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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

REQUEST FOR A HEARING (A/C.4/35/3/Add.10)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to a request for a hearing in connexion with agenda item 85 contained in document A/C.4/35/3/Add.10.
2. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said that his delegation's consistent principle had been to oppose requests for hearing and the discussion of statements in connexion with agenda item 85. He requested that his delegation's opposition should be reflected in the summary record.
3. The CHAIRMAN said that the statement by the representative of Indonesia would be duly reflected in the summary record and that, if he heard no further comments, he would take it that the Committee wished to grant the request for a hearing.
4. It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 85: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued)

Hearing of petitioners

5. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to its decisions, taken at its 8th, 9th, 10th and 12th meetings respectively, to grant requests for hearing as contained in documents A/C.4/35/3/Add.4-6, Add.8 and Add.10. The Committee also had before it a letter dated 9 October 1980 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman (A/C.4/35/6/Add.1).
6. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Dunn (Human Rights Council of Australia), Miss Picken (Amnesty International), Miss Jolliffe (Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights) and Mr. La Rocque (Center for Defense Information) took places at the petitioners' table.
7. Mr. ANDERSON (Professor of Government and Asian Studies at Cornell University) said that the attempted annexation of East Timor by Indonesia had had devastating consequences, not only for East Timor, but also for Indonesia and that the Indonesian Government's misrepresentation of the facts to the outside world had been matched by no less serious misrepresentations to its own people. In point of fact, at no time during the long Indonesian struggle for independence nor during the various régimes following independence up until 1975 had any significant group in Indonesia expressed the slightest interest in Portugal's remote Asian colony of East Timor. Only when that Territory, held by the Portuguese for more than 400 years, had threatened to free itself from colonialism, 30 years after Indonesia's own proclamation of independence, had an Indonesian Government decided to intervene. It was thus utterly false to claim that the annexation of East Timor was a response to deeply felt, long-standing ties of national brotherhood; the same false argument based on so-called ethnic

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(Mr. Anderson)

grounds could be used to justify the annexation of East and West Malaysia, some of the southern provinces of Thailand, Papua New Guinea and most of the Philippines.

8. The attempted annexation bore no relation to Indonesian popular nationalism, as could be seen from the Government's domestic handling of the issue. Tight censorship had been imposed on foreign correspondents since the invasion of East Timor in December 1975 and the Indonesian mass media had been obliged to maintain the fiction that East Timor had been rescued from radical members of the Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) by loyal East Timorese integrationists and brotherly Indonesian "volunteers". Virtually nothing had been reported to the Indonesian public about the serious counter-insurgency campaigns of 1977-1979, which had cost the lives of perhaps 200,000 East Timorese "brothers" as the result of violence, disease and malnutrition. Nor had any casualty figures been revealed, although the Indonesian military losses had been the most severe since the national revolution. However, military operations involving 30,000 troops, aerial bombardments, naval shellings and blockades and the virtual internment of tens of thousands of East Timorese in so-called "resettlement" camps could hardly be kept entirely secret, as could be seen from the horrified reports circulating among the Indonesian Roman Catholic clergy, the nearly standard bribes paid by members of the Indonesian armed forces to avoid service in East Timor, reports of Indonesian soldiers attacking their own officers, and an Indonesian student leader's recent description of the East Timorese nationalists as comrades in the struggle against Indonesian oppression.

9. From a diplomatic point of view the cost to Indonesia of the East Timor adventure had also been very high. It had been extremely humiliating to one of the early fighters against colonialism to have the claimed "integration" of East Timor repeatedly repudiated by the United Nations General Assembly. Even the United States, so far Indonesia's firmest diplomatic and military supporter, had been forced to concede publicly that no valid exercise of the East Timorese people's right to determine their own future had ever taken place. Such stinging rebuffs could not be concealed from the Indonesian people, nor had the Government been able to offer its people any plausible explanation.

10. East Timor had posed economic problems no less serious than the military and diplomatic ones. Testimony before the United States Congress in December 1979 had revealed that no less than 200,000 people in East Timor, one third of the entire population, were living in the so-called "resettlement areas", which involved removing and concentrating people into camps where the army could control them. The resettlement project had had the further consequence of making East Timor permanently dependent on food imports. The devastating effect of resettlement had been such that outside agencies had felt the need to donate at least \$9 million for emergency relief in East Timor. Furthermore, the Indonesian Government, which had repeatedly tried to justify its actions by claiming that East Timor was not economically viable and could not support its population, had recently designated the region a transmigration zone to which peasants from Indonesia would be relocated. The transmigration programme was clearly designed to serve not economic needs but a political strategy, namely, the physical "Javanization" of East Timor.

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(Mr. Anderson)

11. However, the economic costs were also being borne by the people of Indonesia, who already had a huge external food deficit. In 1977-1978, Indonesia had had to import 2.6 million tons of rice, about one third of the total amount of rice on the world market, as well as one million tons of wheat. Aside from the heavy financial cost of counter-insurgency campaigns and military occupation, any serious attempts to develop East Timor by Indonesia would mean further difficulties for an Indonesian population whose daily per capita income was about \$0.60. It was hard to imagine that an Indonesian population, already suffering from low socio-economic development and burdened by an external debt of over \$15 billion could endure all the additional burdens of the East Timor adventure.

12. The Indonesian Government had suggested on various occasions that its actions in East Timor had been taken with Indonesia's security interests at heart. That was difficult to reconcile with the statement made in 1974 by the current Vice President of Indonesia, Mr. Adam Malik, in which he had specifically said that independence was the right of every country, with no exception for the people of Timor, and that Indonesia had no ambitions in East Timor and sought good relations with whoever would govern East Timor after independence. Furthermore, Indonesia's arms purchases over the past five years, mainly from the United States, had consisted mainly of ground-support aircraft that were of no conceivable use except against insurgents and as a symbol of military modernization, i.e., the purchases had been made, not to defend Indonesia but to annex a small, under-developed country. The facts showed that the attempted annexation of East Timor represented nothing more than a short-sighted adventure on the part of the small military-dominated clique that now ruled in Indonesia. The policy commanded negligible popular support and was in violation of long-standing nationalist traditions.

13. The question now was what could be done to reverse the policy. He had three proposals to make. Firstly, the Committee and the General Assembly should maintain their principled stand on the East Timorese people's right to self-determination and their repudiation of Indonesia's attempted annexation. Secondly, the Committee and the General Assembly should use their good offices to encourage Portugal to resume, temporarily and in all disinterestedness its decolonizing responsibilities. Thirdly, Indonesia's friends and allies, in particular the United States and Japan, should use their influence and their good offices to persuade the Indonesian Government to accede to a free expression of the East Timorese people's political aspirations, guaranteed by the United Nations and administered by Portugal.

14. In connexion with the second proposal, he pointed out that in 1949 the Netherlands Government had reversed its position after a brutal and costly counter-insurgency action in Indonesia, and had formally transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian people. That historic reversal had been the result of several factors, namely, the power of world opinion as manifested in the United Nations, Indonesian resistance, a growing sense of guilt among the people of the Netherlands, and the friendly pressure of allies on the Netherlands. The situation in 1980 in East Timor was parallel in many ways. Furthermore, the people of Portugal, after colonizing the people of East Timor for more than four centuries, no doubt felt a moral obligation not to surrender that people cynically to another colonial

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(Mr. Anderson)

Power. The generally constructive role played by Portugal since 1974 and recent statements by the Portuguese Government suggested that, if it resumed responsibility for a speedy, orderly and democratic decolonization of East Timor, the task would be performed fairly. If Portugal requested United Nations assistance in carrying out that responsibility, both the United Nations and the East Timorese people would warmly welcome such a request.

15. With regard to the third proposal, the role of the colonizing Power's allies was of great importance, as has been shown in 1948 and 1949 by the actions of the United States, the country which had underwritten almost all the costs of the attempted reconquest of Indonesia by the Netherlands. The United States had at that time made it clear that assistance to the Netherlands would not be continued unless there was a substantial change in Netherlands policy. It was ironic that the United States was again involved in 1980, now as the major arms supplier to Indonesia. Furthermore, the United States and Japan, together with the World Bank, had provided the overwhelming bulk of the more than \$15 billion in aid that the Indonesian Government had received since 1967. Of the leading industrial democracies, only the United States and Japan had supported Jakarta's colonialist aggression. The United States and Japan should use their influence in a constructive fashion to change the Indonesian Government's policy.

16. The process he had outlined would no doubt mean some loss of face for the Indonesian Government, just as the peace accords signed in 1949 had involved some loss of face for the Netherlands Government of that day. However, in the longer historical perspective, a loss of face for a particular Government quickly became a dim historical memory. Like the people of the Netherlands, the Indonesian people would benefit, not suffer, from a reversal of colonial policy.

17. Mr. DUNN (Human Rights Council of Australia) said that one of the most tragic episodes in the long process of decolonization since the end of the Second World War was the case of East Timor, a Territory with which he had had a long association since the early 1960s under the Portuguese colonial administration. His organization was concerned at the gross violation of human rights perpetrated against the Timorese people when, in the name of integration, East Timor had been annexed by Indonesia and its people subjected to a degree of suffering almost without precedent in the history of decolonization. They must be accorded the right to determine their own future, one of the most fundamental and rigorously observed of mankind's basic rights.

18. East Timor had been described as a very under-developed country which could never become economically viable. The Territory was under-developed but, owing to an increased effort in the education field under the Portuguese colonial administration, by 1974 it had developed an educated elite of sufficient size to provide the basis for self-government. The land itself was poorly developed, but with its rich mountain valleys and extensive plains, where farming had been under development East Timor could have become self-sufficient in food, with favourable prospects for export. There had also been encouraging prospects for the exploitation of petroleum and metals and for the development of a tourist industry.

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(Mr. Dunn)

19. It would have been quite possible within five years after decolonization for East Timor to have become one of the more successful cases in the post-war history of decolonization. In 1974, when the Portuguese administration had offered the Timorese independence, integration with Indonesia or continued association with Portugal, it had been clear that at least 90 per cent of the population would have favoured independence, the express goal of the Uniao Democrática Timorese (UDT) and FRETILIN. It seemed incredible that the option of independence, which had been taken for granted in the case of almost all other former colonies, had been blatantly disregarded in the case of East Timor and that the Timorese had been cynically denied any opportunity to have a say in their own future.

20. East Timor's troubled times had begun five years earlier. The civil war between FRETILIN and UDT had been directly caused by Indonesia's meddling. At a time when the Portuguese administration had become weak and divided, Indonesia had deliberately sought to destabilize the situation in order to bring the two parties in favour of independence into conflict. Indonesia had intervened militarily to prevent FRETILIN from gaining acceptance, while Indonesian intelligence had created the fiction that FRETILIN was a communist party which threatened Indonesia. The situation had been falsified by Indonesia in order to justify to the world its real aim of annexing East Timor. The United States and Australia, which had had some idea of the real situation, had apparently abdicated their responsibilities in accommodating Indonesia's devious objective.

21. Over the past five years the Indonesian occupying forces had behaved brutally and rapaciously towards the Timorese people. They had been directly or indirectly responsible for a loss of life of genocidal proportions: between a third and a sixth of the population had perished over that period. Hundreds of Timorese had been executed without trial, women had been raped, and goods, including humanitarian relief supplies, had been looted by the undisciplined troops of the occupying Power. Those acts had been documented by reliable and impartial sources.

22. Over the past year a more effective programme of assistance had begun, in particular through the International Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Services operating in the Territory. Yet that represented only part of the problem of East Timor. All indications were that the vast majority of the Timorese remained hostile to the concept of integration with Indonesia and regarded themselves as a community under military occupation.

23. FRETILIN's courageous resistance had subsided over the past two years, although armed resistance was continuing. The Indonesian forces had engaged in summary the execution of Timorese, apparently as a reprisal for FRETILIN's acts. Such travesties of justice provided grim reminders that the suffering of the people of East Timor was by no means confined to food shortages and economic dislocation.

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(Mr. Dunn)

24. There was, too, the problem of reuniting Timorese families divided by the invasion. The Indonesian and Australian Governments had reached an agreement two years earlier to allow for the exit from East Timor of several hundred relatives of families in Australia. Nevertheless, only about half of them had been allowed to leave, and in nearly every case the Timorese in Australia had had to pay bribes to secure the release of their relatives from East Timor.

25. The sufferings endured by the Timorese people over the past five years emphasized the importance of finding a solution which would not compromise its right to self-determination. A rigorous stand by the United Nations might well open up the possibility of a just settlement to a tragic episode which had received so little attention from those nations which claimed that human rights were central to their foreign policy.

26. East Timor's experience should be of special significance to many Members of the United Nations. It was, after all, the story of how a small, strategically unimportant community could be ruthlessly sacrificed in the international power game. The upholding of the rights of small States and Territories such as East Timor was acknowledged to be a vitally important role of the United Nations. However late the hour, to discard the rights of the people of that Territory would constitute a dismal end to a shameful chapter in the history of decolonization.

27. The new Portuguese initiative deserved to be welcomed and supported. A United Nations mission should be dispatched to East Timor, with free access to all parts of the Territory and to the FRETILIN groups with the aim of preparing a detailed report on the situation.

28. Miss PICKEN (Amnesty International) said that Amnesty International's mission was to seek the release of "prisoners of conscience" - persons imprisoned for the non-violent exercise of their beliefs, or for their ethnic origin, colour, sex, language or religion. It worked for fair and early trials for all political prisoners and on behalf of prisoners detained without charge or trial; and it opposed without reservation the death penalty and torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

29. Since the Indonesian invasion in December 1975 there had been persistent reports of violations of human rights in East Timor relating to imprisonment and execution without trial of civilians and former combatants, but it had been difficult to establish their veracity, mainly because the Indonesian occupation forces had prevented access to the territory and the free flow of information out of it. On the basis of what it considered to be reliable reports received in recent months, Amnesty International was particularly concerned about: Timorese who had "disappeared" without trace after surrendering under the terms of an amnesty guaranteeing their personal safety, or after being captured; summary execution of persons who had surrendered to or been captured by Indonesian forces; the large number of persons held in prison without trial since the invasion who, having taken no part in the fighting, must be regarded as political prisoners or as prisoners of conscience; and harsh prison conditions constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

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30. In the past three years, following an offer of amnesty by President Suharto to all "FRETILIN remnants" surrendering to Indonesian forces, large numbers of East Timorese, including a number of FRETILIN leaders and fighters, had surrendered or been captured and Amnesty International was gravely concerned about their safety.

31. In February 1980, on the basis of reports received during 1979, Amnesty International had compiled a list of 22 individuals reported to have been killed or, more often, to have "disappeared", after surrender to or capture by Indonesian forces. They included Leopoldo Joaquim, a member of the FRETILIN Central Committee, who in April 1979, after surrender, detention and release, had been escorted to the house of his niece Maria Gorete Joaquim, and both of them had thereafter been taken away, since when neither had been seen or traced; and Dulce Maria da Cruz, also a member of the FRETILIN Central Committee, who had been captured with her 3-year-old child and taken to Dili, since when nothing had been heard of her. Amnesty International had urged a full investigation into the whereabouts of those and others said to have "disappeared" after surrender or capture, but to its knowledge nothing had been done. It continued to receive reports of new cases but was unable to estimate the total number of "disappearances" in East Timor in view of the obstacles to gaining access to the facts.

32. The dividing line between "disappearance" and murder or execution appeared to be slender. Reports received in 1979 and 1980, the most recent in August 1980, alleged the large-scale summary execution of persons who had surrendered under the terms of the amnesty or had been captured. Reports indicated that the East Timorese in general had been victims of reprisals, interrogation and arbitrary imprisonment; there were allegations that persons who had surrendered four years earlier were now being executed for having assisted FRETILIN; and there were also reports of beatings of prisoners and of the use of torture to gain information. According to information received, Comarca Prison, which in Portuguese times had been the Dili district prison, held the largest number of people detained by the Indonesian forces for alleged pro-FRETILIN sympathies, about 700 East Timorese being detained at the end of 1979. Conditions were believed to be harsh: a recent visitor to the prison reported that it was overcrowded, and insanitary, and that serious undernourishment and tuberculosis appeared to be rampant.

33. In April 1980 Amnesty International had written to President Suharto drawing his attention to the situation. It had urged the Indonesian Government to carry out its own investigation into the present whereabouts of persons who had "disappeared" after surrender or capture; appealed to the Government to co-operate in enabling the International Committee of the Red Cross to expand its activities in East Timor beyond the provision of relief so as to include its other internationally recognized functions of tracing missing persons and visiting prisons; requested the President to instruct Indonesian forces in East Timor to ensure the physical safety of former FRETILIN supporters, in compliance with the original amnesty; urged an investigation into the conditions in which East Timorese were being imprisoned; and asked for public assurance that prisoners would be treated in accordance with international standards.

(Miss Picken)

34. No reply had been received to date, nor had there been any evidence that the steps urged on the Indonesian Government had been implemented. In view of the lack of assurance that its findings would be investigated and in view of continued reports of violations, Amnesty International considered that the Committee should be and would wish to be informed of its concern in connexion with the Committee's consideration of the question of East Timor.

35. Miss JOLIFFE (Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights) said that the Society was deeply concerned about reports of continuing human rights violations in East Timor and the lack of progress towards honouring General Assembly resolutions calling for genuine self-determination in East Timor.

36. As a journalist working for Reuters, she had spent three months in East Timor in 1975, including the end of the brief civil war and the period of the de facto administration by the FRETILIN movement; she had been forced to leave by the Indonesian invasion. She had travelled extensively in the Territory, had witnessed the first border incursions by regular Indonesian troops and had been in Dili when five colleagues trying to obtain information about the incursions had, according to eye witnesses she had interviewed later, been executed by Indonesian troops. Since leaving Timor she had monitored events through close contact with the East Timorese refugee community, who received first-hand information from a constant stream of refugees fleeing to Portugal, having paid bribes of up to \$2,000 demanded by Indonesian officials for exit papers; regular and detailed information through letters carried personally from the Territory by trusted people; and limited information through the official postal service in which all mail was censored. Information received from those sources was completely at variance with the information presented by the Indonesian Government.

37. The case of East Timor was a blot on the record of the Fourth Committee. It was the only case since the Second World War in which the legal boundaries of a country had been changed by the invading power. Contrary to the situation in Kampuchea - which was comparable in terms of human suffering - aid teams and journalists had not been given free access to East Timor despite constant international pressure. It was necessary to correct a basic and serious distortion of the truth about events in East Timor, which still persisted, was accepted by many journalists and was encouraged by Indonesia: namely, that East Timor had been engulfed in a civil war in the closing months of 1975 and in early 1976 which had cost tens of thousands of lives and been responsible for the subsequent death of an estimated 200,000 East Timorese.

38. In fact, as she and others of the many foreign journalists, aid workers and other observers in East Timor in 1975 knew, the civil war had lasted only about three weeks. From mid-September until 7 December 1975 - when Indonesian troops had landed in Dili - peace had reigned throughout East Timor, although Indonesian troops had been coming over the border in increasing numbers. The death toll from the civil war, as confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, had been at most 3,000. The bitterness engendered by the civil war had given place to a spirit of national reconciliation following the victory of FRETILIN. Many followers of the defeated UDT party had declared their willingness to work with FRETILIN, which had set up a civil administration and adopted a co-operative attitude to the International Red Cross and to foreign journalists, in sharp contrast to the current situation.

39. Only three weeks after her departure from East Timor, when news of the Indonesian attack on Dili had become known to the world, observers had been deeply shocked to hear the Indonesian Government claim that 60,000 East Timorese had died in the civil war. That statement, made in February 1976, and the statement by the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, that 60,000 or perhaps as many as 100,000 East Timorese had died, could be interpreted as meaning only that initial reports of wholesale massacres during the landing in December 1975 had been correct. Subsequent reports from impartial sources, such as the Catholic Church, had set the death toll at about 200,000; and later sources had claimed that half the original population of 650,000 might have died from executions, bombardment or starvation resulting from the war.

40. Despite assertions to the contrary, gross violations of human rights were continuing to be perpetrated in East Timor: bombings, imprisonment without trial, summary executions, rape, and pillaging by the Indonesian military of international relief supplies were widespread.

41. East Timorese refugees in Lisbon claimed that the people of East Timor were liable to arbitrary arrest at any time without the right of a public trial; they were denied the right to privacy, free correspondence and freedom from arbitrary interference with family and home; they had no freedom to travel within Timor or to enter or leave the country and applications to emigrate to Portugal or Australia were rejected; they were denied free association, and groups of more than three people gathering in public places were subject to arbitrary arrest; they were forbidden to receive or impart information through any media regardless of frontiers and it was a punishable offence to listen to a foreign news broadcast; and parents no longer had the right to choose their children's education. In April 1979, several thousand Timorese had given their names to the International Red Cross as wishing to leave the country; many had since been stripped of all civil rights, had their property seized and been dismissed from employment.

42. That picture was drawn from first-hand testimony from East Timorese who had lived under the Indonesian occupation. But there was another side to the picture: the organized resistance of the population to Indonesian rule and the determination

(Miss Joliffe)

not to become adjusted to the repressive régime. Contrary to all predictions, the resistance had survived. Although an important phase had ended with the death of FRETILIN, President Nicolau Lobato in late 1978, a reorganized movement had now emerged. Early in 1980, refugees arriving in Lisbon and letters smuggled from Dili had reported renewed fierce fighting between guerrillas and Indonesian troops in the whole of the eastern zone. The revolt had been aided by the defection of several hundred Timorese troops with their weapons from the Indonesian militia unit HANSIP.

43. More recently, news had reached Lisbon of an attack on Dili by the resistance on the night of June 9/10 in which casualties had been inflicted on Indonesian troops and the Indonesian military had been thrown into a state of panic. Several days later, sources in Jakarta had acknowledged those events to Reuters, claiming that four of their soldiers had been killed. Harsh reprisals against the population of Dili had followed, with reinforcements of Indonesian troops and equipment arriving overland and by sea.

44. The existence of guerilla units five years after Indonesia's initial claim to have total control of East Timor showed the error of predictions about East Timor's capacity to resist. It was difficult to make new predictions, or to see a way out of the international stalemate in which the war continued, while United Nations resolutions aimed at bringing peace to Timor were continued to be adopted but went unheeded. In that connexion the decision of Portugal, the administering Power, to take a new initiative was welcome, and it was to be hoped that it would receive the full co-operation of Member States invited to participate in the negotiations, including Indonesia.

45. Despite the differing viewpoints presented by several East Timorese groups, all of them deeply opposed Indonesian rule and supported self-determination. Only the Timorese could decide their political future, but the Committee should note the widespread popular support enjoyed by FRETILIN in 1975, while recognizing the claims of other groups. She hoped that efforts would be made to avoid false solutions which would not bring lasting peace to Timor. Any solution which did not involve consultations with the leaders of the guerilla struggle in Timor, no matter how few and isolated, would be seen as ignoring the will of the East Timorese. It was essential to create a situation in which any Timorese could freely give information to whoever sought it. A cease-fire and an international fact-finding mission would seem to be vital steps in that direction. All too often refugees interviewed had described how the real situation was camouflaged for the benefit of foreign visitors in Timor - bombers were grounded, soldiers became "civilians", war materials hidden and the population forbidden on pain of imprisonment to speak to foreign visitors.

46. She did not believe that the aspiration of the East Timorese had changed since 1975, when she had first interviewed them. They sought to regain the political freedom of which they had been robbed. They were inspired by national unity. They deserved respect and support and the urgent attention of the Committee.

47. Mr. LA ROCQUE (Center for Defense Information) said that, according to a recent study by the Center, the five-year-old war in East Timor was the most violent in

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the world, involving the greatest loss of life in percentage of population killed. While the fighting continued, the United States was still shipping weapons to Indonesia for use in East Timor. On 10 June 1980, FRETILIN had launched an official attack to regain Dili, and several other towns. Since then, there had been reports of an impending Indonesian offensive; fresh Indonesian troops and equipment were apparently flowing in and thousands of Indonesian troops continued to occupy East Timor. Meanwhile, the United States had pledged over \$32 million in military aid to Indonesia for 1981, in contrast to its \$13 million in humanitarian assistance for East Timor over the past year.

48. The United States had provided Indonesia with most of the military hardware used to attack East Timor. United States low-level policy-makers had assumed that other factors in the Indonesian-American relationship overrode the right of the people of East Timor to determine their own future. In his view, the minor political or economic gains that the United States might achieve by helping Indonesia did not justify supporting an invasion by Indonesia.

49. From a purely military standpoint, East Timor was too small, poor and underdeveloped to be a military threat to anyone in the foreseeable future. It had no useful military base facilities, no navy or air force and could probably never develop any military capability beyond territorial defence. East Timor's only possible military value was its situation adjoining the Ombai-Vetar Strait. That strait could be used for the submerged passage of existing United States Poseidon-missile submarines, but the impending deployment of the first Trident-missile submarine eliminated any possible requirement for the use of that route to the Indian Ocean. The United States operated missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, but on an irregular basis. Thus, East Timor was of no military concern to the United States or other countries.

50. Indonesia, although an important nation, was also of little military importance to the United States. There was no military treaty between the two countries and Indonesia provided no support for American troops stationed in the Asian theatre. There were no American military bases, facilities or combat troops in Indonesia and there was little need to use Indonesian airfields or ports, because of the proximity to major naval and air bases in the Philippines as well as extensive United States military facilities in Guam, Diego Garcia and Australia. Neither the United States Secretary of Defense nor the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had even mentioned Indonesia in their reports to the Congress for the current year.

51. The primary United States military interest in the area was unimpeded passage through the straits of the Indonesian archipelago, particularly the Molucca Passage and the Lombok Strait. Yet no nation was in danger of having its right of passage denied, no matter what stance it took on East Timor - the straits had not been closed to American ships even when the United States had suspended all military aid

(Mr. La Rocque)

to Indonesia during the Sukarno rule. Clearly the United States had no military interest which should blind it to the Indonesian actions in East Timor. Indonesia admittedly provided the United States and other countries with petroleum, but that should not prevent nations everywhere from curtailing sales of weapons to nations violating basic human rights.

52. American military assistance and the diplomatic acquiescence of many nations had been essential to Indonesia's war effort in East Timor. Regrettably, United States weapons had furthered Indonesia's development of the jungle forces which it was using in East Timor. For the year immediately before the invasion, the United States had pledged 450 per cent more military assistance to Indonesia than in the previous year, enabling Indonesia to launch the two major offences of the war.

53. The United States stood almost alone in its support of Indonesian action in East Timor. He had encouraged it to support the General Assembly's position on East Timor and use political, economic and military pressure, including reduction or suspension of security assistance, to persuade Indonesia to withdraw all troops from East Timor and allow the East Timorese to decide their own fate. He urged the Committee to take the action it considered most appropriate to facilitate efforts to that end.

54. Mr. Anderson, Mr. Dunn, Miss Picken, Miss Joliffe and Mr. La Rocque withdrew.

AGENDA ITEM 18: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued) (A/35/23 (Parts III and V); A/35/222, 223, 261 and 413; A/C.4/35/5 and Add.1-10; A/C.4/35/L.2; A/AC.109/593-597, 602, 603, 606, 608, 610, 613, 615, 617 and Corr.1, 618 and 621)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 84: INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (continued) (A/35/23 (Part III); A/35/233 and 511)

(a) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

(b) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 85: THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued) (A/35/23 (Part V); A/35/233 and 524; A/C.4/35/2, 3 and Add.1-10, A/C.4/35/6 and Add.1; A/AC.109/623 and 634)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 87: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (continued) (A/35/23 (Part III), A/35/178 and Add.1-4)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 12: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (continued) (A/35/3/Add.30)

AGENDA ITEM 88: UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/35/525)

AGENDA ITEM 89: OFFERS BY MEMBER STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/35/518)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

55. Mr. OLCESE (United Nations Development Programme) said that UNDP had been privileged to have the opportunity to offer humanitarian assistance to, and to help in developing the human resources of, the national liberation movements recognized by OAU. The Governing Council had approved an indicative planning figure (IPF) of \$20.5 million for national liberation movements for the period 1977-1981, of which almost one fifth was still available for future programming. At the twenty-seventh session of the Governing Council, in June 1980, \$15 million had been approved for the third programming cycle 1982-1986. In addition UNDP administered a trust fund of more than \$4 million for the national liberation movements, of which more than \$800,000 was still available for programming.

56. The only condition attached to the assistance was that it should be for well-designed humanitarian or human resources development projects endorsed by OAU. Project requests were carefully appraised, prior to approval, to determine their financial viability in terms of their objectives. The amount of money still unprogrammed did not allow much scope for expansion of UNDP's assistance programme

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(Mr. Olcese)

to national liberation movements in the current cycle and that amount might be required in order to honour existing commitments or to phase out ongoing projects. Regrettably, there were many projects which UNDP had been unable to finance through lack of funds. The UNDP Administrator, in a recent statement to the Second Committee, had stressed the unsatisfactory state of UNDP's resources.

57. In June 1979 UNDP had convened a meeting of organizations within the United Nations system, national liberation movements and OAU in order to review the relations between OAU and those organizations and the assistance provided to liberation movements, as required by General Assembly resolution 33/27. The meeting had decided that OAU would appeal to the executing bodies of all the United Nations agencies to allocate more funds under their regular budgets to allow implementation of additional projects benefiting national liberation movements. The meeting had also called for greater flexibility in the implementation of projects. A meeting with national liberation movements was to have been held in 1979 to determine their assistance requirements for 1980; in fact, it had been held in Nairobi in June 1980. At the Nairobi meeting it had been agreed that despite financial constraints UNDP should continue its fund-raising efforts to facilitate implementation of ongoing programmes of assistance.

58. To date, four movements had received UNDP assistance in 1979-1980: the Patriotic Front, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the African National Congress and the South West Africa People's Organization.

59. Assistance to the Patriotic Front had continued in 1979 through a number of ongoing projects relating to education and training, health and economic planning. In addition, six new projects had been approved in 1979 involving more than \$600,000; they concerned public administration training, civil aviation training, transport for students, goods transport, food production, and aircraft mechanics training.

60. The preparation of an economic and social survey of Zimbabwe, approved by UNDP in 1978 and executed by UNCTAD, had been concluded in February 1980 and the report submitted to the Patriotic Front.

61. Following the establishment of the new Government of Zimbabwe, the UNDP Administrator had requested the Governing Council to establish an IPF for that country. The Governing Council had decided on a figure of \$5.6 million for the remainder of the 1977-1981 planning cycle. It had further decided that the IPF for national liberation movements might continue to be used to finance 1980 activities of ongoing projects for national liberation movements in the case of Zimbabwe.

62. UNDP had thus decided to continue financing projects in Zimbabwe which would not normally be financed from UNDP resources, since Zimbabwe had not been a member of the United Nations or of a specialized agency at that time. Those activities had included the provision of specialized advice to the new Government in various

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areas. UNDP had also financed an interagency meeting with the Government of Zimbabwe which had provided the United Nations system with an opportunity to become acquainted with the problems and prospects of that country. It had also acquainted Zimbabwean officials with the United Nations system and its procedures.

63. The meeting was a sequel to an agreement reached prior to independence with UNDP and UNCTAD on the one hand, and the Patriotic Front on the other. A report had been prepared and circulated to all United Nations agencies and to major bilateral donors. The Government of Zimbabwe was studying that report with a view to establishing its priorities on the basis of which donors would be expected to finance the various projects identified.

64. The lack of progress in negotiations concerning the granting of independence to Namibia had led UNDP to continue its co-operation with SWAPO and with the United Nations Council for Namibia. As a result of the agreement reached between UNDP and the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia, UNDP had supervised the over-all implementation of the Nationhood Programme for Namibia during the past year.

65. Funds included in the IPF of the national liberation movements had continued to be used to support projects indicated in the Administrator's report to the Council for 1979. Several projects in Namibia were being funded from the IPFs for Namibia and for national liberation movements. Of the total resources of \$8,750,000 available for Namibia from 1975 to 1981, an uncommitted balance of \$3,320,000 remained. Assistance to SWAPO continued through projects dealing with postal and telecommunications training, agriculture, educational assistance, participation of women in development, construction assistance and training courses for building technicians.

66. UNDP was providing assistance to the African National Congress of South Africa through projects dealing with educational assistance, assistance in community self-reliance and with development and multicomponent assistance involving basic education, health vocational training and basic agricultural activities. In addition, UNDP was providing assistance to the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania through projects dealing with education, construction assistance, self-reliance in food production and a preliminary contribution to the Institute of Azania. UNDP was also supporting projects aimed at assisting various liberation movements with educational aid, vocational training and the representation of liberation movements at sessions of the Governing Council.

67. Mr. BURNETT (Barbados) said that his country was strongly committed to implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Special Committee had played an invaluable role in helping the international community move closer to its goal of universality.

68. Reinforcement for the concept that complete decolonization was inevitable had been provided by the admission of Zimbabwe and of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations and the attainment of independence by the people of Vanuatu.

(Mr. Burnett, Barbados)

69. Nevertheless, much remained to be done, and his country would continue to agitate for the full acceptance by all countries of the right to self-determination. His delegation would oppose all aspects of colonialism, including the policies of the old colonial régimes where white settler minorities obstructed progress, as in the case of Namibia, and the actions of those colonialists who sought to deny the principle of self-determination on the specious argument that a country was too small or too deficient in natural resources to attain independence.

70. His country regarded the right of all peoples to self-determination as sacrosanct. Western Sahara constituted a clear case for decolonization. Morocco, which had itself been subjected to colonial oppression, was misusing the lessons of history in denying the people of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic true independence. He therefore appealed to Morocco to emulate Mauritania and heed the calls of the United Nations, OAU and the non-aligned countries to allow the people of Western Sahara to exercise its right to self-determination without interference. His delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.2 on the question of Western Sahara.

71. His country reaffirmed its support for the people of East Timor in its struggle for self-determination. He accepted the argument that self-determination did not necessarily mean independence; the decision could be taken only by the inhabitants of the Territory concerned without outside interference. In being integrated into Indonesia, the people of East Timor had not freely exercised its right to self-determination. The invasion and annexation of East Timor had violated the fundamental rights of its people, whose continued resistance belied the Indonesian claim that it had freely chosen integration. His delegation called upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor and allow the East Timorese to freely exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with the Charter and with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

72. In the case of Belize, the time had also come for its independence. As the Minister of External Affairs of Barbados had recently stated to the General Assembly, Barbados, in conjunction with other countries, would seek the Assembly's endorsement of a resolution calling on the administering Power to set a date for the independence of Belize before 31 December 1981, and calling on the United Nations and the administering Power to do whatever was necessary to ensure the continued existence of an independent Belize. Such a resolution would command wide support. Its successful implementation would be a fitting way to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Declaration.

73. Mr. CASSANDRA (Sao Tome and Principe) noted that over the past 20 years the number of people living under the yoke of colonialism had fallen from more than 200 million to the little over 2 million in Western Sahara, Namibia, Palestine, East Timor, Belize and elsewhere. Those figures served as a reminder that the international community should continue its efforts to help peoples under colonial domination to achieve emancipation, self-determination and independence. Every people had the attributes of national sovereignty inherent in its existence as a people. Those attributes were indestructible.

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(Mr. Cassandra, Sao Tome and Principe)

74. With regard to East Timor, the Indonesian Government's intransigence and its presentation of a fait accompli in denying East Timor's right to statehood should not be accepted by the international community. It was deplorable that the invading country had attempted to prevent the issue being debated at the United Nations. A substantial proportion of the population of East Timor had been killed as a result of the invasion. Regrettably, those events had not received due attention from the international community. Nevertheless, the people of East Timor had an inalienable right to independence which could only be extinguished by that people's extermination.

75. The Portuguese initiative to enter into talks with the Indonesian Government was welcomed. It was to be hoped that a solution would soon emerge which would enable the people of East Timor to determine its own future under the leadership of FRETILIN, its authentic representative.

76. The United Nations was the pre-eminent forum for constructive dialogue among nations and peoples. Its Members were therefore responsible for ensuring that the noble principles set forth in the Charter were implemented.

77. Mr. KHANDOGY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that item 88, on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations was of particular relevance in 1980, the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration. However, the continued existence of vestiges of colonialism, racism and apartheid was a source of conflict threatening international peace and security. The specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations had a special role to play in the speedy elimination of the manifestations of colonialism, in particular by providing moral and material support to the peoples of colonial Territories and their national liberation movements. His delegation welcomed the fact that the majority of the specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations had conscientiously carried out their obligations under the Declaration.

78. In that connexion, he cited UNESCO for its assistance to national liberation movements and peoples of colonial and former colonial Territories and its campaign to condemn the colonial and racist régime of South Africa. UNESCO's recently adopted declaration on the Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to the Strengthening of Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism and Apartheid and to the Incitement to War and the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice. Other organizations, such as UNDP, ILO and UNICEF, were also making valuable contributions towards improving the economic and social situation of the peoples of colonial Territories. Other important specific measures included the decisions taken by UPU, WHO and FAO to exclude South Africa from membership.

79. His delegation welcomed the increasingly close contact between the organizations within the United Nations system, the national liberation movements and OAU. However, as had been pointed out by the Special Committee of 24, the

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(Mr. Khandogy, Ukrainian SSR)

assistance provided by the specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations was still not sufficient to meet the needs of the colonial peoples and their national liberation movements. An important step, for instance, would be for those organizations to grant full membership to the United Nations Council for Namibia.

80. Unfortunately, some of those organizations continued to reject practical steps aimed at the speedy implementation of the Declaration. In that connexion, he cited the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - also singled out by the Special Committee of 24 - which continued to co-operate with the South African racist régime, in some cases providing more assistance to South Africa than to all other African States combined. Such activities, which served in fact to preserve and strengthen that régime, merited strong censure.

81. The CHAIRMAN said that Angola, Barbados, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe had become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.2, on the question of Western Sahara.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.