indo-Chinese federation. That is why in that period from 1970 to 1975 the Viet Cong used every means and manoeuvre to force Kampuchea to accept the creation of Kampuchea-Viet Nam joint military commands and joint organs of power. Viet Nam wanted to force us to accept Vietnamese personnel at all levels of our military units and organs of power. The goal was clear: to benefit from the difficult time Kampuchea was going through, in order to take over the army and State power in Kampuchea and to prevail upon Kampuchea to join the Indo-Chinese federation. We refused, in spite of great pressure and assassination threats from the Vietnamese.

28. After that refusal, the Vietnamese organized secretly in Kampuchea a parallel State power and a parallel army composed of Vietnamese nationals in Kampuchea and a few traitors that they were able to corrupt. The Kampuchean revolution had to resist them by violent struggle in order to make Viet Nam dissolve this parallel State power and army, which constituted intolerable intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea. Also, taking advantage of the sanctuaries they had found in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese stealthily created military and medical training schools in Kampuchea for the agents whose job was to serve them later on within the framework of the Indo-Chinese federation. Here again we had to fight to force the Vietnamese to close those schools.

29. In the face of the resistance of the people and the revolution in Kampuchea against the attempts at domination of the country, the Vietnamese planned to assassinate our leaders because they were unable to win them over to their cause for an Indo-Chinese federation. Thus, in November 1970, they tried to poison them in the course

of negotiations taking place in Kampuchea, near the Stung Chinut River, and on several other occasions after liberation.

30. Along with their actions aimed at having the leaders of the Kampuchean Communist Party assassinated and their activities aimed at setting up a puppet army and State power, the Vietnamese committed criminal acts of an extremely Fascist kind against the people of Kampuchea. In July 1973, in the south-west region, in the village of Sre Knong, district of Chhuk, province of Kampot, the Viet Cong arrested the Chairman of the village and, when the inhabitants demonstrated to demand his liberation, they beat up the demonstrators, arrested Buddhist monks, women and children, shut them up in a single house with the Chairman of the village and burned down the house, thus burning alive six persons. When they saw the Vietnamese burning these inhabitants alive, the guerrilla units of the village and the people of the locality counter-attacked. The population and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea, having learned of the crimes of the Vietnamese, rose up and attacked them everywhere until the Vietnamese took flight.

31. In the course of the 1970-1975 war of liberation, the People's Republic of China gave us much military assistance: arms, munitions and vehicles. But they accumulated along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier because the Vietnamese allowed them through at a mere trickle. Throughout that five-year war, from 1970 to 1975, more than 80 per cent of the arms and munitions used by our army came from captured war supplies. Here is an instructive example: in 1974, with a view to preparing for the general offensive of 1 January 1975, we asked Viet Nam to transport to us 40 million cartridges for AK rifles. In exchange for this we supplied Viet Nam with tens of thousands of tons of rice. They gave a verbal promise that they would carry out this transportation in good time. But, in actual fact, when did we receive these munitions? Only in 1976, that is, one year after the liberation of the country. The Vietnamese did everything they could to prevent the revolution of Kampuchea from being able to liberate Phnom Penh before Saigon was liberated.

32. From 1970 to 1975, the revolution in Kampuchea saved the Vietnamese who were drowning and on the point of going under. The revolution in Kampuchea successfully defended the soil of Kampuchea; we offered refuge and provisions to the Vietnamese so that they could regain their strength and go and fight in their own country. But the Vietnamese are more ungrateful than crocodiles!

33. Orally and in letters the Vietnamese always expressed to the leaders of Kampuchea—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Chairman of the State Presidium, Khieu Samphan, and Prime Minister Pol Pot—their "infinite and eternal gratitude for the immense aid which Kampuchea had given to Viet Nam". But, despite this verbal gratitude and thanks, the Vietnamese were feverishly bent on destroying the Kampuchean revolution and annexing Kampuchea. Thus, at the very time when the revolution of Kampuchea was saving them from total collapse, they wanted to bring it down in order to take over Kampuchea. They opposed everything which could make the Kampuchean revolution independent. That is why on the battlefields there were often fights between

the revolutionary army of Kampuchea and the Viet Cong. The Kampuchean fighters could no longer tolerate them, in spite of the recommendations constantly being made by the leaders of Kampuchea that they should strive to preserve solidarity with the Vietnamese because at that time we were fighting a common enemy.

34. After the liberation of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese, in May 1975, began to invade and occupy an island of Kampuchea, Koh Way. Furthermore, they refused to leave the Kampuchean territory where they had come to take refuge, claiming that that territory belonged to them. Everywhere along the frontier they created endless provocations, launching incessant attacks against the troops of the revolutionary army of Kampuchea. Furthermore, they sent many Vietnamese nationals to take up their abode on the territory of Kampuchea, for example, at Pean Chor, in the province of Prey Veng. At Kaam Samnor, province of Kandal, the Vietnamese attacked Kampuchean troops right after 17 April 1975.

35. Why did the Vietnamese launch these attacks and create these incidents along the frontiers and why did they take over Kampuchean islands? Vietnamese agents who had infiltrated the ranks of the Kampuchean revolution and were arrested by the revolutionary power in 1976 said that the Vietnamese exerted this pressure along the frontiers for three reasons: first, so that the Government of Democratic Kampuchea should not be able to consolidate its power; secondly, to see to it that Kampuchea was unable to defend itself and to create conditions that would enable it as time went by to take over parts of Kampuchean territory; thirdly, to encourage their agents that had infiltrated the ranks of the Kampuchean revolution. The Vietnamese acted with the purpose of permitting their agents to take over revolutionary power in Kampuchea and, according to their plan, when their agents had legally taken over power they would send as many troops to Kampuchea as they wanted.

36. Along with these attacks on the frontiers, Viet Nam, through its agents, fomented many attempts at coups d'état, all of which failed. The last was that of May 1978; it was also perhaps the most significant attempt because, that time, the plan for the coup d'état had been prepared directly by the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese Party and by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. This last attempt at a coup d'état fomented by Viet Nam was designed to overthrow the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Among the Vietnamese who received the order to penetrate Kampuchea directly from the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese Party there were the following names: Hay So, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Viet Nam, Pham Trung Hieu, alias Ba Hai, assistant, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Viet Nam and former adviser at the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam at Phnom Penh, and four other persons—Nguyen Gia Dang, alias Tu Cam, Ba Ha, Bai Mab and Mai Viet—all belonging to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Viet Nam, as assistants. In a word, Viet Nam continued to utter lies and to protest that it wanted "to negotiate with Kampuchea in order peacefully to solve the problem". It said that "Viet Nam has no intention of forcing Kampuchea to enter the Indo-Chinese federation" and "Viet Nam respects the independence and

sovereignty of Democratic Kampuchea". The present invasion is sufficient proof that Viet Nam was lying.

37. In the fourth place, the representative of Viet Nam raised the frontier problem. I do not want to expatiate on that problem; I would merely like to say the following.

38. The present frontier between Kampuchea and Viet Nam is the disastrous result of acts of aggression and annexation perpetrated by the Vietnamese reactionaries and feudal lords. Because of these acts of aggression and annexation, Kampuchea lost 65,000 square kilometres of its territory to Viet Nam, as well as several islands and a major portion of its territorial waters. But the frontier between Kampuchea and Viet Nam exists, and the people of Kampuchea wish only to live in peace, as masters of their territory and their territorial waters, within their present frontiers, which are delimited in historic documents—texts and maps. By the solemn declaration of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam dated 31 May 1967, and by the solemn declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam dated 8 June 1967, Viet Nam successively stated that it recognized and committed itself to respect the present frontiers of Kampuchea. Why, today, does Viet Nam no longer wish to respect its commitments? It is true that everyone now knows that the commitments undertaken by the Vietnamese are only scraps of paper.

39. In the fifth place, the representative of Viet Nam spoke yesterday evening of so-called genocide in Kampuchea. I would first ask him whether he is not ashamed of himself, for everyone is aware of the following facts:

First, the Vietnamese people are at the present time dying of hunger. Officially, the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique admits that Viet Nam needs 5 million tons of rice for the year 1979. Each Vietnamese can have only 7 kilograms of rice a month, when he really needs at least 20 kilograms. How many hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese are going to die of hunger every day?

Secondly, the Vietnamese authorities are massacring the people of South Viet Nam, and in particular the national minorities, including the Khmers Krom who, at the present time, along with the other national minorities of the highlands within their organization, FULRO, are fighting Vietnamese oppression, weapons in hand. The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is bombing the towns and villages of the Khmers Krom and massacring these people, and it accuses the revolutionary army of Kampuchea of these crimes. How could the very powerful Vietnamese army permit the army of Kampuchea to penetrate so deeply into Vietnamese territory, to the point where it could destroy entire towns? The representative of the Vietnamese colonialists takes us for fools.

Thirdly, because of the famine and the oppression, thousands of Vietnamese refugees are fleeing their country. The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique does not shrink from cashing in on this organized flight. Miss Holtzman, a member of the United States House of Representatives, who has just come back from Viet Nam, has spoken of a veritable "racket" organized by the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique which has already brought that clique about \$30 million. Each refugee has to pay \$2,800 to \$3,400 to

leave his country. How many more tens of thousands of Vietnamese will be forced to use these sordid methods in order to have some hope of remaining alive? And how many more are going to be drowned during their flight?

Fourthly, the South Vietnamese accuse the North Vietnamese of coming to exploit and oppress them. Indeed, corruption, debauchery and degeneracy reign in the North as well as in the South.

40. Such are the rights which the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique grants to the Vietnamese.

41. With regard to Kampuchea, I invite the representatives to give some thought to the following questions.

42. To begin with, Kampuchea is a small country, a country of 181,000 square kilometres, with a population of 8 million. But every farming family has an average of 5 hectares of land—that is to say, it cannot work all of its land. Furthermore, Kampuchea has emerged from a devastating war which destroyed 70 to 80 per cent of its rice paddies, fields, plantations, factories and infrastructure and which left 1,200,000 dead or wounded, that is, 15 per cent of the total population. What reason would we have to decrease the number of our population when we have an urgent need of manpower to reconstruct and develop our ravaged country? Quite the contrary, we have united all the social strata to that end; we have improved the health of the people and increased the birth rate. Democratic Kampuchea is probably the only country in the world where there is no family planning. The representative of the Vietnamese colonialists was not happy yesterday, certainly because we have eliminated all the Vietnamese agents who had infiltrated our ranks and were oppressing our people.

43. Next, during these three and a half years of national reconstruction, we solved the fundamental problem of food supplies; we have begun to export rice once again, while famine is ravaging Viet Nam. We have improved the living conditions of the people. American journalists who visited our country just before the Vietnamese invasion were unanimous in stating that all the people had enough to eat, were living in increasingly comfortable houses, were quite well dressed and were obviously healthy because they had adequate health care. Can anyone think that we could have achieved these results without the unanimous and enthusiastic participation of the people?

44. Lastly, if the people were really unhappy and had risen up against our Government, why is the present fight against the Vietnamese colonialist occupation waged by our people under the leadership of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea becoming ever more intense with the passing of each day? How are the people of Kampuchea and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea able to eliminate, on the average, 200 to 300 Vietnamese invaders a day? Why are the Vietnamese colonialists unable to control either the population or the countryside, and why are they still walled up in towns besieged and encircled by our people and our army? Why do the people of Kampuchea continue to combat the Vietnamese invaders and why have they not fled abroad like the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who can no longer tolerate the oppressive yoke of the Le Duan-Pham Van

Dong clique? The reason is that the people of Kampuchea are determined to defend the régime which they freely chose and to defend their national soil, their civilization and their national identity. Even Khmer nationals abroad are united with the people of Kampuchea and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea in opposing and wishing to drive out all Vietnamese from Democratic Kampuchea, and, as in the past, they will certainly drive them out.

45. In the sixth place—and this is the last point I have to make—I should like to give you the most recent example of the charlatanism of the Vietnamese.

46. For two months now, for the needs of their invasion of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese and their allies have often spoken of someone called Heng Samrin, the alleged leader of the so-called People's Revolutionary Council installed by the Vietnamese occupation troops at Phnom Penh, which they have temporarily occupied.

47. Permit me today to introduce that person to the Council. Heng Samrin was born in the village of Anlong Kreuz, in the commune of Daun Tey, in the district of Ponhea Krek, province of Kompong Cham, in eastern Kampuchea. Among the whole Kampuchean people, you can ask if anyone has ever heard of this name Heng Samrin alias Rin or Weuk. No one knows him. But if we ask the same question of the brigands along the Kampuchea-Viet Nam border and among the gangsters, everyone knows Heng Samrin alias Weuk.

48. In 1955, this Heng Samrin became head of a gang which stole cattle from the people of Kampuchea to sell in Viet Nam. They smuggled goods of various kinds from Viet Nam to Kampuchea.

49. In 1960, the Viet Cong, which were carrying out activities along the Kampuchea-Viet Nam border, near the commune of Daun Tey in the district of Ponhea Krek, got in touch with this gang leader and entrusted him with the task of collecting rice, poultry and cattle for them. They even gave him a carbine so that he could do the job. With that rifle and the support of the Viet Cong, Heng Samrin intensified his robberies and his thefts of rice, poultry and cattle from the people of Kampuchea in order to supply the Viet Cong, who named him chairman of the economic committee entrusted with the provision of food.

50. In 1960 there was a movement of Khmers along the Kampuchea-Viet Nam border stealing the rice from the people. As he was already a gang leader, Heng Samrin immediately declared himself head of the Khmer Serei movement near the commune of Daun Tey and intensified his crimes along the frontier, killing people and stealing their rice, poultry and cattle, which he then used to supply the Viet Cong. Satisfied with the services rendered by Heng Samrin, the Viet Cong brought him into the Workers' Party of Viet Nam.

51. In 1970, at the time of the coup d'état in Kampuchea, with the revolutionary movement of Kampuchea on the upsurge, Heng Samrin, who had contracted an enormous blood debt to the people of Kampuchea, was frightened of punishment by the people and enlisted in the Viet Cong army. The Viet Cong hid him, defended

him and had him carry out activities against the Kampuchean revolution and the National United Front of Kampuchea right up to the liberation of Kampuchea in April 1975.

52. In 1977 the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique used its armed forces to launch large-scale attacks in order to take over Kampuchea, and they sent this Heng Samrin to carry out sabotage activities within the revolutionary army of Kampuchea and to gather information along the frontier. In November 1977 Heng Samrin's activities were exposed, but he succeeded in fleeing to Viet Nam before the Government of Democratic Kampuchea was able to capture him.

53. Since they could find no one who would agree to become a lackey or a traitor, the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique, crooks as they are, got Heng Samrin, the former chief of the frontier brigands, and set him up to play the part of the so-called chairman of what they term the Revolutionary Committee.

54. This was a fine alliance! A gang leader, a frontier cattle-rustler, Heng Samrin, alias Weuk, had become the lackey of the head of the brigands and swallows of territory, the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique! Since we know the conduct of the lackey, we can easily recognize the conduct of his master, which is the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique. In all languages there exists the saying, "Birds of a feather flock together". Everyone knows that axiom.

55. In conclusion: the scene played by the representative of the Vietnamese colonialists yesterday in the Council would have been a very ridiculous farce, a piece of comedy; it would have been a simple melodrama, or a vulgar tragicomedy, were it not for the fact that behind the macabre masquerade are tens of thousands of dead, vast devastation and immeasurable sufferings which the Vietnamese invaders have inflicted and continue to inflict on Democratic Kampuchea in order to annihilate the nation and people of Kampuchea and transform Kampuchea into a Vietnamese province through the Vietnamese "Indo-Chinese federation". The representative of the Vietnamese colonialists said that it was with this gang leader, Heng Samrin, and his gang that the Pham Van Dong clique claimed to have signed a so-called treaty which supposedly permitted the Vietnamese invading force indefinitely to occupy Kampuchea and to continue to massacre the people of Kampuchea. To accept such a macabre farce would be to reward the aggressor, the invader; it would be to encourage the colonialism and imperialism of Viet Nam and its aim to step up and expand its war of expansion in South-East Asia, a war that will inevitably engulf the whole world.

56. This sinister Vietnamese masquerade exposes the total contempt with which the Vietnamese and their allies treat the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the United Nations, the non-aligned movement and all countries throughout the world that love peace, justice and independence. Viet Nam has actually dared shamelessly to take a gang leader, a cattle-rustler, and try to pass him off as a head of State. It is this gang leader and his gang that Viet Nam and its allies want to force the United Nations, the non-aligned movement and all the countries of the world to recognize as the legitimate Government of

Kampuchea. This too shows the arrogant scorn and contempt which they have for the heroic people of Kampuchea. Indeed, Viet Nam is cynical enough to combine perfidy, arrogance and criminality to an unprecedented degree. On that score, it could be given the heroic medal which all its allies think it should be awarded.

57. The PRESIDENT: I should like to make a short statement on behalf of the delegation of KUWAIT.

58. I am grateful to all members of the Council and to those who are not members for their kind words and expressions of encouragement and for the support that has been demonstrated in a most constructive manner during the current deliberations of the Council. I am indebted to all the members of the Council for their co-operation, understanding, constructive approach and sense of accommodation which have enabled the Council to proceed smoothly in dealing with one of the most complicated items it has ever faced in recent years.

59. I am also indebted to the Secretary-General for his support, encouragement, guidance and advice, without which matters would have been more difficult. To him I am grateful. I am also grateful to the Under-Secretary-General and to his dedicated staff for their valuable assistance.

60. The Government of Kuwait opposes any foreign interference in the domestic affairs of any other State. In January, Kuwait joined with other non-aligned members of the Council in sponsoring a draft resolution [S/13027] that never got off the ground because of the power of the veto. We opposed the action taken by Viet Nam in Kampuchea. We maintain that position of opposition. The recent developments that have complicated the situation in Indo-China as a result of the Chinese invasion of Viet Nam are unacceptable to us. We firmly opposed China's action against Viet Nam. In no circumstances can we accept its talk of "teaching lessons". We call upon China to withdraw its forces from Viet Nam and to put an end to its intensified campaign of military invasion. We believe that China's action is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

61. The issue is complex. It cannot be viewed in isolation from the situation in the rest of the region. China's action against Viet Nam cannot be separated from the action of Viet Nam in Kampuchea. The Government of Kuwait opposes China's action as it opposed the involvement of Viet Nam in Kampuchea. The imperative now is to secure the withdrawal of all foreign troops to their own respective countries.

62. Though we deplore the human rights record of the Pol Pot régime, we do not believe that Viet Nam is justified in resorting to force in order to correct it. No Government should take the law into its own hands. The world would not be a safe place in which to live if States felt free to interfere in the domestic affairs of others.

63. I should like to make some observations in my capacity as PRESIDENT. I have seen what is beautiful in the work of the Council and what is not. The presidency of the Council is crippling and restrictive and at times generates a sense of loneliness and frustration. Some speakers asked why the Council did not act speedily. That

is easier said than done. The work of the Council generates its own momentum. It is wise to move when the time is ripe. I have tried to bridge the gap between views that are poles apart. I drafted four working papers in the hope of reaching a consensus. Regrettably, none of them obtained the required consensus. The threat of veto shot them all down in flames. The Council is therefore crippled for the moment. I resisted pressure to act in a manner that could have been counter-productive. I was addressed in language that I would not have accepted had I not been restricted by the presidency. I have seen how the Security Council has been unfairly treated. I might say that it has been abused and misused. The expression "teaching a lesson" has been overused in this debate. One of the lessons I have been taught and learnt is to be prepared for surprises. Nevertheless, I must stress in the positive sense the spirit of co-operation that I have received from all members, particularly those directly involved. It is my feeling that the President of the Council can be surprised, but he may not surprise members.

64. I have tried to be fair to every side. I have held consultations with every member. Unfortunately, I was forced to give up because I felt that I was trying to square the circle, to reconcile the irreconcilable.

65. I see no harm in the fact that I was mildly criticized as President for taking initiatives that did not tally with the views of some members. In such a situation there must be someone to be a scapegoat. I do not mind being mildly criticized. I feel that I have tried my best to obtain a compromise. I leave the Council presidency with a clear conscience.

66. It is important to draw a line between firmness and leniency. It is also important to note that too much patience produces confusion and too much firmness creates antagonism. I have noted with appreciation the concern of members and non-members over the situation in South-East Asia. This concern is legitimate and justified. But we should not be selective in our concern about issues that threaten peace and security in the world. We must strive to place international interests above our narrow national interests if we want to be faithful to the provisions of the Charter. It is also wise to draw a line between impartiality and passivity. Impartiality must be strictly observed. Passivity is helplessness. The work of the Council gets more complicated if passivity finds a shelter behind impartiality.

67. My final observation is that I feel that the presidency of the Council at a time of crisis such as the one we are facing entails being denied basic human rights such as physical comfort and freedom of movement. It is physically restrictive, totally monopolizing and sometimes unbearable.

68. It is very fortunate that 1979 is not a leap year. February of 1979 is usual in the number of its days, but unusual in terms of the gravity of the issue facing the Council, an issue that will remain in the lap of the Council for a long time.

69. I thank members for their patience.

The meeting rose at 8 p.m.

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