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APPENDIX I

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1118
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ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, THE BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

WHEREAS the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties") are parties to the Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter referred to as "the SCCC Agreement"), which established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (hereinafter referred to as "the SCCC");

RECALLING the undertakings of the States Parties in the SCCC Agreement;

RECALLING that, pursuant to the SCCC Agreement, none of its provisions shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the parties thereto to carry out research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I to IV of the SCCC Agreement;

WHEREAS the States Parties are members of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (hereinafter referred to as "ABACC"), to which the implementation of the SCCC has been entrusted;

WHEREAS the States Parties have decided to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") a joint safeguards agreement, with the SCCC as a basis for the agreement;

WHEREAS the States Parties have further voluntarily requested the Agency to apply its safeguards taking into account the SCCC;

WHEREAS it is the desire of the States Parties, ABACC and the Agency to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities;

WHEREAS the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article III.A.5 of its Statute (hereinafter referred to as "the Statute"), to conclude safeguards agreements at the request of Member States;

NOW THEREFORE the States Parties, ABACC and the Agency have agreed as follows:

P A R T I

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

A r t i c l e 1

The States Parties undertake to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

A r t i c l e 2

- (a) The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within the territories of the States Parties, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- (b) ABACC undertakes, in applying its safeguards on nuclear material in all nuclear activities within the territories of the States Parties, to co-operate with the Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, with a view to ascertaining that such nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- (c) The Agency shall apply its safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the SCCC. The Agency's verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency, in accordance with the procedures specified in this Agreement. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SCCC.

A r t i c l e 3

- (a) The States Parties, ABACC and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement.
- (b) ABACC and the Agency shall avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 4

The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

- (a) to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties or international co-operation in the field of nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material;
- (b) to avoid undue interference in the States Parties' nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities;
- (c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities; and
- (d) to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets.

A r t i c l e 5

- (a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect any confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement.
- (b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.
- (ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States Parties directly concerned agree thereto.

A r t i c l e 6

- (a) In implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, full account shall be taken of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and every effort shall be made to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits.
- (b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as:

- (i) containment and surveillance as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting and control purposes;
- (ii) statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and
- (iii) concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the implementation of this Agreement.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

A r t i c l e 7

- (a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, ABACC shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.
- (b)
 - (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.
 - (ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
- (c) If a State Party so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine directly on the premises either of that State Party or of ABACC, design information which the State Party regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on the premises either of that State Party or of ABACC.

AGENCY INSPECTORS

A r t i c l e 8

- (a)
 - (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the States Parties through ABACC to the designation of Agency inspectors to the States Parties.
 - (ii) If the States Parties through ABACC, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, object to the designation, the Agency shall propose an alternative designation or designations.

- (iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the States Parties through ABACC to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Director General"), with a view to its taking appropriate action.
- (b) ABACC and the States Parties shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement.
- (c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:
 - (i) to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the States Parties and ABACC and to the nuclear activities inspected;
 - (ii) to ensure protection of any confidential information coming to the knowledge of Agency inspectors; and
 - (iii) to take into account ABACC activities to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.

STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 9

- (a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (b) is imported into a State Party to this Agreement, that State Party shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; and
- (b) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into a State Party to this Agreement, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement.

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 10

- (a) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by ABACC and the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable.

- (b) Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, ABACC shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards under this Agreement on such material may be terminated.

EXEMPTION FROM SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 11

- (a) Nuclear material shall be exempted from safeguards in accordance with the provisions specified in Article 35 of this Agreement.
- (b) Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities which, in the opinion of either ABACC or the Agency, will not render the material practicably irrecoverable, ABACC shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which such material may be exempted from safeguards.

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUT OF THE STATES PARTIES

A r t i c l e 12

- (a) ABACC shall give the Agency notification of transfers of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of the States Parties, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Agreement. Safeguards on nuclear material in the States Parties under this Agreement shall terminate when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as provided for in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.
- (b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in Article 9(b) is directly or indirectly exported by a State Party to this Agreement to any State not Party to this Agreement, the State Party shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes.

SPECIAL PROCEDURES

A r t i c l e 13

If a State Party intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement for nuclear propulsion or operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency, the following procedures shall apply:

- (a) that State Party shall inform the Agency, through ABACC, of the activity, and shall make it clear:

- (i) that the use of the nuclear material in such an activity will not be in conflict with any undertaking of the State Party under agreements concluded with the Agency in connection with Article XI of the Statute of the Agency or any other agreement concluded with the Agency in connection with INFCIRC/26 (and Add.1) or INFCIRC/66 (and Rev.1 or 2), as applicable; and
- (ii) that during the period of application of the special procedures the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (b) the State Party and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, these special procedures shall apply only while the nuclear material is used for nuclear propulsion or in the operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which the special procedures shall be applied. In any event, the other procedures provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a nuclear activity other than the above. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such material in that State Party and of any export of such material; and
- (c) each arrangement shall be concluded between the State Party concerned and the Agency as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of such activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON-DIVERSION

A r t i c l e 14

If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by ABACC and/or a State Party is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon ABACC and/or the State Party concerned to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this Agreement for the settlement of a dispute.

A r t i c l e 15

If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action, the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the State Party concerned every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Article 16

Each State Party shall apply to the Agency, including its property, funds and assets, and to its inspectors and other officials performing functions under this Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

FINANCE

Article 17

The States Parties, ABACC and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the States Parties, or persons under their jurisdiction, or ABACC, incurs extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case, the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which Agency inspectors may request.

THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE

Article 18

Each State Party shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to residents of that State Party.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Article 19

Any claim by ABACC or a State Party against the Agency or by the Agency against ABACC or a State Party in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 20

At the request of the Agency, ABACC or a State Party or States Parties, there shall be consultations about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

A r t i c l e 21

ABACC and the States Parties shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite all Parties to the Agreement to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.

A r t i c l e 22

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 15 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the State Party or States Parties concerned, ABACC and the Agency shall, at the request of any of them, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of five arbitrators. The States Parties and ABACC shall designate two arbitrators and the Agency shall also designate two arbitrators, and the four arbitrators so designated shall elect a fifth, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either the Agency or the States Parties and ABACC have not designated two arbitrators each, either the Agency or the States Parties and ABACC may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint these arbitrators. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the fourth arbitrator, the fifth arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of at least three arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the States Parties, ABACC and the Agency.

SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS
UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS

A r t i c l e 23

Upon the coming into force of this Agreement for a State Party, the application of Agency safeguards in that State Party under other safeguards agreements with the Agency not involving third parties will be suspended while this Agreement is in force. The Agency and the State Party concerned shall initiate consultations with the third party concerned with a view to suspending the application of safeguards in that State Party under safeguards agreements involving third parties. The State Party's undertaking in the agreements referred to above not to use items which are subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply.

AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT

A r t i c l e 24

- (a) ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency shall, at the request of any one of them, consult on amendment to this Agreement.
- (b) All amendments shall require the agreement of ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency.

- (c) Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force in the same conditions as the entry into force of the Agreement itself.
- (d) The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any amendment to this Agreement.

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

A r t i c l e 25

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Agency receives from ABACC and from the States Parties written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.

A r t i c l e 26

This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the States Parties are Parties to the SCCC Agreement.

PROTOCOL

Article 27

The Protocol attached to this Agreement shall be an integral part thereof. The term "Agreement" as used in this instrument means the Agreement and the Protocol together.

P A R T II

INTRODUCTION

A r t i c l e 28

The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 29

The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

A r t i c l e 30

For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 29, nuclear material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

A r t i c l e 31

The technical conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

COMMON SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A r t i c l e 32

Pursuant to Article 2, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the SCCC and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of ABACC's accounting and control activities.

A r t i c l e 33

ABACC's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as:

- (a) a measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory;
- (b) the evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;
- (c) procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements;
- (d) procedures for taking a physical inventory;
- (e) procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses;
- (f) a system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area;
- (g) provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and
- (h) procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 57 to 63 and 65 to 67.

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 34

- (a) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material under the conditions set forth in Article 10(a). Where the conditions of Article 10(a) are not met, but ABACC considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, ABACC and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied.
- (b) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material under the conditions set forth in Article 10(b) provided that ABACC and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.
- (c) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material transferred out of the States Parties, under the conditions set forth in Article 12(a) and the procedures specified in Articles 89 to 92.

EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS

A r t i c l e 35

At the request of ABACC, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from safeguards as follows:

- (a) special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments;
- (b) nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 11(b);
- (c) if the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in each State Party in accordance with this sub-Article does not at any time exceed:
 - (i) one kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following:
 - (1) plutonium;
 - (2) uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and
 - (3) uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
 - (ii) ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);

(iii) twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and

(iv) twenty metric tons of thorium; or

(d) plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

A r t i c l e 36

If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the re-application of safeguards thereto.

SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

A r t i c l e 37

Taking into account the SCCC, ABACC, the State Party concerned and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. By agreement between ABACC, the State Party concerned and the Agency, the Subsidiary Arrangements may, without amendment of this Agreement, be extended or changed or, in respect of a particular facility, terminated.

A r t i c l e 38

The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within one hundred and eighty days of the entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency. The State Party concerned through ABACC shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 39 even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into force.

INVENTORY

A r t i c l e 39

On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 60, the Agency shall establish unified inventories of all nuclear material in each State Party subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain these inventories on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventories shall be made available to ABACC at intervals to be agreed.

DESIGN INFORMATION

General provisions

A r t i c l e 40

Pursuant to Article 7, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency by the State Party concerned through ABACC during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.

A r t i c l e 41

The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility, when applicable:

- (a) the identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes;
- (b) a description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;
- (c) a description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and
- (d) a description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking.

A r t i c l e 42

Other information relevant to the application of safeguards under this Agreement shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility if so specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. ABACC shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the Agency inspectors shall comply at the facility.

A r t i c l e 43

The Agency shall be provided by the State Party concerned through ABACC with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes under this Agreement, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 42, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary.

A r t i c l e 44

Purposes of examination of design information

The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes:

- (a) to identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;
- (b) to determine material balance areas to be used for accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material balance areas the following criteria, inter alia, shall be used:
 - (i) the size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established;
 - (ii) in determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;
 - (iii) a special material balance area may be established at the request of the State Party concerned through ABACC around a process step involving technologically, industrially or commercially sensitive information; and
 - (iv) for installations of particular sensitivity, key measurement points may be selected in such a way as to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets;
- (c) to establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for accounting purposes under this Agreement;
- (d) to establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures;
- (e) to establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and
- (f) to select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information, as agreed upon between ABACC and the Agency, shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

A r t i c l e 45

Re-examination of design information

Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action taken pursuant to Article 44.

A r t i c l e 46

Verification of design information

The Agency, in co-operation with ABACC and the State Party concerned, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Articles 40 to 43, for the purposes stated in Article 44.

INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE FACILITIES

A r t i c l e 47

The Agency shall be provided by the State Party concerned through ABACC with the following information when nuclear material is to be customarily used outside facilities, as applicable:

- (a) a general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user's name and address for routine business purposes; and
- (b) a general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control.

The Agency shall be informed by ABACC, on a timely basis, of any change in the information provided to it under this Article.

A r t i c l e 48

The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 47 may be used, to the extent relevant, for the purposes set out in Article 44(b) to (f).

RECORDS SYSTEM

General provisions

A r t i c l e 49

ABACC shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. The records to be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

A r t i c l e 50

ABACC shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian or Spanish.

A r t i c l e 51

Records shall be retained for at least five years.

A r t i c l e 52

Records shall consist, as appropriate, of:

- (a) accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and**
- (b) operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.**

A r t i c l e 53

The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards.

Accounting records

A r t i c l e 54

The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area:

- (a) all inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time;**
- (b) all measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and**
- (c) all adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories.**

A r t i c l e 55

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch, data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.

A r t i c l e 56

Operating records

The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area:

- (a) those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material;**
- (b) the data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error;**

- (c) a description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and
- (d) a description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

REPORTS SYSTEM

General provisions

A r t i c l e 57

ABACC shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 58 to 63 and 65 to 67 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

A r t i c l e 58

Reports shall be made in English, French or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

A r t i c l e 59

Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 49 to 56 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting reports

A r t i c l e 60

The Agency shall be provided by ABACC with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The initial report shall be dispatched by ABACC to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation in each State Party as of the last day of that month.

A r t i c l e 61

ABACC shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area:

- (a) inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and, in any event, within thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and
- (b) material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and, in any event, within thirty days after the physical inventory has been taken.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required.

A r t i c l e 62

Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes:

- (a) explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 56(a); and
- (b) describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

A r t i c l e 63

ABACC shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

A r t i c l e 64

The Agency shall provide ABACC with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement.

A r t i c l e 65

Material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by ABACC and the Agency:

- (a) beginning physical inventory;
- (b) inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);
- (c) ending book inventory;
- (d) shipper/receiver differences;
- (e) adjusted ending book inventory;
- (f) ending physical inventory; and
- (g) material unaccounted for.

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report.

A r t i c l e 66

Special reports

ABACC shall make special reports without delay:

- (a) if any unusual incident or circumstances lead ABACC to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or
- (b) if the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible.

A r t i c l e 67

Amplification and clarification of reports

If the Agency so requests, ABACC shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards under this Agreement.

INSPECTIONS

A r t i c l e 68

General provisions

The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in this Agreement.

Purposes of inspections

A r t i c l e 69

The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:

- (a) verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;
- (b) identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred between the date of the initial report and the date of entry into force of the Subsidiary Arrangements in respect of a given facility and, in the event that Subsidiary Arrangements cease to be in force, in respect of a given facility; and
- (c) identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance with Articles 91, 94 and 96 before its transfer out of, into or between States Parties.

A r t i c l e 70

The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:

- (a) verify that reports are consistent with records;
- (b) verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and
- (c) verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.

A r t i c l e 71

Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 75, the Agency may make special inspections:

- (a) in order to verify the information contained in special reports; or
- (b) if the Agency considers that information made available by ABACC, including explanations from ABACC and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 to 80 or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 74 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.

Scope of inspections

A r t i c l e 72

For the purposes specified in Articles 69 to 71, the Agency may:

- (a) examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 49 to 56;
- (b) make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;
- (c) verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment;
- (d) apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and
- (e) use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible.

A r t i c l e 73

Within the scope of Article 72, the Agency shall be enabled:

- (a) to observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples;
- (b) to observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved;
- (c) to make arrangements with ABACC and, to the extent necessary, with the State Party concerned that, if necessary:
 - (i) additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency's use;
 - (ii) the Agency's standard analytical samples are analysed;
 - (iii) appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and
 - (iv) other calibrations are carried out;
- (d) to arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance and, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such equipment;
- (e) to apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
- (f) to make arrangements with ABACC or the State Party concerned for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency's use.

Access for inspections

A r t i c l e 74

- (a) For the purposes specified in Article 69(a) and (b) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, or in the event that the Subsidiary Arrangements cease to be in force, the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present;
- (b) For the purposes specified in Article 69(c) the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with Articles 90(d)(iii), 93(d)(iii) or 95;
- (c) For the purposes specified in Article 70, the Agency inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 49 to 56; and

- (d) In the event of ABACC concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, ABACC and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board.

A r t i c l e 75

In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 71, the State Party concerned, ABACC and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may:

- (a) make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 to 80; and
- (b) obtain access, in agreement with the State Party concerned and ABACC, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 74. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22; in case action by ABACC, a State Party or States Parties is essential and urgent, Article 14 shall apply.

Frequency and intensity of routine inspections

A r t i c l e 76

The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most economical use of inspection resources available to it.

A r t i c l e 77

The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms.

A r t i c l e 78

The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that, in the maximum or limiting case, the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows:

- (a) for reactors and sealed storage installations, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility;

- (b) for facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility $30 \times \sqrt{E}$ man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and
- (c) for facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a man-year of inspection plus $0.4 \times E$ man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.

The Parties to this Agreement may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable.

A r t i c l e 79

Subject to Articles 76 to 78, the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility shall include:

- (a) the form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items, its chemical and isotopic composition and its accessibility;
- (b) the effectiveness of ABACC's safeguards, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of ABACC's safeguards; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 33 have been implemented by ABACC; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency's independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;
- (c) characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycles in the States Parties, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated;
- (d) international interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the nuclear activities in each State Party are interrelated with those of other States; and
- (e) technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.

A r t i c l e 80

ABACC and the Agency shall consult if ABACC or the State Party concerned considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

Notice of inspections

A r t i c l e 81

The Agency shall give advance notice to ABACC and to the State Party concerned before arrival of Agency inspectors at facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows:

- (a) for ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(c), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Article 69(a) and (b) as well as the activities provided for in Article 46, at least one week;
- (b) for special inspections pursuant to Article 71, as promptly as possible after ABACC, the State Party concerned and the Agency have consulted, as provided for in Article 75, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and
- (c) for routine inspections pursuant to Article 70, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 78(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases.

Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the Agency inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the Agency inspectors are to arrive from outside the States Parties, the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the States Parties.

A r t i c l e 82

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 81, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 78 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided pursuant to Article 62(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall periodically advise ABACC and the State Party concerned, through the procedures specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for ABACC and the State Party concerned and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 42 and 87. Similarly, ABACC and the State Party concerned shall make every effort to facilitate the task of the Agency inspectors.

Designation of Agency inspectors

A r t i c l e 83

The following procedures shall apply to the designation of Agency inspectors:

- (a) the Director General shall inform the States Parties, through ABACC, in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the States Parties;
- (b) the States Parties, through ABACC, shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of such a proposal whether they accept the proposal;
- (c) the Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the States Parties, through ABACC, as one of the Agency inspectors for the States Parties, and shall inform the States Parties, through ABACC, of such designations; and
- (d) the Director General, acting in response to a request by the States Parties, through ABACC, or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the States Parties, through ABACC, of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an Agency inspector for the States Parties.

However, in respect of Agency inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 46 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(a) and (b), the designation procedures shall be completed, if possible, within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, Agency inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.

A r t i c l e 84

The States Parties shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each Agency inspector designated pursuant to Article 83.

Conduct and visits of Agency inspectors

A r t i c l e 85

Agency inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 46 and 69 to 73, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular, Agency inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If Agency inspectors consider that, in pursuance of Articles 72 and 73, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.

A r t i c l e 86

When Agency inspectors require services available in a State Party, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, ABACC and the State Party concerned shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by Agency inspectors.

A r t i c l e 87

ABACC and the State Party concerned shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their inspections by its inspectors and representatives of that State Party, respectively, provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

A r t i c l e 88

The Agency shall inform ABACC of:

- (a) the results of its inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
- (b) the conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the State Party concerned, in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck.

TRANSFERS INTO, OUT OF AND BETWEEN THE STATES PARTIES

A r t i c l e 89

General provisions

Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is transferred out of, into or between the States Parties shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of ABACC and of the State Party concerned:

- (a) in the case of import into the States Parties from another State, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the material reaches its destination;
- (b) in the case of export out of the States Parties to another State, up to the time at which the recipient State assumes such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination; and
- (c) in the case of transfer between the States Parties, from the time of transfer of responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination.

The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in accordance with suitable arrangements to be made by ABACC and the State Party or States Parties concerned and, in the case of transfers into or out of the States Parties, the State to which or from which the nuclear material is transferred. Neither ABACC, a State Party to this Agreement nor any other State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over the territory of a State, or that it is being transported on a ship under its flag or in its aircraft.

Transfers out of the States Parties

A r t i c l e 90

- (a) ABACC shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of the States Parties of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to be made to the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram.
- (b) Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping.
- (c) ABACC and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance notification.
- (d) The notification shall specify:
 - (i) the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come;
 - (ii) the State for which the nuclear material is destined;
 - (iii) the dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping;
 - (iv) the approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and
 - (v) at what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached.

A r t i c l e 91

The notification referred to in Article 90 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material before it is transferred out of the States Parties and, if the Agency so wishes or ABACC so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any inspection or verification action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such notification.

A r t i c l e 92

Nuclear material subject to Agency safeguards in a State Party shall not be exported unless such material will be subject to safeguards in the recipient State and until the Agency has made appropriate arrangements to apply safeguards to such material.

Transfers into the States Parties

A r t i c l e 93

- (a) ABACC shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into the States Parties of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to be received from the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram.
- (b) The Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the nuclear material, and in any case not later than the date on which the State Party assumes responsibility for the nuclear material.
- (c) ABACC and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance notification.
- (d) The notification shall specify:
 - (i) the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material;
 - (ii) at what point of the transfer the State Party will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached; and
 - (iii) the expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the nuclear material is intended to be unpacked.

A r t i c l e 94

The notification referred to in Article 93 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material at the time the consignment is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification.

Transfers between the States Parties

A r t i c l e 95

The Subsidiary Arrangements shall specify the Agency's procedures for notification and verification of domestic transfers of nuclear material for transfers of nuclear material between the States Parties. While Subsidiary Arrangements are not in force, the Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the transfer, but in any event, not less than two weeks before the transfer takes place.

A r t i c l e 96

The notification referred to in Article 95 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, a routine or ad hoc inspection, as appropriate, to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material before it is transferred between the States Parties and, if the Agency so wishes or ABACC so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping.

Special reports

A r t i c l e 97

ABACC shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 66 if any unusual incident or circumstances lead ABACC to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during a transfer into, out of or between the States Parties.

D E F I N I T I O N S

A r t i c l e 98

For the purposes of this Agreement:

1. ABACC means the legal person created by the SCCC Agreement.
2. A. adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for.
- B. annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 77 and 78, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.
- C. batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.
- D. batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as follows:
 - (a) grams of contained plutonium;
 - (b) grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and
 - (c) kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit.

- E. book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken.
- F. correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains.
- G. effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:
- (a) for plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
 - (b) for uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
 - (c) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
 - (d) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
- H. enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.
- I. facility means:
- (a) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or
 - (b) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.
- J. inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:
- (a) increases:
 - (i) import;
 - (ii) domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from an activity referred to in Article 13, or receipts at the starting point of safeguards;
 - (iii) nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and
 - (iv) de-exemption: re-application of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.

- (b) decreases:
- (i) export;
 - (ii) domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for an activity referred to in Article 13;
 - (iii) nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;
 - (iv) measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use;
 - (v) retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored;
 - (vi) exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and
 - (vii) other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.
- K. key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.
- L. man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 78, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours.
- M. material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that:
- (a) the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and
 - (b) the physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures;
- in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.
- N. material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory.

- O. nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by ABACC and the States Parties.
- P. physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.
- Q. shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area.
- R. significant quantity means the significant quantity of nuclear material as set by the Agency.
- S. source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated.
- T. strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

DONE at Vienna, on the thirteenth day of December 1991 ,
in quadruplicate, in the English language.

For the REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA:

For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY:

For the FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL:

For ABACC:

PROTOCOL

Article 1

This Protocol amplifies certain provisions of the Agreement and, in particular, specifies the arrangements for co-operation in the application of the safeguards provided for under the Agreement. In implementing these arrangements, the Parties to the Agreement shall be guided by the following principles:

- (a) the need for ABACC and the Agency each to reach its own independent conclusions;
- (b) the need to co-ordinate to the extent possible the activities of ABACC and the Agency for the optimum implementation of this Agreement, and in particular to avoid unnecessary duplication of ABACC's safeguards;
- (c) when performing their activities, ABACC and the Agency shall work jointly, wherever feasible, in accordance with compatible safeguards criteria of the two organizations; and
- (d) the need to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets.

Article 2

In the implementation of the Agreement, the Agency shall accord to the States Parties and to ABACC treatment not less favourable than the treatment it accords to States and regional systems of verification with a level of functional independence and technical effectiveness comparable to that of ABACC.

Article 3

ABACC shall collect the information on facilities and on nuclear material outside facilities to be provided to the Agency under the Agreement on the basis of the Agency's design information questionnaire annexed to the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 4

ABACC and the Agency shall each carry out the examination of design information provided for in Article 44(a) to (f) of the Agreement and shall include the results thereof in the Subsidiary Arrangements. The verification of design information provided for in Article 46 of the Agreement shall be carried out by the Agency in co-operation with ABACC.

Article 5

In addition to the information referred to in Article 3 of this Protocol, ABACC shall also transmit information on the inspection methods which it proposes to use, including estimates of its inspection efforts for the routine inspection activities for facilities and material balance areas outside facilities.

Article 6

The preparation of the Subsidiary Arrangements shall be the joint responsibility of ABACC, the Agency and the State Party concerned.

Article 7

ABACC shall collect reports from the States Parties based on records kept by the operators, keep centralized accounts on the basis of these reports and proceed with the technical and accounting control and analysis of the information received.

Article 8

Upon completion of the tasks referred to in Article 7 of this Protocol ABACC shall, on a monthly basis, produce and provide the Agency with the inventory change reports within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 9

Further, ABACC shall transmit to the Agency the material balance reports and physical inventory listings with the frequency and form specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 10

The form and format of reports referred to in Articles 8 and 9 of this Protocol, as agreed between ABACC and the Agency, shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and shall be compatible with those used in the general practice of the Agency.

Article 11

The routine inspection activities of ABACC and of the Agency, including, to the extent feasible, the inspections referred to in Article 82 of the Agreement, shall be co-ordinated pursuant to the provisions of Articles 12 to 19 of this Protocol and to the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 12

Subject to Articles 77 and 78 of the Agreement, account shall also be taken of the inspection activities carried out by ABACC in determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of the Agency inspections in respect of each facility.

Article 13

Inspection effort under the Agreement for each facility shall be determined by the use of the criteria set forth in Article 79 of the Agreement. Such inspection effort, expressed as agreed estimates of the actual inspection effort to be applied, shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements, together with the descriptions of verification approaches and the scope of inspections to be carried out by ABACC and by the Agency. These estimates shall constitute, under normal operating conditions and under the conditions set out below, the actual inspection effort at each facility under the Agreement:

- (a) the continued validity of the information on the SCCC provided for in Article 35 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements;
- (b) the continued validity of the information provided to the Agency in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol;
- (c) the continued provision by ABACC of the reports pursuant to Articles 62 and 63, 65 to 67 and 69 to 71 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements;
- (d) the continued application of the co-ordination arrangements for inspections pursuant to Articles 11 to 19 of this Protocol, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
- (e) the application by ABACC of its inspection effort with respect to the facility, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, pursuant to this Article.

Article 14

The general scheduling and planning of the inspections under the Agreement, including arrangements for the presence of ABACC and Agency inspectors during the performance of inspections under this Agreement, shall be established in co-operation between ABACC and the Agency, taking into account the scheduling of the Agency's other safeguards activities in the region.

Article 15

The technical procedures in general for each type of facility and for individual facilities shall be compatible with those of the Agency and shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, in particular with respect to:

- (a) the determination of techniques for random selection of statistical samples;
- (b) the checking and identification of standards;
- (c) containment and surveillance measures; and
- (d) verification measures.

ABACC and the Agency shall consult and identify in advance the containment and surveillance measures and the verification measures to be applied in each individual facility until the time the Subsidiary Arrangements enter into force. Such measures shall similarly be compatible with those of the Agency.

Article 16

ABACC shall transmit to the Agency its inspection reports for all ABACC inspections performed under the Agreement.

Article 17

The samples of nuclear material for ABACC and the Agency shall be drawn from the same randomly selected items and shall be taken together, except when ABACC does not require samples.

Article 18

The frequency of physical inventories to be taken by facility operators and to be verified for safeguards purposes shall be in accordance with the requirements of the relevant Facility Attachment.

Article 19

- (a) With a view to facilitating the application of the Agreement and of this Protocol, a Liaison Committee shall be established, composed of representatives of ABACC, of the States Parties and of the Agency.
- (b) The Committee shall meet at least once a year:
- (i) to review, in particular, the performance of the co-ordination arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including agreed estimates of inspection efforts;
 - (ii) to examine the development of safeguards methods and techniques; and
 - (iii) to consider any questions which have been referred to it by the Sub-Committee referred to in paragraph (c).
- (c) The Committee may appoint a Sub-Committee to meet periodically to discuss outstanding safeguards implementation issues arising from the application of safeguards under this Agreement. Any questions which cannot be settled by the Sub-Committee will be referred to the Liaison Committee.
- (d) Without prejudice to urgent actions which might be required under the Agreement, should problems arise in the application of Article 13 of this Protocol, in particular when the Agency considers that the conditions specified therein have not been met, the Committee or the Sub-Committee shall meet as soon as possible in order to assess the situation and to discuss the measures to be taken. If a problem cannot be settled, the Committee may make appropriate proposals to the Parties, in particular with the view to modifying the estimates of inspection efforts for routine inspection activities.

DONE at Vienna , on the thirteenth day of December 1991 ,
in quadruplicate, in the English language.

For the REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA:

For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY:

For the FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL:

For ABACC:

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1119
22 January 1992

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 1992 session
and
Programme of Work for the Conference on Disarmament

(Adopted at its 606th plenary meeting on 21 January 1992)

The Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical Weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1992 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Chemical Weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Programme of Work

In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament also adopts the following programme of work for its 1992 session:

| | |
|---|---|
| 21-31 January | Adoption of the agenda, establishment of subsidiary bodies and their mandates, decision on participation of non-member States, and statements on all items; |
| 3-14 February | Statements on all items, and informal presidential consultations on outstanding matters; |
| 17 February - 27 March) 11 May - 26 June) 20 July - 14 August) | Statements on all items, and supervision of work in subsidiary bodies; |
| 17 August - 3 September | Final statements and consideration and adoption of Report. |

In accordance with rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure, the following Member States shall assume the Presidency of the Conference during the 1992 session as indicated below:

- (a) Yugoslavia from 21 January to 16 February;
- (b) Zaire from 17 February to 15 March;
- (c) Algeria from 16 March to 24 May, including the recess between the first and the second part of the annual session;
- (d) Argentina from 25 May to 21 June;
- (e) Australia from 22 June to 9 August, including the recess between the second and third part of the annual session; and
- (f) Belgium from 10 August to 3 September and the recess until the 1993 session of the Conference.

The Conference shall hold two plenary meetings a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 10 a.m. during the following periods: 21-31 January, 23-27 March, 22-26 June and 10-21 August. For the remaining 18 weeks of the annual session, only one plenary shall be scheduled every week, preferably on Thursdays. Flexible provisions shall, however, be made to allow for a second plenary.

The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning and will report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on that subject.

The Conference will continue its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 12 and 13 of its last annual report (CD/1111) with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1992 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States and the need to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference and will inform accordingly the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Meetings of the subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 2 to 13 March 1992.

In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1119/Add.1
27 May 1992

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 1992 session
and
Programme of Work for the Conference on Disarmament

Addendum

Page 2

1. Add to the 1992 agenda of the Conference on Disarmament the following item and footnote:

9. Transparency in armaments*

2. Change item 9 in CD/1119 to item 10.

* The Conference has included this item in its 1992 agenda in conformity with its decision taken at the 622nd plenary meeting on 26 May 1992 (CD/1150).

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1120
22 January 1992

Original: ENGLISH

Decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the 1992 session

(Adopted at the 606th plenary meeting on 21 January 1992)

The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind General Assembly resolution 46/35 C, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its Rules of Procedure, for the duration of the 1992 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to continue and intensify, as a priority task, the negotiations on a multilateral Convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction with a view to achieving a final agreement on the Convention during 1992.

The Conference further decides to appoint Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1992 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1121
22 January 1992

Original: ENGLISH

Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(Adopted at the 606th plenary meeting on 21 January 1992)

The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1992 session an ad hoc committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The ad hoc committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1992 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1122
22 January 1992

Original: ENGLISH

Decision on the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee
on Radiological Weapons

(Adopted at the 606th plenary meeting on 21 January 1992)

The Conference decides to re-establish, for the duration of its 1992 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1992 session.

GE.92-60131/2786H

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1123
31 January 1992

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE
STATEMENT MADE ON 29 JANUARY 1992 BY B.N. YELTSIN, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ON RUSSIA'S POLICY
IN THE FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION

I have the honour to transmit to you the statement made on
29 January 1992 by B.N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, on
Russia's policy in the field of arms limitation and reduction.

I would request you to make the necessary arrangements to have the text
of this statement issued as an official document of the Conference on
Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all States members of the
Conference as well as States participating in but not members of the
Conference.

(Signed) S. Batsanov
Ambassador

Statement of 29 January 1992 by B.N. Yeltsin, President of
the Russian Federation, on Russia's policy in the field of
arms limitation and reduction

Citizens of Russia,

My address today is devoted to a problem of vital importance.

It concerns Russia's practical steps in the field of arms limitation and reduction.

Our position of principle is that nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction in the world must be eliminated.

This must, of course, be done gradually and on a parity basis.

In this vitally important matter we are open to cooperation with all States and international organizations, as well as within the framework of the United Nations.

The measures I am going to speak about today have been prepared on the basis of continuing interaction with the States members of the Commonwealth and are consistent with agreements reached at the meetings of their leaders in Minsk, Alma-Ata and Moscow.

Russia regards itself as the legal successor of the USSR from the standpoint of responsibility for the fulfilment of international obligations.

We confirm all obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements in the field of arms limitations and disarmament that were signed by the Soviet Union and that are in effect at the present time.

The leadership of Russia reaffirms its commitment to the policy of radical reductions in nuclear weapons, and of ensuring the maximum safety of nuclear weapons and all installations connected with their development, production and operation.

Russia is making a proposal to create an international agency for ensuring the reduction of nuclear weapons.

In subsequent stages, the agency could gradually bring the entire nuclear cycle under its control, from the production of uranium, deuterium and tritium to the dumping of nuclear waste.

The measures we are taking in the sphere of disarmament are not in any way undermining the defence capability of Russia and the States members of the Commonwealth. We are simply seeking to achieve reasonable minimum sufficiency as regards nuclear and conventional weapons.

This is our guiding principle in the creation of armed forces.

Realization of this principle will make it possible to save considerable resources, which will be used to meet civilian needs and to implement reforms.

Conditions are now favourable for taking major new steps towards arms reductions. Some of them we are taking unilaterally, and others on the basis of reciprocity.

The following are the steps we have taken and intend to take as a matter of priority:

First. In the sphere of strategic offensive weapons. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms has been submitted to the Parliament of the Russian Federation for ratification. The ratification process has also been initiated in the United States. In my opinion, this key instrument should be brought into force as soon as possible, and should also be endorsed by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Pending the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, Russia has taken a number of major steps aimed at reducing the strategic arsenal:

Some 600 ground-based and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles, or nearly 1,250 nuclear warheads, have been removed from stand-by alert.

130 silo launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles have been eliminated or are being prepared for liquidation.

Six nuclear submarines have been prepared for the dismantling of their missile launchers.

Several strategic weapons development and modernization programmes have been cancelled.

Strategic nuclear weapons, stationed on Ukrainian territory, will be dismantled earlier than planned. The relevant agreements on this matter have already been concluded.

I want to emphasize that we are not pursuing unilateral disarmament. The United States is taking parallel steps in a gesture of goodwill.

It is now possible and necessary to move further along this road.

The following decisions have been reached recently:

The production of heavy TU-160 and TU-95 bombers will be stopped.

The production of existing types of long-distance airborne cruise missiles will be halted. On a mutual basis with the United States, we are prepared to renounce the development of new types of such missiles.

The production of existing types of long-distance sea-based nuclear missiles will be stopped and new types of such missiles will not be developed. In addition, we are prepared - on a bilateral basis - to scrap all existing long-distance sea-based nuclear cruise missiles.

We will not hold exercises involving large numbers of heavy bombers. This means that no more than 30 such bombers will take part in any one exercise.

The number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles on combat patrol has been halved and will be further reduced. We are prepared, on a bilateral basis, to stop using such submarines for combat patrols.

Within a three-year period - instead of within seven years as planned - Russia will reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons on stand-by alert to agreed levels.

We will thus reach the level that is envisaged in the relevant treaty four years earlier.

If mutual understanding is reached with the United States, we could achieve this level even sooner.

We believe that the strategic offensive weapons that will be left in Russia and the United States after the reductions should not be aimed at United States and Russian targets respectively.

Important talks with Western leaders will be held in the next few days. Proposals on further deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons, to the level of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on each side, have been prepared.

We hope that the other nuclear-weapon Powers - China, the United Kingdom and France - will join the process of genuine nuclear disarmament.

Second. Tactical nuclear weapons. Major steps to reduce these weapons have already been taken, in parallel with the United States.

We recently halted production of nuclear warheads for ground-based tactical missiles, as well as nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines. Stockpiles of such nuclear charges will be eliminated.

Russia is eliminating one-third of all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and one-half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles. Measures to this end have already been taken.

We also intend to reduce stockpiles of tactical nuclear ammunition for the air force by one-half.

The remaining tactical nuclear weapons for the air force could be removed from front-line (tactical) air force units on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, and deployed at bases for centralized stockpiling.

Third. Anti-missile defence and space. Russia reiterates its commitment to the ABM treaty, which is an important factor in maintaining strategic stability in the world.

We are ready to continue impartial discussion of the United States proposal on the limitation on non-nuclear anti-ballistic missile systems. Our position of principle is well known, namely, that, we will support this approach if it strengthens world strategic stability and Russia's security.

I also declare that Russia is prepared to eliminate, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, existing anti-satellite systems and to work out an agreement on the complete prohibition of weapons specially designed to destroy satellites.

We are ready to develop and then to create and jointly operate a global defence system in place of the SDI system.

Fourth. Nuclear weapons tests and the production of fissionable material for military purposes. Russia emphatically favours the banning of all nuclear weapons tests.

We are abiding by the year-long moratorium on nuclear explosions, declared in October 1991, and hope that the other nuclear-weapon Powers will also refrain from conducting nuclear tests. A climate of mutual restraint would promote agreement on the complete renunciation of such tests. Reduction of the number of tests in stages is a possibility.

In the interest of eventually attaining that goal, we propose to the United States the resumption of bilateral talks on further reductions in nuclear weapons tests.

Russia intends to continue carrying out the programme to halt production of weapons-grade plutonium. Industrial reactors making weapons-grade plutonium will be shut down by the year 2000 - some of them even as early as 1993. We confirm the proposal to the United States that agreement should be reached on the supervised termination of production of fissionable material for weapons.

Fifth. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Russia confirms its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those it assumed as its depositary. We are counting on the very rapid accession to the Treaty of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as other countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States as non-nuclear States.

Russia declares its wholehearted support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is in favour of strengthening the effectiveness of its safeguards.

We are taking further steps to prevent our exports from spreading weapons of mass destruction.

Steps are at present being taken with a view to Russia's adoption of full-scale IAEA safeguards as a condition for its peaceful nuclear exports.

Russia intends as a matter of principle to accede to the international regime of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology as an equal participant. We support the efforts of the so-called Australian Group on monitoring chemical exports.

The Russian Federation plans to adopt domestic legislation to regulate Russian exports of dual-application material, equipment and technologies that can be used to create nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as combat missiles.

A State system to monitor these exports is being created. We will establish the closest cooperation and coordination between all member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States on these issues.

Russia supports the guiding principles on arms trade approved in London in October 1991.

Sixth. Conventional weapons. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has been submitted for ratification to the Russian Parliament. Other States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States whose territory is covered by this Treaty also attach importance to its ratification.

Russia confirms its intention to reduce, together with other Commonwealth countries, the armed forces of the former USSR by 700,000 in terms of real numbers.

Russia attaches great significance to the current talks in Vienna on reduction of personnel and confidence-building measures, as well as to new talks on security and cooperation in Europe.

These talks might become a permanent all-European forum in the quest for ways of creating a collective all-European security system.

Russia, in cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan and Tajikistan, will try to reach agreement during the talks with China on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in the border area.

It was decided not to hold in 1992 major military exercises with the participation of more than 13,000 military personnel, not only in the European part, but also in the Asian part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

We also hope that it will be possible to sign an agreement on the "Open Skies" regime in the near future.

Seventh. Chemical weapons. We favour the early conclusion (in 1992) of a global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. A convention of this nature is required as a means of reliably blocking the way to the acquisition of chemical weapons without infringing the lawful economic interests of its signatories.

Russia is committed to the 1990 Agreement, reached with the United States, on the non-production and elimination of chemical weapons. The time-table for the elimination of such weapons envisaged by the Agreement calls for some correction, however.

All the chemical weapons of the former USSR are deployed on the territory of Russia, which is assuming responsibility for their elimination. We are preparing a relevant State programme on this matter.

We are open to cooperation on this issue with the United States and the other parties concerned.

Eighth. Biological weapons. Russia favours the strict implementation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the creation - on a multilateral basis - of appropriate verification machinery, and the implementation of confidence-building and transparency measures.

Since implementation of the Convention is lagging, I declare that Russia withdraws its reservations concerning the possibility of using biological weapons as a response. These reservations were made by the USSR to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

Ninth. Defence budget. Russia will continue to make drastic cuts in its defence budget, orienting it towards meeting social goals.

In 1990-1991 defence spending in comparable prices was already reduced by 20 per cent; this figure includes purchases of weapons and technology, which were cut by 30 per cent.

In 1992 we plan to reduce military spending by another 10 per cent (in 1991 prices). The volume of arms purchases will be nearly halved this year as compared with 1991.

Tenth. Conversion. Russia welcomes and favours increasing international cooperation in the field of military conversion.

For our part, we will encourage such cooperation by according "most favoured treatment" and offering tax advantages to appropriate joint projects.

Citizens of Russia,

I have just described the action plan of the Russian Federation on matters of arms reduction and disarmament. I hope that it will receive your support and be appreciated by all peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

I am convinced that it fully reflects the interests of our country and other countries of the world. If it is carried out, our lives will become not only more tranquil and safer, but also more prosperous.

A few hours ago President George Bush of the United States addressed the American people proposing radical cuts in nuclear potentials and the strengthening of stability measures in relations between our countries.

CD/1123

page 8

We have held preliminary consultations on these matters with each other and are at present engaged in a dialogue on the practical implementation of this policy, and of the initiatives proposed. The positions of both sides are quite close.

This is the guarantee of success on the road to the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons.

Thank you for your attention.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1124
11 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF PERU ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
MEASURES TO PROMOTE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BETWEEN PERU
AND ECUADOR

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the draft Agreement on measures to promote confidence and security between Peru and Ecuador delivered by Mr. Alberto Fujimori, the President of Peru, to Mr. Rodrigo Borja, the President of Ecuador, on 10 January 1992 during his State visit to the city of Quito.

This draft Agreement was accompanied by a memorandum relating to the final execution of the demarcation of the outstanding sections of the common frontier, pursuant to the Peace, Friendship and Boundaries Protocol of 1942 and the Braz Dias de Aguiar Decision, a draft Treaty on trade and navigation between the Governments of the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Ecuador, and a draft Agreement on frontier integration, also between the two countries.

I should be very grateful if you, Sir, in accordance with the established practice, would arrange for this text to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all delegations, including those of the member States and of the non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed):

Oswaldo de Rivero
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**DRAFT AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO PROMOTE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY BETWEEN PERU AND ECUADOR**

The Governments of the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Ecuador,

Prompted by a desire to conduct their relations in a spirit of mutual respect, cooperation and integration and a firm resolve to find means of increasing the confidence and understanding of their peoples, and

Convinced that this is a prerequisite in their fundamental task of endeavouring to ensure the security and development of their peoples,

Hereby sign the present Agreement on Measures to Promote Mutual Confidence and Security between Peru and Ecuador:

Article 1. Measures shall be adopted to promote mutual confidence and to develop a concept of security within an adequate framework consistent with the mutual interest in strengthening the friendship and growing cooperation between both nations.

Article 2. To this end talks shall be held alternately in Peru and in Ecuador between their respective armed forces, at the Commander-General level or at the level of their representatives, to be attended by advisers from their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and any other persons that may be deemed necessary.

Article 3. In order to achieve an effective and comprehensive inter-agency rapprochement which will make possible greater understanding between the armed forces of both countries at the various levels, the armed forces of Peru and Ecuador and their respective intelligence services undertake to carry out, annually or every six months as they agree, programmes of activities which may consist of:

(a) Bilateral talks between the respective national intelligence services, both on the military factors of intelligence and on its other components which give it a comprehensive character;

(b) Bilateral regional intelligence talks between G-2, N-2 and A-2 in the military frontier regions;

(c) Exchanges of armed forces personnel on courses and training cruises, on the occasion of the anniversaries of historic events and for the purpose of other professional activities;

(d) Meetings of an official, professional and/or social nature between the commanders of frontier garrisons and naval zones;

(e) Mutual invitations to participate in events of a cultural, artistic, professional and/or sporting nature;

(f) Exchanges of magazines and publications of professional and/or social interest to the armed forces;

(g) Mutual provision of accommodation at the recreational facilities of the armed forces institutes, to encourage tourism by military personnel of both countries;

(h) Visits to firms producing military equipment, munitions factories, geographical institutes, aeronautical plants etc.;

(i) Mutual exchanges of health and hospital services at the facilities of the armed forces institutes;

(j) Exchanges of information on the social security and health systems for servicemen in each country;

(k) Logistical assistance and exchanges of information on the operation and maintenance of scientific research stations and other facilities in the Antarctic.

Article 4. In addition, both armed forces undertake to implement measures relating to the control of land, air, sea and river space in the frontier regions in order to prevent possible misunderstandings that might lead to incidents of a military nature, thereby lessening the adverse consequences that might arise therefrom.

Article 5. These measures shall, inter alia, comprise compliance with the standards of conduct for observation posts and garrisons on the frontier between Peru and Ecuador, in accordance with the current list of agreements concluded between the armies of both countries. The provisions of these agreements are summarized below:

A. General provisions

(a) The armies of Peru and Ecuador have drawn up the present set of provisions to avert unnecessary incidents, and to strengthen the links of peace and friendship between the two countries.

(b) This set of provisions shall be binding on all frontier units.

(c) Unit chiefs shall be the sole persons responsible for circulating these provisions; to this end they shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all personnel under their command are familiar with them and shall pay special attention to, and exercise strict supervision over, their execution by observation posts.

(d) Any failure to comply with the present provisions which gives rise to a frontier incident shall be the exclusive responsibility of the commands in question.

B. Standards of conduct

In the event of a chance encounter between patrols or individuals, the following formal actions shall be taken:

(a) There shall be no immediate recourse to firearms;

(b) Mutual identification shall be effected;

(c) The reasons for the presence of the patrol or person in question in that place shall be ascertained;

(d) A friendly act shall be undertaken (offer of cigarettes, invitation to eat a snack, start of a conversation, etc.);

(e) The patrols shall abandon the sector immediately;

(f) The incident shall be reported to the respective command.

C. Fraternization activities

With the aim of achieving harmony and good relations in the frontier zone:

(a) Units shall as far as possible provide each other with logistical support in direct proportion to the resources available and in a friendly and spontaneous manner, in accordance with the traditional spirit of fraternity between military personnel of the two nations, when special or unforeseen circumstances so require, as in the case of: epidemics, natural disasters, accidents of any kind, lack of medical services or communications, etc.;

(b) Invitations shall be extended to participate in sporting and recreational events;

(c) There shall be exchanges of social visits on such occasions as changes in command and the name days of senior commanders;

(d) The observation units and/or posts shall in principle be under the command of officers; if they are not, their appointed commanders shall be qualified non-commissioned officers, in order to ensure that any incident may be resolved with common sense and problems may be avoided;

(e) On the national days of Ecuador and Peru (10 August and 28 July respectively), observation units and/or posts shall present greetings in a spirit of fraternity.

D. Facilities for river vessels or aircraft

Such facilities shall be provided when, owing to an emergency or unfamiliarity with the sector in question, river vessels or aircraft have to moor or land in military garrisons; when the emergency is over, they may proceed to their destination and the respective commands shall be informed.

E. Training exercises

(a) Forty-eight hours' notice of training and/or artillery exercises shall be given to the command of the nearest major unit;

(b) Observation units and/or posts shall give 48 hours' notice of patrols and training exercises, with details of the sector to be used, dates and approximate duration.

F. Military courtesy

Instructions shall be given concerning the conduct of the personnel of military frontier garrisons; military courtesy shall be observed at all times.

G. Avoidance of violations of airspace

(a) Flights which entail violations of the airspace of the other country shall be avoided;

(b) In the event of an incursion into the airspace of the other country in the frontier region, the aircraft in question shall not be fired on; the competent command shall be informed of the incident, which shall be resolved through the intelligence headquarters of both countries.

H. Regular cleaning of frontier-markers

(a) Frontier-markers shall be kept clean at all times; their original characteristics shall not be modified and they shall not be defaced by writing or other acts injurious to the dignity of the neighbouring country;

(b) For the purpose of searching for or locating frontier-markers of which records have been lost, the commanders of observation units or posts shall conclude prior agreements for the purpose of locating the markers through joint action, in all cases in conjunction with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries. The commanders of observation units or posts shall not be authorized to establish any formal claim relating to the location of the markers, since this shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Joint Demarcation Commission.

I. Frontier incidents or problems

In the event of a frontier incident or problem, only official communiqués shall be issued, in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs after discussions between the Chiefs of Intelligence of the two armies.

J. Patrol activities

The commanders of observation units or posts shall ensure that, in the course of patrol activities, the members of the patrol carry a signal pistol and/or whistle as a precautionary means of communication (three shots and/or three long whistle blasts at intervals of 5 to 10 minutes).

K. Activities connected with changes in command in the frontier regions

(a) Whenever there is a change in the command of an observation unit and/or post, combat unit or major unit, official greetings shall be exchanged;

(b) Whenever there is a change in the command of an observation unit and/or post, a meeting (to be known as a concord, peace and agreements meeting) shall be held; at this meeting, which shall take place at the nearest frontier-marker, the procedures specified in the relevant bilateral agreements shall be read out.

- L. Sick or seriously injured personnel requiring urgent medical treatment which cannot be provided in one of the countries shall be evacuated to the territory of the neighbouring country
- M. Mutual assistance shall be given in the supply of medicines where needed in order to combat epidemics or when supplies of patent medicines have been exhausted as a result of heavy use
- N. Technical aspects of river and sea navigation

(a) Navigation shall be effected between river ports and shall be permitted in the cases provided for by law and in conformity with the international treaties in force;

(b) Any vessel navigating in the maritime waters of Peru shall have the right of innocent passage. ("Innocent passage" means the transit of foreign vessels through jurisdictional waters for commercial or scientific purposes or for purposes of tourism or goodwill visits. It also applies to warships; submarines shall be required to sail on the surface.)

(c) When a vessel, in the course of its voyage, has well-founded reasons for putting into port, it may make a change of route and enter the nearest port for any of the reasons listed below:

Crew member requiring specialized medical attention;

Lack of supplies;

Presence of enemies, privateers or pirates;

An accident which prevents it from navigating;

Engine damage;

Any other compelling reasons for taking this action;

(d) Since port piloting and river piloting are services of value to safety of navigation, human life and property, harbour-masters shall have at their disposal river/sea pilots, senior river pilots and ordinary river pilots; "port piloting" covers all movements effected in ports, anchoring manoeuvres, coming alongside, berthing and deberthing, and constitutes a continuation of piloting along the course of a river. Port piloting activities shall be effected without interruption at any time of the day or night;

(e) Any vessel that arrives at a river port shall be provided with the requisite port facilities;

(f) In the event of a shipwreck or accident, the vessel shall transmit the following information:

Whether the incident affects safety of navigation;

Situation of the vessel or, if it continues navigating, its port or place of destination.

To this end bilateral consultations shall be held in order to establish support systems for the conduct of joint rescue and salvage operations where necessary.

And to this end, a search and rescue plan shall be formulated.

The use of personnel and organized facilities in order to provide assistance promptly and effectively to persons in danger shall be coordinated, with the aim of avoiding or reducing the loss of human life resulting from shipwrecks or accidents.

Every vessel shall be obliged to provide assistance to any person in danger or lost overboard, provided that it is able to do so without serious risk to the vessel and persons on board.

Article 6. The Bipartite Commission on Measures to Promote Mutual Confidence and Security between Peru and Ecuador is hereby established as an institutional decision-making body responsible for the execution of the present Agreement.

Article 7. The members of the above-mentioned Commission shall be appointed by the Executive Authority of both countries.

Article 8. The Commission referred to in article 5 shall in turn form an integral part of the Bipartite Commission for Friendship, Cooperation and Integration between Peru and Ecuador, the supervisory body for all the mechanisms established to promote cooperation and integration between the two countries.

Article 9. The present Agreement shall enter into force after having been signed and ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective legal procedures.

Article 10. The present Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. It may be formally denounced by either of the Parties through a written communication to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the other Party giving not less than six months' notice.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1125
14 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the
agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled
"Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"

(Adopted at the 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992)

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1992 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1126
17 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE HEADS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION ON THE COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, "THE MENDOZA AGREEMENT"

We have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, known as the "Mendoza Agreement", signed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in Mendoza, Argentina, on 5 September 1991, to which the Republics of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay have acceded.

We should be very grateful if you, Sir, in accordance with the established practice, would arrange for this text to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all delegations, including those of the member States and States with observer status.

(Signed) Roberto García Moritán
Ambassador
Special Mission of the
Argentine Republic
on Disarmament

(Signed) Celso L.N. Amorim
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Brazil

(Signed) Ernesto Tironi Barrios
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Chile

JOINT DECLARATION ON THE COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MENDOZA AGREEMENT

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL,

CONVINCED THAT THE COMPLETE BANNING OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES,

DETERMINED TO CONSOLIDATE THE REGION AS AN AREA OF PEACE AND COOPERATION FREE
FROM THE SCOURGE OF THESE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,

CONFIRMING THE RESPECTIVE UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS ON NON-POSSESSION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS OPPORTUNELY MADE BY THE THREE COUNTRIES,

AGREEING ON THE NEED TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF SUCH WEAPONS THROUGH A
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION AT THE DISARMAMENT
CONFERENCE WHICH WILL COMPLETELY PROHIBIT CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR
PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS, AND URGING ALL STATES PRODUCING OR POSSESSING SUCH
WEAPONS TO ACCEDE TO IT,

CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES DECIDED ON BY THE
STATES PARTIES TO THE 1972 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,
PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, WHOSE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE IS TO BE HELD IN
GENEVA FROM 9 TO 27 SEPTEMBER NEXT,

HEREBY DECLARE THE FOLLOWING:

1. THEIR FULL UNDERTAKING NOT TO DEVELOP, NOT TO PRODUCE, NOT TO ACQUIRE IN
ANY WAY, NOT TO STOCKPILE OR RETAIN, NOT TO TRANSFER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
AND NOT TO USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS;
2. UNTIL THE FUTURE CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ENTERS INTO FORCE, THEY
DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO STUDY IN ADVANCE AND JOINTLY ANALYSE ALL
MECHANISMS NECESSARY TO ENSURE FULFILMENT OF THE UNDERTAKING MADE;
3. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE, AND
IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEIR INTENTION TO ESTABLISH IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES THE APPROPRIATE INSPECTION MECHANISMS FOR THOSE
SUBSTANCES DEFINED AS PRECURSORS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS;
4. THEIR DETERMINATION TO COOPERATE CLOSELY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE
CONCLUSION OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AND TO SIGN IT SIMULTANEOUSLY AS ORIGINAL PARTIES;
5. THEIR RIGHT TO USE ALL PEACEFUL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS FOR
THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOR THE WELFARE OF THEIR
PEOPLES;

6. THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION WILL CREATE AMONG THE STATES PARTIES A FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL TRUST WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE SUBSTANTIALY TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE EXCHANGE OF, INTER ALIA, CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES;

7. THEIR INTENTION TO MAKE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER WAYS OF STRENGTHENING ITS VERIFICATION MECHANISMS;

8. THEIR HOPE THAT OTHER STATES OF THE REGION WILL ACCEDE TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

SIGNED IN MENDOZA (ARGENTINA) ON 5 SEPTEMBER 1991.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHILE

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE
REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1127 /Corr.1
CD/CW/WP.384 /Corr.1
26 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

CHINA

Some information on discovered chemical weapons abandoned in China by a foreign State

Corrigendum

1. Page 2, Section II, paragraph 2, penultimate line:

Replace the term "phenyl cyanoethyl ketone" by the word "chloroacetophenone".

2. Page 4, Section III, paragraph 4, penultimate line:

Replace the word "Quilogou" by the word "Qiuligou".

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1127
CD/CW/WP.384
18 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE

CHINA

Some information on discovered chemical weapons abandoned in China by a foreign State

One of the most urgent tasks in the negotiations on chemical weapons is to resolve, in a just and thorough way, the issue of chemical weapons abandoned on the territory of one State by another State. In response to requests and proposals by some delegations, the Chinese delegation is now authorized to provide the relevant information in the sections below with a view to promoting mutual understanding and facilitating the work of the Conference and its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

As is known to all, the Chinese people have in the past been victims of the use of chemical weapons by a foreign State. Even today, the chemical weapons abandoned by that foreign State still cause havoc and constitute a grave threat.

After nearly half a century, such weapons continue to be discovered in China. They have done great harm to the safety of the Chinese people and their properties and ecology. As the foreign State concerned has provided no information on the chemical weapons it abandoned in China, it is impossible to take the necessary precautionary measures when such weapons are discovered, and many injuries have occurred as a result.

Preliminary statistics reveal that direct victims alone have numbered more than 2,000. Furthermore, the danger posed by such abandoned chemical weapons to the natural environment and to the safety of human beings is increasing. For example, the lives of more than 2,000 students and teachers of Gaocheng High School (Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province) are now threatened by such abandoned chemical weapons discovered on their campus. The normal teaching activities in that school have since been seriously disturbed. In another instance, large amounts of chemical weapons were discovered in the Dunhua region of Jilin Province. They are situated near the upper reaches of the Haerbaling Reservoir. Most of the weapons, manufactured years ago, are

now in a badly rusted and eroded state. Any significant leakage will undoubtedly endanger the lives of the local population and have disastrous consequences for their property and the environment. Such instances have been a source of bitter grievance and serious concern for the Chinese people.

I. Quantities of chemical munitions and agents abandoned in China by a foreign State

1. Quantities of chemical munitions

(1) Discovered but not yet destroyed: approximately 2 million pieces (as most of the munitions are still buried, the exact figure has yet to be verified after excavation).

(2) Destroyed or given preliminary treatment by China: more than 300,000 pieces.

2. Quantities of toxic chemical agents

(1) Discovered but not yet completely destroyed: approximately 100 tons.

(2) Destroyed by China: more than 20 tons

II. Types of discovered chemical munitions and toxic agents abandoned in China by a foreign State

1. Types of chemical munitions

(1) 150 mm chemical shells: shells containing a mustard gas-Lewisite mixture and shells containing diphenylcyanoarsine.

(2) 105 mm chemical shells: shells containing a mustard gas-Lewisite mixture and shells containing diphenylcyanoarsine.

(3) 90 mm chemical mortar shells: mortar shells containing a mustard gas-Lewisite mixture and mortar shells containing diphenylcyanoarsine.

(4) 75 mm phosgene shells: phosgene shells and diphenylcyanoarsine shells.

(5) chemical aerial bombs, 81 mm chemical mortar shells, and chemical munitions of other calibres as well as toxic smoke candles and canisters.

2. Types of toxic agents

Main types of toxic agents include: mustard gas, mustard gas-Lewisite mixture, diphenylcyanoarsine, hydrocyanic acid, phosgene, phenyl cyanoethyl ketone.

III. Geographical distribution of the discovered chemical munitions and agents abandoned in China by a foreign state

1. Locations where chemical munitions and agents have been destroyed or given preliminary treatment by China

(1) Fujin County in Heilongjiang Province: more than 100,000 chemical shells (150, 105, 75, 90 mm).

(2) Shangzhi City in Heilongjiang Province: more than 200,000 chemical shells (150, 105, 75, 90 mm) and more than 1,100 kilograms of toxic agents.

(3) Mudanjiang City in Heilongjiang Province: 4 barrels of mustard gas-Lewisite toxic agents (more than 400 kg) destroyed in 1982 by a chemical process. Others are still buried and have yet to be excavated.

(4) Acheng City in Heilongjiang Province: more than 300 chemical shells and 10 tons of toxic agents.

(5) Changchun City in Jilin Province as well as Shenyang City, Fengcheng County and other places in Liaoning Province: 10.8 tons of various toxic agents destroyed during 1973-1986.

(6) Cities of Taiyuan and Datong in Shanxi Province, Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province, and Bengbu in Anhui Province: more than 10,000 chemical shells (150, 105, 75 mm) completely destroyed by 1988.

2. Locations where the relevant information is available but the chemical munitions have yet to be destroyed

(1) Sunwu County in Heilongjiang Province: 513 chemical shells (150, 105 mm), 4 boxes of toxic smoke canisters, 2 barrels of toxic agents.

(2) Bayan County in Heilongjiang Province: more than 100 chemical shells.

(3) Town of Weijin in the Meihekou region of Jilin Province: 74 tons of mustard gas-Lewisite toxic agents, solidified with lime.

(4) Suburbs of Jilin City in Jilin Province: more than 40 chemical shells (75 mm).

(5) Gaocheng City in Hebei Province: 50 phosgene shells (75 mm).

(6) Hangzhou City in Zhejiang Province: 33 chemical shells (75 mm, types unknown). Others are still buried and have yet to be excavated.

(7) Nanjing City in Jiangsu Province: 4 barrels of mustard gas (originally there were 6 barrels but two of them began leaking and were therefore destroyed in 1990 by a chemical process).

(8) Suburbs of Hohhot City in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region: 3 barrels of mustard gas.

3. Locations where exact quantities of the buried chemical munitions have yet to be verified

(1) Dunhua region of Jilin Province

Local historical documents as well as statements of those who helped to bury or transport munitions reveal that there are more than 1.8 million pieces of chemical munitions in the area. They are mainly chemical shells of 75, 105 and 150 mm and chemical mortar shells of 90 mm, as well as small quantities of chemical aerial bombs and other types of chemical munitions.

(2) Meihekou region of Jilin Province

Chemical munitions abandoned by a foreign State were buried under the railroad tracks near the railway station. They are mainly chemical shells of 75, 105 and 150 mm.

4. Locations where chemical munitions may have been buried, as revealed by preliminary investigations

Harbin, Acheng, and Qiqihaer regions of Heilongjiang Province;

Huichun and Changchun regions as well as Quilogou and Malugou in Dunhua region of Jilin Province.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1128
CD/CW/WP.385
20 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

AUSTRALIA

TRIAL INSPECTION OF A SCHEDULE 3/ "OTHER RELEVANT" FACILITY

Introduction

It has been accepted since the late 1960's that some parts of the civil chemical industry will have to be monitored under the provisions of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to provide the necessary confidence that chemical industry is not involved in the clandestine production of chemical weapons. In particular, the verification of "Non-Production" of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry has been a particular focus of attention.

In Appendix I of the current Rolling Text (CD/1116), there are provisions for on-site inspections of those parts of chemical industry that produce, process or consume chemicals in Schedule 2 (above a specified threshold). Discussions concerning the elaboration of provisions to monitor facilities that produce, process or consume Schedule 3 chemicals are continuing, and indeed have been the focus of much of the work undertaken in Working Group B in 1991.

Within the civil chemical industry, there are many facilities that are not involved in the production, processing or consumption of any of the chemicals in Schedules 1, 2 or 3, and hence not declared under the current provisions of the CWC, that would be capable of producing at least some of those chemicals. In 1991, work was undertaken in developing provisions for routine on-site inspections of these "CW-capable" or "Other Relevant" facilities, and the results of this are contained in Appendix 2 to the current Rolling Text. As well, two recent Working Papers, one By Sweden (CD/1053) and one by a group of eight nations (Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yugoslavia) (CD/348) have offered suggestions on the possible form of on-site inspections at short notice for Schedule 3 and "Other Relevant" facilities.

* * * *

As part of Australia's Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative, a Workshop for Government chemists was held at the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Materials Research Laboratory (MRL) between 26-30 August 1991. One of the activities of this workshop was a Trial Inspection of a Schedule 3 or "Other Relevant" Chemical Facility. One of the objectives of the inspection was to familiarise the participants of the workshop on the possible form of routine qualitative inspections of Schedule 3 and other "Other Relevant" facilities to be carried out under the future CWC.

The Trial Inspection was conducted by Australia. Participants from Brunei, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vanuatu and Vietnam observed the conduct of the inspection.

This inspection is described in the remainder of this working paper.

Objectives of the Inspection

The basic objectives for the verification regime to cover these facilities should be:

- a. to deter the covert production, in chemical industry, of Scheduled chemicals which may then be used for CW purposes; and
- b. to provide assurance to States Parties that other States Parties are not using their chemical industry in violation of the CWC.

In our view, these objectives may best be realised for Schedule 3 or Other Relevant Facilities, by using the plantsite as the unit of declaration and inspection. In order for this inspection regime to be both effective and cost-effective, the inspection of the plantsite would need to be carried out in a reasonably short time, preferably within one working day, without a prior "facility agreement".

With this in mind, the trial inspection was conducted with a view to:

- . investigate the feasibility of inspecting a chemical plantsite without a previously agreed "facility agreement";
- . determine whether the activities observed at the inspected plantsite were consistent with the information provided by the company during an initial briefing to the inspection team;
- . look for any unusual features that could be suggestive of the company violating the CWC; and

- . check for the presence of any undeclared Scheduled chemicals
 - and if present, check whether the presence of that chemical was consistent with legitimate activities below the reporting threshold.

Conduct of Inspection

Briefing by Company Staff

Upon arrival at the site, the inspection team was given a brief history of the company and a general outline of its current activities by the Managing Director of the company.

The production manager then gave a technical description of the raw materials, the finished products, the manufacturing processes used on the site, using a site plan as a guide. The inspection team were advised that the company consumed more than 30 tonnes of Triethanolamine per year. Triethanolamine is currently listed in a footnote to Schedule 3 in CD/1116.

Depending on the ultimate placement of Triethanolamine, this facility may be either a Schedule 3 or "Other Relevant" facility under the future CWC.

In summary, the team was told that:

- . the site covered an area of approximately two hectares;
- . approximately 120 staff were employed at the site;
- . the facility undertook both formulation and chemical reactions (acid-base); and
- . at the time of the inspection there were 3.2 tonnes of Triethanolamine on the plantsite.

In response to a question from the inspection team leader, the production manager stated that there was no Thionyl Chloride at the site.

Development of the Inspection Plan

Making use of the site plan and the information that had been provided by the company officials during the briefing, the inspection team (team leader and chemical engineer) then developed an inspection plan, in consultation with the company technical manager and production manager.

- . The development of the plan took 15-20 minutes.

It was agreed that the inspection would focus on the Therapeutical Plant, the Main Production Area, the "Former Chlorination Plant" and the centralised Waste Effluent plant. The company agreed that company staff would take samples for the inspection team from quality control sampling points or other agreed sampling points, provided the analysis methods used by the team were designed to indicate the presence or

absence of Scheduled chemicals and provided no information on chemicals that are not relevant to the CWC. The company also agreed that the team could use a portable ion mobility spectrometer vapour detector (Chemical Agent Monitor, CAM) to monitor for the presence or absence of vapours of certain Schedule 1 chemicals.

It was further agreed that the inspection plan would be flexible, allowing the inspection team to walk through other parts of the plantsite, but that the inspection team would confine itself to the negative proof approach and would be no more intrusive than necessary in order to satisfy itself that the company was not involved in activities that would be in violation of the CWC.

The inspection team were also advised of the safety regulations in operation at the plantsite.

Details of the Inspection

1. Therapeutical Plant

The inspection team walked from the reception area to the Therapeutical Plant and observed the operations within this plant.

The Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) was used to monitor the effluent air from this plant.

A random sample was requested from the raw materials storage area of this plant.

Result - The Therapeutical Plant was observed to be a modern production area operating at positive pressure - the team's chemical engineer commented that the plant could readily be converted to operate at negative pressure. There was no CAM response, and the analysis of the sample did not indicate the presence of any Scheduled chemicals.

2. Main Production Area

The inspection team walked through the "Main Production Area (MPA)", observed the operations within the MPA, requested a random sample from one of the several Stainless Steel reaction vessels, and requested a random sample from one of the product storage tanks.

Result - It was observed that there was no forced or induced ventilation in the MPA. The workers were wearing protective hats and corrosive-resistant gloves, but there were no signs of any gas masks or other protective clothing.

3. Dry Powder Area

The inspection team walked through and observed the operations being conducted in the "Dry Powder Area".

Result - The team observed nothing that it considered relevant to the objectives of the inspection in this area, and did not request that any samples be taken for analysis.

4. Former Chlorination Plant

The inspection team inspected the "Former Chlorination Plant", observed any operations being conducted in this plant, monitored the plant with a CAM, and took a wipe sample from this plant.

Result - This plant was idle at the time of inspection. There was no CAM response, and no indication of any activities with toxic chemicals. The analysis of the wipe sample did not indicate the presence of any Scheduled chemicals.

5. Waste Effluent Plant

The inspection team inspected the Waste Effluent Plant, monitored the headspace with the CAM, took a headspace sample with a Tenax tube, and took a waste water sample.

Result - There was no CAM response. The analysis of the headspace and waste water samples did not indicate the presence of any Scheduled chemicals in the samples.

6. Storage Areas

The inspection team walked through the Finished Goods Store (FGS), the open air raw materials storage area, and the open drum storage area. Several of the storage drums were monitored with the CAM (the CAM inlet was held approximately 20mm from the closed caps of the drums).

Result - The FGS had natural ventilation. A fork lift driver in the FGS was not wearing any protective clothing.

The quantity of storage drums labelled Triethanolamine observed in the raw materials storage area was consistent with the company information that there were 3.2 tonnes of this chemical on the site at the time of the inspection.

No drums of Thionyl Chloride were observed in the storage area. A CAM response was obtained from near the closed filling cap of one of the drums in the open drum storage area. A sample was requested - subsequent analysis indicated that the sample did not contain any Scheduled chemicals (see Annex 1). The team concluded that the CAM had recorded a "false alarm".

7. Laboratories

The inspection team walked through and observed the features and operations of the quality control laboratory, and walked down the corridor of the building containing the R & D laboratory. The team looked through the doorway into, but did not enter, the R & D laboratory.

Result - The inspection team concluded that there was no evidence that the laboratories were configured for the handling of toxic chemicals, nor did they have any features that could be suggestive of the company violating the CWC.

8. Sick Bay

The team leader was shown the sick bay.

Result - The sick bay was observed to be a small room containing a small bed and a small medicine cabinet. There were no medicines or therapies related to the treatment of poisoning by chemical warfare agents, or any breathing apparatus.

Conclusions

The inspection team concluded that, provided the inspection team contained an appropriately trained and experienced chemical engineer and chemist, it was possible to develop an appropriate inspection plan for a chemical plantsite, within a reasonably short time (15-20 minutes).

By the conduct of an inspection based on this inspection plan, the inspection team concluded that all of the activities that were observed during the inspection were consistent with the consumption of the declared quantity of Triethanolamine, and were consistent with the information received from the company staff during the initial briefing. The inspection team was satisfied that the company was not involved in activities that would be in violation of the CWC.

The actual inspection took approximately 1.5 hours, and the analysis of the samples approximately 2.5 hours.

At the conclusion of the inspection, the production manager of the inspected plantsite commented favourably on the conduct of the inspection, noting that there had been no loss of production because of the inspection, and that the company was satisfied that the inspection team had taken the necessary measures with regard to the protection of confidential information and data.

Participants of the workshop noted with interest the conduct of the inspection.

ANNEX 1 - CHEMICAL ANALYSIS

As discussed in a recent report of the Technical Instrumentation Group (CD/CW/WP,306), it is anticipated that the sample preparation and analysis of samples in this type of inspection under the CWC will normally be conducted on-site, using equipment brought to the inspection site by the inspection team.

MRL has purchased a small Gas Chromatograph-Mass Spectrometer (GC-MS) system, that is to be installed in a vehicle, to enable on-site analysis of inspection samples. As the GC-MS has not yet been vehicle-mounted, the samples were taken from the inspected facility to MRL for analysis.

The analysis of the samples by GC-MS was undertaken using the approach described in CD/CW/WP.353, namely, the GC-MS was used as a rapid screening technique to indicate the presence of Scheduled chemicals, and provided no information on chemicals that are not relevant to the CWC.

Prior to analysis, a 1.0 ml aliquot of each liquid sample was extracted with 1.0 ml of HPLC grade dichloromethane. This extract was dried by passing it through a small column of anhydrous Na_2SO_4 , and a 1.0 microlitre splitless injection of this solution was used for GC-MS analysis. A 25m 0.33mm I.D. BP5 capillary column, temperature programmed from 50° to 250°C/min, was used for the analysis. Tenax air samples were analysed by thermal desorption-GC-MS using similar GC conditions.

The mass spectrum corresponding to each GC peak was compared with a library of mass spectra of Scheduled chemicals to determine the presence or absence of Scheduled chemicals, using the approach outlined in CD/CW/WP.353. No undeclared Scheduled Chemicals were detected in any of the samples obtained during the inspection.

Had this been a normal trial inspection, no further analysis of samples would have been performed. However, as part of the Workshop, additional laboratory analysis of the samples was undertaken as a demonstration of other relevant techniques. Analysis of samples by Infrared (IR) and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) Spectroscopy was performed, again, to check for the presence or absence of Scheduled chemicals. The workshop participants noted that this additional analysis would not normally be undertaken unless there was an ambiguity, for example, in the GC-MS results.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1129
CD/CW/WP.386
20 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL SECRETARIAT: SURVEY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

1. Introduction

At the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held in Canberra in September 1989, the Australian Foreign Minister announced that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was proceeding to establish a National Secretariat to act as a nucleus for the future National Authority of the CWC. The Minister stated that the Secretariat, in consultation with appropriate Federal and State Government departments, would be responsible for reviewing existing laws and regulations covering the activities of the Australian chemical industry, and looking for ways to introduce and adapt the prospective requirements of the CWC to the current regulatory matrix.

The first task of the Secretariat was to develop a strategy to prepare Australia for national implementation of a CWC. The strategy comprises a program of consultation and research leading to the development of a package of implementation measures which will be considered by the Australian Government at the appropriate time. A document entitled "Strategy for Preparing for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Australia" was presented to the Conference on Disarmament in February 1991 (CD/1055).

That paper served to illustrate the fact that there is a wide range of tasks which must be initiated ahead of time by any government if it is to be able to commit its country in good faith to the CWC at the time of entry into force.

An important requirement under the future CWC, highlighted in the above mentioned Strategy Paper, is the assembling of data on which chemicals relevant to the CWC are produced, used, and traded. When considering its approach to implementation, Australia's National Secretariat was faced with the problem of not knowing the levels of production or use of the relevant chemicals in Australia. This is a fundamental question which is critical for any country in determining not only the size and shape of its National Authority, but also the overall national implementation effort which will be required.

In common with most other countries, chemicals are heavily regulated in Australia. While this regulation means that various databases on chemical production do exist, it became clear that in themselves, these would not meet all the requirements of the CWC. Because of differences in the way these databases were structured, difficulties were also found in assembling this information in a format suitable for the CWC. Furthermore it was likely, given that these databases are held by different governments within Australia, that there would have been issues of access to resolve. Consequently Australia's National Secretariat concluded it would be necessary to conduct a survey of chemicals which was tailor-made to meet the requirements of the CWC.

2. Survey Design

The survey was designed to the National Secretariat's specifications by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the government agency responsible for the conduct of the Australian census of population and housing and a large number of industry surveys.

The key objective of the survey was to collect the information about the production, processing and consumption of chemicals that would be required from Australia by the International Organisation when the CWC comes into effect. It was also designed to collect similar information about chemical weapons precursor chemicals subject to Australian export controls.

A first step in the design of the survey was to analyse which organisations would be covered. Analysis of the peaceful purposes for which scheduled chemicals could be used suggested that as well as chemical manufacturers and industrial chemical users, government agencies and laboratories at both Commonwealth and State government levels, universities and hospitals needed to be included.

The main features of the survey methodology were:

- . it was a mail survey
- . participation was voluntary
- . it was directed to companies, not individual plants.

The survey deliberately did not include companies solely engaged in the distribution of, or trade in chemicals. It was considered that this would introduce an element of double-counting between traders and users

and in any case alternative - and possible more reliable - import and export data is potentially available from government sources.

Because it was a mail survey an up-to-date mailing list was required. Such a list was developed on the basis of chemical industry directories supplemented by business telephone directories. Government directories of hospitals and tertiary institutions were used for these organisations. State and territory governments were asked to nominate government organisations at these levels for inclusion on the mailing list. Similarly Commonwealth departments were asked to nominate relevant agencies at this level of government.

This process yielded some 2000 companies and organisations including chemical manufacturers, industrial chemical users, government agencies and laboratories, hospitals and universities to whom the questionnaire was eventually sent.

3. Development of the Survey Questionnaire

In order to ask companies and organisations about the production of chemicals a manageable list of individual chemicals was required.

The chemicals to be covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention are listed in three schedules. Within these schedules some chemicals are listed individually, and others are listed as "families", the families approach having been adopted by our negotiations here in order that all relevant chemicals be covered. Because some of these families may contain a large number of chemicals, however, it was not possible to specify a complete list of chemicals which will be covered by legislation implementing the CWC in Australia.

For the purposes of the survey, the Australian Inventory of Chemical Substances (AICS) was used to identify individual chemicals within the families which are produced in or imported to Australia. The inventory was developed under national occupational health and safety legislation as the basis for distinguishing between existing chemicals and new chemicals for the purposes of assessing a newly introduced chemical's health and safety impact. AICS was used in this survey as an alternative to generating a list of chemicals containing thousands of individual chemicals, most of which would not be relevant to Australia.

A copy of the Survey questionnaire is attached to this paper. It will be noted that for questions relating to families of chemicals, individual chemicals of the family are listed first, followed by a question on other members of the same family. To further assist respondents, a page of the questionnaire provides chemical information on these families.

In addition to scheduled chemicals, the survey covers a list of additional chemicals (Section C, items 18 to 40), which may be used in the production of scheduled chemicals. These additional chemicals are covered by Australian export controls.

The questionnaire was developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics with the technical assistance of the Materials Research Laboratory, chemical industry organisations and a number of chemical companies.

4. Conduct of the Survey

The survey was conducted in December 1991. Respondents were sent the questionnaire, a covering letter from the

National Secretariat seeking their co-operation and providing a contact name and telephone number for any queries, and a self-addressed, postage-paid envelope. One reminder letter was sent to respondents who did not meet the due date for return of the questionnaire. At an appropriate interval those who fail to respond to the reminder letter will receive a reminder telephone call.

The mail-out was preceded by pre-survey publicity in two chemical industry association newsletters. Two weeks before the questionnaire was sent out, a letter from the head of the Chemical Confederation of Australia requesting co-operation was sent to all addressees on the mailing list.

Data entry and analysis will commence as soon as the last returns have been received. When this is completed Australia will be in a better position to determine its implementation requirements including resource questions in relation to its National Authority. Valuable experience will also have been provided to assist in the design of the compulsory data reporting system which will be introduced under the Australian CWC implementing legislation.

Australia will present a Working Paper incorporating the results of the survey when this is available.

It is hoped that this preliminary communication, in particular the survey methodology and questionnaire, will assist other countries in undertaking similar exercises in preparation for the implementation of the CWC.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

Survey of Chemical Industry

November 1991

Confidentiality

Your completed form remains confidential to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Due Date

Please complete this form and return it to the address below by
3 December 1991

Help Available

Chemicals marked with a * have a brief technical note on page 26.

If you have any other problems in completing this form or if you require additional copies, please contact Henry Fox on (06) 261 2431 or Sherree Minehan on (06) 261 2338.

Instructions

Please answer all questions carefully, even if you have not handled or produced any of the chemicals listed.

We are interested in your entire Australian operations, so please compile your information accordingly.

Careful estimates should be provided only when actual figures cannot be obtained.

This survey collects information about the **1990** calendar year.

Return Address

The Executive Officer
Chemical Industry Survey - CBS
D-3-N / DND
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Canberra A.C.T. 2600

A. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in ANY amount:

*Include - amounts imported and exported
 - amounts processed without conversion*

- 1 a.** O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate
(Sarin, CAS Number 107-44-8)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- b.** O-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate
(Soman, CAS Number 96-64-0)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- c.** Other O-Alkyl ($\leq C_{10}$, including cycloalkyl) alkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr*) **phosphonofluoridates *?**
- No 1
 Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2
- 2 a.** O-ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate
(Tabun, CAS Number 77-81-6)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- b.** Other O-Alkyl ($\leq C_{10}$, including cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr*) **phosphoramidocyanidates *?**
- No 1
 Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2
- 3 a.** O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate
(VX, CAS Number 50782-69-9)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- b.** Other O-Alkyl (*H or $\leq C_{10}$, including cycloalkyl*) S-2-dialkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr*)-aminoethyl alkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr*) **phosphonothiolates *** and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts?
- No 1
 Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2

- 4 a.** Methylphosphonyldifluoride
(DF, CAS Number 676-99-3)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- b.** Other Alkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr*) **phosphonyldifluorides *?**
- No 1
 Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2
- 5 a.** O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite
(QL, CAS Number 57856-11-8)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- b.** Other O-Alkyl (*H or $\leq C_{10}$, including cycloalkyl*) O-2-dialkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr*)-aminoethyl alkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr*) **phosphonites ***, and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts?
- No 1
 Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2
- 6 a.** O-isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate
(Chloro Sarin, CAS Number 1445-76-7)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- b.** O-pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate
(Chloro Soman, CAS Number 7040-57-5)?
- No 1
 Yes 2
- c.** Other O-Alkyl ($\leq C_{10}$, including cycloalkyl) alkyl (*Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr*) **phosphonochloridates *?**
- No 1
 Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2

Additional chemical names from above - if you need more space please use page 10.

[CAS Number]

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| |

A. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in ANY amount:

*Include: - amounts imported and exported
- amounts processed without conversion*

CD/1129
CD/CW/WP.386
page 9

- 7** a. bis (2-chloroethyl) sulphide
(Mustard gas, CAS Number 505-60-2)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- b. 1,2 bis (2-chloroethylthio)-ethane
(Sesquimustard, CAS Number 3563-36-8)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- c. bis (2-chloroethylthioethyl) ether
(O-mustard, CAS Number 63918-89-8)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- d. bis (2-chloroethylthio) methane
(CAS Number 63869-13-6)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- e. 1,3-bis (2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane
(CAS Number 63905-10-2)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- f. 1,4-bis (2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane
(CAS Number not available)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- g. 2-chloroethylchloromethylsulphide
(CAS Number 2625-76-5)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- h. 1,5-bis (2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane
(CAS Number not available)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- i. bis-(2-chloroethylthiomethyl) ether
(CAS Number not available)?
- No 1
Yes 2

- 8** a. 2-chlorovinylchloroarsine
(Lewisite 1, CAS Number 541-25-3)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- b. bis (2-chlorovinyl) chloroarsine
(Lewisite 2, CAS Number 40334-69-8)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- c. tris (2-chlorovinyl) arsine
(Lewisite 3, CAS Number 40334-70-1)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- 9** a. bis (2-chloroethyl) ethylamine
(HN1, CAS Number 538-07-8)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- b. bis (2-chloroethyl) methylamine
(HN2, CAS Number 51-75-2)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- c. tris (2-chloroethyl) amine
(HN3, CAS Number 555-77-1)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- 10** 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate
(BZ, CAS Number 6581-06-2)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- 11** Saxitoxin
(CAS Number 35523-89-8)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- 12** Ricin
(CAS Number 9009-86-3)?
- No 1
Yes 2
- 13** 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol
(Pinacolyl alcohol, CAS Number 464-07-3)?
- No 1
Yes 2

B. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in amounts which total at least 10 kilograms:

Include: - amounts imported and exported
- amounts processed without conversion

8 a. 2-Dimethylaminoethanol
(CAS Number 108-01-0)?

No 1
Yes 2

b. 2-Diethylaminoethanol
(CAS Number 100-37-8)?

No 1
Yes 2

c. 2-Di-isopropylaminoethanol
(CAS Number 96-80-0)?

No 1
Yes 2

d. Choline
(CAS Number 62-49-7)?

No 1
Yes 2

e. Choline carbonate
(CAS Number 78-73-9)?

No 1
Yes 2

f. Choline chloride
(CAS Number 67-48-1)?

No 1
Yes 2

g. Choline hydroxide
(CAS Number 123-41-1)?

No 1
Yes 2

h. Choline methyl sulphate
(CAS Number 65151-62-4)?

No 1
Yes 2

i. Choline dihydrogen citrate
(CAS Number 77-91-8)?

No 1
Yes 2

j. Tricholine citrate
(CAS Number 546-63-4)?

No 1
Yes 2

k. Choline bitartrate
(CAS Number 87-67-2)?

No 1
Yes 2

l. Other N, N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols
and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts?

No 1
Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2

9 a. N,N-diisopropyl-2-aminoethane thiol
(CAS Number 5842-07-9)?

No 1
Yes 2

b. Dimethylaminoethane-2-thiol hydrochloride
(CAS Number 13242-44-9)?

No 1
Yes 2

c. Other N, N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols
and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts?

No 1
Yes (Specify name(s) below) 2

Additional chemical names from above - if you need more space please use page 10.

[CAS Number]

B. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in amounts which total at least 10 kilograms:

*Include amounts imported and exported
- amounts processed without conversion*

- 10 a. O-ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphonothiothionate**
(Fonofos, CAS Number 944-22-9)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- b. Diethyl ethyl phosphonate**
(CAS Number 78-38-6)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- c. Methyl phosphonic acid**
(CAS Number 993-13-5)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- d. Dimethyl methylphosphonate**
(CAS Number 756-79-6)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- e. Diphenyl methylphosphonate**
(CAS Number 7526-26-3)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- f. Phosphonic acid, methyl- methyl 3-(trimethoxysilyl)-propyl ester**
(CAS Number 67812-17-3)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- g. Phosphonic acid, methyl-, monoammonium salt**
(CAS Number 34255-87-3)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- h. Phosphonic acid, methyl-, monoethyl ester**
(CAS Number 73750-69-3)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- i. Methyl phosphonyl dichloride**
(CAS Number 676-97-1)?
- No 1
- Yes 2

- j. Phosphonothuonic dichloride, ethyl-**
(CAS Number 993-43-1)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- k. Methyl phosphinyl dichloride**
(CAS Number 676-83-5)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- l. Phosphonic acid, methyl-, bis(3-trimethoxysilyl) propyl ester**
(CAS Number 67812-18-4)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- m. Phosphonic acid, methyl-, compounded with (aminoiminomethyl) urea (1:1)**
(CAS Number 84402-58-4)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- n. Phosphonic acid, methyl-, (S-ethyl-2-methyl-1,3,2-dioxaphosphorinan-5-yl) methyl methyl ester, P, oxide)**
(Antblaze 19, CAS Number 41203-81-0)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- o. Phosphonic acid, methyl-, bis[(S-ethyl-2-methyl-1,3,2-dioxaphosphorinan-5-yl) methyl ester, P, P' dioxide]**
(Antblaze 19, CAS Number 42595-45-9)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- p. 1,2-Oxaphospholan-5-one, 2-methyl-, 2-oxide**
(Trevira 271, CAS Number 15171-48-9)?
- No 1
- Yes 2
- q. Methyl phosphinyl difluoride**
(CAS Number 753-59-3)?
- No 1
- Yes 2

C. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in amounts which total at least 100 kilograms:

Include - amounts imported and exported
- amounts processed without conversion

- 1 Phosgene
(Carbon dioxide dichloride, CAS Number 75-44-5)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 2 Cyanogen chloride
(CAS Number 506-77-4)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 3 Hydrogen cyanide
(Hydrocyanic acid, CAS Number 74-90-8)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 4 Trichloronitromethane
(Chloropicrin, CAS Number 76-06-2)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 5 Phosphorus oxychloride
(Phosphoryl chloride, CAS Number 10025-87-3)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 6 Phosphorus trichloride
(CAS Number 7719-09-7)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 7 Phosphorus pentachloride
(CAS Number 10026-13-8)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 8 Trimethyl phosphite
(CAS Number 121-45-9)?
No 1
Yes 2

- 9 Triethyl phosphite
(CAS Number 122-52-1)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 10 Dimethyl phosphite
(CAS Number 868-85-9)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 11 Diethyl phosphite
(CAS Number 762-04-9)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 12 Sulphur monochloride
(CAS Number 10025-67-9)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 13 Sulphur dichloride
(CAS Number 10545-99-0)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 14 Thionyl chloride
(CAS Number 7719-09-7)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 15 Triethanolamine
(CAS Number 102-71-6)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 16 Ethyldiethanolamine
(CAS Number 139-87-7)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 17 Methyl-diethanolamine
(CAS Number 105-59-9)?
No 1
Yes 2

C. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in amounts which total at least 100 kilograms:

Include: - amounts imported and exported
- amounts processed without conversion

- 18 Hydrogen fluoride
(Hydrofluoric acid, CAS Number 7664-39-3)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 19 Ammonium bifluoride
(Ammonium hydrogen fluoride, CAS Number 1341-49-7)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 20 Sodium bifluoride
(Sodium hydrogen fluoride, CAS Number 1333-83-1)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 21 Sodium fluoride
(CAS Number 7681-49-4)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 22 Potassium fluoride
(CAS Number 7789-23-3)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 23 Potassium bifluoride
(Potassium hydrogen fluoride, CAS Number 7789-29-9)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 24 Sodium sulphide
(CAS Number 1313-82-2)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 25 Phosphorus pentasulphide
(CAS Number 1314-80-3)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 26 Sodium cyanide
(CAS Number 143-33-9)?
No 1
Yes 2

- 27 Potassium cyanide
(CAS Number 151-50-8)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 28 2-Chloroethanol
(CAS Number 107-07-3)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 29 3, 3-Dimethyl-2-butanone
(Pinacolone, CAS Number 75-97-8)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 30 Dimethylamine
(CAS Number 124-40-3)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 31 Dimethylamine hydrochloride
(CAS Number 506-59-2)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 32 Diisopropylamine
(CAS Number 108-18-9)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 33 3-Quinuclidone
(CAS Number 3731-38-2)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 34 Phosphorus sulfochloride
(Thiophosphoryl chloride, CAS Number 3982-91-0)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 35 Triethanolamine hydrochloride
(CAS Number 637-39-8)?
No 1
Yes 2
- 36 Oxalyl chloride
(CAS Number 79-37-8)?
No 1
Yes 2

C. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in amounts which total at least 100 kilograms:

*Include: - amounts imported and exported
 - amounts processed without conversion*

- 37 Tri-n-butylamine
 (CAS Number 102-82-9)?
 No 1
 Yes 2
- 38 Sodium iodide
 (CAS Number 7681-82-5)?
 No 1
 Yes 2
- 39 Morpholine
 (CAS Number 110-91-8)?
 No 1
 Yes 2
- 40 Decalin
 (CAS Number 91-17-8)?
 No 1
 Yes 2

D. Were the chemicals described below produced, synthesized, consumed or handled during 1990 in amounts which total at least 1 kilogram:

*Include: - amounts imported and exported
 - amounts processed without conversion*

- 1 a. O,O-Diethyl S-(2-(diethylamino)ethyl) phosphorothiolate
 (Amiton, CAS Number 78-53-5)?
 No 1
 Yes 2
- b. Alkylated and/or protonated salts of
 O,O-Diethyl S-(2-(diethylamino)ethyl) phosphorothiolate?
 No 1
 Yes (Please specify below) 2

Chemical name

[CAS Number]

- 2 1,1,3,3,3-pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene
 (PFIB, CAS Number 382-21-8)?
 No 1
 Yes 2

E. Did you answer "Yes" to any chemical in Section A?

- No (Go to Section I) 1
 Yes 2

How many different chemicals from Section A were handled?

Number

Complete Section I for each such chemical

F. Did you answer "Yes" to any chemical in Section B?

- No (Go to Section G) 1
 Yes 2

How many different chemicals from Section B were handled?

Number

Complete Section J for each such chemical

G. Did you answer "Yes" to any chemical in Section C?

- No (Go to section H) 1
 Yes 2

How many different chemicals from Section C were handled?

Number

Complete Section K for each such chemical

H. Did you answer "Yes" to any chemical in Section D?

- No (See note at bottom of page) 1
 Yes 2

How many different chemicals from Section D were handled?

Number

Complete Section L for each such chemical

If you answered "No" to ALL of Questions E, F, G and H, please turn to the back page.

If you answered "Yes" to ANY of Questions E, F, G, or H, please turn to page 11.

Question number

Additional chemical names

[CAS Number]

- I. If you answered "No" to Question E, go to page 13.
If you answered "Yes" to Question E, complete the section below for each chemical handled in Section A.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 0.1 gram. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 1 (from Section A)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> grams |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> grams |

CHEMICAL 2 (from Section A)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> grams |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> grams | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> grams |

- I. If you answered "No" to Question E, go to page 13.
If you answered "Yes" to Question E, continue completing the section below for Section A chemicals.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 0.1 gram. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 3 (from Section A)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 - |
| <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams |

CHEMICAL 4 (from Section A)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 - |
| <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams | <input type="text"/> grams |

J. If you answered "No" to Question F, go to page 17.
If you answered "Yes" to Question F, complete the section below for each chemical handled in Section B.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 10 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 1 (from Section B)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 2 (from Section B)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

J. If you answered "No" to Question F, go to page 17.
If you answered "Yes" to Question F, continue completing the section below for Section B chemicals.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 10 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.

If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 3 (from Section B)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 4 (from Section B)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

J. If you answered "No" to Question F, go to page 17.
If you answered "Yes" to Question F, continue completing the section below for Section B chemicals.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 10 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 5 (from Section B)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 6 (from Section B)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> kilograms |

J. If you answered "No" to Question F, go to page 17.
If you answered "Yes" to Question F, continue completing the section below for Section B chemicals.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 10 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 7 (from Section B)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 8 (from Section B)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
 If you answered "Yes" to Question G, complete the section below for each chemical handled in Section C.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
 Report figures for your 1990 operations.*

If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 1 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|---|-----------|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> | kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> | kilograms |

CHEMICAL 2 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|---|-----------|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> | kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> | kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
 If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
 Report figures for your 1990 operations.
 If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 3 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| Quantity produced | | Quantity processed without conversion | | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> |
| Quantity imported | | Quantity exported | | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> |

CHEMICAL 4 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| Quantity produced | | Quantity processed without conversion | | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> |
| Quantity imported | | Quantity exported | | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> | kilograms | <input type="text"/> |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 5 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|---|-----------|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> | kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> | kilograms |

CHEMICAL 6 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|---|-----------|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> | kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> | kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> | kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 7 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 8 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 9 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 10 (from Section C)

| | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 11 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 12 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity produced <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity processed without conversion <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity consumed <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity exported <input type="text"/> kilograms | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 <input type="text"/> kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
 If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

*NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
 Report figures for your 1990 operations.
 If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.*

CHEMICAL 13 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 14 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

K. If you answered "No" to Question G, go to page 25.
 If you answered "Yes" to Question G, continue completing the section below for Section C chemicals.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest 100 kilograms. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
 Report figures for your 1990 operations.
 If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 15 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

CHEMICAL 16 (from Section C)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms | <input type="text"/> kilograms |

L. If you answered "No" to Question H, go to back page.
If you answered "Yes" to Question H, complete the section below for each chemical handled in Section D.

NOTE: Please report all quantities to the nearest kilogram. If a quantity is 'NIL', please write '0'.
Report figures for your 1990 operations.
If you require extra sheets for this section, contact the Department or photocopy this page.

CHEMICAL 1 (from Section D)

| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name

Name and Address of Facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| | | |
| kilograms | kilograms | kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| | | |
| kilograms | kilograms | kilograms |

CHEMICAL 2 (from Section D)


| Question number | Common or Trade Name | CAS Number |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | |

Chemical Name


Name and Address of facility where chemical handled and/or stored

| | | |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Quantity produced | Quantity processed without conversion | Quantity consumed |
| | | |
| kilograms | kilograms | kilograms |
| Quantity imported | Quantity exported | Quantity stored on 31/12/90 |
| | | |
| kilograms | kilograms | kilograms |


Question A 1 c: Other O-alkyl alkyl phosphonofluoridates




Question A 2 b: Other O-alkyl N,N-dialkyl phosphoramidocyanidates




Question A 3 b: Other O-alkyl S-2-dialkyl aminoethyl alkyl phosphonothiolates




Question A 4 b: Other alkyl phosphonyldifluorides





Question A 5 b: Other O-alkyl O-2-dialkyl aminoethyl alkyl phosphonites



Question A 6 c: Other O-alkyl alkyl phosphonochloridates



Question B 10 x: Other chemicals containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded an alkyl group but no other carbon atoms



x, y and z may be any functional group or heteroatom, provided that no other carbon atoms are directly bonded to this phosphorus.

All of the chemicals in Question B 10 are examples of the structure described.

M Did you answer yes to any of the chemicals or chemical groups listed inside the form?

No (Go to Question P) 1
Yes 2

N Did you need any extra sheets for Sections I, J, K or L?

No (Go to Question P) 1
Yes 2

O How many extra sheets did you need?

Number

P What is the name of the organization (*company, facility, laboratory, etc.*) covered by this questionnaire?

Name

Mailing Address

Q If we have any queries about this form, who should we contact?

Name and title

Address

Telephone Number

R Do you have any comments about this collection?

S Please return this form by 3 December to:

The Executive Officer
Chemical Industry Survey - CBS
D-3-N/DND
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Parkes A.C.T. 2600

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1130
CD/CW/WP.387
20 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE

CHINA

Principled Position and Proposals on the Issue of Abandoned Chemical Weapons

I

1. The objective of the future convention is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of chemical weapons and the realization of a chemical-weapon-free world. As the issue of the chemical weapons abandoned in a victim State by another State is of direct relevance to this objective, a just solution will have to be found within the framework of the convention and form an essential part of it. An important consensus to this effect has already been reached in the Conference and its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and is clearly reflected in the rolling texts of 1990 and 1991.

2. The necessity and relevance of arriving at a solution is self-evident. The act of using and abandoning chemical weapons by a State on the territory of another State is certainly not a mere "historical problem" that concerns only the States directly involved; it is of relevance to the entire international community. Furthermore, the possibility that such acts might be committed again cannot be excluded before the chemical-weapon-free world becomes a reality. The issue of abandoned chemical weapons is, therefore, an important one that has a bearing on the rights and obligations of each and every State party to the convention.

3. The issue of abandoned chemical weapons, being inherently related to definitions of chemical weapons as well as provisions on their use, declaration, destruction, verification, sanctions and cooperation, should be dealt with in a balanced, reasonable and integrated way, and the resulting provisions should become an integral part of the convention. Only then can the convention become truly comprehensive, effective and universal.

4. As an international legal document of unlimited duration, the convention must contain equitable provisions on abandoned chemical weapons, clearly setting forth the rights and obligations of States parties, including the principle that the State which used and abandoned chemical weapons shall bear the responsibility for undoing the consequences of such uses and for

destroying the chemical weapons it abandoned. This is a fair and reasonable principle at all times; only by establishing such a principle can past wrongdoings be duly dealt with and future ones prevented. If, on the other hand, responsibility were imposed on the victim State, it would be not only a great injustice to the victim State, but also tantamount to allowing and encouraging a chemical-weapon-State to use chemical weapons against, and abandon such weapons in, another State whenever it pleases regardless of the consequences. This would obviously run counter to the letter and spirit of the convention.

5. As the circumstances under which chemical weapons were abandoned or will probably be abandoned may not be identical, they should be dealt with accordingly, in a pragmatic fashion. In setting forth the principle that the abandoning State shall bear the responsibility for destruction, the convention should not preclude the possibility that appropriate solutions may be found through consultations among the States concerned.

6. The precise role of the organization to be set up under the future convention in facilitating the solution of the problems of abandoned chemical weapons and in completing the destruction processes should be specified in the convention, and fully adhered to in practice.

II

7. The Chinese delegation has been working actively to promote an early and appropriate solution to the issue of abandoned chemical weapons on the basis of the foregoing position of principle. For this purpose, we now reiterate and further propose the following necessary additions and changes to the relevant paragraphs in the rolling text:

8. Paragraph 3 of Article I should read:

"3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control, except as provided in paragraph 5 below."

Furthermore, a new paragraph 5 should be added at the end of Article I:

"5. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State, and the States concerned may on this basis seek proper solutions through consultations among themselves."

9. A new paragraph on the definition of abandoned chemical weapons should be inserted after paragraph 1 of Article II:

"The term 'Abandoned Chemical Weapons' means any chemical weapons abandoned in the past or in the future by a State on the territory of another State without its consent during a war or a conflict or under other circumstances."

10. Paragraph 1 (a) (i) of Article III should read:

"(i) Whether it owns or possesses any chemical weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or whether it has abandoned any chemical weapons in any place in other States;"

Furthermore, paragraph 1 (a) (ii) of Article III should read:

"(ii) Whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of other States or that are under the ownership or possession of other States or have been abandoned by other States;"

11. Two new paragraphs C and D should be inserted in section I of the Annex to Article III (with the original paragraph C renumbered as paragraph E):

"C. Existence of chemical weapons abandoned elsewhere

Yes ...

No ..."

"D. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons abandoned by anyone else

Yes ...

No ..."

12. Paragraph 1 of Article IV should read:

"1. The provisions of this Article and its Annex shall apply to any and all chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control or have been abandoned by it in any place in other States."

In paragraph 2 of Article IV, subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) should read, respectively:

"(a) Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of the chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control or have been abandoned by it in any place in other States;

"(b) Report any chemical weapons on its territory that are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of other States or have been abandoned by other States;

"(d) Provide its general plan for destruction of chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control or have been abandoned by it in any place in other States."

Paragraph 3 of Article IV should read:

"Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under paragraph 2 of this Article has been submitted, provide access to the chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or that it has discovered abandoned by other States, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall ensure, through access to the chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or that it has discovered abandoned by other States, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a chemical weapons destruction facility."

In paragraph 6 of Article IV, subparagraphs (a) and (c) should read, respectively:

"(a) Destroy any chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or have been abandoned by it in any place in other States, pursuant to the order of destruction specified in the Annex to Article IV, beginning not later than one year after the Convention enters into force for it, and finishing not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force; however, a State Party is not precluded from destroying them at a faster pace;

"(c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that any chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or that it has discovered abandoned by other States, have been destroyed."

Furthermore, paragraph 7 of Article IV should read:

"7. Each State Party, during its transportation, sampling, storage, and destruction of any chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or have been abandoned by it in any place in other States, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State party shall transport, sample, store and destroy such chemical weapons in accordance with national standards for safety and emissions."

13. A new paragraph C should be inserted under section I of the Annex to Article IV (with the original paragraphs C, D and E renumbered as paragraphs D, E and F, respectively):

"C. Information on abandoned chemical weapons:

1. A State Party that has discovered any abandoned chemical weapons shall declare:

- (1) the time of each discovery.
- (2) the location of each discovery (name and geographical coordinates).
- (3) the types of abandoned chemical weapons discovered by it.
- (4) the quantities of abandoned chemical weapons discovered by it.
- (5) the treatment given.

2. A State Party that has abandoned any chemical weapons shall declare:

- (1) the time of each abandonment.
- (2) the location of each abandonment (name and geographical coordinates).
- (3) the types of chemical weapons abandoned by it.
- (4) the quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by it.

Furthermore, a new provision on "abandoned chemical weapons" should be added after "multi-component chemical weapons" in section III.B of the Annex to Article IV:

"Abandoned chemical weapons

The destruction of abandoned chemical weapons discovered before the date the Convention enters into force shall be completed not later than five years after the entry into force of the Convention; the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons discovered after the date the Convention enters into force shall be completed not later than two years after their discovery."

14. A new paragraph 11 should be added to Article X:

"11. If any State Party discovers on its territory any chemical weapons abandoned by a State not Party to the Convention, or if the abandoning State cannot be identified, the Organization shall, at the request of the State Party that discovers such weapons, provide assistance in the destruction of those abandoned chemical weapons."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1131
20 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL ON THE OCCASION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

We have the honour to transmit to you the text of the "Joint Declaration of the President of the Argentine Republic, Carlos Menem, and the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Fernando Collor, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco".

We should be very grateful if you, Sir, in accordance with the established practice, would arrange for this text to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all delegations, both of member States and of States with observer status.

(Signed) Roberto García Moritán
Ambassador
Representative of the
Argentine Republic for
Disarmament

(Signed) Celso L.N. Amorim
Ambassador
Representative of Brazil
to the International Organizations
at Geneva

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC,
CARLOS MENEM, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC
OF BRAZIL, FERNANDO COLLOR, ON THE OCCASION OF THE
25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

"1. Since assuming the presidencies of our countries, we have given a new and determined impulse towards a common nuclear policy, including the aspect of non-proliferation. We were always inspired by the idea of endowing our nuclear programmes with internal and external transparency and of demonstrating to the international community the exclusively peaceful objectives which guide them, in keeping with the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

2. Those programmes reflect the determination and political will of our Governments to strengthen regional and international peace and security, by the adoption, inter alia, of clear verification mechanisms.

3. In that context, in the Declaration of Foz do Iguazú on Common Nuclear Policy, of 28 November 1990, we agreed on three concrete steps:

The creation of a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials;

The conclusion of a joint safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency; and

The taking of appropriate action to permit the full entry into force for the two countries of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including action to update and improve its wording.

4. The international community is witness to the rapidity and efficacy with which the results of this undertaking, known to all, were achieved:

The Agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, signed on 18 July 1991 in the City of Guadalajara and since adopted by the Congresses of the two countries and ratified by both Governments, representing implementation of the first step; and

The signature, on 13 December 1991, of the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

5. Today we are taking effective measures for the implementation of the third and last commitment of the Declaration of Foz do Iguazú. At the earliest possible opportunity we shall submit for the consideration of OPANAL some amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, of a primarily technical nature not affecting its principles and purposes in any way.

6. We are asking all the countries of our region for the necessary support for this initiative, whose objective is to facilitate the application of the Treaty.

7. We congratulate the Government of France on its decision to ratify Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will contribute to the definitive establishment, hopefully in the near future, of its juridical validity for the entire region for which it is intended.

8. All of these recent developments, indicative of a deep and shared desire to strengthen Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone free of nuclear weapons, lead us to the common conviction that finalization of the process, now announced, of adoption of amendments to the text of the Treaty, will decisively open the way for its entry into force in our countries.

9. In this way, Argentina and Brazil are contributing clearly and constructively to the establishment of a new international scenario, characterized by cooperation and confidence-building between nations, as central elements for the maintenance of international peace and security."

BUENOS AIRES - BRASILIA, 14 FEBRUARY 1992

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1132
21 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING COMPENDIA ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS COMPRISING PLENARY STATEMENTS AND WORKING PAPERS FROM THE 1991 SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 1/

We have just received the latest in the Canadian series of compendia of the CWC AHC plenary statements (PVS) (in one volume) and the Plenary Working Papers (WPS) (in two volumes) concerning the ongoing work on Chemical Weapons during the 1991 Session of the Conference.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of these volumes, under a CD number, to all member and participating non-member State delegations.

(Signed) A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of these compendia in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1133
21 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION PAPER NO. 9 ENTITLED: "VERIFYING LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY PERSONNEL" 1/

You will find enclosed a copy of the 9th in Canada's series of Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers, entitled "Verifying Limitations on Military Personnel".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its informal distribution to all member and participating non-member State delegations.

(Signed) A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy
Permanent Representative
to the Conference on
Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this brochure in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1134
24 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED
BY THE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE CONCERNING
INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT

I have the honour to transmit the text of the Statement on International
Disarmament issued by Mr. Eduardo Vargas C., Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Chile, on 12 February last in the city of Santiago.

I should be most grateful if you, Sir, in accordance with established
practice, would arrange for this text to be issued as an official document of
the Conference on Disarmament and distributed it to all delegations, both of
the member States and of the non-member States participating in the work of
the Conference.

(Signed) Ernesto Tironi
 Ambassador
 Permanent Representative

**STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ISSUED BY ACTING MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

I should like to announce some important advances in matters of international disarmament, a question to which the Government of Chile attaches the greatest importance.

First, I wish to refer to the announcement of the President of France, Francois Mitterrand, at the United Nations Security Council Summit on 31 January last, concerning the ratification by his country of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco). We welcome that decision as a significant move towards the desired goal of the entry into force of that Treaty.

When this French initiative is added to the Safeguards Agreement recently concluded by Argentina and Brazil with the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna, and to the favourable statements of the Government of Cuba regarding its ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there is now justified hope that by the twenty-fifth anniversary of its signature, in 1992, this instrument may begin to have effective validity.

Pursuant to the permanent instructions of President Aylwin, the Ministry is taking the necessary diplomatic actions for the early consideration in OPANAL, which is the technical body established by the Treaty for such purposes, of the legal and technical procedures for strengthening and updating Tlatelolco and bringing it into force. In preparing such actions, this Ministry will coordinate with the national technical body concerned, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission.

I should also like to mention as an interesting development in the international field the signature on 30 January last of a safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency of Vienna which will enable IAEA to carry out the appropriate inspections of the installations and fissionable materials in that country. We have reason to hope that that agreement will be ratified and that, together with the agreement on reconciliation of the two Koreas, it will help to create a climate of security, peace and stability in that part of the world. I must point out that Chile supported the initiative of Australia, Canada and Japan urging the Government of North Korea to enter into this safeguards agreement and that our Ambassador to IAEA, as Chairman of the Group of 77 in Vienna, made important efforts to bring about consensus on the matter. This process taking place in a region of Asia adds to the explicit statements in favour of non-proliferation made by the States belonging to the new Commonwealth of Independent States and so considerably strengthens the global scope of international security.

Another important dimension is that relating to the multilateral convention on chemical weapons which is being negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and which unquestionably represents the most

important international effort in the matter of disarmament and a significant contribution to the protection of the global environment. In that connection, it will be recalled that Foreign Minister Silva Cimma, along with his colleagues from Argentina and Brazil, signed the Mendoza Agreement, subsequently joined by the other Latin American States before and during the Presidential Summit of the Rio Group at Cartagena. At present, we are finalizing with Argentina and Brazil the contribution which the three countries can make to the procedures of verification and implementation of the future convention in keeping with the position taken in the Mendoza Agreement.

Santiago, 12 February 1992

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1135
CD/CW/WP.388
24 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

HUNGARY

Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention

With a view to contributing to the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Hungarian Foreign Minister put forward an initiative at the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly declaring that Hungary was ready to comply with all the provisions of the Convention under negotiation and to act in full conformity with it at this stage already. In February 1990 and in February 1991, in accordance with this initiative, Hungary presented a declaration on the production, consumption, as well as export and import of chemicals relevant to the Convention. (CD/969, CD/1061)


Following the spirit of these measures, Hungary wishes to repeat its declaration and present detailed information regarding the year of 1991.

The declaration was prepared in conformity with the draft provisions of the convention. The data contained in the declaration are based on the co-operative and voluntary contribution of chemical plants and enterprises.

Quantities exceeding one ton and thirty tons for Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals respectively are contained in the declaration. The general methodology adopted for the purposes of the present declaration are not intended to prejudice in any way the final agreed provisions of the relevant section of the draft convention.

AGGREGATE NATIONAL DATA
ON THE PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, EXPORT AND IMPORT OF
SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS
in 1991

Chemical name: N,N-dimethylamino-ethane-2-ol
name used by the facility: dimetilamino-etanol
structural formula:



CASRN: (108-01-0)

the total amount

produced (t): 0

exported (t): 0

consumed (t): 2


imported (t): 2

from the United Kingdom

DECLARATION
1991
SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICAL

I. CHEMICAL

Chemical name: N,N-dimethylamino-ethane-2-ol
name used by the facility: dimetilamino-etanol
structural formula:



CASRN: (108-01-0)

the total amount
produced (t):0 exported (t):0
consumed (t):2 imported (t):2 from the United Kingdom

The purposes for which the chemical was produced, consumed
or processed: *pharmaceutical product*

II. FACILITY

name of the facility: Kémia-5 üzem
name of the owner: EGIS RT
operating the facility: EGIS RT

the exact location of the facility: 1106 Budapest
10.kerület Keresztúri út 30-38
24. épület

the facility is a *multipurpose* facility

the main orientation of the facility:
production of intermediers

the facility *can not be used* for the production of
Schedule 1 and other Schedule 2 chemicals


capacity for the declared compound: 10 t

The following activities are performed with regard to the
declared chemical:
processing with conversion into another chemical

NATIONAL DATA
ON THE PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, EXPORT AND IMPORT OF
SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND THE FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCED
CONSUMED, PROCESSED OR TRANSFERRED MORE THAN 30 TONNES
in 1991

1. CHEMICAL

Chemical name: carbonyl dichloride
common or trade name: phosgene
structural formula:



GASRN: (75-44-5)

the total amount

produced (t): 5000-10000

exported (t): 0

consumed (t): 5000-10000

imported (t): 0

FACILITIES

1.

name of the facility: Foszgén Üzem
name of the owner: BORSODCHEM RT
operating the facility: BORSODCHEM RT

the exact location of the facility: KAZINCBARCIKA Bolyai tér 1

production (t): 1000-5000

capacity (t): 10000-20000

consumption (t): 1000-5000

capacity (t): 1000-5000

2.

name of the facility: MDI Üzem
name of the owner: BORSODCHEM RT
operating the facility: BORSODCHEM RT

the exact location of the facility: KAZINCBARCIKA Bolyai tér 1

production (t): 5000-10000

capacity (t): 10000-20000

consumption (t): 5000-10000

capacity (t): 10000-20000

3.

name of the facility: V-3, V-4 üzem
name of the owner: Északmagyarországi Vegyiművek
operating the facility: SAGROCHEM Kft

the exact location of the facility: 3792 SAJOBÁBONY

production (t): 500-1000 capacity (t): 10000-15000
consumption (t): 1000-5000 capacity (t): 5000-10000

2. CHEMICAL

Chemical name: phosphorus trichloride
common or trade name: phosphorus trichloride
structural formula:



CASRN: (7719-12-2)

the total amount
produced (t): 0 exported (t): 0
consumed (t): 500-1000 imported (t): 500-1000

FACILITIES

1.

name of the facility: Szintézis üzem
name of the owner: Rhone-Poulenc - Agro Borsod KFT
operating the facility: Rhone-Poulenc - Agro Borsod KFT

the exact location of the facility: KAZINCBARCIKA Bolyai tér 1

production (t): 0 capacity (t): 0
consumption (t): 100-500 capacity (t): 500-1000

2.

name of the facility: V-2 üzem
name of the owner: Északmagyarországi Vegyiművek
operating the facility: SAGROCHEM Kft

the exact location of the facility: 3792 SAJOBÁBONY


production (t): 0 capacity (t): 0
consumption (t): 50-200 capacity (t): 1000-2000

3.

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| name of the facility: Kloracetilklorid üzem | |
| name of the owner: Nitrokémia Ipartelepek | |
| operating the facility: Nitrokémia Ipartelepek II.sz. Gyáregység | |
| the exact location of the facility: 8184 FUZFÖGYÁRTELEP | |
| production (t): 0 | capacity (t): 0 |
| consumption (t): 500-1000 | capacity (t): 1000-5000 |

3. CHEMICAL

| |
|--|
| Chemical name: Dimethyl-phosphite |
| common or trade name: dimethyl-phosphite |
| structural formula: |



CASRN:(868-85-9)

the total amount

produced (t): 0

consumed (t): 500-1000

exported (t): 0

imported (t): 500-1000

FACILITY

| |
|---|
| name of the facility: Kémia III.üzem |
| name of the owner: STATE PROPERTY AGENCY |
| operating the facility: Alkaloida Vegyészet Gyár RT |

the exact location of the facility: TISZAVASVÁRI
Kabai János u. 29.

production (t): 0


consumption (t): 500-1000

capacity (t): 0

capacity (t): 500-1000

4. CHEMICAL

Chemical name: Diethyl-phosphite
common or trade name: diethyl-phosphite
structural formula:



CASRN:(762-04-9)

the total amount

produced (t): 100-500

consumed (t): 100-500

exported (t): 0

imported (t): 0

FACILITY

name of the facility: Szintézis Üzem

name of the owner: Rhone-Poulenc - Agro Borsod KFT

operating the facility: Rhone-Poulenc - Agro Borsod KFT

the exact location of the facility: KAZINCBARCIKA Bolyai tér 1.

production (t): 100-500


consumption (t): 100-500

capacity (t): 500-1000

capacity (t): 500-1000

5. CHEMICAL

Chemical name: Thionyl-dichloride
common or trade name: thionyl-dichloride
structural formula:



CASRN:(7719-09-7)

the total amount

produced (t): 0

consumed (t): 100-500

exported (t): 0

imported (t): 100-500

FACILITIES

1.

name of the facility: Kémia-2
name of the owner: EGIS RT
operating the facility: EGIS RT

the exact location of the facility: 1106 BUDAPEST
10.kerület Kereszturi ut 30-38 III. csarnok
production (t): 0 capacity (t): 0
consumption (t): 100-200 capacity (t): 100-200

2.

name of the facility: Kémia IV.
name of the owner: Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár RT
operating the facility: Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár RT

the exact location of the facility: BUDAPEST
10.kerület Gyömrői ut 19-21
production (t): 0 capacity (t): 0
consumption (t): 50-200 capacity (t): 100-200

6. CHEMICAL

Chemical name: Phosphonyl chloride
common or trade name: phosphorus oxichloride
structural formula:



CASRN:(10025-87-3)

the total amount
produced (t): 0 exported (t): 0
consumed (t): 100-500 imported (t): 100-500

FACILITIES

1.

name of the facility: Kémia I.
name of the owner: Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár RT
operating the facility: Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár RT

the exact location of the facility: BUDAPEST
10.kerület Gyömrői ut 19-21
production (t): 0 capacity (t): 0
consumption (t): 100-500 capacity (t): 100-500

2.

name of the facility: Kémia V. üzem
name of the owner: STATE PROPERTY AGENCY
operating the facility: Alkaloida Vegyészeti Gyár RT

the exact location of the facility: TISZAVASVÁRI
Kabai János u. 29.

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| production (t): 0 | capacity (t): 0 |
| consumption (t): 50-200 | capacity (t): 100-200 |

3.

name of the facility: Kémia VII. X. XII.
name of the owner: CHINOIN RT
operating the facility: CHINOIN RT

the exact location of the facility: BUDAPEST
4.kerület Tó u.1-5

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| production (t): 0 | capacity (t): 0 |
| consumption (t): 50-200 | capacity (t): 100-200 |

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1136
CD/CW/WP.389
27 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

THE CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Protection against Chemical Weapons (Data bank of available basic means)

1. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has repeatedly stated that it does not possess chemical weapons, and it has declared its intention to become an original signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention. All steps undertaken by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the various fields within the existing rolling text (CD/1116) have been aimed at an early conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
2. In the light of openness and transparency, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has informed the Conference on Disarmament (CD) about its past and current activities in the sphere of the chemical industry, including military facilities, as well as other relevant industrial branches. Documents CD/1021, CD/1022, CD/1048 have illustrated the positive and concrete contribution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to the on-going negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.
3. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic welcomes all activities and proposals leading to the intensification of the work on the text of the CWC. In accordance with the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the negotiations on a multilateral Convention continue to intensify with a view to achieving a final agreement on the CWC during 1992. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament, is working for the successful end of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and it shares the responsibility for reaching that goal.
4. In this connection, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic sees, inter alia, the necessity for making the work of subsidiary bodies, which will be established under the future CWC, much easier. From this point of view, it should be underlined that one of the important questions dealing with the future Convention is the protection against use of CW. According to the present rolling text (CD/1116), article X, paragraph 4: "The Technical Secretariat shall establish within 180 days after the entry into force of the

Convention and maintain, for the use of any requesting State party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons ...".

5. In this connection, the early establishment of such data bank will be a significant step towards the fulfilment of the spirit and letter of the CWC. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as an advance expression of its interest in the CWC would like to provide, on a voluntary basis, the data with means and equipment for protection against CW. These means are specified as follows.

6.

| Mean | Characterization | Note |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| 7-MEOTA | Antidote against psychotomimetic compounds like BZ | Possible use for civilian purposes (injections and tablets) |
| Injection part of the Autoinjector | Antidote against nerve agents containing reactivator and atropine | In plastic syringe, it can be used also without Autoinjector (injection) |
| FOSAN | Antidote against nerve agents. Multipack of reactivator with atropine (solution) | Injection |
| CHONOL I | Antidote against nerve agents. Multipack of atropine (isotonized solution) | Common drug, injection |
| CHONOL II | Antidote against nerve agents. Multipack of benactyzine (isotonized, lyophilized) | Common drug, injection |
| RENOL | Antidote against nerve agents. Lyophilized new reactivator | Pharmacological efficacy is very high, injection |
| PANPAL | Prophylactic antidote against nerve agents containing reversible inhibitor of cholinesterase, combined with two parasympatholytics | Obduced tablets and capsules |
| DESPRACH | Emergency decontamination kit | Based on a sorption mechanical principle (powder) |
| Antichemical carrier PCHB-60-P | For decontamination and disinfection of the skin (two parts solution) | For decontamination of 50 sq. dm |

| Mean | Characterization | Note |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| PCHB-60-P kit | For decontamination, and containing solutions for additional decontamination | Enlargement of decontamination area |
| Protective mask M-10 | Face-type mask with two filter elements inserted into pouches molded in the cheeks of the facepiece. It protects respiratory system, eyes and the face surface against CWA, radioactive compounds (RC) and biological warfare agents (BWA) in the form of vapours, gases and aerosols. | It has been verified in field conditions |
| Protective mask M-10 M | Innovative mask of M-10 type, facepieces are resistant to scraping, it offers capability to drink water and to transduct speech through the soundpermeable membrane. | It has been verified in field conditions |
| Protective cape JP-75A | Protection of persons, their clothing and personal arms against CWA, RC, BWA. Partly resists to light emission of nuclear weapons (NW) and incendiary weapons (IW), consisting of cape, gloves and rubbers. | It has been verified in field conditions |
| Protective clothing OPCH 90 | Individual protective equipment of isolating type for special troops, with increased hermeticity and improved physiological tolerance to heat. It protects body surface and personal equipment against RC, CWA, BWA and industrial chemicals of polar character. Single protection against light emission of NW and IW including short-term fireproofing. The variant with active airflow mechanism allows staying and moving in this protective device for a 24-hour period (up to 30° C and 55 per cent humidity) or working (middle effort) at least for a 3-hour period. The passive variant offers the same parameters as OPCH-70. | It has been verified in field conditions |

| Mean | Characterization | Note |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Protective cape PO-90 | A protective device of isolative type for multipurpose use. It protects against CWA, BWA and rain. Single protection against light emission of NW and IW. Usable for simple porch, tent or water resistant bed | It has been verified in field conditions |
| Change clothing FOP-85 | A mean of filter-type, it protects body surface against CWA | It has been verified in field conditions |
| Protective clothing OPCH-70 | It offers antichemical protection of body surface for special troops. It is a heavy-duty equipment which protects against CWA, BWA and RC, predestinated for long-lasting period of use in the contaminated areas | It has been verified in field conditions |

7. The enumerated list of means creates the basis for antichemical protection in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Some of them are available for sale. Some should be order, in case of necessity, in advance. Many of them are commercially used in the specialized facilities for protection against highly toxic chemicals, for the treatment of accidental poisonings or diseases. Some of them have been verified and tested in field conditions.

8. The proposed list might represent the first contribution to the data bank of the means for antichemical defence of the future CWC Organization and its Technical Secretariat. At the same time, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic understands that only in cooperation with other States parties and data bank will be reasonable and useful. That is why the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic invites other delegations to follow its step in this field.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1137
27 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION STUDY NO. 4 ENTITLED "VERIFICATION TO THE YEAR 2000" 1/

We have just received a new booklet in the Canadian series Arms Control Verification Studies, No. 4, entitled "Verification to the year 2000".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of this booklet, under a CD number, to all member and participating non-member State delegations.

(Signed): A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this booklet in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1138
27 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PUBLICATION ENTITLED "BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: 1962-1991" 1/

You will find enclosed copies of a new Canadian ACD publication, entitled "Bibliography on Arms control Verification: 1962-1999".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed): A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this publication in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1139
28 February 1992

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ECUADOR ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN ECUADOR AND PERU

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the "Draft agreement on measures of confidence and cooperation" as submitted by the Ambassador of Ecuador to Peru for the consideration of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, Mr. Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, on 28 October 1991, further to the proposal made 21 days earlier in the United Nations General Assembly by the President of the Republic of Ecuador, Mr. Rodrigo Borja, for a permanent solution to the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru through the arbitration of Pope John Paul II.

I should be most grateful, Sir, if, in accordance with established practice, you would arrange for the text to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all delegations both of Member States and of the non-Member States participating in work of the Conference.

(Signed): Francisco Riofrío
Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

"DRAFT AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION

The Government of the Republic of Ecuador and the Government of the Republic of Peru,

Having decided to strengthen the ties of solidarity and mutual confidence between the two countries,

Persuaded that this is the spirit inspiring the whole of Latin America in the search for conditions which will bring its peoples closer together in a joint effort to strengthen unity, peace, security and cooperation in the region,

Convinced that the process of regional and subregional integration is essential for the development of both countries and requires political will to prevent and overcome tensions through understanding and cooperation,

Reaffirming the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States, as well as in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, wishing to strengthen their spirit of conciliation,

Resolved to live as neighbours in observance of the obligation to resolve all disputes by peaceful means and under no circumstances to resort to the threat or use of force,

Have agreed to conclude the following Agreement, for which purpose they have designated as their representatives:

His Excellency the Constitutional President of the Republic of Ecuador, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.,

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Peru, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr., who have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any act incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Charter of the Organization of American States and

reaffirm their obligation to refrain from resorting directly or indirectly, to any form of the threat or use of force in their mutual international relations.

The Parties therefore undertake not to invade or occupy the territory of the other Party and to refrain from any act constituting aggression within the meaning of United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, and from any other act which might jeopardize the peaceful coexistence of the two countries.

ARTICLE II

The Parties reaffirm their obligation to resolve exclusively by peaceful means and in accordance with international law all problems and incidents, including any arising as a result of reports of military incursions.

Until such time as any such situations are resolved, the Parties shall hold consultations with a view to avoiding acts which might impair the coexistence of the two countries and adopting measures to bring about détente.

In the event of a military incident which cannot be dealt with by the military mechanisms in force between the armed forces of the two countries agreed on as part of the confidence measures, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Parties shall seek ways and means of arriving at mutually satisfactory solutions in order to avoid any worsening of tension and to safeguard international peace. The measures adopted in this connection may include the establishment, by joint agreement, of demilitarized zones in the areas of conflict.

ARTICLE III

The Parties agree to promote a climate of friendship and confidence between the two countries and undertake to maintain peaceful and good neighbourly relations, for which purpose they shall encourage ties based on solidarity, justice and understanding, with a view to strengthening their mutual cooperation and overcome any obstacles which may arise to peaceful coexistence and the overall development of their peoples.

ARTICLE IV

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification to take place at the Secretariat of the United Nations, with which the Parties undertake to register the Agreement in

accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, and which shall be the depositary of this instrument and of the relevant instruments of ratification.

Upon the signing of this Agreement, the Parties shall refrain from any acts which might frustrate the purposes for which it is concluded.

ARTICLE V

This Agreement shall remain in effect indefinitely."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1140
28 February 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING THE OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1992
FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBER STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

I have the honour to send you herewith the official text of the letter dated 8 February 1992 from the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the member States of the Conference on Disarmament concerning the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

I would be grateful if you would circulate this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and arrange for its translation into the other languages of the Conference.

(Signed) Dr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner
(Ambassador)

Excellency,

The participants in the Geneva negotiations on Chemical Weapons set themselves in their mandate the goal of successfully concluding the Convention in 1992.

This year offers us the opportunity to achieve the aim to which we publicly committed ourselves on 11 January 1989 at the Paris Conference: "To prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". We can fulfil the high expectations we placed in this Convention only through joint action. Our representatives at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament have already achieved consensus on major sections of the rolling text of the Convention. The remaining issues now call for joint efforts. I am convinced that we can reach consensus on the Chemical Weapons Convention in this year's negotiations, and I would ask you to give this goal, which affects mankind as a whole, your personal attention.

The Federal Republic of Germany whose representative at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has this year assumed the chairmanship of the negotiations for the first time, is aware of the special responsibility this entails. I should like to convey my sincere thanks for the confidence your country placed in us through this election. The Federal Government will do all within its power to seek the successful conclusion of the negotiations, if possible by the middle of this year.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany

DOCUMENT IDENTIQUE A L'ORIGINAL

DOCUMENT IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL