

Press. United States aid to Greece not only was conditioned on the continuing consent of the Greek Government but was subject to termination whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly found that aid furnished by the United Nations made the continuance of United States assistance unnecessary or undesirable. Furthermore, the United States had waived its right of veto were the matter to come before the Security Council. Mr. Cohen wondered whether the aid given by the USSR to the *Cominform* nations was subject to such conditions. Presumably the representative of the Soviet Union would not contend that the lend-lease aid amounting to over 10 billion dollars, which had been extended to the Soviet Union in the past had compromised the latter's sovereignty. The purpose of that aid was the same in both cases, namely to protect the common interest of both nations in the preservation of freedom throughout the world. When the threats to Greece were removed the Government of the United States would be happy to be relieved of its responsibilities.

39. The Government of the United States looked forward as much as any other Government to the time when the sovereign and independent State of Greece could, without danger, release those persons detained for reasons of national security. That day could be hastened, not by stirring up hate against the Government of Greece, but by putting an end to warmongering and securing compliance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

40. The statements of the representative of the Soviet Union had been characterized by the divergent nature of their compliance regarding the testimony obtained by the Special Committee. They had sought unsuccessfully to divert attention to the mountain of evidence concerning foreign aid to the Greek guerrillas by trying to

cite a few imperfections. However, when they questioned the character of the witnesses or the validity of the testimony, they should bear in mind that the Special Committee had reported that it had been seriously handicapped in obtaining information by the refusal of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Authorities to permit it or its observers to enter their territories in order to investigate charges or to interrogate witnesses. Moreover, when the representatives of the Soviet Union criticized the Special Committee's work as inadequate or partial, it should be pointed out that he was impugning the good faith not of the United States but of representatives of nine States from different parts of the world aided by an internationally responsible Secretariat. The Soviet Union and Poland had repeatedly been invited to serve on the Special Committee but had abstained from taking part. Mr. Cohen believed that the detailed quotations which the representative of the Soviet Union had extracted from the documents of the Special Committee had as their purpose to detract the First Committee's attention from the essential facts of the Greek problem.

41. Mr. Cohen considered that none of the criticisms had in any way invalidated the unanimous conclusions reached by the Special Committee after careful study and observation. The basic issue was the accusation that aid had been given by Greece's northern neighbours to the Greek guerrillas in spite of the resolutions of the General Assembly. At no point during the debate had those representatives who supported the Soviet Union position ventured to deny that material aid had been given in substantial quantities. It was therefore the duty of the First Committee to act upon the unanimous conclusions contained in the Special Committee's report.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 1 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (*continued*)

REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (*continued*)

1. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said he would deal with the Greek question on the basis of the reports of UNSCOB and of the Conciliation Committee. He reserved the right to present his delegation's views on the various resolutions after the general discussion had been concluded. At that time he would also deal with the allegations concerning the treatment of Greek children.

2. The Greek question was before the General Assembly for a third time and again there was no evidence that the majority of the First Committee had made a serious effort to dissolve the real basis for Balkan unrest. That was confirmed by the reports of UNSCOB and of the Conciliation Committee. No welter of documents could

hide the fact that the United Nations had been duped into pursuing United States strategic policies and had failed to remedy the situation. That was true despite the statements of UNSCOB and despite the efforts of the Conciliation Committee to win approval for Greek aggression against Albania. It was evident that the present report of UNSCOB could have been drafted by anyone without having visited Greece. That was but another example of the United States policy of using United Nations not as an organ of international co-operation but as a pawn in the cold war.

3. It was time to make a full review of the Greek question. It had been raised originally in January 1946 when the Soviet Union had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a danger to international peace and security¹. In August 1946 the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had asked the Security Council to consider the Balkan situation as one which

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, annex 3.

endangered international peace and security¹. On neither occasion did the Security Council take action because it did not consider that the relations between Greece and its neighbours constituted a menace to peace and security. On neither occasion did the Greek Government lay charges against its northern neighbours, although guerrilla units had been operating in Greece. The charges of external aid had only been worked out in December 1946 by the Tsaldaris régime and its Anglo-American underwriters. The Security Council unanimously decided to establish the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents². This unanimity gave rise to the hope that the Greek question could be solved in a manner which would serve the interests of peace and democracy. However, in March 1947 before the Commission of Investigation had completed its work, the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed. That move prejudged the findings of the Commission and put pressure upon it. It clearly showed that the United States was trying to wreck the United Nations and that it was not concerned with the result of the investigation.

4. The obvious course for the United Nations at that time should have been to recall the Commission, to re-examine the situation in the light of the unilateral action of the United States. However, the United Nations, through its majority, bowed to the dictate of the United States. No attempt to pretend that the Truman Doctrine was altruistic could cloak its strategic aim. As Walter Lippman had stated at the time, Greece and Turkey had been chosen "because they are gateways to the Black Sea and to the heart of the USSR". The Truman Doctrine proved to be an instrument for enslaving Greece; and economic occupation followed military occupation. After two and half years, Greece found itself completely under United States control. Candidates for Cabinet posts had to be approved by the United States Mission. Military operations and the appointment of commanders were controlled by United States officials. The economic and political life was controlled, through various missions sitting in Greek Ministries, in the interests of American companies. The details of what that control meant in terms of cost of living, black marketeering, could be judged from the reports of the United States Government on its expenditures in Greece.

5. Mr. Katz-Suchy proceeded to name American corporations which controlled major industries in Greece, including roads and railroads, the Corinth Canal and ports, war industries, public utilities, water distribution, airlines, radio and telegraph communications and tobacco. The altruistic nature of American aid to Greece was typified in the contract of the American International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which in June 1949 took over all communications in Greece through "an autonomous company free of all governmental or ministerial control" to purchase equipment from "recognized foreign industrial houses" rather than from Greece.

6. Millions of dollars had been taken from American taxpayers to maintain the Athens Government in power and the Greek people in poverty. Mr. Katz-Suchy quoted figures from an article in *The Chicago Daily Tribune* of

3 August 1949 which stated that Greece had received a total of 1,750,000,000 dollars of foreign aid which was equivalent to 171 dollars *per capita*. That compared with an average annual pre-war income of 80 dollars. The article pointed out that all that money had had no important effect other than to delay the establishment of orderly government. It also pointed out that out of 182 million dollars given under the Marshall Plan during the year preceding May 1949, only one and a half million had been for industrial machinery, and only one million for farm implements. The article concluded that the hundreds of millions poured into Greece had done the country no good, militarily or economically.

7. Mr. Katz-Suchy asked how any objective person in the light of the foregoing could believe that the Greek situation resulted from aid given to the guerrillas by the northern neighbours. The report of UNSCOB was manifestly one-sided and had clearly been drawn up in order to justify certain policies. Chapter 3, which dealt with alleged aid to the guerrillas and described the procedure of UNSCOB, showed plainly that their procedure was completely abnormal. Paragraph 62 stated that witnesses had usually been made available by the Greek Liaison Service and that many had previously been interrogated by Greek Authorities. Of the captured guerrillas examined, a number had been in detention pending further interrogation. In short, all the witnesses heard by UNSCOB had been previously interrogated by the Athens authorities and many were in prison. Clearly, unless the testimony was useful to the Athens Government, UNSCOB never heard the witness. Yet UNSCOB was prepared to state in paragraph 64 that it was firmly of the opinion that the statements recorded reproduced the facts as described by the witnesses.

8. In dealing with external aid to the guerrillas, the report divided the support into moral and material classifications. UNSCOB considered any opinions expressed in Albanian or Bulgarian newspapers which were not favourable to the Athens régime to constitute moral support. In connexion with material aid from Albania, UNSCOB alleged that since the spring of 1949 more than half of the guerrilla strength had been based on the Albanian border. On what part of the report was that assertion based? He challenged anyone to show him a basis for that assumption on the part of the Special Committee. UNSCOB had reached the interesting conclusion that the guerrillas were using a road going from south to north on the Albanian side of the frontier because there was no north-south road on the Greek side of the frontier. The conclusion, in short, was derived by abstract speculation and not on a basis of facts.

9. Elsewhere the report concluded that, because in May 1949 the guerrillas had used more and bigger guns than they had used previously, the guns had been supplied from Albania. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed to the possibility that the guns had been captured and also to a report of the Greek gendarmerie concerning imports of arms from Italy. However, UNSCOB delighted in that sort of evidence and had given accounts of motor vehicles being observed by night moving along the Albanian road through Bilishte towards Greece. It concluded that the only purpose for

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 5, annex 8.

² *Ibid.*, No. 28, 87th meeting.

such particular traffic must be to cross the border. Another sample of that kind of reasoning could be found in paragraph 74 which purported to establish beyond question that guerrillas in the Vitsi area were being maintained from Albania. As the observations had been made at night from an aircraft and over mountainous and wooded regions, it was not unreasonable to suppose that the movement might have been between two Albanian towns. As a whole, the evidence submitted by UNSCOB in connexion with Albania amounted to mere gossip and hearsay.

10. Bulgaria also was accused of giving moral support. That was partly based on a statement by Mr. Kolarov, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, quoted in paragraph 88, according to which the Bulgarian people were extending moral support to the Greek people in their struggle for freedom and independence. Mr. Katz-Suchy remarked that constituted material support, practically every State represented in the First Committee could be accused of giving material support to Indonesia and to colonial peoples in general. The accusations made against Albania were repeated in the case of Bulgaria with changes only in the names of localities. For instance in paragraph 93, the fact that guerrillas often spoke to Bulgarian frontier guards was mentioned as evidence of Bulgarian military intervention. Paragraphs 96 and 97 gave further examples of peculiar observations and abstract reasoning concerning supplies.

11. New charges directed against Romania had been added. The basis for the charges was the existence of the "National Committee to aid the Greek people". The activities of that organization were not described, for its very existence was deemed a sufficient basis for accusations. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that various committees to aid the Greek people existed in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and many other European countries, but it was only the Romanian organization which was considered criminal. Another of UNSCOB's accusations was that the Free Greece radio station was located near Bukarest. That charge was based on the results of radio location tests which, everybody knew, could never be considered conclusive. These were the bases of the charge of interference in Greece's internal affairs.

12. Mr. Katz-Suchy said he had looked into the evidence quoted by Mr. McNeil on the previous day, which was attributed to witness No. 6/W/194, relating to the observation of five mules carrying 150 rifles and 10 machine guns. Apart from the fact that that was an improbable load for five mules, Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that no member of the observation group had asked the witness how he had been able to obtain such accurate figures. Mr. McNeil considered the capture of Bulgarian arms from the guerrillas to be satisfactory evidence. However, UNSCOB gave no indication of what proportion of the captured arms were Bulgarian, American, German or Greek.

13. The bias of UNSCOB was shown by its attitude towards border violations by the Athens Government, which were always minimized. On the other hand, Bulgarian representations were treated with contempt, as in paragraph 24, which referred to "... a typical series of Bulgarian allegations ...". Frontier violations by the Athens

Government were actually justified, as in paragraph 43.

14. While ignoring violations of the Albanian and Bulgarian frontiers, UNSCOB also ignored the war-mongering of the Athens Press and the plans for the invasion of Albania. It had tried to make out a case against Albania, Bulgaria and Romania entirely on the basis of rumour.

15. With regard to the members of the observer groups, Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that no details were given in the report as to their names, nationalities, ranks, past occupations, etc., although it was common knowledge that about two-thirds had been furnished by the United States and the United Kingdom. It seemed reasonable to assume that those observers, nationals of countries which had "strategic" interests in Greece, had reached their conclusions before doing any observing.

16. Even if it were assumed that the evidence produced by the Greek Liaison Service was actually correct and that the report of UNSCOB was nothing but the truth, any objective person could see that the situation in the Balkans had no connexion with the reason submitted by UNSCOB. On the one hand there were a few thousand ill-armed and ill-equipped guerrillas. On the other hand, there was an army of 150,000 men, 60,000 military police, several thousand British troops and a few hundred officers of the United States Army. Funds and modern equipment were furnished by the United States and the United Kingdom, both in large quantities. Even if Albania and Bulgaria devoted their entire national military budget to supporting the guerrillas, it would only amount to a few per cent of the enormous sums contributed to the Athens Government.

17. Clearly the reasons for the prolonged war in Greece had to be sought elsewhere than in the alleged aid by the northern neighbours. The Conciliation Committee had failed because it had avoided the fact that the real cause of the situation was the actions of the Greek Government. That was in accordance with the policies of the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. McNeil had announced the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and declared that their action would long be remembered as a contribution to peace. Mr. Katz-Suchy agreed that British action would long be remembered by the families of those who had fallen before British arms. However, Mr. McNeil, without saying it, had made clear that the naval and air units would remain in Greece. Nothing could hide the fact that the intervention of the United Kingdom and the United States had caused the Balkan trouble. No one could deny that the basis of the difficulty was the internal situation and that the accusations against the northern neighbours arose out of it. The Chairman of the first Conciliation Committee, Mr. Evatt, had reached the conclusion that the internal problem had to be solved if the Greek problem was to be solved at all and had so stated in a letter to the Four Foreign Ministers. The reply made by Mr. Bevin was not convincing.

18. With regard to the elections in Greece, the opinions of British observers and of a delegation of British members of Parliament were well known. The great sensitivity of the British Cabinet in regard to Greece's sovereign rights was

therefore surprising. However, it could be recalled that Mr. McNeil had gone to Greece in November 1945 to discuss the re-organization of the Greek Cabinet and had proposed the establishment of British or Allied advisory committees to advise in matters of economic administration and policy.

19. The current Conciliation Committee had chosen to ignore Dr. Evatt's letter. It had also ignored the need for safeguarding the territorial integrity of Albania by not demanding a declaration from the Greek Government that it had no territorial claims. Although it had been stated that Greece was prepared to accept an appropriate formula, the First Committee had not been informed that Greece had refused to guarantee the territorial integrity of Albania. Responsibility for that refusal rested mainly with the United States.

20. Clearly the threat to Albania had not diminished. The designs of the United States in the Balkans were evident from the denial of a territorial guarantee to Albania and from the fact that UNSCOB had concentrated its attack on Albania. The provocations against Greece's neighbours constituted the real danger to peace. Yet the only proposal made was that the Greek régime should be allowed to continue to threaten Albania with the endorsement of the United Nations. The new reason given by Mr. Pipinelis for refusing to guarantee Albania's integrity, namely the presence of troops of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria, Hungary and perhaps in Albania, was extremely naive.

21. Mr. Katz-Suchy cited various statements and articles published in the Greek Press and directed against Albania and proposing measures including armed invasion. He pointed out that foreign support had been given to these provocations in the form of legalistic reasoning. In addition to such verbal provocations it should be noted that, according to a broadcast by the Albanian radio, on 10 August 1949, Greek troops had invaded Albania for four days and fighting had taken place along a thirty-mile front. There had also been attacks made against the guerrillas through Albanian territory. Although the facts had been reported, UNSCOB had carried out no investigation.

22. Despite the increasingly blatant calls for attack upon Albania and inflammatory statements including a declaration by the Greek Prime Minister that Greece would not abandon its claims in Northern Epirus, the Conciliation Committee had accepted the Greek Government's statement that it had no designs on Albanian territory. However, on the following day, 19 October 1949, it had been reported that the Greek Prime Minister had reiterated his régime's territorial claim.

23. The plots against Albania were further confirmed in the despatch of 15 September 1949 by C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*. That despatch noted that the United States and the United Kingdom had set up a Free Albanian Committee in Paris which they intended to recognize as the legal Government. Despite their concern about expressions of sympathy toward the Greek people, they apparently saw nothing wrong in setting up a rival to the legally constituted Government of Albania. The enlargement of the threat against Albania had been encouraged by the resolution 193 A (III) of the General Assembly which, while making groundless accusations against the northern neighbours, permitted

the Athens régime to continue its plot against the peace in the Balkans, in order to conceal its failure to deal with the real Greek problems.

24. The beneficiaries of the American aid programme had been indicated by Harold L. Ickes, former United States Secretary of the Interior in an article dated 29 August 1948. Mr. Ickes had pointed out that, since the Greek Royal Family, the royalist supporters and many United States officials found that they could live in luxury on the proceeds of the war, they would continue to make a living out of it. Mr. Ickes had also suggested that, by a carefully supervised and honestly conducted election, one should discover what kind of government the Greek people wanted. Similar suggestions had been made by Mr. Sofianopoulos, a former Greek Foreign Minister. The leader of the Greek Communist Party had declared at that time that his Party would accept United Nations supervision of such an election and would abide by any decision reached by the people. He had urged the institution of an interim neutral Government and had stated that the appointment of a United Nations mediator would be welcome. The only reply given to that offer had been a new wave of terror. Again, at the current session of the Assembly, an appeal had been made by the provisional democratic Government of Greece declaring its willingness to accept an honourable agreement in the interests of peace. No reply had been sent to that letter (A/C.1/520).

25. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that the solution which the United Nations had tried in Greece for three and a half years had not improved the situation. The situation arose out of internal difficulties which had been created by the intervention of the United Kingdom and later by the United States in Greece's internal affairs. Conciliation was the requirement, but no serious effort had yet been made in that direction. However, the United States Government wished neither peace nor conciliation; it wanted to continue to use Greece in its strategic plan.

26. It might be easy to speak of the guerrillas as bandits, but the United Nations should not allow its name to be misused to justify terrorism. Mr. Katz-Suchy drew attention to the statement made on 9 July 1949 by Constantin Rendis, Greek Minister of the Interior, to the effect that those who persisted in their communistic tendencies would be imprisoned or expelled from Greece and that those measures had been agreed upon by all political parties and by the United Nations. While stressing that misuse of the name of the United Nations, Mr. Katz-Suchy suggested that the representative of Australia might wish to adjust his proposals for the repatriation of Greek children in the light of the programme which had been mapped out for those who did not disfavour communism.

27. When proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, the President of the United States had said that his Government had advised Greece to practice tolerance. The past two years had served to show what was tolerated: murder, suppression of human rights, strife, starvation, brutality, miscarriage of justice, lies and plans for war. The problem before the Committee was not only the tragedy of Greece but also the fact that the United Nations had allowed themselves to come under the control of one country and be an in-

strument of its policy. Although victory had been claimed by the American Commanding General in Greece, it was well-known that mere weapons and foreign military planning could not stop the fight for freedom. The democratic army had decided to cease major operations in Greece, not because they were weak but because a new peace was the only hope for the Greek people.

28. The choice before the First Committee was whether the United Nations would survive as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations or become the tool of one Power. The Assembly had the power to institute new and conciliatory ways of resolving the Greek question. Such action would be of great value in diminishing international tension. It would constitute a return to the purposes of the United Nations and conform to the expectations of those who expected it to act in the interests of peace and not as the protector of foreign intervention. If it did nothing, or followed the line of least resistance, all would share the responsibility for the continuation of the sufferings of the Greek people and of the dangers to world peace and security.

29. Mr. EUSTACE (Union of South Africa) shared the general feeling of regret for the failure of the Conciliation Committee to bring about the solution of the Balkan problem. He had hoped that, since the work of the Committee had not been prejudiced by the ideological recriminatory clashes which had so badly poisoned the atmosphere at previous sessions, it had had a reasonable chance of bringing about a better understanding as well as a decision on the part of all those involved to terminate the conflict. However, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, the Conciliation Committee had failed to arrive at a solution. Such a failure, however, should not be construed to mean that it had achieved nothing, since a measure of agreement had, in fact, been achieved on certain points. Besides, it had enabled the representatives to scrutinize and evaluate the elements of the problem. Finally, it constituted another realistic effort to establish international peace and security. The position in the Balkans was, of course, only one component in the over-all problem of international conflict, which was still so seriously threatening peace. If the Balkan problem were removed, the world situation would become much less depressing. The continued efforts of the United Nations with a view to achieving success in the Balkans were therefore, essential. The Greek nation, as it had been stated so often, had surely suffered enough and must be afforded an opportunity to deal with its task of reconstruction.

30. Many of the statements already made, like that of the representative of Lebanon, had indicated the large measure of sympathy which the Greek delegation enjoyed in the First Committee. The trials of the Greek people were fully appreciated, and the courageous efforts of the representatives of Greece in the First Committee had not gone unnoticed. The delegation of the Union of South Africa had always endeavoured to give a clear indication of both its sympathy for the people of Greece as well as its admiration for the manner in which the Greek spokesmen had represented their problem at the United Nations.

31. Turning to the problem of Greek children, Mr. Eustace said that his delegation had noted

the relevant terms of the joint draft resolution submitted by Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/513) and would support it.

32. As to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, his delegation felt that the Committee had done good work under trying and often dangerous circumstances. It was for those reasons that his delegation had voted in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/519). Furthermore, the presence of the Special Committee in the Greek battle areas had played an important role, and its value in keeping the United Nations informed should not be underestimated, although, much to their regret, it had not succeeded in obtaining a full measure of co-operation from all parties concerned.

33. Mr. Eustace was at a loss to understand the contention of the opponents of the United Kingdom draft resolution that that resolution, in trying to protect the servants constitutionally appointed by the United Nations, constituted an intervention in the domestic affairs of Albania.

34. His delegation, always vigilant in the matter of domestic jurisdiction, had felt compelled to vote against (298th meeting) the Ecuadorean draft resolution because it did constitute an interference in the administration of justice in Greece, commendable though were its motives.

35. As regards the joint draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Australia, China, United Kingdom and United States (A/C.1/513), the delegation of the Union of South Africa considered it as a logical consequence of the report and recommendations received from the Special Committee. The draft resolution also recognized the work performed by the Special Committee and took note of the announcement by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the question of disarmament of guerrillas. It finally called upon all States harbouring Greek nationals to facilitate the peaceful repatriation of all those nationals who desired to return and live in accordance with the law of the land. Since the South African delegation supported those aims, it would, therefore, gladly vote in favour of the joint draft resolution.

36. Abdur RAHIM Khan (Pakistan) doubted that it was possible to add anything new to the arguments which had already been advanced by the two schools of thought in connexion with the represent conflict in Greece. The Greek case had been before the United Nations for nearly three years and the salient features of the problem had remained the same throughout the discussions, namely, the armed conflict along the northern borders of Greece between Greek Government forces and the guerrillas. On the one hand, it had been claimed on behalf of the Greek Government that all the fighting taking place in those regions was primarily due to the assistance and shelter which the northern neighbours of Greece were affording to the guerrillas, while on the other hand, it had been alleged that the Athens Government was thoroughly distasteful to a large portion of the population of that country, and that its activities were so intolerable that some of its opponents had taken arms against it with a view to freeing their country from outside influences. The fact, however, remained that up to the present time fighting had continued