

38. Neither Mr. Austin nor the representatives supporting him could deny the obvious facts mentioned in paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal. What Mr. Austin was asking the Members of the United Nations to do was to approve propaganda for a new war and preparations to that end. The adoption of such a conception would seriously endanger the existence of the United Nations.

39. The second purpose of the Soviet Union draft resolution was to condemn the use of the atomic bomb as well as other weapons for mass extermination which had been recognized by all as contrary to the conscience of the civilized world and incompatible with membership in the United Nations. The condemnation of those weapons was the logical result of paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal, for war propaganda and threats of the use of the atomic bomb were closely linked. The United States policy, in regard to the atomic bomb, was responsible for the war propaganda. The prohibition of the use of the bomb and the condemnation of those who threatened to use it would certainly dispel the existing tension in the world and would clear the way for closer international co-operation. Those who opposed prohibition had lost their argument that control was a prior condition to prohibition, since the Soviet Union had declared that the door was open for such control. That was why the USSR proposal simply called upon all States to settle their disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force. It was a logical consequence of the obligations arising from the Charter.

40. In reply to the Soviet Union proposal that a pact be concluded between the five great Powers in order to strengthen peace, all that was being said was that the principles underlying that proposal were already embodied in the Charter. But the Charter was based on the principle of collective security, which the Soviet Union had proposed well before the end of the Second World War. That principle meant that the independence of all States must be respected, that there could be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. If the principle of collective security were strictly observed, according to the letter and spirit of the Charter, there would be no need to strengthen peace, but the Truman doctrine was the most flagrant violation of that principle. The same was true of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty; attempts were being made to justify that Treaty by strange interpretations

of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, according to which it was merely a regional pact. But what was that elastic region without frontiers? Article 3 of the Treaty did not refer to legitimate defence measures but to mutual military assistance, which was in flagrant contradiction and incompatible with international law. Article 5 introduced the concept of automatism even in the case of provoked attack. In other words, an act of legitimate defence by a State that was attacked would authorize another State signatory of the Treaty to have recourse to aggression. Who then would be the aggressor? The United States had thus, through unilateral action, contrary to the principle of collective security, violated not only the spirit, but also the letter, of the Charter.

41. There had been criticism of the fact that the Soviet proposal restricted participation in the pact to the five Great Powers. Such limitation arose from Article 106 of the Charter, however, which provided that the five great Powers, in accordance with their declaration of 30 October 1943, should consult together and take joint action for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It was precisely because the principal of collective security had been violated by the United States that it was essential to stress once more the principle of co-operation between the great Powers. If the United States opposed that theory, they would only be giving further proof that they did not want to co-operate. The United States seemed to require that all other States should renounce their sovereignty. Mr. McNeil had already renounced that of his country. He appeared to support Mr. James Burnham's theory that the United States should promote the establishment of a federation including as many States as possible and impose it by force if the other peoples objected.

42. In regard to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/549), it merely stressed the well-known fact that the Charter was the most solemn pact in the history of mankind. But the authors of that draft resolution did not respect the Charter themselves, and their proposal was merely an attempt at diversion with the object of misleading world public opinion.

43. In the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union draft resolution represented a step forward and those who were in favour of peace should support it.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was grateful for the Committee's courtesy in giving him priority in the list of speakers. His task was not easy because, though they had touched on irrelevant topics, many preceding

speakers had given such an arbitrarily distorted picture of the Soviet Union's position that their statements could not remain unanswered. Clearly, it had been their aim to lead the Committee astray from a true understanding of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996). However, that proposal was of vital importance for the cause of peace and, whatever might be said to the contrary, the five great Powers could not eschew the fact that they carried the primary responsibility for war or peace.

2. The United States representative had described the Soviet Union proposal as just another in the long line of propaganda manoeuvres which the Soviet Union had presented at every session of the General Assembly (325th meeting). But that merely proved two facts: first, that the propaganda for a new war was increasing steadily and was now taking the form of active preparations; second, that the Government of the USSR had always been consistent in its attempts to frustrate a new war. Consequently, the Soviet Union delegation would continue to submit such proposals until appropriate action was taken.

3. The United States representative had denied that war-like preparations were being undertaken. Apparently he had not been convinced by the facts which Mr. Vyshinsky had adduced. Yet it was noteworthy that the United States representative had not himself adduced any facts to show that the accusation was groundless. He had not attempted to disavow the nightmarish statements of General Bradley and Mr. Johnson, Secretary of Defense. Moreover, what reply could be made to the charge that, at Maxwell Field, a course of lectures had been given on the strategy of the future war against the Soviet Union? Mr. Vyshinsky would be very happy to be shown that his charges were unfounded, but the facts were evident and he had even read the text of the lectures to which he had referred. Furthermore, the reactionary Press of the United States was carrying out a slanderous campaign of hatred against the Soviet Union, and that was something that could not be denied. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he could submit many additional facts in support of his charges but had refrained from doing so, in order to save the Committee's time.

4. The United States representative had criticized the Soviet Union proposals and resented the plain statement of facts as they existed. He had said that provocative statements would not promote co-operation. But the provocation lay not in the Soviet Union's position but rather in the acts of militaristic circles of the United States which were preparing a new war. Doubtless that was a heinous accusation but it was a true one which had not been disproved by the unfounded statements of other representatives such as the New Zealand representative (326th meeting). The Committee should not attempt to evade the facts of the situation but should examine the charges as if it were a judicial body. It must recognize its responsibility to the majority of the peoples of the world who were not participating in the debate. By ignoring the charges and refusing to disprove them the delegations concerned had shown that the charges were in fact well founded. Mr. Vyshinsky again asserted that the United States, the United Kingdom and a number of other States which it was not necessary to name were preparing a new war under the leadership of certain militaristic circles in the United States which were responsible for the existence of bloated budgets, the establishment of military bases and the organization of political blocs specifically designed to wage war.

5. In 1945 Stuart Hansell, the Secretary of the Navy, had said that the United States must secure a gigantic network of military bases including bases in the Pacific, some of which had formerly belonged to the United Kingdom. From available statistics, during the war the United States

had established a total of 484 such bases in the Pacific and Atlantic areas. Since the war the number of bases had been increased. An official statement had been published in London confirming that the United States Army Air Force possessed permanent bases in the United Kingdom and that a total of ninety Superfortresses were stationed in that country, being divided in three bombing groups. As had already been pointed out, that force of bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs, would be equal in destructive power to 19,800 Superfortresses carrying conventional bombs. On 4 November 1949 *The New York Times* had published a report that, after careful consideration, the United Kingdom Government had agreed to the transfer of a number of B-29 planes to the United Kingdom as part of Marshall aid. All that showed that the United Kingdom Government did not trust its own military strength and was prepared to rely on the United States air power. But what was the purpose of such a powerful force in the United Kingdom and whom were they intended to attack. The silence of the United States delegation was self-explanatory. Mr. Vyshinsky knew well against whom those planes were intended.

6. No sensible persons would entertain the absurd thought that the Soviet Union wanted to bomb the United Kingdom. Obviously, it was those who were building military bases that were guilty of war-like intentions. To argue the contrary was ridiculous and would convince no one. There was further evidence of the war-like preparations of the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1948, *The New York Times* had published a report from Nicosia to the effect that the whole of Cyprus was being transformed into a bastion against the Soviet Union under the joint direction of the United States and the United Kingdom. In September 1948, there had been a meeting between the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Franco. In return for granting bases to the United States, Franco had asked for admission to the United Nations and Marshall aid. Thus, a new light was shed upon the United States sponsorship of Portugal's application for membership. Clearly, once Portugal was admitted to the United Nations, Spain would submit its own application. According to Press reports, the State Department was seeking the right to establish military bases in various parts of Spain, including Cadiz, Cartagena, Valencia and Barcelona and was also seeking control of one of the Balearic Islands. There was also a report in *World Affairs* that, in 1948, a secret pact had been concluded with Spain giving the United States the right to establish a number of bases on Spanish territory. Similar reports were available to the effect that Portugal had granted the United States the right to establish bases in Portugal and its overseas territories. Furthermore, the Associated Press had made an announcement to the effect that the United States was preparing advance bases in the Arctic where planes could refuel. The Associated Press had also reported that budgetary appropriations were being proposed for the establishment of heavy bomber bases in Maine, and that planes from those bases after refuelling in Canada or in the Arctic would be able to fly across the North Pole. There was ample evidence of that nature relating to the establishment of military bases. Therefore, it was important to explain to world

public opinion for what purpose they were being created and against whom they would be utilized. Thus far, no answer had been given by the United States representative and talk about mutual defence and the need for filling the power vacuum left by the war was not convincing.

7. The head of the Belgian delegation had spoken blandly (328th meeting) about the existence of fear in the world, but it was an old and outmoded fairy tale to describe the army of the Soviet Union as a tremendous power ominously threatening the world. Such a vast army did not exist and there would be no danger of aggression on its part even if it could swim the Atlantic Ocean. Previous speakers had said that deeds were more important than words, yet while the Soviet Union delegation spoke about peace its opponents were engaged in warlike deeds.

8. Mr. Vyshinsky challenged the United States representative to adduce facts which would disprove the charge of war propaganda in the United States and which would explain the reason for the establishment of military bases. He believed that the United States representative had failed to do so simply because he could not contradict real facts. All the evidence which the Soviet Union delegation had brought forward was based upon the statements of responsible persons in the United States and the United Kingdom or upon authenticated testimony. It was insufficient to deny them and merely to assert that the aims of the United States were not aggressive.

9. Mr. Austin had quoted the Foreign Relations Committee, as asserting that the North Atlantic Treaty was designed to prevent war and that the policy of the United States was aimed at promoting peace through the United Nations. He had added that his Government sincerely desired to reach an agreement upon the armed forces which, according to the terms of the Charter, must be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. It was said to be United States policy to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations, so that armed forces should not be used, except in the common interest. Mr. Vyshinsky doubted the truth of such a description of United States policy. The United States representative had argued that since the Charter was the instrument for maintaining peace, there was no need for an additional five-Power pact. But the same argument applied to the North Atlantic Treaty. If there was need for a twelve-Power North Atlantic Treaty, then why was there no need for a five-Power pact? Surely, any measure designed to strengthen peace should not be rejected as unnecessary. Actually, it was quite incorrect to say that the North Atlantic Treaty was aimed at strengthening the United Nations. The latter had not asked for it and the Treaty included a number of non-member States while it excluded certain States which were Members. It was quite a different agreement from the pacts of friendship and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. As was well known, those pacts were purely defensive and aimed at preventing a resurgence of German aggression which was being kept alive by the encouragement of the western world. Likewise, if the United States Government wished to strengthen the United Nations, why was it preventing any agreement upon the establishment of the United Nations armed force?

10. The United States representative had criticized paragraph 2 of the Soviet Union proposal, which related to the prohibition of the atomic bomb, as misleadingly phrased and contrary to the decision of the General Assembly to the effect that the problem could only be solved by transferring all atomic materials and processes to an international agency. Mr. Vyshinsky could find nothing misleading about his proposal. The Soviet Union delegation had already stated that it could not accept the majority proposal that all atomic raw materials and all processing facilities be transferred to an international control body on a basis of ownership or trusteeship. It was quite wrong to argue, as certain delegations did, that the Soviet Union had an incorrect concept of sovereignty. The delegation of the USSR had stated that complete international ownership of all aspects of atomic production would be impossible because the national economy of all those countries where atomic energy played a predominant role as a source of power would be crippled. Even the authors of the United States plan which the majority had approved, had agreed that it was impractical and that it would not ensure complete international security against clandestine activities. Obviously, as the authors of the United States plan had themselves admitted, it was unnecessary to transfer control over all aspects of Soviet Union production to an international body. The only reason for advancing such a plan must be a desire to create a world monopoly. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that he had quoted a report by Mr. Acheson and other official documents of the United States Government to show what were the real aims of the United States plan. If his statement had been incorrect why had the United States delegation made no attempt at disavowal? It was not the question of national sovereignty that was at stake, but the vital interests of all the countries concerned; only those States which were powerless to prevent foreign control of their economy could accept the plan. For its part, the Soviet Union Government was determined to defend the independence of its people and possessed the necessary armed forces to do so. In the past powerful enemies had tried to dominate the Russian people but had been overthrown. The people of Russia were confident of their ability to repel any future aggressor.

11. The Soviet Union proposals regarding atomic energy were modest in scope. They rejected completely the decision which had recently been taken by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.¹ The conclusion was simple: the General Assembly should recommend to the Atomic Energy Commission not to delay any further in elaborating the necessary measures to prohibit atomic weapons and establish strict international control over atomic energy. Such a decision could harm no one whereas the decision of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee could have no practical effect. Either the First Committee should decide that practical measures must be taken or it should admit that such measures were not desired. Clearly, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments did not want any action. That was made clear in Mr. Acheson's letter to the Senate in 1945, in which he had explained that any decision by the United Nations would have to be ratified by the Senate and, until it was

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 37th meeting.*

ratified, the stockpiling of atom bombs would continue. A statement to the same effect had also been made by Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Obviously, the aim of the United States Government was to stockpile atomic bombs in order that it might have an advantage in time when the secret of the atomic bomb became known to others. However, the secret was no longer a secret. The Soviet Union possessed the atomic bomb and was making more rapid scientific progress than the United States. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed to the number of years that had been needed to prepare the few bombs which the United States possessed at the time of the Hiroshima bombing. Incidentally, it was noteworthy that the bombing of Hiroshima had been a blow at the Japanese people and not at Japanese imperialism which was still being encouraged by the United States Occupying Authorities.

12. Mr. Vyshinsky saw no objection to the First Committee adopting a decision regarding atomic energy in spite of the fact that the question had already been discussed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. He thought it intolerable that there should be any delay in the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control.

13. Preceding speakers had accused the Soviet Union of aggressive acts towards the neighbouring People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. There had been references to the question of freedom of elections which had been discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that he had already explained the true facts of the situation. He had also demonstrated the falsifications which had accompanied the last elections in Greece. That the elections had been characterized by cheating was proved by the dismissal of one of the foreign observers merely because he had criticized the manner in which the elections were being conducted. The United States representative had also asserted that in 1945, the Soviet Union Government had issued an ultimatum to the King of Romania demanding a change in government in that country. Actually, that story was quite untrue. In 1945, when the Red Army was advancing on Berlin, the Romanian Government, headed by General Radescu, had hatched a plot to attack the Red Army from behind. The Government of the USSR had therefore insisted that the Romanian Government be reformed in order that the lines of communication of the Red Army should not be threatened and so that the Government might be representative of the Romanian people. The United States representative could have told the Committee that, in 1945, an Allied commission had been established, comprising Mr. Vyshinsky, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Harriman for the purpose of advising the King of Romania as to how the Romanian Government could be strengthened and made more representative. With the help of the United States and the United Kingdom, the basis of the Groza Government had subsequently been broadened to include representatives of the Peasant-Liberal Party. That action had amounted to a recognition of that Government, and it could not be said that the latter had been set up by the USSR. The Groza Government was still in existence, though its membership had been somewhat improved, and it enjoyed the confidence of the Romanian people. Mr. Vyshinsky concluded that,

while the USSR proposals would no doubt be rejected, they had not been disproved or ever analysed.

14. The representative of the Tito clique had not merely said that the USSR proposals unilaterally defined the meaning of war propaganda and the preparation of a new war but had wanted a broader definition and clarification in a direction which was unnecessary since no one had designs on the independence or sovereignty of Yugoslavia. As for applying pressure and violating agreements, it was Tito who had violated the treaty regarding Danubian navigation and the agreement for the Yugoslav-Soviet air transport company. It was the Tito Government which had engaged in mass arrests of USSR nationals who had been accused, not of espionage, but of being partisans of friendly co-operation with the Soviet Union. That was necessary so as to incite the Yugoslav people against the USSR. The fact that the Yugoslav representative had repeated, almost verbatim, what Mr. Bevin had said at a plenary meeting of the Assembly showed that the Tito clique was becoming more and more an intrinsic part of the camp they were joining. In referring to the Rajk trial, Mr. Djilas had not mentioned the testimony of Brankov, who had been the principal Yugoslav spy in Hungary. Brankov had described the establishment of liaison during the war with the leader of the United States' spy organization in Europe, Allan Dulles, whose activities were dealt with in the Soviet Information Bureau publication *The Falsifiers of History* published in 1948. In addition to the Anglo-American intelligence services, he had related that contact had also been established with the Trotskyite groups. Stating that the persons involved in that work now occupied high positions in the Yugoslav Government, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the Rajk trial had exposed the shame of the Tito clique, which claimed that it represented the Yugoslav people and that it was building socialism. It was in that context that the Government of the Soviet Union had had to consider its subsequent relations with Yugoslavia and the friendship agreement which that country had signed on the eve of the German attack. The Soviet note of 29 September 1949 had pointed out that during the trial it had been ascertained that the Yugoslav Government had been conducting an undermining activity against the USSR for a long time, under the hypocritical cloak of the treaty of friendship. The fact that that note had been withheld by the Yugoslav Government and that that Government had trampled upon the friendship agreement ought not to be forgotten and could not be concealed by unfounded counter-charges.

15. The Canadian representative thought that the main task of the General Assembly was not to condemn the preparation of a new war and strengthen peace but to deal with the problem of fears and anxiety. He would advise that representative not to concern himself about the regions supposedly under the mastery of the USSR, which were quite capable of taking care of themselves. Mr. Martin had expressed concern about another matter, namely, that war was supposed to be inevitable according to the teachings of Marxism and Leninism. In that connexion Mr. Vyshinsky asked why the Canadian representative, if he did not want war, did not want to endorse the USSR proposal for a five-Power pact

for the strengthening of peace. In support of his argument, the Canadian representative had quoted from the works of Lenin. For a clear understanding of those words, however, attention must be paid to what Lenin had tried to say and to the circumstances in which he had spoken. The statement had been made in 1919 when the USSR had been encircled by enemy countries and when Kautsky, the advocate of the capitalist classes, had preceded Mr. Martin in trying to accuse the Bolsheviks of being engaged in militarism rather than socialism. The crusade of fourteen Powers under the leadership of Winston Churchill had necessitated the building of a military organization of the proletariat capable of defending the borders of the USSR and the independence of workers. He recalled that the United States representative had made similar charges and claims at the previous session and had cited a passage from the history of the Communist Party to the effect that war was the concomitant of capitalism and that there were just wars designed to liberate the people from capitalist slavery. Mr. Austin had endeavoured to prove that the Soviet Union wanted to disarm the capitalist States because it considered war inevitable and that the USSR proposal for the strengthening of peace must therefore be mere hypocrisy. Those would-be interpreters of Lenin and Marx had not understood the true meaning of the development of human society in accordance with certain laws. The true concomitants of capitalism, which was based on class suppression, were war, crisis, unemployment, crime and prostitution. Those social phenomena were engendered by the very social structure of capitalist society, and not by the individual psychology of any particular human being. The great merit of Marxism and Leninism was the discovery of the key to the study of the laws of development of human society. That key had been found in analysis of the methods of production, of the organization of social and particularly of productive relations in every historic period. However, the subordination of the development of human society to those laws did not rule out the individual human being, who was capable of organizing social inter-relations so as to promote social development in accordance with those laws. On the other hand, the individual could hamper such development and in that case played a reactionary role in society. The role played by every individual was particularly important in the case of those called upon to regulate human and social relations. The task and policy of the socialist States was to remove all those factors engendering conflict and was therefore to organize the peace-loving forces of society in all countries and to create mutual trust and confidence. Mr. Vyshinsky quoted a statement made by Lenin to that effect, in an interview twenty-seven years previously. That statement made it clear that Leninism called for peaceful relations among nations, without which it was impossible to promote and develop everything of value in human civilization. Thus, at the All Union Congress of the Soviet in 1920, after two years of civil war, and when the USSR was still encircled by hostile States, Lenin had said that every step in military victory brought nearer the time when all efforts could be devoted to peaceful construction. At that same Congress, Lenin had proposed a resolution saying that the USSR wished to live in peace with all nations of the world and to direct all its efforts

towards all aspects of the internal reconstruction which had been prevented by the aggression of German imperialism and subsequently by the intervention of the *Entente* and the hunger blockade. There was no contradiction between the law that war was the inevitable outcome of capitalist society and the statement that war could be curbed by the forging together of the forces of the democratic world. Human solidarity and reason could harness the laws of nature in the service of mankind, and could also harness the laws of human development, placing them at the service of human progress and advancement. Just as it was absurd to say that, because it believed that crises were inherent in capitalism, the Soviet Union wished to foster such crises, similarly the statement that war was a concomitant of capitalism did not imply support of such war. The task was to modify the action of such laws if the latter were harmful.

16. In connexion with what he had just said, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the history of the period prior to the Second World War when hitlerite militarism had been fostered by American dollars and by the shameful Munich policy of France and the United Kingdom. The USSR had raised its voice in the defence of the Czechoslovak Republic and had exposed that policy which was bound to lead to the Second World War and which had in fact resulted in it. Only madmen could say that the Soviet Union had wanted that war in which it had suffered such tremendous losses. The Polish representative had described the role played by the USSR in that war and had recalled an important episode, when the Allied forces on the Western front under General Eisenhower, had been in a very difficult position. Mr. Vyshinsky quoted the text of a telegram sent to Generalissimo Stalin by Mr. Churchill on 6 November 1944 describing the gravity of the situation resulting from the temporary loss of military initiative, and asking what the Generalissimo proposed to do. That telegram had called for heroic efforts on the part of the USSR to save the Western front. The USSR forgot how Churchill and others had violated their obligations to open the second front. On the following day Generalissimo Stalin had cabled a reply to the effect that, in spite of unfavourable weather conditions, the Soviet High Command had decided to complete preparations for broad offensive operations to be launched in the month of January. The subsequent success of the winter offensive of the Red Army had thwarted the efforts of the German offensive in the West. Mr. Churchill, in the name of the United Kingdom Government, had expressed gratitude and congratulations in connexion with that great offensive and had given assurance that action would be prosecuted on the entire Western front. In the face of such facts, Mr. Vyshinsky did not wish to dwell on statements such as those of the representatives of New Zealand and the United Kingdom to the effect that the USSR was repeating the action of Goebbels and Hitler. An elementary feeling of gratitude and fairness ought to preclude such speeches and thoughts.

17. The representative of France had asked thirty meaningless questions of the USSR delegation. He had even answered one rhetorical question to the effect that the USSR proposals were unnecessary, since they dealt with matters

already set forth in the Charter. According to his argument, those proposals must be rejected as superfluous as they contained principles which were already in the Charter. If they contained something which was not in the Charter, they were to be rejected as harmful. That kind of reasoning was unworthy of attention.

18. Turning to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, which had been a summing up of the arguments of previous speakers to the effect that the USSR did not want peace. Mr. McNeil had also been unable to prove that thesis and had therefore avoided dealing with the substance of the USSR proposal. Mr. McNeil's contention that normal human beings under normal conditions wanted peace was correct; only abnormal persons like the late Mr. Forrestal did not want it. It must be recognized that there were too many such abnormal people at large in some countries. However, the Committee was not talking about people but about the reactionary circles which wanted war. Mr. McNeil's statement that no war was threatening was similar to what the Munich men had said on the eve of the Second World War when the USSR had warned that Hitler was preparing war. That war had taken place because it had been prepared, but the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States had said that there would be no war and had appeased Hitler.

19. Mr. McNeil had disputed the USSR statement as to the 600 million supporters of peace and in that connexion, had cited elections in a number of countries. However, it was the system of elections which counted, and it was known that the Moch system in France and the rotten borough system in Britain were designed to make sure that whoever had the most votes would get the least seats. The fact was that the friends of peace and democracy were on the march.

20. Mr. McNeil also desired the figures on the USSR budget to indicate that the USSR was a militaristic Power. Those figures ought to be available to him because they had been fully published in all the Moscow newspapers on 11 March 1949. Citing those figures, Mr. Vyshinsky said that maintenance of the Soviet armed forces comprised 19 per cent of the proposed budgetary expenditures for 1949. The slight increase in those expenditures as compared with the previous year had been due to a rise in prices. The appropriations for military purposes were to secure all the expenditures of the Army on which the freedom and independence of the USSR undoubtedly depended. Mr. Vyshinsky compared those figures with the military expenditures of other countries. Those of the United Kingdom for 1949-1950 were twice as great as before the war and comprised 30 per cent of all expenditures. In the United States the figure was 34 per cent of the entire budget and according to a calculation, 69 per cent of that budget for 1949-1950 was assigned directly or indirectly to military purposes. Forty per cent of French Government expenditures were devoted to military purposes, and it was well known that the bulk of military measures were taken at the cost of the United States. The Press of those countries had pointed out that those expenditures exceeded all normal budgetary standards. That was a clear answer to the United Kingdom representative's question.

21. As to the jamming of BBC and "Voice of America" broadcasts, as the Polish representative had pointed out, those broadcasts were inimical propaganda which actually appealed for revolt against and war upon the USSR. If measures were taken to ensure the free transmission of such lies over the USSR, popular indignation would be aroused to such an extent that the result would be unpleasant for Mr. McNeil and others who desired such broadcasts. In connexion with the United Kingdom representative's desire to have British correspondents admitted to the USSR, Mr. Vyshinsky quoted from the book of a well-known British journalist in Moscow who had refused to go back to his country because, in his own words, he could not return to a country which was fomenting war against the USSR. That book showed that London correspondents worked in close contact with the Foreign Office as spies and intelligence agents, and that was presumably the reason for the insistence displayed by Mr. McNeil. However, he could not promise that the USSR could give access to such persons.

22. The United States representative in alleging that the Soviet Union did not want any cultural relations had ignored the fact that USSR delegates to a congress in New York in 1946 had had to register as agents of a foreign Power or leave the country and they had in fact left. The same had happened in March 1949 in connexion with a congress of scientific and cultural leaders for peace. Referring to the fact that traitors to the Soviet people were being harboured in the United States, Mr. Vyshinsky said that cultural relations could only be maintained on a basis of reciprocity. The mendacious talk about the so-called iron curtain was refuted by the fact that the USSR maintained broad cultural relations with other peoples, and he cited numerous instances of such relations.

23. Mr. Vyshinsky said that the United Kingdom representative's references to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin could not be taken seriously. That representative had also quoted a fable from Krylov, comparing Mr. Vyshinsky to a snake. He cited another fable by Krylov, which showed that slanderers were more evil and deadly than snakes.

24. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) wished to reply to one untruth stated by Mr. Vyshinsky and would reply to the others at a later stage. It was not the Yugoslav Government which had violated the agreements for the Danubian transportation companies since it had merely sent a note to the USSR Government asking that those agreements be revoked. Mr. Vyshinsky had agreed to that and ought to remember his own notes, even if he wished to forget others.

25. Mr. Djilas said that after the publication of the *Cominform* resolution, Brankov was the only Yugoslav in Budapest to endorse it. Brankov had merely been utilized at the Rajk trial as a USSR agent and his fate was unimportant as he had become a traitor to Yugoslavia.

26. Mr. DE MARCOS (Cuba) said that the Soviet Union draft resolution was self-contradictory in that it invited the five great Powers to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace only after accusing two of them of instigating war. The United States representative had been quite cor-

rect in stating that the Soviet Union proposal was defamatory. One might think that any conciliatory proposal was at once invalidated if it was preceded by a series of injurious statements or contained in its preamble repeated defamations. Likewise, it might be felt that the position of the Soviet Union was illogical and was being taken deliberately in order to increase the existing political dissensions or to serve as propaganda, and thus to prevent any just and honourable solutions. The proposal of the Soviet Union was certainly a strange way of promoting understanding and conciliation. First the United Kingdom and the United States were violently accused of seeking war and then they were invited to subscribe to a pact for the furtherance of peace. Mr. Vyshinsky had appeared in the role of prosecutor when he had affirmed that the Berlin crisis of the preceding year had been created by the United Kingdom and the United States, that both Powers had violated the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and that the North Atlantic Treaty was really a militant bloc organized in preparation for an offensive against the Soviet Union. It was hardly necessary to point out on behalf of the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty, that they had been moved by the common instinct of self-preservation. Mr. Vyshinsky had asserted that his Government was pursuing a policy of peace and that, in carrying out that policy, the Soviet Union objected to aggressive blocs. However, nobody was aware that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of peace. Of course, it was not to be doubted that, during the early days of the communist régime, the guiding principle of the Soviet Union had been a desire for peace. But thirty-two years had elapsed since then and nothing could be more certain than that the USSR had emerged from the Second World War with a desire for domination. Mr. Vyshinsky had quite correctly recalled the many peaceful treaties signed by the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War. He only forgot one agreement, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement for the partition of Poland, the result of which had been to encourage Hitler to embark on the path of war in September 1939. A Soviet Union spokesman, writing in a Moscow review, had stated that no people wanted war and what was needed was to create a new life of peace in the world. Yet, when the representatives of the USSR spoke of the need for peace they lightly entered into a play of deceit and fallacy. It was not sufficient to speak of peace; what was needed was a spirit of confidence and co-operation throughout the world. So long as the representatives of the Soviet Union sought to impose peace according to their own conception, which implied territorial and ideological imperialism, there could result only a constant and repeated exchange of threats and intimidations. The Soviet Union proposal was unacceptable because, under the guise of promoting peace, what it really implied was destruction of the Charter and its basic principles. To say that the maintenance of peace was primarily a responsibility of the five great Powers was simply a manoeuvre to create a privileged position for a certain group of States. It was tantamount to establishing a form of trusteeship over the world. The aim of the Charter was to bring about a greater degree of equality among all States, large and small. Article 24 of the Charter stated that the Members of the United Nations conferred upon the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security and added that in discharging its duties, the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Thus, the responsibility for maintaining peace and security did not lie with five States alone but with one of the organs of the United Nations acting on behalf of all Member States.

27. For all the foregoing reasons, Mr. de Marcos said that his delegation would vote against the Soviet Union proposal and would support the joint draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/549). He believed that the latter, if adopted, would strengthen the purposes and principles of the Charter which alone could be the foundation of peace in the world.

28. Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) said that the debate taking place should be welcome since, if good faith prevailed in it, the critical situation of the international family would be somewhat clarified. The Charter of the United Nations was the finest instrument of international co-operation yet conceived and was so perfect and balanced that the Governments of the world had been willing to admit that five Powers, because of services rendered, were qualified to assume a prime responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security. That step had not been easy but had been taken because full confidence had been placed in the five permanent members of the Security Council. Unfortunately the USSR had been unwilling to serve the ideals of the United Nations faithfully and, as a result, the fear of a new and total war had arisen which might lead people to lose faith in the United Nations. In that connexion, Mr. de Freitas-Valle cited the example of Canada, which in the next year was going to spend seventeen times as much on defence as it had spent for that purpose in the years prior to the Second World War. The Canadian Defence Minister in presenting that budget proposal to the Canadian Parliament had stated that Canada could not expect and could not be expected to defend its immense territory alone and for that reason, among others, had joined the United Nations and had signed the North Atlantic Treaty. That example was impressive. Canada had joined the United Nations and had put confidence in the Organization, but when the veto, meant to be used sparingly and conscientiously, had become an instrument of pressure and partisanship, then Canada and eleven other countries, determined on survival, had entered into the North Atlantic Treaty. Citing the main principles of that Treaty, Mr. de Freitas-Valle pointed out that it was avowedly patterned after the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro of 1947. Both of those Treaties were of a purely defensive character and could not be construed as military alliances for the attainment of specific political aims. The similarity of their provisions had resulted from the identical preoccupations which had led to their conclusion. Both Treaties were within the framework of the Charter and had been concluded only because the USSR veto had blocked the peace machinery of the Organization. That being so, he could not see why the USSR should now propose that the five permanent members of the Security Council should conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace. That pact would be needless if the USSR acted in accord with universal moral principles and with the spirit of the pro-

visions of the Charter. If the USSR insisted upon its present course of disturbing the normal life of peaceful nations by unbridled imperialistic encroachments, it would be necessary to stand by the Rio Treaty and North Atlantic Pact.

29. The "might popular movement" referred to in the USSR proposal was nothing but the abuse of the idea of peace which communists in all countries, in strict obedience to instructions from the USSR, were engaged in spreading. The real purpose behind the so-called peace congresses was to spread subversive propaganda against the democratic form of government. The USSR proposal was a transparent illustration of the truism that Soviet foreign policy and communist propaganda were indivisible, and his delegation would oppose it. He supported the United States-United Kingdom joint draft resolution which, for the sake of the happiness of the world, his delegation would like to see respected by the USSR.

30. The representative of Brazil agreed with the recent statement of the USSR representative to the effect that all mankind wanted peace. Some merely indulged in outward professions, however, while others spoke from their hearts. An expansion of one country into two continents was taking place and a godless credo was being disseminated throughout the world. Appealing to the USSR delegation to return to participation in the common aims of the United Nations for the establishment of peace and understanding among all peoples, he said that the idea of co-existence of the group under Soviet rule and the rest of the world was not an irreconcilable paradox. Refusal to associate with others would lead to distrust, and the people that did so ran the risk of perishing amid delusions begotten of its own pride. The only way to peace was to allow all peoples to lead their own lives in the prosecution of their chosen ideals.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 17 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)

1. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) stressed that the concern of the small nations in the preservation of peace was not less than that of the great Powers. The question was a vital one for the small countries because they suffered from the repercussions of conflicts.

2. The Committee had before it two draft resolutions (A/996 and A/C.1/549) which clearly showed the seriousness of the dispute between the two great blocs opposing each other. Both referred to peace, but one was expressed in terms of reproach and anger, whereas the other contained an attempt to persuade and an appeal to principles. Such discussions were not new to the General Assembly. Similar debates had taken place at previous sessions and the repetitions only served as a proof of the ill faith of the pretexts and the falsehood of the propaganda used by some. The USSR proposal implied that small nations should merely play the part of spectators in the tragedy that was being enacted. How could the small nations be content with that? They could not, for the very survival of the universe was at stake. They could not agree to be the dupes of hollow phrases. While referring to peace and to a pact for the strengthening of peace, the Soviet Union proposal used terms which led to the conclusion that its authors knew in advance that it would certainly be rejected. It was founded solely upon an arbitrary condemnation of two of the great Powers to whom participation in a peace pact was being proposed.

3. The world was divided into two all-powerful blocs, which mistrusted one another. Each was determined not to yield to domination by the other, and both were engaged in a furious armaments race. They were prepared to risk total war for total dominion. Whereas six or seven

great Powers formerly succeeded in maintaining a certain balance of power and preserving peace for a time by means of coalitions and combinations of alliances, now there were only two great Powers facing one another. Every country had taken one side or the other, or would be obliged to do so. The core of the problem was to ascertain whether there was a possibility of achieving peace, or at least a truce during which the basis of a permanent peace might be laid. There were sparsely populated parts of the world in which each of the two blocs was trying to establish a footing; other densely populated regions had not yet taken sides and the two blocs were tempted to face one another there. So long as that unstable situation lasted the two parties should refrain from resort to arms and accept the principle of peaceful co-existence and competition. If that could be done, the chances of a final agreement would be greatly increased. The idea of establishing peace by force would be an anachronism and would immediately entail the destruction of the universe. It was essential to keep cool and use common sense. If Marshal Stalin was as realistic as was claimed, he must have realized that the free world had the necessary strength and conviction to resist the pressure which he sought to bring to bear upon certain regions and parts of the world that had not yet taken sides. If that were so, the conflict might be avoided. The free world should try to eliminate conditions tending to aggravate dangerous friction. The standard of living in under-developed countries should be improved and human rights and fundamental freedoms should be scrupulously respected. Above all, it was necessary to hold the line along the portions of the newly independent States and the Non-Self-Governing Territories of the world.

4. The joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) incorporated some of those principles. It proposed terms that would enable the two conflicting worlds to co-exist. Its immediate purpose was that of maintaining a balance between the Powers. Although