

resolution on the one hand whether they were prepared to support the amendment submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, even if it were not adopted unanimously by the Committee, and on the other the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Poland and the Soviet Union whether they would accept that amendment.

52. The CHAIRMAN called upon the authors of the joint draft resolution to inform the Committee whether or not the replacement of paragraph 2 as a whole by the United Kingdom amendment would be dependent on its unanimous adoption.

53. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) said that his amendment had been submitted in the hope that it would obtain the majority of the Committee's votes and perhaps full acceptance.

54. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he would have to obtain the Russian text of the United Kingdom's representative's amendment before he could give his final views on it.

55. The main argument put forward by certain representatives in favour of paragraph 2 was that it stated the facts. Those facts, however, were actually contained in paragraph 1 of the first draft, which referred to the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies. That report mentioned the enormous work performed by the Governments that had received the Greek children as well as by the Committee and the League. It pointed out that those Governments had acted in that humanitarian work as a matter of duty. Much organizing work still remained to be carried out, since it had not yet been possible, for technical reasons, to take final measures for the return of the children. In those circumstances, it was difficult to imagine what reproaches could be made to the countries concerned. Neither the authors of the draft resolution nor the USSR delegation could find any, and his delegation therefore considered the insertion of paragraph 2 in the draft resolution unnecessary. The Greek representative's statement left no doubt that that

paragraph had political implications, and that only confirmed the Soviet Union delegation's conviction that the paragraph should not be retained.

56. If he understood the United Kingdom amendment correctly, it seemed to stress the fact that the General Assembly should recognize the necessity of further efforts for the implementation of the provisions of the previous resolution. That idea, however, was already expressed in paragraph 4 and the inclusion of two paragraphs dealing with the same subject in one resolution could serve no useful purpose.

57. He reserved the right to give his views on the United Kingdom amendment when he received the printed text.

58. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that he could not express an opinion on the amendment until the text was distributed.

59. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) suggested that the first three paragraphs of the joint draft resolution should be amalgamated into one paragraph constituting the preamble to the proposal. The words "Notes" and "Recognizes" could be replaced by the words "Noting" and "Recognizing".

60. The CHAIRMAN proposed that an attempt should be made to submit a final text for consideration at the next meeting.

61. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) considered that paragraph 2 was not indispensable. Nevertheless, if there were any objections to its deletion, he would support the amendment proposed by the representative of Ecuador, for the adoption of the following wording:

"Notes that Greek children have not yet been returned to their homes".

62. He also supported the amendment to paragraph 4 submitted by the representative of Guatemala.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 3 November 1949 at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION CONCERNING REPATRIATION OF GREEK CHILDREN (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/514/Rev.1, and to the United Kingdom amendment thereto (A/C.1/523). He inquired whether the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had any observation with regard to the suggestions made, respectively, in the course of the morning session, by the representatives of Lebanon and Guatemala to the effect that the first two paragraphs of the joint draft resolution should be considered as a preamble and that in paragraph 4 the words "early return of Greek children to

their homes" be substituted for the words "repatriation of the children".

2. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) said he would accept the Guatemalan amendment and added that his delegation was prepared to delete from paragraph 2 (A/C.1/523) the words "in response to the unanimous recommendation in the above resolution".

3. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that since there seemed to be an endeavour on the part of the First Committee to reach a unanimous decision on the draft resolution concerning the Greek children, his delegation would submit the following compromise text as a substitute for paragraph 2:

"Notes that the Greek children have not as yet been returned to their homes in accordance with

the resolution of the General Assembly despite the favourable attitude of the Governments concerned to this question".

4. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that his delegation could not endorse the Byelorussian SSR amendment, since it amounted to an expression of gratitude towards certain States with regard to the manner in which they had treated the Greek children. Such an approach would be inopportune and not in accordance with the facts.

5. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) disagreed with the representative of Greece and referred to the fact that the principle expressed in the Byelorussian SSR amendment was already included in the English text of the joint draft resolution proposed, among others, by the United Kingdom.

6. Mr. COHEN (United States of America), in the hope of reaching a unanimous agreement, said that his delegation would submit the following text in lieu of paragraph 2:

"Notes that the Greek children have not as yet been returned to their homes in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly and recognizes the necessity of further efforts for the full implementation of the resolution."

7. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that if the sponsors of the joint draft resolution were indeed not guided by political considerations, the Byelorussian SSR amendment should prove acceptable to them. He thought he could agree to the proposal of the United States delegation but saw no need for the second part of the paragraph suggested by the United States representative since the principle it contained was covered by paragraph 4 of the joint draft resolution.

8. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece), Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) and Mr. MAKIN (Australia) supported the amendment submitted by the United States representative.

9. Mr. BOHEMAN (Sweden) saw no substantial difference between the Soviet Union and the United States proposals.

10. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) repeated his contention that the second part of the United States amendment was repeated in paragraph 4 of the joint draft resolution.

11. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that if the USSR representative insisted on the deletion of the second part of the United States proposal, he would, for the sake of unanimity, accept that suggestion.

12. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) wished to retain the part of the paragraph in question since its deletion would cause an abrupt transition from the preamble to the operative part of the resolution. It would seem to be more logical to state the need for further action in the preamble and then determine the means giving effect to that action.

13. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) could not agree with the view of the representative of Lebanon that if the preamble did not take note of the necessity for further efforts towards implementation, such efforts would no longer be made.

14. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the second part of the United States amendment

reading as follows: "and recognizes the necessity of further efforts for the full implementation of this resolution".

The second part of the United States amendment was adopted by 31 votes to 7, with 13 abstentions.

15. Following an inquiry by Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom), the CHAIRMAN took a vote as to whether the Committee was in favour of using the word "noting", instead of "note", in the first two paragraphs.

The proposal was adopted by 19 votes to 6, with 27 abstentions.

16. Finally, the CHAIRMAN put to the vote the whole joint draft resolution as amended.

The joint draft resolution, as amended, was adopted unanimously¹.

CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

17. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) and to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/518). In view of the fact that the Committee had held a lengthy discussion on the substance of the matter contained in those draft resolutions, he hoped that the discussion would be restricted to the texts only, thus enabling the Committee to reach an early decision.

18. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that the joint draft resolution took into account the different stages through which the Greek question had passed in the different organs of the United Nations. On the other hand, the USSR draft resolution summarily dismissed all references to the previous efforts made by the United Nations with a view to solving the Greek problem. The General Assembly should make recommendations lying within its own jurisdiction. The joint draft resolution satisfied that condition. Furthermore, it instructed the Special Committee to continue its endeavours to arrive at an acceptable solution to all parties concerned. Those instructions were still within the scope of the General Assembly, whereas the draft resolution of the Soviet Union was not, since it called for the declaration of a general amnesty and general and free elections in Greece under United Nations supervision. Those were indeed tantamount to an interference in the domestic affairs of Greece which fell outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

19. Moreover, in view of the failure of the efforts of the Conciliation Committee, Mr. Beláunde saw no need for the creation of a joint commission to control the frontier, as suggested in subparagraph (d) of the USSR draft resolution.

20. The representative of Peru described at length the machinery established by the Pan-American States at Bogotá and Rio de Janeiro with a view to dealing with conflicts similar to those arising out of the Greek question, and noted that the joint draft resolution happened to be in conformity with article 7 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro dealing with conciliation in case of hostilities.

21. Mr. Beláunde was at a loss to understand the answer given by the representative of Albania who had declared that his Government had never recognized the legality of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (308th meeting). Obviously, a candidate for membership

¹ See document A/C.1/524.

in the United Nations, such as Albania, should have started by complying with the recommendations of the General Assembly as a proof of ability for membership.

22. Mr. Belaúnde concluded that the Greek problem which seemed to be nearing a solution might also prove the possibility of co-operation between those two worlds which were considered incompatible.

23. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the statement of the previous speaker was not germane to the Greek question. He appealed to the Chairman to insist that future speakers restrict themselves to the item under discussion and expressed the opinion that there was a tendency in the Committee to attempt to delay the debate of the next item on the Committee's agenda which was the Soviet Union's proposal for a condemnation of war-like preparations and conclusion of a Five Power Pact for the strengthening of peace. The Sixth Committee was the proper organ to consider the legal issues which the Peruvian representative had raised and not the First Committee, which was concerned with political questions. Mr. Manuisky rejected the slanderous assertions which the Peruvian representative had cast upon the Soviet Union and commented that Mr. Belaúnde showed little understanding of events in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

24. Turning to the substance of the Greek question, Mr. Manuisky noted that the Peruvian representative had criticized the proposals contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution as interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Why was it that the Peruvian representative was so anxious not to infringe upon the national jurisdiction of the Greek Government when he had taken a very different position in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee during the discussion of the alleged violation of human rights in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania? For its part, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could not remain silent when it saw in Greece a return to the barbaric cruelties of the Middle Ages. Before the Second World War, when appeals for aid from the victims of the nazi prison camps had been received, world public opinion had insisted that something must be done and it was mainly in order to provide the instrument for such action that the United Nations had been created. Now that there was a United Nations what reason could there be for permitting the reign of terror in Greece to continue? Mr. Manuisky considered that the Greek representative had flung a challenge in the face of the First Committee when he had said that with or without the assistance of the United Nations the Greek Government had done and would continue to do what it had been doing thus far. After such a statement the Greek representative had no right to demand that the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments should bind themselves to accept a recommendation of the General Assembly.

25. With regard to the joint draft resolution, Mr. Manuisky asked whether the members of the Committee could say honestly that it served the cause of conciliation and pacification and would not exacerbate the Balkan situation. He believed otherwise. That kind of proposal was merely a challenge to Greece's northern neighbours. It

would not help to normalize the situation; on the contrary, if there were not already a civil war, it would create one by inflaming the passions on both sides. Its purpose in so doing was to create disorder in the Balkans and thus serve the interests of certain aggressive circles in the United States. Mr. Manuisky appealed to the First Committee, if it wanted to solve the situation which had been created as a result of sabre-rattling by militaristic circles, to reject the joint draft resolution and seek some other peaceful solution.

26. Mr. Manuisky handed to the Chairman of the Committee two telegrams which he had received which contained appeals on behalf of certain Greek seamen detained by United States immigration authorities pending their surrender to the Greek Government. In one case, a group of seamen was being held aboard a ship at Baltimore while in the other, 29 men were being detained on Ellis Island. All were members of the Federation of Greek Seamen who were politically opposed to the Greek régime and feared that if they were to return to Greece, they would immediately be victimized.

27. Mr. COHEN (United States) said that the question of the Greek seamen had no possible relationship with the subject under discussion. The persons concerned were being held for deportation, not because of their political conviction, but because they had violated United States immigration regulations. Some of them were guilty of serious breaches of United States law. For example, one, who had been the representative of the Federation of Greek Seamen in New York had arrived in the United States in April 1944 with permission to reside for 29 days. Subsequently, his permission to stay had been extended until May 1946. Thereafter he had stayed illegally until 9 May 1947 when he had been arrested. True, the political convictions of the seamen involved delicate considerations with regard to their eventual deportation to Greece, but that was a question which must be left to the decision of the United States courts. Their fate had nothing to do with the subject under discussion by the Committee and the question could only have been raised in order to confuse the debate.

28. When Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) wished to speak on that same question, the CHAIRMAN ruled that the incident was closed and that the Polish representative could only raise the question as a point of order after the Committee had taken a decision upon the draft resolutions before it.

29. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) disagreed with the Chairman's ruling. It was not correct to assume that the fate of the Greek seamen was unconnected with the substantive question. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR had referred to the two telegrams in connexion with the criticisms of the Soviet Union draft resolution adduced by the representative of Peru. The fate of the Greek seamen was directly connected with the Soviet Union proposal for a general amnesty in Greece. Moreover, when the First Committee had adopted its resolution in connexion with certain death sentences passed by the Greek military tribunals (298th meeting) it had created a precedent and had shown that the fate of individuals politically op-

posed to the Greek régime was definitely relevant to the question under discussion.

30. The CHAIRMAN replied that the Soviet Union proposal was for a general amnesty in Greece, and was not a question relating to a private amnesty in the United States. That was why the question had been ruled out of order.

31. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) believed that there was a connexion. It was unjust for the United States Government to return to Greece political refugees who had sought asylum in the United States. Mr. Manuilsky recalled that when his Government had asked for the return of certain spies and traitors, who had aided the nazis, in order that they might be punished, the United States Government had refused to surrender them citing the right of political asylum.

32. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that paragraphs 12 and 13 of the joint draft resolution, which provided for the return to Greece of Greek nationals who found themselves abroad as the result of the operations of the guerrillas, contained a most dangerous proposal which did not take into account all the discussions which had taken place regarding the danger to the lives and liberty of all persons who opposed the Greek régime. It was known that such a danger existed and that the Greek Government had not kept its promises in the past regarding appeals for clemency. Nevertheless, the joint draft resolution provided no guarantees of protection for those who returned to Greece. It was known that the *émigrés* were political opponents of the Greek régime, whether or not they had taken up arms against it. The appeal by the Greek seamen at Baltimore and on Ellis Island showed that they feared a return to Greece and preferred starvation and even death to repatriation. If the General Assembly accepted the proposal contained in the joint draft resolution it would be held responsible for the fate of those persons upon their return. The treatment of the seamen by the United States courts showed what would happen if the proposal was adopted. Denial of the right of asylum for political refugees was directly contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the General Assembly had adopted.

33. The Peruvian representative's approach in his analysis of the two draft resolutions had been interesting as it had clearly shown that he believed that the United States delegation alone was in the right. One of his criticisms of the Soviet Union draft resolution was that it did not take into account the previous decisions of the General Assembly. In Mr. Katz-Suchy's view, that was an advantage. Surely, if the General Assembly had been endeavouring to reach a solution for three years without success, it must have been following the wrong course. In that case, there was no reason for the General Assembly not to recognize its previous errors and to adopt a new approach. The earlier decisions to which the representative of Peru had referred as having been of great constructive effort actually constituted a black record in the annals of the United Nations.

34. It was noteworthy that wherever a course of action was proposed which some delegations disliked, they had always recourse in the last resort to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Yet whenever the majority of delegations wished to act, that Article was forgotten and it was

always Article 10 which was brought to the foreground. That had happened in the case of the alleged violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, although, quite clearly, any action would have been an infringement of domestic jurisdiction.

35. The representative of Peru had criticized the representative of Albania for stating that his Government would not accept certain recommendations by the General Assembly. But the General Assembly resolutions were not even binding upon Member States and several earlier Assembly resolutions had not been implemented by all Member States. In fact, the Peruvian Government had failed to implement several resolutions, including the resolution concerning Franco-Spain. Hence, there could be no right in demanding a greater degree of compliance from a non-member State. In Mr. Katz-Suchy's opinion, every Government, whether a Member or not, was entitled to decide upon the legality or illegality of any recommendation and to act in accordance with its own judgment. If there was an outstanding difference between the political concepts of the People's Democracies and the Western Powers, it was that the former regarded the States as existing for the benefit of the individual while the so-called "free enterprise" concept could be described as "survival of the fittest". It was true that Greece had once been the centre of freedom and democracy. But the present régime was characterized by complete suppression of human rights although it maintained a façade of high ideals.

36. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) pointed out that the proposal for the return of Greek nationals contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the joint draft resolution was fully in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it spoke only of the peaceful repatriation of those who wished to return. The United States delegation fully intended to respect the provisions of the Declaration and the latter ought not to be exploited for political ends.

37. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) found the joint draft resolution unacceptable. In addition to the criticisms which he had already adduced, he noted that one of the bases for accusing Albania and Bulgaria of supplying personnel to the Greek partisans was the assertion, in paragraph 121, of the Special Committee's report in which it was alleged that children, aged from 5 to 17, were being drafted into the guerrilla units. It was obviously ludicrous to imagine that such young children could participate in military action and it was perfectly apparent, therefore, that the accusation was totally unfounded.

38. Secondly, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had already drawn attention to the plight of the Greek seamen in supporting the adoption of the USSR proposal for a general amnesty. Such amnesty would put an end to the terror in Greece and was designed to normalize the situation so that seamen, such as those referred to, would not be in fear of their lives if deported. Mr. Kiselev urged the First Committee to endorse the Soviet Union draft resolution. If it failed to do so there would be little possibility of bringing peace to the Balkans because the Greek monarcho-fascist Government, which did not wish such pacification, would continue its

campaign of terrorism. The Soviet Union draft resolution alone provided the means for bringing peace to the Balkans and normalizing the situation in Greece.

39. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) asked for an explanation of the term "Greek guerrillas" in paragraph 12 of the joint draft resolution. He wondered whether it would apply to Greek seamen under arrest in the United States and whether the paragraph would be interpreted by the United States Government in such a way as to imply an obligation to give such persons either asylum or an opportunity to emigrate to another country of their choice rather than be repatriated forcibly to Greece.

40. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that he could reply only for his own delegation. As he understood the phrase "Greek nationals" situated outside Greece "as a result of the Greek guerrillas' operations", it would include not only those who had fought on behalf of the guerrillas but also those who might find themselves in other States because of the civil war. Paragraph 12 appealed to States harbouring Greek nationals to facilitate their peaceful return only if they desired to go home. If they did not, there would be nothing in the draft resolution to compel them to go or to prevent them from going to other States if they so desired.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 4 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he would not reopen the discussion to reply to the casuistry which certain delegations had resorted to the day before instead of speaking on the item on the agenda. His delegation had previously clearly described its attitude to the four Power joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) and to the Soviet Union resolution (A/C.1/518).

2. His delegation had, in particular, proved that the Special Committee did not deserve any praise, for it had, in fact, been kept in leading-strings by the Greek police. The Special Committee had worked on the basis of evidence given by witnesses who had been screened and presented by the Greek police. It was that Anglo-American version of the Arabian Nights that had served as a basis for the four Power joint draft resolution.

3. Hence if the Greek question was to be considered objectively, it was impossible to admit for a single moment that the joint draft resolution could contribute to the solution of the internal problems in Greece or to the solution of that country's external difficulties. The sole purpose of that draft resolution was to divert the attention of the First Committee and the General Assembly from the deep-rooted causes of the evil and from the fundamental necessity of restoring normal internal conditions in Greece, and for that purpose to give prominence to Greece's relations with its northern neighbours.

4. It was clear from the statements of Mr. Evatt, who had been Chairman of the first Conciliation Committee, set up during the third session, that the question of the internal situation in Greece was connected with the question of Greece's relations with its northern neighbours or, rather, that the two were parts of a single problem and should be solved simultaneously.

5. It was in that spirit that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/518) which he firmly expected would lead both to a decisive

improvement in the situation in Greece and to the restoration of relations between that country and its northern neighbours.

6. By contrast, the joint draft resolution submitted by Australia, China, the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/513), far from being a remedy, would merely aggravate matters and complicate Greece's relations with its northern neighbours. The authors of that text were merely hoping to fish in troubled waters and in the resulting confusion to justify the external interference of the imperialist Powers in Greece. His delegation would therefore vote against the joint draft resolution, and in favour of its own. The USSR text, in conjunction with the draft submitted by the Conciliation Committee and amended by the Soviet Union in the particular concerning the frontier between Greece and Albania, was the only one that could serve as a basis for the solution of the Greek question.

7. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution submitted jointly by Australia, China, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/C.1/513).

The joint draft resolution was adopted by 38 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

8. The CHAIRMAN put the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/518) to the vote. At the request of the representative of the Soviet Union, the vote was taken paragraph by paragraph and by roll-call.

9. The Chairman put the following part of the text to the vote:

"With a view to regulating the position in Greece,

"The General Assembly

"Appeals to the conflicting parties to cease military operations and"

A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:

Norway, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour:

Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France.