



General Assembly

Seventy-second session

First Committee

19th meeting

Monday, 23 October 2017, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Bahr Aluloom (Iraq)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 52 (b) and 90 to 106 (continued)

Thematic discussions on specific subjects and the introduction and consideration of draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items

The Chair: The Committee will first hear a briefing by the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Mr. Karsten Diethelm Geier, Head of Cyber Policy Coordination Staff of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. I take this opportunity to warmly welcome Mr. Geier to this meeting. Following his statement, the Committee will change to an informal mode to afford delegations the opportunity to ask questions and make comments. Thereafter, the Committee will continue listening to statements on the cluster on conventional weapons.

I now give the floor to Mr. Geier.

Mr. Geier: Allow me to express my gratitude for the invitation to address the First Committee and to present my impressions on the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE).

The 2016-2017 GGE did not reach a consensus on the report. That, however, was not for a lack of trying. The Group held a total of four week-long formal plenary rounds of discussions. Those meetings were

complemented by a series of regional conferences held, inter alia, in Belgrade, Berlin, Dakar and Talinn, which were organized by GGE members, and by numerous briefings and side events. Combined, those efforts helped increase transparency around the GGE and obtain input from the wider international community, private industry, civil society and the academic and scientific communities.

The Group's mandate, as formulated in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 70/237, is to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them and how international law applies to the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) by States, as well as norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States, confidence-building measures and capacity-building.

Experts based their deliberations on the work of previous Groups of Governmental Experts and aimed to formulate concrete guidance to States on how to implement the recommendations that those previous reports contained. In that spirit, the members of the GGE identified many valuable points related to most elements of the mandate.

Looking at existing and potential threats, GGE members noted that increases in incidents involving the malicious use of ICT by States, non-State actors and actors acting as proxies, as well as the spread of malicious ICT capabilities, are continuing unabated. They feared the potential for ICT capabilities to be used in a manner incompatible with the maintenance

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).

17-33954 (E)



Accessible document

Please recycle



of international peace and security and in violation of international law. Throughout the Group's deliberations, experts worried about malicious ICT activity that could disrupt or impair the general functionality of global ICT systems.

Other threats identified included actions that determine the security of data, including its confidentiality, integrity, availability, accessibility and authenticity. Concern was raised about the use of ICT by States to interfere in the internal affairs of other States. Experts also voiced concern about the use of ICT for terrorist and other criminal purposes.

GGE discussions saw very helpful observations on how to take forward the non-binding norms, rules and principles for the responsible behaviour of States presented in the 2015 report (see A/70/174). Concrete recommendations included establishing the national structures, policies, processes and cooperation mechanisms necessary to facilitate careful consideration of serious ICT incidents and to determine appropriate responses. Other proposals covered ICT incident assessment or severity templates to evaluate and assess ICT incidents. Experts suggested procedures for official notification from one State to another State of malicious ICT incidents, in addition to procedures for requesting and providing assistance.

GGE members discussed how to respond to incidents that affected critical infrastructure and the need for States to consider the potentially harmful effects of ICT activities on the general functionality of global ICT systems and the essential services that rely on them. Experts also made suggestions on how to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and on how to prevent non-State actors from conducting malicious ICT activities. The recommendations also covered harmful hidden functions.

With regard to confidence-building, experts made concrete suggestions for States for implementation at the national, regional and international levels. Those concrete suggestions included guidance on the identification of appropriate points of contact, as well as templates and procedures to facilitate information requests between States about serious ICT incidents. The GGE also discussed the possibility of developing a repository of confidence-building measures and cross-regional exchanges of information on the implementation of such measures.

There were many useful comments on the relationship between capacity-building and international peace and security in the context of State use of ICT. The guidance offered referred to awareness-raising, promoting educational and professional training activities related to security in the use of ICT, information-sharing, the use of self-assessment tools and the importance of involving Governments, the private sector, academia and civil society in capacity-building initiatives. Another suggestion was to integrate capacity-building efforts into national development policies as a means to contribute to attaining the Sustainable Development Goals.

Despite significant convergence on all those points, at the end of the Group's deliberations deep divisions remained on some aspects of how international law applies to the use of ICT by States and on the conclusions to be drawn from the Group's deliberations, including recommendations for future work. As a result, the 2016-2017 Group of Governmental Experts was unable to agree on a consensus report at the end of its last day of scheduled discussions. Even after the Group's fourth formal meeting ended, with the help and at the request of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I continued exploring ways to retain the many good elements that the experts had identified in their work. That went on for weeks. I even suggested an extraordinary informal GGE meeting and terms under which a consensus might still be reached. The overwhelming majority of experts confirmed that they could work on that basis. However, even that did not meet with the approval of all.

It is regrettable that the many good points identified by experts in the deliberations of the 2016-2017 Group of Governmental Experts cannot be carried forward in a jointly drafted and generally accepted document. I am convinced that Member States would have found useful the concrete guidance formulated on how to implement the recommendations contained in the reports of the Group of Governmental Experts submitted in 2010 (see A/65/201), 2013 (see A/68/98) and 2015 (see A/70/174).

The question now is how to proceed from here. Discussions at the United Nations on ICT in the context of international peace and security have been ongoing since 1998. Over the years, tremendous progress has been made. The previous reports of Groups of Governmental Experts stand unaffected by the lack of consensus in 2017. Nevertheless, we must realize that deep divisions remain. They are real, deeply held and

worrisome, and their resolution will be fundamental to creating a stable ICT environment.

As the international community, we do ourselves no favour by papering over those divisions or by wilfully remaining in the dark about them. Each and every Member State has a stake in cyberstability, just as each will be weakened by an ICT environment that is not open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful. There is a need to retain the progress made, to continue discussions in the United Nations and to increase transparency and inclusivity. Global issues such as the use of ICT in the context of international security require a global understanding of the threat situation and of ways to address and mitigate such threats, including the applicable rules. Such a global understanding must be pursued in the United Nations.

The easiest option may be simply to continue as before. There may be good arguments for convening another Group of Governmental Experts. The format has been tried, but it does not have a perfect track record. The question arises, *inter alia*, as to whether the development of its size to a body consisting of 25 experts was helpful or whether that enlarged format is not, in fact, too large to allow for truly informal exchange and interaction, while at the same time being too small to be representative of the wider United Nations membership.

Looking for alternatives, various options have been proposed. They include an open-ended working group, a subcommittee on the use of ICT in the context of international peace and security, consulting the Conference on Disarmament, taking the matter to the Disarmament Commission or even convening a conference of interested States. All of those proposals, and perhaps others, require careful consideration.

There is a motion on the agenda of the Committee to recommend that the General Assembly decide to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-third session an item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security". To my mind, the time until the seventy-third session should be used to explore a way forward and to identify a consensual, transparent and inclusive approach that will allow for further substantive progress to be made.

The Chair: I will now suspend the meeting to afford delegations the opportunity to have an interactive

discussion on the briefing that we just heard through an informal question-and-answer session.

The meeting was suspended at 10.20 a.m. and resumed at 10.35 a.m.

The Chair: The Committee will now resume its consideration of the cluster on conventional weapons. I again urge speakers to kindly adhere to the established time limits.

Ms. Motsumi (Botswana): My delegation aligns itself with the statements delivered by the representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the representative of Egypt, on behalf of the Group of African States (see A/C.1/72/PV.17). However, I wish to make a few remarks in my national capacity.

We live in a world where peace is elusive and where armed conflict and other forms of violence are rampant. That situation has had an adverse bearing on security and development, which we believe to be essential prerequisites for achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. My country remains deeply concerned about the use of conventional weapons in fuelling conflict and violence around the world. It is regrettable that an estimated 500,000 people die annually as a result of armed violence.

Although we recognize the legal trade in conventional arms and the sovereign right of States to develop, transfer and possess arms for their self-defence, we underline the responsibility of all stakeholders to enforce control measures aimed at denying the possession of weapons by illegitimate entities in our societies. It is undeniable that the illegal accumulation of arms and dangerous weapons has catastrophic humanitarian, security and socioeconomic consequences.

Explosive weapons and munitions also cause indiscriminate harm to innocent civilians, especially women and children. The problem is further compounded by the conduct of modern warfare in highly populated and built-up areas. We therefore urge all parties to armed conflict to strike a balance between military operational necessity and respect for international humanitarian law. It is disheartening that unarmed civilians, including women and children, are the greatest casualties and often merely regarded as collateral damage, while the full humanitarian consequences of such actions are ignored.

Botswana reiterates its support for the work of the fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties

to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We welcome with appreciation the appointment of the Group of Governmental Experts, which will, inter alia, examine challenges related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. We also welcome the adoption of the Declaration on Improvised Explosive Devices, which we believe will go a long way towards raising awareness about the dangers posed by such devices.

Furthermore, Botswana is strongly committed to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. We remain committed to its ideal of eliminating anti-personnel landmines around the world. In that regard, we are guided by the Maputo Action Plan, which has set critical milestones towards the implementation of the Convention.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is another area that requires our collective action. On the African continent, for example, the devastation attributed to these weapons is quite evident, resulting in thousands of casualties and displaced people. Botswana fully supports the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and its International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI). We also acknowledge the numerous challenges that affect the Programme, including technology, which has complicated the marking and identification of illicit weapons. In this regard, we welcome the Review Conference to be held in 2018 and sincerely hope that it will generate practical steps that will fully address all issues affecting the Programme of Action and the ITI.

Finally, Botswana reaffirms its commitment and responsibility to work with like-minded nations to ensure the maintenance of peace and security around the world. To this end, in the past few years, we have embarked on a process to review and promulgate legislation and create new entities in areas such as arms control, money laundering and anti-terrorism, to name just a few. The key objective for us is to align our statutes with international instruments, ensure that they are relevant and enhance our contribution to addressing contemporary and emerging international peace and security challenges.

Mr. Tuy (Cambodia): I would like to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your election to chair the First Committee during the seventy-second session

of the General Assembly. We are fully confident that under your able leadership, the Committee will be able to conclude its deliberations successfully.

Cambodia associates itself with the statements delivered by the representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/72/PV.17), and the representative of Thailand on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see A/C.1/72/PV.18).

From 1967 to 1975, Cambodia suffered immensely from a civil war, and, from 1975 to 1979, the situation in the country was unstable, which enabled the Pol Pot regime to take control and carry out torture, mass executions and forced labour, while, on the whole, the Cambodian people struggled with famine and starvation. We have experienced the tragic circumstances and devastation caused by the unregulated and unjustifiable use of weapons in our society, which resulted in the loss of everything of value — human life, peace and stability. Thousands and thousands of farmers and innocent men, women and children lost their lives, while some were maimed for life. Cambodia then turned to the United Nations rehabilitation programmes and adopted confidence-building measures, especially in the field of conventional arms, landmine clearance and the reintegration of mine victims.

My Government highly values upholding peace-promoting instruments and agreements. To effectively prevent, combat and eradicate the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, it is imperative to establish or strengthen subregional and regional cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms, in particular transborder custom cooperation and networks for sharing information. Accordingly, as an ASEAN member, Cambodia is strongly committed to adhering to this approach.

Welcoming resolution 71/35, on information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms, adopted on 5 December 2016, Cambodia believes that Member States should also bear in mind the major role it could play in creating favourable conditions for disarmament and promoting the use of enhanced capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, monitoring and reporting on the smuggling of arms and explosive materials. Cambodia appreciates the role of the United Nations in keeping the database updated and helping Member States in the organization of seminars,

courses and workshops so as to enhance knowledge of new developments in this field.

Cambodia remains actively and constructively engaged on all fronts to ensure that the issues of the illicit trade in and diversion of conventional arms are adequately addressed and appropriately dealt with. In addition to our efforts, a regional seminar for ASEAN member States and Timor-Leste on the illicit trafficking in and diversion of small arms and light weapons and other conventional arms and ammunition will be hosted in Phnom Penh from 19 to 20 December.

We are aware that the flow of illicit arms constitutes a key factor in prolonging conflict, fuelling regional instability and hindering the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process, which, in turn, leads to organized crime and terrorism in all its aspects. This situation needs to be addressed by all Member States, which should also establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating, or improving the regulation of, the international trade in conventional arms. The illicit trade in and diversion of conventional arms should be prevented for the sake of national and regional peace, stability and security. This approach is the best and only way to reduce human suffering.

Over the past two decades, mine clearance has remained one of Cambodia's top priorities. In collaboration with and with support from the international community and donors, most of the country's agricultural lands have now been made free of mines. However, there remain certain rural areas in Cambodia that need to be cleared. The Government has incorporated in its national goals Sustainable Development Goal 18, on mine clearance. Given Cambodia's experience in mine clearance, ASEAN member States established an ASEAN regional mine action centre last year in the capital of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, with the objective of intensifying our regional efforts, as well as joining the United Nations umbrella in assisting States Members of the United Nations in mine clearance. My message here is to stop mine production to save lives.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that Cambodia has always cooperated with the United Nations in the fight against the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and the use of anti-personnel mines. The key to advancing the cause of both disarmament and development lies in fostering a sense of global unity.

Unless global unity is attained, true peace and security will remain out of reach.

Ms. Bonkougou (Burkina Faso) (*spoke in French*): My delegation aligns itself with the statements made by the representatives of Egypt and Indonesia on behalf of the Group of African States and the Non-Aligned Movement, respectively (see A/C.1/72/PV.17).

The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons poses a threat to peace, security and stability in many parts of the world. These weapons fuel many conflicts, with transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups killing thousands of people, including civilians. As such, they constitute a direct threat to the stability of States and an obstacle to their socioeconomic development. Indeed, according to the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security, 875 million small arms and light weapons are scattered throughout the world. According to this research group, the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms and the Small Arms Survey, more than 30 million small arms are in circulation in sub-Saharan Africa, more than 8 million of which are in West Africa.

Those weapons are a real source of concern for Burkina Faso. I would therefore like to state our appreciation for the determination and political will of all the States that have demonstrated the usefulness of multilateral efforts to achieve the common objectives of arms control, the significant reduction of conflicts and the strengthening of peace and collective security. Burkina Faso welcomes the adoption in 2014 of the Arms Trade Treaty, which is aimed at providing an appropriate and collective response to regulate and consolidate international transfers of conventional arms.

Today's meeting is therefore an opportunity for my delegation to welcome the convening of the third Conference of States Parties to that important Treaty, which was held from 11 to 15 September, in Geneva. It called for all stakeholders, especially States, to assume the responsibility and commitment for its full implementation and universalization. We are confident that this Treaty, as well as the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons; and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms will be able to bring greater efficiency and effectiveness to

existing instruments in the West African subregion, in particular the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, which was adopted on 14 June 2006.

In Burkina Faso, the implementation of these various instruments and their follow-up will make it possible for the national authorities, namely, the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the High Authority to Control the Importation of Arms and Their Use, to stem the scourge of the proliferation of small arms and their illicit trafficking. In this regard, I take the opportunity to thank the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for their partnerships with my country in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

With regard to small arms and light weapons, the humanitarian, environmental and socioeconomic consequences of anti-personnel mines are many and varied. My delegation therefore calls for the universalization of the Ottawa Treaty in order to eradicate anti-personnel mines, and calls upon all States and relevant institutions to pool their efforts to provide multifaceted assistance to the countries affected by these devices, which indiscriminately kill and destroy the lives of thousands of people, including, in particular, children.

As for cluster munitions, they, like anti-personnel mines, continue to impede access to and therefore the use of vast fertile lands in many parts of the world. Accordingly, my country calls for the universalization of the Oslo Convention. In addition, the quest for lasting solutions to the emergence of new challenges resulting from fully autonomous weapons systems is essential for all. Since our individual security can be guaranteed only when collective security is guaranteed, let us join our efforts to build peaceful societies and protect future generations from the scourges related to the proliferation of conventional weapons.

Mr. Al-Rikabi (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, my delegation associates itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/72/PV.17).

Iraq is aware of the fact that the challenges arising from the proliferation of conventional weapons are no different from the catastrophic consequences of weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore incumbent

on us all to assume responsibility and make further international efforts to promote the universality of relevant international instruments, as that would contribute to achieving international peace and security.

Iraq has acceded to most of these instruments, the most recent of which was the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as well as its five Protocols. We are committed to fulfilling our obligations and submitting our updated national reports on time. In this vein, we greatly appreciate the achievements and efforts of His Excellency Ambassador Farukh Amil, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, in his capacity as President of the fifth Review Conference on the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

The indiscriminate growth of the illicit trade in and stockpiling of small and light weapons is a source of great concern. This phenomenon presents a serious danger to the security of States and peoples. Their use has resulted in many catastrophic consequences. Thousands of lives are lost — civilians and military, personnel — leading to destabilization and insecurity. Iraq therefore reaffirms once again the need to maintain concerted efforts to reactivate the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

It is equally important to provide assistance with technology transfers to developing States, including my country, Iraq. We support the voluntary exchange of information between nations to enhance Member States' capabilities in countering different threats. We call upon Member States to be flexible and demonstrate political will to ensure the success of the third Review Conference on the Programme, which will be held next year.

Iraq is one of the countries that suffers most from landmines. Terrorist gangs of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham started this problem by planting landmines and explosive devices throughout large swaths of Iraqi territory to prevent Iraqi troops from advancing and to kill the largest possible number of civilians. The spread of anti-personnel mines, explosive war remnants and cluster ammunitions is of great concern because of their negative impact on the environment and the economy.

Iraq reaffirms the important role played by the United Nations Disarmament Commission as the primary multilateral deliberative body addressing disarmament issues at the United Nations. We welcome the Commission's adoption in April 2017 of recommendations on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons under the leadership of the representative of Bulgaria in his capacity as Chair of Working Group 2. However, we also regret the continued failure of that body to adopt recommendations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In conclusion, my country appreciates all international efforts aimed at reaching a world free from mines, war remnants and unexploded ordnance. At the same time, we call upon donor countries and international organizations to coordinate and consult with the Government of Iraq and other relevant public entities to ensure that assistance and support reach their intended beneficiaries. We reiterate that the problem of landmines, booby traps and war remnants — and their victims — in Iraq demands the urgent assistance of the international community to mitigate their catastrophic consequences.

Mr. García Moritán (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): The international community should spare no effort in responding to the challenges posed by the illicit trafficking in and diversion of weapons, which fuel destabilization, violence, delinquency, organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking, and affect not only the security levels in our countries, but also the most vulnerable segments of our populations and their most basic rights, including the right to life itself. To address this scourge, Argentina stresses the need to address the unregulated trade in conventional weapons and to explore the synergies that exist among the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Firearms Protocol.

Argentina welcomes the recent holding of the third Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty and the agreements reached in the areas of the universalization and implementation of the Treaty. As one of the co-authors of the ATT, the Argentine Republic has given great importance to this legal instrument since its inception. Argentina believes that the ATT deals holistically and comprehensively with three vitally important dimensions: the issue of human rights, development and production, and responsible

trade in conventional weapons. By establishing common criteria, parameters and standards for all States at the time of authorizing transfers, efforts are made to ensure transparency and put an end to irresponsible trade and transfers, as well as to the proliferation of conventional weapons and their use against civilians.

Next June, the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons will take place. Argentina will fully support the French presidency and trusts that, under its able leadership, recommendations will be issued on national reports, cooperation and assistance, the issue of tracing and marking, stockpile management and the regulation of ammunition.

At the domestic level, the national plan on restricting firearms is one of the Government's 100 management objectives. In this regard, only last year we adopted new positive standards regarding commercial imports, exports, the international transfer of firearms, special-purpose materials, spare parts and ammunition, including — and improving — the documentation of export licences, end-user certificates and requirements for the transit of weapons. In addition, with regard to handling inventories and stockpiles of arms, we established a mechanism for the maintenance of secure storage facilities for controlled materials as well as a comprehensive management system for controlled materials. Finally, six months ago a new round of the national programme for the voluntary surrender of firearms was launched in order to reduce the circulation of weapons in civil society and to prevent armed violence.

In relation to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), Argentina, as a party to all its Protocols, hopes that the universalization of these legal instruments will be achieved, taking into account the need to respect the relevant humanitarian principles and purposes without any reservations. Moreover, Argentina believes that the CCW is the most appropriate framework to negotiate new instruments concerning other weapons that are not yet fully regulated from a humanitarian point of view, such as lethal autonomous weapons systems and mines other than anti-personnel mines.

The high proportion of civilian victims resulting from the use of anti-personnel mines requires the

urgent and unconditional commitment of all countries of the international community. A humanitarian view of the problems arising from the use of such mines must prevail.

On the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Argentina is established as an important contributor to humanitarian mine clearance, in particular with regard to training and verification in that respect.

Argentina has played an active role in promoting confidence-building measures in general, particularly in the area of conventional weapons.

At the international level, Argentina is resolved to contribute to international peace and security by providing transparency and by participating in the joint activities of the international community in the belief that greater openness and transparency with regard to arms builds confidence, promotes stability, helps States to exercise moderation in their transfer policies and strengthens peace.

Mr. Weinoh (Nigeria): My delegation wishes to restate its confidence, Mr. Chair, in your experience and ability to steer our deliberations to a successful outcome.

Nigeria aligns itself with the statements delivered under this cluster on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of African States (see A/C.1/72/PV.17).

Over the years, people have died needlessly from conventional arms and ammunition produced primarily for the defence and security needs of nation States and other lawful uses. A large portion of the global population, including many in my country, have experienced the painful consequences of illicit small arms and light weapons in the hands of criminal gangs, terrorists and armed militants. These weapons continue to undermine otherwise peaceful societies, cause internal displacement and are responsible for hundreds of deaths each day.

In that regard, my delegation commends all States for their renewed efforts of all States and welcomes the convening of the sixth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in June last year, in which my delegation fully

participated. The consensus adoption of the outcome document is commendable in view of its efforts to address numerous issues, including by highlighting the significance of the nexus between the United Nations Programme of Action, the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Sustainable Development Goal 16. We look forward to actively participating in the third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action, to be held in 2018.

My delegation also welcomes the successful outcome of the third Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), held last month in Geneva, and reiterates the need for a robust and effective implementation of the numerous instruments already in place as tools for regulating the global transfer of conventional weapons. We urge States, particularly large weapons-producing and weapons-exporting States not yet parties to the Treaty, to ensure their timely accession.

In addressing such issues, Nigeria has redoubled its efforts to strengthen its national borders, as well as its security cooperation across the West African subregion. Our commitment is further demonstrated by the signing and ratification of the relevant international, regional and subregional instruments and legal regimes, such as the ATT and the United Nations Programme of Action, among others.

The Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was set up by the federal Government in April 2013, has been involved in activities geared towards stemming the tide of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It carried out an initial baseline assessment of the situation with regard to small arms and light weapons in Nigeria, including a comprehensive national survey on small arms and light weapons, the comprehensive national weapons-marking programme, the establishment of a database on small arms and light weapons and the development of a new firearms law in the country.

Finally, we look forward to working with other delegations to translate the vision of international peace and security into a reality for our future and for that of our children.

Mr. Al Habib (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/72/PV.17).

Iran reaffirms the inherent right of any State to acquire, manufacture, import and retain conventional arms and related parts, components and ammunition for its self-defence and security needs. Iran shares the concerns expressed about the increasing global military expenditure, which is even more alarming in a region such as the Middle East, where, in addition to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the Israeli regime's large arsenal of sophisticated offensive conventional weapons continues to threaten the peace and security of the region and beyond.

In recent years, the already complicated security situation in the Middle East has been exacerbated, including by a manifold increase in the military budgets and arms imports of certain States in the Persian Gulf. One example of this trend is the signing of a \$110 billion weapons deal by one such country with the United States in 2017, in addition to the 10-year, \$350 billion arms deal that this country had signed separately with the United States.

However, some countries criticize Iran for having launched just a handful of missiles that are strictly designed to carry only conventional warheads and are proportionate to its security environment. Iran's missile programme has been developed to meet its defence and security needs. It cannot and should not be seen and assessed in a vacuum. For instance, historically, during the war imposed on Iran by Saddam Hussein, not only did the United States and its regional allies provide military, intelligence, logistical, economic and political assistance to him and support his campaign of chemical-weapon attacks by remaining silent during that campaign, they also did everything in their power to prohibit the acquisition by Iran of even the most basic defensive capabilities. Through that experience, Iran learned that, in order to protect its people, safeguard its independence and security and defend its national honour, it had to rely on indigenous capacities. It learned that it should not hesitate to develop the capability to meet its legitimate defence and security needs.

With regard to the current security environment in the Middle East, at a time when the hostile policies of the United States and its regional allies, especially the

Zionist regime — as well as the transfer of hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of arms into the region — have turned it into a tinderbox, why should Iran remain complacent about its defence needs? When the United States allies in the region, whose combined population is far smaller than Iran's, each spends exponentially higher sums on their military than Iran, why should Iran — which has attacked no one in almost 300 years but has been the victim of aggression supported by the United States and its regional partners — not acquire the necessary tools of deterrence in the face of the constant threat by an aggressor?

While the combined total military expenditure of the Middle East countries in 2016 showed a 19 per cent increase compared with 2007, Iran's military expenditure decreased by 7.3 per cent during the same period. That fact alone indicates how Iran has exercised maximum restraint in reacting to skyrocketing security challenges in its region. That restraint is also based on the understanding that our security can be achieved through our reliance on our people, not by spending billions of dollars to import arms.

It is in that framework that Iran's missile programme has a purely defensive and deterrent character. Our missiles are designed strictly to carry conventional warheads, and their range and precision are proportionate to our security environment and threat perception. It is based on these facts and understanding that Iran has always stressed that its missile programme will continue with full force, in accordance with its national defence programme and is not, nor will it ever be, negotiable.

Mr. Issa (Niger) (*spoke in French*): First of all, Sir, allow me to offer the congratulations of my delegation on your election as Chair of our Committee and to assure you of our full cooperation. My delegation is convinced that, thanks to your wealth of experience, the work of our Committee will be successful. Also, I am honoured to address the First Committee today with the hope of helping to advance some of the critical issues discussed here.

With regard to the question of disarmament, it should be noted that the international community as a whole is working not only to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction but also to control the production, sale, use and trade of many types of conventional weapons, in view of the need for all States to contribute to international peace and security. We are grateful

for the work done by the United Nations through our Committee, which has always played a significant role.

It is important to recall the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001; the adoption of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006; the resumption of the work of the Conference on Disarmament with a view to developing concrete recommendations on nuclear disarmament and practical confidence-building measures on conventional weapons; and the conclusion of the Arms Trade Treaty. Those are all concrete actions in the progress of the United Nations toward achieving its goals.

In the framework of general and complete disarmament, it should be noted that the Niger, a peace-loving State dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, maintains not only good-neighbourly relations with the countries around it, but also ties of peaceful cooperation with all the peace-loving nations of the world.

At the national level, the Niger has signed and ratified almost all of the regional and international legal instruments related to disarmament and international security issues. At the regional level, the Niger has ratified the following texts: the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, on 19 January 2007; the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons; the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons; and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty, signed by the Niger on 23 March 2014 and ratified on 24 July 2015.

At the international level, the Niger has also ratified all five Additional Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, including the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices, to which it acceded on 6 March 2012. In that regard, we note that to further demonstrate its political commitment to disarmament and the protection of civilians, the Niger has taken a step forward in ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

We note that West Africa and the Sahel continue to be severely affected by the uncontrolled circulation and

proliferation of firearms and ammunition as a result of certain armed conflicts and their repercussions in those regions. In fact, since 2012, the Sahelo-Saharan region has been destabilized by the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and drug trafficking. That is why firearms control is a cross-cutting objective in the framework of the prevention and resolution of armed conflict and the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

Additionally, since 1994 the National Commission for Illicit Arms Collection and Control in the Niger has been responsible for the national implementation of all the treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions on arms to which our country has subscribed. The Commission also led operations for a national programme of humanitarian demining. The programme — financed by the Niger, the United Nations Development Programme and the European Union — has made it possible to identify and decontaminate certain main roads and other, secondary roads in the Air region.

Also worth noting is the National Commission's partnership with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which is currently conducting a major programme on the security and management of arms stockpiles in national arsenals of the national defence and security forces. The purpose of the partnership is to contribute to security and stability in the Sahel by assisting affected countries to prevent the diversion of Government-owned small arms and light weapons and ammunition, as well as their illegal trafficking, by improving physical security and inventory management.

With regard to the Arms Trade Treaty, my country, as a State party, welcomes its adoption and pleads for the universalization of the Treaty with a view to preventing, combating and eliminating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): My delegation fully aligns itself with the statements made by the representative of Egypt, on behalf of the Group of African States, and by the representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/72/PV.17).

We must not allow global peace and security to be undermined by the potential threat posed by conventional weapons. In terms of accessibility,

conventional weapons are by far the most widespread and most used weapons in different parts of the world. Their availability in many countries continues to be a key enabler of numerous international conflicts and civil wars. It is against that backdrop that those weapons end up in the hands of both domestic and international terrorist groups, which further aggravates different forms of violent crime.

Ethiopia continues to suffer the effect of small arms and light weapons as a result of porous borders, the presence of various refugee camps and geographically vast and isolated arid and semi-arid areas, which make it difficult for security officers to adequately cover the territory. Domestic terrorist groups have been using such weapons, provoking unemployed youth and instigating civil strife, which has resulted in loss of life and the destruction of property. Despite all that, Ethiopia is working to avert those challenges by focusing on national and regional policy and legal frameworks to regulate compliance, creating public awareness and enhancing operational arrangements that facilitate inter-agency coordination and cooperation among law-enforcement agencies at the regional, national and international levels.

Therefore, the existing overarching framework of conventional arms control and confidence-building measures — such as the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, which contain many effective elements — needs to be preserved.

We look forward to the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, scheduled to be held in June 2018. In that connection, we reaffirm our country's commitment to playing a constructive role in international and regional efforts, as well as in supporting and reinforcing the Programme's national implementation.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction is an important convention to which my country is a State party. Ethiopia had declared the completion of the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in 2009 — before the deadline. However, the shortage and obsolete condition of operational equipment, as well as the lack

of adequate funding, hampered the accomplishment of the programme planned in accordance with article 5 of the Convention. In 2015, the fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties agreed to grant Ethiopia's request for an extension until 1 June 2020 of the deadline to fulfil its obligations under article 5 of the Convention.

In that connection, we remain convinced that the main responsibility for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines, in accordance with article 5 of the Convention, lies with the States parties concerned. Furthermore, the full implementation of Treaty obligations depends on the availability of sufficient resources and technical support provided by other States parties and donors. Therefore, in order to fully accomplish the tasks envisaged in the requested five-year extension period, support from the international community is indispensable.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to seize this opportunity to state that Ethiopia continues to do its level best to meet its international and regional commitments and treaty-based obligations on conventional weapons.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Mali to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.21.

Mr. Diarra (Mali) (*spoke in French*): Compared to weapons of mass destruction, small arms seem unsophisticated, yet in the light of the very high number of victims and injuries they cause, not to mention the resulting trauma and impact on communities, small arms can to a certain extent also be considered weapons of mass destruction. My country, Mali, unfortunately knows the devastating effects of such arms. Since 2012, the country has been a victim of terrorist groups that indiscriminately target children, women, national defence and security forces and friendly international forces. Through those actions, terrorist groups linked to organized criminal groups undermine all development efforts undertaken by the Government.

Through the Flame of Peace ceremony held in Timbuktu in 1996, during which several hundred small arms were incinerated, the Government of Mali expressed its determination to fight the illicit circulation of small arms, especially within the area of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Sahel. For that purpose, a national commission for the fight against the proliferation of small arms was created in my country. It is charged with coordinating the actions of various State services involved in the fight against the proliferation of small

arms. That structure also works closely with civil -society organizations and the people.

However, transnational organized crime and the activities of terrorist groups and traffickers of all kinds represent, in my country as well as in many others in the region, real challenges in the fight against the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons. Those criminal groups exploit border porosity to freely circulate such weapons, which have often been used in various earlier hotbeds of tensions.

Against that backdrop, participants in the regional conference on the security situation in the Sahel and West Africa held in Bamako on 14 October agreed to strengthen the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as efforts to implement the Arms Trade Treaty. The conference called in particular for scrupulous respect for the prohibition of arms transfers to non-State actors, including by States that manufacture and supply arms; strengthening the control of legal arms transfers to the region of the Sahel and West Africa; and improving the management and physical security of the stockpiles of weapons and ammunition.

The unbreakable link between development and peace and security is well established, and Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is ample proof of that. That should help us go beyond a strictly security-related vision of the fight against the illicit flow of small arms and consider a more comprehensive approach by also addressing the factors that facilitate the use of such weapons for criminal purposes.

As usual, the delegation of Mali has submitted to our Committee the draft resolution entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them" (A/C.1/72/L.21), on behalf of the 15 States members of ECOWAS. We invite all delegations to co-sponsor the draft.

Mr. Giacomelli da Silva (Brazil): The Brazilian Government has been advancing its internal legislative procedures to conclude the approval and ratification process of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and hopes to become a State party in the near future. Brazil already has in place a national export-control system that complies, to a large extent, with ATT obligations and is advancing the process to make it fully compatible with the Treaty.

The universalization of the ATT is one of the greatest priorities for the international community. The accession of the major arms exporters is paramount to avoid the continued detrimental effects of an unregulated international arms trade on world peace and stability.

Brazil also attaches great importance to the Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). By ratifying all CCW protocols, we have demonstrated our firm commitment to international humanitarian law and to the protection of human life and dignity in the context of armed conflicts. We strongly believe that the Convention provides a useful framework for addressing current and future humanitarian challenges in armed conflicts.

Brazil has never used of mines on its territory and was one of the main supporters of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted in Ottawa, which we ratified in 1997. The Brazilian armed forces have been engaged in mine-action cooperation for the past two decades, particularly in Latin America and Africa.

We also acknowledge the humanitarian challenge posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), especially by their use in densely populated areas. We deplore the fact that those devices seem to be increasingly used against civilians. Brazil has been undertaking efforts to prevent the diversion of relevant controlled materials that can be used for IEDs, in particular through national export-control legislation.

Brazil also looks forward to the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held in June 2018. We commend the presidency-designate of the Conference for having held numerous informal consultations since last year, and we are committed to contributing to the outcome. We particularly hope that the third Review Conference will be able to tackle the issue of ammunition.

There is an important connection between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, specifically Sustainable Development Goal 16, and the ATT and the Programme of Action. The illicit trade of small arms and light weapons has serious negative impacts on

public security across the globe. Domestic efforts must be supplemented by cooperation at the regional and international levels. Discussions were already held at the sixth Biennial Meeting of States of the Programme of Action and at the third Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. We look forward to continuing this debate at the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action.

The Chair: We have now heard from the last speaker on the cluster on conventional weapons.

The Committee will now take up the cluster on disarmament measures and international security.

I give the floor to the representative of Indonesia to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/72/L.29, A/C.1/72/L.30, A/C.1/72/L.31 and A/C.1/72/L.32.

Mr. Rahdiansyah (Indonesia): I am pleased to speak on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM).

The Movement highlights the important socioeconomic opportunities, in particular for developing countries, provided by information and communication technologies (ICTs) and underscores the need to prevent all discriminatory practices and policies that hinder access by developing countries to the benefits of information and communication technologies. NAM notes with concern cases of the illegal use of new information and communications technologies, including in social networks, to the detriment of States members of the Movement, and expresses its strongest rejection of those violations.

As the use of information and communication technologies has the potential to endanger international peace and security, it is essential to counter such emerging security challenges and reduce their risk. The development of a legal framework to address those issues should be pursued within the United Nations, with the active and equal participation of all States. The Movement stresses the importance of ensuring that the use of such technologies is fully in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; international law, especially the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and internationally known rules of peaceful coexistence among States.

NAM stresses the central role of the United Nations in developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international

security. NAM emphasizes the need to continue the discussion at the United Nations in order to ensure the transparent and inclusive participation of all Member States on an equal footing, including in the consideration of the establishment of an open-ended working group of the General Assembly.

NAM calls for transparency and the strict application of the principle of equitable geographical representation, particularly with regard to the composition of groups of governmental experts established in the field of disarmament and international security. The Movement also underlines the importance of transparency and openness in the work of such groups. In that regard, NAM highlights the fact that keen interest was expressed by many developing countries in meaningfully contributing to the subject of ICTs in the context of international security, and deeply regrets that their request for participation in the recently constituted Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security was not considered.

The Movement also emphasizes the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms-limitation agreements. Furthermore, the Movement reaffirms that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, and that all States, through their actions, should contribute fully to ensuring compliance with the aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties.

Finally, NAM would like to draw attention to the draft resolutions it is presenting in the cluster, as follows: first, "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control" (A/C.1/72/L.31); secondly, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" (A/C.1/72/L.29); thirdly, "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation" (A/C.1/72/L.32); and, fourthly, "Relationship between disarmament and development" (A/C.1/72/L.30). The Movement will welcome the support of all Member States.

Mr. Al-Dobhany (Yemen) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to state that the Group of

Arab States associates itself with the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement.

On the point of other measures for disarmament, the Arab Group underscores that solutions approved in multilateral frameworks pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations are the only sustainable way of dealing with disarmament issues and international security. The Arab Group calls on all Member States to renew and implement their collective and individual commitments, within a multilateral context, and stresses its belief in the role of the United Nations with regard to disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Arab Group is concerned about the increase in world military spending. A significant part of it could be used to promote development and combat poverty worldwide, especially in developing and Arab countries. The Arab Group emphasizes the importance of following up the implementation of the programme of action adopted by the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in 1987, as well as of studying the impact of more military spending on the implementation of the Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The existence of weapons of mass destruction and their continued development is one of the issues most dangerous to international peace and security, as well as to environmental balance and sustainable development for all without exception. Consequently, the Arab Group stresses the need for international disarmament forums to focus on environmental standards during the negotiation of treaties and conventions on disarmament and arms limitation. It emphasizes the need for Member States to fully contribute towards ensuring compliance with environmental standards in implementing such treaties and conventions.

In conclusion, the Arab Group expresses its concern about the use of information and communication technologies against the interests of States in the political, military, economic and scientific fields. However, the Arab Group welcomes the positive contribution of the United Nations to establishing standards that regulate this vital area, despite the difficulties that might be encountered in the development of an emerging system seeking to establish controls in this field. The Arab Group underscores the need to continue international cooperation and maintain the central role of the United Nations in these efforts.

Mr. Teo (Singapore): I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam and my own country, Singapore. At this thematic debate, our statement will focus on cybersecurity.

This year, we commemorate the golden jubilee of ASEAN — 50 years of collaboration and cooperation. ASEAN has not only fostered regional economic integration, it has secured regional peace and strengthened national resilience by creating a sense of common identity in the midst of great diversity. Fifty years on, we are on the cusp of a very exciting time, with tremendous opportunities beckoning. The digital economy can bring about huge potential for growth. However, cyberthreats and cyberattacks undermine trust in the digital future and adversely affect our lives, given our increasing dependence on digital technology. ASEAN will need to address cybersecurity challenges to reap the full dividends of the digital economy.

ASEAN reaffirms the importance of regional cybersecurity collaboration and is taking concrete steps to address cybersecurity challenges holistically. As part of our regional capacity-building measures, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy in March 2017. In addition, ASEAN has taken concrete steps to foster regional cybersecurity cooperation, which include the ASEAN Computer Emergency Response Team Incident Drill; the second ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity, convened in September 2017; the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus Experts' Working Group on Cybersecurity; and the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. Such initiatives involve more than the 10 ASEAN member States and demonstrate ASEAN's commitment to working with key partners to preserve the stability of cyberspace.

ASEAN hopes to play a greater role on the international stage. We support the ongoing work to promote international voluntary cybernorms of responsible State behaviour and the eventual development of a rules-based cyberspace. Several ASEAN member States have contributed to the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in

the Context of International Security. While we regret that the latest iteration of the GGE could not agree on a substantive report, ASEAN reaffirms the importance of the work and reports of previous Groups. In particular, ASEAN supports moving forward discussions on the adoption of basic, operational and voluntary norms of behaviour to guide the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in ASEAN in a responsible manner, with reference to the norms set out in the 2015 GGE Report.

A coherent, coordinated global effort is key to a trusted and resilient cyberenvironment. ASEAN is stepping up our efforts to forge consensus on a set of global norms on cyberspace and to enhance regional and international cooperation to address increasing threats to global cybersecurity. ASEAN is of the view that the United Nations should continue to play a central role in addressing problems of the global commons such as cybersecurity and further enrich discussions of norms at the international level. The United Nations has served as a catalyst for peace and development and is uniquely placed to facilitate a more inclusive and open process to address emerging cybersecurity threats.

Capacity-building is also an important aspect in enhancing our region's ability to respond to the evolving threats and in building a secure and resilient ASEAN cyberspace. ASEAN welcomes contributions towards capacity-building in the region. In particular, we are pleased that the Plan of Action to implement the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations (2016-2020) highlights the need for closer cooperation between ASEAN and the United Nations in cybersecurity and outlines, inter alia, the need to enhance cooperation and continue the sharing of information with existing ASEAN-led mechanisms to address cybersecurity, and the need to enhance training and technical support in cybersecurity cooperation, including strengthening ASEAN member States' capacity for cooperation among Computer Emergency Response Teams.

ASEAN believes that cybersecurity is an issue that requires coordinated expertise from stakeholders across different domains in order to be addressed effectively. We recognize that Governments do not have all the answers. The large percentage of cyberinfrastructure, resources and expertise in the hands of the private sector necessitates the private sector's involvement in our discussions. We will continue to encourage

and contribute positively to such discussions at the international level.

Permit me to add a few comments in our national capacity. As a small and highly connected State, Singapore supports a secure and resilient cyberspace underpinned by international law, well-defined norms of responsible State behaviour and coordinated capacity-building efforts to meet those norms. Robust international cooperation is necessary to address the emerging challenges posed by cyberthreats, and Singapore will play its part.

Singapore has contributed to facilitating inclusive conversations on key issues such as norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, capacity-building and confidence-building at International Cyber Week. We are also facilitating dialogue on cybersecurity and related topics through hosting side events and informal dialogues at the United Nations. Singapore has also launched a \$10 million ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme, which is a modular, multi-stakeholder and multidisciplinary programme to build capacity across policy and technical areas in the region. As part of the Programme, Singapore is partnering with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to develop a flagship United Nations online training course on the use of ICTs and international security.

Singapore looks forward to taking the discussion on cybersecurity and cybernorms in ASEAN forward when we chair ASEAN in 2018.

We must stand ever ready to deal with the changing nature of the cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead of us if we are to seize the opportunities of our digital future. Singapore looks forward to continuing to engage constructively on this important issue in the First Committee.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

Ms. Körömi (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

The EU and its member States recognize the role of the United Nations in further developing frameworks

for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The EU commends the efforts of the consecutive United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security to advance understanding of the application of international law, the norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour by States and to promote confidence-building measures, as well as capacity for the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs).

The EU emphasizes that over the years, the Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) have reached consensus on a number of views contributing to greater cyberstability, including that the Charter of the United Nations applies in cyberspace. The EU recalls the outcomes of the discussions in the Group of Governmental Experts, which the General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed, and important recommendations that States should fully implement. The EU regrets that the GGE of 2017 did not reach consensus on an additional report, but will continue to implement the consensual views articulated in previous GGE reports, and invites other international actors to do likewise.

The EU will continue to promote the establishment of strategic frameworks for conflict prevention, cooperation and stability in cyberspace. Such frameworks must be based on the application of existing international law, particularly the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety. The EU reaffirms that international law, and the United Nations Charter in particular, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment. The EU supports the development and implementation of universal norms of responsible State behaviour, supported by targeted regional confidence-building measures between States.

In that context, we emphasize the following, which, inter alia, apply to State use of ICTs: sovereign equality; non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States; the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means in a manner such that international peace, security and justice are not endangered; the right to respond, including by non-forcible countermeasures, to internationally wrongful acts committed through the use of ICTs; the obligation to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the

purposes of the United Nations; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the inherent right to self-defence; and international humanitarian law, including the principles of precaution, humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction.

The EU recalls, among other things, the following norms in GGE reports: States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts emanating from their territory; States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; and States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking into account, inter alia, resolution 58/199 of 2003, "Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures". The EU recalls that the 2015 GGE emphasized that States should guarantee full respect for human rights, including privacy and freedom of expression.

The EU supports and encourages the development of regional confidence-building measures, which are an element essential to increasing cooperation and transparency and reducing the risk of conflict. Implementing cybersecurity confidence-building measures in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization of American States and other regional settings will increase the predictability of State behaviour and further contribute to stabilizing cyberspace.

In order to build trust and strengthen cooperation among States, as well as to implement the currently agreed cybernorms, the EU acknowledges the role of capacity-building and stands ready to provide the necessary support. The EU is committed to addressing cyberthreats globally by assisting third countries in responding to such threats and increasing law-enforcement capabilities to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. The EU considers it essential to advance cybersecurity capacity-building through the development of appropriate domestic policies or legislation, the protection of infrastructure, the provision of training as well as upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights in cyberspace.

Recognizing the challenges posed by cyberthreats, EU member States have adopted a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyberactivities.

That framework contributes to conflict prevention, cooperation and stability in cyberspace by detailing how measures within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including restrictive measures, can be used to prevent and respond to malicious cyberactivities. The measures within the framework aim to protect the integrity and security of the EU, its member States and their citizens, encourage cooperation, facilitate mitigation of threats and influence the behaviour of potential aggressors, both State and non-State actors, in the long term. By providing clarity on the EU response to malicious cyberactivities, the framework contributes to international peace and security.

In conclusion, the EU and its member States reaffirm their commitment to better protecting Europeans in the digital age, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to improving and strengthening security and stability in cyberspace. We call on all States Members of the United Nations to apply existing international law, fully implement agreed cybernorms and advance the development and implementation of confidence-building measures.

Ms. Challenger (Antigua and Barbuda): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 14 members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). We also align our statement with that delivered earlier by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

My remarks will focus on two areas that are of great importance to the region: gender and disarmament, and disarmament and development.

CARICOM affirms that disarmament is fundamentally about ensuring that we all live in a safe and secure world. In that context, CARICOM is of the firm view that the continued consideration of gender perspectives can advance the achievement of disarmament goals, away from the traditional perspective to one that embraces a multidimensional and humanitarian approach, with the aim of leaving no woman, man, girl or boy behind.

We welcome Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and its follow-up resolutions, which affirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and stress the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Those resolutions urge all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender

perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. They also call on all parties to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict.

Resolution 65/69, adopted in 2010 in specific recognition of the tenth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), urges Member States to promote equal opportunities for women in disarmament and decision-making processes and to support and strengthen the effective participation of women in disarmament. That resolution is introduced biennially in the First Committee by CARICOM member State Trinidad and Tobago. It is entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control” and remains the only Assembly resolution that addresses the vital links between women and disarmament. In 2016 that resolution was adopted for a fifth time.

Over the years, substantive updates to the text have been made in relation to the 2015 review of the women and peace and security agenda and the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Arms Trade Treaty. Those additions only served to strengthen that important resolution as we all seek to position gender and disarmament as a core and cross-cutting item on the agenda of the United Nations.

CARICOM member States welcome the specific inclusion of the impact of women and girls in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. That Treaty also recognizes the importance of the equal, full and effective participation of both men and women in achieving sustainable peace and security, and it declares its members’ commitment to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament.

Additionally, in 2016, at the sixth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, States agreed to ensure the participation of women in the Programme of Action processes. They undertook to encourage the collection of disaggregated data on gender and illicit small arms and light weapons. That is particularly relevant and important to CARICOM member States, since we encounter the differing impacts of illicit small arms and light weapons on women, men, boys and girls in our communities.

Our region also looks forward to the third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action in order to build on the discussions held at the sixth Biennial Meeting of States, in particular with regard to gender-related disarmament issues.

In the Caribbean region, while men are most often the victims of gun crimes, it is the women who are left to become the sole breadwinners for families and who risk falling into poverty. Women also have to deal with the emotional and mental trauma that follows in the wake of gun violence. For that reason, we believe that women must be included in the disarmament discourse at all levels.

While we welcome the greater attention that gender is receiving in the area of international disarmament, CARICOM remains cognizant that there are still too many “firsts” with regard to women and disarmament. We continue to reiterate the need to ensure gender diversity in those discussions.

Even though the CARICOM region is not affected by armed conflicts, we face tremendous challenges related to gun violence in our countries. According to statistics, approximately 70 per cent of homicides within the region feature the use of firearms. As a result, significant resources are diverted from development and, by extension, from social and development goals. The fallout from that violence can plunge families and communities into poverty and cause significant damage to a country’s longer-term development efforts. Security costs can cause delay in social, educational and infrastructure programmes and create an untenable burden for countries that are already heavily indebted and vulnerable to natural disasters.

For CARICOM, the problem of illegal weapons is closely linked to transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and money laundering. The region is engaged in efforts to combat the effects of those destructive elements. A consequence of that is the opportunity cost, since limited resources have to be diverted from improving the social and economic situation to addressing security and monitoring systems due to the presence of illegal weapons in our territories.

Developing nations are often more negatively affected by the use and trade of weapons. No CARICOM member State is an arms producer. A diverse range of perspectives must be present at the international disarmament forum in order to ensure

that the decisions made reflect worldwide concerns. The underrepresentation of lower-income countries at international disarmament forums must be addressed in a holistic manner.

In closing, CARICOM would like to reiterate the impact that armed violence has had on development and the quality of life in our communities. We will continue to work with member States to ensure that there is a broader framing of disarmament and weapons issues to address the humanitarian and development agendas.

Mrs. Dallafior (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): Switzerland believes that cyberspace should be open, free, accessible and stable. Switzerland took part in the fifth Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It took the opportunity to advocate for a cyberspace based on the implementation of international law, voluntary norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour, confidence-building measures and capacity-building. From the outset, Switzerland underscored the importance and validity of the work accomplished by the previous Groups of Governmental Experts. The consensus reports of 2013 (see A/68/98) and 2015 (see A/70/174) stated and affirmed the clear applicability of the existing body of international law to the activities of States in cyberspace.

Switzerland therefore deeply regrets that this year the fifth Group of Governmental Experts was unable to adopt a consensus report submitting substantive recommendations to the General Assembly. While the Group made significant progress with regard to recommendations on existing and emerging threats, the norms, rules and principles for responsible State behaviour, confidence-building measures and capacity-building, it failed to fulfil its mandate on one issue — the application of international law to the use of information and communication technology. Given that the General Assembly adopted the 2015 consensus report and that the members of the Group of 20 and the Group of Seven explicitly supported it, Switzerland views the outcome of the fifth Group of Governmental Experts as a setback.

Switzerland is concerned about the hesitation of certain States to recognize the crucial role of international law in promoting a peaceful and cooperative approach to cybersecurity. First and foremost, we must affirm that existing international

law applies in cyberspace. Cyberspace is not a new sphere of activity that is void of norms and rules. International law sets the legal framework for State action and therefore applies to State use of information and communication technology. States must comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other provisions of international law everywhere, including in cyberspace.

Switzerland believes that the Charter of the United Nations fully applies to all State action in cyberspace and therefore prescribes the prohibition of the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the principle of due diligence, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, both online and offline, and the inherent right of States to act in self-defence in response to an armed attack. Furthermore, States must comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, including the principles of precaution, distinction, proportionality, necessity and humanity. Switzerland wishes to underscore the consensus of 2013 and 2015 in order to deepen and further the discussion on how the principles of international law apply to cyberspace.

The United Nations must be involved in the consideration of the crucial role of international law and of its humanitarian aspect to ensure a peaceful and cooperative approach to cybersecurity. Moreover, the United Nations should provide guidance to States regarding implementation of the recommendations of the 2015 consensus report, including the norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour.

Above all, the future system for regulating international cybersecurity must take into account the wider United Nations membership and allow for broader and more inclusive participation, including by States. In addition, international cooperation would benefit from the involvement of the relevant non-State actors, such as those from the private sector or civil society. To establish a future regime for international cybersecurity, we could draw inspiration from existing United Nations models, such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The full version of this statement is available on PaperSmart.

Mr. Kapur (Canada): I wish to speak today on a subject of importance to my Government — the issue of gender and disarmament. It is important for States members of the United Nations to understand more

fully that arms proliferation and armed violence can affect people differently on the basis of their gender.

Today, most conflicts are fought with small arms and light weapons, and armed State and non-State actors often use small arms to perpetrate or to threaten gender-based violence. Small arms are also durable goods. They can exacerbate social and political inequalities for decades, long after a conflict has ended.

Small arms inflict most direct casualties on men and boys, and in many cultures the possession of weapons is linked to narratives of masculinity. At the same time, such weapons facilitate and perpetuate violence against women and girls, including acts of sexual violence and domestic abuse. Furthermore, due to entrenched gender roles in many societies, women bear the primary responsibility of caring for survivors and indirect victims of small arms and light weapons. In such cases, the loss or incapacitation of spouses or other male family members can result in women facing persistent discrimination and hardship.

Women are not only victims of small arms and light weapons. In times of conflict, women play a variety of roles, including community protectors, combatants, arms dealers, smugglers and providers of support to armed actors. These roles should be fully recognized by including women in post-conflict peace processes, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

(spoke in French)

Given the impact on women's human rights, we must strive to increase the meaningful inclusion of women as full partners in disarmament and arms-control discussions in relevant international organizations, be it in the tracking and analysis of illicit trafficking networks and trends, in all aspects of the destruction of small arms and light weapons, or in international negotiations and peace processes.

The international community has made some progress in recognizing gender perspectives in the relevant legal and normative frameworks, including through the Security Council, the Commission on the Status of Women and the Arms Trade Treaty. We hope that this trend will continue. The fact that gender issues were included in the Arms Trade Treaty is a clear sign of the power of advocacy in bringing these issues to the fore. For our part, Canada will implement a particularly high standard for article 7.4, on gender-based violence

and violence against women and children, as we will assess the risks related to such violence in the context of products for export other than those defined within the Treaty.

Together, we must work to ensure that a gender analysis is included in all our work and that we fully implement the legal and normative frameworks to bring a gender-sensitive perspective to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.7.

Ms. Hicks (United States of America): It is a fundamental goal of the United States to create a climate in which all States can enjoy the benefits of cyberspace, all have incentives to cooperate and avoid conflict, and all have good reason not to disrupt or attack one another — a concept we call international cyberstability. We have sought to achieve this goal by nurturing a broad consensus on what constitutes responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

The Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security has served as a productive and groundbreaking expert-level venue to advance international stability in cyberspace. The consensus recommendations of the Group's three reports of 2010, 2013 and 2015 (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174, respectively) have included affirmation of the applicability of existing international law to States' activities in cyberspace, support for certain voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour in peacetime, and the implementation of practical confidence-building measures. In addition, these three landmark and successful reports have demonstrated the value of consensus-driven, expert-level negotiation on this topic within the United Nations.

The failure to find consensus during the most recent round of the Group's discussions demonstrates that there are challenging issues that we still need to confront. However, this inability to reach consensus does not make the existing Group's recommendations of the previous reports any less valid or important. We look forward to future discussions where we can focus on the important issues, particularly on those issues where we were unable to find consensus during the most recent Group.

At this year's session of the First Committee, the United States is again sponsoring our draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.7, entitled "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments". I will take a moment to introduce the draft resolution under agenda item 99 (aa), "General and complete disarmament".

There is a broad consensus that compliance with international treaties, agreements and other obligations and commitments undertaken by States Members of the United Nations to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and to regulate and/or reduce armaments is a central element of the international security architecture. Without the confidence that countries are honouring their commitments, the deals we make with one another in this field will not be worth the paper on which they are printed. Moreover, if we fail to hold States accountable for their non-compliance in accordance with international law, the authority and benefits of effective agreements and commitments will be undermined, and the world will become a far more dangerous place.

That brings me to North Korea's unlawful and dangerous behaviour. North Korea's dangerous actions violate multiple Security Council resolutions, and collectively they present a security threat not just to North-East Asia, but to the entire world. Over the last 25 years, North Korea has violated every agreement it has made with regard to its nuclear-weapons programme. Instead, North Korea has used its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile development programmes to threaten Member States and leverage international negotiations and agreements to extort such benefits as oil, food and money from the international community, continuing its destructive drive towards a nuclear arsenal.

Given North Korea's non-compliance with its disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and its failure to live up to its international commitments, the First Committee must make clear that compliance is essential to international peace and security by supporting this draft resolution. Draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.7 acknowledges the widespread recognition that non-compliance undermines international peace and stability. The draft also affirms our determination to use diplomacy to return violators to compliance.

This year's version of the draft resolution contains only minor technical updates to the text we sponsored

in 2014 (resolution 69/59). The draft resolution is open for sponsorship, and we welcome even more sponsors than the 74 that it currently enjoys. We hope that all nations represented in the First Committee will join in supporting draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.7, as the principle of compliance with treaties, agreements, obligations and commitments in this field, freely undertaken, is something that should be universally accepted.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of India to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.52.

Mr. Gill (India): My delegation has the honour of introducing under this theme draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.52, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament.

Science and technology have transformed our world and brought us unprecedented economic growth, food security and ease of communication and travel. Scientific and technological endeavours have also erased many of the world's divides and given us, especially our young people, shared aspirations and a common vocabulary. The potential of science and technology for resolving the world's most intractable problems, such as clean and affordable energy, is immense.

At the same time, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his opening address to this session of the General Assembly (see A/72/PV.3), the dark side of innovation is moving from the frontier to the front door. We need to ensure that we have the correct understanding of the latest developments in science and technology so that our practice in multilateral forums can adjust accordingly. We call on the First Committee to lend its support to draft resolution A/C.1/72/L.52, which calls for a comprehensive study of developments in science and technology that could have an impact on the general context, as well as on specific domains of the United Nations system's activities in the area of international security and disarmament.

Such a study could be carried out through a panel on science and security set up by the Secretary-General, whose mandate could include a survey of current science and technology developments in emerging areas, such as information and communications technologies; biotechnology, including synthetic biology and genetics; artificial intelligence and autonomous systems; outer space; directed energy systems; and new materials and additive manufacturing. The focus should be on twenty-first-century technologies that enjoy growing civilian applications and could be repurposed for military uses.

Secondly, an assessment of the challenges and areas of concern related to the use of such technologies for military purposes should be carried out, while recognizing that it is the prerogative of all States to use science and technology for national security in exercise of their right to self-defence. This assessment should also take into account how existing multilateral forums are dealing with such concerns, so as to avoid duplication and instead focus on the gaps and cross-connections between and among the relevant forums. The potential application of such technologies for enhancing assurance levels and lowering costs of verification of disarmament and arms-control agreements could also be assessed.

Finally, there should be an assessment of how potential opportunities can be seized, including those for strengthening verification and how emerging challenges can be better addressed. Such an assessment could include measures for follow-up by Member States and the Secretariat, especially through regular follow-up in existing mechanisms.

The panel would be composed of a maximum of 18 independent experts, drawn from relevant areas of scientific research, industry, science policy, international security policy, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, international law and ethics. They should be broadly representative, particularly in terms of geographical origin and gender balance, and should be well recognized in their respective domains as thought leaders. It is important that the younger generation of technology leaders find a place on the panel. All experts shall serve in an individual and honorary capacity. The Secretary-General could invite one of the experts to chair the panel and appoint a secretary from within the Secretariat to assist it. As stated in the draft resolution, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research could assist the panel in carrying out its work, so as to further reinforce existing linkages.

The panel would follow established practice and complete its work in two years. It will meet for five days each in 2018 and 2019, at the United Nations Offices in Geneva and in New York, respectively. Apart from these physical meetings, the panel would hold virtual meetings at regular intervals. It may invite inputs from relevant international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, the International Telecommunication Union and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. A web page would

also be set up, under the responsibility of the Chair, for inviting comments from industry associations and civil society. It would be useful for the Chair or a designated expert to brief Member States and provide information about the progress of the panel's work, taking advantage of a session of the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission or the Conference on Disarmament.

My delegation believes that science and technology should continue to shape our future and bring us together, not divide us. Challenges related to the military applications of advances in science and technology should be tackled, first and foremost, with a nuanced understanding of what these developments are and how they interface with existing mechanisms and instruments on international security and disarmament. Our approach should be anchored in humility starting with: "We do not know and we do not even know what we do not know", and we should proceed step by step from there.

Mr. Carrillo Gómez (Paraguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I have the high honour of delivering this statement on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Paraguay, which is grateful for the briefing by the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

The development of science and technology, access to information and communications and their use should be placed in a framework of respect for human rights in the broadest sense and of fundamental freedoms. They should contribute to maintaining international stability and security, and stimulate cooperation and friendly relations among States while respecting their national sovereignty. They should also be protected from being used for criminal or terrorist purposes.

With regard to the aspect of security related to information and communication technologies, the Paraguayan Government adopted a national cybersecurity plan in April, following a two-year development process. This process, led by the National Secretariat for Information and Communications Technology, in coordination with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, brought together representatives of all sectors involved in the management and use of cyberspace in all its aspects, such as the national Government, the private sector, including Internet service providers, the education sector, civil society and international organizations. After two rounds of

consultations, there was a consensus agreement on a draft that brought together the concerns, challenges and specific sectoral problems, as well as possible lines of action proposed by each of these actors. The agreed draft was presented to the general public, which also contributed its comments and suggestions.

There is no doubt that the national cybersecurity plan will serve to strengthen the security of critical assets, promote scientific research and bring about a secure, reliable and resilient cyberspace in Paraguay. However, it is the dynamic and participatory process of the plan's development that will guarantee that national cybersecurity efforts are sustainable, constant, coordinated and effective. The experience of jointly devising, in a participatory and committed manner, tangible measures to achieve a secure, stable and reliable cyberspace gives us an impetus to devise effective responses that are commensurate with the increasingly sophisticated threats and attacks on cyberspace.

Lastly, the delegation of Paraguay underscores the importance of international cooperation to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of mechanisms and policies for preventing threats and attacks on cyberspace and urges Member States' delegations to adopt, at the multilateral level, standards that regulate developments in information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which, *inter alia*, will make it possible to bridge the technological divide between developed and developing countries.

Mrs. Schneider Calza (Brazil): It is in the interest of all States to promote the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) for peaceful purposes and to prevent conflict arising from their use, as these technologies contribute to higher levels of economic and social inclusion and provide new channels among citizens, businesses and Governments to gain access to and share knowledge and to participate in decisions that affect their lives and work.

However, as a growing number of countries have been investing in the offensive and defensive capabilities of a military nature in the use of ICT, there is a risk that the militarization of these technologies and the emergence of new systems of ICT-related weapons might lead to an arms race, increasing the risk of escalation and conflict. To ensure a peaceful cyberspace, Brazil favours the strengthening of multilateral norms and principles applicable to the conduct of States in the field of information and telecommunications

technology in the context of international security. However, this result cannot be achieved at the expense of the free flow of information and respect for human rights, particularly the right to privacy.

The recognition that international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations apply to State behaviour in their use of information and communications technology paves the way for a peaceful and stable digital environment. In addition, the international community must examine the need to develop a specific legal framework. Among other functions, such a framework will be important for introducing a list of proscribed behaviours that would include, *inter alia*, offensive first use, tampering with the supply chain, intentionally introducing vulnerabilities into systems or networks and compromising the information security of other States.

Brazil encourages Member States to consider the adoption of a no-first-use norm with regard to offensive operations using ICT. Such a norm will reduce the chances of a global ICT-related arms race and reassure the international community that ICT will not be used as tools of aggression. In addition, confidence-building measures and increased international assistance and cooperation are important for achieving an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.

Brazil has been an active participant in almost all the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. A Brazilian expert chaired the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to resolution 68/243. While the Group's format has led to important work being done to advance international discussions on these issues, we regret that the Group established by resolution 70/237 was unable to reach consensus on substantive recommendations that would have deepened and expanded those contained in the previous reports of the previous Group. That serves to highlight the urgency of the Group's format evolving into a more inclusive format, one that is open to all States Members of the United Nations, so as to allow for the adequate participation of all countries, including developing countries, in those discussions.

ICT must remain inclusive and development- and peace-oriented, so that everyone can create, gain access to, use and share information and knowledge, thereby enabling individuals, communities and peoples

to achieve their full potential in promoting sustainable development and improving their quality of life, with full respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We look forward to continuing our contribution to the achievement of that goal within the framework of the United Nations.

Ms. Gonsalves (Netherlands): We align ourselves with the statement made by the observer of the European Union. In addition, we would like to make the following remarks in our national capacity.

The Internet is increasingly regarded as a global commons because of its role in supporting all aspects of human endeavour. The Netherlands is committed to keeping the Internet free, open and secure for all, which means taking full advantage of the opportunities that information and communication technologies (ICT) offers our economies and societies, confronting threats and protecting fundamental rights and values. With that in mind, we participated in the most recent meeting of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. I would like to extend my warm gratitude to the Group's Chair, Mr. Geier, for his tireless efforts and leadership over the past year.

Despite efforts by the Group's members to arrive at consensus on views and recommendations with regard to norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour by States, confidence-building measures, capacity-building and the application of international law in cyberspace, such consensus proved out of reach, which is regrettable. However, despite that setback, there is ample reason for optimism. That optimism is grounded in the fact that the lack of consensus during this year's meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts does not in any way diminish the foundations on which the convocation of the most recent iteration of the Group was based. Those foundations include the Group's reports from 2013 (see A/68/98) and 2015 (see A/70/174), which were landmark achievements.

In its 2013 report, the Group acknowledged that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. That acknowledgement was self-evident for the Netherlands. After all, international law, of which the Charter of

the United Nations forms an integral part, provides a legal framework for interaction among States no matter whether that interaction takes place on land, on the high seas, in the air or in cyberspace itself. More progress regarding the operationalization of how international law applies was made in the consensus report of 2015.

Furthermore, I would like to note the progress in 2013 and 2015 on voluntary norms, confidence-building measures and capacity-building — building blocks for more stable and predictable interaction among States. During the past year, the Group had an opportunity to break new ground. In particular, the Group of Governmental Experts could have provided guidance on the application of the inherent right of self-defence. It could also have set out its findings on how the law of State responsibility applies to the use of ICT by States. In addition, the Group could have made an important contribution by unequivocally recognizing that international humanitarian law applies to the use of ICT in the context of an armed conflict, including the principles of precaution, necessity, proportionality, distinction and humanity. Moreover, the Group could have usefully reaffirmed that obligations under international human rights law apply to the use of ICT by States. On the other hand, regarding voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour, confidence-building measures and capacity-building, progress seemed within reach. I would like to note the constructive and fruitful discussions that took place on the protection of the general functionality of the Internet.

Despite this year's setback, my country sees grounds for optimism. It is with an eye to the future, therefore, that my country is willing to support the decision to include the item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly's seventy-third session. We hope that, after a period of reflection, we can resume our discussions on norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace and continue to work together in addressing the challenges of today, taking into account — it must be said — the contributions of other relevant stakeholders, the private sector and civil society. It is important that during that period of reflection we collectively endeavour to implement all the recommendations submitted by previous Groups of Governmental Experts.

The complete version of my statement is available on PaperSmart.

Mr. Abbani (Algeria) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country's delegation aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of Arab States on the cluster "Other disarmament and international security measures". The full version of this statement will be published on the Committee's website.

New information and communication technologies (ICT) offer many opportunities for social and economic development in all countries owing to the growing reliance on them in civilian and military uses. The virtual realm has also become indispensable in different areas, as has the growing use of ICT by defence and security systems. However, the use of new information and communication technologies for non-peaceful purposes by terrorists and criminal groups represents a real threat to international peace and security and calls for securing cyberspace and strengthening international coordination in that regard to prevent any attempt to use ICT for criminal purposes. We stress that the concerns about the dual use of such cutting-edge technologies must not hinder the transfer of ICT to States that need them, especially developing States, while bearing in mind the legitimate defence needs of those States.

I take this opportunity to thank the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Mr. Geier, for his briefing. Unfortunately, there was no consensus on the final report of the Group of Governmental Experts. The recommendations we had expected from the Group could have made a contribution by shedding light on many important issues, including the prevention of the use of such technologies for terrorist and criminal purposes, and the means of promoting international cooperation, confidence-building and transparency, all of which can reduce the threat of conflicts.

Cybersecurity is among the greatest challenges we face today, owing especially to the increasing number of electronic security threats, which are the result of alarming breakthroughs that have recently targeted many countries and affected their security, stability and infrastructure. In that regard, Algeria has adopted a comprehensive approach that includes both general security and cybersecurity to fight transnational cybercrime, by adopting practical coordination tools to better understand the challenges in this field.

My country has also established an entity to prevent ICT-related crimes, which is designed to protect national security by promoting and coordinating the prevention of and fight against such crimes, especially terrorist crimes, which threaten national security and stability. We also ratified the Arab and African agreements on combating ICT-related crime, so as to promote coordination among countries with a view to fighting such illegal acts. In that regard, we stress the need for genuine cooperation among States to enable us to adopt a unified strategy to fight transnational digital crime. We must also reach an international agreement to fight digital crime, which affects persons, entities and States alike.

The use of artificial intelligence offers the world the hope of promising prospects that might contribute to greater prosperity and human development in many fields. However, the use of artificial intelligence in the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems poses ethical, humanitarian and legal challenges. The international community must therefore adopt clear legislation to end the threat of the use of artificial intelligence and its possible catastrophic consequences. In this regard, Algeria welcomes the decision of the fifth Review Conference on the Convention on the Prohibition of Certain Conventional Weapons, which established an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts to address this important issue and submit recommendations thereon.

In conclusion, Algeria reiterates the utmost importance of ensuring compliance with environmental standards while preparing and implementing disarmament and arms-limitation agreements. These standards must be taken into account when negotiating and concluding disarmament treaties and conventions in the relevant international forums.

Mr. Khan (Pakistan): Pakistan aligns itself with the statement made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries under this cluster.

The inexorable pace of scientific innovations and emerging weapons technologies carries serious implications for international peace and security. The rapid development of new weapons technologies in the conventional domain poses serious threats to peace, security and stability at the regional and global levels. Furthermore, governing and regulating the development and use of such weapons under international law is proving to be a major challenge.

The development of lethal autonomous weapon systems has emerged as a major cause of concern for the international community. Any weapon system that delegates life-and-death decisions to machines is by nature unethical and cannot fully comply with international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Lethal autonomous weapon systems gravely threaten international and regional peace and security, as they lower the threshold for war. They would also negatively affect progress on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Their likely proliferation to non-State actors and terrorists adds another dangerous dimension to their existence.

Developments in the field of artificial intelligence need to be appropriately tackled and regulated and should not outpace the evolution of the regulations governing them. In view of the illegal, unethical, inhumane and unaccountable nature of lethal autonomous weapon systems, Pakistan has consistently called for a pre-emptive prohibition on their further development and use. States currently developing such weapons should place an immediate moratorium on their production and meaningfully engage with the international community in addressing their concerns.

Pakistan presided over the fifth Review Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, held in Geneva in December 2016, which provided a useful opportunity to take stock of the Convention and resulted in a forward-looking outcome document. Pakistan supported the establishment of an open-ended group of governmental experts related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention and looks forward to the detailed consideration of this issue by the group of governmental experts. At the same time, we remain open to addressing this issue in other relevant multilateral forums, including the Conference on Disarmament.

In our view, the unauthorized transborder use of armed drones outside of international armed conflict, especially against civilians, constitutes a violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Their use also contravenes State sovereignty and the Charter restrictions on the legitimate use of force for self-defence only. The Human Rights Council, jurists and human rights groups have all

opposed the targeting of civilians using armed drones to make signature strikes and have termed their use to be tantamount to extrajudicial killings. Moreover, the threat of non-State actors and terrorists acquiring armed drones cannot be ruled out. All of these factors necessitate the development of appropriate international regulations on the employment of armed drones.

Cyberwarfare poses serious challenges to international peace and security. We are witnessing how the misuse and unregulated use of information and communication technologies could have serious implications for international peace and security in the event of a cyberattack launched on critical infrastructure. The hostile use of cybertechnology is fast approaching the stage where it can be characterized as a weapon of mass destruction and not just disruption.

As a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security mandated by resolution 68/243, Pakistan remains positively and constructively engaged in the work of the Group and welcomed the Group's 2015 report (see A/70/174). We were disappointed that at its last meeting, the Group of Governmental Experts could not agree on a consensus report. Perhaps it is time to move the issue to a universal multilateral setting, including in the Conference on Disarmament, to develop an international consensus on addressing the security and arms-control-related dimensions of this vital issue.

The Chair: I shall now call on those representatives who have asked for the floor in the exercise of the right of reply under the conventional weapons cluster. I would note that the right of reply on disarmament measures will be exercised at the end of the day. I wish to remind all delegations that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention.

Mr. Elbaz-Starinsky (Israel): In response to the representative of Iran, I would like to remind all colleagues sitting in this room, although I am sure everybody remembers, that he represents a regime that is the world's first and main sponsor of terror. Iran is engaging in a campaign of aggression in the Middle East and beyond, fuelling some of the worst conflicts in the world today, by providing weapons, funding, training and extreme ideology.

Both directly and through its proxy Hizbullah, Iran is committing atrocities against the people of Syria while also supporting the Al-Assad regime, which is guilty of massacring its own people, using conventional and horrific non-conventional weapons alike. It is therefore hard to see how Iran has any standing to level accusations against a country that has been fighting terrorism every day since its establishment.

Mr. Wood (United States of America): I take the floor in the exercise of my right of reply to respond to the comments made earlier today by the representative of Iran.

As senior United States officials have said, the United States is fully committed to addressing the totality of Iranian threats and malign activities and seeks to bring about a change of behaviour in Tehran. Iran routinely takes advantage of regional conflicts to expand its influence and threaten its neighbours, with little cost for its actions.

The full range of Iran's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including support for terrorism — we know what it does in terms of its support for Hizbullah, Hamas and the Houthi rebels — its complicity in the Al-Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people; unrelenting hostility towards Israel — even threatening to erase Israel — a State Member of the United Nations — from the map; consistently threatening freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf; cyberattacks against the United States and our allies and partners; grievous human rights abuses; arbitrary detention of United States citizens; and ballistic-missile proliferation.

With regard to Iran's ballistic-missile activities, on 28 July the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned six Iran-based entities involved in Iran's ballistic-missile programmes. Those actions are in response to Iran's continued provocative actions, including Iran's 27 July launch of its Simorgh space-launch vehicle, which uses technologies closely related to those of an intercontinental ballistic missile. We also remain concerned about Iran's support to the missile capabilities of militants around the region, including its military support to the Houthis in Yemen, which only further escalates the conflict there. It is critical that Iran cease its support for terrorism throughout the Middle East if that region is ever to become peaceful.

Mr. Azadi (Islamic Republic of Iran): Today, the representative of Israel has again made allegations against my country, all of which I categorically reject.

Despite all the new sources of insecurity, the first, oldest and most chronic threat to the security in the Middle East stems from the expansionist and interventionist strategies, aggressive warmongering policies and offensive, brutal practices of the Israeli regime. Invading all its neighbours, and even countries beyond the region, waging more than 15 wars and repeatedly committing all core international crimes are only a small part of Israel's vandalism in the region.

That regime is the only one in the region that has nuclear weapons and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and activities, while brazenly rejecting the continued international calls to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The nuclear weapons of the regime, along with its hypocritical policy of strategic ambiguity, are the main obstacle to fulfilling the long-standing international demand for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In addition, Israel possesses all other weapons of mass destruction and stubbornly rejects the international call for it to become a party to the international instruments banning them. The possession of a large arsenal of

sophisticated offensive conventional weapons and a sky-rocketing increase in Israel's military expenditure are among the other sources of the threat it poses. For instance, Israel's military expenditure grew by 19 per cent between 2007 and 2016, and it had one of the largest military expenditures in the world in 2016. That is separate from the approximately \$3.5 billion it has received in annual military aid from the United States.

In that regard, it is worth mentioning that, according to United States documents, Israel has been the largest cumulative recipient of military assistance from the United States since the Second World War. To date, the United States has provided Israel \$127.4 billion in bilateral assistance. Almost all of that amount is in the form of military assistance that is designed to help maintain Israel's so-called qualitative military edge over the other countries in the region despite the fact that Israel itself is one of the top global arms suppliers.

To restore security and stability in the Middle East, the elimination of Israel's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and its accession to the related international instruments are crucial, including for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.