



UN Doc /

OCT 30 1980

UN/SA COLLE... 1

FIRST COMMITTEE
14th meeting
held on
24 October 1980
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 14TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)

CONTENTS

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 31 TO 49 AND 121 (continued)

- General debate

Statements were made by:

- Mr. Michaelsen (Denmark)
- Mr. Elliott (Belgium)
- Mr. Anderson (Australia)
- Mr. Mittal (India)
- Mr. Dumevi (Ghana)
- Mr. Saed (United Arab Emirates)
- Mr. Ahmed Adan (Somalia)
- Mr. Kravets (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550, 866 United Nations Plaza (Alcoa Building), and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/35/PV.14
27 October 1980

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31 TO 49 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): In his statement of 23 September in the general debate of the General Assembly the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs said, inter alia:

"In the course of the second substantive meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in May and June of this year, Denmark highlighted the problems and principles of conventional disarmament. The debate showed that there was wide support for the Danish idea of an in-depth study of the entire range of issues involved in conventional disarmament. We intend to pursue those ideas during the present session of the General Assembly." (A/35/PV.7, p. 61)

After having conducted consultations with a number of member countries, Denmark has proposed a draft resolution on the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces. The draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/35/L.2. My delegation considers that adoption by the General Assembly of that draft resolution would be a logical follow-up to the deliberations at the second substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, held in May and June of this year. As we all recall, there was wide support - although at the same time there were objections or reservations - in the United Nations Disarmament Commission for recommending that at this session the General Assembly approve such a study. We hope that those countries which in the United Nations Disarmament Commission registered their objections to such a study will now be in a position to change their attitude.

The proposal for a study on conventional disarmament is in no way intended to interfere with our common endeavours to obtain progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Nor is it intended to deprive member countries of their right to protect their own security, or their right of self-defence.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Since so many human and material resources and funds are used on conventional weaponry - as we all know, more than 80 per cent of all military expenditures are spent in the conventional field - it is time to obtain a thorough reassessment of the general problem of the conventional aspects of the arms race. It should not be forgotten either that for most nations the most immediate threat to national security stems from conventional weapons: and all wars and armed conflicts since the Second World War have been fought with conventional weapons alone.

Several studies on aspects of nuclear weapons have been carried out or are under way under the auspices of the United Nations. I feel sure these studies will contribute greatly to our future work. However, to attain our final goals one dimension is lacking, a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race. Together with other studies, a study on conventional weapons could be highly relevant for the process of achieving general and complete disarmament.

Turning now to the text of the draft resolution, I should like to comment briefly upon the operative paragraphs.

Operative paragraph 1 reads:

1. Approves in principle the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis" (A/C.1/35/L.2).

By approving this paragraph the General Assembly will once and for all have decided on the carrying out of a study on conventional weapons. That decision will enable the Secretary-General to appoint the experts immediately and to make practical arrangements for the work of the expert group pending the deliberations at the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission next spring. No further decision by the General Assembly is called for.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 read:

"2. Agrees that the Disarmament Commission, at its forthcoming third substantive session, should work out the general approach of the study, its structure and scope"

"3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to convey to the Secretary-General the conclusion of its deliberations which should constitute the guideline for the study" (ibid.).

That implies that the United Nations Disarmament Commission must have a thorough discussion on the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and convey the results thereof to the Secretary-General in order to initiate the work of the expert group immediately after the Disarmament Commission session. It should be borne in mind, however, that a certain freedom in choosing their own ways and means of carrying out a study has traditionally been given the various expert groups. Similar leeway should also be left to the experts on the study on conventional weapons.

In a working paper submitted to the second substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in document A/CN.10/13, entitled "Approaches to conventional disarmament within the framework of the United Nations", we for our part indicated that the proposed study should seek to ascertain the facts of the conventional arms race in its quantitative and qualitative aspects as well as in its vertical and horizontal dimensions, including international arms transfers; it might examine its interrelationship with international peace and security as well as with social and economic development; it might examine the nature of the particular problems involved in conventional disarmament, including an analysis of the connexion between conventional and nuclear disarmament; and, finally, it might examine the general principles and guidelines which relate to conventional disarmament and explore directions in which it might be possible to proceed and modalities to be applied.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Operative paragraph 4 reads:

"4. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (ibid).

In my view, it is most important that the final results of the study be ready as a basis for discussion at the second special session on disarmament. It will then be possible to work out directives for the further endeavours to obtain progress also in the field of conventional disarmament at the second special session on disarmament.

We hope that this modest component in the long process leading towards general and complete disarmament - the carrying out of this study - will be approved by this Committee and the General Assembly.

Mr. ELLIOTT (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, in extending to you my congratulations on your election to guide the proceedings of this Committee, I wish to say that I am grateful to you for expressing, on behalf of all our States, our heartfelt sympathy to Algeria, a country to which we feel so close, at the terrible disaster that has so cruelly befallen it.

Very rarely since the end of the Second World War have we had a period so strongly marked by anxiety and concern. We are concerned at the deterioration of the international climate brought about since the end of last year by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which has elicited the general reproof of the international community. We are concerned at the proliferation of focal points of tension in different regions of the world, particularly in those where stability is an essential element of our collective security. Our thoughts turn in particular at present to the prolonged conflict between Iran and Iraq, which carries with it the threat of political destabilization in that region and which would spare none of our countries.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

We are concerned at the unbridled nature of the arms race, which is a consequence of growing political, economic and social imbalances between our peoples. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Nothomb, recently emphasized from the rostrum of the General Assembly how frightening it was to note that at present \$450 billion is devoted to armaments in the world whereas only \$20 billion is allotted to assistance to development. He recalled on that occasion the suggestion of the Brandt Commission concerning the creation of machinery to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace, which should make it possible to release for development the funds deducted from military expenditures.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

More than ever in the past, those concerns make it imperative to intensify our efforts in order to promote security between our States and to make progress along the path of weapons control and disarmament.

In this context, and addressing the General Assembly on behalf of the nine countries of the European Community, President Thorn indicated the course that those countries had always endeavoured to follow in our interdependent world, namely: patiently to seek out solutions of problems in international relations, and endeavour to meet the fundamental interests of each of the parties rather than, as so often has happened in the past, attempting to free oneself from one's own dependency while making others dependent on oneself and one's own wishes.

Our wishes would be met if this concept of international relations were shared by all. That seems to me the best means of eliminating the causes of present-day tensions and of creating the indispensable confidence for the achievement of our peace objectives. The security of our States could henceforth be conceived more readily in terms in which the military element would become less predominant. That security could thus be established at negotiated balance of armaments at the lowest possible levels, while détente and defence would remain the two inseparable bases of our security.

In that connexion, the Secretary-General of our Organization, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, quite rightly stressed, in his report on the work of the United Nations, how important it was, at the dawn of this Second Disarmament Decade, to set concrete, politically viable objectives.

Despite the difficult conditions that have prevailed in 1980, that realistic approach has made it possible to achieve results whose importance should not be underestimated.

It was thus that the Committee on Disarmament - in the work of which the five nuclear Powers, which are also the five permanent members of the Security Council, participated for the first time, was able to conclude an agreement - not without difficulty it is true - concerning its methods of work. The establishment of four working groups on important

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

items on the agenda of the 1980 session, namely, chemical weapons, radiological weapons, security guarantees and the comprehensive programme of disarmament, has made progress possible in the mutual evaluation of the various positions on those subjects and in the case of one of them, radiological weapons, in the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons. Belgium hopes that that negotiation process will be concluded shortly, on the basis of a realistic definition of the weapons to be prohibited.

We are gratified too by the opening by the United States and the Soviet Union of preparatory talks which, integrated within the framework of the SALT process, will deal with the limitation of certain given systems of theatre-of-operations nuclear weapons. Belgium, incidentally, has always sought to favour the offer of negotiations which accompanied the decision of the Atlantic Alliance last December concerning the streamlining of medium-range nuclear weapons as a response to the continued development of new systems of armaments directed against our country. In the same context, Belgium has always hoped that the SALT II accords would be ratified as soon as possible.

We note too that hope for progress has emerged in the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments as well as related measures in central Europe.

Belgium, which remains strongly attached to all international actions in the field of arms limitation, has taken note with satisfaction of the report of the Group of Experts on Regional Disarmament. That is so because, as members of the Committee know, it was my Government which in 1978 took the initiative of proposing the study of all the regional aspects of disarmament with a view to determining a systematic regional approach to questions of disarmament and arms control. That study was carried out by the 10 experts appointed with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, who had adopted the text unanimously. It has now been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration. Together with other delegations, Belgium will submit a draft resolution whereby the General Assembly, expressing its appreciation of the Secretary-

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

General's report containing the study in question, would invite States to express their views on the subject so that they might be submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly for consideration. Our Assembly would also decide that the study be communicated to the Committee on Disarmament and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Belgium hopes that that suggestion will enlist the support of all and that the debates that will take place on that occasion will contribute to the achievement of progress on disarmament.

Our common endeavour should aim at preserving the possibility of dialogue among our States, while everything possible is done to improve the prospects for progress.

In that connexion, I should like to make the following comment. I was surprised at the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union concerning measures for reducing the danger of war, a proposal concerning which, at this stage in our work, I shall confine myself to noting that the objectives proposed are obviously lacking in the specific or realistic character that could justify their becoming the subject of an Assembly resolution.

To our surprise must be added our disappointment, shared no doubt by a large number of members of this Committee, at the polemical and aggressive tone used by the author of the proposal in introducing it. On the one hand, that attitude disregards the events which have created the tension in Asia which affect us all. On the other hand, it does not contribute to the serenity of our dialogue.

However, I should like to point here to three areas in which our efforts could be more usefully concentrated: they are, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the limitation of conventional weapons and confidence-building measures, which should always promote and pave the way to the conclusion of disarmament agreements.

This year has been placed under the sign of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a principle to which Belgium remains fundamentally attached.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

During the recent NPT Review Conference, my Government noted the extent to which true implementation of the Treaty appeared to be difficult to achieve. We also expressed our concern at the wide interpretation that nuclear-weapon States are inclined to give, at the expense of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to those provisions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In fact, in that field, as opposed to that of military activities, the Treaty guarantees to all parties full freedom of access. Belgium also stressed the erroneous and dangerous character of imposed agreements or unilateral decisions aimed at adding to the verification provisions contained in the Treaty itself. Those provisions are applied through the intervention of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and constitute the most elaborate verification system which has ever been included in a treaty on arms control. Moreover, that system is not without considerable economic consequences for the industries which it covers.

It has always seemed to us that the fundamental objective to be achieved was to have the Treaty become universal and that, while awaiting the attainment of that goal, non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty should not be placed in a position of inferiority as compared to those that still refuse to accede to it. Apart from its strict implementation in the civil domain, the Treaty, if we are to strengthen its credibility, should give rise to specific decisions on nuclear disarmament in such a manner that we may move step by step towards the realization of its objective - the elimination of proliferation in all its aspects.

Indeed, it is not possible to consider that this key instrument - the Treaty - should become a fixed norm in international life. The discrimination inherent in the Treaty is not an end in itself and should disappear in the long run, thanks to nuclear disarmament. It is no doubt the disagreements concerning assessment of this concept of the Treaty that were at the root of the difficulties encountered during the recent Review Conference.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

It is therefore essential that we endeavour to draw the proper lessons from that situation which, in any event, had the merit of confirming, in difficult circumstances, that the aim of non-proliferation and the very existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were not called into question. In this connexion, the elimination of the causes of international tension, as I said earlier, are an essential condition for progress. Reactivation of the SALF process and the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the total cessation of nuclear tests, a treaty urgently needed especially in view of the increase in the global rate of such tests, a rather disappointing development, must be sought.

The three nuclear States participating in negotiations on that subject indicated to the Committee on Disarmament certain interesting areas of agreement. Details are lacking on some important aspects of those negotiations, particularly the duration envisaged for such an agreement. That duration should not be so short as to reduce the Treaty to a mere moratorium which, if broken, would open the path to new, intensified programmes of nuclear testing.

My country also noted with satisfaction that the verification of such an agreement would give an important place to the international exchange of seismic data, a system which Belgium is helping to elaborate in the Committee on Disarmament. Its political and technical effectiveness will be determined to some extent by the equitable distribution of national seismic stations and international centres of the system. Belgium is also of the opinion that the three nuclear Powers at present carrying out separate talks should by no means await the accession of all nuclear States before themselves accepting a multilateral treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

A further question, which has been debated for over 10 years, also represents an important aspect of the non-proliferation policy. I refer to security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Those guarantees, formulated by the five nuclear Powers in unilateral declarations, have been the object of detailed consideration in the Committee on Disarmament. The objective sought - a common formula - appears to be difficult to achieve, since the situations and security doctrines reflected by each of those declarations are so diverse.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

Above all, we should reassure the non-nuclear States which have chosen the path of non-alignment by intensifying our efforts with a view to arriving at effective arrangements. Belgium also feels that we should not neglect the element of progress which could derive from an interim arrangement, particularly if it involved the Security Council. Neither should we, in our efforts in the field of proliferation, disregard the importance of negotiations in due course on the cessation, under adequate verification conditions, of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

Like nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament remains one of the most urgent tasks before the international community. Belgium, concerned at the acceleration of the conventional arms race and the imbalances which it produces, is ready to associate itself with any initiative towards conventional disarmament.

My country is gratified at the success recorded by the United Nations Conference on prohibitions or limitation restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons in elaborating a general convention as well as three annexed protocols relating, respectively, to undetectable fragments, booby-traps, land mines and incendiary weapons.

The work undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament's working group on the prohibition of chemical weapons proved to be especially fruitful. That working group fully discharged its mandate by identifying the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a convention. Belgium regrets, however, that the elements of disagreement, particularly as regards the verification of a convention, could not be more extensively resolved. We hope that it will be possible at the next session of the Committee to bring views closer together and to move forward towards the conclusion of such a convention. The method followed for the achievement of that objective may serve as a model, because the 1980 session of the Committee proved that the creation of a working group with a clearly defined mandate was perfectly compatible with the efforts undertaken in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this field, as in the very important field of the total prohibition of nuclear tests, a concern for the successful conclusion of separate negotiations should be reconcilable with the legitimate desire of the Committee on Disarmament to deal in a substantive way with the items on its agenda.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

Confidence is a decisive factor for the harmonization of international relations. In the field of disarmament, one of the most appropriate instruments for generating that confidence is the very principle of the verification and implementation of adequate mechanisms in order to bring to a successful conclusion the implementation of the agreements concluded. When deprived of such mechanisms, those agreements lose much of their substance.

The Foreign Minister of Belgium, like many of his colleagues, expressed from the rostrum of the General Assembly his profound concern at the rumoured use of chemical weapons. In so doing, he requested all those countries which had not yet acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to do so without delay: this would permit the contracting parties which had hitherto expressed reservations inter partes to consider the possibility of removing those reservations. The international community might also through an objective procedure of investigation formulate a definitive substantiated judgement on the charges. It is to be regretted that the 1925 Geneva Protocol lacks machinery permitting the verification of compliance with such prohibitions. Thought might be given to the best means of filling that gap, and Belgium reserves the right to make its contribution thereto if necessary.

In the same context, my country regrets that the proposal relating to the establishment of control machinery in the Convention on the use of certain conventional weapons should have come up against rejection by a group of delegations at the recent session in Geneva of the Conference that negotiated the Convention. We hope that the scope of this suggestion will be better appreciated in the future.

Belgium wishes also to recall the essential nature of the exercise aimed at ensuring the comparability of military budgets in so far as that type of confidence-building measure constitutes a precondition for any serious discussion of a freezing or reduction of military expenditures. My delegation is ready to consider carefully any constructive initiative that may be adopted at the current session.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

In expressing my country's concern, and in stressing that there were some grounds for satisfaction. I have sought to outline the prospects for progress, to the realization of which Belgium is deeply attached.

Our efforts should now be directed towards the creation of conditions enabling us to ensure the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Rather than shaping a new instrument, we must take advantage of that event to offer additional reasons for optimism and, as emphasized by the Secretary-General, to maintain our faith and our will to complete the structure erected on the foundations so judiciously laid down 35 years ago.

Mr. ANDERSON (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I should like on behalf of the Australian delegation to offer you my warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. We have no doubt that you will guide this Committee through its important work with your customary skill and wisdom. I should also like to offer my delegation's congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen and to the other officers of the Committee.

We are almost at the halfway point between the first special session devoted to disarmament and the second special session. The first Disarmament Decade has just ended and we are embarking on a second. It is all too easy to dismiss the work which has been carried out in the disarmament field, both multilateral and bilateral, as lacking in substance and to predict little progress in the immediately forthcoming years. It is true that great strides have not been made in recent years, but there has been some important progress in a number of areas and we believe there is a growing realization amongst most States that without continuing movement there can be no end to international tension or to the continued threat of a catastrophic conflict.

In the years immediately ahead, we cannot hope for sudden or miraculous breakthroughs in the fields of disarmament and arms control, but given the political will to achieve results we should - indeed we must - add impetus to the

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

sluggish machinery which we are struggling to keep in motion. Arms control and disarmament is a step-by-step process. Our efforts in this Committee and in other multilateral disarmament forums must proceed at a realistic and an attainable level. It does not help to achieve our goals if our time and effort are diverted by a series of vacuous propaganda items designed to disrupt and mislead. We have seen in the past that such efforts have contributed nothing to our work. That was clearly demonstrated at the last session of this Assembly when, after spending long and valuable time negotiating on just such an item, representatives saw the originating Government acting in flagrant breach of the very provisions which it had put forward.

Our work here is too important, too urgent, to be diverted by such exercises. We regret to see that such an item is before the Committee again this year.

Since the last session of the General Assembly, events have occurred which have increased international tension and have damaged the disarmament process. Although there are a large number of multilateral and bilateral negotiations continually taking place to try to realize the objectives of arms control and disarmament, that increase in tension has taken its toll. One of the developments of most serious concern to Governments is the armed intervention in Afghanistan by powerful Soviet forces and their continued presence in, and occupation of, that country. The Australian Government has condemned those actions, as have the majority of countries in the United Nations General Assembly. We cannot overemphasize the detrimental effect of those actions on the international climate of trust which is necessary for the negotiation of effective arms control and disarmament measures. Yet it is precisely during periods of international tension, even more so than in periods of relative stability, that we need to redouble our collective efforts in pursuit of effective arms control measures.

Let me now turn to some of the areas where such important and useful measures are being pursued.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Present-day multilateral disarmament negotiations are built around the first special session devoted to disarmament and the Final Document which emerged from that session. The Final Document was the result of difficult negotiations and it represented the product of a delicately balanced consensus. Care must be taken not to upset that consensus.

From the special session emerged the two chief multilateral negotiating bodies - the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Both bodies have this year experienced certain difficulties in their deliberations due in large part to the current international situation. They have, however, made important progress in a number of fields.

The most urgent of the areas where progress must be made is nuclear disarmament. It is of concern to Australia that in recent years no effective new measures of nuclear arms control have been put into effect. This is not to denigrate the efforts that have been made. Australia has welcomed the signing of the SALT II Agreement as a significant achievement. When brought into force, it will place verifiable limits on the strategic arsenals and delivery systems of the two major nuclear weapon States. This is an important step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. We regret, however, that the Agreement has not yet been ratified. The early ratification of SALT and rapid progress on the negotiation of further substantive measures under the SALT II process would be a major contribution to enhancing the prospects for arms control.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

SALT is, however, only one of the elements of the arms limitation process, and although it should achieve much in limiting the arms race between the super-Powers it does cover only two of the nuclear-weapon States. We look to the other nuclear-weapon States also to participate constructively in nuclear arms limitation and disarmament.

Very high on the list of attainable yet critical agreements necessary for all nuclear-weapon States to accept is the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Australia has long been an active proponent of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement as a further restraint on existing nuclear arsenals and a further major obstacle to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Such a treaty would put a stop to all nuclear explosions for the duration of the treaty -- indeed we would hope for all time. It would apply to explosions for military purposes as well as for peaceful purposes, and it would thus limit, and perhaps even stop, the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the parties to the Treaty. It would make the development of new nuclear weapons, or the improvement of existing ones, more difficult. This in turn would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, lead to a fuller implementation of that Treaty and help overcome the objections of those States that see the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as discriminating in favour of the existing nuclear-weapon States.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty would also prevent, or at least restrict, horizontal proliferation. The objective is, of course, a universally accepted treaty under which States which do not today have nuclear weapons would not acquire them. In this respect it is relevant to note that States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty could become party to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and thus provide assurances that they would not become nuclear-weapon States.

Another attraction of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be its usefulness as a point of pressure on States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or comprehensive test-ban treaties. Any such State which engaged in nuclear testing after a comprehensive test-ban treaty had been concluded would come under increasing pressure to explain and justify its action to international opinion.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Australia has in a variety of forums consistently voiced its dissatisfaction that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States have not yet concluded their discussions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly Australia played an active part in preparing resolution 34/73, which, inter alia, called upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. Although we welcomed the statement which the nuclear-weapon States made in the Committee on Disarmament on 31 July on the progress of their negotiations, we were disappointed that that statement gave no indication when a comprehensive **test ban** was likely to be concluded. We shared the hopes and expectations of the overwhelming majority of States that the negotiating nuclear-weapon States would have concluded their trilateral negotiations this year and that their co-operation in the Committee on Disarmament would have permitted that body to proceed swiftly with the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions for all time. We regret that that was not the case, but we look forward to positive results in 1981. Such progress would not only demonstrate the commitment of the States concerned to nuclear disarmament but would help bring us a step nearer to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

The completion of such a treaty is now urgent, and the involvement of the international community through the Committee on Disarmament to complement the efforts of the negotiating parties is essential if the treaty is to attract widespread support. Without that support its impact would be seriously limited.

I turn now to "cut-off". Looking ahead, it would be an important further brake on proliferation if at an appropriate stage agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear-weapon purposes - or "cut-off", in short - were negotiated. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, while an integral part of the over-all plan for nuclear non-proliferation, is not an end in itself. It would not restrict the continued production of existing types of nuclear weapons. "Cut-off", on

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

the other hand, would help to achieve this goal and to limit existing nuclear arsenals to approximately their present size and so contribute to the scaling-down of the arms race. It would also prevent the emergence of new States with nuclear explosive capabilities.

In the context of the limiting of nuclear arsenals, it is important to recognize the contribution made by the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. We trust that all nuclear-weapon States will observe the provisions of that Treaty. We also look to the United States and the Soviet Union to comply with the provisions of the Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and the Treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Coming now to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the 10 years that it has been effect it has made a substantial contribution to international security and to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are encouraged by the fact that over two thirds of the States Members of the United Nations have voluntarily undertaken to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a security Treaty. It is the linchpin of the international non-proliferation régime and a benchmark of responsible international behaviour. Indeed it is worth reflecting on how the world security situation might now be if 10 years ago the international community had not established the non-proliferation régime.

A climate of confidence is essential for the development of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The régime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including in particular the full-scope safeguards administered by the the International Atomic Energy Agency, provides assurances of the peaceful intent of nuclear activities and is essential to this climate of confidence. It is for that reason that we are concerned about indications that some States outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty may have covert programmes, including the construction of unsafeguarded facilities, for the development of a nuclear-explosive capability. There is no doubt that detonation of a nuclear explosive device by one of those States would jeopardize regional and international security. It could also undermine the prospects for more broadly based co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

It was disappointing to Australia that it was not possible for agreement to be reached on a final document in the time available at the Review Conference. The Conference did, however, provide the opportunity for a valuable and productive airing of developments and aspirations on the vital issues of nuclear disarmament. It emerged clearly from the Conference that, while the Treaty itself was subjected to rigorous examination, there was no questioning of its principal objectives.

There remains broad international consensus that the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime should be preserved and that horizontal and vertical proliferation should be contained. The absence of a final consensus at the Review Conference reflected concern over the pace and direction of nuclear disarmament efforts rather than any fundamental conflicts of interest. We share this concern. A note of warning has been sounded and must be heeded by the nuclear-weapon States.

I must draw attention to a number of important and positive aspects which emerged from the Conference. I have in mind the near unanimity reached on most of the issues relating to the application of international safeguards and the arrangements governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Agreement on these issues was of significance and will contribute to further international discussion in the International Atomic Energy Agency and elsewhere aimed at enhancing the non-proliferation régime.

I turn now to the question of chemical weapons. The Australian Government attaches considerable importance to the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. There exists among the international community a broad consensus for the conclusion of such a convention. The working group established this year in the Committee on Disarmament under the able chairmanship of the Japanese representative in the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Okawa, has made progress and we are confident that at its next session a further working group will be set up to continue this encouraging work and that the elaboration of a convention can begin. We also welcome the valuable exchange of information and material that took place in the seminar on chemical weapons which arose out of an Australian suggestion.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

We are looking for a truly comprehensive convention, one that would eliminate completely the possibility of any form of warfare intended to kill or injure human beings through the use of chemical weapons. It must contain a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapon agents and their means of delivery, without hampering the proper uses of chemicals for peaceful purposes.

One important area where much further work is necessary is that of verification. A vital element of a convention on chemical weapons is of course a verification arrangement which takes full account of the military potency of chemical weapons. It is acknowledged that agreement on effective verification machinery will take time to achieve, but it is essential that it be achieved.

The difficulties of verification are real and have been brought home strongly to us by recent disturbing reports of the use of chemical weapons in several current armed conflicts. Difficulties in obtaining conclusive confirmation of the accuracy or otherwise of such reports demonstrates the importance of ensuring that a convention on chemical weapons should contain strict and workable verification procedures. Not only are there great difficulties in verifying the use of chemical weapons but there is no established procedure for exposing to the international community a country which uses chemical weapons, and no established way for countries to demonstrate their innocence if unjustifiably accused.

We welcomed the progress report on the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons which was submitted to this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. We share the hope of the international community that these negotiations will soon be concluded and their results presented to the Committee on Disarmament.

I turn now to the Indian Ocean. My Government supports the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace but believes that the creation of these zones is primarily a matter for States of the regions concerned and should be based on intraregional consensus. It is our view that the adherence of all States in a region to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons offers one of the best prospects for the successful implementation of such a zone in that region.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Australia has long supported the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and has been an active member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

At the last session of the General Assembly, resolution 34/80 B called for the convening in 1981 of a conference to implement the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In line with our traditional support for this principle, Australia voted for that resolution. We did, however, express certain reservations about the holding of a conference in 1981, bearing in mind in particular the unsatisfactory outcome of the then just concluded Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. That meeting demonstrated that the necessary degree of harmonization for the convening of a conference was still some way off. We were then and still are of the view that when a conference is held it must be held under conditions which will enable it to reach a successful conclusion. An unsuccessful conference would, in our view, be particularly harmful to the concept of a zone of peace and to regional security and stability. Since last year, unfortunately, there has been little, if any, progress towards a further harmonization of views.

Unfortunately, too, a new element has now commanded the attention of the Ad Hoc Committee. The invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan, a hinterland State of the region, has created a climate of apprehension and unease amongst the littoral and hinterland States and has cast an ominous shadow on efforts to bring about peace in the region. It is difficult to envisage how we could expect a conference to produce a declaration on a zone of peace when one of the hinterland States of the region is forcibly occupied by one of the Powers attending the conference - a Power which is further threatening the stability of the region by massing forces on the borders of other littoral States. These events also make it increasingly unlikely that adequate preparations for a conference can be completed in time for it to be held next year.

Australia, which remains committed to the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, believes, therefore, that early in 1981 the Ad Hoc Committee should review the political situation in the region and the degree of preparations for a conference, including the degree of harmonization that has been reached on outstanding issues. In the light of that review a considered decision should then be made on the advisability of convening a conference in 1981.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

One of the more positive contributions in the field of disarmament was the recent and successfully concluded inhumane weapons Conference. Australia welcomes the outcome of that Conference, which represents a significant advance in the field of conventional disarmament. The issues addressed by the Conference were delicate and it is significant that agreement was reached on three of the items.

We recognize of course that the agreements reached at the Conference were limited in scope. But they were significant both in substance and as an illustration of the continuing international will to proceed along the path towards disarmament. The agreement reached does not reflect all the hopes of all delegations but in international forums there must be willingness to compromise, to show flexibility and to co-operate.

So we hope that that willingness by States to show such a degree of co-operation will be reflected in other forums. We have before us a decade devoted to disarmament. It is essential that substantive progress be made during that time. To help achieve that it will be necessary that for the second special session devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982, the General Assembly set itself realistic goals and that in order to achieve those goals adequate preparation be made.

Mr. MITTAL (India): We live in an age in which the political compulsions of nation States are remarkably at odds with the moral imperatives of human society, in which the urge to dominate and the equal determination to resist domination are surpassed by an overwhelming concern at the danger of mankind's collective extinction from the face of this planet. Conventional notions of the relationship between States in terms of their political power and military capability are balanced against the staggering destructive potential of nuclear weapons. When the unconstrained ambitions of States are linked to the locomotive of technological ingenuity, the world is placed on the edge of a nuclear catastrophe. The great revolutionary changes brought about by advances in science and technology give us hope for the future on the one hand and at the same time confront us with the danger of sudden death.

(Mr. Mittal, India)

In our present-day world not only is the offensive capability of nations to inflict intolerable damage on their adversaries increasing continually but technology has itself given a new and unforeseen dimension to conflicts between States. The rational calculation of the outcome of war has today been rendered impossible, since an actual conflict would result in mutual destruction even before the issue of who was the stronger could be settled. Such a development has spawned dubious doctrines of deterrence and balance of terror based on the offensive capability of nuclear weapons. As long as no technological breakthrough in defence systems emerges, therefore, it appears that the Hephistophelean attractiveness of a deterrence strategy will continue to engage the attentions of military planners and power manipulators all over the world, particularly in the most powerful States.

According to current estimates, the number of nuclear warheads in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two most powerful States in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, has risen from 4,500 and 1,000 respectively just about 12 years ago to figures of 9,600 and 6,000. Under the SALT II guidelines, which remain as yet unratified, those numbers are expected only to increase.

If the principal concern of nuclear-weapon States had been to establish a numerical threshold based on the amount of nuclear weapons needed by each side to ensure an unacceptable degree of destruction of the other, the above figures would of course have been recognized by them as being far in excess of any defence requirement. But the limits of deterrence have tended to depend not so much on any technically ascertainable standard alone as on the fluctuating pressures of internal public opinion, the sophisticated second guesses of armchair strategists and public opinion pundits and the numerous pressures of governmental and extra-governmental economic interests, often referred to as the military industrial complex.

The effect of those factors on the world situation is significant. While the strategic relationships between the super-Powers and other nuclear-weapon States, governed by the so-called balance of terror, have perhaps discouraged direct military confrontation, they have not prevented the major involvement of those States in regional conventional conflicts, either directly or through proxies.

(Mr. Mittal, India)

If anything, they have lessened their inhibitions as regards involvement in such conflicts and their ambitions to fashion spheres of interest in individual areas of the world. There is an increasing perception in the present-day world that even the sedulous promotion of regional arrangements, nuclear-weapon-free zones and so on, where they have not emerged as a direct result of spontaneous initiatives on the part of all the regional States concerned, may result in the solidifying of the protectorate status of certain regions of the world vis-à-vis one or the other great Power, thus further hardening the military polarization of the globe.

With regard to issues that are outside the margin of global understandings, these occasionally threaten to introduce dissonances in the over-all balance and to fuel mutual suspicion, even when an escalation of conflict is not imminent. Those issues are then used by States as an excuse for preparing a psychological atmosphere for the further escalation of the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect.

Even as the language of deterrence is being adduced to justify continued escalation in the building of nuclear stockpiles, and qualitative changes are taking place which raise the minimum level of such deterrence, newer doctrines of limited nuclear war are being postulated which, by giving a semblance of credibility to nuclear exchanges, in fact increase the risk of such exchanges actually taking place. It is the continued adherence of the nuclear-weapon States to those perverse doctrines that has chiefly accounted for the continuance of the arms race in both its qualitative and its quantitative aspects, with such vast debilitating consequences for the physical security and the economic well-being of peoples, and especially the peoples of the third world. My delegation would like once again to reaffirm its faith in the consensus adopted in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective

(Mr. Mittal, India)

implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ... to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means." (resolution S-10/2, para. 13)

As our first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, presciently observed: "The climate of peace is completely absent today and the only alternative to a surrender appears to many people to be war, with all its terrible consequences. Surely there are other alternatives which are far removed from surrender and yet lead to the objectives aimed at. It is in this spirit we have tried to approach the world's problems."

(Mr. Mittal, India)

It is now more than two years since the convening of the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, devoted to disarmament, but many of the important measures outlined in the Programme of Action adopted by consensus remain far from implementation. My own delegation did not regard the results of the special session as entirely satisfactory, but we believed then and continue to believe now that the Programme of Action, if implemented in good faith, could lead to meaningful measures of nuclear disarmament. More than anything else, however, this requires bold political decisions on the part of the leaders of the nuclear-weapon States. If the prevailing political attitudes of the past year are any indication, we are still far from summoning this kind of political will. There has clearly been a deterioration in the international situation. But this, in fact, should spur us on to strive even more vigorously towards peace and disarmament.

In this context, we note with interest the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union on "Certain urgent measures for reducing the danger of war". My delegation will give those proposals the most earnest consideration. We sincerely hope that the recent resumption of talks between the Soviet Union and the United States will mark an end to postures of confrontation and a return to the process of negotiation on a wide range of questions, in an atmosphere of responsibility and restraint. It is only in this way that progress can be made in negotiations for genuine nuclear disarmament, which has avowedly the highest priority in the field of disarmament.

It is relevant to recall that the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons was first brought to the attention of the United Nations by India in 1964, when we called for the inscription of an item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". Our motivation and

(Mr. Mittal, India)

approach at that time was based on the premise that both horizontal and vertical proliferation are integral aspects of a single problem which has to be dealt with as a whole. This concept was endorsed in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which declared, inter alia, that any treaty should embody

"...an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations on nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." (resolution 2028 (XX), para. 2(b))

If those principles were indeed to have been embodied in an agreement on non-proliferation, such an agreement could have been workable. Unfortunately, however, in the course of the finalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, that concept was deliberately altered.

If we have before us today an unworkable NPT document, this is because of the narrow and illogical approach which has been adopted of concentrating only on the question of horizontal proliferation. There has been a tendency to look with suspicion at the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States while disregarding the continued and even escalated activities of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. At the same time, the assumption of a cartel-type approach such as embodied in the London Suppliers Club as well as attempts to impose full-scope safeguards and discriminatory constraints on activities relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would seem to be directed towards perpetuating a kind of nuclear feudalism, which is unrealistic, illogical and unacceptable.

As the Foreign Minister of India stated in his address at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 3 October 1980:

"India is opposed to nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Government of India is firmly committed to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. We would oppose any moves or measures which are discriminatory in nature and which come in the

(Mr. Mittal, India).

way of our programmes to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be confused with the right of all States to develop, acquire and use nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests." (A/35/PV.23, p.68)

The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for developing countries, whose power resources are limited, than for industrially-advanced countries. An additional source of power such as atomic energy may not mean very much for the latter, since it is not so indispensable to them and it would not make much difference if they were to restrain and restrict its use. On the other hand, efforts to restrict the peaceful uses of atomic energy by developing countries would adversely affect their developmental efforts.

The general question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world has been considered in the General Assembly and was also a few years ago the subject of a comprehensive study by an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. There is general agreement that certain basic principles should be taken into account wherever appropriate conditions for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist.

The Indian delegation, in conformity with the conclusions of that group of experts, continues to believe that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from the States within the region concerned, and that participation must be voluntary. This principle is of the utmost importance, not such much for any doctrinaire reason but because a zone can be viable only if it comes about as a result of the initiative taken by the States concerned arising out of common

(Mr. Mittal, India)

security concerns, a common perception of the threat to such security and a common desire to help each other. These principles have also been reflected in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the final document of the special session.

Another important aspect of this question is the clear definition of the region concerned in terms of acknowledged and well-defined geographical areas. In so far as South Asia is an integral part of the region of Asia and the Pacific, to define a proposal in terms of an artificial sub-region such as South Asia would appear to my delegation to be not only misleading but also counter-productive.

The year 1980 marks the beginning of the second Disarmament Decade. We should like in this connexion to refer to the work done by the Disarmament Commission in June this year in preparing the elements of the Declaration of the eighties as the second Disarmament Decade. The Disarmament Commission and, in particular, the Working Group under the chairmanship of Ambassador Adeniji undertook extensive and painstaking efforts in negotiating a consensus text. But my delegation is disappointed that final agreement could not be reached on certain crucial questions relating to the time-frame for the accomplishment of specific priority measures of disarmament, the specific role and function of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of such agreements as the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, treaties on radiological and chemical weapons, and so forth.

On other priority measures, too, there was no agreement on a time-frame for disarmament efforts. We are particularly concerned at the fact that some delegations are still experiencing difficulty over a reference in the document to the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which to my delegation, as indeed to an overwhelming number of delegations, is a question of fundamental priority which should figure in any document on disarmament.

(Mr. Mittal, India)

My delegation also feels that serious consideration should be given to the careful preparation and organization of the second special session on disarmament scheduled to be convened in 1982, so that it will make a substantive contribution in the direction of disarmament and so that the second Disarmament Decade may become a decade of real disarmament.

We have so far addressed ourselves to the question of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction because the question of nuclear disarmament merits, in our view, the first and the highest priority. We do not, of course, mean that disarmament in the conventional field is not important or, for that matter, unessential. It is only a question of comparative perspective. Quite apart from the fact that conventional weapons do not threaten the total annihilation of the human race, a modicum of conventional capability is essential, especially to newly-independent countries, in order that they may safeguard their hard-won independence from the aggressive interpositions of great-Power ambitions which straddle the globe and from other threats to their security.

All too often, however, we come across proposals on conventional disarmament measures which seeks across-the-board solutions without reference to the reality that it is a handful of military-significant States that bear the primary responsibility in that regard.

(Mr. Mittal, India)

The same is true of regional disarmament measures, where progress would best be initiated in the most heavily armed theatre of the world, namely, Europe. As regards other proposals pertaining to the ratios of armed forces, and so on, we in India are fully conscious of the fact that in the imperfect world we live in concern for basic security is natural and understandable, since the size of our own country necessitates a basic ability to withstand threats to the integrity of the nation which may emanate from any quarter. This is especially relevant to countries like India that have on principle refused to align themselves with one or other of the military blocs. Attempts to impose artificial strait-jackets through concepts such as balanced ratio of forces, and so on, in a purely bilateral context, in the absence of an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence among countries, would be, to say the least, diplomatically unwise and politically unproductive.

While we may view with some degree of satisfaction the success achieved at the recently concluded Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, our satisfaction should be tempered by the knowledge that the effects of the use of those weapons, however indiscriminate, are after all relatively minor compared to the enormous destructive capability of nuclear weapons. We do nevertheless recognize that the success of that Conference could contribute to similar successes in other, more important fields.

A secure world cannot be built upon foundations of human misery. While 40 per cent of the total population of more than two thirds of the countries represented in this Organization live in a state of absolute poverty, the countries belonging to the upper crust of the pyramid of economic affluence lavish their financial, technical and economic resources on weapons of mass destruction which they declare with equal firmness are meant not to be used but merely to be kept for their so-called defence in well-protected silos or beneath the hatches of nuclear submarines.

(Mr. Mittal, India)

The world today is spending billions upon billions of dollars on armaments. As the Brandt Commission recently observed:

"The world's military spending dwarfs any spending on development. Total military expenditures are approaching \$450 billion a year, of which over half is spent by the Soviet Union and the United States, while annual spending on official development aid is only \$20 billion. If only a fraction of the money, manpower and research presently devoted to military uses were diverted to development, the future prospects of the Third World would look entirely different. In any case there is a moral link between the vast spending on arms and the disgracefully low spending on measures to remove hunger and ill health in the Third World."

The Brandt report rightly stressed the moral link between vast spending on arms and the urgent need for alleviating the misery of the human condition in areas of the world which need urgent attention. The malaria eradication programme of the World Health Organization (WHO) languishes for want of funds which represent an amount that is a mere one thousandth of the world's annual military spending. The report also decries the sense of resignation and the traditional acceptance that accompany large defence spending, which it identifies as one of the chief obstacles to disarmament. Yet it would seem that the fourfold increase in defence spending over the last 30 years has not been a sufficient eye-opener to the world. In the current surcharged atmosphere of media pressures on the one hand and popular clamour on the other, the indications are that spending on armaments in the militarily most powerful nations will continue to increase. Fallacious arguments continue to be advanced that arms production and exports are essential to the economies and employment situation of the industrialized North. However, recent data from studies conducted in the United States have only confirmed earlier arguments that higher employment and growth potential are obtainable in development industries and that conversion to civilian production of existing

(Mr. Mittal, India)

military facilities could be achieved faster than was generally assumed. Here again it is not the economic imperative but the absence of political will which is responsible for inaction. The talents of half a million scientists and engineers throughout the world need to be better utilized towards solving the energy, health, education and food needs of the world rather than in fashioning ever more sophisticated artefacts of war.

The close link between disarmament and development has been underscored in the Final Document and is also the focus of a special study of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between Disarmament and Development which is due to submit a report to the next session of the General Assembly.

The conscience of the world needs to be awakened against the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. The efforts of the United Nations in the dissemination of public knowledge and the creation of enhanced awareness against the use of nuclear weapons has obtained the appreciation of the world at large. As the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declares:

"...since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed; ... ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war."

Efforts should be made to build up public opinion so as to turn Governments away from the path of competition and tension towards sobriety and reason. With the commencement of the Second Disarmament Decade, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should make still greater efforts in this direction and fully involve the widest range of governmental and non-governmental organizations in this noble effort.

Our purpose this afternoon has been to address general questions relating to some of the items on the agenda, particularly on the first and highest priority in the field of disarmament, namely, nuclear disarmament. We shall

(Mr. Mittal, India)

have occasion later on to revert to other important issues, including the question of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) and the question of the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean next year. We note that there will be a further meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean next week to consider its report to the General Assembly. We should naturally have to await the results of those deliberations before commenting on the work done in that field.

In concluding my statement, I should like to pledge the full co-operation of my delegation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all other delegations in taking such decisions as would help to further the objectives of this Committee to the best of our ability. My delegation is convinced that there is no such thing as a hopeless situation as long as mankind shows vision and does not give up here.

Mr. DUMEVI (Ghana): Statements made since the debates commenced about a week ago have, in the view of my delegation, highlighted three important points: firstly, the pervading threat of the arms race to international peace and security; secondly, the reaffirmation by States Members of commitments to disarmament; and thirdly, the intimate relationship between disarmament and security. The clearly expressed commitments show that what is needed now is to summon the necessary political will and to cultivate an attitude of compromise and restraint in our relations with others if we want meaningful progress in disarmament. In other words, until at least some of the causes of distrust and rivalry are dealt with, progress in disarmament will continue to elude the international community.

As the Ghana delegation has had the opportunity to state here in this Committee, it is our view that negotiated agreements alone cannot advance the cause of disarmament unless those involved have the necessary trust in each other. The Final Document underscores this point when it states, inter alia:

"In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, /and/ refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament ..." (resolution S-10/2, para. 41)

(Mr. Dumevi, Ghana)

Therefore the Final Document has imposed on Member States specific obligations essential for the relaxation of tensions. These obligations include, in the view of Ghana, the exercise of military restraint to avoid arousing the apprehensions of other countries legitimately concerned about their security and the preservation of vital interests. Unless this is done, decisions and actions could create their own chain reactions, escalate tensions, deepen distrust and add further spirals to the arms race. No country, in our view, will disarm if it has any reason to feel that others thereby gain advantages over it. Present trends do not offer my delegation the feeling that the two super-Powers seriously accept the special responsibility that the Final Document has imposed on them; the two military blocs, of course, share this blame. In the view of Ghana, numerous disarmament initiatives without the backing of genuine political will and restraint in international relations are not likely to slow down the arms race.

Last year the General Assembly remitted a number of resolutions to the Committee on Disarmament with specific instructions to negotiate and elaborate, as a matter of the highest priority, treaty texts to be submitted for consideration at the current session. In fact those resolutions relate to issues which are essentially carry-overs from previous sessions of the General Assembly. A logical starting point for our work, in our view, is to examine the report of the Committee on Disarmament and determine whether there has been any progress in its work and whether there is need for any new political directive. Therefore I intend to devote my statement to consideration of some parts of the Geneva Committee's report, contained in document A/35/27, now before this Committee.

In many respects the report represents an improvement on previous reports. It is true that the Committee has not completed its work, but the fact that it has accomplished so much is a tribute to the conscientious efforts exerted by all the delegations. It is encouraging to note that for the

(Mr. Dumevi, Ghana)

first time all the nuclear Powers participated in the work of the Committee. Particular mention should be made of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, which has now joined this important multilateral negotiating Committee. It is equally encouraging to note that concrete negotiations have commenced through the four ad hoc working groups created by the Committee. My delegation hopes that the momentum generated will be fully exploited when the 1981 session commences.

As the report shows, much work remains to be done. Therefore my delegation supports the view expressed by the delegation of Denmark a few days ago that this year the General Assembly should avoid overburdening the Geneva Committee with new priority items, so as to enable it to devote enough time to its uncompleted work. My delegation would also urge that the Committee at its 1981 session should endeavour to reduce substantially the amount of time spent on organizational and procedural questions. This would give it sufficient time to tackle its heavy agenda.

Let me now turn to the agenda items which were considered by the ad hoc working groups. With regard to chemical weapons, we note that the working group went a long way towards fulfilling its mandate. As noted in the report, there was a convergence of views on the scope of the prohibitions, the important question of verification, confidence-building measures and the international co-operation vital for the attainment of the objectives of a multilateral convention. However, there are a number of important issues on which the possibility of a consensus has yet to be explored. Therefore it is the hope of my delegation that a working group will continue this important work when the Committee reassembles next year.

With respect to radiological weapons, it seems that further efforts must be exerted to narrow the difference between the various concepts about a ban on weapons of this type. The view of Ghana is that the convention envisaged should include the prohibition of all types of weapons that involve radiation.

(Mr. Dumevi, Ghana)

On the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, my delegation supported General Assembly resolutions 34/84 and 34/85, relating to assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, as a matter of principle - because the attainment of the objectives of both the resolutions would be yet another contribution to the disarmament process and, more important, because the objective is to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. However, I should like to point out that Ghana does not believe that an international convention is a substitute for general and complete disarmament, which remains our ultimate objective. We believe, however, that until this objective is attained a legally binding convention applicable to all non-nuclear-weapon countries without any qualifications or limitations is desirable. Unilateral declarations, in our view, are no substitutes for commitments entered into in the form of legally binding conventions.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a comprehensive disarmament programme has also made remarkable progress, as is evident from the consensus report in the relevant paragraphs of document A/35/27. It is hoped that the unfinished work will be taken up at the next session of the Geneva Committee and that a comprehensive programme as envisaged in the Final Document will be made ready before the second special session devoted to disarmament.

It is a matter of deep regret for my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament could not establish an ad hoc working group on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is, however, noted that the trilateral negotiators, as in the previous year, submitted a progress report to the Committee on Disarmament. While Ghana appreciates the efforts made by the three negotiators, we share the general concern over the rather slow progress in concluding the negotiations. A comprehensive test-ban treaty has for long been a priority item on the agenda of the General Assembly, reflecting the great importance the international community

(Mr. Dumevi, Ghana)

attaches to a nuclear test ban. In the words of the Final Document, a nuclear test ban treaty would stop "the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons" (resolution S-10/2, para. 51) and prevent "the proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ibid.). We also share the view that the necessary scientific and technical problems have been fully explored and that what is needed now is the political will on the part of the trilateral negotiators. The Ghana delegation urges that at this session a further appeal be addressed to the trilateral negotiators to exert their best endeavours and bring these long negotiations to an end. Having said this, I wish to make a brief comment on the substance of the progress report submitted by the three negotiating countries. As noted in the report, the three negotiating countries have agreed to prohibit and prevent nuclear weapon tests, refrain from encouraging or supporting such tests and place a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions. On the important question of verification, the trilateral negotiators have also agreed on the use of national technical means of verification supplemented by seismic data to be obtained from the international exchange system which they have also agreed to establish. Other co-operative measures to ensure effective compliance have also been agreed upon.

(Mr. Dumevi, Ghana)

The report therefore represents a remarkable step forward compared with last year's report. My delegation, however, wishes to express its views on the question of the duration and review envisaged for the treaty.

It is the view of Ghana that if the treaty is to be credible a long duration is necessary in order to attract accession by as many countries as possible. With respect to the question of review, my delegation finds it difficult to understand the apparent attempt to confer veto powers on the permanent members of the Security Council in matters concerning a multilateral treaty of this nature. My delegation feels that the tripartite draft would benefit from detailed comments and suggestions by an ad hoc working group; we would therefore urge the two negotiating countries that have objected to the establishment of an ad hoc working group to reconsider their position.

One of the objectives of disarmament is the promotion of international peace and security. That objective is particularly relevant in areas of tension where racist régimes seek through armaments to sustain a social and political system that denies basic legitimate rights to peoples. In the words of the Final Document:

"... the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council." (Ibid.,
para. 12)

And yet the racist Pretoria régime continues to build large arsenals of deadly weapons through the collaboration of certain Members of this Organization and in contravention of Security Council decisions. Relying on superior military forces, Pretoria has launched unprovoked attacks on neighbouring African countries. It is also a well-known fact that through nuclear collaboration with some Members of this Organization South Africa

(Mr. Dumevi, Ghana)

now possesses nuclear capability. The fact that South Africa has refused to submit its nuclear facilities to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) further underlines the threat to security in our part of the world posed by South Africa. We call upon Member States to respect the wishes of the African countries and refrain from all forms of collaboration with South Africa, particularly in the military and nuclear field.

The latest reports show that military expenditures have reached the staggering figure of \$500 billion a year. That has happened while millions of our people, particularly in the developing countries, cry out for assistance that would have a meaningful impact on their life and society. As we commemorate Disarmament Week, may we express the hope that we shall all rededicate ourselves to the objectives of disarmament by exerting the necessary political will. The results would be not merely greater security but also greater prosperity for us all.

Mr. SAED (United Arab Emirates) (interpretation from Arabic):

It is a pleasure, Sir, at the beginning of my statement to convey my warmest congratulations to you on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. We are firmly convinced that your high level of competence and your vast experience in the field of diplomacy will be a guarantee of the success of the work of this Committee.

I also have the pleasure of congratulating the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur and of wishing them every success.

There is great concern in the world at the feverish attempts of States to build arsenals of highly developed weapons and at the unbridled arms race, which has now reached a peak among all those States, which seem unaware of the terrible consequences of that dangerous race.

The vast majority of those States have given armaments one of the highest priorities in their programmes, so that they swallow up the bulk of their annual budgets; yet those States have only limited resources and suffer from many problems, above all those of poverty, under-development and hunger.

(Mr. Saed, United Arab Emirates)

In 1980 military expenditures in the world exceeded \$500 billion. That appears to be a fantastic figure, particularly when it is reported that 25,000 people die every day because of the lack of potable water and that pollution is the prime cause of death of children under the age of five years. Statistics also show that more than 700 million people in the world today are illiterate and that the literacy programmes intended for them would require an expenditure of more than \$1,200 billion by the end of the century.

Most of the inhabitants of the world live in tragic conditions and in a state of under-development because of poverty, ignorance and disease, which are destroying twentieth-century man. We should like to ask the following question: can we not save others from this bitter reality by making the smallest effort and devoting some of the funds squandered on monstrous armament programmes to remedying this situation? These facts add nothing new to the information with which we are all familiar. I have no intention of repeating what has been said by previous speakers. I did, however, want to mention the bitter and sad situation in which mankind is living and the unknown destiny which awaits us.

In mentioning this truth my delegation would like to appeal to the States of the world, in particular the major Powers and the developed States, to put an end to this grim prospect by limiting the production and stockpiling of armaments in order to bring about disarmament in the near future. I also appeal to the other States of the world, particularly the developing States, to switch their focus of concern to the building of a healthy and educated community instead of building arsenals of weapons.

(Mr. Saed, United Arab Emirates)

My delegation also urges the developed world in particular to set aside part of the resources now devoted to financing destructive armaments research and production programmes and divert it to improvement and to benefiting mankind rather than leading it to the brink of the chasm.

The implementation of General Assembly resolution 3093 (XXVIII) on the reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries is a practical and efficient measure for disarmament.

We welcome the step taken by the Austrian Republic to reduce its military budget, referred to by its Permanent Representative in this Committee. This is a constructive measure, and that is why we appeal to the States of the world to follow the example of Austria.

Our country attaches great importance to the implementation of resolution 3093 (XXVIII) because of its positive contribution to achieving general and complete disarmament.

The signing of the SALT II treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 June 1979 has strengthened our hopes for the reduction of tension in the world, but its non-ratification has revived world concern. We hope that the States concerned will ratify it with a view to starting the SALT III negotiations, in which the world has placed great hope for achieving the limitation of the arms race.

The halting of the arms race should not be confined to conventional weapons but must be extended to nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally, because that aspect of the race increases fear and concern.

While calling on the States of the world to ban the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes, at the same time we support and encourage the utilization of this technology with a view to fostering the development of States and the well-being of their peoples.

(Mr. Saed, United Arab Emirates)

The problems facing the world today relating to the increase of the production of chemical weapons have aroused considerable fear because of the danger of the use of such weapons. States producing and possessing such weapons will not refrain from using them at any moment against any country, should they find it expedient. That is why we call for the elaboration of an international treaty banning the use of those destructive weapons. The manufacture and use of bacteriological and incendiary weapons and their development is also a problem of increasing concern to the world today more than at any time in the past. We believe that the conclusion of an international convention totally banning those weapons as soon as possible would be a very important and fundamental step on the road towards disarmament and a positive factor in promoting international stability.

Developed States are still carrying out nuclear tests paying no attention to their pernicious consequences. Those tests threaten the annihilation not only of mankind but also of all living creatures, which represent a source of human nutrition. We hope that a treaty will very soon be concluded which will totally ban all nuclear tests whether underground or on the sea-bed. This measure will without doubt remove some of mankind's concern for its civilization and for its very future.

My country's geographical situation and political ties prompt it to attach particular importance to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East. The fact that we belong to a non-aligned group - the Group of 77 developing countries - inevitably compels us to be interested in seeing that Latin America and Africa should be declared nuclear-weapon-free zones. That is why we supported and still support all the efforts exerted and all the resolutions adopted in order to attain this objective on those two continents.

There is much evidence that Israel is producing and possesses nuclear weapons. Many delegations, in the course of the tenth special session, submitted such proof and testimony. That is why there is no point in repeating it here at this session.

(Mr. Saed, United Arab Emirates)

Everyone knows that the goal of the Israeli entity in acquiring those weapons is to use them against the Arab States and peoples. As an Arab State, we are one of the targets threatened by such aggression by that entity.

The United Arab Emirates, with other States, supported the General Assembly resolution on creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Zionist entity rejected that resolution and put forward futile arguments which had no foundation whatsoever. This only goes to show that it intends to continue its nuclear weapons production programme and consequently to use those weapons against the Arabs in the future.

The fact that this racist entity has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has refused to place its nuclear facilities under international control is further and irrefutable proof of this. We therefore call upon the United Nations to adopt the necessary effective measures to implement that resolution.

The close military co-operation between the Zionist entity and the racist régime of South Africa, in particular in the field of nuclear armaments, is not confined to jeopardizing gravely the security and stability of the peoples of Africa and the Middle East but threatens peace and stability throughout the world.

The fact that the racist régime of South Africa possesses nuclear weapons is a threat to the peoples and States of the African continent.

The Indian Ocean region has recently witnessed a growing military presence of the major States, which severely endangers its security and integrity. The major Powers have used that part of the world as a theatre of conflict and rivalry, and this extends the arms race to the region and conflicts with the efforts exerted to reduce international tension. My country, which is a littoral States of the Indian Ocean, voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) in 1971, declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. We associate ourselves with those States which claim that this region should be outside the field of military rivalry. We once again

(Mr. Saed, United Arab Emirates)

affirm the need for the great Powers to respect that declaration and to refrain from any military activity contrary to the General Assembly's resolution on the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

We attach great importance to the international conference on the Indian Ocean to be held in Colombo in 1980. We hope that the necessary measures will be adopted to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Mr. Ahmed ADAN (Somalia): My delegation commented last October on the lack of progress being made by the international community towards the goals set by the tenth special session. Unfortunately the past year has been marked not only by a lack of progress towards disarmament but also by several retrograde trends. Last year for example, the majority of States joined in welcoming the progress that had been made towards the ratification of SALT II. Today the **ratification** of that limited but essential measure of nuclear arms control has been indefinitely postponed because of the invasion and occupation by one of the two negotiating partners of the territory of a neighbouring non-aligned State. This major setback in the field of nuclear arms control is particularly disturbing because controlling the nuclear arms race with a view to its elimination has without doubt the highest priority on any programme for general and complete disarmament.

It is widely acknowledged that the steady increase in the quality and quantity of weapons and weapons systems in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers makes nuclear war almost inevitable. We have been told repeatedly by the most eminent scientists that in such a war there would be no winners and few survivors capable of carrying on even a tolerable existence. Nevertheless, the spiralling nuclear arms race continues, and the illusory idea of limited nuclear war is being established as the new partner to the principle of the balance of terror.

Each year the astronomical cost of building ever more destructive nuclear weapons reaches new heights fuelling world inflation, hindering the establishment of a more just international economic order and providing an ironic background to a world in which the vast majority of the people suffer from poverty and hunger. Unfortunately too, the reduction of the military budgets of nuclear and other militarily significant Powers and the application of such savings to development remains little more than a pious aspiration.

The lack of progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty is further evidence of the perilous disregard by the nuclear Powers of the imperatives of global survival. That measure, long given highest priority

(Mr. Ahmed Adan, Somalia)

by the international community and representing an obligation of the nuclear Powers under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been overdue for many years. Its urgency today is highlighted by the Secretary-General's Expert Committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty which shows that nuclear testing has steadily increased since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty signed in 1963.

No disarmament measure can make a more immediate and significant contribution to vertical and horizontal non-proliferation than the cessation of all nuclear tests. It was therefore a great disappointment to the majority of attending States when the nuclear Powers, showing a rare unity of purpose, opposed the proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing put forward at the Second Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That attitude is all the more frustrating in view of the admission by the nuclear Powers that only a few insignificant problems stand in the way of completing a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

My delegation sincerely hopes that the resumed tripartite negotiations will soon produce an agreed text. We hope too that that if those negotiations continue to drag on without result the Committee on Disarmament will decide to undertake the negotiating process without waiting for a text agreed on by the nuclear Powers.

My delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament must give urgent attention to the question of establishing international centres for seismic verification since that question is related to the remaining obstacles to the test-ban treaty and is also central to the task of confidence building.

While Somalia believes that the nuclear Powers have the major responsibility for carrying out measures for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty it supports a number of initiatives under international consideration which bear on the question of horizontal non-proliferation.

(Mr. Ahmed Adan, Somalia)

In that regard we are disappointed that the relevant ad hoc Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament is far from reaching agreement on effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That question is one of great urgency for the members of the Organization of African Unity, who are committed to the denuclearization of Africa and who strongly support the establishment of the Middle East as a zone of peace. We are acutely conscious of the potential and indeed the actual capability of South Africa and Israel for developing and deploying nuclear weapons. We are obliged to consider the strong possibility that those States might use nuclear blackmail against the African and Palestinian struggles for self-determination and nationhood.

The strong evidence that South Africa detonated a nuclear weapon in September 1979 is cause for deep concern. The refusal of South Africa and Israel to become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to accept full safeguards on their nuclear activities also heightens suspicions about their motives. My delegation notes that the Group of Experts on South Africa's nuclear capacity stated emphatically in its report that South Africa has the capacity to make nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery. The Group of Experts was of the opinion that South Africa might adopt a policy of latent proliferation, in which it would covertly stockpile nuclear weapons and, like Israel, would use rumours of its nuclear capability to further its purposes.

Those developments lead us to hope that the ad hoc group working on measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States will make greater progress next year.

Also relevant to the question of containing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is the issue of modalities for the transfer of nuclear technology to the developing countries. While my delegation believes that such transfers must be accompanied by international safeguards, we hope that the industrialized countries will not use discriminatory policies in order to preserve their monopoly over nuclear technology.

(Mr. Ahmed Adan, Somalia)

The establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones would make a significant contribution, we believe, to the purposes of the non-proliferation régime, to world disarmament and to the removal of regional tension and conflict. Efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace have unfortunately been disrupted by the massive intervention of a super-Power and its surrogates in regional conflicts. That intervention, which has caused the escalation of armed conflict and led to the establishment of the large-scale military presence of the Soviet Union and its surrogate Cuban forces in the Horn of Africa, is doubly reprehensible because it has been directed against the freedom struggle of oppressed peoples seeking their right to self-determination and independence.

Such developments lead inevitably to the expansion of the military and naval presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean in the context of their global rivalry. The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace can best be implemented by the elimination from the region of hegemonist ambitions, colonial oppression and interventionist foreign mercenaries which are the cause of instability, continued tension and conflict.

Another dangerous element of the Indian Ocean situation is the strengthening of the military forces of South Africa's racist régime by its western and Zionist allies. As I have already mentioned, South Africa has been able to add a nuclear weapon capability to its already threatening arsenal of sophisticated conventional weapons. My Government calls on all the States concerned to end their naval, military and nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria régime, which is encouraged by their support to impose its militant and aggressive policies on the southern African region.

The establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of a number of ad hoc groups to deal with disarmament questions given high priority by the international community is a welcome development. Unfortunately, the ad hoc groups in most cases have not been able to go beyond the form to the substance of negotiations.

(Mr. Ahmed Adan, Somalia)

The work of the ad hoc Group on Chemical Weapons is particularly important and we hope that the progress, which was slow this year, will pick up some momentum in 1981. The question of chemical weapons is high on the list of disarmament priorities identified by the tenth special session. It is also an urgent priority because of the growing number of reports of the use of such weapons in many parts of the world and in particular against peoples fighting wars of liberation.

Even more alarming is the evidence that the super-Powers may be preparing to add the horrors of a race in chemical weapons to the existing nuclear threat. That development demands outraged protest and the strongest condemnation by the international community.

The use of conventional weapons which cause unnecessary suffering and have indiscriminate effects is also clearly identified with the oppressive policies of those who would impose colonial, foreign and racist domination.

My delegation is therefore happy to learn of the recent progress towards a general treaty and specific protocols made by the United Nations Conference on the use of exceedingly injurious weapons.

Another welcome advance is provided by the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a text for a treaty banning radiological weapons. We hope that the relevant ad hoc Group of the Disarmament Committee will be able next year to complete its work on a convention on radiological weapons and will also make progress towards preventing the development of other new weapons of mass destruction. The terrible danger to world peace, security and indeed world survival posed by existing weapons of mass destruction indicates the urgency and essential nature of this task.

(Mr. Ahmed Adan, Somalia)

It is easy for both large and small States to be daunted by the complexity and scope of the problems which must be overcome if nuclear disarmament and, finally, general and complete disarmament are to be achieved. Preparations for the second special session on disarmament alone present a major challenge to the various bodies working on disarmament questions. But however difficult the task ahead may be, the international community has no alternative but to continue to try to achieve progress, step by step, with courage and political will. The mobilization of world public opinion in support of the principles and policies outlined in the Final Document of the tenth special session will be an important factor in the success of this process.

We believe that it is important for the various disarmament bodies to avoid the temptation of merely reiterating accepted principles, priorities and programmes as though this exercise in itself constitutes movement towards disarmament goals.

In our view, the greatest hindrance to the implementing of disarmament measures is the lack of a climate of confidence. Suspicion and fear, instability, tension and conflict are rampant in every area of the world because of the resurgence of policies of world hegemony, the continued existence of colonial and racist oppression and the denial to peoples of their right to choose their own destiny.

The United Nations is designating the 1980s as a Disarmament Decade. This must not be an empty and ritualistic gesture. In its resolution S-10/2, the General Assembly states that mankind faces the alternatives of ending the arms race and proceeding to disarmament or facing complete annihilation. Both in and out of the United Nations, Member States must work to ensure that the sane rational alternatives presented by the tenth special session are chosen.

Mr. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): At this stage of the Committee's work, the Ukrainian delegation would like to explain its position on questions related to limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament which are contained, inter alia, in the memorandum of the Soviet Union entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees" (A/35/482).

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

In the present complex international situation, the countries of the socialist community clearly contrast the doctrine of an arms race and military hysteria with their own platform of consistent struggle for international peace and security.

In the declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted in May this year it was stressed once again that the socialist countries have never sought and will never seek military superiority. They do not have, have never had and will never have any strategic doctrine other than a purely defensive one; they do not have, have never had and will never have any intention of creating the potential for a first nuclear strike, either limited or total. By the very nature of their social system, the socialist countries cannot and never will seek to create spheres of influence or establish military or political control over any regions or international lines of communication.

The determination of the socialist countries to continue tirelessly and consistently to fight for peace, for an end to the arms race and to extend international détente to all parts of the world was confirmed just four days ago on 20 October this year in a communiqué issued by the meeting of Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

As was pointed out by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mr. Brezhnev,

"Countries belonging to different social systems need a minimum of trust as much as they need the very air we breathe. Of course, we are and will continue to be polarized by ideological differences in our outlook, but our failure to adopt a bourgeois ideology does not prevent us from remaining firmly on realistic ground and patiently continuing to seek agreement".

The only possible realistic way of seeking agreement in matters of strengthening peace, supplementing political détente by effective measures in the field of military détente, is the course of negotiations based on strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. In the view of the Ukrainian SSR, what we must strive for is for serious consideration to be given to curbing the arms race and to disarmament and that all talks which have been embarked upon in recent years in various international meetings and

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

on a bilateral basis but which have, for one reason or another, now been halted or deferred should be resumed and continued. We must also immediately embark on talks on such vital measures for calling a halt to the arms race and eliminating the threat of war as have not as yet been the subject of talks.

The socialist countries attach the highest priority to calling a halt to the nuclear-arms race. We are all familiar with their proposal for carrying out, with the participation of all nuclear and some non-nuclear States, talks about halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons in all their forms and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons up to and including their total elimination. Also familiar are the concrete proposals of the socialist countries about procedures for holding such talks on a whole range of questions to be discussed. The last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution on the subject which, inter alia, requested the Committee on Disarmament to begin talks on the question of halting the arms race and nuclear disarmament.

However, the Committee on Disarmament was unfortunately unable to take practical steps to put into effect this decision of the General Assembly and even failed to undertake consultations about talks in this area. The reason for this situation was the negative position of a number of States, in particular the United States and China. It was truly a blasphemous act for the United States to have approved the strategy of a preventive nuclear strike on the very day of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This decision could only possibly lead to a twist in the spiral of the nuclear-arms race - even more dangerous to the fate of the world, and to the perfection of the nuclear arsenal.

In the Committee on Disarmament and here in the First Committee, the delegation of China has unceasingly been proclaiming that talks and measures on nuclear disarmament can be embarked upon only after the super Powers unilaterally take such measures themselves while the Chinese themselves are carrying out another nuclear test in the atmosphere leading to the fall-out of a large quantity of radio-active dust that is liable to have such grave consequences for the health of the people of so many countries.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

In the view of the Ukrainian delegation we must, as a matter of urgency, begin businesslike talks on halting the nuclear arms race and subsequently reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons up to and including their total elimination.

The production and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament must run parallel with the strengthening of international political and legal guarantees of the security of States, particularly through the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

An important factor in promoting the solution of the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons would be the qualitative and quantitative limitation and reduction of strategic armaments. The SALT II treaty must come into force as soon as possible. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union that the trilateral talks on the preparation of a treaty on the complete and total prohibition of nuclear weapon testing has taken so long. In spite of the fact that it has already been possible to come to an agreement on the basic provisions of such a treaty, the General Assembly unfortunately has been forced to appeal once again for an acceleration of the work of concluding that important international legal document. The range of measures aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race, preventing the spread of this weapon and ultimately averting the danger of nuclear war include the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. As is shown by the report presented to the Committee by the Secretary-General in document A/35/145, many States favour the conclusion of an international agreement on that question which would help to protect States that scrupulously observe their nuclear-free status from the use against them of the deadly nuclear weapon and would make it difficult to destabilize the strategic situation. We support the proposal made here in the Committee that the General Assembly should request the Committee on Disarmament to embark immediately on talks in order to produce an international agreement on that subject.

At the present time there are a number of areas in the field of the limitation of the arms race where there are real opportunities to achieve mutually acceptable decisions at a very early date. One of those areas is that of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

More than a year has passed since the fundamental elements of a treaty prohibiting that type of weapon of mass destruction was presented to the Committee on Disarmament. However, its discussion has been taking a very long time in the Committee. We believe it necessary for the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of urgency, to conclude work on a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the fundamental elements of a treaty presented jointly in the Committee by the Soviet Union and the United States. The prohibition of radiological weapons would have a favourable effect on the progress of talks on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The approach of the socialist countries to that problem is well known. It has been set out in a number of resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly. The Ukrainian SSR believes that the Assembly must once again call on the Committee on Disarmament to continue talks, with the assistance of qualified experts, on the preparation of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and also possible draft agreements on individual aspects of those weapons.

The Ukrainian SSR, as emerges clearly from its answer to the Secretary-General's question about the proclamation of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, views the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as one of the high-priority measures in the field of limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Over the last year a certain amount of positive work has been done in the search for measures on the prohibition of that type of weapon of mass destruction; in particular, pursuant to the appeal of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, the Committee on Disarmament held a wide-ranging discussion of many aspects of the problem of eliminating chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. The Committee set up a special working group to define the questions that should be considered during negotiations on a multilateral convention on the total and effective prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing such weapons. The report presented to the First Committee by the Committee on Disarmament points out that in the course of discussion of the complex problem of prohibiting that type of weapon it was possible to achieve agreement on a number of issues, while on others the views of the participants in the discussion differed.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

The Ukrainian SSR welcomes the efforts of the Committee to find mutually acceptable solutions and believes that the General Assembly should call on that body to continue that work next year.

At the same time as the discussion of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been taking place on a multilateral basis, the Soviet Union and the United States have continued in 1980 their bilateral talks on preparing a joint initiative on the prohibition of these weapons. A detailed joint report presented to the Committee on Disarmament on 7 July this year shed light on the situation on those talks. That kind of work, we believe, deserves the support of the whole international community.

In this regard I should like to point out that the successful conclusion of work on reaching agreement on the provisions of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons would be helped considerably by the creation of an atmosphere of trust among the countries conducting the talks, in particular on questions that have a direct bearing on the subject of those talks. We find it inadmissible, in circumstances in which talks are going on, to continue the chemical arms race, but the facts, and there are a great many of them, go to show that the United States has begun a new round of intensified preparations for chemical warfare. If we really want to bring about the prohibition of chemical weapons what we need above all is to create a reliable obstacle to the development and testing of new and even more sophisticated generations of that type of weapon.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

Historical experience has shown that the destructive power of conventional means of waging war has grown to such an extent that their wholesale use could lead to the annihilation of whole peoples. In the light of this, the socialist countries are ready to limit and ban any type of weapon on a reciprocal basis in agreement with other States, without detriment to the security of anyone, in conditions of total reciprocity among the States which possess the weapons in question.

However, what has been proposed to us represents a completely different approach. The representative of China, speaking in the First Committee on 22 October - as in the case of nuclear disarmament - proposed that all the permanent members of the Security Council should limit and prohibit conventional types of weapons, except his own country. That is something he said at the very time when it was China itself which had embarked on a course of "teaching military lessons" to the heroic Vietnamese people and hurled against it a 600,000 man army, more than 500 tanks and armoured transport vehicles and more than 700 aircraft.

It is obvious that the refusal of China to join the efforts of the world community to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces is aimed at one clear-cut purpose, that is, to increase its military potential, to dictate to the neighbouring States and to expand at their expense.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wishes to express the hope that realism and sobriety will prevail over a war hysteria and a bid to cram the arsenals of the world full of weapons.

The attainment of mutually acceptable understandings and agreements on measures that we have mentioned and on other measures in the field of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament would mark the 1980s as a decade which saw substantial progress in the struggle for the strengthening of international peace and security. That is precisely what the decisions of the General Assembly on disarmament matters should do.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.