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Forty-ninth Session

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 May 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. POUDADE (France)

Examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the year ended 30 September 1981: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (continued)

Examination of petitions listed in the annex to the agenda (continued)

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82- 60565

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

EXAMINATION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY FOR THE YEAR
ENDED 30 SEPTEMBER 1981: TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

(T/1837: T/L.1228 and Add.1-3) (continued)

EXAMINATION OF PETITIONS LISTED IN THE ANNEX TO THE AGENDA (T/1836/Add.1) (contin

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I would first refer to the requests for hearing contained in documents T/PET.10/190 and T/PET.10/197 made respectively by Ms. Felice Gaer and Mr. Roger Clark of the International League for Human Rights and Magistrate Tomaki Juda, Senator Henchi Balos and Mr. Jonathan Weisgall on behalf of the people of Bikini. I have just received a letter dated 20 May 1982 from Mr. Roger Clark of the International League for Human Rights containing a request that Mr. Glenn Alcalay be included among the petitioners. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to that request and the letter will be published as an official document of the Trusteeship Council.

It was so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Ms. Felice Gaer, Mr. Roger Clark, Mr. Glenn Alcalay, Magistrate Tomaki Juda, Senator Henchi Balos and Mr. Jonathan Weisgall took places at the petitioners' table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I call on Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK: I appear today with Mr. Glenn Alcalay on behalf of the International League for Human Rights. The International League, of whose board I am a member, is a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. It was indeed one of the first general-purpose human rights organizations to be granted consultative status. We believe that this is the thirty-sixth year in which our representatives have attended meetings of the Trusteeship Council. Some of the members of the Council may recall the appearances before it of our late honorary chairman, Mr. Roger Baldwin, who died last year at the age of 97. He never dreamed

(Mr. Clark)

at the time of the first meeting of this Council in 1947 that it would outlive him. Yet the greatest Power on earth has spent the past 13 years negotiating with its wards over the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. It is not difficult to see that the haggling that has taken place concerns an effort to reconcile the near irreconcilable: the right of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory to self-determination, including independence, and the perceived strategic interests of the Administering Authority.

As recently as two years ago the International League commented favourably on a draft Compact of Free Association with three of the Micronesian entities which appeared to meet the United Nations requirements for a genuine example of free association. Since that time the United States has tried to undercut that Compact by its insistence on including in the related military agreement provisions aimed at what is referred to euphemistically as permanent denial. Permanent denial is designed to keep the Micronesian entities permanently and inextricably within the United States orbit. The United Nations Charter envisaged that a strategic trust would play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet it never contemplated that the inhabitants of that Trust Territory would be forced into a situation where the security interests of the United States, as interpreted by the United States, would be eternally paramount.

The matter on which the League would like to address the Council today is closely related to United States military activity. I refer to the continuing aftermath of the nuclear testing of the 1950s. The continuing health problems in the Territory raise questions that go to the very heart of the Administering Authority's obligations under Article 76 of the Charter to encourage respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

I should like to introduce Mr. Glenn Alcalay, who has made a special study of these matters and will speak on behalf of the International League.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I call on

Mr. Glenn Alcalay.

Mr. ALCALAY: I am appearing today as a representative of the International League for Human Rights to describe our concerns about the ongoing radiation problems in the Marshall Islands portion of the Trust Territory. As a former Peace Corps volunteer in the Marshall Islands, I spent two years living among the people of Utirik Atoll, who were exposed to the radioactive fall-out from the detonation of a hydrogen bomb at Bikini during the United States atomic testing programme in 1954. Last year I spent six weeks in the Marshall Islands recording the testimony of 70 individuals who were affected by radiation. I am at present a doctoral candidate in medical anthropology at Rutgers University, where I am conducting research concerning the myriad ways in which the lingering effects of radiation and fall-out have disrupted the lives of the Marshall Islanders.

(Mr. Alcalay)

When I appeared on behalf of the League before this body three years ago, I suggested that the World Health Organization be asked to initiate an independent international radiation assessment of the Marshalls. Since an internationally-supervised radiation survey has not yet taken place, the League today reiterates this request. To facilitate this survey, we also urge the Trusteeship Council to request the United States Government to release all its accumulated data on the effects of radiation in the Marshall Islands. In the following section, I shall briefly outline the reasons why we believe that such an independent study is not only warranted, but long overdue.

In 1978, the United States Government conducted a radiobiological and radiological assessment of the Northern Marshall Islands. There are serious deficiencies in this study. In the portion of the assessment entitled "Foodchain Study", Government scientists calculated that the Marshallese consume an average of 300 grammes of coconut per day. Recently, independent radiation experts commissioned by the legal counsel for the Bikini islanders estimated that coconut intake is about three times the amount estimated by the Government. Because coconuts are a major source of radiation uptake for the Marshallese, this discrepancy is more than a polemical and academic debating point. The catastrophic exposure of the Bikini population, leading to their emergency evacuation in 1978, resulted from a similar, earlier underestimation of coconut consumption by the United States Government. Similarly, the Government's researchers concluded that only the muscle tissue of reef fish presented any possible danger of ingestion of radioactive material. It is a well-established fact that the Marshallese eat not only the flesh of reef fish, but also the viscera and head portions, which would significantly increase the amount of contaminated food ingested.

In terms of the delayed effects of radiation exposure, there is again a discrepancy between the Government's findings and information provided by the attorneys from the Marshall Islands Atomic Testing Litigation Project, who are representing the Marshallese in their law suit against the United

(Mr. Alcalay)

States Government. In a recent article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, the Government-sponsored researchers stated that of a total population of some 30,000 there are 80 Marshallese who have had their thyroid glands surgically removed because of radiation-induced pathology. Although this figure reveals an unquestionable epidemic of thyroid disease among the Marshallese, where we might normally expect to see one or two randomly occurring tumours, it too underestimates and distorts the true picture of thyroid disease in the Marshalls. According to the Litigation Project attorneys, well over 150 Marshallese have had thyroid surgery following the 1954 hydrogen bomb. This gross difference in the number of thyroid cases stems from the fact that the United States Government counts only those persons who were physically present on Rongelap and Utirik during the 1954 fallout. The Litigation Project attorneys, on the other hand, include in their analysis all the islanders from all the Northern Marshall Islands who have had thyroid operations. Moreover, in a 1978 Department of Energy report, the United States Government itself acknowledged that all of the Northern Marshalls received fallout from the 1954 hydrogen bomb test. Despite this, they officially count only the thyroid cases from Rongelap and Utirik.

Similarly, when the Rongelap people were evacuated to Kwajalein after the fallout in 1954, United States Government scientists calculated that they received a dose of 175 rads of whole-body radiation. They deduced this average figure from a pooled urine sample of the islanders. At best, this is a dubious scientific method for determining radiation dose, in so far as it averages the radiation dose and does not reveal the individual radiation doses, many of which were undoubtedly much higher than 175 rads.

Similarly, the United States Government method of measuring radiation exposure is the whole-body count. It is a well-established fact about radiation that certain isotopes tend to concentrate more heavily in certain parts of the body. For example, radioactive iodine concentrates about 5,000 times as much in the thyroid gland as anywhere else in the body, as does cesium in muscle tissue and strontium in bone tissue. Yet the whole-body method of calculating radiation dose which is used by the United States Government obscures the fact of radiobiological concentration in certain parts of the body, and greatly downplays the dose of radiation received by the islanders.

(Mr. Alcala)

During the 1978 Government survey, radiation sensors were suspended from helicopters, and average radiation levels were determined for the islands in the Northern Marshalls. By this technique the readings of the radioactive hot-spots known to exist on many of the islands were averaged into other readings. Once again, this method of averaging grossly misrepresents the danger of radioactive contamination in the islands.

All of the aforementioned practices have the effect of greatly underestimating the risks of radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands.

As a social scientist, I am concerned about the ways in which radiation has disturbed the fragile matrix of Marshallese society and its environment. The following statements of Marshall Islanders, which I recorded last year during a research visit, reveal the deep uncertainties and anxieties among the islanders in the grim aftermath of the nuclear weapons tests. When I spoke with Minji Kel of Utirik, she had this to say:

"Our island is changed after the 1954 bomb, and many people have now had surgery on their throats. I really fear the radiation now, and since I had my thyroid operation last year my throat always hurts. There are many new problems that have come up after the 1954 bomb, and I wonder if everything will be all right in the future. I am very worried about my son Winton: it took almost an entire day to operate on his thyroid cancer for the second time, but the AEC doctors told me that his condition is not caused from the radiation. I know that it is from the bomb."

Etry Enos from Rongelap shared these views with me last year while I was in the Marshalls:

"I now have many illnesses - I have body aches and lumps on my skin, and I am losing my vision. There are many problems after the 1954 bomb, and these problems are increasing with time. The AEC does not tell us the truth, and when we ask why these problems are occurring, they never tell us the truth. Doctor Conard keeps telling us to eat our food on Rongelap, yet we notice that when he comes to our island he only eats food from the AEC ship. We now have many people who have had operations on their thyroids. I am really afraid to live on Rongelap, and I now live on Ebeye due to my fears of the radiation. My wish is to return to my home island of Rongelap, but I am afraid to move back. What we really need is a new medical programme with independent doctors who will tell us the truth about our radiation condition."

(Mr. Alcalay)

In conclusion, the League wishes to request two specific actions from the Trusteeship Council. The first is that the United States Government be required to release all its accumulated radiation data from the Marshall Islands so that these data may be scrutinized by an independent team of radiation scientists. Secondly, we should like to see the creation of an international team of radiation scientists who would be commissioned to perform an independent assessment of the Marshall Islands.

It would be impossible to reverse the pernicious effect of radiation in the aftermath of the nuclear weapons tests in the Marshalls. However, it seems appropriate to take whatever steps may be necessary to assess the full impact of the nuclear weapons tests in the islands. By releasing the United States Government data, and commissioning an international team of radiation scientists impartially to assess the islands, we can go a long way to reassure the Marshallese about the uncertain future they must face. The health of these unfortunate people and the well-being of their future progeny have been sacrificed and will continue to suffer because of the radioactive contamination of their precious islands and the surrounding marine environment.

(Mr. Alcalay)

The nuclear weapons programme in the Marshall Islands was conducted in order to ensure the national security of the United States; yet these same nuclear explosions have precipitated the gravest national insecurity on the part of the islanders. At the very least, we owe the people of the Marshall Islands an independent and internationally supervised survey of the radiation in their homeland, so that they can make informed and intelligent decisions about their future.

In this respect we urge the Trusteeship Council to endorse the 17 August 1982 referendum called for by the Kwajalein land-owners. This referendum will determine the question of the future use of their atoll by the United States military for testing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) guidance systems. In addition, we call upon the Trusteeship Council to support the moratorium on missile testing until the referendum decides the issue.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I now call on Mr. Henchi Balos.

Mr. BALOS: Sir, on behalf of the people of Bikini, I wish to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of the Trusteeship Council. Our best wishes also go to the past President and current Vice-President of this body. It is good to be once again among friends gathered here today.

With me are Mr. Tomaki Juda, Magistrate of the Bikini-Kili Council, and Mr. Jonathan Weisgall, who, I am sure, is well known to the Council. Mr. Weisgall is our legal counsel.

It is indeed a great honour to have the opportunity to appear before the Council today. I am deeply honoured to address the Council on behalf of the people of Bikini.

I want to tell the Council briefly the story of what happened to my people 36 years ago. A seaplane landed at Bikini one day in 1946 and an American, Commodore Wyatt, came out dressed in white. The only Americans we had seen before were soldiers, whose guns and grenades scared us during the American-Japanese war. The man told us about a powerful bomb the United

(Mr. Balos)

States wanted to test on our islands. The bomb had invisible power that could kill thousands of people. Commodore Wyatt never told us of the damage and destruction that was about to come to our islands. He said that, if we left our land, we would help all mankind. With great fear, seeing the military uniform, we knew we had to leave. We had no choice.

We had lived on our islands at Bikini for hundreds of years, but our departure came quickly. Three weeks after Commodore Wyatt came to see us, United States Navy ships came to remove us. They brought along hundreds of photographers to take pictures of us on the saddest day of our lives.

We were first moved to Rongdrik Atoll, where we nearly starved to death. I know this because my mother told me how she nearly died. She fed me terrible-tasting food, rotten copra, since that was all that was left. Most of the fish was poisoned and made us sick. When we nearly died of starvation, the United States moved us to a camp at Kwajalein Island. Then we were moved to Kili Island temporarily.

Thirty-six years have passed and we are still living on Kili temporarily. We were once famous in the Marshalls for our sailing and boat-building skills, but these skills became useless at Kili, which has no lagoon. Food and kerosene supplies were floated in from field-trip ships at Kili, so we had to swim out to try to get them to shore. In these attempts, we have lost some of our sons to the sharks and to the strong ocean currents.

In 1946 the Americans told us that we could go home right after the tests. This never happened. They broke their promise. Finally, after 22 years, we were told by President Johnson that Bikini Island was safe and many of us returned home. Ten years later we learned that the President of the United States had lied to us. Bikini was not safe and, for a second time, we were moved off our islands. Moreover, some of us may have been injured by radiation while we were back in our homeland.

We gave the United States all we had: our islands and our only identity. And we are now the only Marshallese people who have not been returned to our home. And what did we receive from the United States? Thirty-six years of lies and broken promises and a radioactive home. This caused us frustration and depression and that is why we are angry and hurt today.

(Mr. Balos)

I bring to the Council's attention the damage the United States has done to my people:

1. Destruction of our only homelands;
2. Vaporization of some of our islands at Bikini;
3. The taking and destruction of Bikini from 1946 to the present, without compensation;
4. The taking and destruction of Bikini from the present for 30, 40, 50, 60 or more years into the future, without compensation;
5. Loss of skills at Bikini;
6. Loss of copra revenue at Bikini;
7. Loss of peacefulness and happiness at home in Bikini;
8. Loss of arrowroot, an unseasonal food crop, at Bikini;
9. Damage, past and future, to Bikini Lagoon;
10. Broken promise concerning our safe return to Bikini;
11. Lies concerning the safety at Bikini;
12. Starvation at Rongdrik Atoll;
13. Hardship and suffering on Kili Island;
14. Possible radiation injuries at Bikini from 1969 to 1978;
15. Hardships and suffering from 1946 to the present;
16. Destruction of our self-reliance -- in the past, today and in years to come;
17. Breaches of fiduciary obligations under the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement to protect our health, lands and culture.

And there are many more.

What has the United Nations done to stop this? The United States unlawfully took and destroyed our only homeland. The United States destroyed our future, and our hope for the future is now meaningless.

We feel that we, like our atoll, have been destroyed by the United States. We will never be happy until we are settled on our ancestral home islands. We have waited for 36 years for the United States to come to us to account for what it did. Most Bikinians still do not think that the United States is ready to talk to us about the past or about the many years in the future we may still have to be away from our home. We are told that our home cannot be cleaned up, but

(Mr. Balos)

we have never been told the reason why. The United States, unbelievably, put men on the moon, and it easily cleaned Enewetak Atoll and put the Enewetakese people back on it. What is the difference? We want our home back clean and safe.

In conclusion, in his statement to the United States Ambassador on Kili one of our elders said to Ambassador Fred Zeder:

"If you dri belle" - Americans - "do not hear my wishes and request, you tie my hands and feet and drop me in the middle of the ocean."

That same feeling is shared by all the people of Bikini.

I should like at this time to request that our legal counsel, Mr. Jonathan Weisgall, be called on to make a statement.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I now call on Mr. Weisgall.

Mr. WEISGALL: I thank the Trusteeship Council for the opportunity afforded me to address it today.

As members know, talks commenced recently in the Marshall Islands on an agreement subsidiary to section 117 of the Compact of Free Association. This is a very difficult negotiation, because there is nothing pleasant about the legacy of Bikini. The United States Government's disregard for the human and legal rights of the Bikinians represents a sorry blot on its administration of Micronesia. The United States wants to terminate the trusteeship. The Bikinians recognize this goal, but the United States cannot walk away from its obligations to the victims of its nuclear testing programmes.

(Mr. Weisgall)

Most United States officials who have been involved in Marshallese matters over the years have viewed the Bikinians as wards of the United States, people who have been complaining for over 30 years about conditions on Kili, their "temporary" home since 1948. These officials always seem to forget what the Bikinians gave the United States. The Bikinians are not welfare cases; this has not been a one-way street. Never forget that the Bikinians gave the United States all they had - their land.

In order that this Council may understand fully the feelings of the Bikinians today, we must take time to review history. What did Bikini mean to the United States in the 1940s and 1950s? What did United States officials tell the Bikinians in 1946 about the length of their exile from Bikini? After 36 years, perhaps the time has come to close the books on Bikini. In order to assess the damage, however, we must turn back the clock.

On 16 July 1945 the United States detonated the world's first atomic bomb at Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert. The fireball was so bright, President Truman was told, that a blind woman saw the light. Secretary of State Byrnes later wrote that "the New Mexico situation had given us great power". Winston Churchill later reflected: "We now had something in our hands which would redress the balance with the Russians."

Three weeks later the second bomb was finally assembled. The next day, 6 August, a B-29 bomber dropped it over Hiroshima. The city was totally destroyed. Over 60,000 people were killed within two minutes, and tens of thousands died later of radiation poisoning, including 12 United States Navy men imprisoned in the city jail. When President Truman received the news, he declared, "This is the greatest thing in history," and said he had never been happier about any news in his life. His announcement from Washington stated: "We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city." On 9 August 40,000 people died in the explosion of the third bomb over Nagasaki, and Japan surrendered five days later. The atomic age had begun.

(Mr. Weisgall)

The atomic bomb represented a quantum leap in the technology of warfare. It suddenly made the rules of geography meaningless, and it wiped out all previously known rules of warfare. The atomic bomb immediately changed the post-war balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the United States had little knowledge of the force and effects of these weapons. As noted in 1946 in the official United States history of the Bikini tests: "Just how much of a revolution did the bomb represent? No one knew the answer to that question." More testing of atomic weapons was needed. As the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) explained in its 1948 report to Congress:

"America's pre-eminence in the field of atomic weapons ... depends upon ... the observation by scientists of nuclear phenomena that can only adequately be studied by actual full scale test operations."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff thus began to plan a series of atomic tests code-named Operation Crossroads. President Truman approved its plan on 10 January 1946, and the next day Joint Task Force One was ordered to select "a suitable site which will permit accomplishment of the test with acceptable risk and minimum hazard". Within three weeks a decision was reached; to quote the ironic words of the official United States history, "Bikini won out."

The United States acted with extraordinary speed and logistical planning to implement Operation Crossroads. The Bikinians were quickly moved off their atoll and thousands of men were moved in. All in all, Operation Crossroads involved 42,000 men, 242 ships, 156 airplanes, 25,000 radiation recording devices, 5,400 experimental rats, goats and pigs, and 750 cameras that took 50,000 still photographs and 1,500,000 feet of movie film.

Meanwhile, events in 1946 made the upcoming tests at Bikini a critical part of American diplomatic strategy. The cold war had set in. Russian Army troops remained in eastern Europe, and Stalin refused to evacuate

(Mr. Weisgall)

Russian soldiers from Iran. President Truman ordered the battleship "Missouri" to Turkey in late February as a signal to the Russians. On 22 February George Kennan cabled the State Department from Moscow that the Soviet Union could foresee "no permanent peaceful coexistence" with capitalism. The "neurotic" Kremlin leaders were no different from the tsars, Kennan declared; Marxism was just "the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability".

Five days later Senator Vandenberg demanded the end of "appeasement" of the Russians. The next day Secretary Byrnes declared that the United States could not ignore "a unilateral gnawing away at the status quo". One week later, in the course of his celebrated speech which introduced the term "iron curtain", Churchill called for a revival of the wartime Anglo-American alliance against a new enemy - Russia.

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was scheduled to meet in June, and the United States delegate, Bernard Baruch, was prepared to offer a plan for the international control of atomic weapons and nuclear disarmament on terms that would have prevented the Russians from developing their own atomic bomb. The Baruch Plan, as it was called, also included "prompt and certain" punishment - including atomic attack - of violators of the plan.

United States military leaders wanted to test the first bomb at Bikini in May, but Secretary Byrnes wanted it postponed because of the upcoming United Nations meeting. "Senator Byrnes said from the standpoint of international relations it would be helpful if the test could be postponed," one participant noted at the Cabinet meeting where Truman approved the delay.

On 14 June Baruch presented the United States plan before the United Nations General Assembly. "Before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons - as Baruch frequently called the atomic bomb - "it must have more than words to reassure it." On 19 June, the Russian delegate, Andrei Gromyko, offered a counterproposal that provided for neither inspection nor sanctions. On 5 July Baruch rejected the Russian counteroffer.

(Mr. Weisgall)

However, as one historian has noted, "Baruch's formal rejection of the Gromyko plan may have seemed unnecessary to the Russians," since the first United States atomic test had occurred four days earlier at Bikini. In the weeks that followed the gap between the two sides grew, and on 25 July the United States detonated the second Bikini shot. The Russians saw no coincidence in the timing. "The atomic bomb ... exploded something more important than a couple of out-of-date warships," Pravda observed; "it fundamentally undermined the belief in the seriousness of American talk about atomic disarmament." The Soviet Union voted against the plan on 31 December, and an atomic curtain fell on international control of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Weisgall)

The atomic bomb represented America's only real weapon against Russia's immense army. President Truman stressed this point in his statement concerning preparations for the Bikini tests:

"These tests on Bikini are of vital importance in obtaining information for the national defense. Without the information from these experiments, designers of ships, aircraft and military ground equipment, as well as our strategists, technicians and medical officers, will be working in ignorance regarding the effects of this revolutionary new weapon against naval and other targets not previously exposed to it. These tests, which are in the nature of a laboratory experiment, should give us the information which is essential to intelligent planning in the future and an evaluation of the effect of atomic energy on our defense establishment".

The successful tests at Bikini rapidly changed military thinking. Secretary of War Patterson, having received the Joint Chiefs of Staff's evaluation of the tests, stated: "The conclusions as to the effect of the atomic bomb are clearly revolutionary and affect things up and down the line." General Carl Spaatz echoed this belief: "The atomic bomb, because of its decisive nature, is now an essential part of our military strength."

As a result of the Bikini tests, the atomic bomb quickly came to play a critical role in American military planning. In March 1947, Secretary Patterson advised General Eisenhower that the War Department "is already following a policy that assumes the unrestricted employment of atomic energy as a weapon." Five months later the Pentagon drew up a new plan in the event of war with Russia. It relied almost entirely on the use of nuclear weapons, an important change from the previous plan drafted just before the first Bikini tests. Then, in 1948, President Truman concerned about spiralling inflation, placed a \$14.4 billion ceiling on the defence budget for fiscal year 1950 despite the Joint Chiefs' request for \$21 to \$23 billion. Truman's budget called for increased atomic bomb production and required such a deep cut in conventional forces that the only emergency operation the United States could have mounted would have been an atomic air offensive.

(Mr. Weisgall)

Over 58 per cent of the defence budget was allocated to the Air Force, largely to build more planes to carry and delivery atomic bombs. As one historian has noted, "The President's continuing refusal to budget adequate conventional alternatives thus made the United States virtually dependent on the atomic bomb." The budgetary attractiveness of an atomic striking force was suggested by a 1946 Bell Telephone Laboratory study that indicated that atomic bombing was 10 to 100 times less expensive than conventional strategic bombing and many times more effective. All of these savings were directly attributable to the changes in military planning that resulted from the 1946 Bikini tests.

Bikini was not to be used again for nuclear testing until 1954. In November 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the National Security Council, concerned that the Russians or Chinese might invade Bikini or Enewetak, recommended a site in Nevada for further tests. The return to the Pacific was occasioned by America's decision to develop the hydrogen bomb, a weapon whose fusion process is triggered by the 100 million degree heat generated by an atomic, or fission, bomb. With a force equal to 1,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) could not risk testing the new weapon in the continental United States.

"The "Mike" shot at Enewetak on 1 November 1952 was the world's first thermonuclear explosion, but it was not a usable weapon. The device was larger than a two-storey house, weighed 65 tons and required a massive refrigeration unit to keep the hydrogen fuel in a liquid state until detonation. A better bomb was needed.

The Russians had tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. Then, in August 1953, United States scientists detected the first Russian hydrogen explosion. President Eisenhower told the American people that the Russians now possessed "the capability of atomic attack upon us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time".

(Mr. Weisgall)

What President Eisenhower failed to tell the American public was that the Russian device used dry hydrogen isotopes that did not require unwieldy refrigeration. The Soviets had not only caught up with American nuclear technology; they had actually moved ahead and America had to develop and test a deliverable dry hydrogen bomb.

"Bravo", detonated at Bikini on 1 March 1954, was the answer to the Russians. It was a viable hydrogen bomb and it was better than the Russian bomb. It was 15 times bigger than the Russian shot, half as big again as the "Mike" shot and, most important, had twice the estimated yield. It was also the largest artificial explosion in the history of the world. The shot completely vaporized several small islands and parts of others at Bikini and left a one-mile wide gaping, circular hold in the reef that is still there today. Moreover, what was described at the time as an unprecedented shift in wind direction sent the 20-mile high cloud of radioactive particles drifting not south-west but due east, right over Bikini Island and 240 miles eastward, dropping radioactive fallout on the people of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls.

The United States cover-up of "Bravo" began immediately and the AEC response represented one lie after another. The people of Rongelap and Utirik were evacuated to Kwajalein within several days, and on 12 March the AEC made the following statement:

"During the course of a routine atomic test in the Marshall Islands, 28 United States personnel and 236 residents were transported from neighbouring atolls to Kwajalein Island according to plan as a precautionary measure. These individuals were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity. There were no burns. All were reported well. After the completion of the atomic tests, the natives will be returned to their homes."

What were the real facts? The "routine test" was twice as large as expected; the Marshallese were not "transported according to plan", they were evacuated because there was an emergency. The "some radioactivity" included near-lethal doses of up to 175 rem.

(Mr. Weisgall)

And there were many burns, lesions and losses of hair. After four months, the AEC reported that "there is no reason to expect any permanent aftereffects on the general health of these people" and the United States representative here at the Trusteeship Council that year accused the Russians of trying to score a propaganda victory from the plight of the Marshallese.

Meanwhile, unknown to the AEC, a Japanese fishing boat, ironically named the "Lucky Dragon", also received fallout from "Bravo". The 23 crew members suffered severe radiation sickness and one died seven months later from the effects of the poisoning. Although the United States Government quickly paid \$2 million in compensation to crew members, it did not admit that the dead crew member died from radiation exposure, despite the fact that the autopsies revealed significant amounts of radioactive elements in his liver and bone marrow. Rather, the United States insisted that the crew member had died of jaundice as the result of a blood transfusion. Lewis Strauss, the chairman of the AEC, confided to President Eisenhower's secretary, that, despite the 800 pounds of tuna on the "Lucky Dragon", it was really a "Red spy outfit" snooping on the American tests and he publicly accused the ship of "inadvertent trespass".

(Mr. Weisgall)

As to the unexpected shift in wind direction, the facts are also clear. The wind patterns for 1 March clearly showed the wind blowing to the east, but the test went on as scheduled.

Altogether, the United States detonated 23 nuclear devices at Bikini between 1946 and 1958, when President Eisenhower declared a moratorium on United States atmospheric nuclear testing. Each test was approved and reviewed by President Truman or President Eisenhower, and each test represented a major advance in military planning for the defence of the United States. The tests cost at least \$20 billion, but the United States never questioned their value, because they assured United States nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and led to immediate savings of billions of dollars in the defence budget in the late 1940s and 1950s. As the AEC stated:

"Each of the tests involved a major expenditure of money, manpower, scientific effort and time. Nevertheless, in accelerating the rate of weapons development, they saved far more than their cost."

Bikini was a real bargain for the United States.

That, then, is one side of the story. The Bikinians lived up to their side of the deal. What about United States officials? What did they tell the Bikinians?

The evidence clearly indicates that United States officials told the Bikinians that United States use of Bikini would be temporary and that their removal from their homeland would be short-lived. For example, when the Bikinians were moved to Rongerik, they failed to tell the United States Navy that, according to Marshallese mythology, Rongerik was inhabited by an evil spirit, Libokra, that contaminated fish. According to one historian:

"Americans were surprised that Libokra had not been mentioned before the relocation. The Bikinians...claimed, however, that initially they had considered Libokra to be relatively unimportant because they had understood that their relocation was a temporary measure, and a short-term inconvenience could be endured."

(Mr. Weisgall)

Most news accounts from these years also support that conclusion. In July 1946, Vice-Admiral Blandy, commander-in-chief of the task force in charge of the Bikini tests, visited the Bikinians on Rongerik to relay greetings and thanks from President Truman. According to the 17 July 1946 issue of The New York Times:

"Admiral Blandy...presented King Juda with several gifts - a pipe, a cigarette holder, matches, a carton of cigarettes - and a complete set of photographs of the atomic cloud over Bikini.

"/As the natives gathered around and looked impassively at the gigantic mushroom-topped cloud, Admiral Blandy called over the interpreter.

"Tell them this is Bikini,' he said. 'And tell them the palm trees are still there.'"

The clear implication of this statement to the unsophisticated Bikinians, who did not understand the lingering effects of radiation, was that Bikini was unchanged and that they could return home soon. Two months later, Vice-Admiral Blandy was quoted as saying that the Bikinians living on Rongerik would remain there for "some months" - not some years, not some decades. In late 1946, Time reported that Juda had petitioned the United States to return his people to Bikini. Commodore Wyatt told newsmen on Kwajalein: "All I can tell them is that they can't go home now." One year later, a United Press International story carried a headline reading: Bikini Radioactivity Dissipated: Atoll Safe for Human Habitation". The article reported:

"Radioactivity has dissipated from the island of Bikini where two atomic bombs were set off a year ago, and the island is now safe for human habitation, scientists reported today."

The most thoughtful interpretation of the Bikinians' impressions at this time was written by an anthropologist who was dispatched by the United States Government in 1948 to examine the Bikinians on Rongerik. He later wrote, in 1954:

(Mr. Weisgall)

"When one reviews the many statements to the press by responsible officials in those early months, even by scientists who had worked with the A-bomb, it is evident that no one was able to speak with certainty (although many believed they could) about the extent of the damage expected from the bomb. Prognostications ran the gamut from complete destruction of the atoll to only temporary contamination by radiation of the water and the marine life in the lagoon.

"In the writer's opinion, based on numerous interviews with Bikinians after they left Bikini, these people understood that their enforced absence from the atoll was to be only short-lived."

The rest of the Bikinians' odyssey is well known. They were left on Rongerik Atoll with only a few weeks' supply of food and water. One United States military official, quoted in Time, referred to the removal of the Bikinians as "one hell of a good sales job". The Navy, meanwhile, assured the media that the Bikinians were pleased with their move. One Navy press release reported that:

The natives are delighted, enthusiastic about the atomic bomb, which has already brought them prosperity and a new promising future."

An Associated Press story, quoting a Navy spokesman, indicated that the move was a blessing in disguise:

"Rongerik is much more beautiful and is a richer island than Bikini. Rongerik is about three times larger than Bikini... Coconuts here are three or four times as large as those on Bikini and food is plentiful."

In fact, the move to Rongerik was a disaster and the people nearly starved. The land area of Rongerik Atoll is actually much smaller than that of Bikini and its lagoon is less than one-fourth the size of Bikini's. A United States doctor who visited the Bikinians in 1946 reported that they were "visibly suffering from malnutrition". Another doctor reported that the people were rationing themselves to one bucketful of water per household per day and were cutting down young palm trees in order to eat the heart of the palm because there was nothing else to eat.

(Mr. Weisgall)

But the United States did not understand the deplorable conditions on Rongerik or the Bikinians' deeply felt ties to their home. A 1946 New York Times article reported:

"United States military authorities say they can't see why the Bikinians would want to return home; Bikini and Rongerik look as alike as two Idaho potatoes."

The Bikinians were finally moved to Kwajalein in March 1948 and then to Kili later that year. The total area of Kili is less than one-ninth the area of Bikini Atoll. Kili has no lagoon, no reef and no sheltered fishing area, so the people cannot fish most of the year. The drastic change from an atoll existence, with its abundant fish resources and islands as far as the eye could see, to an isolated island with no lagoon and inaccessible marine resources has taken a severe psychological, cultural, social and physical toll on the people. That damage can never be repaired.

For a decade, it appeared the Bikini story would have a happy ending. In 1968, an AEC scientific committee reviewed a 1967 survey of Bikini, stated that the atoll was "once again safe for human habitation" and concluded that the "exposures to radiation that would result from the repatriation of the Bikini people do not offer a significant threat to their health and safety." In August 1968, President Johnson announced that radiation levels on Bikini were low enough to allow safe resettlement and in 1969 the first group of Bikinians returned to their homeland. That same year, the AEC stated that "there is virtually no radiation left" on Bikini and that there was "no discernible effect on either plant or animal life". And in 1971, the AEC surveyed Bikini's well water and stated that "from a radiological viewpoint, the water is safe to drink."

No one knew at the time that the 1967 AEC study that formed the basis of President Johnson's 1968 decision to resettle Bikini was based on a gross miscalculation in an earlier diet study, which had stated that the Bikinians' entire daily consumption of coconuts - the only liquid in their diet - would be 9 grams, or several teaspoonsful. As a result, the AEC miscalculated the average daily coconut intake by a factor of up to 100.

(Mr. Weisgall)

No one can doubt the sincerity of the United States officials who wanted to return the Bikinians to their homeland. Nor can anyone doubt the public relations value to the AEC in having people return to live at the site of 23 nuclear tests. Nor can anyone doubt the feelings of the Bikinians that they may have been moved back to Bikini in part as guinea pigs, to enable scientists to study the long-term effects of radiation. After all, a 1977 Department of Energy study concluded that:

"Bikini Atoll may be the only global source of data on humans where intake via ingestion is thought to contribute the major fraction of plutonium body burden... It is possibly the best available source of data for evaluating the transfer of plutonium across the gut wall after being incorporated into biological systems."

There are only two ways to explain the 1968 decision to move the Bikinians home. Either United States officials knew the real risks, in which case the return should not have occurred, or else they did not know the real risks, in which case they should have studied the atoll more carefully before making a decision. Warning signs began to show up in 1974, and the Bikinians successfully brought suit in Federal Court in October 1975 to force the United States to stop the resettlement of Bikini until it had conducted a much-needed, comprehensive radiological survey of the atoll.

By 1978, examinations on people living at Bikini revealed what was described as an "incredible" one-year 75 per cent increase in body burdens of radioactive cesium-137. United States scientists stated that the people living on Bikini may have ingested the largest amounts of radiation of any known population and they concluded that it was necessary to move the people off the island as soon as possible.

History sadly repeated itself in August 1978, as United States ships once again entered Bikini lagoon and the 139 people on the island packed up their possessions and left again. No one has been allowed to live there since.

The United States can close the books on Bikini, but it must be done fairly. The people of Bikini want to go back to the time when they were self-reliant, sailing from island to island in Bikini Atoll and living off the resources of the land and the lagoon. They want to go back home and be Bikinians more than anything else in the world. They want their dignity back, and their dignity is their land. Their land is their life; to lose one is to lose the other. They believe that the country that put men on the moon can clean up their atoll and return them to Bikini in a safe environment. And they want compensation from the United States for all it has done to them: compensation for the complete disappearance of their islands, for the past and the future taking, destruction and irradiation of their lands and lagoon, for the loss of their skills, and for the three and a half decades of hardship and suffering they have endured as nuclear nomads.

In one sense it is strange that the Bikinians have to find themselves at the negotiating table; just as it is sad that they have had to retain a lawyer to sue the United States. Because if the United States were really the great humanitarian nation it purports to be, lawsuits and political status negotiations should not have been needed in order for it to make amends to the people of Bikini. The Bikinians strongly hope and pray that the section 177 subsidiary agreement will mark the end of 36 years of neglect, unkept promises and empty hopes.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): We have heard the final petitioner for this morning. It appears that no delegation wishes to put any questions to the petitioners. The statements by all the petitioners will, of course, be fully reflected in the official records of the Council, which will be distributed in the near future by the Secretariat.

I should like now to thank all the petitioners for their statements yesterday and today; they have facilitated the work of the Trusteeship Council by delivering those oral petitions and by submitting them in accordance with the time-table set out by the Council. Naturally, their statements will be studied most carefully when the report of the Council for this year is prepared.

The petitioners withdrew.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): Before we proceed to the continued questioning of the Administering Authority; Mrs. McCoy, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, would like to add to the statement she made yesterday.

Mrs. McCoy (Special Representative): I want to explain two different figures mentioned with regard to the budget of the Trust Territory. In my opening statement I used the figure of \$150 million as being the approximate annual amount. I wish to explain that that would be a Territory-wide budget, including the budget of the Northern Marianas. Since they have become a Commonwealth, their budget no longer flows through the Trust Territory Government. Therefore, when I replied yesterday afternoon to a question from, I believe, the British delegation I used the figure of \$94 million for 1981 and about \$75 million for 1982; those are the correct figures for the current Trust Territory budget.

I should like to explain that, while those figures show quite a drop in budget as far as the annual report is concerned, the reason for that drop is not that there has been any decline in the amount of money that has gone to each of the individual Governments. It reflects a cut in my headquarters operating budget and also in the amount of Capital Improvement Programme money. I should like to note, for instance, that the Marshall Islands Government had \$8.994 million in 1981; in 1982 this went up to \$9.707 million, and the estimate for 1983 is \$10.358 million. For the Republic of Palau: in 1981, it was \$8.053 million; in 1982 it is \$8.939 million, and the estimate for 1983 is \$9.575 million. For the Federated States of Micronesia: in 1981, it was \$30.415 million; in 1982 their budget was \$33.558 million, and the 1983 estimate shows \$35.137 million or an increase of \$1.579 million.

I think that perhaps gives a better picture of the budgets in their entirety.

I should like to add one thing with regard to the Capital Improvement Programme. The total amount of money that has come into the Trust Territory for that Programme is \$237 million. That includes funds from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), and all that money will have been committed by the end of this year.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): We shall now continue with questions to the Administering Authority.

Mr. BARELLI (France)(interpretation from French): I should like first to ask Mrs. McCoy to repeat the figure for the total 1982 budget of the Trust Territory.

Mrs. McCOY (Special Representative): The total budget for the Trust Territory Government for 1982 is \$76.157 million - that is excluding, of course, the Marians.

Mr. BARELLI (France)(interpretation from French): I should like to note in passing that there has been a large drop in the overall budget for the Trust Territory, if the figure I have for the 1981 budget - about \$95 million - is correct. There has been a drop of \$18 million in the total budget. At the same time the total increase in the budgets of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia was in the neighbourhood of \$2 million or \$3 million. Thus, if we take the consolidated budget for the whole of the Trust Territory and the various entities, we see a large decrease.

I should like to ask Mrs. McCoy to explain the reasons for that large decrease in the budget. What are the chief budgetary items affected by the decrease?

Mrs. McCOY (Special Representative): The majority of the decrease is because the Capital Improvement Programme is nearing the end and there are no longer funds in that budget for that, which would reflect a decided drop in the budget.

Mr. BARELLI (France) (interpretation from French): Yesterday in a petition Mr. Tmetuchl, Governor of the State of Airai in Palau, referred to expropriation cases that he thought to be unjust. My delegation would like to know what procedures are used for expropriation. Which authority takes the decision to declare expropriation to be in the public interest and how and by whom is financial compensation decided upon?

Mrs. McCOY (Special Representative): I believe it should be pointed out that the Trust Territory Government no longer has any eminent domain. Land has now been transferred back to the Governments. In the case of Palau, it has gone back to the local land authority. At the time when they were talking about the airport, for instance, the appraised value of the land was put in hold and it is now up to the land owners to decide whether they wish to accept that appraised value as the local land authority set it - the money is there and available for them - or if they wish to go to court and change the appraised valuation. That is a decision to be made by them.

Mr. BARELLI (France) (interpretation from French): If the decision is up to the local Government, could the representative of Palau clarify this?

Mr. OITERONG: I shall attempt to answer the question, and if I do not reply fully we will submit a written reply to that question, as well as to questions posed to our delegation yesterday, in an annex to our closing remarks at the appropriate time.

The Constitution of the Republic of Palau requires that no eminent domain is to be exercised by the National Government or the State Government in order to take private land for use by foreign countries or foreign companies. The case that the Governor of Airai referred to is a project for the airport which was part of the five-year capital improvement project started by the Administering Authority and continuing to this day.

Mr. BARELLI (France) (interpretation from French): Still referring to the Government of Palau, I should like to mention the oral petition made yesterday by Mr. Gibbons. He was very critical of the Administering Authority's actions in Palau in respect of economic development. My delegation would like to have information about efforts being made by the Administering Authority and by the Government of Palau to promote economic development.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): That is a big question. I do not know whether the representatives of the Administering Authority would like to respond to it now or whether perhaps they might wish to wait and answer at a later stage?

Mrs. McCOY (Special Representative): If I may, I should like to respond to that question later.

Mr. BARELLI (France) (interpretation from French): My question was rather broad. I should simply like to have some answers regarding the specific accusations made by Mr. Gibbons. I do not have his text to hand, but I remember that he mentioned in particular the road network and the production of certain raw materials, saying that since the beginning of the trusteeship that production and the extent of the road network had decreased. I should like to hear the Administering Authority's response to that criticism, and I understand that information will be provided at a later stage.

I think my United Kingdom colleague asked a question about compensation for war damage. I do not have a list of the precise questions he asked or the record of the replies, and if this question has already been answered I shall not press my point, but my delegation would like some additional clarification on the matter of war reparations, particularly as to whether agreement has been reached or will be reached between the United States Government and the Government of Japan with regard to ways and means of settling war claims.

Mr. SHERMAN (United States of America): With regard to the status of war claims, let me say that in addition to the \$10 million for title 1 claims authorized under the Micronesian Claims Act of 1971 the United States Congress also authorized in Public Law 95-134 of 15 October 1977 funds to satisfy all adjudicated claims and the final awards made by the Micronesian Claims Commission. The total adjudicated amount for title 1 war claims is \$34 million.

(Mr. Sherman, United States)

Funding under this Congressional authorization is under the terms of the legislation contingent upon the Japanese Government's first making a contribution to the Trust Territory Government of one half of the outstanding amount. As I understand it, the official policy of the Government of Japan is that the 1969 Agreement between Japan and the United States together with an exchange of diplomatic notes in which the United States confirmed that all claims against Japan were "fully and finally discharged" absolved the Japanese Government of any further responsibility for these claims. Irrespective of these claims, however, and desirous of improving its relations with the newly emerging Micronesian entity, the Government of Japan has concluded government-to-government aid agreements with Palau, the Marshalls and the Federated States of Micronesia. These aid agreements, many of which are in the area of fisheries development, now provide several million dollars-worth of aid to the Micronesian Governments.

United States Public Law 95-134 of 15 October 1977 also authorized the appropriation of sums necessary for the full payment of Title 2 claims, and a total of \$32.6 million has been paid by the United States in settlement of all adjudicated Title 2 claims.

Mr. BARELLI (interpretation from French). I now move on to another question relating to the statements made this morning by the petitioners representing Bikini. I am referring to the statements of Senator Balos and his legal counsel, Mr. Weisgall. The speakers representing Bikini told us of the painful situation of the inhabitants of that atoll and the problems linked with their removal from, their return to, and their evacuation once again from Bikini. My question is as follows. I should like to know the amount of material reparations that the Government of the United States has so far paid to the inhabitants of Bikini and whether other reparations are envisaged.

I have another question relating to Bikini, concerning decontamination of the atoll. What measures have been taken to decontaminate the atoll, and if decontamination is impossible at the moment, I should

(Mr. Barelli, France)

like to know what measures have been taken or are envisaged to resettle the people on another atoll until the Bikinians can return to their own.

Mr. SHERMAN (United States of America): In late August 1978 it was necessary to relocate some 144 Bikinians who had resettled on Bikini on their own in advance of the rest of the Bikini community. This move was made necessary by analysis of the recycling of radio-nuclides by food plants. The caesium-strontium level in the soil of Bikini had not yet fallen to a level safe for the growing of food crops and other purposes. It is now estimated that, regrettably, it will be another 50 to 60 years before Bikini itself is safe for agricultural and residential purposes. Since the other major island of Bikini Atoll, Eneu, has a lower caesium-strontium level, the people of Bikini requested the United States to allow the use of Eneu Island if radiation permitted, with Kili Island as a secondary base.

The United States Department of Energy prepared dose and risk assessments for such a system. They indicated that Eneu Island could be used at the present time for habitation only under very stringent restrictions. Among those restrictions were an absolute guarantee that at least 50 per cent of all food consumed must be imported; movement within the atoll must be severely restricted; and Bikini, only some seven miles away, must be off-limits for residential or agricultural use.

It is the opinion of the Government that these restrictions could not be effectively enforced or carried out and that Eneu resettlement is not a realistic option at this time.

Once the decision not to resettle Bikini at this time became known, new temporary houses were built for all Bikinians who returned to Kili Island in August 1978. In addition houses were built on the small island of Ejit, in the Marjuro Atoll, for those who did not choose to return to Kili. Although Kili Island had not been developed in recent years due to the anticipated return of the Bikinians to Bikini, the United States also constructed a new school building and a dispensary; it expanded the existing church building and constructed new temporary housing for all of the residents of Kili. Preliminary surveys indicate that one anticipated projected -- a permanent all-

(Mr. Sherman, United States)

weather dock -- is not feasible. Such a dock would be enormously expensive to build, and, given the island's unique position in relation to the prevailing winds, would almost certainly not stand up against severe winter storms.

A short-range airstrip for Kili Island was constructed in Kili in the summer of 1981, and Air Marshalls now has flights to Kili.

The President has submitted a \$21-million fiscal year 1982 supplemental request for Bikini resettlement along with his fiscal year 1983 budget request to the Congress. This supplemental request would provide for the long-range relocation and resettlement of the displaced Bikini islanders on Kili Island and the small isle of Ejit in Marjuro Atoll until such time as the radiation hazards on Bikini Atoll have abated sufficiently to permit the Bikinians safe return and habitation on their home atoll. Of this proposal, \$20.6 million is to plan for and construct permanent housing and community facilities on Kili and Ejit Islands and to replant coconut and other food crops. It will also include such needed projects as the upgrading of the short-range airstrip constructed in 1981, dock and sea wall construction, road improvement on Kili Island and small dock and road improvements on Ejit Island, in addition to housing and other basic community facilities. The fiscal-year 1982 supplement of \$21 million includes \$400,000 for on-going costs of small current programmes, a nutrition and agriculture survey of Kili Island, and the costs of translation and presentation to the Bikinians of the findings of an independent radiological survey of Bikini Atoll. The \$400,000 also includes \$50,000 for special medical expenses for the Bikini people.

It may be that Foreign Minister DeBrum, who is also here, might wish to comment further on this subject.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): If Mr. DeBrum does indeed want to add some information, he is of course at liberty to do so.

Mr. DeBRUM (Special Representative): I do have a number of items I should like to add to the response of the Administering Authority to the questions posed by the representative of France. However, I should like to do so at a later time, if I may, so that I can more fully organize my response.

Mr. BARELLI (France) (interpretation from French): I have an additional question regarding the compensation paid to the Bikinians. I note the fact that Mr. DeBrum will be giving further clarifications at a later stage. I have also noted the various efforts - major efforts, it would seem - made by the Administering Authority as regards communal equipment and the construction of housing, schools, churches and other buildings on Kili. I want to know whether, in addition to that communal equipment from which the former inhabitants of Bikini are benefiting directly, the Bikinians are also receiving pensions, grants or additional income, on a regular basis, that is to say, distributed each month or each year, and whether there is a time-limit in respect of those payments.

Mrs. McCOY (Special Representative): There have been trust funds given to the Bikinian people. These were payments that were set aside by Congress. The first was for \$3 million, and then an additional \$3 million was allocated. These are held in trust for them, and the Bikini people receive a cheque each month from those trust funds.

There is also the food programme, which of course applies not only to the Bikini people but also to the Enewetak and other people involved in radiation issues. Also we have had some typhoons down there. The total number of persons benefiting from the food programme, for instance, is 2,139. The total funding is estimated at \$190,000, and this is fully funded by the United States Department of Agriculture. An additional programme is funded by the Department of the Interior, to supply food items not included in the United States Department of Agriculture programme but necessary because no other food source is at present available. I have further details concerning what constitutes the food items, but that is perhaps part of the answer on some of the other income. Of course, it must be remembered that under the Compact of Free Association, section 177, there will be other allocations to them.

Mr. HUMFREY (United Kingdom): Carrying on from where I left off yesterday evening, I should like to take advantage of Mr. DeBrum's presence this morning to raise two questions on the important speech he made to us earlier in the session. I should like to address myself to the Administering Authority in the first place. In Mr. DeBrum's statement he set out a rapid time-table for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement with regard to the Marshall Islands. My delegation would be grateful to know how the Administering Authority proposes to respond to the views and the time-table contained in his statement.

Mr. SHERMAN (United States of America): Mr. DeBrum proposed a time-table which contained six successive steps. Termination of the trusteeship was, if I recall correctly, the fifth of those steps. The United States believes that at this point it is most appropriate to concentrate on the first of those steps, that is, the completion of the remaining agreements subsidiary to the Compact of Free Association and the signature of the Compact and those agreements. Once the Compact has been signed, the task of establishing a time-table for the remaining steps will be somewhat easier.

As a technical matter, the Trusteeship Agreement is an agreement between the United Nations and the United States as Administering Authority. Consequently, it is not within the competence of the Marshall Islands to establish a specific date for termination of the trusteeship. In so far as Mr. DeBrum's projection represents an indication of the desire of the Government of the Marshall Islands to conclude the process of negotiations at an early date, however, the United States welcomes and reciprocates that desire.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I call on Mr. DeBrum to respond, if he so wishes, to the United Kingdom delegation.

Mr. DeBRUM (Special Representative): I believe that the question of the representative of the United Kingdom was directed to the Administering Authority. I can only say at this point that I am delighted that the Administering Authority seems to share our concern for an early termination. I request that I be allowed to answer the question more fully at a later time, especially after I have heard other questions from the United Kingdom which may be more directly addressed to me.

Mr. HUMFREY (United Kingdom): My second question regarding Mr. DeBrum's statement is this. He stated that the Administering Authority was seeking from the Marshall Islands certain rights and authority having to do with security and defence. Mr. DeBrum said firmly that such requirements must not be made a prerequisite for the termination of the trusteeship. I should be grateful to know the Administering Authority's response on that point.

Mr. SHERMAN (United States of America): It has long been contemplated that the political relationship of free association originally proposed by the Micronesians themselves would provide for, among other things, the future defence and security of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. The same would be true with respect to any other future political status. The Hilo principles of 1978 and the initialled Compact of Free Association contemplate the assumption by the United States of significant responsibility for the future defence of Micronesia. To meet that responsibility the United States will require corresponding authority. The Compact of Free Association sets forth these general principles. The detailed arrangements are to be covered in subsidiary agreements which are currently under negotiation between the United States and the Marshall Islands, as I believe Mr. DeBrum is fully aware.

Mr. HUMFREY (United Kingdom): My last question this morning concerns the very important subject of political education as we move towards the termination of the trusteeship.

This Council has been clear in its view that all the people of Micronesia should be given the fullest opportunity before any referendum to inform themselves about the various political choices open to them, including independence. My delegation would like to be sure that the various local communities on the individual islands of the Trust Territory have been fully consulted about the form which such a political education programme will take, particularly in the run-up to any plebiscite - for example, through the distribution of information material, the holding of public meetings and the fair representation of all political points of view.

I should be grateful to know in some detail, if possible, what efforts are being made to ensure that the wishes of the individual local communities on the individual islands are being both sought and satisfied on this most important aspect of the trusteeship.

Mrs. McCOY (Special Representative): The Administering Authority has sponsored the translation of the Compact of Free Association into 12 Micronesian languages. These have all been certified by the individual Governments, so we know that they are correct. On completion of the negotiations on various subsidiary agreements the balance will also be translated. These translations, together with the English version, will then be one of the most important parts of the political education programme.

As we stated in our opening remarks, the Administering Authority is fully supportive of a thorough and impartial political education campaign. We wish to assure this Council that when the negotiations are complete we shall co-operate and support such a programme, which encompasses not only the concept of free association but its alternatives. The Administering Authority looks forward to full co-operation with the Micronesian Governments concerned in jointly planning and carrying out the programme leading to the plebiscite, which will be observed by the international community.

(Mrs. McCoy, Special Representative)

Last October the United States invited the Marshall Islands as well as Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia to begin planning their respective plebiscite education programmes on a contingency basis and at an appropriate stage to consult the United States about the implementation of those plans. None of the three Governments has yet consulted the United States about its plans, so we are not yet in a position to make a full comment. However, some of their programmes are well in hand and they are getting ready to send in a final discussion paper to our headquarters.

The Compact of Free Association and its subsidiary agreements have not yet been signed, and until that happens it is impossible to speak with any precision about a plebiscite date.

Mr. DeBRUM (Special Representative): I should still like to reserve the opportunity to address later the thought-provoking questions put by the United Kingdom, but I am now prepared to make a few comments on all three questions.

I wish first to address the question on political education. The operations of the Government of the Marshall Islands and the deliberations of the Parliament and its committees have always been open since the formation of our Government. Our sessions are broadcast live to all corners of the Marshall Islands, and important discussions of the Government are listened to by our population - for one reason, that the only radio station in our entire country is that which broadcasts those deliberations. We have had the Compact translated and have distributed it as widely as possible.

The political education budget sought from us by the Administering Authority has been presented, and we have brought with us a copy so as to be able to discuss it with the Administering Authority later this week. We are prepared to go forward with political education on the Compact and, as I said in my opening statement, we wish to invite members of the international community to observe that part of this very important function of the trusteeship, as well as the plebiscite itself.

A question was posed as to the future defence and security interests of the United States, which are addressed in the Compact. It is true that we have recognized through the Hilo principles and throughout the negotiations on the Compact that there are certain defence and security interests that the United States would like to have met post-trusteeship under the free association relationship. The Compact covers these requirements under title III.

All three Governments of the Trust Territory initialled the Compact fully realizing that the United States was not about to terminate the trusteeship unless those security and defence interests were met. The problem that has arisen since then is that the United States continues to seek from the Micronesian Governments, through the subsidiary agreements, concessions that go beyond those agreed to in the Compact. As late as yesterday afternoon I was told by negotiators on the United States side that if those defence and security interests were not retained - that is the word that is used now - the Trusteeship Agreement would simply be extended in order to ensure that those interests were met. That is the fundamental unfairness to which I referred in my statement. The umbrella of trusteeship cannot be used as something with which to hit our collective heads every time a demand is made by the United States Government and is not met by our Governments.

The Compact contemplated a 15-year defence and security responsibility and authority of the United States. In the subsidiary agreements periods ranging from 30 years to 50 are being sought. The Compact did not contemplate permanent denial of all other military interests, as has been referred to earlier in statements to this Council. Now a permanent denial provision is being sought.

(Mr. DeBrum, Special Representative)

The time-table we have set is a partial answer to this state of the negotiations where the Trusteeship Agreement itself is used as leverage upon us for the Administering Authority to gain those provisions which, in some cases, we feel are not necessary.

We feel that our negotiations cannot be fairly conducted if the prevention of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement continues to be used against us in the negotiations.

I said earlier that I would respond to the question regarding Bikini at a later time, but I wish to bring that up now as an example. The problems of Bikini are current; they are not problems that will crop up after the termination of the trusteeship; the problems of Rongelap and Utrik are current; the problems of Kwajalein are current. To say that these problems can be solved under the Compact when termination of trusteeship occurs is to force us to relinquish certain rights and freedoms which we do not feel we must relinquish in order to achieve termination.

For example, if we are told that the people of Bikini cannot be paid compensation unless we sign off and hold the United States to be exempt from all claims past, present and future, we feel that this is unfair. For example, if we cannot embark on a medical programme which will take care of people who have been exposed unless we agree to sign off and consider all claims against the United States fully fulfilled, that is an unfair demand.

We feel that these problems can be dealt with if the United States can agree to an early termination of the trusteeship. If we negotiate with the United States as an independent country, and if the United States will deal with us fairly without the spectre of trusteeship haunting us every time we want to make fair and equitable arrangements, we believe that we can have a relationship that is more meaningful, more valid and fairer post-trusteeship. On the other hand, if demands of the United States must be met as preconditions to termination, then we are allowing the Trusteeship Agreement to continue to be used as a weapon against the people it was designed to protect.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.