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Chair: Mr. Tenya (Peru)

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In the absence of Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru), Mr. Tenya (Peru) took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

1. *The agenda was adopted.*
2. **The Chair** said that, in accordance with the Committee's accepted practice, members of the groups of experts supporting the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), and representatives of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) had been invited to attend the relevant briefings provided at the meeting.

Briefing on the impact of terrorism on children and children's rights (S/AC.40/2018/NOTE.79)

3. **The Chair**, recalling that the Security Council, in paragraph 29 of its resolution [2395 \(2017\)](#), had encouraged the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to integrate the impact of terrorism on children and children's rights into its work, especially in regards to issues related to the families of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, said that CTED would first explain how it proposed to integrate age and gender considerations into its work and then the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the Director of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research would provide further information on the subject.
4. **Ms. Brattskar** (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate), accompanying her remarks with a digital slide presentation, said that the recruitment, abduction and victimization of children for terrorism-related purposes was not a new phenomenon. However, the number of children currently associated with, or accompanying, foreign terrorist fighters, and the nature of those children's exploitation, was unprecedented, and presented new challenges.
5. Many of the countries currently dealing with, or likely in the future to deal with, children returning or relocating from terrorism-affected areas had little or no experience with such individuals and did not have appropriate strategies or resources in place. In addition,

the majority of the countries most affected by issues related to children and terrorism lacked the legal norms, safeguards and standards to implement the relevant provisions of resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), regarding returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, in a way that fully protected the human rights of children. Welfare, child-protection and criminal-justice services were often already overwhelmed, adding to the existing challenges.

6. The ability of children to readjust to everyday life was affected by many factors. Those included coming from communities with low levels of security and few opportunities, frequent serious mental-health problems, lasting disabilities and injuries, loss of family members, stigmatization by the community and rejection. Among girls, the issues included higher rates of mental-health problems, severe gynaecological problems, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and a lack of gender-specific assistance programmes.

7. According to 2017 estimates, at least 2,000 children of foreign origin, representing about 20 nationalities, were present in the conflict zones of Iraq and Syria. The actual numbers were almost impossible to verify and might be considerably higher. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had subjected children as young as 9 to extreme violence and sexual exploitation. In the Lake Chad Basin region, over 1.4 million children had been forcibly displaced; many were unaccompanied and particularly vulnerable to recruitment and abduction. According to estimates, Boko Haram had kidnapped over 1,000 children between 2013 and 2018. In 2015, one fifth of Boko Haram suicide attacks had been carried out by children, 75 per cent of them girls. Between 2017 and 2018, that group's use of children in such attacks had tripled. It appeared that most of the children who had ultimately become Boko Haram suicide bombers had been abducted. Children were easy to abduct, recruit and exploit; they were difficult to detect, and could be particularly fearful of seeking assistance. The use of children as combatants, executioners and suicide bombers, though prohibited by law in a number of legal systems, produced enormous impact.

8. In resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), the Council recognized that children associated with foreign terrorist fighters had performed many different roles and called upon States to assess them and take appropriate action, in compliance with domestic and international law. The Convention on the Rights of the Child defined a "child" as anyone under the age of 18, and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict prohibited States from recruiting those under that age. The Committee on the Rights of the Child had indicated

that the best interests of the child implied that, in the case of child offenders, the traditional objectives of criminal justice, such as repression or retribution, must yield to rehabilitation and restorative justice. States' national legislation established ages of criminal responsibility ranging from 7 to 18; in the few States establishing the age of criminal responsibility at 18, those under that age could be placed in rehabilitation or protection programmes.

9. Early action was needed to protect children and prevent their abduction or recruitment. Such action should include strengthening security and increasing opportunities for children, particularly through education. Programmes focused on prevention, reintegration and rehabilitation, should take into account individual needs, gender, and local conditions. In order to be able to handle cases involving children effectively, authorities should conduct individual and unbiased assessments, taking account of immediate needs before embarking on criminal or security-related proceedings; they should have scope for discretion at all stages of such proceedings, including the ability to explore alternatives to judicial action and sentencing, and gender-specific child-protection measures; with regard to those alternatives, they should be given clear guidelines governed by international standards and subject to review; they should also be provided with adequate funding, including funding for monitoring and evaluation; they should be encouraged to consult local communities and relevant civil-society stakeholders; and, lastly, they should be required to protect and promote children's human rights fully.

10. Following the adoption of resolutions [2395 \(2017\)](#) and [2396 \(2017\)](#), she had been leading a CTED task force to investigate the impact of terrorism on children and children's rights. It had worked to identify and analyse new and emerging trends, issues and developments, related gaps and challenges, and approaches to overcoming those challenges. CTED had raised those matters with Member States, including Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria and Switzerland, and had been working with UNODC and other partners to support the efforts of the Government of Nigeria to implement an approach to children associated with Boko Haram that centred on protection and rehabilitation. Work with Cameroon, Chad and Niger had also begun. CTED had also worked with partners in the United Nations system with experience in related fields. They included the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the Director of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, who were present at the current meeting.

11. In view of the urgent nature of the matter, CTED would continue, within the bounds of its mandate, to use all mechanisms at its disposal to incorporate consideration of the impact of terrorism on children and children's rights into its work.

12. **Ms. Gamba** (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict) said that the mandate conferred on her by the Security Council was to monitor six grave violations committed against children in times of armed conflict. The monitoring mechanism had indicated that all six had continued to be perpetrated by groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist groups, in locations including Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Syria. The related annual report of the Secretary-General, which would be published shortly, indicated that such groups had accounted for over 8,000 violations, the most prevalent of which were recruitment and use of children in combat and non-combat roles, at and away from the frontlines, including as porters, scouts, cooks, and sexual slaves. Children were also drawn into conflict through being members of the families of combatants. It was important to acknowledge the variety of roles for which children were used, exposing them to extreme violence. However, the use of children to support armed struggles or violent acts was not a new phenomenon, having existed among government forces, armed groups, groups designated as terrorist groups by the Security Council, and foreign terrorist fighters. It was unlikely to cease in the near future.

13. The challenge was to determine how to prevent the recruitment and use of children by such groups and how to deal with children allegedly associated, currently or in the past, with such groups. Before addressing the formulation of responses to that challenge, which must take account of legal, political and security issues, the scope of the problem must be examined. There was no complete set of data to show how many children were associated with armed groups, but there had been over 7,000 verified cases of recruitment and use of children by armed groups in 2017, and many more children had been associated with them in other ways. The monitoring and reporting mechanism was likely to be the most accurate source of information on the recruitment and use of children in situations in which parties — including those mentioned in the concept note provided to the Committee ([S/AC.40/2018/NOTE.79](#)) — had been reported as having committed one of the six grave violations falling within the remit of the Special Representative. It should be pointed out that the information available was not readily comparable from one geographic region to another, or from one year to another. In addition, the

data often only provided a partial picture of the situation, as more research on matters such as vectors of recruitment was required.

14. The United Nations University had launched such research. With regard to vectors of recruitment, the office of the Special Representative had been unable to confirm from its sources of information, including the Global Horizontal Note, which had provided quarterly information for approximately the last decade, that children joined terrorism-related groups because of susceptibility to radicalization or indoctrination, a conclusion often drawn by the general public. In some locations around the world, children rejected for recruitment by armed forces were found to have formed a subsequent association with armed groups, including groups designated as terrorist groups by the Security Council. While not invalidating the theory of children's vulnerability to radicalization or indoctrination, that finding did indicate other reasons for recruitment, including socioeconomic pressure and security concerns. Education had also often been cited as a vector of recruitment to armed groups. While it was true that those groups recruited from schools and religious educational facilities, additional factors — including abduction, and threats against teachers — were often involved. Schools provided an easy target because they contained large concentrations of children. It was therefore important to find ways to better protect school infrastructure.

15. Exploring the reasons behind the reluctance of many child-protection actors to discuss the association of children with armed groups was essential to finding responses to the phenomenon. First, the most widely ratified instrument for protecting children, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, defined a "child" as anyone under the age of 18. That central tenet must remain, and no exception must be made for children alleged to be associated with armed groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist groups. The same protection must be afforded to all children, regardless of their affiliation. Second, both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict served as a commitment to protect against recruitment of children both by armed forces and by armed groups. States were requested to take all measures to prevent such recruitment. As a result, children alleged to be associated with armed groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist groups must be seen primarily as victims rather than as perpetrators. That commitment notwithstanding, it was a trend for counter-terrorism legislation to override juvenile-justice principles, therefore restricting measures to safeguard the best

interests of the child. Consequences of that trend included a lowering of the age of criminal responsibility and failing to ensure specific protection for children during detention and prosecution by judicial systems that were not sensitized to the specific needs of children. In addition, counter-terrorism legislation often made it impossible to divert children away from the judicial process, potentially overburdening of the judicial system.

16. Her remarks were not intended to maintain that children should not be held criminally responsible if they committed criminal violations during their association with groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist groups. However, account must be taken of the extraordinary situations in which such children found themselves, and international principles of juvenile justice must be applied. Apart from the immediate impact of children being charged for terrorist acts, such charges, even if proven false, could lead to the long-term stigmatization of those boys and girls. The effective reintegration of children formerly associated with groups responsible for violent extremism should be a priority. However, in Member States' response to violent extremism, children were often systematically treated as security threats rather than as victims. That situation must change. Labelling children as terrorists or as individuals associated with terrorists limited their ability to receive assistance and could obscure the fact that there were significant differences in agency and responsibility. Legal reintegration and rehabilitation responses must be adapted to the age and development status of the children concerned.

17. Many of the remarks made applied equally to returning and relocating children of foreign fighters. However, the cross-border nature of recruitment, association, prosecution and repatriation further complicated the response. The task of the United Nations must be to support countries in which foreign fighters and their families were located. There was an urgent need for a coordinated international response based firmly on international law. Where children were still associated with armed groups, States should be encouraged to engage with the United Nations to establish handover protocols ensuring that children separated from armed groups were handed over wherever possible to relevant child-protection actors. Chad, Mali, Niger, Somalia and Sudan had already signed such commitments. Three priorities should be kept in mind in connection with children in camps or detention facilities following their separation from armed groups or because they were part of the family of a member of an armed group. First, the international

community should support affected countries in the delivery to children of humanitarian assistance, including food, health care and education. Second, the formulation of responses to the problem required a better understanding of its scope, including the number of children living in camps or detention facilities. That task would require resources. Third, States should be encouraged to engage with host authorities to establish contact with their citizens via their consular services to identify adequate return, prosecution, reintegration and other responses.

18. **Mr. Cockayne** (Director of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research), introducing the research of the United Nations University on the impact of terrorism and violent extremism on children, said that, as the previous speakers had indicated, many people had been shaped and scarred by childhood experiences of terrorism which would have genuine and serious consequences for them through the rest of their lives, as well as for their communities and countries. While efforts to understand the phenomenon, and its causes, dynamics and consequences had just begun, its significance had been clear for some time. That explained why the United Nations University had chosen to investigate it.

19. The United Nations University research project on children and extreme violence, launched two years previously, had been undertaken with the support and partnership of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Governments of Luxembourg and Switzerland. Its aim had been to begin the task of filling gaps in knowledge about how and why children became associated with, were used by, and departed from, non-State armed groups, particularly those often characterized as terrorist or violent extremist groups. The results of the project had taken three main forms: first, three "state-of-research" briefs drawing lessons from worldwide research in the areas of social science, criminology and brand marketing; second, the edited volume entitled *Cradled by Conflict: Child Involvement with Armed Groups in Contemporary Conflict*, which was available for download and in hard copy and examined three cases of conflict — Syria and Iraq, Mali and Nigeria — on the basis of original field research, extensive interviews with key stakeholders, discussions in focus groups, and surveys; and, third, a technical note, due for release shortly, which constituted the final outcome of the project, and addressed the programmatic implications of the research conducted, in order to contribute to practice on the ground, particularly in the case of United Nations agencies operating in situations of conflict. The project had involved researchers from many regions and academic institutions.

20. The aim of the current briefing was to present the six main findings of the research and reflect on their implications for future policy and practice. First, children's motivation for what was often termed "association with" terrorism or violent extremism was often not "anti-social" but "pro-social". In other words, many children joining or becoming associated with armed groups had positive reasons for doing so. They were motivated by love of their group (for example, clans, villages or families), rather than by hate for others. Armed groups could provide children with a ready-made identity, community and sense of significance, as well as some degree of order amid the chaos of war. Armed groups were aware of, and deliberately and strategically exploited, that fact. Many of the armed groups on which the research had focused exploited children's tendency towards altruism and group bonding in their patterns of recruitment and in their relations with and management of child recruits.

21. Second, though it was often assumed that children's pro-social motivation was propelled by religious, political, sectarian or other ideology, the research — particularly in areas of conflict in which the United Nations was present — had shown that ideology was not the central motivating factor that it was assumed to be. It was neither the primary source of children's drive, nor the primary framework for their understanding of their actions. Even where ideology did play a role as a motivator, it was rarely the only motivator.

22. Third, children's motivations for becoming associated with an armed group represented a complex mix of frequently intertwined factors. Some could be described as intimidation and coercion, some as structural causes and incentives. Researchers had found that the motivations included the need for physical security and food security; social incentives from family and peer networks; economic incentives, including wages; a response to direct physical coercion; and a personal search for status and identity. The complexity of children's motivations in such situations had many implications for the way in which children's agency was understood, and, in a legal context, how their responsibility and culpability was understood. The trigger for a child's association with an armed group was often a combination of five or more factors, but there was no single combination that explained the cause in every context.

23. Fourth, taking account of context was essential: motivations were different for children inside and outside theatres of conflict. One significant variation was the role of social media. While it could play an overwhelming role in child recruitment, particularly

when a child was not actually in a conflict zone, it appeared to have a much smaller role when a child was inside a conflict zone. The clear programme-related implication of that finding was that the approach taken to prevention must take account of geography.

24. Fifth, as the Special Representative had mentioned, a child's choice and an adult's choice often did not coincide. However, the assumption behind much of the structure established in recent years to deal with association with terrorist groups was that that association was a matter of choice, and that the exercise of that choice should be resolutely condemned. Yet, the recognition of the difference between adults and children lay behind the distinction made in legal systems throughout the world between the rights and obligations of adults and those of children. It also lay behind the recognition of children's rights in international law, which required the best interests of the child to be the primary factor in decision-making affecting all children, with no exceptions made even when a child's conduct was labelled "terrorist". While adults and children approached making choices differently under ordinary circumstances, that difference was more acute in circumstances of conflict. Once again, the research had found that the common assumption that one could choose to remain neutral was not accurate for children in theatres of conflict. That absence of choice could be more accurately described as the absence of any practical or legal option for a child to reject or avoid association with terrorist groups, often because the choice was made for them by others, usually adults, and often by the child's elders or community. For example, one of the research case studies in the Sahel had shown that the decision regarding association with terrorism was often a communal one. Children seldom had any voice in that decision-making process, or any practical alternative to aligning themselves with the decisions made. In some cases, a child's choice was determined by the State. In one case examined during the study, relating to Aleppo, the State had assumed that all adolescent boys and young men were affiliated with rebel groups, and treated them accordingly. Once again, the absence of real and meaningful choice had implications for programmes relating to protection of children's rights.

25. Sixth, awareness of the nuances of choice raised the issue of a larger danger, once again already mentioned by the Special Representative: programmatic decisions must be made without distortions introduced by over-simplistic analytical frameworks. Care must be taken not to reduce behaviour in conflicts to a single variable. In simplifying the consideration of association with groups, particularly those labelled as terrorist

groups, care must be taken not to misunderstand the experiences, choices and responsibilities of children. If policy choices and the allocation of resources were determined using an over-simplified framework, children might not be protected and might even be placed at greater risk.

26. The project had worked from the outset to draw practical implications from what might appear to be abstract research. The technical note to be published in the following month had been developed in collaboration with practitioners in the field and at Headquarters specializing in children and armed conflict; child protection; and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The note pointed to six main findings. First, the focus must be placed on children's rights and the best interests of the child. Second, programming assumptions about neutrality and about children's agency and accountability must be rethought. Third, in considering the role of ideology, extreme care must be taken not to reduce all questions to a single variable; seeking a "one-size-fits-all" approach risked resulting in a "one-size-fits-none" approach. Fourth, account must be taken of children's pro-social motivations, as children accumulated social and personal capital through involvement with armed groups that could be channelled into more positive, non-violent activities. Fifth, there must be support for children's long-term and non-linear exit processes from armed groups, based on the recognition that withdrawal from armed groups was a non-linear process and that children could not withdraw overnight. Existing models of responsibility, criminal justice, rehabilitation and reintegration did not reflect that reality. Sixth, the distorting effect of the lens of violent extremism must be recognized. An indiscriminate approach would resolve nothing.

27. **Ms. Anderberg** (Sweden) said that the briefings that the Committee had just received confirmed that the international community must face the reality that terrorist and violent extremist groups targeted children, who were then subjected to indoctrination and conscription, exploited and abused, and forced to play supporting roles, including by being used for sexual purposes, or as spies or suicide bombers. However, the international community had an outdated idea of how armed groups recruited children, and how children left such groups, with varying prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration in unstable circumstances. Intervention must be based on legislation and research. Her delegation therefore welcomed the United Nations University's research and reporting. It believed that all States must carry out counter-terrorism activities in compliance with international law and the rights of the

child. The same applied to the treatment of those captured, and children returning to their home countries.

28. As clearly stated in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, children accused of crimes under international law allegedly committed while they were associated with armed groups should be considered primarily as victims, not as perpetrators, and treated accordingly. Moreover, customary international law held that all children affected by armed conflict were entitled to special respect and protection. Importantly, that did not preclude prosecution in cases in which a crime had been committed. While everyone was aware that there were children and juveniles who had committed crimes for which legal remedies were necessary, the Paris Principles and Guidelines established that children who had been associated with armed forces or armed groups should not be prosecuted or punished or threatened with prosecution or punishment solely for their membership of those forces or groups. Wherever possible, alternatives to judicial proceedings must be sought, as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Paris Principles and Guidelines required. The international community had a responsibility to better tailor its policies and its programmatic interventions to prevent child recruitment by armed groups. It could do more to harness children's positive motivation, engaging them as partners on the path to peace. Her delegation was grateful that CTED, after the adoption of resolution 2395 (2017), could devote due attention to that issue.

29. **Ms. Boniface** (France), welcoming the briefings provided, said that her delegation wished to express its particular support for the remit and priorities of the Special Representative. It was particularly important for responses to the involvement of children with armed groups to be crafted taking account of their age and gender; that had been a particular concern of the European Union and of France during the negotiations leading to the adoption of resolution 2396 (2017). France was coping with the situation of some 500 minors, particularly in the context of the situation in Syria and Iraq, and had developed a plan of action, completed in February 2018, to address the issue from two standpoints. The first was preventing the radicalization of minors. That effort focused on better detection of vulnerability in a school setting through training for teaching staff. It also sought to improve the resilience and defences of students, aiming to counter terrorist narratives through critical thinking and debate. The second was handling the return of children from conflict areas. In that connection, the country's Prime Minister had unveiled, also in February 2018, a detailed

plan to provide age-appropriate care and support for minors that was also tailored to their individual situations. It was founded on ordinary law, but the Government had also sought to innovate by mobilizing a range of ministries and other State bodies in the process. Provision had been made for follow-up over the long term. Her delegation wished to express its support for CTED in the latter's efforts to work on the issues under discussion, and to offer technical assistance and the benefit of its experience where required. Finally, she hoped that the issues raised in the current briefings would serve to encourage discussion of the updating of the Madrid Guiding Principles on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

30. **Ms. Bains** (United States of America) said that her delegation welcomed the briefings provided, as they had covered a topic with a prominent place on the agenda of the United States. Echoing the views expressed by the representative of France, she hoped that efforts would continue to be made to develop an approach that was in accordance with, and gave primacy to, children's rights, before addressing the criminal and security issues involved, and that education-related measures would be accorded the importance they deserved. The lack of gender-specific programmes was a particular concern. Her delegation would be especially interested in learning how CTED could contribute to the Office of Counter-Terrorism handbook to help Member States to comply with international law when dealing with children accompanying or associated with individuals considered or suspected to be foreign terrorist fighters. She would also like to hear more from the Special Representative on how to avoid stigmatizing women and children who had been associated with armed groups. With regard to the United Nations University research, and the key finding that ideology was rarely the main motivator for children to become associated with armed groups, her delegation wondered what the research had found the main motivator to be.

31. **Mr. Bieke** (Côte d'Ivoire) welcoming the briefings that the Committee had heard, said that the association between children and terrorism affected all countries, but most particularly countries in Africa. His delegation was particularly conscious of the actions of Boko Haram and its impact on children and was interested to know what could be done to remedy a situation in which discussion of terrorism targeted adults almost exclusively, while expecting those adults to pass on information to children. It wondered whether the research undertaken had found a way of speaking directly to children about the issue. His delegation had noted that CTED had been working with a number of African countries, and wondered which fields that

collaboration was covering, particularly with regard to the reintegration of returning children, and what had been learned from that process. With regard to action by the Member States, his delegation intended to approach the representative of France directly to learn more about the programmes developed in her country.

32. **Mr. Van Der Pluijm** (Netherlands) said that, as the Special Representative and others had acknowledged, the sensitivity of the topic made its discussion all the more valuable. The number of children from the Netherlands currently in Syria and Iraq stood at 175; until January 2018, the Government had believed that the number was half that figure, illustrating the point the Special Representative had made about the difficulty of measuring the scale of the problem. He wondered if the Special Representative could say more about the role of the United Nations in monitoring the situation and obtaining reliable data.

33. His country's approach to children returning from conflict areas was still evolving but was guided by certain core principles, including reliance on action at the local level, and using a multi-stakeholder approach including teachers, child-protection agencies, psychologists and others. The matter of balancing social care concerns and security concerns was a delicate one, reflecting a dilemma faced by many countries. It was important to ensure that information was shared among actors who were not always natural allies, such as those dealing with social care and those dealing with security. His delegation echoed the hope expressed by the representative of France that the current discussion would be put to use in the updating of the Madrid Guiding Principles. He recalled that the Netherlands and the United States had launched an initiative in the Global Counterterrorism Forum to establish good practice for dealing with women and children returning from conflict areas. So far, regional meetings had taken place in Indonesia, Spain and Tunisia; they had highlighted the importance of thorough risk analysis and a case-by-case approach considering — with regard to children — age, motives for return, and the presence or absence of a family in the child's home location. Echoing the representative of Côte d'Ivoire, he wondered about experiences that other countries had with reintegration and rehabilitation of children. Finally, he hoped that the Director of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research could elaborate on his explanation of why the assumption of neutrality had proved inaccurate.

34. **Ms. Fink** (United Kingdom) welcomed the briefings provided, as they had focused on an issue brought to the fore by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. The emphasis on support and

rehabilitation and reintegration of returning women and minors was key; the results of the research by the United Nations University, and the reflection on the programmatic implications of that research, was particularly valuable in the context of the important partnerships developed, such as that between the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Global Compact entities. Her delegation welcomed the continued engagement of CTED on the issue, as the assessments performed provided a unique insight into the situation in various countries and regions and a unique opportunity for dialogue and follow-up. She had been particularly struck by the highlighting of the needs of girls in terms of psychological support, given the effects of the actions of ISIL and Boko Haram. More thought should be given to gender-specific assistance, especially in the context of rehabilitation and reintegration, as too much of the existing support had been geared to the needs and situation of young men. Another area of interest to the United Kingdom was preventing misuse of the internet, and the development of counter-narratives, so her delegation looked forward to further comprehensive collaboration with CTED and other partners on matters including the Madrid Guiding Principles.

35. **Mr. Guo** Shaowen (China) said that his delegation welcomed the very useful briefings provided and wished to emphasize that the complex topic under discussion was not limited to children, or to those returning from conflict areas. Much as in the case of drug addiction or addiction to the Internet, there might be factors other than ideology and poverty drawing children and young people into terrorist organizations. From a psychological and sociological perspective, there was much to be learned. With regard to the definition of "child" referred to by the Special Representative, views might differ from country to country. The differences seen within different age groups of children could be as wide as the differences between children and adults. Capabilities, rights and obligations varied widely, and a more balanced approach seemed justified. He wondered if the Special Representative had any advice or suggestions regarding differentiation among age groups.

36. **Mr. Siqueira** (Office of Counter-Terrorism) said that the Office of Counter-Terrorism would make use of the information provided through the current briefings in its own ongoing project focusing on how to help Member States to adopt a human-rights-based approach to the treatment of children accompanying foreign terrorist fighters. The expert meeting on the issue held in New York in April 2018, which had involved CTED as a contributor, would be succeeded by regional consultations in Jakarta, Amman and Paris in the period between July and September 2018. The Office of

Counter-Terrorism hoped to complete its work on the handbook that had been mentioned earlier in the meeting by the end of 2018. However, conscious of the pressing need for guidance, it would make efforts to share its findings with the Committee and other entities in a dynamic and useful way. The Office of Counter-Terrorism had called on the leadership of the Special Representative to develop an approach to the issue of children and terrorism that could be shared across the United Nations system to help Member States to deal with what was a very difficult problem.

37. **Ms. Gamba** (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict), turning first to the question from the representative of the United States regarding stigmatization of women and children, said that avoiding stigmatizing terminology, particularly in the case of children, was vital. When addressing rehabilitation and reintegration, working with communities was key, but that required long-term effort and resources. A central belief for hers was the need to take responsibility for children, who must never be left stateless. Children, particularly those in vulnerable situations, needed an identity. As an example, in recent discussions with the Government of Myanmar, she had emphasized the importance of issuing returnees to Rakhine State with identification documents.

38. With regard to the question from the representative of the Netherlands regarding the role of the United Nations in monitoring how many children were involved with armed groups, she said that regional action was essential, as many children self-demobilized; many were unaccompanied minors separated from their families or orphaned; and many were on the move and crossing borders. Many children were recruited in one country, used in another country, and must be repatriated to yet another country. There was a need to determine the number of children in detention to whom the United Nations had no access; the Organization was pressing for such access in countries such as Libya and Somalia. A regional approach, and regional and subregional agreement, was particularly needed in the area of protocols for the release and handover of children. That would substantially improve knowledge of the numbers involved.

39. With regard to the comments from the representative of China, she agreed that account must be taken of national legislation and national definitions. However, as the United Nations University research had shown, even where a child under 18 was believed to be guilty of a crime, the primacy of the intention behind the act must prevail, based on the information available to the child when the decision to become involved with an

armed group was taken, and the freedom of choice that that child had. Other principles, including the age of criminal responsibility, a prohibition on use of the death penalty and the application of juvenile-court standards, should also apply.

40. **Mr. Cockayne** (Director of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research), turning first to the request from the representative of the United States for more information on whether the United Nations University research had identified the genuine key motivator leading children to become involved with armed groups, said that it had not been possible to find an answer. Anyone who did claim to know the answer should not be believed, as the scientific basis for knowledge of the issue was scant. What was known was that once there was an accumulation of four or five motivating factors for a given child, the probability of that child becoming associated with an armed group would rise substantially and suddenly. The difficulty of obtaining an answer to the question of the key motivating factor posed a serious problem for Governments seeking to formulate an approach to children in such circumstances.

41. With regard to the several questions and comments regarding the design of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, and to the question from the representative of China about modulating responses by age group, it was not possible to identify a reliable and cost-effective approach for each situation. To illustrate the difficulty, he suggested comparing the problem faced by an insurance company insuring homes. It was impossible for it to know in advance what factors would increase the likelihood of an insurance claim being made for each of the insured locations, and therefore for it to know whether its insurance business would remain sustainable in the long term or provide the required protection. In the context of dealing with children in the situation under discussion, recidivism could have serious consequences, for the child and for others, and must be avoided. His conclusion was that investment in research must be increased without delay, to provide States with the necessary tools to formulate response programmes. A positive step was that the organizations and agencies of the United Nations system were collaborating effectively to provide States with the necessary information. However, more political and financial support was needed from the Member States themselves.

42. With regard to the question of the representative of the Netherlands regarding the reasons for the assumption of neutrality proving inaccurate, a finding that was explored in the technical note, he pointed to two considerations. First, a child and an adult did not

have the same freedom of choice. That had implications for the concept of culpability, for sentencing, for seeking alternatives to punishment, and for the design of disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programmes. Second, if children leaving an armed group had the impression that, in order to escape stigma and regain the approval of society, they must prove that they had left the group, the most obvious solution would be to join another armed group with a different aim or a different allegiance. The future welfare of those children was likely to be in danger as a result. By contrast, if a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programme that was trusted by the community could be developed, and if children could join that programme, the community might be satisfied that they had left the armed group behind, and the children's welfare could be safeguarded. A successful disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programme could therefore create an important opportunity for children to make a choice in favour of neutrality.

43. **Ms. Brattskar** (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate), recalling that a number of members of the Committee had asked about the next steps in the review of the Madrid Guiding Principles, said that much of the information and discussion at the current meeting was useful. The specific question of dealing with children had wide cross-cutting implications affecting criminal justice, prosecution, human rights, countering violent extremism, rehabilitation and reintegration, and international cooperation. The upcoming special meeting of the Committee to review the Madrid Guiding Principles would provide a valuable opportunity for discussion. Once the review of the Principles was complete, CTED would be able to update the Technical Guide to the Implementation of Security Council Resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and Other Relevant Resolutions, and to update the CTED assessment tools in order to elicit from its primary source — the Member States — more information on challenges and possible responses to those challenges. That was an important further step in a process that would continue to evolve.

44. With regard to the question of the United States representative regarding possible collaboration with the Office of Counter-Terrorism, CTED participation in the April 2018 expert meeting had provided a valuable opportunity for learning and dialogue. The Office of Counter-Terrorism had played an important role in coordinating the efforts of United Nations offices and agencies in the area of children's association with terrorism, and in gathering those offices' and agencies' different expertise and perspectives, which in turn were useful to CTED.

45. Turning to the question from the representative of Côte d'Ivoire regarding lessons learned from collaboration with African countries, she said that CTED had found that most countries had adopted a case-by-case approach to dealing with children who had been associated with armed groups. That included their approach to rehabilitation and reintegration. Once the review of the Madrid Guiding Principles had been completed, and once wide consultations and exchanges of views had taken place, it might be possible to explore the prospects for developing policies for case-by-case approaches, looking, for example, at which agency should take the lead in a multi-agency effort, how that effort should be coordinated or guided, and what steps should be taken to ensure that all the stakeholders received appropriate funding and support and were certain of their roles. As the United Nations University research had indicated, monitoring and evaluation were also essential, with programmes being updated to take account of evolving needs.

46. A number of the participants in the current meeting had highlighted the need for gender-specific and age-specific programming. Other considerations relating to individuals or communities should also be taken into account. As the Director of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research had indicated, seeking a "one-size-fits-all" approach risked resulting in a "one-size-fits-none" approach.

Briefing by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Biometrics Institute on the use of biometrics in countering terrorism

47. **The Chair** said that, in line with Security Council resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#) on international judicial and law enforcement cooperation in counter-terrorism matters, the Committee and the Executive Directorate played a central role in strengthening international cooperation relating to the collection and sharing of biometric data, facilitating the provision and delivery of relevant technical assistance and working with key partners to promote the responsible use of biometrics.

48. **Mr. Morange** (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate), reporting on the work of the Executive Directorate, in partnership with the Biometrics Institute, on the use of biometrics in the context of counter-terrorism, said that the adoption of Security Council resolution [2322 \(2016\)](#) had prompted the Executive Directorate to change its working methods, particularly the way it conducted its assessments and engaged with Member States, and to dedicate more resources to studying the use of biometrics in that context. The Executive Directorate had also taken part in several initiatives to learn as much

as possible about the technical and sensitive field of biometrics in recent months.

49. INTERPOL had initially proposed that States share biometric data to help to secure borders against ISIL leaders and foreign terrorist fighters who were finding ways to escape detection based on biographical data. Pursuant to resolution [2322 \(2016\)](#), the topic of biometrics had been included on the agenda of the Committee's special meeting on international judicial and law enforcement cooperation in counter-terrorism matters held in June 2017. The Biometrics Institute had been invited to take part in that event and to ensure that technical considerations had been properly reflected in the final conclusions. The Executive Directorate had also included information on the subject in the updated Technical Guide to the Implementation of Security Council Resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and Other Relevant Resolutions. Additionally, the Executive Directorate had reviewed its working methods to include the topic in discussions held with Member States during the Committee's country visits.

50. In 2017, the Executive Directorate had delivered a presentation on biometrics and the implications of resolution [2322 \(2016\)](#) for Member States at the inaugural INTERPOL Fingerprint and Face Symposium held in Lyon and at the annual conference of the Biometrics Institute held in London. As Chair of the CTITF Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism, the Executive Directorate had also discussed the use of biometric data in the context of counter-terrorism at the regular meetings of the Working Group.

51. Pursuant to resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), the Executive Directorate had engaged in extensive discussions with Member States with experience in the use of biometric data, and with regional, subregional and international organizations, to collect best practices in the sharing of biometric data. Several CTED experts had completed a multi-day training course provided by the Biometrics Institute in March 2018 to prepare them to discuss national challenges and needs relating to the use of biometrics. In recent months, CTED had also worked with the Biometrics Institute to develop public-private partnerships with key stakeholders, as called for in resolutions [2395 \(2017\)](#) and [2396 \(2017\)](#). The Executive Directorate had also contributed to the development of the United Nations Compendium of Recommended Practices for the Responsible Use and Sharing of Biometrics in Counter-Terrorism and had organized a meeting of experts in connection with that project. The Compendium contributed to a broader effort of the United Nations, together with other international organizations, including INTERPOL, the World

Customs Organization, the International Organization for Migration and the Biometrics Institute, to develop a "one UN" approach to, and consistent terminology for, the topic of biometrics.

52. Recognizing the great differences among Member States in their capacity to deploy the full range of biometrics tools, the Executive Directorate focused its recommendations on tools that made the most sense for the States concerned in light of their particular circumstances. The Executive Directorate also followed the Technical Guide and the guidance contained in the Compendium when drafting assessments and proposing technical solutions. CTED would also prepare information on the use of biometric data to assist the Committee in the upcoming review of the Madrid Guiding Principles. Identifying technical assistance needs, including by speaking with the appropriate officials, was already part of the work flow of the Executive Directorate as it prepared for and took part in country visits. The Executive Directorate also ensured that its recommendations were consistent with the work of INTERPOL and other partners in the countries visited. The Executive Directorate would present information on the good practices collected in the Compendium and their potential impact to stakeholders in priority regions to help them to identify the technical, legislative and financial measures they would need to take to implement such good practices.

53. In the first half of 2018, CTED had proposed the development of the Compendium to the Project Review Board of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, had secured the necessary funding and had recruited the Biometrics Institute to serve as a consultant on the project. It would complete its work on the Compendium by the end of June 2018 and would be organizing some regional activities in the coming weeks together with the Office of Counter-Terrorism and private sector partners to familiarize Member States with the document. It hoped that some of those activities could be included in existing initiatives, such as the border security initiative of the Counter-Terrorism Centre. It hoped to be able to organize a regional event specifically for the members of the Group of Five for the Sahel, which had indicated their interest in learning more about using biometrics and which would benefit from tailored recommendations for measures that could be taken at the national and regional levels and from technical assistance.

54. The Executive Directorate had focused on developing public-private partnerships through its work with the Biometrics Institute and on the needs of the Member States through its work with the Office of Counter-Terrorism. He was convinced that progress

made in recent months had prepared CTED to support the needs of the Member States with regard to the challenges they faced in connection with using biometric data and to share the information it had gathered during the country visits and other engagements planned in 2019.

55. **Ms. Moeller** (Chief Executive, Biometrics Institute) said that the Biometrics Institute was a non-profit organization founded in 2001, representing various groups within the biometrics industry with the mission to promote the responsible use of biometrics by facilitating the sharing of knowledge and experience among its members, shaping the discourse on the topic of biometrics and promoting good practices. The Institute's membership comprised users, suppliers, academics, privacy advocates and regulators. Nonetheless, not more than three of the nine members of the Institute's Board of Directors could be drawn from among supplier members.

56. The Institute had established sector and expert groups comprising high-profile experts to identify areas in which good practices needed to be developed. They met regularly to discuss the latest developments and challenges related to their areas of work, which included borders and major travel programmes, privacy and policy, security and integrity, academic research and innovation, digital services and digital identity. The Institute was regularly approached by the media to comment on developments in the biometrics industry and good principles for the use of biometrics technology. The Institute had decided to increase its collaboration with international organizations to extend its global reach and to educate potential users in regions of the world that were not well-represented within its membership, prompting it to reach out to CTED, the International Organization for Migration and the World Bank.

57. The Institute had developed guidelines relating to privacy, implementation and vulnerabilities of biometrics technology. Its privacy guidelines had been developed based on a privacy code it had drafted in 2006, with the support of the Australian Privacy Commissioner, for the Australian biometrics market. The guidelines had been developed based on the relevant guidelines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe but had been recently updated on the basis of the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union. The 16 high-level principles for the use of biometrics, which addressed proportionality, informed consent, data protection, purpose and sharing of biometric data, did not comprise a standard enforced by the Institute. Rather, the Institute's members were asked to consider implementing the guidelines and to

document for their own use the reasons why the guidelines could not be implemented. To address the issue of vulnerability of biometrics technology to spoofing attacks, the Institute had formed a group of international experts who had developed a guide, including a list of vulnerability questions, to help members to understand the risks associated with biometrics technology and how to mitigate them. A reference guide to understanding biometrics that included reference standards would be published soon.

58. **Mr. Baldwin** (Biometrics Institute) said that industry experts from the Biometrics Institute and the CTITF Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism, including experts on counter-terrorism, biometrics, law enforcement, borders, international technical and scientific standards, system vulnerability, privacy and human rights, had contributed to the United Nations Compendium of Recommended Practices for the Responsible Use and Sharing of Biometrics in Counter-Terrorism. The Compendium provided a broad overview of the industry, a summary of recommended practices and case studies that illustrated good practices, emerging technologies and comprehensive references for further reading. The Compendium was a living document that would be updated to ensure that it kept pace with rapidly changing technologies and the evolving threat of international terrorism.

59. Recognizing that biometric data needed to be used responsibly, the authors of the Compendium had sought to strike a balance in each section of the Compendium between the prerogatives of developing counter-terrorism capabilities in order to protect lives, which called for the development of national and international biometrics systems and data sharing, and the need for oversight, to uphold international and human rights law and ensure good governance.

60. The first section of the Compendium dealt with basic biometrics systems, giving an overview of the increasingly ubiquitous use of biometrics applications in everyday life, including in national civil registries, driving license and passport issuing systems, criminal justice records, border detection systems, computer system access, including smart phone access, financial and health-care systems. The Compendium focused on facial, fingerprint, iris, DNA and voice recognition applications that were most relevant to counter-terrorism. The Compendium covered two basic types of biometrics identification systems: one-to-one verification or matching, such as the systems used in airports to match passports to the biometric data on file; and one-to-many identification systems, which searched for a match within a database.

61. A short section on biometrics system performance had been included, to make clear that no biometrics system was 100 per cent accurate and the system's inability to find a match could indicate that it had not located the biometric data, rather than absence of such data.

62. Another section dealt with forensic science applications that could assist in counter-terrorism efforts by helping to prove or disprove the involvement of an individual in a crime and provide objective processes governed by the rule of law, thereby reducing reliance on confessions and the use of coercive measures such as torture in the course of criminal investigations. Biometric data could also be used to interpret crime scenes; link individuals to an activity, event or location or other individuals, before, during or after an incident; link events within one investigation or across multiple investigations; and link data across multiple digital systems. Forensic analysis could be carried out in real time, speeding up crime scene analysis and investigations, particularly in the case of suicide bombings, where the ability to identify the remains at the scene could help to identify other individuals and thwart additional attacks. However, data obtained from a crime scene was often obtained from poor-quality samples and was not of as high quality as when obtained from a traditional fingerprint or iris scan.

63. States had an obligation to protect people within their jurisdiction from terrorist attacks and to bring the perpetrators to justice while honouring their obligations under international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law. Respect for human rights was complementary with effective counter-terrorism measures and essential to the success of counter-terrorism efforts. The Compendium included guidance for legislators on the ethical issues they should take into consideration in connection with the use of new biometrics technology.

64. The topic of data protection and the right to privacy had been the subject of the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union and international media coverage of data breaches in public and commercial systems, which included biometrics systems. Biometric data was personal data and needed to be protected. The Compendium also included information about the threats facing each of the modes used to collect biometric data, such as spoofing of faces and fingerprints and morphing of photographs, as well as strategies for countering them. An overview of technical and scientific biometrics standards was included, to help States assess the performance and value for money of their biometric systems and to put in

place quality management systems to assess staff competence and validity of processes.

65. Lastly, in recognition of the significant capital investment States needed to make to purchase a biometrics system, train their staff, maintain and develop the system to meet their growing needs, guidance had been included in the Compendium to assist States in determining which biometrics systems and applications met their specific needs and generated data that could be shared with their security partners.

66. In the final section, the Compendium included an overview of various sources of biometric data, such as border control and law enforcement agencies, civil registries and military applications, and the benefits, risks and costs associated with greater coordination among those entities at the national and international levels. At the border, biometric data could be screened against one-to-one and one-to-many watchlists, passenger name records and advance passenger information systems, visa and asylum seeker and residence permits databases. Law enforcement officers could screen biometric data against data collected from prior arrests and crime scenes, making it possible for them to link individuals to other individuals, crime scenes and events. Although the Compendium included an overview of the ways biometric data could be shared bilaterally, multilaterally, regionally and globally, the only consistent global application currently was the sharing of INTERPOL fingerprint, face and DNA data, which was a collection of data submitted by States to INTERPOL and overseen independently by the agency.

67. Traditionally, a counter-terrorism watchlist comprised a collection of data from known or suspected terrorists and terrorism-related crime scenes that was either part of or separate from a national system. The business requirements for a counter-terrorism watchlist differed from those of border, law enforcement, military and other applications, in that the information needed to be drawn from all sources to be more comprehensive.

68. Four basic concepts relating to the use of biometrics were outlined in the Compendium. Data sharing ensured mutual protection: in addition to having sophisticated biometrics systems within their own borders, States needed to share data with their international partners on a global scale to ensure comprehensive protection. Biometric data that was lawfully obtained yielded long-term benefits, making it advisable to find cost-effective means for keeping suspected terrorists under surveillance. Owing to scientific, administrative and other errors, biometrics systems were not completely accurate, which meant that a full contextual assessment needed to be conducted for

each match and the origin of the data needed to be checked thoroughly every time. Lastly, a proactive approach to using basic biometric data collected over the previous century by law enforcement authorities could help to identify patterns, associations and networks and predict criminal activity, thereby developing the capability to disrupt and prevent acts of terrorism.

Briefing on the proposal for shortening the timelines for drafting and reviewing reports, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2395 (2017) (S/AC.40/2018/NOTE.74)

69. **Mr. Seif El-Dawla** (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate) said that the Executive Directorate had drafted a proposal for updating the Committee's guidelines on post-visit follow-up, including shortening, as far as possible, the timelines for drafting and reviewing reports, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2395 (2017). The existing guidelines, which dated back to 2012, needed to reflect the Committee's growing workload and comply with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2129 (2013), in which the Council had stressed the importance of CTED providing timely its country reports to the Committee.

70. The objectives of the proposal included shortening the time frame for report preparation and harmonizing the terminology used in the Committee's preliminary conclusions and streamlining procedures and processes, which would help Committee members to know when to report back to their Governments and ask for further comments and instructions. The revised procedure would also allow for immediate engagement with the Member State visited State, on the basis of the Committee's recommendations, immediately following the visit.

71. Under the current procedure, the assessment report, adopted by the Committee either under the no-objection procedure or following a presentation of the report by CTED, was not transmitted to the Member State until the Committee had also adopted the overview of implementation assessment and the detailed implementation survey relating to that State. The proposed changes to the procedure would help to reduce such delays. Under the proposal, the time frame for drafting the assessment reports would be reduced from five to three months, which allowed sufficient time for constructive dialogue with the Member State on the Committee's findings. With regard to extensions, some Member States had been given multiple extensions, totalling more than one year in some cases; the Committee might wish to consider adopting a more

harmonized and politically consistent approach to granting such extensions.

72. Another way to shorten the time frame would be to ask Member States to submit information on the steps taken to implement the recommendations contained in the assessment report. Currently, a Member State was expected to report within four months on its implementation of those recommendations, and also to respond to the overview of implementation assessment and the detailed implementation survey, which was impossible. Under the proposal, the assessment report and both surveys would be transmitted to the Member State as one document, and the Member State would have six months to report back. The change would also enable CTED to report to the Committee on the Member State's progress in implementing the Committee's recommendations within one year, in line with resolution 2395 (2017).

73. It was also proposed that a Member State be permitted to submit its documents in French, which was an official working language of the United Nations and also the official language of some of the Member States being visited, and that the Committee proceed in its deliberations on the basis of the French-language documents and also communicate the deadlines for the submission of follow-up reports by the Member State in French.

74. Greater political engagement by the subcommittees with Member States and their permanent missions could also be helpful in moving the dialogue with the Committee forward. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2395 (2017), Member State representatives could be invited to deliver a briefing to the Committee on their implementation of its recommendations.

75. Lastly, greater engagement with the United Nations country teams and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General concerned, as had been done in the case of Iraq, could also be beneficial when following up on a country's implementation of the Committee's recommendations.

76. **Ms. Boniface** (France) said that it would be useful to hold an informal discussion of the information presented by CTED.

77. **Mr. Horna** (Peru) asked whether it would be possible for documents to be submitted in other official languages of the United Nations.

78. **Ms. Fink** (United Kingdom), welcoming the proposed changes in general terms, particularly in view of the Committee's busy schedule of country visits and meetings, said that the proposed shorter time frames

would ensure that the material being considered by the Committee and the implementation partners was as recent as possible. At the same time, the proposal had implications for other issues being weighed by the Committee and would need be considered in the light of the forthcoming report on assessment tools to be prepared pursuant to resolution [2395 \(2017\)](#).

79. **Ms. Bains** (United States of America) agreed that the timeline for follow-up on the Committee's country visits, set out in the 2012 guidelines, needed to be updated and said that her delegation would welcome a discussion of the proposal in a more informal setting.

80. **The Chair** said that he took it that the Committee wished to take note of the report and to consider the operational suggestions and practical measures outlined in the proposal in an informal meeting.

81. *It was so decided.*

Other matters

82. **Mr. Almowaizri** (Kuwait) reiterated the commitment made by his delegation to work with the Committee and CTED to ensure the success of the upcoming special meeting of the Committee to review the Madrid Guiding Principles, to be held in his country.

83. **Ms. Coninx** (Executive Director, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate) said that the presentations had illustrated the hard work of CTED staff and their successful coordination with outside experts, and that an unprecedented number of assessment visits had been planned for the month of July and therefore many CTED experts would not be present at the following meeting of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.