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*President:* Mr. John D. L. HOOD (Australia).

*Present:*

The representatives of the following States: Australia, Belgium, Burma, China, France, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Italy, New Zealand, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The representatives of the following specialized agencies: International Labour Organisation; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; World Health Organization.

**Examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority on the administration of the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration for 1956 (T/1315, T/1321, T/L.765) (*continued*)**

[Agenda item 4(e)]

**Financing of the economic development plans of the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration: report of the Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration (Trusteeship Council resolution 1255 (XVI)) (T/1296) (*continued*)**

[Agenda item 11]

**Report of the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration (T/1311) (*continued*)**

[Agenda item 16]

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Holte Castello (Colombia), Mr. El-Zayat (Egypt) and Mr. Baradi (Philippines), representatives of States members of the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration, and Mr. Gaspari, special representative of*

*the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory, took places at the Council table.*

**QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE TRUST TERRITORY AND REPLIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY (*continued*)**

1. The PRESIDENT invited the representative of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to make a statement.

2. Mr. WILLIAMS (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) said that he had discussed with the special representative the figures the latter had given to the Council at the previous meeting of possible economies in the cost of banana production in Somaliland under Italian administration. He drew attention in particular to the Section entitled "The European concessions" in part III of the Bank's report (T/1296), to table A2 in the statistical appendix, showing the present cost structure, and to table A3, which showed how the expenditures of the industry were distributed. The special representative and the Bank were in full agreement, with one minor exception concerning the estimate of the economies to be achieved in freight rates; similarly the Bank assumed a slightly lower prospective price in 1960-1961 than did the special representative. The difference concerned two points: in the first place the Bank assumed that the industry would still be paying taxes whereas the special representative's estimate allowed for the remission of the export duty; secondly, whereas the special representative had spoken of the return to the grower in terms of a percentage of sales, the question of the return on capital should by no means be left out of account.

3. Before economies could be achieved the industry would have to concentrate in the Giuba River area, which would be served by the deep-water berth at Chisimaio. New land would have to be developed, irrigation systems installed and roads, packing sheds and houses built. For that purpose a large amount of new capital would be required and the prospective return on that capital would normally determine whether the investment would be made or not. In view of the risks of fluctuations in crop and fluctuations in price the Mission had concluded that, even after allowing for all possible economies, the industry would still probably not have a reasonable chance of earning a large enough return to stimulate the investment required without some form of protection or subsidy. The important point that the Bank report was trying to make was that if nothing exceptional were done the industry as a whole would decline and wither away.

4. The Minister of Economic Affairs of the Government of Somalia had remarked at the previous meeting that the Bank's conclusions were based on a rigidly economic line of reasoning and on cautious reservations inspired by principles of banking. The Bank had, of course, assumed the Mission's purpose to be precisely to give such an opinion. The Bank fully realized that other considerations might enter into the making of decisions but had hoped that by describing the economic

situation as clearly as possible it would facilitate the task of arriving at such decisions.

5. Mr. GRILLO (Italy) referred to the Indian representative's suggestion at the previous meeting concerning a technical assistance mission to the Territory. The Administering Authority's purpose was to create a class of Somali experts and technicians and not to make foreign technical assistance experts a permanent institution in the Territory. That was illustrated by the remarks of the Minister of Economic Affairs at the previous meeting concerning the reduced estimate of expert services. The suggested technical assistance mission would inevitably be a costly proposition. For the time being he would only say that the Indian representative's suggestion would be duly considered by the Administering Authority in consultation with the Somali Government. Subject to the decisions reached, he felt the responsibility for estimating technical assistance needs should be left to the Government of Somalia.

6. The Indian representative had also stated that the question of direct financial assistance to Somaliland under Italian administration by the United Nations would more appropriately be dealt with by the General Assembly than by the Trusteeship Council. That question had two aspects: that of competence and that of substance. As far as competence was concerned, since the budget of the United Nations was administered by the General Assembly no decisive step could be taken by the Trusteeship Council. With regard to the question of substance, he referred to operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 855 (IX). If the Trusteeship Council were to report to the General Assembly without making any recommendations or suggestions then the report would fail to convey the keen interest the Council had taken in the matter of financial assistance for the Territory. It would undoubtedly be premature for the Council to make a specific recommendation concerning the amount of external financial assistance which might be required after 1960. It would, however, be well at least to state clearly that some financial assistance would be required. He hoped that the representatives in the Council would produce some practical suggestions concerning the possible sources of financial assistance.

7. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) said that the Council should concentrate on the prospects for the Territory after 1960. Perhaps the International Bank might be prepared to make a guaranteed loan to assist the Somali Government after 1960. He would like to hear the views of the members of the Council on the question where the loan could be obtained and who would guarantee it.

8. Mr. GRILLO (Italy) said it would not be proper for him to comment on the possibility of obtaining loans from the International Bank. The Bank's report was concerned exclusively with the existing situation and the possibilities of economic development, not with the prospects of financial assistance from the Bank.

9. Mr. WILLIAMS (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) said he could not commit the Bank. He drew attention to the conclusions concerning technical and financial assistance at the end of the Bank's report.

10. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) asked how the Administering Authority and the Somali Government proposed to cover the loss caused by the closing of the Suez Canal.

11. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that the loss had been less than expected; from 1

January to the end of April 1957 the decrease in revenue had only been about 500,000 somalos. The estimated total loss was about 4 million somalos. Means of closing the gap would have to be found in the course of the current year, either by reducing expenses or, if possible, by increasing revenue.

12. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) asked whether there was any prospect of carrying out the suggestion made in paragraph 228 of the report of the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration (T/1311) that the Agency for the Economic Development of Somaliland (ASES) should include Somali members.

13. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied that in April 1957 two Somalis had become members of the Agency—Mr. Hagi Farah Ali Omar, the Minister of Economic Affairs, and Mr. Salad, the Minister of Finance.

14. Mr. RIFAI (Syria) asked what benefits would accrue to the Trust Territory from its association with the European common market and what adverse effects that association would have in the future on Somaliland's commercial relations with countries not associated in the European market.

15. Mr. GRILLO (Italy) said that Somaliland under Italian administration was not a party to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and that Italy as Administering Authority had not committed the Territory to any course of action. The function of the association would manifest itself in two ways: first by the reduction of tariffs and second by capital investment in public works. The principal advantage which the Territory would derive from its informal association with the European common market would be the reduction of tariffs in six European markets for goods and products originating in Somaliland. There would also be \$5 million provided by the common fund for investment, to be applied to development plans in Somaliland.

16. In reply to the second part of the question, he said that the Territory's economy and foreign trade would not be adversely affected in any way by its association with the common market; it would be free to trade with any neighbouring country.

17. In any event, on attaining independence, Somaliland would be entirely free to withdraw from the association if it so desired.

18. Mr. RIFAI (Syria), referring to the Bank's report, asked whether the consideration being given to the quota system for banana growers had led to any decision.

19. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that steps were being taken in the matter. As he had already informed the Council, planters were being compelled to grow two hectares of other crops for every hectare of bananas.

20. Mr. RIFAI (Syria) said that, in view of the importance of livestock for the Territory, it was puzzling to read in the Bank's report that there were only six Italian veterinarians and twenty-two trained Somali assistants to tend to animal health in the whole of Somaliland under Italian administration.

21. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that elsewhere the Bank's report stated that the veterinary service was well equipped and well staffed. The comment quoted by the Syrian representative perhaps referred to further advancement. In any event the

seven-year economic advancement programme included a figure of 24 million somalos for livestock, including 1 million for the improvement of the veterinary service.

22. Mr. RIFAI (Syria) was interested in the Bank's comment that European agriculture had grown up on a largely artificial basis. He was not entirely clear what was meant by that statement. Did it refer to artificial, uneconomic subsidies?

23. Mr. WILLIAMS (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) replied that what the Bank had had in mind was the fact that many of the concessions, and particularly the banana concessions, had been able to develop because they had from the outset had a particular market for their products.

24. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) pointed out that, whilst it was true that Somaliland products were given some preference on the Italian market, they were also sold on other markets; each year cotton, groundnuts and livestock products were exported to the sterling and dollar areas to a value of about 10 million and 4 million somalos respectively; cotton exports to the German mark area were valued at about 4 million somalos for the year 1956. The Società Agricola Italo-Somala (SAIS) was investing large sums in the cultivation of cotton, groundnuts, oil seeds, ramie and other products.

25. Mr. RIFAI (Syria) referred to the Trusteeship Council's earlier recommendations with regard to the establishment of a national bank in Somaliland. He asked whether any steps had been taken in that direction.

26. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied in the affirmative. Early in 1957 a special mission from the Cassa per la Circolazione Monetaria della Somalia had come to Mogadiscio to consult with banks, the Administration and the Somali Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs concerning the establishment of a national bank in the Territory. During recent weeks the matter had also been the subject of conversations between the Minister of Economic Affairs of the Somali Government and the authorities in Italy.

27. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) noted that a total of 40,000 hectares of uncultivated land had been improved and brought under cultivation since 1950. That figure was very striking. Was the improved land being settled by people who had abandoned their traditional agricultural methods in favour of more advanced methods or by farmers already settled on the lands?

28. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied that in the case of approximately two-thirds of the 40,000 hectares of improved land the people had already been settled on the land. In the case of the largest scheme, for example, Project No. 4 in the Bullo Mererta area, all the people concerned, approximately 60,000, had already been working the land in the area. The project was administered jointly by the Italian Administration and the United States International Cooperation Administration; it covered 20,000 of the 40,000 hectares. Two large dams and thirty-six kilometres of canals provided a regular system of irrigation. The output per year per hectare had been increased in the dry-farming areas by seven quintals per hectare. In the areas of flood irrigation the increase had been approximately four or five quintals per hectare. In those areas where there had already been small canals, but without any system for opening and closing the gates, the increase had been between two and three quintals a hec-

tare. Despite the low rainfall in 1955-1956 the Somali growers had been able to produce 200,000 bags of maize. The dams and canals had saved crops valued at 8 million somalos whereas the cost of Project No. 4 was only 5 million somalos. Hence the project had more than paid for itself in a single season.

29. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) noted from page 65 of the annual report<sup>1</sup> that the farmers in southern Somaliland looked with distrust on the migration southwards of people from the northern and less agriculturally favoured regions. He would welcome additional information in that connexion.

30. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied that the Administration had not carried out any large experiments in transferring people from the north to the south. Usually the people in the north, in Migiurtinia and Mudugh, depended on livestock rather than on agriculture. A few resettlement experiments on a very small scale had been made in some co-operatives in the Lower Giuba and had proved successful.

31. Mr. GRILLO (Italy) added that the Administering Authority had no specific plans for transferring people from Migiurtinia and Mudugh to southern Somaliland. The situation described in the annual report was not new; it had its roots in the historical trend of the northern populations to move south and the resentment of the populations already settled in the southern areas.

32. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) noted that some roads that had been asphalted were no longer being maintained as paved roads. Had the roads in question been constructed before or after the establishment of the Trusteeship System in 1950?

33. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied that the roads had been built between 1936 and 1940. They totalled 600 kilometres of which only 150 kilometres were to be maintained and repaired; the traffic on the remaining roads was not sufficient to justify the high cost of maintenance. The Administration had embarked on a large road-improvement programme involving the conversion of most of the Mogadiscio-Chisimaio road—475 kilometres—into an all-weather road. The road passed through the two regions where 90 per cent of the country's riches and 70 per cent or more of the Territory's population were to be found.

34. Mr. HAMILTON (Australia) noted from statements made by the special representative at the previous meeting, firstly, that it was expected that a profit of approximately 19 per cent would be shown by banana growers and, secondly, that a law would probably be enacted requiring banana growers to plant two hectares of cotton or other crops for each hectare of bananas. How would that law affect the 19 per cent profit which it was otherwise estimated the banana growers would obtain?

35. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied that the profit on bananas would remain 19 per cent. The profit on the other crops might be either more or less. As the banana crop was protected, the Italian Administration and the Somali Government were in a position to require the farmers enjoying such protection to plant two hectares of other crops per hectare of

<sup>1</sup> *Rapport du Gouvernement italien à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur l'administration de tutelle de la Somalie, 1956*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato P.V., 1957). Transmitted to members of the Trusteeship Council by the Secretary-General under cover of document T/1315.

bananas. The other crops had not hitherto been grown because banana-growing had been the most profitable sector. A reasonable profit could, however, be made from cotton, groundnuts, ramie and other fibres. SAIS, which was described in the Bank's report as a well-equipped and well-staffed company, was investing more than 5 million somalos in those crops.

36. In reply to a further question by Mr. HAMILTON (Australia), Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that in 1955 the banana growers had made a profit of 32 lire per kilogramme of bananas.

37. Mr. HAMILTON (Australia) understood that the profit would probably be reduced to 10 lire a kilogramme but that a reduction in the cost of producing bananas was expected from a better system of cultivation, involving the growing of the banana plants rather more closely together. What increase in total production was likely to result from the adoption of the new system?

38. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that he could only give an estimate in round figures. By means of the new system, the annual yield per hectare was expected to be between 125 and 150 quintals of exportable bananas. According to the report of the International Bank the corresponding figure at the present time was only 72 quintals.

39. Mr. HAMILTON (Australia) assumed that it was planned to concentrate production in order to reduce the cost. He asked what the budgetary implications of the abolition of the banana tax were and whether such abolition had been taken into account in the estimates of the aid which the future State was likely to require.

40. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that the abolition of the tax would cost the 1960 budget a total of 3,600,000 somalos, which it would have collected on the 600,000 quintals of bananas the Italian monopoly, the Azienda Monopolio Banana, had contracted to buy. The Minister of Economic Affairs had taken that into account in his estimate of foreign aid for the Territory in 1960.

41. Mr. HAMILTON (Australia) asked whether, in view of the lower cost of banana production in the Giuba area, it was intended to transfer a great part of the industry there and virtually abandon the industry in the Genale area.

42. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that that was the policy of the Somali Government and the Italian Administration. Some large banana planters in the Uebi Scebeli area had already transferred to the Giuba area. No steps had been taken by the Somali Government or the Italian Administration to compel people to transfer their plantations from Genale to the Lower Giuba; it was simply in their interests to make such a transfer. The cost in the Lower Giuba might be found to be much lower than the thirty-two lire reported by the International Bank and the special Italian commission on prices.

*The meeting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and resumed at 4.35 p.m.*

43. Mr. HAMILTON (Australia) asked whether the expected transfer would not bring about a revolution, however gradual, in the agriculture of the Genale irrigated area, and whether the estimates for financial aid which had been given to the Council took into account the capital needed for the introduction of an

entirely new system of agricultural production in that area.

44. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that in the Genale and Afgoi areas only 5,000 hectares were planted in bananas out of the 32,000 hectares in use in those areas along the Uebi Scebeli River. Moreover, some of the banana growers in the Genale area would perhaps remain there because at least one-third of them, whose land was better situated with respect to the river, were able to produce bananas more economically than they could in the Lower Giuba.

45. Mr. FELD (United States of America) referred to the observation in the Bank's report to the effect that there was a tendency for capital to leave Somaliland under Italian administration, and asked what efforts were being made by the Administration to encourage private capital and able businessmen to remain in the Territory and to contribute to the growth of the economy.

46. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that the Bank appeared to be expressing a fear rather than a fact. So far no big enterprises had left the country. Perhaps the Bank's impression could be ascribed to the fact that in recent years there had been a decrease in the rate of new private investment. However, that trend was now likely to reverse itself. In 1957, enterprises on the Upper Scebeli alone were expected to invest over 5 million somalos in agriculture. In addition there would be investments of 2 million somalos in fishing industries and 1 million in meat canning.

47. Mr. FELD (United States of America) asked whether the Administration had given thought to the Bank's observation that the extent to which Somaliland's external assets in lire could be used multilaterally at the end of trusteeship would have to be defined.

48. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that he was not in a position at present to commit the Italian Government on the matter. It was a question of policy to be determined at the appropriate time by the body concerned.

49. Mr. FELD (United States of America) asked for comments on the reference in the Section entitled "Somali settled agriculture", in part III of the Bank's report, to the inadequacy of agricultural extension services.

50. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that great efforts were being made with the help of the United States International Cooperation Administration. One expert in extension services had by now probably arrived at Mogadiscio. He would work at Uebi Scebeli where the big Project No. 4 of Bullo Mererta was located. Another expert would be assigned to the Lower Giuba and a third would give advice on dry farming in the Upper Giuba.

51. Mr. THORP (New Zealand) asked whether the estimate given by the Minister of Economic Affairs at the previous meeting of the amount of financial assistance Somaliland would require after 1960 had made allowance for the loss of gross export receipts due to the expected lower price for bananas.

52. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that the loss had been taken into account in the Minister's estimate.

53. Mr. THORP (New Zealand) said that he wished to pursue the question asked by the representative of Australia about the future of the Genale area.

54. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) reiterated that the transfer of the banana plantations from the Genale area on the Uebi Scebeli River to the Lower Giuba was not compulsory. If any transfer took place it would involve only 5,000 hectares since the farmers used 14,000 of the total of 19,000 hectares for other crops. The 14,000 hectares used for cotton, groundnuts, ramie and other crops would not be given up, and the 5,000 hectares now used for bananas would be employed for the other crops.

55. Mr. THORP (New Zealand) recalled the reference at the previous meeting by the Minister of Economic Affairs to the planned investments of SAIS in industrial crops in the Lower Giuba region. He asked whether the operations of SAIS could be described as representative of the operations of investment capital from outside the Territory, and whether it would be fair to assume that the results to be achieved by SAIS by 1960 would be any test of the prospects for investment in the post-1960 period in such crops, primarily cotton.

56. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) replied in the affirmative to both questions.

57. In reply to a question from Mr. THORP (New Zealand), Mr. WILLIAMS (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) explained that the words "fully irrigated agriculture" were used in the second paragraph of the section on "The European concessions" in part I of the Bank's report to convey that under the conditions prevailing in Somaliland anything less than regular irrigation would make impossible sufficiently reliable cultivation of any of the major crops.

58. Mr. THORP (New Zealand) said that the Bank's Mission had stated in the second paragraph of the section on "The European concessions" in part III of its report that there was "no practical alternative to bananas as an export crop". He asked the representative of the International Bank whether in any section of the report cotton was excluded as an alternative crop to bananas.

59. Mr. WILLIAMS (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) referred to the third paragraph of the section "Somali settled agriculture" in part III of the report: the Mission itself had been of the opinion that cotton "could become of primary importance as a Somali cash and export crop" on the assumption that an appropriate organization would be created. So far as cotton in a regular concession type of economy was concerned, the Mission had been left in considerable doubt.

60. The experiments with cotton by SAIS that had taken place up to the time of the Mission's visit to Somaliland under Italian administration had been still somewhat inconclusive. The problem that they had not fully resolved had been that of an economically feasible form of pest control. That, together with some minor reservations about the general world market for cotton and its traditional behaviour, had been responsible for the Mission's view that it would not be warranted, at the present stage at least, to suggest that cotton should be considered by concession farmers as a reliable alternative. If the problem of pest control could be resolved, that view would have to be modified.

61. Mr. THORP (New Zealand) said that the Bank's Mission clearly attached considerable importance to the possibilities of production by the indigenous inhabitants. In that connexion, he asked by when the rural population of the Territory might be expected to make a

substantially increased contribution to the export production of cotton. Was the Government's confidence in the future of cotton as an export crop based primarily on production by local farmers?

62. Mr. GASBARRI (Special Representative) said that for the year 1951-1952, when cotton production in the Territory had reached a peak, 90 per cent if not 100 per cent of the production had come from the local farmers. The Bank's report stated that, between 1950 and 1955, 60 per cent of all the production had come from Somali growers and planters. In the area covered by Project No. 4, it was expected that cotton production by Somalis would reach a high level.

63. The Somali Government relied a great deal on the cotton grown by Somali producers, while the Italian Administration relied mainly on the production of bananas by European growers. In addition, it was hoped that ramie, a new crop, would in time become a profitable export commodity. Lastly, he said that with improved pest control the yield of cotton per hectare had risen greatly in the Territory in recent years and now compared favourably with that of other cotton-growing regions in Africa.

64. The PRESIDENT thought the Council had by now probably accumulated sufficient material for the purpose of preparing a report under General Assembly resolution 855 (IX).

*Mr. Gasbarri, special representative of the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration, withdrew.*

65. The PRESIDENT invited members of the Council to consider social and educational advancement in the Territory.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zadotti, special representative of the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration, took a place at the Council table.*

66. Dr. TABONA (World Health Organization), speaking at the invitation of the President, said that the World Health Organization (WHO) had noted with satisfaction the continued attention being given by the Administration to the health needs of the Somali population. Although progress had been made in setting up basic medical care services and programmes of communicable disease control, maternal and child health and environmental sanitation, much remained to be done. Improvements in educational standards and in economic and social conditions were essential if the technical training of health services staff was to be successful. At the moment there was not even one qualified Somali doctor, and the best foreseeable situation was that by 1963 there might be nine. Even if, by a bilateral agreement and with the financial support of the Italian Government, all the Italian doctors continued to serve in Somaliland after independence, they would be able to do no more than maintain the work at its existing level. The danger was that existing medical facilities might collapse unless provision were made for large-scale Somalization of staff.

67. The World Health Organization therefore suggested that the Administering Authority should consider, first, the establishment of a short two-year course for carefully selected senior medical assistants, who would be trained for greater responsibility, and secondly, the strengthening of the training programme for medical and auxiliary personnel. Those were steps which had been put into effect successfully in the Sudan, and

WHO would be prepared to render appropriate assistance to Somaliland if requested.

68. Moreover, the existing services should concentrate more on preventive work. The establishment of a training and demonstration area, mentioned in paragraph 251 of the Advisory Council's report, (T/1311) was a first necessity and would require careful study of the local situation. For that purpose, too, WHO would be prepared to render assistance, as soon as funds were available.

69. Lastly, long-term plans should be worked out, in the light of the experience gained in the training and demonstration area, for extending health services to the entire country. Such plans could either be independent or, preferably, form an integral part of the social development programme. If requested, WHO would also be prepared to render assistance in health planning of that type.

70. Mr. KIANG (China), reverting to the problem of nomadism, said that the Advisory Council had commented on two projects for the education of nomads, the AUNEP project and the DAUFEP project (T/1311, paras. 322 *et. seq.*) in both of which the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Administration were directly involved. He asked for the views of the special representative on the Advisory Council's observations in paragraph 327 of its report.

71. Mr. ZADOTTI (Special Representative) said that the two projects, which represented the joint efforts of

UNESCO and the Administering Authority to tackle the problem, were somewhat different in nature and scope. They should not be grouped together as referring particularly to the nomads. The AUNEP project, which was proceeding in the Lower Giuba section of Afmadu, dealt with the problem of nomad education; but the DAUFEP project, which had been in operation for some time, was intended to cover mass education and not only nomad education. Its results had not been consistently encouraging. Many experiments had been conducted by the UNESCO expert in charge of the operation, the main purpose being to train the people in handicraft, to encourage them to build their own houses by using new methods and to give practical demonstrations of up-to-date agricultural techniques. In general, the project had not been very successful because it had met with resistance on the part of the population.

72. For the AUNEP project, a UNESCO expert had selected an area in the Lower Giuba entirely populated by nomads. Although the Administration had given him every assistance, it had to be admitted that the project had not so far been successful. The plan was failing because of the nature of nomadism: nomadic tribes and groups of people were constantly on the move so that it was frequently impossible to maintain contact with them. Unless the UNESCO expert were assisted by a very large staff, his work would be unlikely to achieve much result, but financial considerations would, of course, prevent any large-scale increase in personnel.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.