

44. Mr. Pipinelis recalled that, within the framework of peaceful agreements of neutrality, Greece had been able to maintain friendly and close relations with its friends of the West and with the Empire of the Tsars. There had been a peaceful interplay of political and intellectual forces without detriment to Greece's relations with any Power. Once the respect for the independence of small countries was established, their relations with the great Powers could not cause offence to anybody. Sooner or later that concept would have to be accepted as the inevitable basis of normal international relations. The grandeur of the democratic system was to be found in the confidence with which the western nations accepted the free interplay and competition of forces all over the world. He asked whether a great country like the USSR could accept as final an attitude of mistrust toward the free interplay of forces which made it compete with most of the other peoples and which at the same time was a lamentable confession of weakness and failure. After all that had happened since the First World War, it was necessary to make a new start and to sum up in a few clear principles the needs and yearnings of millions of human beings, and first of all the hopes of those who were suffering under a foreign yoke or under the threat of invasion. That was why he welcomed the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom as a move of great vision.

45. Mr. CARÍAS (Honduras) acknowledged that the great Powers carried a major historical re-

sponsibility. Considering the grave international problems confronting the world, he regretted and wondered at the lack of confidence and good-will. He could not believe that the tragedies and lessons of the war had been forgotten. The small nations had a great moral duty to discharge and they must play their part. Since all the people of the world would suffer in any future war, the Members of the United Nations must try to eliminate psychological barriers and conceptions of racial superiority. The participants in the work of United Nations were no longer simple observers and must take upon themselves the duty of deciding the future of humanity. It was necessary to close all doors to hatred and to look for a new living interpretation of justice. He believed that it was possible for man to recover faith and to create a new atmosphere of hope instead of despondency. The delegation of Honduras would give its enthusiastic support to the joint draft resolution of the United States and United Kingdom, which was based on the Charter and established the fundamental principles for a permanent peace. Failure to respect those principles would certainly lead to the continuation of international tension. It was absolutely essential that all Members should act in accordance with those principles, in the spirit of co-operation in which the United Nations had been founded.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPÉR (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (*continued*)**

1. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that, while it was easy enough to reply to Mr. Vyshinsky's arguments (325th meeting), he could feel no enthusiasm at taking part in a debate which would serve no useful purpose. Although discussion to reach and eventually carry out an agreement was the very basis of the political life and the strength of the United Kingdom, that was unfortunately not the case in the Assembly, where agreement was impossible unless the views of the USSR were adopted.

2. The case made by Mr. Vyshinsky was not a new one. He had asserted that the United Kingdom, the United States and certain other countries were preparing a new war of aggression, and gave as proof of his thesis the facts that their military budgets were being increased; that they were extending their network of strategic bases; that a campaign of slander had been launched against the Soviet Union; and that those States were blocking all progress towards international control of atomic energy and of atomic weapons.

3. It would be interesting to know whether Mr. Vyshinsky in fact believed that the democracies were preparing for an aggressive war. If that were so, he would have been deceiving himself

with his own propaganda, and in that case other methods of discussion should be used. Nevertheless, Mr. Vyshinsky's work and intellectual capacity, and even his arguments, showed that he was not allowing himself to be deceived by his own propaganda and that he must therefore be aware of the gulf that separated the facts as they were from the facts as he presented them.

4. No one could deny that the people of the Soviet Union wished for peace. In that connexion, the people of the USSR did not differ from any other people in the world. As a matter of fact, Mr. Vyshinsky admitted that fact when it suited him. Was not the basis of his propaganda in the United Nations and the propaganda to which he gave free rein at so-called peace congresses that the peoples normally and passionately wished for peace? Nevertheless, it had to be said that the closer a Government was to the people, the more a people could apply pressure on the Government and the less likely was the danger of aggressive war. Thus, if Mr. Vyshinsky wished to persuade the First Committee that the United Kingdom was preparing for a new war, he would have to prove that the Government of the United Kingdom was in a more authoritarian position in relation to its people than the Government of the USSR was in relation to the Soviet people.

5. It was well-known that elections in the United Kingdom took place by secret ballot, that opposition was not only permitted, but encouraged, and that newspapers could publish any information

and present arguments against the Authorities, provided that they conformed with the laws of the country, which protected all citizens, irrespective of their position. Mr. Vyshinsky, on the other hand, could not give a similar picture of the relation between the Government and peoples of the USSR. Everyone, including Mr. Vyshinsky and the Government of the Soviet Union, knew that in modern times no freely-elected Government could launch an aggressive war against anyone: that was a political impossibility. But it was also a fact that the democracies would never abandon their dignity and their freedom. They would not stand idle before threats against their freedom: their experience had shown them that union was the only possible means of defence. Rightly or wrongly, they had reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union constituted a threat for them, and they had therefore decided to organize their defence jointly.

6. In speaking of the so-called peace congresses, Mr. Vyshinsky had stated that the Soviet Union was marching at the head of 600 million people throughout the world who believed that the USSR was the only leader of the peace movement. It would be interesting to know where those 600 million persons were to be found, since the Communists had lost an enormous number of votes in the elections recently held in Norway, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, New York State and the United Kingdom. Wherever free elections had been held recently, the results had shown that their electoral successes of 1945 and 1946, which had been due to admiration for the resistance of the Russian people against Hitlerite aggression, had disappeared. That sympathy for the Russian people had vanished because of the ambition and arrogance shown by the Soviet leaders in their statements and activities.

7. The number of the sympathizers of the Soviet Union had diminished in the elections that had taken place recently in democratic countries because free peoples were no longer deceived by the melodious accents of Mr. Vyshinsky. Behind the mellifluity of his speech they had discovered the poison fangs of the Soviet Union Government, and had therefore organized their joint defence.

8. Mr. Vyshinsky had alleged that the military budgets of the United States and the United Kingdom had been increased. In that connexion, Mr. McNeil would recall that the military forces of his country had been reduced from 5 million to 750,000 men and that in the current year, at a time when, according to Mr. Vyshinsky, the joint action of the United States and United Kingdom had reached its culminating point, another 20,000 soldiers had been demobilized. On the other hand, the Committee had not been informed of any comparable reduction of USSR military forces, which in the preceding year had totalled 4 million men. Although the military budgets of the democratic States were greater than their Governments would wish, they were nevertheless of modest dimensions when compared with that of the USSR.

9. It was true that the United Kingdom and the United States had a certain number of bases in various parts of the world. In the case of the United Kingdom, those bases were necessary for the defence of communication routes between the United Kingdom and its dependent territories which were scattered throughout the world.

Nevertheless, those bases were of a purely defensive nature. Furthermore, contrary to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had, since the war, extended that network of bases in order to encircle the USSR. British and American troops had evacuated China and Burma, and the United Kingdom troops had been withdrawn from Australia, New Zealand and New Guinea; they had also been withdrawn from French territories overseas, from Italy, from Greece, from Syria, from Lebanon and from other areas. On the other hand, Soviet troops still remained in nearly all the territories acquired by the USSR at the end of the war: they still remained in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabia, and even in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. It was noteworthy that the announcement of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece had not changed the attitude of the Soviet Union delegation and had evoked no comment from it. That might perhaps be explained by the fact that the withdrawal had taken place at a time when the Soviet Union was installing Marshal Rokossovsky in Warsaw.

10. Mr. Vyshinsky had endeavoured to prove that the United Kingdom and the United States were carrying out a campaign of slander against the USSR, and, as usual, he had made use of newspaper clippings to prove his point. That being the case, why did he not explain to the Committee why those same newspapers could not circulate freely in the USSR? And how could he explain that the Soviet Union was trying to jam the broadcasts of the BBC? The USSR policy to prevent the broadcasts of foreign news could only be compared to Goebbels' policy during the war. While the initial attempts at jamming had had some success, that was no longer true in the Moscow region, where the BBC programmes could be heard without difficulty on frequencies in the 25, 31 and 13 meter bands. If, however, the USSR again tried to jam the BBC news, the Soviet people would inevitably come to the conclusion that the USSR Government was afraid to let truth be known.

11. Mr. Vyshinsky's last charge concerned the problem of atomic energy. In that respect, the USSR representative had stated that the United States had made every attempt to draw up a plan which could not be adopted. If such was the case, Mr. Vyshinsky would only have to indicate his willingness to accept the plan in order to refute the United States. It would then be possible to see whether the United States really intended that its plan should not be adopted. In support of his argument, Mr. Vyshinsky had also mentioned the stocks of atomic weapons which had been accumulated by the United States; but he had also indicated that the USSR possessed stocks of atomic weapons. How could those stocks constitute, on the one hand, the proof of the pacific intentions of the USSR, and on the other, the proof of the aggressive intentions of the United States?

12. Mr. Vyshinsky, moreover, maintained that the international body envisaged by the plan of the majority would be a danger to peace, because it would be dominated by the United States. The USSR representative did not make the same objection with regard to his plan, although the proportion of Americans in the international secretariat of the body he proposed would probably be the same. The real reason for that difference of attitude lay in the fact that the system proposed

by the USSR delegation would be ineffective, and that, consequently, Mr. Vyshinsky took no interest in the composition of that body's secretariat. Finally, the system of periodic inspection proposed by the USSR plan was absurd. Had Mr. Vyshinsky not himself stated, when the Greek question had been discussed (306th meeting), that the proposed inspection to control on the spot the conditions in which Greek partisans had been interned in Albania was ludicrous? If the inspection of such a simple matter appeared absurd to the USSR delegation, periodic inspection of the much more complicated problem of the production of atomic energy would be even more ludicrous.

13. The USSR representative had rightly recalled that one of the essential elements in the preparation of a war of aggression was the fanning of national hatreds. He had attempted to maintain that the United Kingdom was carrying out such a campaign of hatred, but his efforts had been fruitless, because in the United Kingdom, it was the people who controlled the Government, not the Government the people. But the States in the best position to develop such propaganda of hatred were those which possessed governmental propaganda machines. It was superfluous to recall the power exerted by the USSR through the Communist Party and the *Cominform*. That propaganda was carried on not only through the Press, but also by means of the radio, cinemas, theatres, conferences, art galleries and even scientific laboratories. It had contaminated the pacific peoples of half a continent, and whatever the language in which it was disseminated it aimed everywhere at creating confusion and hatred.

14. Four years previously, Soviet sabotage might still have produced some effect, but at the present time, it would be in vain for Mr. Vyshinsky to try to convince the Committee that the policy of his country was based on peace. Every one knew that the strategy of the Soviet Union was based on the idea of the inevitability of war between the Soviet Union and the so-called imperialist Powers, as explained by Lenin and repeated by Stalin in the latter's book *Problems of Leninism*. In the Soviet opinion, therefore, war was inevitable and the proletariat of the Soviet Union must be certain of military supremacy, because its ultimate aim was world hegemony. In such conditions, why did the instigators of war seem so interested in peace? Why were instructions sent to the various peace congresses which were held periodically almost everywhere? Why were meaningless, evasive, and insulting resolutions submitted by the USSR representatives in favour of "Soviet peace"? The reply was simple: it was because, in the existing circumstances, those tactics furthered the aims of the Soviet foreign policy, namely world revolution and Soviet supremacy. In the circumstances, it was useless for Mr. Vyshinsky to quote still other passages or to refute the passages from the works of Stalin or Lenin which had just been mentioned. Mr. Vyshinsky would not convince anyone of his Government's change of attitude until that Government told the Soviet people that the ideas of Leninists concerning the inevitability of war were ideas of the past and that a new period was about to begin. Unfortunately, Soviet propaganda was now declaring that the military expenses of the democratic States were impoverishing the people, while the Red Army and the armies of the satellite States were glorified as the bulwarks of peace, without any

effort being made to explain why those two comparable phenomena should be so different.

15. The peaceful intentions of Mr. Vyshinsky must not be judged by the texts of his proposals, but by the acts of his Government. Unfortunately, since 1945, the Soviet Union had systematically refused to co-operate with other nations. It had refused to accept the plan of international control of atomic energy adopted by an overwhelming majority, and it had prevented any progress being made in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, rejecting even a plan providing for the exchange of information concerning military effectiveness. It had refused to participate in a number of specialized agencies of the United Nations; in at least one case, it had rejected decisions of the International Court of Justice and had refused to submit to that Court questions which it had discussed in the Assembly on legal grounds. Lastly, it had used the Trusteeship Council merely to spread confusion. It was obvious that the Western democracies, confronted with such a systematic effort to sabotage peace, could not be blamed for having used discretion.

16. Mr. McNeil called the attention of the members of the Committee to two other factors which constituted, on the part of the Soviet Union, an obstacle to international co-operation. The first was Mr. Vyshinsky's adherence to a narrow concept of national sovereignty. That concept was obsolete. The political reality of the twentieth century was the joint exercise of national sovereignties for the purpose of solving problems which could not be solved unilaterally. A State did not lose its prestige or surrender any of its essential functions by taking part in a joint action. The idea of national sovereignty belonged to the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, international co-operation had become indispensable.

17. The second of those factors was the idea of the authority of the Soviet State in domestic policy. In his book, *The Law of the Soviet State*, Mr. Vyshinsky justified for the dictatorship of the proletariat the right to pitilessly suppress its adversaries. The democratic States had every reason to fear that the use of force might not be confined to internal policy, but extend to the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. It might be wondered, therefore, whether Mr. Vyshinsky, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country, did not have the same concept of the authority of the State as that which he defended as Public Prosecutor. The rigid and inflexible language which he used to express his ideas concerning national sovereignty seemed to confirm that view.

18. In conclusion, Mr. McNeil recalled that, with the exception of the delegations which had consistently voted with the USSR delegation, all Members had stated that progress in international co-operation would be impossible unless there was a radical change in the policy of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, no one knew whether the Soviet leaders were aware of that fact, and certainly the Soviet people knew nothing of it. Mr. McNeil appealed to the USSR representative to inform his colleagues of the view-point of the Governments outside the Soviet sphere of influence. He should tell them of the growing despair of peoples wishing to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but being prevented from doing so by its policy; he should tell them that the conscience of the world was revolted by the cynicism

of the Soviet regime, that the peoples of the world were rising against the outmoded beliefs of the nineteenth century which separated nations and continents and to which the Soviet Union still adhered tenaciously, and that those people were on the march against isolationism, the mistaken belief that a nation could be self-sufficient. Mr. Vyshinsky should also tell his colleagues of the desire of the Western democracies to see changes brought about, provided that those changes did not endanger the virtues rescued at such a price from the hitlerite domination.

19. He recalled that Iran, France, the Czechoslovakia of Benes and Masaryk, Chile, China, Canada, Yugoslavia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, Turkey, Norway and Denmark had, in varying degrees, been subjected to pressure or propaganda on the part of the USSR, and noted that Denmark had been obliged to abandon its policy of neutrality of more than a century. Could all those countries be described as instigators of war? Could it be said that Denmark harboured aggressive or territorial ambitions? If those countries had been obliged to unite in defensive military action, it was not because they wanted war, which they detested, but because they feared the return of another bestial conflict. That coalition had been formed under the pressure of events. But the existence of that pressure was carefully hidden from the Soviet people, and it was kept in ignorance of the fear other countries had of the Soviet Union.

20. If today the coalition of opinion against the Soviet Union was stronger than it had been against the Hitler régime, during its darkest period, the reason could be found in the fact that a dictatorship was endeavouring to impose its will, not only on its own people, but by direct action in Europe and Asia and by indirect methods in every part of the world.

21. The world was no doubt not on the verge of war. It was true that the Stalin régime was not contemplating war, nor was any other Government. But it was plain that the Soviet campaign to sabotage peace was having disastrous consequences. Relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world were not improving, and there was a danger that they would be reduced to a minimum. But the world was too small for division. Separation would be fatal for all, and would constitute a threat of future war. The democratic nations were therefore pleading that the Government of the Soviet Union should co-operate, however modestly, with all other Governments in order to contribute to the restoration of international confidence on which any world agreement or world changes must be founded.

22. Mr. McNeil appealed to the Soviet Union Government to raise the curtain isolating its country. He asked the USSR authorities to allow foreign reviews and newspapers to circulate freely, to grant free transit to journalists, so that the people of the USSR and the other peoples of the world might know exactly what was happening in foreign countries. An immediate lessening of political tension would be the result, for truth would immediately render propaganda ineffective.

23. The United Kingdom representative felt that agreements, no matter how modest, should first be reached on various questions. In fact, if an agreement could not be reached on Berlin, there

was little hope of reaching an agreement on the atomic bomb, and if a trade agreement on the routes for aircraft proceeding to Moscow could not be signed, it was improbable that an agreement would ever be reached on Berlin. Above all, the USSR delegation should re-examine its reactionary conception of the sovereignty of the State. The United Nations was the result of the need of the twentieth century for joint action. The United Nations Charter not only authorized, but obliged its Members to seek jointly a solution to their problems. Mr. McNeil stated that he did not wish to comment on the five-Power pact. A treaty of such importance was not suddenly produced from nothing. Moreover, the need was not for new treaties, but for the implementation of the numerous existing ones.

24. Mr. WIERBLOWSKY (Poland) stated that scarcely had Mr. Vyshinsky completed his statement in the First Committee on Monday, 14 November (325th meeting), when the text of Mr. Austin's speech and proposal had been distributed, a fact indicating that those documents had been prepared in advance without regard for the arguments brought forward by Mr. Vyshinsky. Sure of the support of the majority, Mr. Austin had not troubled to burden his speech with arguments. He had merely sprinkled it with anti-Soviet headlines culled from the American Press.

25. The cold war now waging had been provoked by the ruling circles of the United States, and it must not be allowed to become a conflagration which would bring with it the destruction of civilization. The pseudo-monopolists of the atomic bomb had posed as leaders and saviours fighting an imaginary danger originating in the Soviet Union. Thousands of millions of dollars had been expended to further the aims of those who would profit from a new war. That policy had had a certain amount of success in the United States and the United Kingdom, but it could not ultimately succeed, for the masses of the people throughout the world knew very well who had liberated them from German national socialism, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism. They had not forgotten the heroic defence of Stalingrad, and they knew that the Soviet Union, busy as it was with the reconstruction of its war-devastated cities, would never entertain aggressive intentions.

26. The Soviet Union had submitted a constructive proposal. That proposal called for the condemnation of the preparation for a new war now being made in some countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. The Press gave new information on that subject every day. The military budget of the United States was growing rapidly. New weapons were being manufactured. The network of military air and naval bases was spreading ever further along the Mediterranean coast, in the territories of the former Italian colonies and in the Pacific. Western Germany and Japan were being progressively transformed into United States military bases. Military blocs of an aggressive nature were being established by the United States and the United Kingdom. The contention that such a development was defensive was contradicted by an increasingly violent war propaganda. Mr. Canon, a member of the Congress of the United States, had gone so far as to propose that an atomic bomb should be dropped on Moscow. Similarly, the United States General Bradley had stated that strategic bombings had priority in United States

military preparations because during the first stage of the future war, the United States would not have sufficient troops to fight against the Soviet Union. The Press was attempting to stimulate hatred against the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracies. It consistently treated the Soviet Union as a potential aggressor. All that was taking place in spite of obligations under the Charter and in spite of resolution 110 (II) against war propaganda unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1947. The United Kingdom and the United States were also aware of resolution 190 (III) unanimously adopted in 1948, appealing to the five great Powers to compose their differences by peaceful means and to strengthen co-operation amongst themselves. During the discussion that had taken place, no one had denied the existence of war propaganda. On the other hand, an attempt had been made to lead the discussion towards subjects having nothing to do with that with which the Committee was concerned. The word "propaganda" had been flourished incessantly. If that word meant that the position taken by the countries of the people's democracies expressed the feelings of the masses, there could be no objection of its use. But those who set the peoples of the world against each other and used the atomic bomb as a threat should be ashamed of their war propaganda. How could they describe as propaganda manoeuvres the resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union since 1946: the proposal for the withdrawal of armed forces, the resolution against warmongers, the proposal made in 1948 for the reduction by one-third of conventional armaments?

27. Mr. Austin was falsifying history in order to accuse the Soviet Union of having abused the unanimity principle at Yalta, Potsdam, in the Allied Control Council, in the Council of Foreign Ministers and during the negotiations on the Peace Treaties. But how could such an accusation be made, since it was precisely at Yalta that the voting formula had been established? Mr. Wierblowsky quoted the report of the late Mr. Stettinius, former United States Secretary of State, on the Yalta Conference, which pointed out that the Soviet Union had made more concessions there to the United States and the United Kingdom than those two had granted to the Soviet Union, and that the Conference had been a diplomatic triumph for the United States. Senator Barkley, today Vice-President of the United States, had said that the result of the Conference had represented a great success for President Roosevelt. Mr. Harry Hopkins, one of the members of the United States delegation to the Conference, had expressed the same opinions. The examples quoted by Mr. Austin on the subject of the Potsdam Conference were just as fallacious. With regard to the Allied Control Council in Germany, that body had functioned until the United States had refused its co-operation. As for the Council of Foreign Ministers, it had prepared five peace treaties as well as numerous decrees, laws and orders, and it was only thanks to the spirit of co-operation shown by the Soviet Union that those treaties had come into force. With regard to the Peace Treaty with Italy, Mr. Wierblowsky asked where the responsibility lay for the failure to elect a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste? It had been enough for the Soviet Union to support the nomination of a candidate suggested by the United Kingdom for the latter country to refuse to accept him.

28. Who had actually failed to observe their commitments during and after the Second World War? As early as 1942, the Western Allies had undertaken to open a second front, and for two years they had failed to keep their promise, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was fighting 200 German divisions. The purpose of that delay was to weaken the Soviet Union in order to impose upon it, after the war, the will of the Anglo-American bloc. The violations of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements on Germany had reached their culminating point in the establishment of the puppet Government of Bonn, in which hitlerite elements were represented. The Conference that had just taken place in Paris between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France was one more step towards the development of a German military potential and the incorporation of Western Germany in the Western Union.

29. The Truman doctrine, which it was claimed was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, really sanctioned the principle of interference in the domestic affairs of States. The American Professor Burchard had justly said that that doctrine knew no frontiers. It flagrantly violated Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, just as did the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the Truman doctrine, Greece and South Korea had become United States colonies.

30. Mr. Austin had mentioned figures relating to the military aid rendered to the Soviet Union by the United States during the war. But how could the sacrifices needed to win a war be assessed in dollars? Those in Europe who had known and felt what war was, judged their effort by the blood shed by their soldiers. If there had been no Soviet army, the world would now be a prey to the hitlerite nightmare. For the countries of the people's democracies, the war which had recently ended had not been a war of domination, a war of conquest for the acquisition of new territories or a war for the domination of markets; it had been a war of liberation, on which the invaded nations' very existence had depended. If any State had come out of that war richer and more powerful, it was certainly the United States. Moreover, the United States had increased its possessions: had Mr. Austin forgotten the Pacific islands, the unilateral administration of Japan, and American economic penetration into other countries? The difference between the attitude of the United States and that of the Soviet Union with regard to small countries was very well illustrated by the following fact: that the Soviet Union, which had received from Denmark bases on the island of Bornholm under the same conditions as the United States had received bases in Greenland, had left those bases as soon as the war had ended, and had restored to Denmark its sovereignty over the island, whereas American troops were still stationed in Greenland, and the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty were being used to stifle Denmark's protests in that respect.

31. Mr. Austin had also insinuated that the elections which had taken place in Poland some three years earlier had not been free, and he had accused the Soviet Union of having manipulated them. It should be remembered that 90 per cent of the electorate had taken part in those elections, and that the opposition parties had secured about 20 per cent of the votes. Hundreds of foreign journalists, especially American, had



been moving about in the country at the time and the majority of them had observed that the elections were entirely free. Mr. Austin, however, would obviously have preferred elections like those which had taken place in Greece, Portugal, South Korea and Italy, not to mention those which were customary in the states of Alabama, Virginia and South Carolina, where the property qualification was still in force. Mr. Austin had not mentioned that 30 per cent of the negroes in the United States were officially denied the right to vote, whilst a further 30 per cent of them were in practice debarred from voting. As for the results of the elections in Italy mentioned by Mr. McNeil, the latter should remember that the Popular Front had secured 48.7 per cent of the votes. It was a pity that he had not spoken of France, nor of China, which had also voted, but without having recourse to a ballot. Mr. McNeil would soon have to concede the result of that vote.

32. Mr. Austin had also alluded to a so-called partition of Poland, whereas that country had never been as united as it was today. If anyone desired its partition, it could only be Mr. Austin and his friend Mr. Bevin, who would like to give Western Poland to Germany. If the allusion in question related to the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, it should be emphasized that the Polish Government considered the reunion of the peoples of the Ukraine and Byelorussia to be a just and fair act. That decision, moreover, had been taken on the advice of the United Kingdom Government. In that connexion, Mr. Austin might ask Mr. McNeil who Lord Curzon was, and what was meant by the Curzon Line.

33. Mention had also been made of Marshal Rokossovsky. He was a Pole, born in Warsaw, where he had spent his childhood and his youth and had joined the workers' movement. Poland at that time had formed part of Czarist Russia, and all Poles had been enlisted in the Russian Army. That was how he had come to Russia, where he had stayed for many years. It was not surprising that a Pole should have fought in the Soviet Army, for one of the traditions of the Polish people was to fight for other countries, in the defence of their liberties; the Polish Generals Zablowski and Danbrowski had been leaders of the *Paris Commune*, the Polish General Bem had fought for Hungarian freedom, and the Poles Kosciuszko and Pulaski fought for the independence of the United States. But they had always returned to their country, as Marshal Rokossovsky had done.

34. Mr. Austin and Mr. McNeil had referred to the respect of human rights. Instead of concerning himself with the alleged violation of those rights in other countries, Mr. Austin should devote his attention to the problem of racial discrimination in the United States. Since President Truman had come into Power there had been 90 cases of lynching, but not a single conviction.

35. In regard to the exchange of ideas and freedom of movement, to which Mr. Austin had also referred, it would appear that Mr. Austin considered the purest expression of that concept to be the "Voice of America". Anyone who had heard those broadcasts knew that they transmitted nothing but libellous propaganda against the Gov-

ernments and the peoples to which they were addressed. Similar activities were carried on in Warsaw by the American Information Centre, which abused diplomatic privileges. As to the question of visits to the United States by students and scholars, a few specific cases might serve to illustrate the state of affairs that prevailed. The Polish Professor Szebiatowski, holder of a UNESCO fellowship, on his arrival in the United States, had immediately been taken to Ellis Island and subjected to interrogation, as if he had been a common criminal. Another Polish holder of a fellowship, Mr. Morawieski, had been sent to the United Nations Secretariat to complete a course of several weeks, as a reward for a paper he had written on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His visa allowed him to travel only between his place of residence and Lake Success. There was no need to recall the restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of the foreign scholars who had attended the Peace Congress in New York last year. In regard to journalists' visits to Poland and the United States, over 500 Press correspondents, the majority of them American, had visited Poland during the past three years, whereas the correspondents of Polish newspapers had to wait for months on end before obtaining their entry visas to the United States and were subjected to every kind of interrogation by the United States Consulate.

36. Mr. Austin had reproached the Soviet Union for not participating in the work of the United Nations specialized agencies. Poland was a member of nearly all those agencies and had been able to experience the negative benefits of participation in their work. The Polish request to the International Bank for a loan for the reconstruction of war-devastated areas, for instance, had remained unanswered, despite the favourable conclusions of the Economic Commission for Europe on the advantages of some of the plans proposed. The President of the Bank had stated in the Economic and Social Council that the Bank had not been influenced in its decision by economic factors. To quote another example, Poland had wanted to build a laboratory for penicillin production, the equipment for which would have been procured by the World Health Organization and had to be bought in the United States. But the United States Government had refused to grant the necessary export licenses, despite the recommendations of the World Health Organization. How, in the circumstances, could one believe Mr. Austin when he affirmed his desire for international co-operation?

37. The statement of the Tito representative was modelled on Mr. Austin's argument and was nothing more than a series of attacks against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. The Titoists had thrown off the mask and revealed themselves as enemies of peace. Mr. Djilas had slandered the Soviet Union, affirming that it was threatening Yugoslavia's independence and sovereignty, whereas Tito's supporters, suffering from megalomania, were working for hegemony in the Balkans, the idea of a greater Serbia, and the economic and political colonization of Albania. Even without the Rajk trial in Hungary or the Petrovich trial in Poland, the statements by the Tito representatives in the First Committee would have been enough to show that they were the servants of imperialism.

38. Neither Mr. Austin nor the representatives supporting him could deny the obvious facts mentioned in paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal. What Mr. Austin was asking the Members of the United Nations to do was to approve propaganda for a new war and preparations to that end. The adoption of such a conception would seriously endanger the existence of the United Nations.

39. The second purpose of the Soviet Union draft resolution was to condemn the use of the atomic bomb as well as other weapons for mass extermination which had been recognized by all as contrary to the conscience of the civilized world and incompatible with membership in the United Nations. The condemnation of those weapons was the logical result of paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal, for war propaganda and threats of the use of the atomic bomb were closely linked. The United States policy, in regard to the atomic bomb, was responsible for the war propaganda. The prohibition of the use of the bomb and the condemnation of those who threatened to use it would certainly dispel the existing tension in the world and would clear the way for closer international co-operation. Those who opposed prohibition had lost their argument that control was a prior condition to prohibition, since the Soviet Union had declared that the door was open for such control. That was why the USSR proposal simply called upon all States to settle their disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force. It was a logical consequence of the obligations arising from the Charter.

40. In reply to the Soviet Union proposal that a pact be concluded between the five great Powers in order to strengthen peace, all that was being said was that the principles underlying that proposal were already embodied in the Charter. But the Charter was based on the principle of collective security, which the Soviet Union had proposed well before the end of the Second World War. That principle meant that the independence of all States must be respected, that there could be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. If the principle of collective security were strictly observed, according to the letter and spirit of the Charter, there would be no need to strengthen peace, but the Truman doctrine was the most flagrant violation of that principle. The same was true of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty; attempts were being made to justify that Treaty by strange interpretations

of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, according to which it was merely a regional pact. But what was that elastic region without frontiers? Article 3 of the Treaty did not refer to legitimate defence measures but to mutual military assistance, which was in flagrant contradiction and incompatible with international law. Article 5 introduced the concept of automatism even in the case of provoked attack. In other words, an act of legitimate defence by a State that was attacked would authorize another State signatory of the Treaty to have recourse to aggression. Who then would be the aggressor? The United States had thus, through unilateral action, contrary to the principle of collective security, violated not only the spirit, but also the letter, of the Charter.

41. There had been criticism of the fact that the Soviet proposal restricted participation in the pact to the five Great Powers. Such limitation arose from Article 106 of the Charter, however, which provided that the five great Powers, in accordance with their declaration of 30 October 1943, should consult together and take joint action for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It was precisely because the principal of collective security had been violated by the United States that it was essential to stress once more the principle of co-operation between the great Powers. If the United States opposed that theory, they would only be giving further proof that they did not want to co-operate. The United States seemed to require that all other States should renounce their sovereignty. Mr. McNeil had already renounced that of his country. He appeared to support Mr. James Burnham's theory that the United States should promote the establishment of a federation including as many States as possible and impose it by force if the other peoples objected.

42. In regard to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/549), it merely stressed the well-known fact that the Charter was the most solemn pact in the history of mankind. But the authors of that draft resolution did not respect the Charter themselves, and their proposal was merely an attempt at diversion with the object of misleading world public opinion.

43. In the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union draft resolution represented a step forward and those who were in favour of peace should support it.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was grateful for the Committee's courtesy in giving him priority in the list of speakers. His task was not easy because, though they had touched on irrelevant topics, many preceding

speakers had given such an arbitrarily distorted picture of the Soviet Union's position that their statements could not remain unanswered. Clearly, it had been their aim to lead the Committee astray from a true understanding of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996). However, that proposal was of vital importance for the cause of peace and, whatever might be said to the contrary, the five great Powers could not eschew the fact that they carried the primary responsibility for war or peace.