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LETTER DATED 4 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the memorandum of 29 January 1993 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

Annex

Memorandum dated 29 January 1993 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(On south Korea's machinations for the development of nuclear weapons now in full swing under the United States "nuclear umbrella")

It is 35 years since the United States illegally introduced its "nuclear weapons into south Korea.

Over the last 35 years the United States has systematically shipped various types of nuclear weapons into south Korea and thus turned south Korea into the biggest nuclear forward base in the Far East and continued its nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The south Korean authorities have long carried forward clandestinely their development of nuclear weapons under the United States "nuclear umbrella" and this move has now assumed grave dimensions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea considers that disclosing the true picture of south Korea's drive for nuclear-weapons development promoted under the tacit consent of the United States is necessary for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and for world peace and security, and issues this memorandum.

I. THE CRIMINAL RECORDS OF NUCLEAR-ARMS DEVELOPMENT

The development of nuclear weapons in south Korea under the United States occupation dates back nearly three decades. South Korea's drive for nuclear development has been put into practice since the late 1960s and eventually reached the stage of its completion through rapid year-by-year furtherance by the successive military fascist "regimes".

A. Establishment of the bridgehead for nuclear development

The Park Chung Hee military "regime" has set nuclear development as its policy and built a bridgehead for this programme.

Since 1968, south Korea has "planned to acquire nuclear fuel reprocessing capability indispensable for nuclear-arms development" (Peter Hayes "American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea").

At the one hundred and seventy-second session of the "Atomic Energy Commission" in May 1969, the south Korean authorities confirmed the "long-term plan for research and development of atomic energy", a nuclear-weapons development programme "drafted by the 'Atomic Energy Research Institute' for the purpose of speeding up the installation of reprocessing facilities" (south Korean monthly, Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

In 1971, the south Korean military "regime" established the "weapons exploitation committee", a "Chongwadae" secret special committee for nuclear-weapons development, and the United States Fraser Committee announced that "in the early 1970s the Park 'regime'" reached "a unanimous agreement on promoting nuclear-arms development at the weapons exploitation committee" ("Final report on the Koreagate case", 1 November 1978).

The Park Chung Hee "regime" set up the "National Defence and Science Institute" with its director ranking as "minister" and his deputy as "vice-minister" in 1970, and later established other institutions one after another: the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" in 1973, the Nuclear Missiles Development Group in 1974 and the Nuclear Fuel Development Complex in 1976, and thus built up the full structural set-up for the development of nuclear weapons (south Korean magazine Shin Dong-A, April 1989).

They signed a contract with Canada in December 1974 to acquire a CANDU-type pressurized heavy-water reactor and in 1975 purchased the facilities of a missile propellant factory from the Lockheed Corporation of the United States (Wolgan Chosom, April 1991).

In June 1975, Park Chung Hee said that south Korea has "acquired the capability of developing nuclear weapons" and predicted that south Korea "will find itself within the group of the nuclear-weapons States in a few years' time" (The Washington Post, 12 June 1975, and Newsweek, 29 June 1975).

On 26 September 1978, south Korea test-fired a nuclear warhead-loadable surface-to-surface missile, "White Bear", developed by the "National Defence and Science Institute", and this has prompted foreign mass media to describe south Korea as a "latent nuclear-weapon possessor" (Shin Dong-A, April 1989).

B. Build-up of industrial foundation for nuclear development

The Chun Doo Hwan military "regime" has built up the industrial foundation for nuclear development by further expanding its programme.

On 19 December 1980, Chun Doo Hwan took the "measure of merging and dissolving the 'government'-subsidized research institutes", a camouflage to feign the abandonment of the nuclear development scheme, but in fact "maximized their research capability" (south Korean Yonhap Yearbook, 1981 edition).

In 1982, the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" and the "south Korea Electric Power Corporation" picked the "problem of controlling the spent nuclear fuel" in a bid to back up their advocacy for putting into operation the reprocessing facilities of an annual capacity of 250 tons in 1992 and for the phased expansion of their annual capacity to 500 tons in 1995 and 1,000 tons in 2000", and in the same year they concluded a contract with the Burns and Law Corporation of the United States to introduce fast-breeder reactor technology at a cost of $295,000 (Wolgan Choson, April 1990, and Yonhap Yearbook, 1983 edition).

In September 1983, Lee Ki Baek, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", submitted his "verbal report on south Korea's nuclear policy" to Chun Doo Hwan,

and this was the occasion for the evolution of the "secretly planned strategy for the nuclear arms options", which has since been vigorously promoted (Wolgan Choson, October 1991).

In November 1985, south Korea completed the post-irradiation test facility capable of extracting plutonium, which has been in full operation since 1987 (Wolgan Choson, April 1990 and October 1991).

In 1987, south Korea deployed in combat-readiness the nuclear bomb-loadable 256 kilometre-range "Hyonmu" surface-to-surface missile (Wolgan Choson, April 1991).

On 28 April 1988, David Fisher, former official of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that south Korea "is capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons".

C. Advent of a nuclear-weapon possessor

The Roh Tae Woo military "regime" has proceeded to finalize its nuclear-arms development scheme.

On 25 March 1989, the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" held the ground-breaking ceremony of the long-promoted installation of 30,000 Kw multipurpose research reactor for nuclear development, which was scheduled for completion by 1992 (Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

In August 1990, the south Korean authorities "announced the plan of strategic investigation and research for the development of a fast-breeder reactor and the perfection of laser spectroscopic technology", a plan indispensable for a legal purchase of the fissionables and for their expanded production. And on 9 November 1990, they agreed with Japan to promote jointly the development of the next generation reactor technology" (Wolgan Choson, October 1991, and south Korean Dong-A Yearbook, 1991 edition).

The "First Conference on the Promotion of Science and Technology" held in the presence of Roh Tae Woo at Taedok, South Chungchong Province, in 1990 "adopted the Taedok Declaration, pledging to complete by 1992 the project of the Taedok Science Town", the general headquarters of nuclear-arms development, "four or five years ahead of schedule", and on 27 November 1992 they held the dedication ceremony of the Town project in the presence of Roh Tae Woo (Dong-A Yearbook, 27 November 1992).

Peter Hayes revealed that the announcement of the "non-nuclear declaration" by the Roh Tae Woo "regime" on 8 November 1991 and its subsequent conclusion with the United Kingdom on 27 November of a nuclear cooperation agreement for fuel-cycle services are the "adroitly hatched double-dealing strategy" (Japanese magazine, Sekai, December 1992).

These facts show that south Korea has crept from the status of a latent nuclear-weapon possessor in the 1970s and beyond the bounds of a para-nuclear-weapon possessor in the 1980s into the status of a nuclear-weapon possessor in the 1990s.

II. THE REALITY OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

The basic criteria for nuclear armaments are the acquisition of nuclear-development technology, operation of reactors, extraction of nuclear substances, manufacture of nuclear bombs, nuclear tests, possession of nuclear delivery means and establishment of the system of nuclear weaponry on an actual war footing. In south Korea these basic criteria have been followed through comprehensively and simultaneously to form an integrated system.

A. Acquisition of the technology for nuclear-weapons production

South Korea has an extensive base for nuclear research and development.

In south Korea there are over 20 research institutes now engaged in the nuclear-development programme and their brain power consists of over 15,000 persons, including more than 1,500 of doctoral class (Wolgan Choson, October 1991).

The south Korean "Atomic Energy Research Institute" has been playing a pivotal role in the nuclear-development scheme, its major task being "research in the reprocessing technology to extract plutonium", and the Nuclear Fuel Development Complex, the predecessor of the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.", was "set up to perfect nuclear-fuel-cycle technology, including the technical capability of manufacturing nuclear bombs" and thereby performed the "role of field headquarters" for the nuclear-arms-development drive. And the south Korean "National Defence and Science Institute" is "exclusively responsible for the development of the combined weapon system centred on strategic secret weapons", nuclear delivery means, "hardcore technology and accessory parts" (Wolgan Choson, April 1990, and south Korean newspaper Hangyore Sinmun, 18 September 1991).

And the "south Korean Chemical Research Institute" has been in charge of "research in special explosives", the "south Korean Electronic Communications Research Institute" in charge of "research in the development of the C31 system", and the "south Korean Research Institute for Aeronautics and Space" in charge of "research in satellite development". And the "Research Institute for Natural Resources" under the south Korean "Ministry of Trade and Industry" has also been camouflaged as if "to secure energy resources", but "intently concentrates on searching for natural uranium to be used in the heavy-water reactor" (south Korean military magazine Wolgangunsa Vision, November and December 1989, and Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

Engaged in the nuclear development programme in south Korea are numerous enterprises, such as the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.", the "South Korea Electric Technology Co.", the "South Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co. Ltd.", the "Kyeung Buk Machinery Mfg. Co., Ltd.", the "South Korea Explosives Co., Ltd.", "the Poongsan Metal Corporation Co., Ltd.", "Hyundai Electronics" and many others.

The Taedok Science Town was inaugurated 20 years ago as a nuclear-weapons development base and has today cut its figure as a nuclear research complex and a command post of nuclear-arms development, which accommodates 65 research

institutes and colleges with 20,000 research personnel and 70,000 permanent inhabitants on a site of 2,780 hectares (MBC Television, 27 November 1992).

It demonstrates that the south Korean research base for nuclear development has reached the stage of industrial expansion, not in the stage of simple experimental development.

The south Korean authorities have promoted the technology for nuclear-weapons development behind the scene of the ostensibly plausible development of "atomic energy development technology".

Under the signboard of the "localization" of nuclear fuel, the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" and the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd." have acquired the technology that can be applied to the reprocessing process, through their "joint designing of a nuclear-fuel cycle with a foreign technical team" and through the "construction and operation of post-irradiation test facility" (Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

Meanwhile, the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" has acquired the hard-core technologies including the computer codes applicable to manufacturing nuclear bombs in the course of the joint designing of the Yonggwang atomic reactors Nos. 3 and 4 and the joint designing of the south Korean multipurpose research reactor (K-MRR) with foreign countries (Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

Therefore, even the south Koreans engaged in the nuclear-development scheme themselves now publicly say that "now, so large and sophisticated a technical infrastructure has been established to look down on the technology of manufacturing atomic bombs" (Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

B. Problematic atomic reactors

The potential of nuclear development is measured mainly by the number and capacity of atomic reactors. At present, three research reactors, eight light-water reactors and one pressured heavy-water reactor serve the purpose of military nuclear development in pursuance of the authorities' policy for nuclear-weapons development.

The research reactors for nuclear development now in question are the 2,000 Kw.-class "Trigger Mark No. 3", which has been in operation since 1972, and the 30,000 Kw.-class multipurpose research reactors, which went into operation in 1992.

The south Korean monthly Wolgan Choson in its April 1990 issue wrote that the research reactors "are possibly to be used in producing plutonium for nuclear bombs".

Specially dangerous is the "CANDU"-type pressurized heavy-water reactor in Wolsong, because the motive and purpose of its introduction and operation are directly related to nuclear-arms development. Those people engaged in nuclear development in south Korea have confessed that "the introduction of the 'CANDU'-type pressurized heavy-water reactor from Canada is obviously related to nuclear development", and admitted that "we, too, attempted to develop

nuclear weapons by using the pressured heavy-water reactor" (Shin Dong-A, April 1989, and Wolgan Choson, March 1990).

The south Korean "Ministry of Science and Technology", in its "medium- and long-term programme for the research and development of atomic energy" confirmed in June last year, decided to "build a demonstration reactor of the 150,000 Kw. fast breeder type by 2011", and started its construction in July 1992 (Japanese daily, Nihonkeizai Shimhun, 29 July 1992).

In this context, the south Korean public "fears the strong possibility that plutonium to be used in the fast-breeder reactor might be diverted in the middle of its transport" (Hangyore Sinmun, 14 January 1993).

South Korea has also "developed the nuclear-fusion test device through the nine-year-long research and experimental course" (Hangyore Sinmun, 28 May 1992).

Considering that the principle of nuclear fusion is now applied, only to manufacturing hydrogen bombs, it is clear that south Korea's ulterior intent in its desperate drive for the development of a nuclear fusion test device is to develop hydrogen bombs, not to generate electricity.

C. Acquisition of nuclear explosive substances through diversified channels

The south Korean authorities have stockpiled a considerable amount of nuclear substances for nuclear bombs their through their own independent extraction and shipment from a third country and are openly seeking high enrichment and reprocessing with a view to securing them in large quantities by industrial means.

Today, south Korea has built a complete system by which to extract nuclear explosive substances at the experimental stage and is secretly extracting them. The pressurized heavy-water reactor in Wolsong serves as an important base for producing plutonium for military purposes.

Lee Chang Gon, a technical consultant of the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.", said that "the problem is the dissimilarity of the duplicate operation records" that is responsible for the misappropriation of spent nuclear fuel. "By keeping such duplicate operation records, the enterprise can spend 1,000 kilogrammes of nuclear fuel every day, but put down 10 kilogrammes in the operation records" (Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

There was even an "incident" some years ago when "IAEA inspectors demanded clarification because the lens of the monitor-camera installed by IAEA over reactor No. 1 in Wolsong was stuffed up with a piece of cloth" (Wolgan Choson, April 1990).

The post-irradiation test facility at the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" in Taedok has two dangerous aspects. One aspect is that it is the "only place from which the spent nuclear fuel is taken out of the compound of

the atomic power plant" in south Korea, and another aspect is that the facility "can be used for the reprocessing purpose" (Wolgan Choson, October 1991).

Since the days of the Park Chung Hee "regime", the south Korean authorities have already launched frenzied smuggling operations to "purchase nuclear substances" from international black markets. A person engaged in nuclear development recalled that "there was once a suggestion to purchase plutonium from abroad", and that a middleman approached them with an offer (Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

Therefore, south Korea has now acquired no small quantity of nuclear explosive substances.

Edition No. 5 of Solidarity and Advance, an organ of the "National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification", noted that "south Korea and Israel are already numbered among more than 20 nuclear States with enriched uranium and plutonium, the main materials for the production of nuclear weapons".

The spent nuclear fuel in south Korea continues to be accumulated rather than to be disposed of, and the accumulated stock of plutonium 239 already amounted to "10 tons as of 1992" and it is "expected to increase to nearly 24 tons by 2000" (Peter Hayes, "South Korea and the Nuclear Issue").

The atomic energy officialdom in south Korea openly advocates the construction of factories for reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel.

The 3,500-page report, captioned "Studies on the prospect of atomic power development in the 2000s and the establishment of corresponding programmes", was drafted in December 1989 by the "Energy Research Institute" attached to Ajou University in south Korea. The report recommended that the "main thrust of diplomatic policy for cooperation in atomic energy affairs should be to create an environment for the transfer and independent development of the atomic power hard-core technologies (enrichment and reprocessing technologies)".

In reality, south Korea has signed a coprocessing agreement with the United Kingdom. Under the United Kingdom-south Korean accord, a special office is to be opened in Seoul, and south Korea is to have the waste from its atomic reactors reprocessed in the United Kingdom at the reprocessing plant at Sheffield into plutonium to be supplied back to south Korea (Sekai, December 1992).

In his paper, entitled "South Korea and the Nuclear Issue", Peter Hayes disclosed the fact that "MOX" (mixed-oxide fuel of enriched uranium and plutonium) can be converted into the materials for nuclear bombs through a simple process. First, the MOX fuel can easily be converted into plutonium if "the converted MOX fuel is chopped up and dissolved in nitric acid. Plutonium could be precipitated as oxalate and calcination would obtain oxide, steps that require few special skills or conspicuous facilities ... and would not be very costly". Second, "large-scale conversion by this route is difficult, whereas small-scale conversion is quite possible" (Sekai, December 1992).

South Korea has directed enormous investments into the scheme to develop the laser enrichment technology and managed to "develop the copper vapour laser" to be used for the separation of high enriched uranium (Yonhap Yearbook, 1992 edition).

This proves that the production of nuclear material in south Korea has certainly entered the industrial stage.

D. Secret specialized production line of nuclear bombs

Nuclear bombs are manufactured secretly in the specialized pattern of production in south Korea.

South Korea is smuggling from European countries special explosives for internal detonation, one of the important components in manufacturing nuclear bombs. Lee Chang Gon, a nuclear development expert, has admitted that "the special explosives are readily available on the international markets" (Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

It has been confirmed that such special explosives are now being produced secretly by the "South Korea Explosives Co., Ltd.".

Tests for nuclear development have been under way since the days of the Park "regime" in south Korea.

A reporter of the south Korean monthly Wolgan Choson has testified that "initially, the internal detonation test was carried out through the fast operation of an imported high-speed camera capable of shooting one hundred thousandth of a second, and such test was conducted in the underground laboratory" (Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

Today, south Korea imports parts of the camera for the internal detonation test and assembles them for the full-time test, just as Lee Chang Gon hinted that "the high-speed camera capable of shooting one millionth of a second can be purchased from Japan, and the disassembled parts of the camera can be bought to avoid detection before being reassembled" (Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

Various types of nuclear bombs are designed and developed in south Korea.

A certain Choe, engaged in nuclear development, mentioned one type of nuclear bomb when he told a news conference that "attention should be drawn to the diameter of missiles. The nations less developed in nuclear technology can manufacture the smallest nuclear warheads with a diameter of 80 centimetres. The advanced nations can reduce the diameter so that it can be loaded into 155 mm-calibre guns. We also tried to make 80 cm-diameter bombs" (Wolgan Choson, March 1991).

Parts and equipment needed for the production of nuclear bombs are now manufactured secretly through the specialized production line, as products camouflaged or marked as ordinary goods, by different industrial enterprises, including the "South Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd.", the "Changwon Machines Co., Ltd.", the "South Korea Explosives Co., Ltd.", the

"Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.", the "Nuclear Fuel Fabrication and Processing Plant" and the "South Korea Atomic Energy Technology Co., Ltd."

Today, south Korean nuclear experts say that "elementary types of nuclear weapons could be developed in nine months, if things went to extremes" (Hangyore Sinmun, 14 January 1993).

In fact, this means there is little difference between south Korea and nuclear-weapons States in separately keeping nuclear bombs in storage.

E. Possession of various nuclear-delivery means

South Korea is possessed of various nuclear-delivery means, including field guns, missiles and nuclear-bomb-loadable vehicles.

At present, the south Korean armed forces have around 40 artillery battalions armed with 155 mm-calibre howitzers and 203 mm (8 inch)-calibre field guns, that can fire nuclear warheads (Wolgangunsa Vision, June 1989).

The "Report on global military expenditure and transfer of weapons in 1988" (7 August 1989), released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, disclosed that south Korea has "developed the south Korean-type 256 km-maximum range surface-to-surface missiles", and Wolgangunsa Vision in its July 1989 issue wrote that south Korea has "developed and deployed in combat-readiness the 'Hyonmu' missile, an intermediate-range guided missile". Besides, the United States forces have transferred to the south Korean armed forces the "Honest John" surface-to-surface missiles and the "Nike Hercules" surface-to-air missiles, which can be charged with nuclear warheads (Wolgangunsa Vision, June 1989).

The south Korean armed forces maintain an array of 457 fighter-bombers according to the 1988 White Paper on national defence, of which "F-4 and F-16 fighter-bombers can be loaded with nuclear bombs" (south Korean magazine Mal, March 1991).

F. Movement towards actual nuclear-war-readiness

The nuclear-weapon system includes nuclear warheads and nuclear-delivery means, plus the "C31" system, a system of command and control, communications and intelligence over a nuclear-war theatre.

The south Korean military authorities have invested a colossal amount of funds and committed large research groups as well as a number of enterprises to the development of the "C31" system.

The "TACCIMS project" is "a large-scale plan to provide for a wartime situation", aimed at "establishing a system of automatic command and control" over a nuclear-war theatre to "acquire a perfect capacity" by 1992 (Mal, February 1990).

In an article captioned "Entity and management of the TACCIMS project", Wolgangunsa Vision noted that, upon the request by the Sixth Department of the "Joint Chiefs of Staff" and with the "Agency for Defence Development" as the central task force, the scheme for the establishment of the "south Korean-type C31" system has been launched on a full scale since January 1988, and further disclosed that a fabulous amount of funds will be invested in the scheme, as there are a number of south Korean enterprises involved, such as "Ssangyong Computer", the "Gold Star System Institute", "Samsung Semi-Conductor Communications" and "Hyundai Electronics".

The south Korean armed forces have been incorporated into the combined south Korean-United States joint operational system and take part in routine nuclear-bomb-launching exercises.

The Wolgan Choson in its August 1989 issue noted that key generals of the south Korean military "hold regular briefings and consultations on nuclear strategy at least once a year" under the "nuclear appendix to the operational plan of the United States forces in south Korea", and The Chicago Daily News on 1 January 1976 reported that the "artillery units of more than 30 battalions under the Commander of the First Combined south Korean-United States Army Corps have undergone trainings of using tactical nuclear warheads with 8-inch and 155-mm-calibre howitzers".

Even south Korean politicians have admitted that it is a well-known fact that the large-scale annual "Team Spirit" joint military exercises in south Korea are comprehensive military manoeuvres simulating a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula" (Wolgangunsa Vision, January 1989).

This proves that the acquisition of nuclear armaments along with nuclear development in south Korea have been pursued fanatically on a very serious stage.

Therefore, even the United States today designates south Korea as a "rival nuclear State of the second category" (Wolgangunsa Vision, November 1989).

III. DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS THE CONSISTENT STAND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is the unanimous desire and aspiration of our people and the world peace-loving peoples as well as the consistent stand of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has already made it clear more than once that it has neither the intention nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons, and officially declared that it will never produce, introduce or possess nuclear weapons. Such integrity of our nuclear development programme has already been demonstrated in practice and is being verified objectively.

The Roh Tae Woo "regime" has recently introduced the south Korean ambassadorship for cooperation in atomic energy to represent the authorities'

position on the "suspected nuclear development in the north". Chong Keun Mo, the first ambassador and the former "Minister of Science and Technology" of south Korea, said that he can "hardly believe the intelligence reports that north Korea has acquired the reprocessing technology", and estimated that "the allegation over north Korean nuclear development" is "a political issue apart from technology" (Hangyore Sinmun, 23 June 1990).

In December 1990, Larocque, former United States Rear-Admiral, said in his interview with the Japanese magazine Sapphire that "I have visited both the north and the south of the Korean peninsula, where I extensively toured industrial facilities. From my experience, I don't think north Korea has the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons, although north Korea's subway is the best in the world. Anyone, who alleges that north Korea will acquire nuclear arms immediately, is thought to be pursuing a certain purpose by striking terror into the Japanese and south Korean hearts".

Japan's authoritative technical critic Kiyoshi Sakurai and Kenneth Hunt, Deputy Director of the United Kingdom Institute for International Strategic Studies, have confirmed that there is no evidence to prove that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is possessed of the nuclear reprocessing facilities (Mal, July 1990 and March 1991).

This notwithstanding, the United States and the south Korean authorities persistently talk about "nuclear development" by the north, and this is nothing but a sham artifice "of strong political implication to bash north Korea" (Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

Public opinion at home and abroad exposes the foul purpose of this plot pursued by the United States and the south Korean authorities as follows:

The United States purpose in kicking up a "nuclear ruckus" is "to incapacitate the north and force the north into the United States-led global order to open itself up", and "to indefinitely put on hold the planned second-stage reduction of the United States forces in south Korea under the pretext of the alleged nuclear weapons development in the north", and south Korea's role as the shock brigade in this scenario is aimed at "emphasizing the need for south Korea's possession of nuclear arms" (Solidarity and Advance, May 1992, "Joint study" published by the "Association for Study of the Korean Nation", 6 January 1992, and Wolgan Choson, April 1992).

In an attempt to attain this purpose, the United States and the south Korean authorities at first made a racket, calling for "an international nuclear inspection of the north's Nyongbyon reactor facilities", and now when such inspection has been carried out, they broach the "limitations" of the nuclear Safeguards Agreement and of the IAEA's inspection, so as to include our conventional military sites in the category of the "reciprocal nuclear inspection", and they are escalating the issue of the nuclear inspection.

Under the pretext of fictitious "nuclear development in the north", the south Korean authorities are seeking to legitimize their own nuclear-arms-development programme, which has already assumed grave dimensions, and to move towards an undisguised acquisition of nuclear weapons. Such moves by the south Korean authorities to acquire nuclear arms pose a grave threat to peace in

Korea and the rest of Asia. Such being the case, for the sake of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and peace in Asia, the criminal machinations by the United States and the south Korean authorities to turn south Korea into a nuclear arms depot under the pretext of our non-existent "nuclear development" must be checked, the United States nuclear weapons in south Korea must be withdrawn completely and the schemes of the south Korean authorities for nuclear development and the acquisition of nuclear arms should be halted immediately.

Now that the whole picture of south Korea's manoeuvres for nuclear armaments has come into broad daylight, public opinion at home and abroad should not look on unconcernedly but pay attention to such a serious situation.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hopes that peace-loving Governments throughout the world and the international community will sharpen their vigilance against the moves now under way in south Korea for nuclear development and the acquisition of nuclear weapons, launch an international joint action to check and frustrate them and extend firm solidarity with our people in their struggle for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
