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#### COMMISSION ON MARCOTIC DRUCS

Seventh Session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 5 May 1952, at 10.30 a.m.

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| Chairman: |  |
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Mr. RABASA

Mexico

Rapporteur

Mr. NIKOLIC

Mugoslavia

Members:

Mr. SHARMAN

Canada

Mr. HSTA

China

Mr. MAHMOUD

Egypt

Mr. VAILLE

France

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY

India

Mr. ARDALAN

Iran

Mr. KRUYSSE

Netherlands

## Nembers: (continued) ...

Mr. AVALOS Peru

Mrs. MELCHIOR Poland

Mr. OR Turkey

Mr. ZAKUSOV Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. WALKER United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

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Mr. ANSLINGER United States of America

Also present: Dr. WOLFF World Health Organization

Mr. MAY Permanent Central Opium Board

Mr. MARABUTO International Criminal Police

Commission

Observers: Mr. DOSI )

Mr. TANCREDI) Italy

Secretariat: Mr. STEINIG Director, Division of Narcotic Drugs

Mr. HUANG Division of Narcotic Drugs
Mr. BCLTON Secretary of the Commission

#### ILLICIT TRAFFIC

(a) ILLICIT TRAFFIC DURING 1951 (E/CN.7/234, E/CN.7/236, E/CN.7/L.14)(continued)

The CHAIRMAN called upon the Commission to continue consideration of the question of illicit traffic during 1951 (E/CN.7/234).

# Chapter X (Penalties)

Mr. NTMOLIC (Yugoslavia) noted, from chapter X of the Secretary-General's memorandum, that the penalties imposed for narcotic offences had consisted in Chile of fines ranging from US \$16 to US \$96 and in New Zealand of fines ranging from US \$35 to \$420; that in Greece the total of penalties imposed for narcotic offences amounted to prison terms of 52-1/2 years, 27 years' deportation and fines of US \$1,260; and, finally, that in Turkey the total of penalties imposed amounted to prison terms of 163 years and 2 months, banishment amounting to 192 years and 3 months and fines of US \$58,163.36.

He wondered whether that meant that narcotic offences were much more frequent in Greece and Turkey than in Chile and New Zealand or that the Governments concerned did not interpret their obligations under the convention in force in the same way and had different views as to the seriousness of narcotics offences. In any case, it would seem necessary for the same penalties to be imposed in all countries; otherwise, the traffickers would go to the countries where the penalties were lightest.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that paragraph 65 of the memorandum said that it was impossible at present to analyse or evaluate penalties from the standpoint of effectiveness. Moreover, so far as Chile was concerned, only administrative penalties imposed for narcotic offences, and not penal sentences which might have been imposed by the courts, were involved. He agreed with the Yugoslav representative, however, that it was desirable for Governments to interpret the provisions of the conventions in the same way.

Mr. NIKOLIC (Yugoslavia) pointed out that the French text of the memorandum did not mention administrative penalties, but merely penalties imposed for narcotic offences. Besides, in the case of coca-leaf smuggling, it could not be a question of administrative penalties alone.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY (India) noted that the memorandum gave no information about penalties imposed in India in 1951 for illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, although the annual report and seizure reports submitted by the Indian Government under article 23 of the 1931 Convention specifically indicated the number of persons involved and the penalties imposed. That was no doubt an oversight on the part of the Secretariat.

Mr. STEINIG (Secretariat) said he would have inquiries made and inform the Indian representative of the result.

The CHAIRMAN said the Commission had completed examination of document E/ON.7/234. If there was no objection, it could take note of the document and of the comments of members.

### It was so agreed.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that at the previous meeting the USSR representative had made certain comments on the United States Government's annual report, with particular reference to the smuggling of narcotics from North Korea and the People's Republic of China. The United States representative had reserved the right to reply to those comments and had expressed the desire to do so at that meeting. He called on the United States representative.

Mr. ANSLINGER (United States of America) submitted to the Commission a report dated 10 March 1952 which had been sent to the United States Government by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

According to that report, investigations, arrests and seizures in Japan during 1951 proved conclusively that the Chirose communists were smuggling heroin into Japan. According to the statements of arrested traffickers, profits from the smuggling were used to finance the activities of the communist party and to obtain strategic raw materials. All the heroin seized in Japan came from communist China; it was brought into the country either through Hong Kong or through North Korea. However, only 50 per cent of the heroin seized in 1951 bore an indication of origin.

The total amount of heroin seized in Japan in 1951 was 8.783 kgs. and 2,208 traffickers had been arrested. Of these arrested, 377 were Chinese communists and 269 North Koreans -- 29.2 per cent of the total, although mationals of the People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Republic formed only 2 per cent of the total population of Japan.

The heroin seized in Japan was from 83 to 98 per cent pure. In the illicit traffic, the price of a bag containing one English pound had risen from \$1,861.11 at the beginning of 1951 to \$3,611.11 at the end of the year. The price per gramme had risen from \$9.72 to \$27.77, and the retail price paid by addicts was about twenty times higher. At that stage in the retail traffic the purity of the heroin varied between 30 and 70 per cent.

The traffic in smuggled heroin had attracted the authorities attention for the first time at the end of 1947. During 1948 it had increased and in 1949 had attained considerable proportions. In 1950, 1,978 grammes of heroin had been seized at Konosaki, on the Japanese coast. It had been brought into Japan by a group of North Korean communists, with the help of Japanese accomplices. At the same time, 729 grammes of heroin bought from a communist company at Genzan, in North Korea, had been seized at Niigata, also on the coast of Japan. The total of heroin seized in 1950 had been 10.591 kgs., or three times the amount seized in 1949.

The chief of the communist party in Kyushu, implicated in one of the seizures, had said the heroin had been given him by a North Korean called Kyo Son, a member of the central committee of the communist party of Rashin (North Korea).

The part played by Kyo Son and the relation between communist party activities and narcotics smuggling had become clear with the arrest of a Japanese called Akira Ito. According to his own statement. Ito at the end of the war had joined the army of the People's Republic of China. September 1947, while he was a member of the crew of a smuggling ship belonging to a Chinese shipowner. Ito had gone to Japan and delivered secret messages to a member of the central committee of the communist party and to a notorious trafficker from Formosa who, when arrested later, was found to be in possession of 8.9 grammes of heroin. After being arrested in Tokyo .... November 1947 for armed assault and sentenced to ten months' imprisonment, Ito had escaped and rejoined the Chinese communist army. He had then been given special political training in China and sent to Rashin in North Korea where, after the outbreak of hostilities, he was put in charge of communist propaganda. In September 1950, he had again been sent to Japan to find one of the chiefs of the Chinese communist party and bring him back to North Korea. The ship in which he travelled had had a cargo of heroin, opium and santonin, which had been exchanged for textiles, dynamite and optical lenses.

On 31 August 1951, during another voyage to Japan, the ship in which Ito was travelling had discharged thirteen cases at Sanrihama, eight of which contained santonin, and had loaded sixteen cases containing dynamite and fuses.

Replying to the USSR representative's statement at the previous meeting that it was absurd to claim that smuggling of narcotic drugs could be carried on in wartime while the coasts of the People's Republic of China were under a very tight blockade. Mr. Anslinger said that it seemed as if the USSR representative was unaware of the activities of the smugglers; contains to what he thought, they found war conditions very favourable. A reference to the cases mentioned in the report of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which all concerned the traffic in heroin between communist China and North Korea on the one hand and Japan on the other, would confirm that To those cases should be added the large seizure of herein made at New York on board a Norwegian ship coming from the Far East. The covering of the packages definitely showed that it was of communist Chinese origin. case of the traffickers whom agents of the United States Bureau of Narcotics had recently arrested at San Francisco and on whom large quantities of heroin of Hong Kong origin were found might also be mentioned.

The facts mentioned in the SCAP report showed that all the heroin seized in Japan came from communist China. The heroin seized in North Korea was of the same type as that seized in Japan, and he referred in that connexion to page 27 of document E/CN.7/232/Add.2, which stated that the island of Tsushima was an important relay point in the smuggling of heroin from North Korea to Japan.

As regards the opium traffic, it should be noted that the Hong Kong authorities had seized large quantities of opium originating in communist China and that a large amount of raw opium of the same origin had been seized in Thailand.

It was obvious from what he had said that the traffic in narcotic drugs in communist thing was increasing all the time and was a serious menace. He urged the authorities in Hong Kong to increase their vigilance and requested the Japanese Government to intensify the campaign against the illicit traffic.

Mr. ZAKUSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United States representative's statement was intended to divert the Commission's attention from the problem before it -- the campaign against the illicit traffic. His speech contained slanderous assertions, intended to make the problem political, and merely took up the accusations of the United States press that communist China was trafficking in narcotic drugs with Japan and South Korea in order to undermine the morale of United States troops and to obtain funds for the purchase of war material.

The truth was that the United States troops who became drug addicts were only following the habits they had acquired in American schools. How could they obtain the drugs they needed if the United States authorities did not allow the traffic? The morale of the United States armed forces was low because the troops knew that it was impossible for them genuinely to uphold the theory that their country was defending the principles of freedom and independence on the far-off Korean front. They knew that the war they were waging was unjust and they had no faith in their country's alleged mission.

The morality of United States troops was suffering as well as their morale. A leading Japanese woman had recently written to the wife of General Ridgway, protesting against the immerality and debauchery introduced into Japan by the United States armed forces.

The United States representative was perhaps not aware that in a statement made before a United Nations Commission, he had just implicitly recognized the moral degradation to which United States armed forces had sunk in the Far East. The shameful responsibility for the debauchery to be found in Japan rested with the United States officers and soldiers; they seduced Japanese girls and then handed them over to prostitution. There were about 200,000 illegitimate children in Japan at present. Drug addiction was not the primary cause of that moral decay; it was only a symbol, like the bacterial warfare and the manifold atrocities committed by United States troops, of which a well-known Belgian lawyer, Mrs. Marie-Louise Moreens, had given several examples at a

press conference on 28 April 1952 on her return from Korea. United States airmen machine-gunned children at school; they attacked churches while services were being held and tortured their prisoners (among them there were many children), as had been proved by the bodies which had been discovered. They used poison gases and bacterial warfare to such an extent that the war in Korea had become organized genocide. It could therefore be easily understood why the United States representative made slanderous attacks against the People's Republic of China. He was vainly trying to divert the attention of world public opinion from the horrors committed by the United States armed forces.

Mr. ANSLINGER (United States of America) said he would raise a point of order if the discussions continued on a plane so far removed from the question of narcotic drugs. The USSR representative had violently attacked the United States Government, which had merely communicated to the Commission accurate, detailed facts, supported by irrefutable proofs, on the traffic in narcotic drugs carried on by communist China. The USSR representative claimed that the information given was inaccurate, but could not prove that. The Commission was waiting for him to produce statistics, documents and reports proving that his accusations were well-founded and stating how the production, manufacture and licit trade in narcotics in communist China was organized. Instead of submitting such facts, he had merely tried to hide the truth under a mixture of half-truths, lies and offensive words. It was not slanderous to state that communist China was at the present time the biggest source of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs in the world; it was a true statement, as would be seen from a Study of document E/ON.7/234. Moreover, China was not the only country where drugs entered the illicit traffic. When the Commission had studied the reports of other countries where such traffic was being carried on, their representatives had not made insulting remarks. They had morely given all the explanations requested, said what their governments were doing, and described the measures taken to combat the traffic. The USSR representative's attitude showed that he was unable to refute the facts the United States Government had communicated to the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN recognized that the Commission was an international body, in which all representatives had the right to be heard and to explain their governments: points of view, but it was solely a technical organ which, under its terms of reference, should deal exclusively with questions concerning narcotic drugs. If a representative departed from the one subject with which the Commission was competent to deal, he would be obliged to interrupt the debate and call that member to order.

Mr. HSIA (China) recalled that on several occasions at previous sessions he had tried to warn the Commission of the danger to humanity of the change in the Chinese authorities: attitude to narcotic drugs. His statements had been interrupted by points of order on the ground that they had nothing to do with the debate. He could give the Commission many interesting details of the way illicit cultivation and export of opium were being carried on officially in communist China. As soon as the red armies occupied a sector, the communist authorities reorganized opium cultivation. They were not concerned with domestic consumption, but were especially interested in discovering foreign markets. Any merchant who wished to expert opium had to obtain a permit from the police -- the special trade office, and thus became a legal shipper of opium. The authorities of the special trade office and all the other authorities gave him the assistance he needed to get rid of his opium by illicit means. was carried on mainly over the south-eastern frontier. Motorized junks carried than the drug to the ships and loading took place at sea. Opium was not, however, the only substance carried in that officially organized smuggling. A morphine factory had been set up in Western China under the auspices of the military authorities. It employed two Japanese experts and two hundred workers and produced 300 lbs. of morphine a day, the major part of which was destined for Japan or the Philippines. By thus officially organizing contraband in narcotic drugs the communist authorities were trying to obtain foreign exchange in order to buy arms and war material. The Commission would realize the extent of the traffic when it knew that one shipment alone to Hongkong by the Hankow-Canton Railway had been valued at HK \$20,000,000 (US \$3,300,000). The same of the providence of the second residence of the second second residence of the second seco

Mrs. MELCHIOR (Poland) was sorry that the question of the representation of the People's Republic of China had been deferred to the next session. It was contrary to all reason that a country with 500 million inhabitants should not be represented on the Commission and thus be able to defend itself against slanderous attacks.

Mr. ZAKUSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to know why the Commission considered his protests against the lying accusations against Communist China as political considerations that were not within its competence, but refrained from applying the same criterion when the representative of Nationalist China accused the Communist Chinese authorities of promoting illicit traffic.

He drew the United States representative's attention to the fact that all his information was drawn from the United States press; if the United States representative challenged the evidence in the United States press, that would indicate that the press was not telling the truth.

The USSR Government had been accused of failing to transmit any information on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs for some time; the Permanent Central Opium Board, however, was in a position to testify that the USSR had transmitted such information, although there might have been some delay since the terminology did not exist in Russian. The charge that the USSR had failed to transmit information had perhaps been made by certain countries where drug addiction was rampant and which were envious of the fact that that evil was non-existent in the USSR.

Mr. ANSLINGER (United States of America) recalled that at a previous meeting, the Chinese representative's statement on the official organization of illicit traffic in communist China had been cut short by a point of order raised by the USSR representative.

In his country the press was completely free; it was not subjected to any Government control and could discharge its duty of informing public opinion without the slightest restraint.

With regard to the absence of drug addiction in the USSR, he pointed out that the last pre-war report submitted by the USSR in 1937 had mentioned

the seizure of several hundred tons of opium for smoking on the Manchurian frontier. That seemed to be a sign that drug addiction did exist in the USSR, unless, of course, the USSR Government did not consider the habit of smoking opium as addiction.

Mr. MAY (Permanent Central Opium Board) recalled that the Government of the People's Republic of China had not so far replied to his letter of 6 November 1951 asking for information on the control of narcotic drugs and of opium in particular.

Mr. VAILLE (France) considered that the USSR representative had pushed propaganda rather far when he had said, implicitly but clearly, that the United States had attacked communist China. He could not let such an accusation pass uncontested since the United States, far from being an aggressor country, had come to the assistance of South Korea when the latter had fallen victim to aggression by communist forces from North Korea. As long as strong nations felt it their duty to assist weak nations when the latter were attacked, the world would have reason to hope.

The CHAIRMAN reiterated that members of the Commission were entitled to state their point of view on the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and on respect for the international obligations assumed by Governments, provided that they kept within the limits of courteous discussion. The best example of the procedure that should be followed was that of the investigation that had been undertaken in Peru and Bolivia: the Commission had been asked for a scientific opinion and had been able to study the facts freely because its examination had dealt solely with the coca leaf and political considerations had not supervened. The Commission was a technical body, and it was not competent to discuss political questions or to consider the status of Governments. He also reminded the Polish representative that the Commission had decided by 10 votes to 3, with 1 abstention, to defer the question of the representation of China to its eighth session. The discussion would therefore be confined to the question of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. Regardless of who was speaking, any

statement which was not to the point would be ruled out of order and any speaker who failed to comply with the ruling would be interrupted immediately.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

Mr. SHARMAN (Canada) unreservedly approved the Chairman's ruling. He recalled that a number of States, including Canada, made no attempt to hide the fact that drug addiction was a problem in their country. In chapter V of its annual report (E/CN.7/232), the Canadian Government had indicated the scope of the problem and had stressed that, because large amounts of heroin were reaching Canada, addiction, which must be considered infectious among criminal psychopaths, was on the increase. In reply to a question, he had explained that the narcotic drugs brought illicitly to Canada came from the same source as those which were smuggled into the United States. His delegation shared the United States representative's views and warmly supported his clear and objective statement.

The CHAIRMAN invited the Commission to consider the memorandum by the International Criminal Police Commission on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs in 1951 (E/CN.7/236).

Mr. MARABUTO (International Criminal Police Commission) recalled that the members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs had expressed their satisfaction at the international co-operation achieved by police authorities and special agencies responsible for the suppression of illicit traffic, and at the assistance rendered by the International Criminal Police Commission. Most of the members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs had felt that such co-operation was essential if the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs was to be suppressed. The ICPC memorandum was intended to throw into relief the advantages of such co-operation in the spirit of article 29 of the draft single convention and along the lines proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the United States, Mexico and France. He supported the provisions of those two texts.

Since ICPC had been represented at meetings of the Commission on Marcotic Drugs, it had made every effort to complement the Commission's humanitarian work, at the practical level of suppression. ICPC was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the difficulties which the Commission on Narcotic Drugs had to face; having in mind the latter's suggestions, it had therefore continued to place the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs, which was a typical international offence, on the agenda of its general assemblies in order to co-ordinate and stimulate the measures which its National Bureaux were taking against such traffic. It had emphasized the need for continuous efforts in view of the resurgence of illicit traffic since the Second World War and had studied the question of giving the police special training and of training specialized personnel. It had also proposed the drawing up of a list of seamen and airmen engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, whose travel papers should be withdrawn, and that the penalties imposed on traffickers should be increased. The last two questions had been dealt with in circulars formally submitted to the various National Bureaux, and the suggestions contained in them had been put into effect.

. The memorandum related some of the satisfactory results it had been possible to achieve through the joint action of police authorities, in particular the discovery of two clandestine laboratories, to which the French representative had referred. He could give a number of other examples, but would prefer not to be too specific, since that might prejudice investigations still under way. Still better results might have been achieved if other countries had participated in the common effort. ICPC was hampered by the absence of information on several countries. That was why it would be advisable to consider practical methods of international co-operation based on the principles contained in article 29, and along the lines suggested in the French alternative draft. The latter proclaimed the need to establish co-operation with the public international organizations concerned with the control of narcotic drugs and to transmit information on traffic in narcotic drugs as speedily as possible. So far as ICFC was concerned such co-operation had already been established. It was well known that, where police action was concerned, the success of the investigation was in direct ratio, to the rapidity with which the information was transmitted and the enquiry begun. If the necessary information was not transmitted quickly enough, the evidence grew blurred, the trail disappeared and /responsibility

responsibility could no longer be determined. That was Why the International Criminal Police Commission asked in paragraphs 110 and 111 of its memorandum that information on cases of international traffic should be brought to its attention as soon as possible. If important information reached it only through the Secretariat of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs it would probably be too late to make effective use of such information, as had sometimes been the case in the past. He reserved the right to return to that question in more detail when the Commission considered the draft resolution submitted by France, Mexico and the United States.

Control of the heroin traffic in Italy was an example of the results that could be achieved through international co-operation. The Commission had considered the problem at its fifth and sixth sessions. From the beginning of 1949, ICPC, which had had exact information on the matter, had informed its Italian correspondent of the existence of extensive traffic in heroin. In June 1950 it had given the Italian Bureau more specific information, proving that since the end of the war hundreds of kilogrammes of morphine and heroin had been diverted from legal manufacture in Italy and that that traffic was the main source for the clandestine markets in France and America. On several occasions, the names of the traffickers and information on the centres of the traffic had been given. The extensive investigations which the Italian Government had undertaken towards the end of 1951 had confirmed the existence of the centres to which ICPC had drawn attention and the ascuracy of its information regarding the names of the traffickers.

He could mention further examples of international co-operation and wished to pay a tribute to the special agencies. There had been co-operation not only in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, but also in other fields. Such facts proved that it was as important to co-ordinate the action of national police authorities in suppression of the illicit traffic as to co-ordinate the measures taken by the various States to regulate such traffic; the two aspects were complementary and would enable more effective steps to be taken.

Mr. SHARMAN (Canada) drew attention to paragraphs 52 to 56 of the memorandum. He wished to know whether the Lucky L..., referred to in those paragraphs, was Lucky Luciano, the notorious trafficker whose activities the Commission had considered on several occasions.

Mr. MARABUTO (International Criminal Police Commission) felt that the Italian Observer might be able to reply to the Canadian representative's question more fully than he could. He explained that ICPC had circulated a description of the individual in question based on information received from the Italian Central Bureau.

Mr. DOSI (Italy) confirmed the accuracy of the facts related in paragraphs 52 to 56 of the memorandum. In conformity with the provisions of the 1928 Convention, the Italian Government had sent the United States Narcotics Bureau a detailed report of the case. The individual concerned was Lucky Luciano. When he had arrived in Italy in 1945, after being deported from the United States, he had not been very well know to the police. Nevertheless, like all deported persons, he had been placed under special surveillance. After a trip to Latin America and, inter alia, Cubo, whence he had been deported, he had returned to Italy in 1947. At that time information in the United States press, reprinted by the Italian press, had given certain useful sidelights on Luciano's personality and activities. Consequently, on arrival at Genoa, he had been taken under close guard to Sigily. The Italian police had received the files compiled by the FBI in the United States, and had brought Luciano before a special Commission at Palermo, which was empowered to order the rigorous imprisonment of particularly dangerous criminals. In cases of that kind the criminals were generally deported to an island. Nevertheless, the Commission had been obliged to state that Luciano had not engaged in any reprehensible activities in Italy and that it was not legally entitled to order his imprisonment. Luciano had continued to be subjected to strict supervision, however, and all his movements had been watched. At the time of the investigation into the Callace affair (E/CN.7/232) Luciano had been arrested as a suspect and had been kept in prison for ten days. After an investigation by the mobile brigade in Rome, he had been sent to Sicily and forbidden to live in Rome. His descritpion had been circulated to the police in the thirty-eight countries members of ICPC. Furthermore, as a result of information published in the United States press to the effect that Luciano had been in charge of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs from Italy to the United States, the Italian police had asked the United States Narcotics Bureau to give them all the information in its possession. Nevertheless, no proofs against Luciano had been /forthcoming:

forthcoming; Luciano himself had admitted that the traffickers had tried to contact him, but had claimed that he had not yielded to their demands. In view of the constant surveillance to which he was subjected, and in the obserce of any proof, it would appear that he was not now engaged in any criminal activities. The Italian police knew that Luciano's income was derived from his activities in the United States and had decided to place him at the immediate disposal of the Public Prosecutor's office if it was proved that he was taking part in the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. The surveillance over him would never be relaxed and his activities would be investigated again in connexion with any important cases of traffic in narcotic drugs.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.