

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

FIRST COMMITTEE

DISARMAMENT

AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS

SESSIONAL FASCICLE



UNITED NATIONS

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

FIRST COMMITTEE

**DISARMAMENT
AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

SESSIONAL FASCICLE



UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1984

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Since the thirty-first session, the Official Records of the General Assembly have consisted of records of meetings, sessional fascicles for each of the Main Committees and the General Committee, annexes to the meeting records, supplements, the List of Delegations and the Check List of Documents. Information on other documents is given in the Check List and in the relevant annex fascicles.

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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AGENDA

Note. The items allocated to the First Committee are listed in the order in which they appeared in the letters dated 23 September and 11 October 1983 from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman of the First Committee (A/C.1/38/1 and Add.1).

At its 4th and 28th plenary meetings, on 23 September and 11 October 1983, the General Assembly decided to allocate the following agenda items to the First Committee for consideration and report:

Agenda item 43:

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Agenda item 44:

Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 45:

Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 46:

Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 47:

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 48:

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 49:

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 50:

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session:

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (c) Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations;
- (d) Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (e) Disarmament Week: reports of the Secretary-General;
- (f) Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (g) Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session:
 - (i) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (ii) Report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (h) Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (i) Proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency: report of the Secretary-General;
- (j) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 51:

United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 52:

Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 53:

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 54:

Israeli nuclear armament: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 55:

Prevention of an arms race in outer space: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 56:

Relationship between disarmament and development: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 57:

Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests: report of the Committee on Disarmament

Agenda item 58:

Reduction of military budgets:

(a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 59:

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

Agenda item 60:

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

Agenda item 61:

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons:

(a) Report of the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 62:

General and complete disarmament:

(a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;

(b) Report of the Committee on Disarmament;

(c) Study on conventional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;

(d) Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament;

(e) Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues: report of the Disarmament Commission;

- (f) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (g) Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (h) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (i) Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities: report of the Secretary-General;
- (j) Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament:
 - (i) Report of the Committee on Disarmament;
 - (ii) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (iii) Report of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Agenda item 63:

Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly;

- (a) Freeze on nuclear weapons;
- (b) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/100 B on a nuclear-arms freeze;
- (c) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (d) Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures: report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (e) Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
- (f) United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
- (g) World Disarmament Campaign: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 65:

Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region: report of the Secretary-General

Agenda item 66:

Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Security Council

Agenda item 67:

Implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security: report of the Security Council

Agenda item 139:

Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference

Agenda item 140:

Question of Antarctica

Agenda item 141:

Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth

Agenda item 143:

Condemnation of nuclear war

Agenda item 144:

Nuclear-weapon freeze

CONTENTS OF MEETINGS

Note. In the table of contents which follows, the contents of individual meetings have been corrected where necessary. For the agenda items, see pages 1 to 5 above.

1st meeting

Tuesday, 20 September 1983, at 4.55 p.m.

ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN

2nd meeting

Tuesday, 11 October 1983, at 10.50 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

ELECTION OF THE VICE-CHAIRMEN

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

3rd meeting

Monday, 17 October 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

4th meeting

Tuesday, 18 October 1983, at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

5th meeting

Tuesday, 18 October 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

6th meeting

Wednesday, 19 October 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

7th meeting

Thursday, 20 October 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

8th meeting

Thursday, 20 October 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

9th meeting

Friday, 21 October 1983, at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

10th meeting

Friday, 21 October 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

11th meeting

Monday, 24 October 1983, at 10.45 a.m.

OBSERVANCE OF DISARMAMENT WEEK

12th meeting

Monday, 24 October 1983, at 3 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

13th meeting

Tuesday, 25 October 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

14th meeting

Tuesday, 25 October 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

15th meeting

Wednesday, 26 October 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

16th meeting

Thursday, 27 October 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

17th meeting

Monday, 31 October 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

18th meeting

Monday, 31 October 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 50

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

19th meeting

Tuesday, 1 November 1983, at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

20th meeting

Tuesday, 1 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 50

21st meeting

Wednesday, 2 November 1983, at 10.45 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

22nd meeting

Thursday, 3 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

ELECTION OF THE RAPPORTEUR

23rd meeting

Thursday, 3 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

24th meeting

Friday, 4 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

25th meeting

Friday, 4 November 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

26th meeting

Monday, 7 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

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27th meeting

Tuesday, 8 November 1983, at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63 AND 139

28th meeting

Wednesday, 9 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63 AND 139

29th meeting

Thursday, 10 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63 AND 139

30th meeting

Friday, 11 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63 AND 139

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

31st meeting

Friday, 11 November 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63 AND 139

32nd meeting

Tuesday, 15 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

33rd meeting

Thursday, 17 November 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

34th meeting

Monday, 21 November 1983, at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

35th meeting

Monday, 21 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 50, 52 TO 59, 61 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

36th meeting

Tuesday, 22 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 50, 52 TO 59, 61 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

37th meeting

Tuesday, 22 November 1983, at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 50, 52 TO 59, 61 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144

38th meeting

Wednesday, 23 November 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43, 46 TO 50, 52 TO 56, 58, 59, 61 TO 63, 139, 141 AND 143

39th meeting

Wednesday, 23 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46, 49, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61 TO 63, 139, 141 AND 143

40th meeting

Friday, 25 November 1983, at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63 AND 141

41st meeting

Friday, 25 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46, 50, 55, 56, 59, 62, 63 AND 141

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

42nd meeting

Monday, 28 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 140

43rd meeting

Tuesday, 29 November 1983, at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 140

44th meeting

Tuesday, 29 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 140

45th meeting

Wednesday, 30 November 1983, at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 140

46th meeting

Wednesday, 30 November 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 140

AGENDA ITEM 56

AGENDA ITEM 63

47th meeting

Thursday, 1 December 1983, at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

48th meeting

Friday, 2 December 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 59

49th meeting

Monday, 5 December 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

50th meeting

Tuesday, 6 December 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

51st meeting

Wednesday, 7 December 1983, at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

52nd meeting

Wednesday, 7 December 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

53rd meeting

Thursday, 8 December 1983, at 3.35 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

54th meeting

Friday, 9 December 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 65 TO 67

CONCLUSION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

CORRIGENDUM

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 3415 (XXX) of 8 December 1975, the records of the meetings of the Main Committees of the Assembly and of the General Committee - which were issued first in provisional mimeographed form and, after being edited, reissued in printed form - have, since the thirty-first session, been issued only once, in final form, the text being subject to correction.

The corrigendum that follows contains delegation and Secretariat corrections to the English text of the records of the meetings held by the First Committee during the thirty-eighth session (A/C.1/38/PV.1-54).

With the issuance of this corrigendum the records of the above-mentioned meetings are to be considered final.

Note. As a rule, corrections to the following have not been included in the corrigendum:

- (a) The headings and tables of contents as well as the date and time of individual meetings;
- (b) The symbols of documents pertaining to the agenda item under consideration;
- (c) The spelling of proper names.

For these, see the contents of meetings above, the relevant annex fascicles, and the List of Delegations respectively.

* * *

In the verbatim records of the First Committee, the text in languages other than that used by the speaker is based on interpretation. If there should be differences between the texts, the original text is the authoritative one.

12th meeting

Page 41

3rd paragraph, line 3

Before in Beirut insert which their forces incurred

5th paragraph

Line 5: for have developed and acquired read have competed to develop and acquire

Line 6: before of warfare insert and potential dangers

The last sentence should read: They have made the questions of halting the arms race and establishing an international community free of the threat of that race questions of vital importance which pertain to the very survival of the human race and of civilization.

Page 42

Line 4: for institution read institutions
before political will insert full

1st paragraph

Line 1: for agencies read machinery

Lines 7 and 8: for fulfil their duty by making read play an active role and make

2nd paragraph

Lines 3, 4 and 5: after national boundaries insert which are no longer impregnable shields for warding off the danger of conventional war and delete Those boundaries were established in the past to prevent conventional types of warfare and guarantee the security of all States.

3rd paragraph

That paragraph should read:

Thirdly, the criterion of ensuring and strengthening security is the one and only criterion for work within this important machinery.

4th paragraph

Line 2: delete composition and and insert membership. We hope the ongoing consultations will set the necessary criteria for

Page 43-45

Lines 1 and 2: for Disarmament Commission read Committee on Disarmament

Lines 6 and 7: for nothing has been done read very little has been achieved

Line 7: for in particular read in various parts

Page 46

1st paragraph, line 1

For Disarmament Commission read Committee on Disarmament

3rd paragraph

Line 1: for item read items

Line 2: for means of strengthening the security of read measures to give

Line 3: before against the use insert assurances

Lines 3 and 4: for We must unfortunately note read We regret also

Line 5: before adherence insert persistent

Line 6: for have been made concerning read reflect their own subjective approaches to

Line 8: before assurances insert clear

4th paragraph

Line 1: for stubbornness read inflexibility
for elimination read removal

Line 2: for reservations read limitations

Line 3: for commitment to give sound guarantees read obligation to give credible assurances

Line 5: before aware insert fully

Line 6: for stop us read preclude us

Line 7: before of nuclear insert of the use

Line 12: for full establishment read finalization

Line 13: for The programme calls for read The importance and necessity of the programme call for

Line 15: should read no agreement as yet in Geneva. As the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or

Line 16: after Non-Aligned Countries insert, held at New Delhi,

Last line: for to smooth out difficulties and to reconcile read as a fresh attempt at reconciling the differences

Page 47-50

For the existing text substitute

on the parts on which there is as yet no agreement and to submit to the First Committee at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly a revised Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Turning to the question of the cessation of the arms race in outer space, the Sudan attaches great importance to this issue in view of its negative and direct repercussions on international peace, security and stability. With the rapid progress taking place in the science and technology of outer space, wide vistas have been opened for the peaceful technical, scientific, economic and cultural development for all countries, in addition to the promoting of international co-operation. However, it is regrettable that outer space, which the General Assembly has unanimously designated the common heritage of mankind, is no longer confined to peaceful purposes. On the contrary, it has witnessed the intensification of military activities and become a new laboratory, so to speak, for anti-satellite weapons and intercontinental ballistic weapons and anti-ICBMs.

Today we are at the crossroads. Either we adopt urgent measures to put an end to the arms race in outer space so as to use that area, which has been termed the common heritage of mankind, for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all, or else it will become a new theatre for the arms race.

The Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration of Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held last year expressed deep concern over the possibility of extending the arms race to outer space and called for the adoption of effective measures as soon as possible to prevent the militarization of outer space and to halt the arms race therein. The only forum for taking these measures is the Conference on Disarmament, which was called upon by the General Assembly at its last session to establish the working group entrusted with the consideration of this item. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be in a position, in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Group of 21 at the Conference on Disarmament, to examine this question at its next session.

We have followed with some optimism the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament in the field of banning chemical weapons and destroying their stockpiles and in the area of the necessary measures of verification to finalize the convention on banning such weapons. We have also followed the relative progress made by the Conference which we hope will be continued so that it may formulate the desired convention. We have likewise followed the efforts made by the ad hoc working group on banning nuclear tests within the framework of the mandate entrusted to it by the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that this group will soon be able to complete its work on the verification measures required to ban nuclear tests and secure compliance with this ban to achieve further progress towards a similar treaty which will be non-discriminatory and can ensure the widest accession. We believe that the means of verification presently available to the Conference are sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which we hope will be finalized soon.

Page 51

For the existing text substitute

Allow me now to turn from the Conference on Disarmament issues to those of the Disarmament Commission and the items on its agenda. We attach the highest importance to the work of this body as the most representative deliberative body and the driving force of the work of the negotiating body at Geneva. This year the Commission has made significant progress in relation to confidence-building measures and their universality. We attach particular importance to these measures and their role in creating and improving conditions conducive to disarmament

measures. We think that at a time when the process of disarmament seems to have come to a halt and the nuclear and conventional arms race is proceeding at a frantic speed, particular priority should be given to those measures that can lead to both nuclear and conventional disarmament and could further move towards disarmament. Those confidence-building measures do not concern only the super-Powers. They could in most cases strengthen confidence among developing countries themselves, because confidence based on faith in the good will of States to co-operate is an essential element in the conduct of States and could considerably remove suspicion, strengthen confidence among States and limit and finally eliminate the causes for misunderstanding, misinterpretation or wrong assessments.

We are convinced that in order to perfect a positive concept of confidence-building measures, the question should be looked at as a whole, which would lead to the adoption and implementation of political, economic and social measures. Reduction of the danger of war will be impossible in the absence of a climate of confidence in international relations. This confidence must be based on respect for the United Nations Charter and the general principles of international law, as well as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. On this basis we commend the initiative undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany in putting forward this issue and we hope that the Disarmament Commission will be able at its forthcoming session to finalize those guidelines for determining the appropriate confidence-building measures and their implementation on the regional and international levels.

This year the Disarmament Commission examined the proposals contained in the important report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the title "Common security: a programme for disarmament". We welcome this report and regard it as a constructive contribution in the field of international efforts to bring about disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. Moreover, we support the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission that this report should be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts.

Page 52

1st paragraph

Line 1: for our Committee's read the Commission's

Line 4: for being one of read joining

Line 6: for particular importance read paramount importance

Line 8: for reach international agreements read conclude an international convention

2nd paragraph

Line 2: after Mrs. Inga Thorsson insert of Sweden

Line 6: for should like countries to take account of them, read hope all countries will observe and implement them,

Lines 7 and 8: delete and those which are spending the most on nuclear weapons.

3rd paragraph

For the existing text substitute

In concluding this section of my statement on the question relating to the Disarmament Commission, I should like to express my regret that the Commission was not able to adopt a consensus decision on the nuclear capability of South Africa. That item has appeared on its agenda every year since 1979. It has become evident to the international community that the racist régime of Pretoria resorted to the military option, particularly the nuclear one, after its banishment and ostracism from the international scene, as a means of internal oppression and external aggression. The racist régime, in order to attain these objectives, has applied itself to develop and acquire nuclear weapons. This was achieved through nuclear collaboration with certain States Members of this Organization, in particular with Israel. The nuclear capability of South Africa, which serves to perpetuate its apartheid policies, is a matter of legitimate concern to the African countries, which in 1964, at the first African summit meeting, held at Cairo, expressed their unanimous desire for Africa to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Sudan, in consonance with its commitment to the resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on the denuclearization of Africa, calls on the General Assembly to take the necessary measures to prevent the racist régime of South Africa from acquiring more weapons or nuclear weapon technology.

Page 53-55

For the existing text substitute

Such measures should be implemented through the strict commitment on the part of all States to the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council should also fully discharge its responsibilities to ward off the danger posed by the nuclear capability of South Africa to international peace and security in general and the security and peace of the African States in particular.

The transformation of the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone remains blocked by Israel's stubborn refusal to submit its nuclear installations to international control and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call upon this Committee and the General Assembly to reaffirm their position in this regard for the sake of international peace and security and the stability of the Middle East, in particular concerning the need for all States to respect their commitments under the United Nations Charter and to desist from any nuclear collaboration with Israel likely to increase its nuclear capability and concerning the need for Israel to accept all non-proliferation measures and to place its nuclear installations under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In conclusion, I wish to refer to the bilateral talks which are going on outside the United Nations. As Mrs. Theorin of Sweden said in her statement at the 4th meeting of this Committee, that we live on a planet that has no emergency exits, we could only hope that the successful conclusion of these negotiations would lead to the improvement in the general climate of international relations. The absence so far of any progress in the negotiations in Geneva on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces and of intermediate-range nuclear forces or the

negotiations in Vienna on mutual balanced force reductions is a source of deep concern and frustration for all of us. The failure of these negotiations would necessarily lead to a new and most dangerous escalation in the arms race, in both nuclear and conventional weapons. We appeal to both super-Powers to pursue their negotiations with more determination and sincerity, because we know beforehand that any failure in these negotiations would have very serious consequences and grave repercussions on the maintenance of international peace and security.

14th meeting

Page 2

Penultimate line: for effect read affect

Last line: for at time read at times

Page 41

4th paragraph, line 3

For on 6 June read in July

25th meeting

Page 76

1st paragraph

Lines 1 and 2: delete including the United States,

Line 4: for effectiveness read significance

Page 78

1st paragraph, line 4

For microtoxins read mycotoxins

Page 79-80

Line 1: for microtoxins read mycotoxins

36th meeting

Page 12

3rd paragraph

Line 7: for cannot read could

Line 9: for such a contained statement read such as a consensus statement

4th paragraph, line 3: for our read your

44th meeting

Page 21

Last paragraph, line 1:

For control core read central core

49th meeting

Page 4

3rd paragraph, line 1:

For scant Power consultation read scant prior consultation

4th paragraph, line 2:

For strictly based read solidly based

Page 7

Last paragraph, line 5:

For staff read starved

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION
*Official Records**



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FIRST COMMITTEE
1st meeting
held on
Tuesday, 20 September 1983
at 4.55 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 1ST MEETING

Temporary Chairman: Mr. ILLUECA (President of the General Assembly)

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ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN

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Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

DISTR. GENERAL
A/C.1/38/PV.1
21 September 1983
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 4.55 p.m.

ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Rule 103 of the rules of procedure provides that each Main Committee shall elect a Chairman, two Vice Chairmen and a Rapporteur. These officers shall be elected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, experience and personal competence.

The elections shall be held by secret ballot unless the Committee decides otherwise in an election where only one candidate is standing. The nomination of each candidate shall be limited to one speaker, after which the Committee shall immediately proceed to the election.

Furthermore, rule 110 of the rules of procedure provides that congratulations to the officers of a Main Committee shall not be expressed except by the Chairman of the previous session or, in his absence, by a member of his delegation - after all the officers of the Committee have been elected.

This meeting has been convened to elect the Chairman of the First Committee. Are there any nominations?

Mr. GBEHO (Ghana): Sir, it is a very pleasant duty for me to nominate a candidate as the next Chairman of the First Committee, but may I first take this opportunity to congratulate you most sincerely on your election to the high office of President of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. In the course of the next few days, the chairman of the delegation of Ghana will have the opportunity to pay you a formal and richly deserved tribute, but for the moment allow me to express my personal confidence in your great skill as a diplomat and negotiator, for I believe that it augurs well for this historic session to have you leading it.

May I also pay a very warm personal tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Imre Hollai, with whom it was a pleasure for me to work harmoniously during the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. He was an understanding, fair and most dedicated leader throughout that session, balancing an insistence on active and up-to-date work with sympathy and a fine sense of humour. Being himself a veteran of the First Committee, Mr. Hollai provided a leadership that was most instructive in matters related to that Committee, and I personally learnt a lot from him.

The First Committee begins this session against a worrisome political and diplomatic backdrop in international affairs. In addition to the regrettable lack of any substantial progress in the consideration of international political and security matters during the thirty-seventh session, the last year has been a period of increased tension between the super-Powers. No Member of this Assembly would doubt that East-West relations have plunged to their lowest level in two decades. It is no less disturbing that we have lived in the past 12 months, and still live, in times of increased military activities, gunboat diplomacy, deployment of nuclear missiles and, sadly, very little progress, if any at all, in the crucial disarmament talks.

These are ominous circumstances for humanity and our lives continue in the shadow of an unprecedented military and nuclear threat. It goes without saying therefore that the task of the First Committee will be impossible without the skill and personality of a talented chairman. I am pleased to inform this meeting that the Government of Norway has decided to present the candidature of one of its ablest and most trusted servants, Mr. Tom Eric Vraalsen, for this post. Norway has an impeccable record as a peace-loving nation and its assiduous contribution towards the establishment of international peace needs no elaboration. The country that provides the world-renowned reward for individual excellence in the pursuit of peace on our planet, through the institution of the Nobel Peace Prize, could not, in my humble view, come to the assistance of the international community at a better time.

So it is with great pride and confidence that I nominate Mr. Tom Eric Vraalsen as Chairman of the First Committee of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Ambassador Vraalsen is a well-known figure in United Nations circles, not only because he contributes wisdom and leadership to United Nations endeavours, but also because his own career as a foreign service officer has been developed around the United Nations and its ideals.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

He has even co-authored a book on the United Nations which is widely used in Norwegian colleges and universities. His diplomatic experience covers almost all the continents, as he has served in various positions in his country's diplomatic missions in Peking, Cairo, Manila and Djakarta, as well as having been a member of high-level delegations to Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Ethiopia and the United Kingdom. He has also served as the deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations.

Perhaps one of the most welcome facts in favour of Ambassador Vraalsen is that with his election today as Chairman of the First Committee he will join the comity of the very few diplomats who have achieved in their career at the United Nations the distinguished record of chairing two Committees of the General Assembly. Many will recall that Ambassador Vraalsen was elected Chairman of the Fourth Committee at the thirty-first session, not to mention his vice-chairmanship of the Committee of 24 from 1976 to 1977.

But perhaps the most relevant information about Ambassador Vraalsen is that he is highly respected by all because of his distinguished record of active contribution to the work of the First Committee. I found his support and assistance invaluable during the last session, when he served the Committee as one of its Vice-Chairmen.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that Ambassador Vraalsen possesses the qualities required to manage the delicate and intractable business of the First Committee in general and the search for genuine and complete disarmament in particular. I have the greatest pleasure, therefore, in nominating Mr. Tom Eric Vraalsen, scholar, diplomat and international negotiator, for the post of Chairman of the First Committee.

May I take this opportunity to extend my warm wishes to Mr. Vraalsen for success in the discharge of his very heavy responsibilities.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Ghana has nominated Mr. Tom Eric Vraalsen of Norway. Since only one candidate has been presented, I propose that under rule 103 the Committee decide not to hold a secret ballot.

It was so decided.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I therefore declare His Excellency Mr. Tom Eric Vraalsen of Norway elected Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.



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FIRST COMMITTEE
2nd meeting
held on
Tuesday, 11 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 2ND MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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DISTR. GENERAL
A/C.1/38/PV.2
15 October 1983
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of all the members of the Committee and on my own behalf, I take great pleasure in extending a most cordial and friendly welcome to the new Member of the United Nations, Saint Christopher and Nevis.

May I express my profound appreciation to all Members of the United Nations for the honour and privilege which they have conferred upon me and my country by electing me Chairman of the First Committee.

I thank all representatives most warmly for the confidence they have placed in me. It will be my endeavour to conduct the business of the First Committee of the General Assembly in a manner which will gain their confidence and approval.

Let me say, first of all, how much I appreciated the very kind words offered by our Chairman of last year, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho of Ghana, when he nominated me at the first meeting of the Committee. It was my privilege last year to serve as one of his Vice-Chairmen and I was much struck by his engaging personality and negotiating ability.

(The Chairman)

I am certain that I am expressing the sentiments of all members of the Committee when I extend to Ambassador Gbeho our congratulations and gratitude for the exemplary manner in which he presided over our deliberations at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

I am thus fully aware that I am following a succession of distinguished Chairmen, who presided ably and skilfully over the work of this Committee. I shall spare neither effort nor time to assist delegations in our common endeavours. In so doing, I count on the constructive co-operation and assistance of the Committee's entire membership. It is gratifying to know that I can count also on the most valuable experience, competence and profound knowledge of my friends, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, Mr. Viacheslav A. Ustinov, the Under-Secretary-General for the Department for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Jan Martenson, and the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Maceem Rathore and his colleagues. I am certain that the First Committee will fully benefit from their experience and we look forward to their co-operation in dealing with the many important issues before this Committee.

The agenda for today's meeting concerns the election of the Vice-Chairmen and the organization of work.

If I hear no objection, I shall consider that the agenda is adopted by the Committee.

The agenda was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Before taking up the items on our agenda, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the decision of the General Assembly, taken at its 1935th meeting on 22 September 1971, concerning the procedure regarding the election of officers of the Main Committees of the General Assembly. According to that decision, the nominations of candidates should be limited to one statement for each candidate, after which the Committee should immediately proceed to the election. The Committee will follow this procedure in regard to the items on our agenda for today.

ELECTION OF VICE-CHAIRMEN

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): On behalf of the Norwegian Government, I have the great honour to nominate His Excellency Mr. Elfaki Abdalla Elfaki of Sudan as Vice-Chairman of the First Committee during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Elfaki is at present Deputy Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations. He is known and respected in the United Nations for his diplomatic skills and high personal qualifications. The Norwegian delegation feels very confident that the election of Ambassador Elfaki as Vice-Chairman of the Committee will be most welcome and that he will be of invaluable assistance to the Chairman and the officers of the Committee in carrying out the difficult task of leading us through the First Committee's work during this Assembly.

Ambassador Elfaki has had a very distinguished career in the Foreign Service of his country. He joined the Sudanese diplomatic service in January 1966 and served at the headquarters of the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both the Arab and African Affairs Department. In the period between October 1967 and September 1972 he served on the diplomatic staff of the Sudanese Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria. In September 1972 he was appointed Counsellor to the Sudanese Embassy in Moscow where he served until November 1974, when he was transferred back to the headquarters of the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Deputy Director of the Department of International Organizations. In the period between August 1975 and September 1977 he joined the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi on a scholarship from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before returning to his headquarters to serve as Director of the Arab Affairs Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has served in his present post in New York since August 1979.

During his distinguished career, Ambassador Elfaki has been a member of Sudan's delegation to several Organization of African Unity, Arab League and Non-Aligned Movement ministerial and summit Conferences between 1966 and 1983. He has been a member of Sudan's delegations to the thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth, thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh regular sessions of the General Assembly, and also

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

to special sessions of the General Assembly, since 1979. He has also led Sudan's delegations to several international conferences held under United Nations auspices, and to non-aligned meetings.

Apart from his professional career, Ambassador Elfaki has also had a distinguished academic career in political science and in international law and diplomacy. In 1978 and 1979 he served as President of the Sudanese Diplomats' Association.

It is a great pleasure and honour to nominate Ambassador Elfaki as Vice-Chairman of the First Committee, and I propose that he be elected by acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN: There being no other nominations, I take it that, in accordance with rule 103 of the rules of procedure and with established practice, the Committee wishes to dispense with the secret ballot and to declare Ambassador Elfaki of Sudan elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

Mr. Elfaki Abdalla Elfaki (Sudan) was elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

Mr. ESPECHE GIL (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): As this is the first time that the Argentine delegation is speaking in the Committee at this session, Mr. Chairman, I should like to extend to you our congratulations on your election as Chairman. You may count on the full co-operation of the Argentine delegation in the effective discharge of your responsibilities.

I should also like to join in the statement you have just made concerning the outstanding work done by Mr. Gbeho last year when he presided over the meetings of our Committee.

In the absence of Mr. Carasales, it is my honour to nominate Mr. Gheorghe Tinca, of the Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations, as Vice-Chairman of the First Committee.

Mr. Tinca is very well known in the United Nations. I refer to his record now, because it gives me an opportunity of praising his work on all those occasions when it fell to him to act with dedication and intelligence in the service of his country and on behalf of international co-operation.

(Mr. Espeche Gil, Argentina)

Mr. Tinca, who has an outstanding academic background in law and international relations in his own country has worked in the field of disarmament in Bucharest as well as in Geneva and New York. I should also add that Mr. Gheorghe Tinca was one of the authors of the important study produced by the Secretary-General on all aspects of nuclear weapons.

For all those reasons, we are convinced that Mr. Tinca will make an excellent Vice-Chairman of our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that I am expressing the sentiments of the Committee when I thank the representative of Argentina for his delegation's important contribution to the work of the Committee as Vice-Chairman of last year's session.

(The Chairman)

There being no other nominations, I take it that the Committee in this case also wishes to dispense with the secret ballot and to declare Mr. Gheorghe Tinca elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

Mr. Gheorghe Tinca (Romania) was elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN: I extend to the two Vice-Chairmen my warmest congratulations on the distinction that has been conferred on them and assure them of my confidence that we shall co-operate in a harmonious manner so that we can jointly discharge the responsibilities incumbent upon us.

I now call upon last year's Chairman, Ambassador Gbeho of Ghana.

Mr. GBEHO (Ghana): When I had the privilege, Sir, of nominating you for election to the chairmanship of this Committee at our first meeting, my choice of words and obvious enthusiasm betrayed the high regard in which I hold you. It is a great pleasure for me, personally and also for my delegation, to see you presiding over our deliberations. I wish to take this opportunity once again to congratulate you most warmly on achieving this distinction.

I wish to express my sincere felicitations to Ambassador Elfaki of Sudan and Mr. Tinca of Romania on their election to the posts of Vice-Chairmen of the First Committee. I have no doubt that both you and the Committee will find Mr. Elfaki of Sudan and Mr. Tinca of Romania admirable friends and supporters of the best traditions of the Committee, given their wisdom, diplomatic skill and experience in matters concerning disarmament and international security.

It is a tradition in the First Committee that the outgoing Chairman says a few words on this occasion, and I am particularly anxious to do so in expression of my sincerest thanks to all members of the Committee for the tremendous assistance and encouragement extended to me during the thirty-seventh session. It is by no means an exaggeration to say that my task was considerably facilitated and also made more enjoyable because their co-operation was very positive, constructive and enlightening.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

You, Sir, were one of the team of very able officials who constituted our proud bureau and without whom our Committee would not have worked so well. I am particularly indebted to you, to Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, the other Vice-Chairman, and to Mr. Erdenechuluun of Mongolia, who served the Committee as its able Rapporteur. I wish also to express my thanks and appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Ustinov, to our Assistant-Secretary-General, Mr. Martenson, and to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Rathore, and all his other colleagues, who worked so hard and with so much dedication. I am privileged and proud to have had the opportunity to forge a close and enduring friendship with each and every one of them.

Custom demands that I say a word or two about the work of the First Committee, and I now wish to turn to that. We are about to commence another session of meetings devoted to disarmament and international security in an atmosphere that no one would desire for our deliberations. Relations between the two super-Powers, the star performers, have worsened considerably since we concluded our work in December 1982. Many are seized, understandably, with pessimism with regard to our work, since it is believed that the two sides may not even find it easy to communicate with each other. Regrettable as the situation is, it is my considered opinion that the First Committee's work must proceed apace no matter what the circumstances, and that we should all put our talents together to forge the necessary political will for success. My faith in all the members of the Committee and my conviction that even the super-Powers desire the ultimate goal of peace prompt me to appeal not only to the delegations constituting the Committee but, more important, to the delegations of the super-Powers to endeavour to make our discussions a success.

I have already alluded to the tense atmosphere in which we meet. This has resulted from a gradual deterioration of relations between East and West and the rather strong language that has been employed in the attacks on each other. A few incidents between them have also indicated quite clearly how fragile peace and international security have become. I believe that the lesson of the ominous war clouds under which we live is that conflict cannot be too far away. It is our duty, therefore, to create the conditions under which disarmament and

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

arms control talks can be promising or reassuring. Since we met last year the arms race has intensified and the arsenals of the nuclear Powers have increased in quantity and in quality. The deployment of missiles has also become a controversial issue, and only today there is talk of the arms control talks being cut off altogether. These developments are indeed regrettable, but one realizes also that not much progress has been expected in the arms control talks, because of poor East-West relations. Therefore it is a challenge to the Committee at this session to improve the international atmosphere and provide the appropriate guidelines, through adoption of our resolutions, to facilitate negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

The delicate nature of the debates in the Committee makes a departure from traditional procedures very difficult. However, I hope I am permitted to venture a thought on how I consider our deliberations can be made more concise and effective. It will be recalled that on previous occasions we have grouped a number of items under the general title, for example, of "Disarmament and international security" and allowed delegations to speak on any of them at our meetings. Practical as that procedure has been, in my view it tends to diffuse consideration of the specific items. Therefore it is my hope that we shall be able to vary the procedure a little so as to focus more on a lesser number of items grouped together at any given time. I have no doubt that you will lead us successfully in that direction,
Mr. Chairman.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

All of us know what difficulties the United Nations has been experiencing during the last twelve months. Its image as a world body has been attacked, while its capacity to reduce tensions and produce answers to difficult international problems has been questioned. But we all know that the United Nations will be only what its Member States are. Since all of us desire it to be more efficient, particularly in the areas of arms control, disarmament and international peace and security, we have an onerous duty, in the First Committee especially, to redouble our efforts so that our deliberations can afford the various forums of the United Nations system the opportunity for greater success than before.

These are not new ideas, but I dare say that they bear repetition at the beginning of our work so as to streamline the debate and provide the encouragement to achieve more than before. Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that with your ability and expertise in these fields, you will lead us to a successful conclusion of our work. In this daunting task, I wish to assure you of my delegation's fullest support.

May I also take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all the other colleagues who have used very kind words to describe my period of service last year as Chairman of the Committee. I wish you and the Committee every success in the task ahead.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ghana, Mr. Gbeho, for his pertinent and thought-provoking remarks. I also would like to thank him for his generous words of congratulations to the officers of the Committee. It is a great satisfaction to me to know that I and the other officers of the Committee can draw upon his wisdom and experience as we discuss and take action on the many items which we have on our agenda.

Mr. ELFAKI (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, allow me at the beginning of my statement, as this is the first time I am addressing the Committee, to offer you cordial congratulations, on behalf of my delegation, on your important election. The choice which has been made of you as Chairman is a reaffirmation of the complete confidence which the international community has in you, your skills and diplomatic experience, all of which were evident from your past performance at the United Nations, for example, as Chairman of the Fourth Committee at the thirty-first session, and also through your participation in the

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

work of the Special Committee of Twenty-four of which you were Vice-Chairman. Your election is also a recognition of the important and effective role played by your country, Norway, with which we have friendly relations, for the cause of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security, particularly as your country, as we all know, has been a Member of this Organization which has turned its words into deeds by performing peace-keeping operations in various parts of the world.

I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words about me, and let me take this opportunity to state that I shall at all times be ready to co-operate with you and your fellow officers of the Committee, and other members of the Committee, for the successful outcome of the work of this important Committee.

I also wish to thank the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, the outgoing Chairman of the First Committee for the very kind words he said about me this morning. Let me say, also, how very proud we are of him and of the efforts he made to ensure a successful outcome of the work of the Committee last year, and of his exemplary performance as Chairman.

I also would like to cordially thank Mr. Bjorn Skogmo of the Norwegian delegation for being kind enough to nominate me for the post of Vice-Chairman and for his kind remarks.

I also wish to thank all the members of the First Committee for the confidence they have expressed in me and my country by electing me Vice-Chairman. I wish to assure all the members that I will co-operate to my fullest ability in the performance of our work. I wish to thank the other Vice-Chairman for the important role his country has played in the field of disarmament. I would also like to congratulate him on his election. His experience and diplomatic skills will do much to advance the work of the Committee. I will co-operate with him to the utmost in order to enable the Committee to complete its work properly.

Mr. TINCA (Romania): I must confess that it is for me a particular pleasure and honour to be elected to serve as Vice-Chairman of this important Committee. For this honour I have sincerely to thank you, Mr. Chairman and all the members of this Committee, and I am particularly grateful to the representative of Argentina, who nominated me for this post.

I should like to offer my congratulations to the other Vice-Chairman, the Ambassador of Sudan, and to assure him of my co-operation in the fulfilment of our responsibilities.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to assure you, Sir, and, through you, all the members of the Committee, of my full co-operation, dedication and - why not? - enthusiasm in discharging the responsibility entrusted to me and to the other officers of the Committee. I shall do everything in my power to contribute to the successful conclusion of the work of this important body.

I cannot conclude this short statement without offering to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are confident that your ability, your qualifications and your skill as an outstanding diplomat will guide the Committee's work to a successful conclusion, and we are sure that this year this body will be able to achieve practical results in curbing the arms race and on disarmament.

I should also like to offer our thanks to the outgoing Chairman of the First Committee, the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, as well as to the other outgoing officers.

The CHAIRMAN: I look forward to the very active co-operation of the Vice-Chairmen of the Committee, and I am sure that I can count on their assistance and their close co-operation.

The election of the Rapporteur of the Committee will take place at a later meeting.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I draw the attention of the members of the Committee to document A/C.1/38/1, dated 28 September 1983, containing the letter dated 23 September 1983 addressed to me by the President of the General Assembly

(The Chairman)

and informing me that the General Committee, at its 4th meeting, decided to allocate 27 agenda items to the First Committee for its consideration.

In order to be able to submit a work programme to the First Committee for approval by all members of the Committee I have taken particular account of the time limitation the Committee faces. According to established practice the First Committee will begin its substantive work only after the conclusion of the general debate in the General Assembly, which is scheduled for 17 October 1983. On the other hand, the Committee should not go beyond the cut-off date suggested by the General Assembly, that is, 9 December. These limitations leave the Committee with a period extending from 17 October to 9 December, during which the Committee should be able to cover its rather heavy workload.

I should now like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to document A/C.1/38/2, dated 7 October 1983, which contains my proposals for the programme of work and timetable of the Committee.

As members will note, compared to previous years the programme of work and timetable contained in the document include some modest changes as far as the organization of our work is concerned. In making these proposals I have been motivated solely by my wish to expedite and render more effective the work of the Committee. More specifically, the purpose of my proposals has been to facilitate a more structured and focused debate, particularly on the disarmament items, and to make possible more rational consideration of and action on draft resolutions submitted to the Committee. In this latter context I have been particularly mindful of the problems faced by smaller delegations, especially during the hectic concluding phase of the Committee's consideration of the disarmament items, during which time a large number of draft resolutions is acted upon in a very limited span of time. In my opinion all delegations, and particularly the smaller ones, would benefit from a modest attempt at streamlining the work of the Committee, and this is what I have attempted to accomplish.

The proposals made in document A/C.1/38/2 are my own proposals. They have, however, been the subject of extensive consultations with a number of individual delegations and representatives of the regional groups. These consultations have convinced me that there is widespread support in the Committee for reforms along the lines suggested in the tentative programme of work and timetable, and this I find very gratifying and encouraging.

(The Chairman)

To summarize, in the document before the Committee I am making the following main proposals: first, that the general debate on the disarmament items be divided into phases, and that the items themselves be subjected to a rough grouping to be considered by the Committee during separate phases of its work; secondly, that the deadline for the submission and introduction of draft resolutions on disarmament items be moved up; and, thirdly, that before the Committee proceeds to take action upon draft resolutions on disarmament items time be made available for in-depth consideration of texts and informal consultations on them. At least in some cases this could conceivably facilitate the merger of texts dealing with the same subject matter.

Having made these general observations, I should like to proceed to a more detailed presentation of my tentative programme of work and timetable.

Adding up the number of meetings proposed for the various stages of our work, members will find that I have been working on the assumption that the Committee should be able to complete its work in a total of 65 meetings. I have arrived at this number on the basis of past experience in the Committee. The statistics show, for instance, that last year a total of 80 meetings had been allocated to the Committee. Out of that total 59 meetings were actually utilized. The corresponding figures for the preceding year are 68 and 51, respectively. Against that background it seems likely to me that the Committee will be able to conclude its work in the 65 meetings I have suggested. However, if this turns out not to be the case there is the possibility of adding meetings, since the Committee will have at its disposal a total of 80 meetings.

(The Chairman)

Turning now to the document before us, I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that it is suggested that the debate on the disarmament items should be divided into three phases.

The first phase, lasting from 17 to 21 October, should be devoted to general debate on all disarmament items. Delegations are encouraged to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible. As necessary, the general debate would continue into the second phase, lasting from 24 October to 4 November.

During this second phase, however, delegations would be encouraged to concentrate in their statements on those disarmament items listed on pages 1 to 4 of document A/C.1/38/2.

During the third phase of the Committee's debate on the disarmament items lasting from 7 to 11 November, delegations would be encouraged to address the remaining items, which have been listed on pages 4 to 6 of document A/C.1/38/2. The completion of the third phase on 11 November coincides with the suggested deadline for the submission and introduction of draft resolutions. On this point, let me add that, subject to the approval of members of the Committee, I intend to be firm on the suggested deadline. Let me also add that delegations are encouraged to submit and introduce their draft resolutions as early as possible during the first four weeks of the work of the Committee.

Following the completion of the third phase, the Committee will proceed to act upon all draft resolutions that have been submitted on the disarmament items. I am proposing that a two-week period, beginning on 14 November and ending on 25 November, be set aside for the purpose of acting upon draft resolutions.

In the first part of this period, however, it is my intention to schedule a minimum number of formal meetings. It is my hope that this will make it possible for individual delegations to subject draft resolutions to unhurried and careful consideration. Also, I would hope that the time thus made available could be constructively used for informal consultations and draft resolutions between the delegations concerned. In particular, I would encourage the sponsors of drafts dealing with the same subject-matter to get together and explore the possibilities that might exist for merging texts.

(The Chairman)

Having proposed that the Committee act on draft resolutions on the disarmament items between 14 and 25 November, let me add that in my opinion this should not preclude the possibility of its taking decisions before this period. Thus it is my understanding that, if a delegation submitting and introducing a draft resolution at an early date wishes to have it acted upon before the period designated for decision-taking in the document before members, the Committee should make every effort to accommodate that wish.

After the Committee has acted on draft resolutions on the disarmament items, I propose that it move on to consider and act upon item 140, the Question of Antarctica. Consideration of this item would begin on 28 November and should be concluded on 30 November. Since there is a possibility that the draft resolution on the item will entail financial implications, the Committee's consideration of it will have to be concluded in time to comply with the deadline for submission to the Fifth Committee of all draft resolutions with such implications.

The final stage of the work of the Committee will commence on 1 December and end on 9 December. During this period the Committee will consider and act upon the international security items on the agenda, and it is suggested that 10 meetings be allocated for the three items in question. Also, it is my intention to make time available so that delegations will have an opportunity to carry out informal consultations before the Committee proceeds to act upon the draft resolutions on the international security item. As indicated on page 7 of document A/C.1/38/2, the suggested deadline for submission and introduction of draft resolutions is 2 December.

By way of concluding this review of the tentative programme of work and time-table, I should like to emphasize to all delegations that in carrying out the programme flexibility will have to be the key word. On the other hand, I believe that the Committee would stand a better chance of making progress on the vital issues before us if every delegation, in a spirit of co-operation and discipline, did its utmost to adhere to the guidelines contained in the document that I have submitted to them. I appeal for and count on their support in this regard.

(The Chairman)

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the suggested programme of work and time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: It would be fair to say that the work programme the Committee has just approved presupposes full utilization of the time available to us.

At this juncture I should like to state that the efficient utilization of conference resources has long been of major concern to the General Assembly as well as to all of us. Therefore it requires that the Committee should avoid the loss of time arising from late starting or early ending of meetings. To achieve this goal, I should like, with the co-operation of the members of the Committee, to start the meetings punctually. In order to utilize fully the time available, I will open the meetings of the Committee at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m. sharp and will endeavour to close the meetings at 1 p.m. and 6 p.m. It is my conviction that such a policy would also obviate the need to hold night or weekend meetings.

I shall convene the Committee only when there is a sufficient number of speakers, to ensure adequate utilization of available resources. No meeting should be scheduled for those days on which less than four delegations have inscribed their names on the list of speakers.

In order to avoid unnecessary rush and to give ample time, I open the list of speakers for the general debate on the disarmament items, the first phase, as of today. I urge delegations to inscribe their names on the list of speakers before the Committee begins its substantive work. The list of speakers for the general debate -- and I emphase "for the general debate" -- will be closed on 19 October at 6 p.m.

(The Chairman)

To facilitate the task of the Committee's officers, as well as the Secretariat, members of the Committee should submit draft resolutions as far in advance as feasible so as to provide sufficient time for consultations. The Secretariat has asked me to request members of the Committee to note that draft resolutions, amendments and co-sponsorships should be given in writing to the Secretariat in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. With regard to requests for accommodation in and use of conference rooms for group meetings, they may also be given in writing to the Secretariat.

In connection with documentation, I should like to indicate that over the years the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation containing measures designed to make the most effective and economical use of this vital but very expensive element of the services. These rules have been summarized in document A/INF/136/Rev.1. I would therefore at the outset request all delegations strictly to limit any requests for additional documents. This is necessary, as representatives are aware, owing to the tremendous pressures on the Secretariat during the General Assembly as far as the preparation, typing, translation and distribution of documents are concerned. May I particularly appeal to members to take those provisions which I have mentioned into account.

It would also be appreciated if delegations would provide the conference officers with 20 copies of a statement when a prepared text is to be delivered.

As representatives know, the General Assembly, at its third plenary meeting on 23 September, decided that smoking should be discouraged in large conference rooms. I therefore appeal to all members of the Committee kindly to comply with the decision of the General Assembly.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to rule 110 of the rules of procedure, which reads as follows:

"Congratulations to the officers of a Main Committee shall not be expressed except by the Chairman of the previous session - or, in his absence, by a member of his delegation - after all the officers of the Committee have been elected."

I hope this rule, as well as other rules pertaining to the Committee's work and proceedings, will be strictly observed by all delegations.

If no delegation wishes to make any observations or remarks at this stage, I propose to adjourn the meeting. As decided, the Committee will meet again on 17 October 1983, at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records*



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FIRST COMMITTEE 3rd meeting held on Monday, 17 October 1983 at 3 p.m. New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Statements were made by:

- Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico)
Mr. Hepburn (Bahamas)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Moussa (Egypt)
Mr. Romulo (Philippines)

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL A/C.1/38/PV.3 17 October 1983 ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 58 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144

GENERAL DEBATE

The CHAIRMAN: Today we are embarking on the substantive work of the First Committee during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. During the coming two months we will spend many hours together in this Committee.

The issues we are facing in the First Committee - the issues of disarmament, arms control and international security - are perhaps the most crucial issues facing mankind today. As is so aptly stated in the Introduction to the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1978,

"The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.

(The Chairman)

"Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind."

(General Assembly resolution S-10-2, paras. 1-2)

Unfortunately, since 1978 the situation has not improved. The arsenals of nuclear weapons have continued to grow. We have still not succeeded in negotiating balanced and verifiable international agreements which could curb the development of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. We may be on the threshold of an arms race in outer space. The development of a new generation of space weapons with potentially destabilizing effects may be imminent. Conventional weapons are becoming ever more sophisticated and destructive. The costs involved in the arms race, in terms of human, technological and financial resources are growing every year and much faster than the resources allocated to international development.

There is no need for me to spend more time in repeating the sad facts, as members all know them only too well. We have just heard over 140 statements in the general debate in the plenary meeting of the Assembly by our Heads of State or Government or by our Foreign Ministers. Many of those statements have included important proposals, observations or comments on disarmament and international security. Practically all of them have regretted the lack of progress in international negotiations on arms control, disarmament and security issues. Many of them bear eloquent testimony to the frustration and disappointment felt by peoples all over the world about the present situation.

The question we are facing today is how we, the Member States of the United Nations, can make better use of the United Nations system to promote disarmament and strengthen international security. The United Nations has, according to the Charter, a central role and a primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and international security. Our task is, through deliberative action, to facilitate and encourage all disarmament and security measures. This is our duty, and this is what is expected of us by the international

(The Chairman)

community. We must now ask ourselves how we can use the next eight weeks to contribute in a positive way to promoting disarmament and international security.

Members of the First Committee are fully aware of the limitations and constraints we are facing. This Committee has no mandate to conduct negotiations on arms control or disarmament. Negotiations on the nuclear issues, which are of overriding importance, obviously have to be conducted on a bilateral and multilateral basis between the major nuclear Powers themselves. Important negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are currently under way within the framework of the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in Geneva. Developments in these negotiations will have a direct bearing on the general climate in international politics and are likely to affect other arms control and disarmament negotiations being conducted at present in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva or other multilateral forums.

The First Committee is a deliberative body. It nevertheless has a very important role to play as part of a chain of multilateral or bilateral institutions working in the field of disarmament. The Committee is without doubt the most representative forum of them all, including all 158 Members of the United Nations. The substantive range of the items on our agenda covers practically every question at present discussed in the context of disarmament and related international security questions. We will have a free and full debate where all members are encouraged to articulate their views and present their policy positions on all these issues that are before us. Important initiatives are launched, discussed and tested in this Committee to see whether they should be transmitted to negotiating bodies for further consideration.

The number of resolutions adopted in the First Committee has in recent years shown a sharp increase. At the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969, 12 resolutions on disarmament were adopted. In 1975, at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, 25 disarmament resolutions were adopted. Last year the number was 57. Parallel to this quantitative development, however, we find a proportionate decrease in the number of resolutions adopted by consensus.

(The Chairman)

This development is perhaps inevitable in a period of worsening international relations and with increased public attention to disarmament and security issues. In such times it is tempting to use the forum of the General Assembly and the First Committee for political purposes, to submit and seek support for one's own ideas and proposals and to give vent to frustration. The United Nations in such situations functions as a useful safety valve for emotions and policies.

Nevertheless we should fail to live up to the fundamental ideas expressed in the United Nations Charter if we limited our ambitions to damage control or to seeking political propaganda victories for one-sided proposals. The issues before the Committee are too important to allow such a course of action. We have a duty towards the Charter, and towards the peoples of the world who are deeply concerned about the present situation, to act together in a sense of common purpose and common destiny. On such a basis we stand a better hope of contributing towards real progress in international disarmament and arms control and towards the strengthening of international security.

There are three different areas where I think progress can be achieved at this session of the General Assembly and which I should like briefly to mention.

First, I feel that it might be useful if delegations would give thought to how the efforts to improve the working methods of the First Committee could be continued in order to make the Committee a more effective instrument for promoting disarmament and international security. We have made a modest beginning this year through a minor restructuring of the programme of work of the Committee. If this effort proves to be successful, I venture to suggest that at a future stage the Committee may wish to consider moving further towards a more structured work programme, perhaps by clustering items which organically belong together, and organizing the debates and voting accordingly. The time may also come to have a closer look at the way the agenda on disarmament items is organized, without prejudice to any country's right to seek the inclusion of items that it deems important. At present the agenda of our Committee represents a rather random, repetitious and arbitrary listing of the issues we are actually discussing, and new items tend to be added on top of existing items even if they deal with basically the same issues. I have no ready-made solution to these problems.

(The Chairman)

However, I would encourage delegations to give thought to these questions and thus prepare themselves for a discussion on the subject at an appropriate time in the future. Sponsors of draft resolutions could perhaps also have these problems in mind when they draft the relevant paragraphs in the draft resolutions asking for inscription of the respective items on the agenda of future sessions of the General Assembly.

Secondly, I feel we can make a tangible and positive contribution to improving the international climate if we do our best to avoid polemics and recrimination. Atmospherics is a very important element in international relations and a better political atmosphere between the main Powers, between East and West and between the non-aligned and the aligned would make it easier to achieve the results that we are wanting in ongoing negotiations on arms control, disarmament and international security. I do not in any way mean that we should avoid an open, frank and free discussion on questions where opinion, positions and policies differ. On the contrary. What we should seek, however, is to conduct these discussions in a manner which bears testimony to the seriousness and importance of the subjects before us. Our objective must be through our deliberations to contribute to easing existing tensions instead of further exacerbating them.

Thirdly, I think the impact of the decisions of the First Committee will be greater if we seek consensus solutions wherever possible. Presentation of competing draft resolutions on similar subjects without making any attempt to consult with one another to see whether compromises could be made and consensus achieved seems to me to be rather unproductive. There will certainly be cases where positions differ so much that a meaningful consensus cannot be achieved. Nevertheless, I think we should try to encourage and improve contacts, consultations and negotiations between sponsors of different draft resolutions in order to make a genuine effort to find common solutions to problems which are basically common. If we succeed in such attempts, the First Committee will have made an important contribution towards progress on issues which are vital for all of us.

Before I call upon the first speaker for this afternoon's meeting, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to document A/C.1/38/2/Add.1, dated 13 October 1983, containing the letter dated 11 October 1983, addressed to me by the President of the General Assembly and informing me

(The Chairman)

that the General Assembly, at its 28th meeting, decided to allocate agenda items 143 and 144 to the First Committee for its consideration. In this connection, I propose to the Committee that these items should be considered by the Committee under phase II of the Committee's programme of work and timetable. If there is no objection, may I take it that the proposal is approved by the Committee?

It was so decided.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is pleased that you have been chosen to conduct the work of the First Committee at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Those of us who have had an opportunity to work with you for some time are familiar with your keen interest in all matters relating to disarmament. That interest has been demonstrated once again in the informal consultations that you have been holding here and in Geneva ever since you were entrusted with this very special responsibility. This year that responsibility has become greater because of the deplorable international situation. In so many ways the present situation is reminiscent of the cold-war period, of which we have such gloomy memories. During your work as Chairman of the First Committee, in the course of which you will have the co-operation of the delegation of Mexico, we wish you positive results and we hope that procedures will be generally accepted which will enhance the effectiveness of our work.

At its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly adopted no less than 58 resolutions on disarmament, the largest number ever adopted in the history of our Organization.

The increased number of items assigned by the General Assembly to the First Committee, even greater than the number that appeared on our agenda last year, prompts us to believe that work on disarmament, both in the General Assembly and in the only multilateral negotiating body linked to it, the Committee on Disarmament, is moving with the wind in its sails, so to speak, and constitutes an example of the greatest effectiveness.

Unfortunately, the real situation is very different. The total lack of substantive tangible results can be described not only as discouraging but also as despairing. Both in the report of the Committee and the agenda of the Assembly we find, with a few additions and very few modifications, the same

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

series of questions that we have been considering year after year, in some cases for more than a quarter of a century, as is true of the banning of nuclear-weapon tests.

In these circumstances it is difficult to remain level-headed and hard not to lose patience. The only thing that can save us is the maxim that reminds us that the steady dropping of water can wear away stone, even when we have to wonder whether the resistance of certain States, especially some nuclear-weapon States, to the repeated appeals of the General Assembly on the basis of recommendations of this Committee, is not really comparable to the resistance of iron or steel. However, in the initial statement by the delegation of Mexico, we wish to mention, in the order in which they appear on the agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, certain resolutions adopted by the Assembly during its previous session, the thirty-seventh, the implementation of which we feel should be given serious consideration as soon as possible by those States for which they were intended.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The resolutions are the following.

First, resolution 37/71, urges France not to delay any further the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which has been requested so many times".

Second, resolution 37/72 stresses the need for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed immediately to

"the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests"

and calls upon the three depositary States of what is known as the Moscow Treaty, because it was signed in that city in 1963, and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

"by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoriums".

Third, resolution 37/78 A calls upon the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to transmit to the Secretary-General

"not later than 1 September 1983, a joint report or two separate reports on the stage reached in their bilateral negotiations"

on nuclear weapons for consideration by the General Assembly at its present session. It also calls upon both negotiating parties

"to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question".

Fourth, resolution 37/78 C calls on the Committee on Disarmament

"to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Fifth, resolution 37/78 I calls on the Committee on Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war".

Sixth, resolution 37/83 calls on the Committee on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc working group ... with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

Seventh, resolution 37/95 A calls upon "all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries".

Eighth, resolution 37/98 A calls on all States "to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of a convention "on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction".

Ninth, resolution 37/100 B calls on the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two major nuclear-weapon States,

"to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze" which, while not an end in itself, would be "a first step towards the comprehensive programme of disarmament". Furthermore, its structure and scope and the procedures for its submission to an effective verification system are also described in the resolution.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Tenth, resolution 37/100 E calls upon

"the Security Council - and more significantly its permanent members - to proceed with a sense of urgency to the necessary measures for the effective implementation of the decisions of the Council, in accordance with the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security".

Those 10 resolutions have been chosen from among the 58 adopted last year on the basis of a very narrow criterion. They were chosen because of their importance, because there is an obvious need for them to be implemented, and because one of them was adopted by consensus and the other nine were adopted by an overwhelming majority, with an average of 124 votes in favour. There were very few opposing votes. In the votes on three of them there was no negative vote; in the votes on three others only one delegation voted against; and in the vote on another resolution only two delegations voted against. That is why we are inclined to believe that the consideration of these items by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session should encourage the small number of States with responsibility for the implementation of those resolutions finally to modify their policies.

I should like now to dwell on two questions which certainly deserve careful consideration: the so-called bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons and the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. My delegation believes that a few modest suggestions are in order in connection with both questions.

Regarding the first question, the ideas that I shall set forth now, which have been taken from the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, provide, I believe, an excellent introduction.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The current bilateral negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces are of vital importance ...

"The failure so far to achieve real progress in these negotiations can only cause us all profound alarm ... The situation could well become virtually irreversible if the establishment of viable methods of arms limitation is jeopardized by the development of new weapons systems, and if either side, in search of military advantage, deploys strategic weapons that suggest an attempt to reach out for first-strike capability. ... In this connection, I might venture the observation that in this field there are no bargaining chips. Each side seems determined to respond to any advance achieved by the other side by matching it rather than by making concessions." (A/38/1, p. 5)

As is well known, one of the main difficulties encountered by these bilateral negotiations concerns the treatment that should be given to the nuclear weapons of France and Great Britain. In connection with this increasingly urgent problem, the thirty-third Pugwash Conference which met in Venice from 26 to 31 August last, stated its view, as indicated in the declaration of that council, that

"if no agreement is reached by the month of December, NATO could and should postpone the deployment [of new nuclear missiles] in order to allow more time both for negotiations and for national initiatives".

With a view to contributing to the solution of the problem, I should like to repeat the suggestion we made at the 23rd meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 16 August last that the two series of bilateral negotiations that have been taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union, in November 1981, in Geneva - presumably in consultation with their respective allies - the first dealing with so-called intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the second, in June 1982, dealing with strategic nuclear weapons, should be merged into one.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We feel it is appropriate to add two more suggestions to this institutional one. The first is to expand the scope of negotiations to include, in addition to strategic and intermediate-range weapons, so-called tactical nuclear weapons, of which there are several thousand in forward positions in Europe, as is well known. In this respect it should be mentioned that the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Questions - also known as the Palme Commission, after its Chairman, the present Prime Minister of Sweden, Olaf Palme - in a report entitled, "Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament", made the following observations:

"Battlefield nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear air defence systems and atomic demolition munitions, raise important problems of stability. Air defence systems would likely create pressures for delegation of authority to use them before combat actually was initiated. Battlefield weapons also would create pressures for early use in any armed conflict. Their location near the front lines of any war would mean that political leaders may face a choice early in a conflict of either authorizing the use of battlefield weapons or watching them be overrun. Each side's fears that the other side might resort to 'first use' could intensify crises and multiply the dangers of the initiation of nuclear conflict and its escalation." (A/CN.10/38, pp. 111, 112)

The Palme Commission concludes this section of the report by saying:

"Security for both sides would improve if these weapons were mutually reduced and withdrawn. These weapons are currently not the subject of East-West negotiations. They should be, and urgently." (ibid., p. 112)

Our second additional suggestion has to do with the "vital interests" of all the peoples of the world in the disarmament negotiations, which was emphasized strongly more than once in the Final Document. This has been dealt with by the negotiating super-Powers, however, as if it were some fantasy, or some kind of invention, of the collective imagination of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

To correct this and to give the expression of this interest reality, even if only symbolically, it would be appropriate for the negotiations between the two super-Powers - which should encompass the three nuclear questions to which I have just referred: that is to say strategic weapons, intermediate-range weapons and battlefield weapons - to be expanded by participants including among them a personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. His function should be twofold: he would be there to safeguard the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States or States that do not belong to either alliance, and where appropriate he could act as a friendly-go-between in order to help the two negotiating Powers to break the deadlock which their talks seem so often to reach - and which, unfortunately, they seem to have reached at the present time.

We believe that these suggestions, which, as can be seen from paragraph 29, section III B of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, were shared by 'many member States' in the Committee, should be seriously considered by the two super-Powers. We also believe that a General Assembly resolution inviting the two super-Powers to support these suggestions could prove effective. As has been frequently stressed, and as we have already mentioned today and would like to repeat, it is not just the national interests of the two Powers that possess the largest nuclear arsenals that are at issue, but, in the final analysis, the vital interests of all the peoples of the world and the very survival of mankind.

We also wish to put forward a few considerations which might contribute to the adoption of another important measure. This would be a step, albeit a modest one, towards the final goal set at the first special session devoted to disarmament and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the second special session on that subject - namely, the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

This measure would be the adoption by the nuclear-weapon States of a commitment not to be the first to use these terrible instruments of mass destruction.

There could be two stages for this. In the first, the United States, France and the United Kingdom could solemnly pledge, through unilateral declarations - as China did in 1964 and the Soviet Union did in 1982 - not to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons. If that could be done, the result, from the moral, psychological and pragmatic points of view, would be almost the same as if the five nuclear-weapon States became parties to a treaty or convention formally prohibiting the first use of these weapons. It would seem desirable, however, for an additional effort to be made to strengthen this obligation from the strictly legal point of view - that is, an attempt to incorporate this obligation in one of the instruments whose fully binding nature under international law is recognized.

Since thus far it has only been in the United States and in the European countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that the first use of nuclear weapons has been seriously considered as a desirable proposal, it is encouraging to note that over the past few months prominent individuals and institutions in that region have either given favourable consideration to or openly proposed the renunciation of this strategy by the United States and the other members of the Atlantic Alliance. I should like to mention the following few enlightening examples of this trend: the article, published in the spring 1982 issue of the magazine "Foreign Affairs", by four United States internationalists with prestige in their respective fields - McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith; an article, published in The New York Times on 10 May 1982, by Egon Bahr - a prominent member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany; a speech made to the National Press Club in Washington on 14 April 1982 by Paul C. Warnke, a former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; an interview given by George Ball, a former Under-Secretary of State of the United States, and published in the 7 June 1982 issue of "The New Yorker";

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

a memorandum submitted to the General Assembly in June 1982 by a group known as "General's for Peace and Disarmament", including a Marshal, an ex-President of Portugal, 10 retired generals and a retired admiral - all nationals of NATO countries, where they held a variety of important military posts; the declaration adopted by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in September 1982, after two meetings held successively in London and Rome in March and June 1982, with the participation of representatives of 35 Academies of Science from the entire world, a declaration containing, among others, the following significant words: "We appeal to all nations never to be the first to use nuclear weapons"; the report adopted in February 1983 by the "Union of Concerned Scientists", with headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the preparation of which a number of generals and admirals had a hand - Lord Carver, General Karl Christian Krause and General Jochen Loser - as well as a number of specialists such as Lord Zuckerman, and in which the following is stated: "The present first-use strategy would very probably result in the catastrophe of a nuclear war; it is intellectually and morally unacceptable, and internally it is a divisive factor for the nations of the Alliance"; the declaration which was adopted by the Synod of Bishops of the Church of England as a result of a debate that took place on 10 February 1983 and which contained these words: "We believe that it is a moral obligation of all countries, including the NATO countries, to renounce solemnly and publicly the first use of nuclear weapons, in any form whatsoever; and, to conclude this list - the result of a very selective choice among the large amount of material that exists in this area - the Pastoral Letter of the Bishops of the United States on war and peace, adopted on 3 May this year, which includes the following key concepts: "We cannot imagine any situation in which the deliberate initiation of a nuclear war, even on the most limited scale, could be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks that another State might make must be resisted with means that are also non-nuclear".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I do not wish to conclude this statement without referring, albeit briefly, to two items that also appear on our agenda and that, without any doubt, are of particular significance: the comprehensive programme on disarmament and the World Disarmament Campaign.

With regard to the programme - and, as will be recalled, I had the honour of presiding in 1981 over the Working Group that the Committee on Disarmament established to prepare a draft - the General Assembly has before it this year, in accordance with the request of the second special session devoted to disarmament, a revised draft that has been drawn up bearing in mind paragraph 63 of the Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament and in keeping with the provisions of paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session, in 1978, in which, it will be recalled, the General Assembly stated that the programme should encompass

"all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated". (resolution S-10/2, para. 109)

Since the text of the draft, appearing as an annex to the report of the Working Group incorporated in section III F of the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Committee on Disarmament, is relatively brief and self-explanatory, I shall merely offer a few general considerations, like those I put forward in Geneva, to help us better evaluate the draft.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I should like to stress at the beginning that the programme proposed is much less ambitious than the one that in 1982 was submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. That should be obvious to anyone who compares the two documents. In addition, as indicated in the report, the text of some paragraphs is still outstanding, as is the location of others. There remain differences of opinion regarding the desirability of including certain paragraphs since there is a need to avoid duplication.

No agreement has as yet been reached on the important question of the stages of implementation, nor was there enough time to consider the draft introduction which, as Chairman of Working Group I of the special session of the General Assembly in 1982, I prepared at the time. Thus, obviously, if it is decided to use it for the revised programme that has been submitted to the Assembly, a number of substantial modifications need to be made to bring it into line with the contents of the new document. Finally, it can be said that all delegations have, expressly or tacitly, reserved the final positions of their Governments until the Governments have had occasion to study the programme as a whole and state their views on it.

In spite of all the limitations that we have mentioned, we believe that the draft programme, which is the fruit of the hard work of the member States of the Working Group, could serve a great practical purpose. It could allow Governments, with a text completely free of square brackets, to get a clear idea of how much they can strive for at the present time, if it is felt that, as obviously appears desirable, the comprehensive programme of disarmament on which we have worked for the past three years, should be adopted by a consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations.

The procedure followed in the Working Group is now clear beyond any doubt. In those cases where generally acceptable formulations could not be agreed upon using as a basis the draft programme sent back by the second special session of the Assembly, together with the additional material provided by it and the new proposals put forward in the course of the deliberations of the Working Group, it was necessary, in order to reach agreement, to incorporate the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of 1978 without making any modifications.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Consequently, it seems to me that the General Assembly should take this situation into account when, after considering the content of the new texts in the draft programme - in the preparation of which the Group bore in mind that the draft programme should not represent any step backward, no matter how small, from the Final Document - it decides what its general policy must be.

It seems to me that the General Assembly will have to make a choice between two possible courses of action. One course is to adopt the draft programme in spite of its modest nature at this thirty-eighth session, after, of course, resolving the outstanding problems. This it could do in accordance with whatever procedure it deemed most appropriate. For example, it could create an open-ended working group that would work simultaneously with the First Committee of the General Assembly, whose work would be supplemented by these meetings for informal consultations. On the other hand, the matter could be returned to the Committee on Disarmament, but in this case it should be fully realized that it would be an illusion to believe that the multilateral negotiating body could consider this matter once again with any chance of success at all before at least three years had elapsed.

I think it would be difficult for me to find a more appropriate subject with which to conclude my statement than that of the World Disarmament Campaign. This is true because Mexico had the honour of submitting this initiative three years ago at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, and because, having been solemnly initiated at the second special session last year, it will, it now seems, play a prominent role as regards disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

I should like to add here, parenthetically, that we welcome the fact that the present session's agenda includes the holding of a Pledging Conference for the Campaign. That Conference will take place next Thursday, 27 October. In this connection, I venture to hope that all Members of the United Nations will realize that it is necessary to participate in that Pledging Conference. The amount of the contributions, in my opinion, is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance, however, that every single Member expresses its interest in the Campaign.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

A comparison of the objectives solemnly set forth in the Final Document and the conditions that exist in the international order at the present time gives rise not only to understandable alarm, but also to justified indignation. The modest arsenals of 1945, which included a small number of bombs of a very few kilotons, are now replaced by arsenals with a total of about 50,000 nuclear warheads, whose destructive power is conservatively estimated to be considerably greater than that of a million bombs like the one that destroyed Hiroshima. This means that nuclear arsenals today are more than capable of destroying the total population of the world 60 times over.

As was so rightly said two weeks ago by the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Bernardo Sepulveda Amor:

"The supremacy of the concept of military superiority is leading us to increase uncertainty, in which total annihilation seems probable." (A/38/PV.13, p. 81)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It should be recalled that it was also in the Final Document of 1978 that the General Assembly stressed:

"the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the 'political will' of States, especially of those possessing nuclear weapons ..." (resolution S-10/2, para. 10)

and it stressed the need - and these are the words from the Document - to:

"mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament ..." (ibid., para 99)

I am convinced that, thanks to the World Disarmament Campaign, whose objective fundamentally is to inform, to educate and to generate understanding and public support throughout the world for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of limiting weapons and disarmament, the voices of hundreds of millions of human beings everywhere, in the north and south, in the east and west, will gain greater persuasive power than have had, unfortunately, statements made in the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament; and we are sure they will contribute, as a result of healthy moral pressure in all countries, to give concrete expression to this political will which the General Assembly quite rightly called a decisive element in disarmament.

Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas): During preparations for this statement, I happened on a copy of a doctoral dissertation on disarmament written by Mr. Jack Brainard. Three aspects caught my attention:

First, the entire work was based on deliberations of States Members of the United Nations on the subject of disarmament.

Secondly, the dissertation, although completed in 1960, shows certain parallels to the status of the arms race today. For example, rapid developing technical changes in disarmament have continued since the 1950s; balance of power situations are created by technical developments, domestic, political and social conditions; shifting relations between the countries of the world indicate the tenor of the arms race; and the underlying assumptions of the Powers concerning the nature of international relations are very significant.

Thirdly, the author felt that the definition of the term disarmament must be re-examined. My delegation has long expressed this view, particularly since the United Nations definition of disarmament differs appreciably from that stated in dictionaries and encyclopedias. For Mr. Brainard's purpose, he referred to disarmament as "any plan or system for the limitation, reduction or abolition of armed forces, including their arms or budgets".

Certainly, given the information just cited, it is clear that we have not advanced very far in reducing the threat to total annihilation of the human race.

Personally, I am embarrassed to make another statement in the general debate on the question of disarmament because I have nothing new to say, except to point out that once again delegates have gathered to discuss the perennial question of disarmament and international security. One can almost feel the disinterest and lack of commitment to the cause.

Once again we are going to hear platitudes about the evils of the arms race and suggestions as to what must be done to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

Once again we are going to rehash the issues and adopt numerous consensus resolutions on the many items allotted to the First Committee.

Once again we are going to hear rhetorical excuses as to why concrete measures cannot be implemented and how the super-Power struggle or rivalry places stumbling blocks to effective solutions.

Once again we are going to listen to appeals for the implementation of political will and respect for interdependence.

Once again we are going to hear accusations and rights of reply combined with calls for co-operation without confrontation.

The more I reflect on the above, the more convinced I become that we are mocking ourselves with these tiresome charades. I am afraid that despite our keen awareness of the physical destruction and human tragedy that have resulted from wars or conflicts - whether by primitive, conventional or atomic weapons - mankind is still opposed to adopting a more appropriate

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

programme of action. Despite the fact that Governments are aware that the arms race has resulted in the wastage of valuable resources that could be put to more productive use, there is a great unwillingness to desist from acquiring and - even more disconcerting - developing newer and more sophisticated weapons of destruction.

From 1959 to the present, several conventions and treaties have been ratified on test bans, non-proliferation of arms and nuclear weapon-free zones. They have all been violated. Instead of limitation and control of armaments, global expenditures have continued to mount, consuming human and material resources, thereby jeopardizing the peace, security and stability of regions, and the environment.

Perhaps I am too serious about the arms race and the urgent need for us to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Perhaps it is necessary for us to go on talking and not acting. Perhaps this call for peace is merely an illusion and peace can be achieved only through war. Perhaps the expression of a comedian - "They can't blow up the world. Where would people live?" - is more believable than documentaries and simulated dramatic films on the danger of the escalated arms race. If this is so, what then of the aspirations of every child to become an adult, to succeed at a career or to have a family, or both? What then of the desire of every parent to see their child or children grow, discover life, have a family of their own and provide for them an old age of contentment through their offspring?

If these then are still real, genuine goals of human beings, and not merely philosophic, melodramatic posturings, then the Charter provisions and Assembly directives we are mandated to implement and bring to fruition are to be given a different fate from that to which we have hitherto consigned them.

The questions therefore arise:

Why do we continue to pour resources into acquisition of guns instead of butter?

Why do we allow conflicts still to threaten our peace of mind, dreams of the future?

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

Why do we permit situations which deprive human beings of the joys of their procreation?

Why do we continue to waste our energies in rhetoric?

Why do we not forestall and eliminate the obviously detrimental?

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

The answer is a simple one. We believe we would be heard for our much gainsaying. Strangely enough, silence would be more effective; for only what comes out of a man defiles him. What is evident is that nations must be convinced that there is an urgent need for the strengthening of the United Nations as a peacemaker. They must believe that it is not an oversimplification to say that the Charter provides ample mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the lowest possible level of armaments will characterize not only defence systems but regions as well.

Let me reiterate that, while the role of the super-Powers and militarily significant States cannot be overlooked, action by non-militarily significant States is no longer an option but an imperative: for it is only through such complementary action and commitment by non-militarily significant States that militarily significant States, blinkered and bound by their individual and collective vested interests, will think twice about maintaining the political doctrines which inflate their security needs and, in turn, lead to arms escalation, transferrals and the use and threat of use of force, which increase international tensions and in many instances influence decisions to engage in and exacerbate international conflicts.

In addition, it seems to my delegation that the real challenge of disarmament rests with the non-militarily significant States, which at present, by and large, have less to lose from renunciation of arms and all to gain for themselves and for militarily significant States by so doing.

Mr. Chairman, I feel that the organization of work you have presented to the Committee has great merit. The grouping of similar items is particularly appealing, and if Member States could agree to one single resolution for each item we should be able to boast of significant progress, on paper at least, in curbing the arms race. Let me assure you that my delegation welcomes the opportunity to assist you and the other officers of the Committee in bringing your onerous task to a successful conclusion.

I am realistic enough to know that when we begin to deal with texts of draft resolutions the frustrations, disagreements and disappointments will be ever present. However, as someone said regarding the implementation of a very innovative and controversial plan to ease the economic crisis in developing countries, "This is an extraordinary challenge that we cannot refuse to take and a responsibility we cannot afford to avoid."

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your election to preside over this Committee.

The priority items on the Committee's agenda are the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the limitation and halting of the nuclear arms race. In the true sense of the expression, that is global problem number one, crucial not only in solving other problems of mankind but also to the very survival of life on our planet. The Soviet delegation fully shares the concern over the increasingly ominous shape of the risk of nuclear war voiced during this session's general debate in plenary meetings. This risk is primarily the result of the unbridled nuclear arms race unleashed by those who are seeking to acquire military superiority in a bid to impose their will on other countries and peoples and to halt and reverse the objective processes of world development.

It would appear that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were already packed to capacity, and yet, the weapon assembly lines run on ever faster, at a frantic pace. It is impossible to think of any type of armament that is not either being stockpiled or being replaced by some new and even more deadly weapon. The development and improvement of strategic offensive weapons is proceeding apace: weapons are being developed on the basis of the latest scientific and technological advances in an obvious endeavour to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability. In order to bring nuclear weapons right up to their targets, plans to deploy new medium-range missiles in Western Europe, which promote illusions about the possibility of remaining outside a nuclear exchange.

There can be no doubt that Europe is now the nerve centre of international relations. The deployment of new United States missiles in Europe would greatly complicate the whole world situation, dramatically escalate the nuclear confrontation, increase the threat of nuclear war. If the United States missiles are actually deployed in Europe, the Soviet Union will have no alternative but to take appropriate countermeasures.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The arms race, which is being speeded up by the United States, is not confined to one continent alone. New attempts are being made to secure the deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe and in other parts of the world. Over a broad geographic area, from Diego Garcia to Okinawa, and over the expanses of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, both the land and the waters are being crammed with nuclear weapons through a pathological desire to add more such weapons where they are already in place and to deploy them where there are none.

The nuclear arms race, to which is now being given a qualitatively new dimension, increases the risk of war, inter alia, through an accident or technical error. The situation is being made worse by the fact that, even in the conditions of a nuclear arms race there are some who, with criminal thoughtlessness - as if the lives of millions of people were not at stake - are bandying about all kinds of doctrines and concepts of limited and protracted nuclear war, or selective or countervailing nuclear strikes - all based on the same reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Any sober-minded person would readily see that to think of the unthinkable, namely, the admissibility of nuclear war, disregards the single most important reality of the nuclear and space age, which is that if any nuclear war were unleashed, it would inevitably become world-wide. That is the fatal threshold beyond which life on earth itself may be destroyed.

Every time eminent scientists, physicists, physicians, ecologists or military experts lift the veil covering hypothetical nuclear missile war scenarios, they reveal a truly monstrous abyss which has little in common with speculative calculations of the trigger happy strategists who, in effect, think in pre-nuclear war terms. To hear them makes it appear that nuclear war is just a variety of conventional warfare but with more extensive consequences. However, a good look at the real facts shows that the soldier's conventional view of war is as outdated and as simple minded as is the straight-forward Velasquez picture of the helmeted Mars compared to the apocalypse of Picasso's Guernica.

The final documents adopted by the Third World Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War held in the summer of 1983 point to the fact that all-out nuclear war would instantly kill hundreds of millions of people, and thus call into question the future of those who might survive the initial attack: the medicinal services would be unable to provide effective aid for the survivors: future generations would inherit a violated biosphere on a planet poisoned by radioactivity: the long-term ecological consequences of nuclear explosions would affect later generations: indeed, if account is taken of all that is known and, even more important, of all that is still unknown, about the consequences of nuclear explosions, there is a danger that human life on our planet would cease to exist.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Similar conclusions have also been reached by scientists working in other fields and by sober minded politicians and military figures.

Clearly the advocacy of reliance on force, and particularly on nuclear force, blasphemously declared by some to be political realism, is biological nihilism, and therefore also political nihilism, because nuclear war is the road of no return. A truly realistic policy cannot be based on the possibility of experimenting with our planet to determine its capacity to survive a nuclear holocaust. That is the point repeatedly made by the Soviet Union: there can be no victors in a nuclear war.

People on all continents are rightly asking whether the slide towards the nuclear abyss can be halted and whether we can move on to another road in world politics.

We would answer that question most emphatically in the affirmative. The history of the post war years has proved convincingly that the threat of a nuclear war can be averted. Mankind has gained experience in the consolidation of peace and international security. For an entire decade international relations were developing in a spirit of détente. That was certainly a valuable gain for the international community. And there is no alternative. The gravity of the existing situation and the present level of the danger of war urgently require a return to the policy of détente and to a joint search for ways of preventing nuclear war.

What is now the essence of the problem of assuring peace and international security? Succinctly expressed, it is maintenance of the approximate strategic military equilibrium existing in Europe and on a global scale between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and between the Soviet Union and the United States. That equilibrium makes an objective contribution to the preservation of peace. Reluctance to accept that reality and a striving for military supremacy and destabilization of the military and political situation lead to an escalation of the arms race and a greater threat of nuclear war.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union has done, and will continue to do, its utmost to preserve that equilibrium and to seek the reduction and limitation of armaments on the basis of the existing equilibrium so that approximate parity at any given moment would be maintained, but at an increasingly lower level. That position is realistic, it is scientifically and politically sound, and it is in keeping with the interests of both sides and with the cause of world peace.

To that end, it is crucial that the nuclear weapon Powers strictly adhere to a defensive doctrine. That is precisely the doctrine that forms the basis for the building of the Soviet armed forces, including their nuclear components. Yes, we are maintaining the combat readiness of our armed forces at an appropriate level, taking into account the threats to our security. But we do that because we must. The arms race has always been imposed on us from outside. Preventive wars of any type or scale, and concepts of preemptive nuclear strikes are alien to the Soviet military doctrine.

Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has pointed out in his recent statement that:

We do not separate the well-being of our people and the security of the Soviet State from, let alone oppose it to, the well-being and security of other peoples and other countries. In the nuclear age one cannot look at the world through the prism of narrow egoistic interests. Responsible statesmen have one choice - to do all they can to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Any other position is short-sighted, nay more suicidal.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

As pointed out in the communiqué of the recently concluded Sofia meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty States, the Soviet Union, together with its allies, is offering an alternative to nuclear disaster, in a broad complex of proposals designed to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, halt the arms race and bring about disarmament and détente.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary to strive to create reliable material, political, legal, moral, psychological and other guarantees for the prevention of nuclear war at every level - unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. Our intentions are matched by specific deeds.

The Soviet Union has assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This has been a resolute and bold move considering that the United States and other NATO nuclear Powers find the unleashing of nuclear war possible and have not reacted at all in response to this action of the Soviet Union. The adoption of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is not a mere declaration. In military terms it means that more attention will be paid in the building up of armed forces to the objectives of preventing armed conflicts from becoming nuclear, thus necessitating the introduction of even stricter standards in the establishment and the makeup of the manpower of the forces, and in the organization of strict controls guaranteeing the exclusion of unsanctioned launchings of nuclear weapons - from tactical to strategic. If other nuclear States which have not done so followed the example set by the Soviet Union, this would amount in actual practice to the renunciation in general of the first use of nuclear weapons.

We cannot fail to agree with the remarks of the speaker who just addressed the Committee, the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, who said that the question of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons is one of the most important issues before us.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The other truly tangible measures adopted by the Soviet Union on a unilateral basis are: the cessation in 1982 of further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union and, moreover, the actual reduction of part of these armaments; the non-stationing of additional medium-range missiles beyond the Urals in an area where they would have western Europe within their range.

This year yet another significant move has been added to the Soviet Union's record of unilateral peace initiatives. The Soviet Union has assumed an obligation not to be the first to launch into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapons. In other words, the Soviet Union thereby has declared a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for as long as other States, including the United States, refrain from launching into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapons of any sort. This decision is yet another manifestation of the goodwill of the Soviet Union and its determination to promote in actual deeds the elimination of the threat of war.

The significance of unilateral actions in this sphere of the prevention of nuclear war is self-evident. At the same time, of course, unilateral efforts alone are not enough.

The Soviet Union has taken a properly responsible approach to the on-going negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. We believe that these negotiations should not be conducted merely for the sake of holding negotiations, but in order to reach concrete results; and we are firmly convinced that it is quite possible to reach a common position at these negotiations on the basis of strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security. But, just as it is impossible to applaud with one hand, the efforts of one side alone are clearly inadequate to get results in the talks. The state of affairs at these negotiations makes my point in this regard perfectly clear.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Let us now turn to the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe that have now entered the decisive phase. As far back as two years ago the Soviet Union proposed a truly zero option for Europe: the elimination of all nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical. I emphasize, this was a genuine zero option. However, since NATO was not prepared to adopt such a radical solution - and the Soviet Union is still ready to do so - the Soviet Union proposed a not so radical yet far-reaching option: the renunciation of the deployment in Europe of any new medium-range missiles and the reduction of all existing missiles by roughly two thirds, leaving 300 missiles on the USSR and NATO sides, respectively.

In view of western claims that such option would be unfair because the Soviet Union could, supposedly, retain within those 300 systems more missiles than NATO has at its disposal, the Soviet side declared that it was willing to keep - after the reductions in Europe - exactly as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France have in their possession. Accordingly, the two sides would be left with equal numbers of nuclear-capable aircraft of medium radius of action. Moreover, we also expressed our agreement to negotiating equal numbers not only of the delivery vehicles - that is, missiles and aircraft - but also of nuclear warheads carried by them.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

As a result, the Soviet Union would have in the European zone far fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on those missiles than it had before 1976, when it had no SS-20 missiles at all.

Finally, the USSR quite recently took another major step towards a positive solution of the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the event of a mutually-acceptable agreement being reached - including the renunciation by the United States of its plan to deploy new missiles in Europe - the Soviet Union would not only reduce its own medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of missiles possessed by Great Britain and France, but would also eliminate all the missiles removed. In that way a significant number of SS-20 missiles would also be dismantled. Thus, a major, real disarmament measure has been proposed with a view to considerably facilitating agreement.

But the United States has adopted a different kind of approach at the negotiations. For a long time the United States has been proposing that the USSR reduce to zero - that is, destroy - all its medium-range missiles, and not only in the European but also in the Eastern part of the country, while NATO would not destroy a single missile or aircraft. In other words, the purport of this proposal, which can be called a zero option only as a mockery of common sense, boils down to zero missiles for the USSR and zero reductions for NATO.

Another variant on this lopsided position is found in the so-called interim solution proposed by the United States, under which the USSR would have on the one hand to reduce its medium-range nuclear arsenal and on the other hand to give its blessing to the deployment in Europe of a certain number of new United States missiles in addition to existing British and French missiles and the European forward-based systems of the United States itself.

Even now the United States continues to press for this solution, which would enable it in any event to begin at the end of 1983 the deployment in Western Europe of its new medium-range missiles, in addition to the American forward-based nuclear systems already in place there. The United States is merely covering up this fact with talk about some sort of United States flexibility in the Geneva talks. Another helping of this "flexibility" has

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

just been dished out, and the inherent deceit is obvious this time too. The essence of the latest so-called flexible movement in the United States position amounts, as before, to a proposal that agreement be reached on how many Soviet medium-range missiles are to be removed and how many new American missiles are to be deployed in Europe in addition to the nuclear arsenal already possessed by NATO.

The current United States position not only precludes the possibility of reaching agreement, but is altogether devoid of elementary common sense. How is it possible, for example, to find an even remotely reasonable justification for the refusal to take into account British and French missiles in the overall balance of nuclear arms? The British and French systems, which are capable of destroying targets on the territory of the USSR and its allies, even now constitute a significant component of NATO's nuclear arsenal.

The stubborn reluctance of the United States to take them into account is clearly intended to delay the talks and enable that country to deploy its missiles in Western Europe by invoking the intransigence of the Soviet Union. Capable as they are of destroying targets deep inside Soviet territory, these missiles are designed to become an absolute addition to the United States nuclear arsenal and to upset the existing regional and global balance in NATO's favour. However, it is not only targets on Soviet territory, but also targets in some other countries, including African and Asian countries, that could turn out to be in the sights of these new American missiles.

Together with the other Warsaw Treaty countries, the Soviet Union continues firmly to advocate that an early agreement be reached in the negotiations which provides for the renunciation of the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles and for appropriate reductions in existing medium-range nuclear systems in that continent. As was emphasized in the communiqué issued on 14 October 1983 in Sofia, Bulgaria, by the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States,

"The possibility of reaching at the Geneva negotiations an agreement consonant with the interests of the peoples of the world still exists. In this context it was pointed out that if no agreement were reached in the talks before the end of this year it would be necessary for the negotiations to continue for the purpose of reaching one, with the

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

United States and its NATO allies waiving the deadline they had themselves established for the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles."

The USSR is willing in those conditions to observe the freeze it has unilaterally declared on medium-range missile systems deployed in the European part of its territory and to carry out the unilateral reduction of such systems that began when the freeze was declared, as a major contribution to the creation of the conditions necessary for the successful completion of the talks.

A situation similar to that in the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is developing in another Geneva forum: that of the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

At these talks, the Soviet Union has been proposing as a first step, a freeze on the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides and that they should both forgo not only any increase in the present number of missiles, but also the development and testing of new types and kinds of strategic arms, as well as limiting to the maximum extent possible the modernization of existing systems.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

But this would only be a first step. The Soviet proposals call for deep reductions of all strategic weapons in the interests of enhancing over all military strategic stability. Specifically, the draft treaty put forward by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks proposes that the existing arsenals of both sides be reduced by approximately 25 per cent, to equal levels. The number of nuclear warheads on these armaments would also be cut substantially to equal agreed ceilings. All channels for the continuation of the strategic arms race would be blocked. There would be a ban on the deployment of long-range cruise missiles and other new kinds of strategic systems, and the possibilities for competition between the two sides in a qualitative upgrading of their arms would be very strictly limited. All these limitations and reductions would of course be subject to verification. The Soviet Union then would be prepared to move towards even deeper reductions.

Here too the United States position is aimed at obtaining unilateral military advantages rather than an honest agreement. The reductions as proposed by the United States would affect the Soviet strategic arsenal to a considerably greater degree than the American arsenal. It is true, however, that from time to time the United States side engages in a tactical gliding around some important problems facing the negotiations. However this does not change the over-all picture. Allow me to give a concrete example. As soon as the United States felt that it wanted to ensure a future deployment of another inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) - the Midgetman - in addition to the latest MX ICBMs, which are to increase the United States nuclear arsenal by at least 1,000 high-yield warheads, the United States delegation in Geneva hastened to declare its readiness to adjust its position. The United States delegation declared its willingness to raise its earlier proposed limit of 850 on deployed sea-and-land-based ballistic missiles.

The same is true of the recent United States idea of a build-down, or increase in reductions. Even according to United States mass-media estimates, that idea would in effect mean a faster reduction of land-based ICBMs which

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

constitute the backbone of the USSR strategic nuclear forces than of sea-based missiles, which are more important for the United States of America. The thrust of the new United States proposal is to channel the strategic arms race towards a qualitative improvement of missiles and bombers rather than to curb it. Thus that proposal is by no means a step forward; rather, at best, it is a move sideways.

Though the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms have so far failed to advance, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, believes that progress is feasible at these negotiations too, if the other side also strives for it, not in words, but in deeds.

While recognizing the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States for averting nuclear war, we believe at the same time that active multilateral efforts are required of all States of this planet, irrespective of their size, geographical location, social system and of whether they possess nuclear weapons or not or of whether they are members of some military-political grouping or are non-aligned. Only joint efforts by all those who cherish peace can contain those who are pushing the world towards the abyss and hinder the unravelling of intricate political knots and the achievement of constructive agreements.

The recent Madrid meeting of States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has demonstrated that neither the present-day world tensions nor considerable differences in national policies are an insurmountable obstacle to finding areas of agreement in order to produce solutions which clear the horizons of world politics.

We attach exceptional importance to the United Nations, the most representative international forum. United Nations decisions, aimed at the prevention of nuclear war and the curbing of the arms race and at expressing the will of the States Members of the United Nations, carry great moral and political authority and have significant potential for influencing positively the policies of States.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The recent report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the work of the Organization rightly notes that the task of eliminating the threat of nuclear war

"should override the differences of interest and ideology which separate the membership." (A/38/1, p. 3)

In our view the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly can and should make its own meaningful contribution to the cause of reducing the military threat and strengthening universal security. Today, more than ever, it is important for the States Members of the United Nations to have full awareness of themselves as united nations determined to act for the sake of saving present and future generations from nuclear annihilation.

Aware of the utmost importance of uniting efforts in the struggle against the nuclear threat, the Soviet Union has submitted to this session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war. It proposes that the General Assembly condemn nuclear war resolutely, unconditionally and for all time as the most hideous of all crimes that can be committed against the peoples of the world and as a gross violation of the foremost human right, the right to life.

It is imperative that the States Members of the United Nations declare as criminal acts the formulation, advocacy, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts designed to substantiate the legitimacy of the first use of nuclear weapons and, in general, the admissibility of unleashing nuclear war. This stand of the Soviet Union is an organic expression of its principled approach to the questions of war and peace. The founder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, pointed out that "socialists have always condemned wars between peoples as barbaric and atrocious".

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

At the same time this Soviet proposal is a follow-up to recent United Nations decisions. Two years ago the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, which solemnly proclaimed that those statesmen who would decide to be the first to use nuclear weapons would be neither justified nor pardoned, and a year ago it adopted a resolution calling upon all the nuclear Powers that have not yet done so to follow the example set by the USSR and assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The adoption at this session of a declaration condemning nuclear war in all its forms and manifestations would contribute to the creation of a political climate that would make the actions of those who are devising plans for the first use of nuclear weapons more difficult, and would build confidence among States, thus contributing to the implementation of practical measures to limit and reduce nuclear arms. This would become another large-scale political action by the United Nations aimed at removing the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union believes that the condemnation of nuclear war should be effectively backed up by practical steps to curb the nuclear-arms race.

In this respect a freeze on nuclear armaments in qualitative and quantitative terms by all States possessing them would be an extremely timely and feasible measure. The majority of the countries of the world and the broadest sectors of world opinion have supported it. The United Nations has also come out in favour of a freeze of nuclear arsenals. We respect this will of the peoples and are actively working for its realization.

Last June the Soviet Union advanced a concrete proposal to this effect addressed to all the nuclear States. Unfortunately it too has not found a positive response on their part. Today we are again focusing attention on this question, proposing that the General Assembly adopt a resolution entitled "Nuclear arms freeze", whose draft the Soviet delegation is submitting to the First Committee. The essence of the Soviet proposal is to reach agreement between all nuclear-weapon States to cease the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and nuclear weapons, renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons of all kinds and types, declaration of a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems, and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It goes without saying that a nuclear freeze under appropriate verification would be most effective were it to be carried out simultaneously by all the nuclear Powers. Such a freeze could be of indefinite duration or be limited in time, a matter that could be negotiated by the nuclear States. At the same time, the Soviet Union considers it possible that the proposed freeze would initially become effective as regards the USSR and the United States by way of an example to the other nuclear-weapon States, hopefully prompting them to take similar steps in the nearest possible future.

A nuclear freeze that is both effective and relatively easy to achieve would make a contribution to the strengthening of strategic stability by removing apprehensions that the deployment of new systems of nuclear weapons would have a destabilizing effect. As a result, the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict would greatly diminish. Correspondingly, the degree of trust among nuclear-weapon States would sharply increase and a breakthrough in improving the overall atmosphere in the world would materialize.

Naturally a freeze is not an end in itself, for the threat of nuclear war exists even at the present level of military confrontation. That is why we consider a nuclear-weapon freeze as a major step towards halting the nuclear-arms race, reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear-weapon stockpiles, thereby making it possible completely to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

The complete and general cessation and prohibition of tests of such weapons would erect a reliable barrier against the escalating risk of nuclear war because of qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons. Let me here again say how much I agree with the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, who said that a nuclear-weapon-test ban is long overdue. We feel it is important that the General Assembly should at this session call upon the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a draft treaty on this subject as a matter of the highest priority. The Soviet draft entitled "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests", submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, represents a sound basis for early agreement on this matter.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, we are proposing a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. As a practical step in this direction, the Soviet Union

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

reaffirms its readiness to give effect to the Soviet-United States treaties limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, provided that the United States acts likewise.

Unfortunately, the United States position with respect to the aforementioned threshold treaties as well as with respect to the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests indicates that this arms limitation measure has also fallen victim to nuclear programmes, under which the Pentagon intends to develop and produce about 17,000 new nuclear weapons within six years. And while previously attempts were made to conceal its unconstructive approach by references to verification complexities and other spurious arguments, a recently published reply by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a congressional commission "dots all the i's". The reply states that "nuclear tests are necessary for developing and modernizing warheads, for maintaining the dependability of the stockpiled arsenals and for evaluating the effect of the use of nuclear arms".

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

At the same time, as demonstrated by the discussion of this problem in the Committee on Disarmament, the overwhelming majority of States attach tremendous importance to it and are putting forward concrete considerations in this respect. The Soviet Union is prepared to consider in a constructive spirit the proposals of other States aimed at facilitating the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In this context, we take note of the initiative put forward by Sweden, which has introduced its own draft treaty in the Committee on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union is advocating most resolutely the immediate and specific elaboration of a nuclear disarmament programme the realization of which would lead to the one hundred per cent elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is naturally prepared to negotiate such verification as would guarantee the programme's implementation by the nuclear States. A thorough consideration of this question has led us to the conclusion that the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in control procedures could be used for the purposes of verification of specific nuclear disarmament measures.

In an atmosphere of an escalating nuclear threat the task of strengthening the non-proliferation régime becomes particularly urgent, above all because of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and South Africa. The prospect of some other States, in particular Pakistan, acquiring nuclear weapons is another cause for concern. The spread of nuclear weapons throughout the planet and particularly their appearance in areas where the threat of war is highest would undoubtedly do considerable harm to both regional and international security.

The Soviet Union actively supports the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, in particular in Northern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa. It is in favour of a proposal to create a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons along the line separating the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

We advocate the speedy solution of the question of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States by the conclusion of an international convention on this issue and the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions calling upon all concerned to refrain from building up nuclear weapons on foreign territories and making qualitative improvements in them. It is high time to begin negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In order to redouble efforts aimed at averting nuclear war and at solving other arms limitation questions, we think it is necessary to intensify work in the Geneva multilateral disarmament body. We would like to express the hope that the transformation of the Committee on Disarmament into the conference on disarmament will not only change the name, but also the state of affairs. It is now time to move on from endless procedural debates to substantive negotiations on problems which are known to require prompt solution.

In reaffirming its previous proposals and putting forward new ones the Soviet Union declares its readiness to act together with all countries, irrespective of their socio-political systems, and with all those that advocate the strengthening of peace and international security.

The calendar of historic dates also reminds us that this is both necessary and possible. This October marks the fortieth anniversary of the Moscow meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom which, in the face of the threat of fascist barbarism, decided in principle to create an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. The underlying principle was that of joint action in the name of peace by States with different social systems. Abiding by that principle, the States of the anti-Hitler coalition were victorious in the Second World War. That principle has withstood the test of time, and is today no less relevant than it was 40 years ago, because once again humanity must ensure that reason triumphs over barbarism - this time the barbarism of nuclear maniacs.

Humanity has not lost, nor can it lose, its reason. This is forcefully demonstrated by the upsurge of the anti-missile and anti-war movement in Europe and other continents, made up of people of various social, political and religious affiliations. In this context, I would especially like to emphasize the importance of the decisions of the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War, held in Prague last June, the very name of which reflects the main demands of all peace-loving people. Today as never before it is imperative for all peoples and every human being to understand the impending threat in order to pool their efforts in the struggle for their survival. The United Nations is also called upon to promote this objective.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It has taken a long time for mankind to evolve, but it could take but an instant to exterminate it. Today history does not offer much time for a search for solutions. We must choose the most effective of them without delay. The Soviet Union's proposals on that score have been put forward. We are most certainly prepared to consider without prejudice any other proposals aimed at overcoming the nuclear threat. What is needed now is action, the exercise of political will on the part of all States. As for the Soviet Union, it will not be found wanting. The Soviet Union has always been and will continue to be a resolute and consistent fighter for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, for world peace, détente and disarmament. We are willing to do everything in our power, but we expect other States to do likewise.

Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): It is for me personally, Mr. Chairman, as for all delegations who know you, a real pleasure to see you presiding over the First Committee. We are convinced that your interest in questions of disarmament, your initiative, sincerity, and charisma will make the work of the Committee more constructive and fruitful, especially in view of the current international situation, which is reminiscent of the cold war, as Ambassador Garcia Robles rightly reminded us.

I wish also to congratulate the Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Elfaki of Sudan and Mr. Tinca of Romania. We are familiar with the important role they play in various fields in the United Nations.

The present international situation, characterized by tension among the major Powers, between the major Powers and the other countries of the world, and within the various blocs and groups themselves, requires us to take a comprehensive and objective view, especially in the United Nations and a Committee such as ours which is working on questions of international security and disarmament. In doing our work we must divorce ourselves from the propaganda and counter-propaganda campaigns, otherwise the credibility of our approach to the international situation particularly concerning disarmament and international relations, will be undermined. We are making an effort to strengthen that credibility through our procedural work, as you, Sir, said in your statement at the beginning of this meeting.

Although consideration of the international situation as a whole is part of the work of this Committee, I do not intend to discuss it, since my delegation will be speaking on that subject later. However, I believe that its consideration is a necessary prelude to linking the development of the international situation with negotiations and other activities in the field of disarmament.

We all recall that twenty-five years ago, in 1959, the General Assembly declared the question of general and complete disarmament the most important question facing the world today. That was the situation twenty-five years ago that is the situation today, but it is twenty-five times more frightening since, although some say that nuclear war is impossible in view of the risks and possible consequences, yet the danger is clear, and international society,

(Mr. Mousa, Egypt)

having achieved such a high intellectual and cultural level, cannot leave its survival or destruction to chance, at the mercy of the actions and judgement of a few fallible individuals in a small number of States.

Two essential factors strengthen this argument. One is the competition, confrontation and mistrust between the two major Powers, which is constantly increasing, to the point where the situation could get completely out of control at any moment. The second is that this confrontation and this competition and conflict arise from causes which have nothing to do with the interests of the great majority of countries and peoples: indeed, they have a harmful effect on their interests and on their political, economic, scientific and other plans. The risk of an East-West confrontation increases every day, firstly because international institutions are incapable of playing an effective role in eliminating it, and secondly because of the lack of political will on the part of several States which have a special importance in the world today, including some whose political will is a key factor in the structuring of contemporary international relations. We can no longer accept this situation as a *fait accompli* imposed on us: we must set about changing it as a very serious situation with harmful effects on our daily life which is blocking the progress desired by all countries, especially the countries of the third world, and forcing us to gamble with our own future and that of coming generations.

Having noted the inability of international institutions to discharge their proper role, and the lack of progress in bilateral negotiations between the major Powers, our only possible course, in a field as important as that of disarmament, is to insist on the continuation of collective and bilateral negotiations, and to work to strengthen the effectiveness of the existing system of international negotiations, that is, the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. At the same time we must call on the two super-Powers to pursue negotiations on disarmament or arms reduction, on strategic weapons and medium-range weapons, and on all other matters in respect of which discussions between those two Powers have become an important element of all integrated international disarmament efforts.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

In saying this, we are not calling for dialogue simply for the sake of dialogue, however useful that might be: we are calling for responsible dialogue based on a political will free from any suspicion of a leaning towards the use of force, domination, expansion or coercion.

Egypt attaches considerable importance to the studies of the Committee on Disarmament, formerly known as the Conference. The process envisaged must not be confined to a mere change of name. The studies in question are the result of a whole year's work by the Geneva Committee, and represent the common ground among its members, whatever their political or ideological leanings. The importance of these efforts stems from the fact that the Geneva Committee on Disarmament is the only United Nations forum in which effective progress can be made towards general and complete disarmament. We must make use of it.

It may be recalled that the delegation of Egypt referred, in its first statement in the First Committee at the last session to the need for the Disarmament Committee to consider ways and means of making its work more effective. That means we must equip the Committee to do so. A rigid adherence to the consensus rule impedes the Committee's work and can even paralyse it. That is certainly not the way to bring to a successful conclusion the current negotiations in the various working groups, which we believe now provide the best means of pursuing disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

The delegation of Egypt has a fundamental comment to make on the work of the Commission at its past session, which was mentioned in the report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. In a number of important areas the question of working groups, the definition of their mandate and the need to reach a consensus on their creation have proved to be a barrier to an in-depth study of the subject and took up much of the Commission's time in discussing the mandate of some working group or other. Very frequently these matters have made it impossible to create certain working groups. We therefore feel that the General Assembly should stress the following.

First, the method of creating working groups to consider certain questions on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission is very important;

Secondly, it is necessary to define the mandate of the working group in terms of agenda items to be considered by it. It would be absurd to create a working group on halting the arms race and on nuclear disarmament, without asking it to fix a timetable within which to achieve those objectives:

Thirdly, the view that the mandate of the working group should be very general and broad seems to lose sight of the purpose of creating the working groups and seems to be designed to turn them into a group of experts to consider the Commission's agenda, which is certainly not the reason why working groups were created by the Disarmament Commission:

Fourthly, the mandate of the working groups could be drafted flexibly enough to make it possible for them to consider every aspect of a question in the knowledge that the final aim in setting them up is to reach one or more consensus agreements on the agenda item. We believe that the concept of a consensus should be flexible and applied objectively.

Referring now to the Committee on Disarmament and the effectiveness of its work, I should like to take up the question of its membership. The delegation of Egypt welcomes the addition of four new members and we hope that this increase in membership will give its work further momentum but we think that the main criterion of the effectiveness of the work of the Commission does not have to do with the number of members but with their effective participation, their political will and ways and means of increasing that effectiveness.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

In this discussion of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should now like to take up certain points on its agenda. I shall deal first with a nuclear test ban. Notwithstanding the creation of a working group to consider this question -- and this is the first item on the agenda of the Committee -- it has not been possible to make tangible progress in starting negotiations on a nuclear test-ban treaty, the main aim of the working group. In this connection we would like to propose the following:

First, the mandate of the working group, as now worded restricts its activities to the question of verification and hampers the start of real negotiations on the treaty.

Secondly, for a number of sessions until now verification and control have been the only subjects tackled by the working group. Although those questions are important, we do not feel that they should be considered independently of the substance of the matter, namely the drafting of a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Thirdly, the delegation of Egypt, in the context of the Group of 21 believes that the means of control and verification in use at the present time are sufficient to arrive at guarantees regarding observance of the test ban. What is missing is an authentic political decision to reach a final agreement on a matter of the highest priority as agreed in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

Fourthly, it follows from the foregoing that the mandate of the working group should be amended to make it clear that the group should start negotiations on drafting a nuclear-test-ban treaty, including the question of control and verification. It is to be hoped that we can reach agreement on this so that the group will be able to undertake negotiations at the next session in Geneva.

Amendment of the working group's mandate is very important, especially since the group declared at the end of its work that it had gone as far as it could on the subjects of control and verification.

Fifthly, in order to allow the negotiations to bear fruit, we appeal to the nuclear-weapon States who decided not to participate in the work of the group to reconsider their position as soon as possible. It would be absurd to reach a agreement on a nuclear-test-ban treaty without the participation and acceptance of all nuclear-weapon States within the framework of the 1963 partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

On this subject, Egypt welcomes the draft treaty prepared by Sweden as a positive step since it contains a number of ideas that deserve consideration.

Secondly, cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and disarmament, high-priority items of particular importance, as can be seen from the Final Document of the special session on disarmament, are at the very crux of disarmament efforts. No further proof of that is needed. Nonetheless, the inability of the Committee on Disarmament to set up a working group on this runs counter to the unanimous opinion on the need for a ban on nuclear weapons and for a halt to the unbridled arms race.

Egypt, however, agrees with the Group of 21 on the need to begin multilateral negotiations and to continue bilateral and regional negotiations, which are necessary, logical and of crucial importance to all States in the interests of their security and survival. However, the concern of all States cannot absolve the nuclear-weapon States of their very special responsibility deriving from their nuclear potential. We appeal to all, particularly the nuclear-weapons Powers, to enable the Committee on Disarmament to play its part. We hope that the proposal of the Group of 21 will receive consensus support in the Committee in order to make it possible to set up the working group in question as soon as possible.

With regard to the cessation of the arms race and to bilateral and multilateral talks, quite obviously Egypt has been following very closely and with great interest the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are deeply concerned at reports that the talks might be broken off. We hope that the parties concerned will show the political will to press on with the negotiations and arrive at positive, tangible results, in order to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt.

(Mr. Boussa, Egypt)

Thirdly in connection with these extremely important subject, I wish to refer to the question of the prevention of nuclear war. It is, of course, absurd to see a deterioration in the already grave international situation and a frantic arms race while, at the same time, the Committee on Disarmament has so far proved unable even to establish a working group on this question -- on the pretext that the question of the prevention of nuclear war is linked to nuclear disarmament, and even the prevention of war in general, and that it would therefore be preferable to discuss the matter in informal meetings. In our view, that is not a convincing argument, but I shall not refute it here because that has already been done.

Nevertheless, I would once again emphasize that Egypt's position is that of the Group of 21 as regards the need to consider this question separately in a special working group, for reasons that are obvious from the very title of this agenda item. I should like to add that informal meetings cannot be a substitute for meetings of working groups -- a method that has proved to be the best so far, since it enables the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its essential task as a negotiating body and to reach disarmament agreements. The Group of 21 has shown a spirit of understanding and flexibility by agreeing to reduce the number of its meetings, in view of the short time available and the difficulty of reaching agreement at the last session of the Committee. It is to be hoped that the parties concerned will also demonstrate understanding and flexibility so that a working group can be established at the beginning of next year's session of the Committee.

Fourthly, I turn to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Of course, the members of the First Committee are all familiar with developments in the consideration of this matter in conformity with General Assembly resolution 37/83, which requests the Committee on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space". (resolution 37/83, para. 6)

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

It is highly regrettable that the Committee on Disarmament proved unable to put that resolution into effect, despite the flexibility shown by the Group of 21. That flexibility is clearly demonstrated in the documents issued on this subject, which contain a proposal of the Group in regard to the terms of reference of a working group.

In this respect, I draw attention to what I said at the beginning of this statement in relation to the general work of the Committee on Disarmament and to the need to determine the objectives of working groups in the light of the subjects entrusted to them, if we are to reach agreements on those subjects. All disarmament questions are by nature complex, but that should not be used as an excuse to delay the efforts to fulfil the aims decided upon.

We believe that it is necessary to hold negotiations, within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and we think that that should be done in a working group. We request the Committee to undertake the consideration of this question at its next session, because the striking, indeed terrifying, development of space technology makes it imperative not to waste time. The delegation of Egypt attaches the highest importance to this agenda item. It is engaged in consultations on a draft resolution in this regard, which it hopes will be adopted by consensus.

Fifthly, let me take up a number of agenda items on which the Committee has made some progress but on which we must work even harder in order to conclude consideration of them.

The first of these items is the convention on chemical weapons. There is no doubt but that the Working Group on the question of chemical weapons has made considerable progress. That is why I think it is high time to start drafting texts on the subject. I would note here document CD/408, proposed by Egypt and endorsed by the Group of 21. It contains a number of points which we think should be included in the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in order to ensure its credibility and effectiveness.

(Mr. Houssa, Egypt)

These points relate essentially to the commitment by States to respect the convention, particularly the provisions made for the collective responsibility of parties to it in cases of breaches of the convention and measures to deter violations by parties to the convention as well as to protect parties against any violation committed by non-party States. We feel that the role of the Advisory Committee on this matter must be strengthened. My delegation believes that the results of the activities of the Working Group are important and positive developments that should be used in the work of drafting provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I take up next the convention on radiological weapons. Egypt has already welcomed the increased support for the Swedish proposals to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities. Recent events show the importance of this matter and its close link with radiological weapons, for any attack on nuclear facilities results in fact in a dissemination of nuclear radiation. The Group of 21 has stated its position on this question, emphasizing the need to take up the matter of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities while, at the same time, being prepared to negotiate on the question of radiological weapons. Hence, we cannot accept a draft convention that separates the question of radiological weapons from the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. The differences on the question in the Committee on Disarmament must be overcome and the necessary efforts must be made to conclude this convention.

I turn now to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. There can be no doubt that the failure of the second special session devoted to disarmament to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament constitutes a failure to carry out the goals set forth in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. We were all very disappointed, because we had placed great hopes in the adoption of this programme. Following that failure, the Committee on Disarmament was asked to draw up a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament for submission to this session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Houssa, Egypt)

Those of us who have followed the activities of the Working Group established to consider this item are aware of the difficulties encountered by the Group, particularly in regard to the chapters on principles and on measures to be taken. While paying a tribute to Ambassador Garcia Robles for the efforts he made in presiding over the Group, with his well-known experience and wisdom, we nevertheless think that the efforts must be continued if we are to achieve a comprehensive programme, overcoming the present difficulties. We feel that the negotiations that will take place here during this session on the parts of the programme not agreed upon in Geneva will be a step forward towards the objective.

This brings us to express our support for the proposal for the establishment of an open-ended working group to consider this question during the coming weeks and to present to the First Committee a report making it possible to judge the situation on the spot, as it were.

In this context, I would note that the delegation of Egypt attaches special importance to the question of measures that would build the kind of confidence among States necessary to establish an atmosphere favourable to the achievement of real progress on disarmament. Whether these are multilateral, bilateral or unilateral measures, they are very important. Indeed, Egypt believes that the cessation of the flow of arms to the States of a given region for the purpose of ensuring superiority over other States of the region, on the pretext of security considerations, would be significant progress and would prepare the way for a reduction of tensions and the establishment of an atmosphere favourable to the peaceful solution of existing disputes.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Let me now briefly touch on a few points which could be taken together. The first is establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions, such as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, and the creation of zones of peace in other regions, such as the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, as indicated in the Final Document, which emphasizes the importance of such zones. Indeed, their importance as a contribution to general and complete disarmament and to a way of reducing tensions in the world cannot be over-emphasized.

Egypt continues to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and we will have an opportunity of discussing the proposal in detail and submitting a draft resolution to that effect in the coming weeks. Since the appeal to all States at the Lusaka summit meeting of the non-aligned countries, to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, Egypt has always supported the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, in accordance with the desire expressed by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session. Efforts made to bring this about, and to arrange for a world conference on the subject, have met with a series of obstacles that have prevented the progress we had hoped for. As a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, Egypt appeals to all concerned, particularly the great Powers, to co-operate in enabling the Committee to complete its preparations for the conference to be held in Sri Lanka next year, and invites the major Powers to attend.

I must say that I can hardly speak about disarmament without referring to the relation between disarmament and development. These questions are of crucial importance and urgency in the light of the terrifying rise in military spending, with its resulting drain on natural and human resources, especially in the developing countries, the deterioration of the world economy and the grave crisis now threatening the economies of the third world countries, and the effect of that situation on the international political situation. In other words, there is a triangular relationship between disarmament, development and international security, elements which interact upon each other.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

In conclusion, let me touch briefly on a question of some interest - disarmament studies. Egypt is convinced that disarmament studies can make a valuable contribution, and welcomes the idea of reviving the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies; the fullest use should be made of its studies, which contain many recommendations and important findings that could contribute to progress in disarmament. In that connection I would like to refer to the work of the Group of Experts on conventional arms and disarmament. The Working Group was unable to complete its task in the time allotted, because of the many difficult aspects of the subject matter. We therefore feel that this Group should be given extra time to complete its work and to report back to the General Assembly at its next session.

Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): Mr. Chairman, may I say at the outset how pleased I am to see you in the Chair of the First Committee as once again we embark on our review of the arms race and security. Your dispassionate approach and equanimity, and your experience and concern with this area, are our assurance that our discussions will be skilfully guided.

I venture to say that the proliferation of proposals for steps in arms control has become as awesome as the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While we warmly welcome each new suggestion as an indication of interest in the pursuit of arms limitations, it has become difficult to follow the implications of the proposals and counter-proposals, flying as fast and thick as missiles. Many times, it appears, one has not landed before another streaks past it going the other way.

It might be well to examine in general terms the intent and content of some of these proposals, and try to determine how they relate to the work of this Committee and the various bodies of the United Nations seized of the question of disarmament. Perhaps we should begin with strategic nuclear-weapons systems, as these are generally regarded as the most threatening to human life, in fact to all life on the planet.

The current positions of the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be the following, although they change with such rapidity that one may be forgiven if the review is out of date within a day or two.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

For his part, we heard Mr. Troyanovsky of the USSR state on 4 October that his country calls for a reduction by more than a quarter of the total number of strategic delivery vehicles, or missiles, with a concurrent reduction to agreed equal limits of the aggregate number of nuclear weapons, or warheads, carried by these delivery vehicles.

The President of the United States, in his address to us on 26 September, mentioned that his country had been prepared to reduce by one half the number of strategic missiles on each side, and the numbers of warheads by one third.

Both these proposals have tremendous merit, being the largest immediate cuts ever considered relatively simultaneously by the proponents. They also have specific differences, the more significant of which concerns the number of warheads to be cut. Here, each proposal favours the proponent, since the USSR has more powerful missiles with fewer warheads, and the United States more warheads. In this circumstance, as in so many others, the argument ranges around percentage cuts versus cuts by numbers of warheads. It seems reasonable, however, that with goodwill the differences could be bridged. What is important, as always, is that the rough parity which is now generally acknowledged to exist in strategic missiles be maintained, and the principles of balanced and equitable reductions be observed throughout the reduction process.

In his United Nations address, the United States President made a further proposal: namely, that there be reductions and limits on a global basis, under which circumstance the United States would limit its missile deployments in Europe. The full parameters of this proposal require further exploration.

Meanwhile, in the European area, the USSR has proposed a standstill or a freeze in respect of both strategic and medium-range missiles in Europe during negotiations, which presumably would forestall planned United States deployments of cruise and Pershing 2 nuclear weapons systems, but might provide a breathing space, useful to slowing down the present tempo of the arms race.

It is difficult to tell what earlier proposals remain on the table for discussion, and for this reason I am confining my comments to those made or alluded to at the General Assembly or since.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

The United States President has in the last few days introduced a new concept, that of the build-down. This concept has a definite appeal which derives from the fact that more than one older strategic nuclear warhead would be discarded each time a new one was built. Over time this procedure might -- or might not -- result in sizable reductions, depending on the formula agreed upon. There may be additional difficulties. Might the proposal not put a premium on a continuing race in research and development and the search for new and more dangerous weapons? The way in which different formulas would affect the differing weapon configurations of the super-Powers is hard to foresee, and may prove to be complicated in practice.

One extremely useful lesson appears to have come out of the renewed effort to achieve control of the strategic nuclear arms race. It is that multiple-headed missiles (MIRVs) increase insecurity, not security, because they are destabilizing, because they give the advantage to the party which decides in times of stress to strike first. With 5 or 10 warheads per missile there is the possibility that one or another party might be tempted to eliminate the forces of the other. With one warhead per missile this temptation does not appear.

Thus all the energy, time and materials put into MIRVs is now seen to have been mistaken, a fact which many strategists pointed out before these weapons were built or deployed. It is always much more difficult to climb down a tree than up, and when heavily committed. Getting rid of MIRVs will prove no exception.

Further with respect to Europe, the proliferation of proposals is much more complex than that concerning strategic weapons, because the circumstances are very involved. What shall be taken into consideration? Intermediate range missiles only? Missiles and airplanes capable of delivering the same warhead? Tactical weapons as well? Submarines in the area? Because of the mix of weapons, any formula of equity is much more difficult. The United States has proposed a zero option for all intermediate range missiles in Europe: as Mr. Reagan put it, "a whole class of weapons". The USSR has suggested a zero option of all nuclear systems, as Mr. Troyanovsky stated, including medium-range and tactical. Failing that, the USSR has proposed that deployment of any new medium-range systems -- meaning Pershing II and cruise missiles -- be cancelled, in return for which all existing systems be reduced by approximately two thirds.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Again, we find that the proposals tend to favour the proponents, at least in their initial form. But then, the purpose of negotiations is to narrow these positions. Some further steps have been offered. The USSR has suggested reduction of its own medium range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union to a level equal to the number of missiles possessed by France and Britain, and would eliminate all the missiles affected by that reduction, including a considerable number of SS-20 missiles. The Western States, it will be recalled, had stated that the British and French weapons could not be included, as they constitute a separate national deterrent. In these two positions again there appears to be room for accommodation since they are extremely wide ranging and significant.

I have undertaken this short review because it is difficult to keep before us any composite view of the current status of initiatives by the two super-Powers. At the same time, it is important to us if we, as an oversight Committee of the United Nations, are to respond appropriately.

I have several concerns about the conduct of negotiations on these various proposals. I wonder if both States are allowing adequate time for a full and thoughtful response at the negotiating table before launching new proposals with complex ramifications? The history of disarmament negotiations has often shown that, for lack of adequate time for response, valuable proposals have been dropped before the range of response and possible accommodation were fully explored. The range of proposals now before the two competing Powers are so significant, involving as they do possible deep reductions in nuclear weapons, that they deserve most careful exploration.

I have another major concern that involves a question to which this body has frequently directed its attention, namely, that both parties should abstain from introducing any new complications such as additional nuclear weapons systems into the present situation for whatever reason.

Again, disarmament history has a lesson for us. It is that whatever is done by one party is inevitably repeated by the other, irrespective of whether the overall effect is to heighten insecurity rather than security. Thus, the concept of a moratorium, a standstill, or a freeze on the introduction of new weapons or additional numbers of old ones is of the utmost significance

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

in the search for arms regulation. Not doing so leads to long waits while one side duplicates the newest developments so that psychological parity is restored and negotiations can resume. I say psychological because the overkill capacity of both parties may be little affected in fact.

It will be noted that very little of the substance I have discussed has immediate application within the First Committee of the United Nations or for that matter within the Disarmament Commission or the Committee on Disarmament. We must draw the obvious conclusion, namely, that the United Nations continues to be confined to the role of a cheering section when it comes to negotiations on the substance of disarmament.

I see a need for a very different situation, given the paucity of results from disarmament negotiations from 1945 to this date. The United Nations, after all, is the Organization which its Members, and in particular the permanent members, established for questions dealing with international security and disarmament. The United Nations should be intimately and deeply involved in deliberations most important to the future of all its Members. While I see little likelihood for this development in the short term, I should like to see a time in the not too distant future when appropriate officials of the United Nations will be enabled to offer suggestions and recommendations to the negotiating parties, based on the rapidly developing expertise being generated within the expanding Centre for Disarmament and other concerned United Nations affiliate bodies.

Turning now to the deliberations within our own house, this has not been, as is broadly recognized, a vintage year. The small achievements to be noted stand out only by their singularity. Thus, once again our agenda is crowded, and overcrowded, with unfinished items and new ones being added to the old. Our admonitions, our appeals are dutifully made and registered, but frustration is the banner under which we meet.

As I have mentioned earlier at this session of the Assembly, we are at the twentieth anniversary of the partial nuclear test ban treaty and have not yet achieved the second step - a comprehensive treaty. Nor have we achieved a treaty on the banning of chemical weapons, especially the deadly nerve gas weapons. In the absence of the capacity to alter the course of events in any major ways, the United Nations is, however, providing a valuable support system for the elaboration of new perspectives, studies and possible next steps in the disarmament picture. It is beginning to perform the needed task of examining the wider parameters of a global security system which will permit disarmament and is holding open to all States the opportunity to negotiate agreements in good faith within its forums when they may be ready to do so. Because of the United Nations efforts the world is much wiser in the field of disarmament than it had previously been.

There are a few fields in which the United Nations has the opportunity to develop a significant role related to disarmament in implementation of its central mandate regarding peace and security.

A study on the significant proposal of the Government of France for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency has been completed. During this session we shall consider further steps towards its possible implementation. The proposal has the support of a significant number of Governments at present. I regret, of course, that it is not currently supported by the two major nuclear protagonists. I do not believe we should be dismayed by this fact. I believe it may be seen as an opportunity for the rest of the membership to contribute to breaking the deadlock between them and towards establishing the rightful role of the United Nations in this field. By definition, the United Nations is the agency responsible for monitoring compliance with arms control agreements, and it requires the technical capacity to do so. When I say "United Nations" in this context, I am referring of course to the entire institution, including its satellite agencies, to which the new projected monitoring agency would be added.

A review of the study prepared by the Secretary-General indicates that the usefulness of the agency would include the capacity to oversee crisis areas and United Nations peace-keeping missions - an invaluable adjunct to the present capabilities of the United Nations. In this sense it can become an early warning system alerting the Security Council to signs of developing

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

crisis in time to set in motion actions to arrest conflict before it starts.

There are perhaps three major concerns being expressed regarding the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency: the present disinterest of the United States and the USSR, technical expertise and money. A considerable period of preparation will be required before large amounts of money are needed. When they are, it will be well to remember that the amounts will be insubstantial in comparison to the sums nations are committing to both conventional and nuclear arms.

The needed technical expertise is not confined to the super-Powers but is largely already available among the States supporting the monitoring agency. The present and, I think, temporary disinterest of the United States and the USSR provides an opportunity for the United Nations membership to undertake an initiative demonstrating the rightful and necessary role of the United Nations in establishing the conditions for disarmament. Thus, I would urge that Members consider most seriously in their disarmament priorities the upgrading of the approach to establishment of the international satellite monitoring agency.

Most of our agenda is rather threadbare, we must confess. We have seen the items year after year. This does not, of course, absolve us from the responsibility to appeal once again for forward motion on a nuclear freeze or moratorium, on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, on a treaty banning chemical weapons and on other questions. To these perennials, I would add also an emphasis on the curtailing of steps towards the militarization of space, including the development of anti-satellite weapons. It is always many times easier to deny a development than to dismantle it once in place.

I have spoken often about the psychological factors which underlie and ultimately determine the continuation of the nuclear arms race. Today I wish to stress only one factor: security. The arms race is, for the most part, a futile search for national security. The means employed, however, in this search clearly are succeeding not in providing security but in guaranteeing massive insecurity. Again, in turn, disarmament measures, looked upon as a security goal, are not being achieved. Here again, the basic reason for their non-achievement is that States are not convinced

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

that disarmament in and of itself will provide security. In this they are quite right. Disarmament measures can bring a better atmosphere and with it a better chance for the taking of those steps which will provide security and have been our goal since the founding of the United Nations in 1945 -- those steps which will result in the gradual erection of a true international security system.

Security has become a collective and indivisible responsibility for the global community; and security requires not only disarmament but also the means of keeping peace and settling disputes among States. I have to say that our knowledge of the processes of disarmament now far outstrips our understanding of the necessary institutions for peace-keeping and peace-making which will make disarmament safe and possible. In my view, only when this serious imbalance is redressed can we expect to make the kinds of gains in disarmament which alone can ensure the continuance of humanity in this age of interdependence and interaction.

The United Nations is being diminished by the refusal of its Member States as a whole to commit themselves to the processes for collective security which they themselves have established. This is the main reason disarmament is not occurring. Nor can we afford to place our hopes on disarmament as a disconnected phenomenon. Disarmament can occur only when the other elements for creation of a peaceful world, especially machinery for the maintenance of peace, are increasingly present. Let us not delude ourselves. Let us work for disarmament, yes, with the intensity that the situation demands, but realizing that disarmament is only a single pillar and cannot alone support the edifice of peace.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last speaker on the list for this afternoon's meeting. Two delegations have asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I shall now call on them.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): The representative of the Soviet Union in his statement today made a remark which might be construed as meaning that there were nuclear weapons on the territory of Japan. A similar remark was made by the Soviet Union during the general debate in plenary meetings at the current General Assembly session. My delegation then exercised its right of reply and stated clearly that such an allegation was totally unfounded. We made clear, as we have always done, that Japan upholds the three non-nuclear principles. These principles, which represent the basic policy of Japan, are well known to everyone here I hope, including the Soviet delegation. I do not intend to go into a detailed discussion here and now. I should like to reserve our right to speak further on this subject on a later occasion.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): The representative of the Soviet Union, during his statement a short while ago, referred to the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation and, in that context, also referred to Pakistan. In order to put the record straight, I should like to draw the attention of the Soviet representative to the numerous statements made at the highest level by Pakistan that it will not exercise the nuclear-weapon option.

I should also like to draw his attention to the active support that Pakistan has always given to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones all over the world and, in particular, to its own proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in south Asia.

Lastly, I should like to draw his attention to the active role that the Pakistan delegation has played in all international forums and, in particular, in the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum of the United Nations for disarmament, towards the elimination of the nuclear-weapon threat in all its aspects. May I add that the Soviet delegation to the Committee on Disarmament is fully aware of that role.

Given those facts, I can only express my great surprise at the gratuitous reference that the representative of the Soviet Union thought fit to make in his statement this afternoon.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Corrigendum

Page 33-35, line 27

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FIRST COMMITTEE
4th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 18 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 4TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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- Mr. Jaroszek (Poland)
- Mr. Stephanou (Greece)
- Mr. Fischer (Austria)
- Mr. Marinescu (Romania)
- Mr. Pavanarit (Thailand)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 58 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker for this morning's meeting, I should like to extend a warm welcome to Assistant Secretary-General Mr. Rikhi Jaipal to the First Committee. I am certain that we will benefit fully from his experience and look forward to his co-operation in the Committee's work.

I am also pleased to observe the presence amongst us of the participants in the Fellowships Programme on Disarmament. I am sure that their participation will enable them to contribute more effectively in the area of disarmament when they resume their role in their respective Governments.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): First of all, I should like to congratulate you, Ambassador Vraalsen, as Chairman of this Committee. It is with particular pleasure that my delegation sees the representative of a Nordic country in this important post. We rest assured that, with your well-known diplomatic skills, you will lead the Committee's work with efficiency and impartiality.

I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Elfaki of Sudan and Counsellor Gheorghe Tinca of Romania on their election as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

The international situation is becoming more and more threatening. Conflicts and tensions have increased in many regions of the world. The arms race has accelerated. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have deteriorated sharply. Disarmament negotiations have been a long series of missed opportunities. We are faced with a terrifying perspective of a continuously rising spiral of nuclear armaments.

Governments defend their participation in the arms race as necessary to guard their national security. They are only buying greater insecurity at higher costs. The arms race poses ever steeper obstacles to disarmament negotiations. While disarmers talk, the arms race advances.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Nuclear weapons constitute the primary threat to the survival of mankind. These weapons have changed the very concept of war. There is no protection against a nuclear attack. Our goal is a world free of nuclear weapons.

The threat of nuclear weapons casts its dark shadow over the continent of Europe in particular. That continent, bristling with nuclear weapons, is where the forces of the two power blocs stand face to face.

At the end of this year, NATO plans to start deployment of new Pershing-II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. The Soviet Union has indicated that it will add new missiles to its already oversized armaments, aimed at Western Europe.

The consequences of a continued deployment of new nuclear weapons are terrifying. Tension and hostility between East and West will escalate even more.

This autumn hundreds of thousands of people will be demonstrating for the cause of peace in Europe. Among those people are to be found a large section of the politically conscious young. Everything seems to indicate that we have before us a hot autumn in Europe.

My Government hopes that the current negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva on intermediate-nuclear forces will yield positive results. Sweden's view is that no further deployment of nuclear weapons should take place. There should also be a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons already deployed. A balance of conventional forces should be achieved at a lower, not at a higher, level.

There are no credible scenarios implying that a nuclear war can be controlled once it has broken out. All nations would then suffer devastation to a degree that would make victory a meaningless word..

This fact has recently been confirmed by the Heads of State of the United States and of the Soviet Union. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan said, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". (A/38/PV.5, p. 3) And President Andropov expressed the same thought almost as explicitly:

"Responsible statesmen have only one choice - to do everything possible to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Any other position is shortsighted; more so, it is suicidal".

We welcome these statements. But, so far, action has not followed statement.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The doctrine of deterrence as a firm basis for international security is today being questioned by an increasing number of people. Not only by the growing peace movement, but also by politicians, the military, scientists and other experts. They warn us against nuclear deterrence. If deterrence is to function, the nuclear Powers must conduct themselves as if they were prepared to fight and win a nuclear war. But this is an illusion.

To say that peace can be achieved only through deterrence is another way of saying that the search for security must be based on fear, on the threat of revenge.

The objective is to inspire as much fear as possible in your opponent and his objective is to do the same to you. So fear will continue to increase and so more and more weapons are developed and deployed around the world. This cannot provide a long-term basis for peace.

The enhanced accuracy achieved through military research and development increases the ability for a first strike. The qualitative arms race is thus undermining the doctrine of deterrence.

The doctrine of deterrence is trapped in its own contradiction. Nuclear deterrence must be phased out as a security-policy doctrine.

All peoples have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. On this, the concept of common security is based. Security has to be found in common, and the opponents must act together to prevent war. Political means must be given priority. Negotiations must be given a chance.

In that process not only respect for the opponent but also knowledge of his vital interests and wishes has to be sought. Thus understanding of the security interest of the opponent is deepened.

This would give us the basis for a policy of negotiations and co-operation and lead to growing confidence. The foundation is then laid for a policy of common security.

In order to move away from the doctrine of nuclear deterrence to a policy based on common security, a constructive dialogue between East and West is essential. Such a dialogue would include politicians, decision-makers, negotiators, scientists and the immense public, concerned with peace and security in all countries.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

A policy for common security includes different confidence-building measures as well as measures for halting the arms race.

Confidence-building measures are urgently needed. Increased information sharing, a dialogue on military research and development, various hot-line arrangements, high-level meetings, respect for the opponent's command and control arrangements are examples of confidence-building measures between the major military Powers.

Confidence-building measures are highly relevant to the European continent. This has manifested itself in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, where agreement on certain confidence-building measures was reached as early as 1975.

Sweden is honoured to host early next year the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. My Government considers that Conference as a stepping stone in the important work of turning distrust into confidence and of reducing the risk of armed conflict in Europe.

I should also like to mention a few other issues of great importance to the security of Europe.

My Government believes that a corridor in Central Europe free of battlefield nuclear weapons would make a substantial contribution to the process of building confidence in Europe. The corridor concept is not intended to change the basic military balance in Europe but to enhance the security of both sides.

The idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be seen both as a means of enhancing security and as a confidence-building measure. My Government is convinced that a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone would improve the security of the Nordic countries through reducing the nuclear threat in our part of the world.

It should also be possible as part of a realistic disarmament policy to agree on a mutual obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a restriction in nuclear doctrines would increase confidence and help avert further speculation on limited nuclear war. An enhanced reliance on conventional forces, as currently discussed, should therefore be pursued. A conventional balance can and should be achieved at a lower level of armament.

To halt the arms race there are three measures I find extremely important: a nuclear freeze, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a curb on military research and development.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Last year this Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution put forward by Mexico and Sweden on a nuclear-arms freeze. That resolution called upon the Soviet Union and the United States immediately to proclaim a freeze. Such a freeze would be a strong gesture of confidence. It would stop increases in the number of nuclear weapons as well as attempts to modernize them and to develop new categories. A freeze would be a basis for proceeding to balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The present session of the General Assembly should repeat this call for a nuclear-arms freeze.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

A major step in curbing the qualitative arms race and in preventing a further spreading of nuclear weapons should be a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There is today no issue that blocks the international disarmament negotiations more than the disinclination of the nuclear-weapon States to take part in serious talks on a total ban on nuclear-weapon tests.

After detailed preparatory work, Sweden put a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty before this summer's meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. That draft is an honest attempt to find a compromise that should be acceptable to all as a basis for serious negotiations. The draft includes an outline for a viable international verification system. The Swedish draft was favourably received by many members of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty undertook to seek to achieve a stop to any test explosion of nuclear weapons for all time. They also stated their determination to continue negotiations to this end. This commitment was reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. They have neglected their obligations. And still no real negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

If the two super-Powers do not fulfil their obligations in this Treaty, how can they expect all other parties to do so? How can they expect universal accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty?

Without a test ban the risk that we will be faced with a proliferation of nuclear weapons is increasing day by day. The threat to peace and stability in different parts of the world will then be further increased. The responsibility rests heavily on the nuclear-weapon States. We strongly urge them to enter without delay into serious negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Extensive military research and development propels the qualitative arms race. To curb military research and development is crucial. Next year we will be able to discuss this in depth on the basis of the Secretary-General's report on the scope, role and direction of the military use of research and development.

Today, the arms race threatens to extend into outer space. This is not an entirely new phenomenon, but recent developments give reason for concern. The Soviet Union has tested anti-satellite systems for many years. The United States will soon be testing a new anti-satellite system. These weapons are destabilizing. An effective ban on anti-satellite development is urgent in order to ensure crisis stability and decrease the risk of a nuclear war.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

New advanced technologies such as beam weapons are considered by the super-Powers for use in outer space, not only for anti-satellite purposes, but also for ballistic-missile defence. Efforts in this area have recently gathered considerable momentum. We do not believe that beam weapons for ballistic-missile defence will lead to a more stable world.

Development of space-based ballistic-missile defences would violate the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. If a certain technique is used, the partial test-ban Treaty could be jeopardized. Deployment of such missiles would violate the outer space Treaty.

Serious negotiations on the militarization of space are urgently needed. The establishment of a working group in the Committee on Disarmament for negotiations on the militarization of space must no longer be delayed. Its mandate should cover all aspects of the issue.

The negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons have progressed reasonably well with respect to the technical and legal issues. For the first time a report was adopted unanimously.

All States have a genuine interest in a total prohibition of chemical weapons. We regret that the United States, which has for several years refrained from producing chemical weapons, has now decided to produce binary chemical weapons. This kind of decision will not facilitate agreement on a convention banning chemical weapons.

Last year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on chemical and bacteriological weapons asking for a special conference to establish a procedure to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We regret that due to the unwillingness of one of the depositaries, the Soviet Union, no action has yet been taken.

In many parts of the third world long-standing conflicts have exploded into war. Conflicts are often aggravated through the flow of arms to the developing countries from the major Powers. International transfer of weapons is increasing.

Many developing countries feel they have to spend scarce resources on the import of weapons and weapon systems. The major industrialized countries are the main exporters of weapons to the developing countries. As the Secretary-General

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

notes in his annual report, no significant initiative towards any kind of restraint has been taken in recent years. Sweden feels that it would be desirable to promote limitations of and to establish guidelines for international arms transfers. The United Nations would be a suitable forum for this task.

The major conclusion of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development was that the arms race and development compete for the same resources. Military spending is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

The Swedish Government recently decided to appoint a special expert to carry out a national study on disarmament and development. As the Committee will certainly recall, the United Nations study contained recommendations that all Governments should study national aspects of disarmament and development, including conversion. I am pleased to inform the Committee that the special expert is my predecessor, Mrs. Inga Thorsson, and that the Swedish study, when finalized next year, will also be available in English for the benefit of other interested parties.

Let me now turn to the subject of the naval arms race. My Government is concerned about it, especially about the development of naval forces and the technological development of naval arms systems.

The technological development of the means for naval warfare has advanced rapidly in a number of respects. This trend is dominated by the major naval Powers, but it is also gradually influencing the navies of smaller countries.

This situation has increased the risk of confrontation at sea, unintended incidents and unnecessary conflicts. A further dimension is added by the fact that missiles, torpedoes, depth charges and mines could be adapted to include nuclear warheads. While strategic nuclear weapons have attracted a great deal of attention, tactical nuclear weapons at sea have not, although they outnumber the strategic ones.

Sweden proposes that the United Nations carry out a broad study on various aspects of the naval-arms race. Such a study could provide us with valuable information and give impetus to arms control and confidence-building measures in the naval field. My Government hopes that this General Assembly will adopt a draft resolution to this effect. It is the intention of the Swedish delegation to consult with other interested delegations on this matter.

My Government appreciated the constructive discussion in the United Nations Disarmament Commission of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. The Disarmament Commission welcomed the report as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. In particular, we note that the Disarmament Commission recommended that the report be taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts. We shall revert to this matter during this session.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

As a European it is natural for me to derive my examples from the European scene. It is there that the fear of a nuclear war is widely felt. This threat, however, looms equally over all parts of the world. In a nuclear war we would all be losers. But fear must never be allowed to paralyse us. Instead we must embark on a road of trust and co-operation. Strong public opinion against nuclear war can exert sufficient pressure on the major Powers to compel them to halt the arms race. Such pressure would provide important support in the work for peace and disarmament.

The world is one and indivisible. Our security is our common security. We must never forget that this planet has no emergency exit.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): May I begin my statement, Sir, by associating my delegation and myself with the congratulations and good wishes expressed to you on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. I should like to assure you that in the discharge of your mandate you can look forward to the full and constructive co-operation of the Polish delegation, in the interest of the productive and orderly work of the First Committee.

Since the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly the international situation not only has failed to improve but has in fact been further aggravated. In the critically important area of arms limitation and disarmament no progress has been made. On the contrary, the unabated arms race, first of all in the nuclear field, is about to take on a qualitatively new dimension, spreading as it does to virtually all environments and involving practically all parts of the globe. The responsibility for the destabilizing spiral of the nuclear arms race rests squarely with the militarist policy of the leading imperialist Power and some of its allies, which are bent on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. Their policy of confrontation with the socialist States leads to a dangerous escalation of tension and further complicates the already difficult situation.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The adverse implications of such a policy are being eloquently brought home to millions of people, especially in Europe, by the formulation of aggressive strategic doctrines whose common message seems to be that nuclear war is a practical proposition. This in turn appears to imply the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons.

In his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General has succinctly observed:

"The situation could well become virtually irreversible if the establishment of viable methods of arms limitation is jeopardized by the development of new weapons systems, and if either side, in search of military advantage, deploys strategic weapons that suggest an attempt to reach out for first-strike capability." (A/38/1, p. 5)

The same ominous prospect was addressed by the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Professor Henryk Jablonski, in his address before the General Assembly on 30 September, when he stated, inter alia:

"A war mentality of stirring up tension and intolerance is invading the world and directly affecting the quality of the international atmosphere. In the face of the escalation of strategic concepts and doctrines, the development of new methods of killing, the destabilization of international relations and the pursuit of military superiority, the prospect of annihilation has already assumed a cosmic dimension. The Second United Nations Disarmament Decade is actually being turned into an armaments decade by the forces of imperialism. A severe judgement on these moves will be pronounced by the international community, for to refuse to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons is to envisage the possibility of being the first to use them. To call for armaments is to call for war; to rattle the sabres in the present state of advancement of military technology and saturation of the globe with lethal weaponry is to gamble with the fate of hundreds of millions of human beings." (A/38/PV.13, p. 11)

It needs no special effort of imagination to appreciate that international security would be particularly compromised and eroded as a result of the future deployment in some West European countries of the new American

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The installation of these destabilizing, first-strike missiles on European soil would lead to a dangerous lowering of the nuclear threshold. It would mean yet another step towards the brink of a nuclear disaster in the continent.

The States of the socialist community, among them Poland, could not remain indifferent in the face of the prospect of such a development of events, just as they are not indifferent to the attempts at revision of the territorial and political realities that have obtained in Europe since the second world war. We have declared on many occasions, and we would like to reaffirm, that a balance of security and the inviolability of the territorial and political status quo in Europe constitute the basic foundations of peace and stability. Their importance has again been strongly emphasized in the joint declaration issued following the recent official visit to Poland of the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker.

Poland and its socialist allies have never believed and do not believe now that it is inevitable that the international situation deteriorate further, that there is no way for the world but to continue on its present nuclear collision course, in Europe or elsewhere. In our considered view there is a viable alternative to the debilitating and wasteful nuclear arms race. The States of the socialist community, Poland included, have elaborated and submitted for serious and constructive consideration a broad-ranging and imaginative programme of peace, contained in the declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty of last January. Subsequently amplified and reaffirmed by the leaders of the seven European States, at a meeting in Moscow last June, and most recently by the Foreign Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, at their meeting in Sofia, that programme should be seen as an outstretched hand, an invitation to the international community, more particularly to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to work in concert for the restoration of détente and peaceful co-operation, for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for meaningful disarmament, against the policy of confrontation and military rivalry.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

These goals, in our view, can be attained provided the political will is mustered by all concerned to remove forthwith the menace of nuclear confrontation in Europe and establish a military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty at the lowest possible level of force. Such political will would best be demonstrated by an agreement not to proceed with the installation of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and providing for a corresponding reduction of the existing systems of such weapons. As proposed to the NATO member States in the Prague Declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, such a pattern of relations in Europe would be cemented with and in a sense ratified by the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, a treaty, which, of course, would also be open to other States.

It should be well understood that if these fair and constructive proposals find no response and if, consequently, the NATO members decide to go ahead with the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, thus upsetting the existing parity of nuclear potentials in Europe, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will be constrained to take appropriate defensive measures and frustrate the attempt to gain military superiority over them. This is not a prospect to be taken lightly.

However, an agreement is still possible. Although it is late, very late, yet it is not too late. As is well known, the Soviet Union has demonstrated considerable flexibility and good will in the Geneva negotiations. It is high time for the other side in these negotiations to display a similarly constructive approach which would help to overcome the impasse arising from its unreasonable and rigid position.

The generally bleak state of international relations notwithstanding, I am glad to say that the picture has not been totally and uniformly dark over the past months. There have been important optimistic developments that give cause for optimism.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

To begin with, the international community has received with satisfaction and interest a number of significant, constructive and forward-looking initiatives submitted by the USSR and other socialist States, which I am confident the General Assembly will not fail to consider with the due care attention they deserve.

Secondly, the recent positive conclusion of the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is telling proof that even in difficult times understanding is possible if the political will exists. Poland attaches particular importance to the agreement on the convening in Stockholm early next year of a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. We believe that, given the good will of the States concerned, the Conference may become an important factor in checking and reversing the negative trend in Europe and throughout the world.

Efforts have also been pursued in such multilateral disarmament forums as the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Unfortunately, as of today they have not yielded the expected results.

As far as the Vienna talks are concerned, we regret the lack so far of a positive Western response to the latest comprehensive proposals advanced by the socialist States in an effort to move the talks off dead centre. Similarly, in Geneva -- where we do not fail to appreciate even the smallest sign of progress, such as, for instance, with regard to the elimination of chemical weapons -- the good will of all the negotiating parties concerned constitutes the primary condition of meaningful progress.

Last, but not least, the important, constructive and sobering voice of the community of non-aligned countries has been raised -- and must be heeded -- on the key issues of peace, international security and disarmament. Poland has traditionally welcomed the co-operation and support of the non-aligned countries in efforts to curtail the nuclear arms race, prevent the danger of nuclear catastrophe and promote nuclear disarmament. The Political Declaration adopted at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, in New Delhi last March, has charted an agenda of disarmament priorities which, in its most important respects, coincides with the programme of peace advanced by the socialist States.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

Emphasizing that "disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue: it is an issue of human survival" (A/38/132, p. 14), the Declaration is correct in stressing that the dangers facing mankind have been greatly aggravated by the ongoing technological arms race, especially in regard to weapons of mass annihilation, which threatens to extend into outer space.

Poland, therefore, looks forward to continued, close co-operation with the group of non-aligned countries in the pursuit of our common disarmament objectives and priorities.

These objectives are many and pressing, as the heavy agenda before this Committee confirms. If anything, it is illustrative of the uncertain outcome of the contest between the arms race, both qualitative and quantitative, on the one hand and the efforts to prevent nuclear conflict and consolidate world peace and security at the lowest, balanced level of military force on the other.

From that perspective, the Polish delegation believes that the most urgent problems facing the current session of the General Assembly are those pertaining to the prevention of nuclear war, in particular: the adoption of a declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war; an immediate freeze of the nuclear weapons of all nuclear-weapon Powers, in the first place, the Soviet Union and the United States; the undertaking of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so; and the finalization of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Furthermore, of fundamental importance would also be: first, the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth; secondly, the elaboration and conclusion at the earliest date of an agreement on the non-increase of military expenditures and on subsequent specific steps with a view to the mutual reduction of military budgets;

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

thirdly, the elaboration without delay of an international convention banning and liquidating chemical weapons; at the same time, it would be useful to take parallel steps leading to that goal within the limits of the European continent; and fourthly, the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which would also be open to other States.

All these proposals have in common one underlying objective: they have been made in an effort to contribute in the most direct way to the scaling down of the nuclear confrontation, to pre-empting the danger of nuclear catastrophe and to promoting genuine disarmament. They go a long way to words meeting the postulates of the international community. Their practical application would be instrumental in alleviating tensions and strengthening international peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

In this context, the Polish delegation welcomes the three new important initiatives submitted to this session of the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, namely, on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth, on the condemnation of nuclear war, and on a nuclear-weapon freeze. Poland extends its full support to these initiatives. My delegation will elaborate in detail on the new Soviet proposals in a separate statement.

In concluding my statement, I should like to reiterate the lasting determination of Poland to continue making a constructive contribution to disarmament efforts. We shall persevere in seeking to broaden areas of understanding and agreement for the benefit of international peace and security and peaceful, equitable co-operation among States.

Mr. STEPHANOU (Greece) (interpretation from French): I have the honour to address the Assembly on behalf of the ten member States of the European Economic Community, of which Greece has assumed the presidency for this half-year. This gives me the opportunity and the privilege of expressing on behalf of the ten countries and on my own behalf, my warmest congratulations to

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

the representative of a friendly country, Norway. We are well aware, Sir, of your long experience in the field of disarmament and arms control your subtle approach to the problems that you will have to be tackling and of your innate shrewdness in tackling the various tasks that have fallen to you.

It is with particular pleasure that we offer our best wishes that your task will be crowned with success and effectively concluded.

Our congratulations also go to the two Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Elfaki Abdalla Elfaki and Mr. Gheorghe Tinca, the representatives of friendly countries, Sudan and Romania respectively. Their professional qualifications, particularly in the sphere of disarmament, have been rightly recognized by this Committee.

Finally, we wish to congratulate the outgoing Chairman of the Committee, Mr. James V. Gbeho, representative of Ghana, a friend whose personal efforts in the settlement of the problems before us have been repeatedly recognized in this forum.

The United Nations Charter is based on the doctrine that the implementation of its system for the maintenance of international peace and security will facilitate the disarmament process. It affirms equally clearly that the preparation and implementation of arms-control measures and disarmament would promote the maintenance of international peace and security. Both those principles remain valid today. We must however recognize that we are still a long way from applying the Charter system.

The increased number of violations of the Charter, military invasions and occupations, faits accomplis, acts of intervention in the internal affairs of States and violations of human rights have darkened the international atmosphere. The all too frequent recourse to the threat or use of force, of which we are all aware, have not only led to a deterioration in the international situation, but also accelerated the arms race.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

Confidence among States has therefore been seriously shaken and the effect of this could be to make the disarmament process more difficult. Furthermore, distrust, fear and prejudice continue to hold sway and the achievement of effective international security has been impeded. States feel compelled to equip themselves with the weapons they need for their security, although this must be based not only on weapons alone but also on agreements which will bring about undiminished security at a reduced level of arsenals.

Moreover, we all know that in a nuclear confrontation no one would be the winner. All our efforts must be directed towards disarmament and with this in mind we are ready to encourage any serious initiative in this connection, while taking into account the complexities and difficulties of the process of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the two super-Powers.

In the field of disarmament statements are not enough. Intentions must be expressed in binding, significant, balanced and verifiable agreements.

In the same context, it should also be recalled that every year an enormous part of the resources of the world is devoted to military ends. These resources could be used to resolve the economic and social problems with which mankind is confronted.

The nuclear threat is one of the most serious challenges before the world today. The international community must not only prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and put an end to the arms race, but also bring about a substantial reduction in the global level of these weapons.

The Ten give their full support to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and to the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which are at present proceeding in Geneva. They sincerely hope that the two nuclear super-Powers will reach agreement in the near future, the objective being to bring about a balance at the lowest possible level.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

All negotiations on disarmament should be aimed at significant and verifiable reductions, and if possible elimination, as well as a more stable balance. In the opinion of the Ten, this is indispensable to the growth of confidence and stability and to ensuring the security of all States. Negotiations which do not serve these ends are in no one's interest.

As regards the complete cessation of nuclear tests, the Ten support the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

The policy of non-proliferation, which has been followed since the 1960s together with the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has generally speaking proved effective. Nevertheless the Ten, aware of the risks of proliferation, would like to see the maintenance and improvement of the international non-proliferation régime. The maintenance of an international non-proliferation régime which is non-discriminatory and credible is a significant element in the disarmament equation, provided there is no violation of the inalienable rights of all States to develop research on the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

The Ten believe that, as specified in the Final Document on the principles and conditions appropriate for the creation of nuclear-free zones, the creation of such zones, as well as zones of peace, should be seriously taken into consideration. They believe that the creation of such zones in certain parts of the world could make an important contribution to disarmament and to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, provided all States concerned are prepared to subscribe to them on the basis of agreements freely entered into and in keeping with internationally recognized principles.

The spectre of nuclear weapons and their terrifying destructive capacity should not mask the concrete and irrefutable danger of so-called conventional weapons. Security should be seen as a whole. A serious imbalance in conventional weapons could be an important obstacle to the control and reduction of nuclear weapons.

While the primary objective should be to prevent war of any kind, in particular nuclear war, and the use of weapons, the Ten feel that no effort should be spared also to reduce the level of conventional forces and to reach a balance at the lowest possible level, while at the same time preserving undiminished security for all States. Europe should occupy a primary place in these efforts.

I should also like to mention the work of the Group of Experts on conventional disarmament. Although the Group has made considerable progress, it has been unable to complete the final report and, consequently, to present it to the General Assembly, as requested in resolution 36/97 A. The Ten fully support the continuation of this important work.

Elsewhere, our Assembly, on a number of occasions, has unanimously stressed the importance it attached to the regional approach to disarmament, which is an essential component of our work on a world-wide level. Once again, I would like to appeal to Governments and the relevant regional institutions, to intensify their consultations in order to agree, within their own framework, on disarmament measures.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

Turning to Europe, those of the Group of Ten who participate in the Vienna negotiations on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces, attach a special importance to this. These countries believe that negotiations, if successful, could pave the way to further important developments in disarmament.

We should not underestimate the concrete problems to be overcome if we are to achieve tangible results in the various negotiations taking place on disarmament. Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the fact that serious differences of opinion prevail on the subject of verification. The ten members of the European community consider that adequate verification should constitute an essential part of agreements on arms control and disarmament. Regardless of the fact that it is indispensable in ensuring effective implementation of agreements, verification plays an important role in the creation of a climate of confidence between the parties which in turn facilitates the conclusion of agreements.

The Ten reaffirmed, furthermore, their interest in the proposal to create an international satellite-monitoring agency, the success of which would make an effective contribution to the verification of disarmament agreements.

The Ten attach major importance to a solution, consistent with General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, of the question of observance of the 1925 Protocol regarding the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons.

Furthermore, it is equally indispensable to reduce tension among States by a series of security and confidence building measures. These efforts, undertaken jointly, would at the same time safeguard undiminished security for all countries.

The Ten attribute special importance to the fact that, for the first time, in the United Nations, there has been a substantive detailed debate on the concept of confidence building measures.

The Ten are convinced that these deliberations in the Committee constitute a significant development to attempts to give this concept concrete expression in the area of disarmament at the global level.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

The future conference in Stockholm on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe, an integral part of the process which was begun by the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 could, in the opinion of the Ten who intend to participate actively there, constitute an opportunity to make concrete progress which, in turn, could lead to realistic progress toward confidence and disarmament.

In keeping with the mandate adopted in Madrid by the thirty-five participants, the first phase of the conference should be devoted to negotiations and to the adoption of new confidence and security building measures which are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and applicable to all of Europe.

The reduction of military expenses would pave the way to a better allocation of resources which have thus far been used for military purposes, and would facilitate economic and social progress, in particular in the developing countries. In this regard, the Ten welcome the General Assembly's acknowledgement of the importance of a unified system of communications and comparability of military expenses. We would welcome the participation in this system of the largest possible number of countries, regardless of the size of their budget. We earnestly hope that a group of countries which thus far have not taken part in this United Nations exercise will do so as soon as possible. This system, furthermore, is the first step in an important work that attempts to make military expenses comparable and transparent. It is therefore an important confidence building measure which could improve the climate for disarmament.

Viewed in a broader perspective, the security of States is not only threatened by the use of military force, but also by economic and social factors. The General Assembly has affirmed that there is a close link between disarmament and development. It is not for lack of proposals by governments or studies by experts that this link has not found concrete expression, but because of an absence of genuine disarmament. Over and above differences regarding approaches to disarmament and security, all countries hope that, in an interdependent world brought about by disarmament measures, increased solidarity will contribute to everyone's security. It is highly desirable, therefore, that anything which might lead to realistic and concrete approaches should be explored.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

Furthermore, the Ten would like to state that, in keeping with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the United Nations has a central role to play in and a primary responsibility for disarmament and its role should be a more active one. The General Assembly should remain the primary deliberative body of the Organization in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. In this context it is our conviction that a dialogue aimed at security and peace for all peoples must be pursued vigorously.

The Ten also wish to stress the importance of co-ordination with other United Nations agencies and institutions. We believe that, while the work of specialized agencies within the United Nations system involves certain aspects of disarmament problems which fall within their specific areas of responsibility, it is desirable that useful action be taken to make better use of available resources in areas in which the United Nations, in particular the Committee on Disarmament, is already working.

The Ten are prepared to encourage any effort by the Chairman of the Committee to improve the work of the First Committee, which, in turn, might have a beneficial influence on the work of the General Assembly.

In spite of the fact that the Disarmament Commission has not yet been able to reach conclusions regarding certain of the items on its agenda, the Ten believes that a realistic assessment of this year's session should not lead to unduly pessimistic conclusions. It seems to us that the work of the Commission has already reached an appropriate level that holds promise for future discussions. We hope that the Commission will to an even greater degree become a deliberative body supporting the actions of the General Assembly and that each year it will submit recommendations of a concrete nature on a limited number of important and specific disarmament subjects.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

The Ten welcome the fact that during its 1983 session the Committee on Disarmament has been able to continue its work as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. The Ten have made a constructive contribution to that work.

The Ten fully support any realistic and substantive effort made in that Committee. However, they regret the fact that the nature and vast number of the tasks that the Committee on Disarmament must carry out are strengthening the general tendency of that Committee gradually to lose its character as a negotiating body and to become a forum for debate. The achievement of the Committee's objectives may thus be made increasingly difficult.

The Ten welcome the fact that in the field of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons some progress has been made, in particular with regard to the scope of the convention and the content of the declarations on the stocks of weapons to be destroyed, thanks in particular to the efforts of the Canadian Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, which have brought about a more efficient organization of work and promoted substantive negotiations.

The more positive approach that prevailed at the last session led to significant results with regard to both the content of declarations on the stocks of weapons to be destroyed and the scope of the convention.

Among the important problems discussed - without any solution so far being reached - was the question of practical modalities for the destruction of stockpiles of and installations for the production of chemical weapons, as well as the control of the production of the essential components of such weapons.

The specific elements of proper verification in these various fields are an essential part of any future agreement. Agreement on them must be based on the dual requirement of effectiveness and pragmatism.

The Ten sincerely hope that from the beginning of its next session the Committee on Disarmament will negotiate resolutely so as to arrive rapidly at the adoption of a draft convention on chemical weapons, the importance of which there is no need to stress.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

With regard to the agenda item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", while noting the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the two super-Powers, the Ten hope that at the next session of the Committee delegations will reach a consensus that, taking into account the diversity of views expressed, will nevertheless make possible serious consideration of the security conditions necessary for avoiding conflict, whether nuclear or conventional. Some countries have already submitted proposals to the Committee during its consideration of the agenda item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war and all related questions".

The Ten also support the creation of an ad hoc working group within the Committee on Disarmament that will make possible the structural and comprehensive consideration of questions concerning the prevention of the arms race in outer space in all its aspects. This is an area in which developments are extremely rapid and where technological progress has made arms control in outer space more and more complex. The danger of an arms race in outer space must be tackled urgently and given serious attention. Thus, it has become necessary to consider the possibility of exercising effective control over such weapons by means of verifiable international measures. The Ten reiterate the importance of the problem of the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

They regret that a mandate for an ad hoc working group within the Committee on Disarmament did not command the necessary consensus, and they hope that agreement can be reached in this connection at the beginning of the 1984 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Compared with these major subjects of negotiations, the importance of which is self-evident, the prohibition of radiological weapons seems less ambitious.

The adoption of the draft convention which the Committee on Disarmament has been considering since its inception indicates that, whatever the international situation, multilateral negotiations are not a dead end. Difficulties remain, however, in reaching agreement. The Ten hope that those difficulties will be overcome and that it will be possible for the Committee on Disarmament to submit an agreed text very soon.

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

Efforts to bring about disarmament confront us with an immense task and responsibility. The problem is so important that the search for solutions should unite, not divide, us.

Mr. FISCHER (Austria): At the outset, Sir, allow me to express the sincere pleasure and satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you in the chair of the First Committee this year. Before the beginning of this session, through your intensive efforts with regard to the question of the organization of work, you had already given us tangible proof of your qualities of leadership. The Austrian delegation looks forward to working under your able guidance. My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee.

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

Austrians live on the dividing line between the two major military alliance systems. In neighbouring countries new weapons are added every day to the already vast arsenals of the opposing camps of East and West. Within a few hundred miles of their territory, hundreds of thousands of soldiers stand ready for the day of an armed conflict - which, if it ever comes, will mean the destruction of the greater part of Europe, in all likelihood including Austria. Austrians are well aware that their security depends on the stability of the relationship between East and West. They are deeply concerned about the present crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union and the unending accumulation of destructive power in their region.

We have often been told that deterrence based on military strength - and, in particular, on nuclear weapons - helps to prevent armed conflict between the major Powers and thereby contributes also to our security. And it is true that the threat of nuclear war has limited the possibilities for military competition of the super-Powers. But developments in past decades make us fear that the system of deterrence might contain within itself the seeds of its destruction. Deterrence, as we know it, involves persistent efforts by the nuclear-weapon States constantly to build up and enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear arsenals. These efforts are explained by the need to ensure an equilibrium but are often indistinguishable from the search for superiority. In the name of deterrence both sides are building faster and more precise nuclear weapons which, by threatening the opponent's second-strike capability, undermine the very assumption on which the system is built. A continuation of these trends would lead to a further weakening of the stability of deterrence and an increasing risk of nuclear war. Winston Churchill had hoped that in the nuclear age peace would be the "sturdy child of terror". Even if this were true, we have to recognize that today there is a second, even sturdier, child - the arms race - and that this child has fratricidal tendencies.

We have also been told that disarmament is a worthy but essentially unrealistic objective, that the size of the arsenals and the level of military forces are a mere function of inter-State conflict and could be affected indirectly only by addressing the underlying political and economic problems. There was a view that to strive for disarmament as long as these problems are unresolved would

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

mean putting the cart before the horse and, consequently, be doomed to failure. This notion has lost much of its credibility in recent years. We had to learn that the arms race is not only the expression of conflict but also creates conflict. At the end of the 1970s the policy of détente declined not least because of the relentless military build-up by some States. Today it is primarily the conflict about intermediate-range forces in Europe which poisons the climate between East and West. Moreover, the present decisions on weapons programmes and the intensification of military research and development efforts prepare the ground for political tension and conflict in future decades. It has become clear that détente and disarmament are inseparable and mutually dependent. The success of disarmament negotiations presupposes a minimum of trust and goodwill and would be facilitated by a return to détente. But détente will endure and facilitate the solution of problems between East and West only if the arms race is brought under control.

Two conclusions follow from those considerations.

First, to rely for one's future security primarily on the continued effectiveness of nuclear deterrence would be shortsighted and dangerous. To hope for a continued military stalemate at ever-higher levels of armaments is not a responsible reaction to the threat of nuclear war. We must transform the balance of terror into a balance of reason. Peace cannot be strengthened by the deployment of still more weapons of mass destruction; rather, it must be sought through dialogue and co-operation, the building of confidence, and the removal of mutual suspicion and fear.

Secondly, arms control and disarmament efforts must not be postponed to a time of a better international climate; rather, they are themselves a key factor in the present world situation. If they fail, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue their rapid downward slide towards ever-worsening tensions and confrontation. If they succeed, this dangerous trend will be arrested and the ground for more stable and co-operative ties between East and West will be prepared. It is therefore irresponsible to play for time in the disarmament process, to tailor one's arms control posture around the requirements of the military build-up, to stall

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ongoing negotiations or to block the opening of new talks for tactical reasons. Today's serious situation demands of the political leadership on both sides that they cut through the morass of hostility and fear, the influence of special interests and outdated concepts of security which have so often frustrated the disarmament efforts. They must overcome these obstacles and, through the conclusion of equitable and substantial disarmament agreements, take the first steps towards a more peaceful and secure world.

Fortunately, concern about the present trend of East-West relations and awareness of the urgency of disarmament are not limited to a few experts as they are shared by millions of people all over the world. Genuine popular movements have emerged, wherever people can freely express themselves, calling for effective measures to strengthen peace and promote disarmament. Austria welcomes those movements and believes that they have a crucial role to play in creating the political will essential for disarmament.

The danger of nuclear war overshadows the future of all mankind. It is therefore the right and duty of everyone and every Government to participate in the struggle against this threat. The final responsibility for halting the nuclear arms race however, remains, with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular with those having the largest arsenals. The ongoing direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva offer the only realistic hope for an early reversal of the present acceleration of the nuclear arms build-up. Attention is now focused on the negotiations on the subject of intermediate-range nuclear forces which have entered an extremely critical stage. Austria is convinced that it should still be possible to bridge the gap between the positions and to work out a compromise formula provided that goodwill and flexibility exist on both sides. We believe that these talks should aim at eliminating, or at least greatly reducing, the existing arsenals of the weapons concerned.

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

Agreement could conceivably be sought in two stages - a first one delineating an overall framework, with a second phase for filling in the details. A breakdown of these negotiations, on the other hand, would be a damaging blow to disarmament efforts, would speed up the arms race and further aggravate an already tense international situation. Austria believes that both parties should commit themselves to continue the dialogue until an agreement is reached. We urgently appeal to them to do everything in their power, both inside and outside the framework of the negotiations, to facilitate a successful conclusion of these talks.

Europe is already today the continent with the greatest concentration of nuclear arms, the region where the risk of an outbreak of nuclear conflict has always been considered particularly high. It is therefore essential that a further nuclear arms build-up in Europe be avoided. This is true not only for the intermediate-range nuclear forces but also for tactical nuclear weapons. Given its precarious geopolitical situation, it is only natural that Austria should view the vast stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons stationed in its vicinity with particular concern. We welcome the recent unilateral decision to withdraw a portion of these warheads from Europe as a positive step, but we still strongly believe that the tactical nuclear arsenals must be included in the arms control process as soon as possible. The objective of negotiations on this subject should be greatly to reduce the stockpiles, to avoid a further blurring of the borderlines between conventional and nuclear warfare, to raise the nuclear threshold and to reduce the dependence on nuclear weapons in the defence postures of the military alliances. Austria follows with interest the discussions about the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe and about the concept of non-first-use. We are well aware, however, that all these proposals have to be considered in the context of the overall balance of military forces in the region.

Austria attaches particular importance to the negotiations on strategic nuclear arms, the central and most powerful elements of the nuclear arsenals. Within the past year we have witnessed a certain narrowing of the gap between the public negotiating positions. We welcome the fact that both sides have committed themselves to seek significant reductions of their strategic arsenals and to respect in the meantime the limitations of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). In spite of these positive developments, we are increasingly worried when comparing the slow rate of progress

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

in those talks with the rapid pace of the development and production of new strategic-weapon systems. We perceive a growing danger that the dynamic forces of the arms race will again overwhelm the negotiating process, that the bargaining chips of today will become the nuclear arsenals of tomorrow and that the arms control efforts will degenerate to a mere codification of the military build-up. Austria believes that this risk will be averted only if the qualitative dimension of the arms race is addressed more vigorously both in the context of the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and in other forums.

The self-propelling momentum of the nuclear-arms race will not be broken so long as the competitive development of weapon technology continues. It is for this reason that Austria sees merit in the freeze proposals which call for an end to the development, testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is for the same reason that we are so deeply frustrated by the persistent lack of progress towards a ban on nuclear testing.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty would inhibit the further qualitative development of nuclear warheads as well as their spread to other States. It constitutes, therefore, a logical first step towards nuclear disarmament and a safer world. For more than 25 years the international community has called for this measure in countless resolutions and declarations. Already 20 years ago both super-Powers pledged themselves in the partial test-ban Treaty to achieve a comprehensive test ban. They reaffirmed their commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Various rounds of intensive negotiations followed each other, clarifying most of the complex technical and scientific aspects of the subject. Since the interruption of the trilateral talks in 1980, the Committee on Disarmament has become the focal point of the work on a test-ban Treaty. It has established a working group on the nuclear-test ban and regularly devotes a major part of its debate to this issue.

Still, in spite of the tremendous efforts expended on this subject, one cannot say today that the outlook for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban is brighter than it was in 1960. On the contrary, one might well say that it has become gloomier because the evolution of the debate, in particular in recent years, has disclosed the fundamental obstacle to progress: the unwillingness of some nuclear-weapon States to relinquish nuclear-test explosions as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of their nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

Austria cannot but express its profound regret at this situation. We strongly believe that the international community must not relent in its efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. It must re-emphasize again and again the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban for nuclear disarmament and for the international political climate. It must maintain the pressure until the Committee on Disarmament is finally enabled to initiate substantial negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In the meantime the States still carrying on with their test programmes should, as a minimum, commit themselves to substantial and lasting reductions of those programmes.

Progress on this issue appears particularly urgent in view of the need to strengthen the international non-proliferation régime, which shows ominous signs of strain and tension. Austria considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the most effective and important barrier against a further spread of nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war rises exponentially with the number of nuclear-weapon States. The great majority of countries have decided that this risk outweighs any potential increment of power that they would gain from a nuclear-weapon capability. By acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty they have made their renunciation of nuclear weapons permanent and legally binding. But the Non-Proliferation Treaty system will remain vulnerable and unstable as long as a number of States with significant nuclear activities - many of them in troubled regions of the world - choose to remain outside it. Austria believes that the forthcoming start of the preparations for the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be an occasion to renew the efforts to achieve universal acceptance of this treaty. These efforts must include steps to assure more predictable and long-term supplies of nuclear material, equipment, technology and fuel cycle services. They must encompass the extension and further development of the safeguards system of the international Atomic Energy Agency. But the most important contribution will have to come from the nuclear-weapon States. I refer to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

Vertical and horizontal proliferation are ultimately two aspects of the same problem. Continuing failure with regard to one of them will finally destroy the fragile achievements with regard to the other.

I have in this statement concentrated on matters relating to nuclear disarmament. The Austrian delegation will, in further contributions to our debate, present its views on other items on the agenda.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): I should like first of all to express to you, Sir, the sincere congratulation of the Romanian delegation on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee and our confidence that under your guidance the Committee's work will lead to positive results, in accordance with the ardent desire of the peoples of the world to stop the aberrant escalation of weapons and promptly get down to real disarmament measures, particularly in the nuclear sphere. I should also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee and wish them full success in the performance of the responsible tasks with which they have been entrusted.

The Committee's work is taking place in most difficult international circumstances. The world economic and political situation is in a state of unprecedented tension. International peace and security, the sovereignty and independence of many nations and indeed life itself on earth are seriously threatened. At every moment there is the possibility that a random accident might lead to the annihilation of mankind by nuclear means.

The daily course of events shows very clearly to those who are willing to face reality clearly that the deterioration of the international situation, the heightened tension among States, the danger of war, the state of profound distrust and uncertainty and the deepening of the world economic crisis are engendered above all by the intensification of the arms race and particularly the nuclear arms race.

The recently concluded general debate in the Assembly, in which a large number of Heads of State or Government and Foreign Ministers took part, the political statements of parliamentarians and many prominent political figures, mass media of the most diverse persuasions, and analyses contained in specialized political literature highlight the axiomatic truth that the basic problem of our era is to prevent war and safeguard peace, to stop the arms race and

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

proceed to disarmament, particularly in the nuclear sphere, and to attain a military balance not by building up stocks of new weapons but by reducing the levels of existing ones. Millions of people of all ages, regardless of their political, philosophical or religious convictions, are uniting resolutely to reject nuclear weapons and to put a brake on the escalation of armaments.

The nerve centre of the tension, the military competition - primarily nuclear - and the danger of the outbreak of a new world war is undoubtedly in Europe. It is there that there is the most massive concentration of weapons, including nuclear weapons; it is there that the two military blocs, which came into being, as everyone knows, during the cold-war period, stand face to face, giving rise to distrust and confrontation; and it is there in particular that the horizon is gravely darkened by the accumulation of nuclear weapons.

At present, the crucial problem for Europe - and by virtue of its dimensions and consequences for the whole world - is the danger posed by the deployment, from this year, of new intermediate-range missiles. This will lead, perhaps irreversibly, to a new spiral of the arms race and accentuate the danger of a nuclear conflagration, thus endangering the very existence of the European peoples and at the same time of the whole of human civilization.

This first statement by the Romanian delegation will be devoted to the gravity of this problem and its profoundly negative implications for world peace and security.

The keen concern that this problem generates everywhere, even if based on different approaches, compels us to seek and find common solutions, the result of the combined efforts of all States, and to take into account the security interests of all peoples, both in Europe and in other parts of the world.

We particularly emphasize this aspect, because it is our firm conviction that the conclusion as soon as possible of an agreement on nuclear weapons in Europe, leading to the halting of the deployment of new nuclear missiles and the reduction of those that already exist would have a decisive impact on the improvement of the international political climate. Moreover, such an agreement would make an important and invaluable contribution to the enhancement of trust and the reduction of tension and confrontation in other

parts of the world and would be the starting-point for the implementation of more complete agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on disarmament.

Romania has from the outset welcomed the Soviet-American negotiations on intermediate-range Euromissiles and those on strategic weapons, as it believes that they could lead to a decrease in the danger of war and a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons.

We regret that so far, for a variety of reasons, those negotiations have failed to yield positive results and we wholly endorse the feeling of disquiet expressed by the Secretary-General in his report and by a large number of Member States about the prospect of the failure of those negotiations. We also agree with him that if those negotiations fail the problem of intermediate-range missiles "may reach a critical stage" (A/38/L, p.5).

Indeed, the Secretary-General points out that

"If they should fail, we may be faced with another significant escalation in the spiralling arms competition. A development of this kind would inevitably add to the world's burden of insecurity and instability."
(ibid)

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The prevention of such a disastrous situation, with its grave consequences for the countries of Europe and for the whole of mankind, is the reason for the firm position of Romania and the recent initiatives of its President, Nicolae Ceausescu, concerning negotiations on nuclear forces in Europe. My country's proposals in this connection are contained in the messages addressed by President Nicolae Ceausescu to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Yuri Andropov, and to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, which were distributed as General Assembly documents under the symbol A/38/375 and were introduced at length in the general debate by the Romanian Foreign Minister. Those proposals are based on the judgement that, by means of new efforts, by negotiations carried out in a spirit of co-operation and responsibility on both sides, it should still be possible to reach an appropriate agreement capable of guaranteeing the cessation of the deployment of new missiles in Europe and the reduction of those which are already there.

Romania has proposed that if the negotiations fail to yield positive results by the end of the year agreement should be reached that the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles should be postponed at least until the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985 and that negotiations should continue. During that period the Soviet Union would give guarantees, in the terms of its earlier declarations, that it would stop the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles and their modernization, and would unilaterally remove a part of the missiles situated in the European zone of Soviet territory. The Romanian President proposed that, should an agreement not be reached on those proposals, consideration at least be given to the possibility of not deploying medium-range missiles on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic and other States, as an intermediate measure pending final agreement in the Geneva negotiations.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

These, of course, are the proposals of Romania and they reflect my country's views on the action that could be taken to avert the danger of a new twist in the arms spiral that is hanging over the continent of Europe. We would be the first to welcome proposals from any State aimed at achieving the same common, vital objectives. We have always felt that constructive proposals, a dialogue on them and a common desire for accommodation must replace the state of distrust and suspicion and the absence of genuine dialogue.

As the President of Romania has recently stated, in the present conditions there is no justification for accepting the deployment of new nuclear missiles as a fait accompli. Those States and Governments which disregard the imperative need to do the utmost while it is still possible in order to achieve an agreement to prevent such a grave act bear heavy responsibilities towards their own people and towards the whole world. The rejection of a fait accompli is all the more imperatively necessary in that, together with the countless voices expressing concern and alarm at the course of events, it is also possible to hear voices suggesting that we should simply resign ourselves to the failure of the Geneva talks. In this situation the United Nations must speak up. It is consequently particularly important and urgently necessary for the General Assembly to state its position resolutely, so that the negotiations may be continued and intensified and may lead as soon as possible to the results hoped for by all the States and peoples of the world.

Proceeding from those fundamental considerations and bearing in mind the gravity of the danger were the Geneva negotiations to fail, the Romanian delegation proposes that the General Assembly adopt an appropriate resolution. According to the draft text established after consultation with other delegations, the resolution would contain an appeal to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to continue for as long as necessary, on the basis of mutually acceptable proposals, their Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles until they reach positive results in

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

keeping with the principle of equality and equal security and the security interests of all countries. The Governments of the two countries would also be called upon to show moderation and to do nothing which might make the course of the negotiations more difficult or prevent their successful conclusion.

Moreover, it is of great importance that the two Powers should adopt the unilateral measures that they feel appropriate in order to strengthen mutual trust and prevent the build-up of armaments in Europe, thus facilitating the process of implementation of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The Romanian delegation will shortly present such a draft resolution.

Given the urgency and the seriousness of the problem which the draft resolution will deal with, we feel that it is perfectly justified that its consideration and adoption should take place during the first part of the Committee's work and at the earliest possible date. In our opinion, the adoption of those proposals would prove the common denominator of our capacity for action at this crucial time, while expressing the determination of Member States to enable the United Nations to prove equal to the tasks with which it has been entrusted in the maintenance of international peace and security. As we see it, it is more necessary than ever before, in the complex, difficult circumstances of the present international situation, to act with the highest sense of responsibility and to do nothing which might aggravate tension in Europe and throughout the world. On the other hand, it is necessary to show political wisdom and a desire for co-operation, and to intensify constructive efforts and actions, for the sake of the general cause of international peace and security. We feel that the appeal by the General Assembly which the Romanian delegation has the honour to propose on a problem of extreme importance and urgency - the problem of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe - would constitute such a particularly constructive action at the present time.

Mr. PAVANARIT (Thailand): It gives me much pleasure indeed to extend to you, on behalf of myself and the Thai delegation, my warm congratulations on your election to the post of Chairman of this important Committee. With the benefit of your knowledge and vast experience, we are certain to have effective and fruitful discussions. The Thai delegation pledges to you and to the officers of the Committee its full co-operation throughout the session.

There can be no doubt how crucial the 25 agenda items on disarmament before our Committee are. The themes of most statements made by representatives during the general debate in the General Assembly reflected their concern on such important matters as the disproportionate spending of the world's resources on armaments, the extension of the arms race into the deep sea and outer space, as well as the deterioration in the international situation.

In this connection, it may be opportune for my delegation to submit the following observations.

Despite the efforts of the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, it is regrettable to note that nuclear-weapon tests were still conducted in various parts of the world during the past year. The continuation of these tests breeds nothing but the threat of international tension, the acceleration of the nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear war. The present partial test-ban Treaty, which was signed and entered into force nearly two decades ago, has proved to be insufficient and a more effective and thorough instrument is needed in order to restrict the behaviour of nuclear States. In this connection, my delegation is in favour of an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty which will, hopefully, place constraints on the improvement of existing nuclear weapons. We are pleased to learn that some progress on this matter was achieved during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation, in this regard, would like to commend that Committee and its working group for their work. The draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban submitted to the Committee by Sweden is an admirable contribution to our efforts. We hope that such

(Mr. Pavanarit, Thailand)

a step will eventually lead to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty which is acceptable to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The Thai delegation would like to call on all nuclear States to participate fully and constructively contribute to the realization of such a treaty. For without their participation there can be no genuine success in the endeavours to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests.

Concerning the prevention of nuclear proliferation, my delegation believes it would be useful to hold the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985. This is to evaluate the implementation of the Treaty and to find ways and means to improve and strengthen non-proliferation régimes with the final goal of achieving universal accession to the Treaty. My delegation therefore supports the establishment of the preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference at this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is designed to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States should actively seek agreement on arms control and disarmament and the non-nuclear-weapon States, at the same time, should refrain from developing or acquiring such weapons on the understanding that their use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was fully assured. My delegation is of the view that the prevention of nuclear proliferation through nuclear arms control, the promotion of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We would therefore like to urge the nuclear weapon States, which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to exert their best possible efforts to achieve concrete and realistic measures for tangible nuclear disarmament. My delegation would also like to call upon all non-nuclear-weapon States to place their nuclear energy facilities and installations under the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In so doing, they would demonstrate their utmost constructive spirit of co-operation in creating an atmosphere of good will and mutual trust.

(Mr. Pavanarit, Thailand)

The repeated reports of the alleged uses of chemical weapons, particularly in South-East Asia, represent a challenge to the efforts of the international community to arrive at the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons before the arms race in this field gathers further momentum.

My delegation is pleased to note that during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the contact groups of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons were working very actively on several difficult problems. There appears to be no objection to having some provisions in the new convention relating to effective international verification measures. My delegation believes that while national verification can simplify the task, it alone is not sufficient and could never replace verification measures of international scope. Rather, a systematic international inspection, which provides measures of on-site inspection under international auspices would facilitate the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

My delegation would like to urge the Committee on Disarmament to work out, as a matter of highest priority, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction in which the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be ratified. We sincerely hope that co-operation will be forthcoming from all countries concerned so as to enable the contact groups of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to finalize several unresolved issues.

With regard to the investigation of the alleged uses of chemical weapons, my delegation wishes to reaffirm the position of the Royal Thai Government in providing full co-operation and assistance to the United Nations and any other interested government in their investigation of activities which may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law under resolution 37/98 D. Thailand has already done so with experts of the United Nations under resolutions 35/114 C and 37/96 C.

(Mr. Pavanarit, Thailand)

Furthermore, my delegation supports an early convening of a special conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction signed in 1972. We hope that a procedure to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention can be established.

My delegation strongly believes that the establishment of a zone of peace would bring security and stability to the countries concerned and would facilitate economic co-operation which would consequently contribute to the prosperity of the region. My delegation would therefore like to register our support of the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean. We hope that the divergent views in the Ad Hoc Committee can be narrowed so that the conference will be convened in a timely manner.

My delegation, as well as all other members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are well aware of the deteriorating situations in various parts of the world which threaten international peace and security. We believe that the establishment of a regional zone of peace can contribute to arresting this precarious trend. This is why the ASEAN members have since 1971 been calling for the establishment of a zone of peace; freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. Thailand and other ASEAN countries would like to reaffirm our commitment to the concept and pledge to continue to work for the early realization of such a zone. Such an effort, we believe, will contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the region. In this connection, my delegation is pleased to note that during the plenary session of the Committee on Disarmament on 30 August 1983, a text on the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia was unanimously adopted. Please allow me to quote the section in the Committee's report on the matter which reads as follows:

(Mr. Pavanarit, Thailand)

"Steps should be taken by the states of the region towards the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, taking into account the need for ensuring stability and for enhancing prospects for co-operation and development in the region."

To this end, my delegation would like to invite all Members of the United Nations to join in our efforts as a step towards the ultimate goal of global peace and security.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.



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FIRST COMMITTEE
5th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 18 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

OCT 24 1983

Statements were made by:

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Mr. Gauci (Malta)
Mr. Murin (Czechoslovakia)
Mr. Qian Jiadong (China)
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Mr. Gbeho (Ghana)

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20 October 1983
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. TSVETKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I wish first, Sir, to congratulate you on your election to the responsible post of Chairman of the First Committee for the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I am convinced that your rich political experience and your diplomatic ability will contribute to the success of the Committee's work. I congratulate also the other officers of the Committee.

During the general debate which has just ended in the Assembly the States Members of the United Nations expressed their deep concern about the situation which has been created in the world during the past two or three years. Indeed, mankind is going through an extremely alarming period. A new and particularly dangerous spiral has begun in the arms race. It affects all types of weapons and military activities on a global scale extending even into outer space. The shadow of war looms over the world.

As is mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General, military expenditures are constantly increasing and have reached astronomic figures. The arsenals of deadly weapons are growing, even though they have long been powerful enough to annihilate all life on our planet. Approximately 50,000 nuclear devices have already been stockpiled. New means of mass destruction - such as laser and radiation weapons - radiological, chemical, biological and neutron weapons - are being developed at an accelerating pace. Given the constantly growing tension we are witnessing at present, a single spark would be sufficient to hurl mankind into a cataclysm unprecedented in human history.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

This dangerous situation is not the result of some fortuitous element or fatal chance. It is the result of a clearly determined policy of aggressive imperialist factions of the United States and of NATO which are continuing to step up the arms race and stubbornly aspiring to strategic superiority on a world-wide scale, so as to be able to impose their domination upon other peoples and countries. The increasingly adventurist concepts and doctrines elaborated by these factions demonstrate that in order to achieve their purpose they are openly admitting the possibility of conducting a nuclear war. The character of the military and political situation in the world, the existence of unimaginable means of destruction, the fatal turn that could be taken at any given moment by developments in international affairs - these are what make the preservation of peace a vital necessity for all peoples and countries. In the struggle for the survival of mankind it is impossible to be neutral. This struggle is a duty for every Government, for each State and for every people.

At this critical moment the socialist countries, aware of their responsibility, are demonstrating by their action their approach of principle to the key problems of the difficult times in which we are living. In recent months they have adopted documents concerning important initiatives designed to improve the political climate and halt the arms race.

The Prague and Moscow declarations, respectively of January and of June 1983, have again forcefully drawn the attention of the world public to the danger of nuclear catastrophe and have brought about wide discussion on ways of preventing such a catastrophe.

The profound and sincere concern of the socialist countries about the fate of peace found new expression during the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty which was held in Sofia on 13 and 14 October. At this meeting a profound analysis was conducted of the present situation throughout the world as well as of the nature and the sources of the military danger.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

The need to prevent sudden aggravation of the situation of nuclear confrontation in Europe and to look for ways to eliminate the ever-increasing threat of a world-wide nuclear conflict were the focal point of the attention of those participating in the meeting. Thus, in the communiqué published following the Sofia meeting, it is stated that

"the participants in the meeting expressed their Governments' alarm and concern in connection with the fact that the situation has become even more tense and dangerous.

"Further steps are being taken to whip up the arms race, steps which are increasing the threat of nuclear catastrophe. As was pointed out in the joint statement issued in Moscow, the United States and some of its allies do not themselves conceal that their actions pursue the aim of gaining military superiority.

"The imperialist policy of resorting to force and diktat, consolidating and redistributing spheres of influence, and making direct use of military power against States and peoples is being toughened even further. Old military conflicts are being rekindled and new seats of tension are being cultivated. Actions are being carried out to further heighten political confrontation and attempts at external interference in the internal affairs of States are being stepped up. The position of the military-industrial complex of the most reactionary militarist forces are being strengthened, and a military psychosis is being fomented.

"Statements are made whose aim is to call into question the territorial and political results of the Second World War and post-war developments. More obstacles are erected to the attainment of agreements on pressing international issues and to the development of equitable economic relations free of any discriminatory restrictions. The gap in the economic development of States is being widened and the economic position of developing States is being worsened."

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

In thus describing the international situation, the participants in the meeting emphasize that if a new escalation of the arms race in Europe is not prevented it will inexorably lead to a sudden exacerbation of the situation in the European continent and throughout the world. They stress the exceptional danger flowing from the intention to proceed in the near future to the deployment in certain Western European countries members of NATO of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the practical preparations for which are already under way.

In order to reverse this dangerous trend of events, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have come out firmly in favour of the conclusion as soon as possible of a mutually acceptable agreement in the negotiations on this question, which have already entered a decisive phase. In this connection, the Sofia communiqué states the following:

"Confirming their position on the substance of the matter, which was set forth in the joint statement adopted at the Moscow meeting on 28 June 1983, they believe that such an agreement should provide for the renunciation of the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and for a corresponding reduction of the existing medium-range nuclear systems, with the reduced missiles to be scrapped, as has been proposed by the Soviet Union. The agreement on medium-range nuclear systems in Europe should be based on the principle of equality and equal security and should make for the stability of the strategic military situation and the balance of forces. This balance should rest, not on the build-up of nuclear arms, but on their reduction to ever lower levels."

In the meeting document we can clearly see the constructive position of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which are proposing that the maximum use should be made of every opportunity to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. In the same communiqué it is emphasized in this connection that

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

"The participants in the meeting expressed the conviction that there is still a possibility of achieving agreement in the Geneva talks that meets the interests of the peoples. In this connection they pointed out that if agreement is not reached in the talks by the year's end, it is essential that the talks should be continued with a view to reaching it, on condition of the renunciation by the United States and its NATO allies of their schedule for the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles. Attention was called to the fact that the Soviet Union's readiness in these conditions to continue to maintain its unilateral freeze on the medium-range missile systems deployed in the European part of its territory and carry out the unilateral reduction of such systems, which was started at the same time as the introduction of the freeze, is an important contribution to creating the prerequisites for the successful completion of the talks."

Taking into consideration the exceptional importance of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear confrontation in the European continent, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty appeal urgently to the member States of NATO to concentrate all their efforts in order to exclude the possibility of the deployment of new medium-range missiles in Europe and to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear systems already in that continent. They also urge the other European States to do all they can to help prevent this danger and to contribute actively to the success of the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

In the communiqué the socialist countries remind their Western partners that the interests of peace and security in Europe demand, above all, the maintenance of the existing balance. They say:

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

"The Ministers confirmed once again that their States have never striven and are not striving for military superiority for themselves, and recalled the statement of 28 June 1983 by the States participating in the Moscow meeting that they will never permit military superiority over themselves. The Governments of NATO countries would be making a serious mistake if they underestimated the significance of that statement of the socialist countries and refused to give a positive answer to their call to promote the strengthening of peace and security on the basis of a balance of forces and at ever lower levels of armaments."

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

If one studies carefully the whole range of initiatives of the socialist countries contained in the document I have just mentioned it is clear that together with considerations regarding medium-range weapons that document contains a broad range of timely measures designed to halt the arms race that is threatening to escape human control. The People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that all those measures are urgently and imperatively necessary.

In this connection we should mention, inter alia, the extremely relevant proposal that the nuclear Powers should commit themselves, if they have not already done so, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; the idea of a freeze, both quantitative and qualitative, on nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States and, in the first instance, the United States and the USSR; the proposal for a general and complete prohibition of all test explosions of nuclear weapons; the initiative designed to prevent the militarization of outer space and the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth and the initiative aimed at eliminating chemical weapons in Europe as a first step towards their complete prohibition and eradication.

The Soviet Union has submitted to the present session of the United Nations General Assembly three new initiatives, with which the Committee is already familiar. In the view of the Bulgarian delegation, those proposals are fully in keeping with the urgent need to strengthen peace and security now and they deserve attentive examination and support from the world Organization.

The communiqué of the Sofia meeting includes an appeal to the States members of the two principal military-political groups to reach an agreement on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Participants in the Sofia meeting once again proposed the conclusion of a treaty open to all the countries of the world on the mutual non-use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

My delegation has already had occasion to express its views on the capital importance of that proposal. Nevertheless, I should like to emphasize once again that the conclusion of such a treaty, together with the mutual renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, would have particularly beneficial effects on overall stability in Europe and would establish a solid basis for progress in the field of disarmament. What is more, it would be a starting-point for overcoming the division of the continent into two opposing military groups.

By their very nature such initiatives respond to the interests of the whole of the international community. Unfortunately, there has still been no adequate response from those to whom they are addressed.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, faithful to its socialist foreign policy of peace, fully appreciates the idea of creating zones of peace and nuclear-free zones in various regions of Europe and of the world in general where this would be in the interest of strengthening international security. Located in the Balkan Peninsula, which from the geographic point of view is at the crossroads of three continents, we are vitally interested in transforming our region into a nuclear-free zone. Furthermore, we are very conscious of the importance of establishing a situation of peace and lasting co-operation throughout the Mediterranean as a whole.

I should like to reaffirm the importance Bulgaria attaches to the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as its interest in the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of a convention on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

In view of the destabilizing effect of the use of military vessels in various parts of the world -- particularly in the pursuit of the well-known gunboat diplomacy -- it is extremely important to limit the activities of military vessels, to reduce naval armaments and to extend confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans. This would contribute to reducing the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war, in which, as everyone knows, fleets would play a particularly important role.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

There is an objective basis for achieving agreement on many of the problems to which I have just referred, especially since in the majority of institutions machinery and multilateral and bilateral forums have already been created for negotiations on these questions.

My country, like the other socialist countries, has always been in favour of wide ranging, fruitful consultation with all countries with regard to disarmament. It has always welcomed and shown keen interest in any idea, whatever its source, designed to contribute to progress in this vital area.

It is imperative that those who bear responsibility for the destiny of peoples in our nuclear age heed their voices and take into account their aspirations. At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi, it was clearly stated that the policy of confrontation and the arms race is contrary to the national interests of the peoples. The arms race is encountering opposition from the biggest peace movement since the Second World War. Politicians, men of the arts and culture, members of the clergy, representatives of every level of society, millions of human beings, are rising up against the nuclear threat. It would be a fatal illusion to think that mankind could live for ever on top of nuclear powder-kegs.

In conclusion, I should like once again to assure you, Mr. Chairman, and the representatives present, that my country will continue to work, within the limits of its possibilities, both within the United Nations and in other international forums, for the fulfilment of the most important task mankind has ever faced - that of removing the threat of self-destruction and eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

Mr. GAUCI (Malta): In the interest of progress, I for one promise not to repeat our own previously stated positions, contenting myself with a brief but definite reaffirmation. I shall also strive to search for consensus on each of the issues before us. It seems evident to me that this is our wisest course, and I am convinced that you, Mr. Chairman, will do your best to inspire us all to achieve positive results. Your realistic opening address was a clarion call commanding respect. No man can do more and, therefore, I congratulate you and the other officers of the Committee on your election.

Permit me first a general observation expressive of the concern we all must surely feel. Today I am reminded of the sobering truism expressed with charming simplicity by Alfred, Lord Tennyson, in his poem "The Brook": "For men may come and men may go, But I go on forever." If we apply that to our disarmament debate, we uneasily feel the analogy, that "sessions may come and sessions may go, but the arms race goes on forever".

There is a significant difference, of course. The brook, a thing of beauty, rightly goes on, and therefore remains a joy for ever. But the arms race, especially its nuclear dimension, has become monstrously repugnant. It is an insult to man's intelligence, and, if it goes on, will cease only after it has destroyed the world, thus depriving itself of the sinews that have sustained it so far.

Apart from this reminder, and as promised, I shall refrain from repeating the familiar refrain of our previously stated positions on specific disarmament items, but will instead today raise two different aspects of the disarmament debate which, it seems to me, have not yet received the concentrated attention that they deserve, despite their fundamental importance. Both aspects derive from the same single incident.

The recent tragic shooting down of a civilian airliner, which has caused such a severe setback in international relations, nevertheless provides an opportunity for us to analyse objectively and - to the extent possible - dispassionately two important factors essential for informed public debate on current developments in this present dangerous phase of the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Gauci Malta)

The first point that clearly emerges is the susceptibility of communications systems to error, even when there is no undue stress. Errors can, of course, be caused by several factors, either singly or in combination, each of which could lead to unintended tragedy and, in the nuclear age to unprecedented catastrophe.

The President of the United States was among the first to recognize this when he remarked:

An act of this kind reveals how easily there could be an accidental start to conflict.

No doubt the same sentiments may have been expressed or pondered over by many different national leaders. It should certainly encourage us to probe this important aspect in greater depth.

Before entering into specific details, I must in all candour observe, in the first place, that on the basis of the law of probability this danger must have been as evident a decade ago as it has been demonstrated to be real today. Yet over the same decade, realization of this danger did not prevent the further deployment and amassing of nuclear weaponry whose cumulative destructive power can be measured only by the number of times it could destroy all life on this planet. This build up by both sides took place even though then as now a sufficient plateau of nuclear deterrent power had already been reached, in relative parity, by the two major military alliances.

Nor, unfortunately, in the second place, can I fail to observe that, as usual, even while we debate here, this realization has not prevented new authorizations of billions of dollars for enhanced nuclear weapon deployment. Therefore we are not only on the verge of repeating the same mistakes but, worse, these new deployments are having incalculable long-term and short-term repercussions even on the basic premises on which the theory of deterrence is founded, to the extent that the very future of arms control negotiations is in jeopardy.

Almost as if what is now deployed is not already known to be overabundant, these new weapons systems even envisage the use of outer space for military purposes and, additionally, provide for a vast increase in chemical weapons procurement.

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

Let me recall here that, macabre as are the total number of deaths and the ratio of civilian to military deaths in the case of nuclear weapons, they are even higher in the case of chemical weapons. Instead of increasing national security, these new weapons and systems are further exacerbating global insecurity.

Once again, it was the President of the United States, in his address to the General Assembly last month, who rightly reminded us that "people do not make wars, Governments do" (A/38/PV.5 p. 5). But people all over the world are now coming back into the picture. If debate on the nuclear arms race has not hitherto featured as a major issue of national concern in all countries today it has become an issue of overriding importance. It is therefore all the more essential that the encouraging current public outcry at the folly and danger of the nuclear arms race should benefit from a full disclosure of the present dangers so vividly brought to our attention by the latest incident. What is even more important, of course, is that the lesson should be heeded by all Governments.

The people of all nations are now worrying over what their leaders are doing. Certainly, no person anywhere in the world can be indifferent to what is happening today. The more the debate is opened up the more the revulsion spreads the greater the cumulative resistance to the spiralling expenditure recklessly and dangerously devoted to massive destruction, to the detriment of the satisfaction of pressing social needs. This revulsion and consequent protest know no national boundaries. The present situation has never been worse, it calls for emergency action.

It has clearly become timely to examine, albeit briefly, at least some of the considerations which determine the real capability of civilian leaders to exercise control over their nuclear forces through the appropriate military command and control channels - as we are told they all do. Further, we could consider their ability to make well-informed, prudent judgements based on available information not in normal circumstances but under conditions of great stress and within severe time constraints. This aspect has certainly not received the consideration that it merits.

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

In this examination and to put matters in simple perspective, it is a sobering reflection that in the last quarter-century the warning time from launch to target has declined from approximately 10 hours in the case of an aerial bomber to 30 minutes for an intercontinental ballistic missile, and down further to 15 minutes for a submarine-launched ballistic missile. With the Pershing 2 missile, and under the dangerous doctrine of "launch on warning", it will drop to around seven or eight minutes.

How much further can we go? The shorter the interval, the greater the chance of genuine error, let alone of deliberate misinformation. And yet it seems to me that, unfortunately, none of the spate of current proposals -- submitted, of course, with extraordinary fanfare in attempts to assuage an alarmed public opinion -- seems to address this potentially fatal weakness.

Let us then consider some of the principal elements involved. It is known that maintaining command and control over extremely sophisticated weapons has always presented a problem to the military alliances, because very quick and decisive military responsiveness is needed as a fundamental prerequisite for such a system.

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

On the basis of the evidence available and from actual experience, we can speculate on what might have been the outcome if a command and control system had encountered an off-course military missile rather than a civilian airliner. And then the crucial question arises: would there have been time for the political leadership to assume responsibility for control of any considered retaliatory military action, under the extreme pressure of the speed differential between the forthcoming generation of missiles and the conventional civilian passenger aircraft?

Unfortunately, once the system did not work in the case of the civilian aircraft, it is - to put it mildly - difficult to have absolute confidence that it will work in the case of a nuclear dilemma.

It is true, of course, that we can only speculate and that none of us has a certain answer, although perhaps some are better informed than others in considering this question. It is perhaps little consolation to observe that none of us in any case knows how we ourselves would react if a situation were to get out of hand.

But most certainly it is a chilling aspect of the present stage of the nuclear-arms race to consider how potential human error or human error based on a machine malfunction could accidentally lead to nuclear war.

It need hardly be stressed that preventing a nuclear exchange or controlling one that has unfortunately started is among the most difficult and complex operations that a Government can undertake, and yet at the same time it is an operation which, by the very notion of deterrence, cannot be tried out in practice and is one in which the possibilities for rapid improvisation are minimal, and yet it is an operation in which the slightest breach of discipline, departure, from set procedure or human error would be disastrous for all mankind.

We all know one important lesson derived from past conflicts and crises: command and control systems never perform in practice the way they are designed to do according to military specialists, and even less according to manufacturers' manuals. It is also known that communications systems and procedures often fail, frequently at the most crucial moment, simply because of human error or fatigue

This aspect is complex and highly technical, so perhaps the Committee will permit me to give some practical examples, though by no means a complete list.

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

It will be appreciated that reliable information is highly sensitive and therefore difficult to come by but, even in those countries where such information is allowed to come under public scrutiny, it becomes available only after a lapse of some years, and this will explain why available information is somewhat dated.

There are indications, for instance, that between October 1967 and April 1969 one super-Power lost two ships, and an aircraft loaded with the most sophisticated communications equipment, during incidents in which general problems of communications as a mechanical operation and of command and control as a human operation were readily apparent.

On 8 June 1967 a communications post and signal intelligence ship, on a delicate assignment in the midst of hostilities, was attacked and sunk by aircraft of a country friendly to the super-Power owning the intelligence vessel.

Three urgent messages from headquarters instructing the ship to abandon station apparently were never received, despite the fact that they were of the highest priority and employed the most sophisticated equipment available at that time. That incident, once again, took place in a conventional situation, 16 years ago.

It goes without saying that the possibilities of human error are greatly compounded in today's nuclear environment as compared to the more conventional situations of the past.

Missile launch control officers must have the discretion to determine whether a launch command is genuine. Furthermore, a simple human mistake of entering an erroneous digit into a launch control computer - quite possible under the extreme duress and the tense psychological conditions endemic to a potential nuclear exchange - could escalate a catastrophe to even broader dimensions. It could, for instance, spell the difference between retaliation against an intended target - perhaps an intercontinental ballistic missile silo or a remote oil refinery - and one directed against the wrong target, such as a heavily populated civilian centre.

In this connection it is pertinent to observe that the most likely explanation of the cause of the unfortunate change in direction of the civilian airliner was in fact a wrong entry punched into its navigational guide which in-built

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

computerized systems failed to check and rectify in time. In this particular instance, moreover, there appeared to be no major stress either of time, events or weather conditions; and yet the unpredictable happened with calamitous results to innocent civilians.

Today's policy-maker has to depend upon a vast array of machines to supply him with necessary information. The more machines and the more electronic links between the policy-maker and the firing mechanism on the nuclear weapon, the greater the likelihood that something, somewhere along the process, could go wrong.

As an indication of the complexity of the command and control systems, it might be sufficient to mention that the fundamental core of one such system consists of approximately 35 computers at 26 command posts, necessitating 43 separate communications systems. This in turn governs some 600 facilities consisting of more than 30 million miles of electrical wiring and connects five aerial satellites to more than 100 satellite ground-receiving terminals.

In a simulated exercise on this system, which attempted 124 times to obtain or to send information through the computer network, 54 failures occurred as a result of abnormal shutdowns of the computers -- an almost 48 per cent failure rate. Another system tried 295 times with 122 failures, while a third had only 19 successes out of 63 attempts. In yet another test, a major system could receive and send information only 43 times in 290 attempts. Overall, the computers tested worked only 38 per cent of the time. It is on this uncertain accuracy factor that the so-called stability of modern nuclear calculations are based.

One more technical example might suffice. Each missile launch control capsule has what is referred to as a user terminal element. Demands on one system in 1976 included more than 171,000 electronic displays, both printed and wall screen, per month, or about 5,700 daily. Computer-to-computer traffic averaged more than 1.87 million messages per month, more than 62,000 daily. That translates into more than 2,500 per hour. Highly trained personnel were involved in the input or output of 850,000 messages per month, or 28,000 daily, nearly 1,800 per hour.

It is not difficult to imagine a malfunction occurring in this computerized communication system or that bewildered operators might become bemused with so many messages being transmitted that they fail to act when they should or act on erroneous data when they should not.

Moreover, there is now additional concern that computer systems, previously held to be virtually impregnable, are susceptible to tampering and espionage. Even the closely guarded secrets of Swiss bank accounts have apparently been breached. A recent study has surprised experts by revealing that computer scientists who tried to break into sensitive computers succeeded on every single occasion. The New York Times of 14 October reported that even teenagers managed to gain unauthorized intrusion into sensitive systems.

These systems are of course supplemented by others, but they too are not immune to human or mechanical error. The whole world has recently seen evidence of the fragility of an advanced conventional system under peacetime conditions. We simply have no certainty of how even more complex systems would work in a conflict situation under very short notice, possible bad weather, deliberate electronic jamming, changes in the earth's magnetic field and other powerful complicating factors.

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

The only conclusion we can reach is that there is no certainty in uncertainty. And yet uncertainty seems to be one unintended characteristic of communications, on which a tenuous world peace at present rests. As Shakespeare's Prospero might have exclaimed in a modern-day version of "The Tempest": "These are such stuff as nightmares are made on."

In all fairness it should be added that in order partly to remedy these shortcomings much expenditure and much thought have been given recently to improved and continuous communications links between the two super-Powers.

These clearly are necessary to make possible clarification of confusing events and would provide a channel for regulating super-Power behaviour in regional crises and for controlling an escalation of tensions and preventing their evolving into a nuclear exchange. The hot line between Moscow and Washington plays an important role in these respects. But even the hot line itself has been subject to interruption.

The cable and radio links that constituted the hot line from 1963 to 1978 were quite vulnerable to accidental interruption as well as to possible sabotage or direct attack. For instance, six separate accidental interruptions were publicly reported over the period 1964 to 1965.

Since 1978 the hot line has been improved by replacing the cable and radio teleprinter links with a satellite communications system comprising two independent and parallel circuits and four ground stations. The satellite link is probably more secure and reliable than the cable from the point of view of accidental interruption, but it is also vulnerable to electronic jamming disruption and to anti-satellite weapons platforms such as killer satellites or miniature homing vehicles, the latter being impossible to stop because of their speed and small size. In any event, anti-satellite technology will soon progress to the point where satellites are as vulnerable as the cable and ground links of the command and control systems were. Thus effective counter-measures to improvements in command and control systems have only further increased the possibility that such systems can be either jammed or destroyed, adding yet another element of instability.

And of course, once again, we cannot but conclude that in the recent airline incident, in conventional circumstances, the system apparently was not used - and if it was it did not prevent a tragic incident.

If we can at least derive some lesson from this tragedy, then the loss of life may have served a higher purpose. Certainly the wider and deeper study of crisis prevention and management -- of war prevention and war ending -- is deserving of concentrated and priority attention, attention much deeper than it has currently received.

This is the first lesson to emerge, to be discussed and to be pursued.

The second lesson, in essence, comprises the other side of the same coin. The demonstrated capability of one super-Power to monitor with reasonable accuracy the entire sequence of ground-to-air communications in a sensitive area within the airspace of the other super-Power provides further proof, if any were needed, that each side does possess intelligence capabilities able to monitor sensitive actions of the other. The emphasis on verification possibilities for compliance with arms-limitation agreements -- one of the long-standing primary obstacles to arms control and eventual disarmament -- has been proved to be less of an obstacle than is publicly claimed.

After all, it seems reasonable to assume that if the super-Powers have the technical means to eavesdrop electronically on each other, and such sophistication as to allow for the recording of sensitive air traffic communications and of the military procedure followed, then the verification of stationary missile deployment is also technologically feasible at the present time and should constitute less of an obstacle to any equitable, effective and verifiable arms-control agreement.

Even if a certain element of risk is involved in this aspect, certainly it is a much lower percentage than the proven failure rate of command and control systems. If, as it seems, we cannot as yet escape from the world of nuclear deterrence, surely we can at least invest in and even gamble more on reducing its dangers, rather than incur the higher risks involved in a blind and unyielding continuation of the present error-prone course. If we do not change direction, there will not be a black box to tell the world how it drifted to disaster. There will only be the radioactive ashes and dust which will have buried life on this earth in the stillness of death.

I hope that at this session and under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, we can take a small step back from the abyss yawning at our feet. What I have said will be sufficient to explain why my country, amongst others, attaches so much importance and urges that priority be given to the development of an international

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

satellite-monitoring agency. To repeat just one phrase from what I said last year, we urge those who are at present dragging their feet on this matter to join in and make their best contribution to the realization of this project, commensurate with their tremendous potential and in the interests of peace.

I look forward to another opportunity to address this Committee on specific aspects of regional and international security when those items are taken up.

Mr. MURIN (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): First of all may I welcome you, Sir, and wish you, on behalf of the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, every success in your work in the responsible post of Chairman of the First Committee. I can assure you and the other officers of the Committee that you will have our full support and our constructive co-operation.

Our Committee is starting its work on the discussion of a broad range of questions relating to disarmament in a difficult and alarming international situation, which has become even more tense and dangerous. Never in the past has the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, reached such threatening proportions as it has today. All the channels for negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armaments are being blocked and new armaments programmes are being carried out. New and even more dangerous forms and systems of weapons of mass destruction are being designed. The threat of the extension of the arms race to outer space is increasing. The peoples of the world are having forced upon them the possibility of using nuclear weapons and of waging a limited or even an extended nuclear war.

As a result, during the past year mankind has come one dangerous step nearer the nuclear abyss. That opinion is universally held. It is an unquestionable fact. This demonstrates where mankind is being led by the proponents of militarism and of world reaction, who are advocating the use of force in international relations. The United States and certain of its allies do not conceal the fact that by their actions they are pursuing the achievement of military superiority.

Our task is to find a way out of the explosive situation that has been created and to find realistic ways to remove the threat of nuclear war, put an end to the arms race, ensure the development of all States in an atmosphere of peace and security, and turn the trend of world events in a more peaceful direction, in particular by ending the deadlock in disarmament negotiations and adopting measures designed to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

In this respect, much depends upon the future situation in Europe and the direction in which relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) develop. Will they follow the course of retaining the existing approximate balance of forces, with negotiations aimed at maintaining the balance at the lowest possible levels of armaments, in the spirit of the results of the recently concluded Madrid Conference, or will there be, on the contrary, a further intensification of the arms race and an increased level of military confrontation, in the spirit of the well-known NATO so-called dual track decision of 1979 on the deployment in a number of Western European countries of hundreds of new medium-range American nuclear missiles? Apparently, this very important question will be answered this year.

The appearance of new American nuclear weapons in Europe will bring in its wake the establishment of a qualitatively new strategic and political situation. It will lead to a sharp deterioration in the situation on the European continent and throughout the world. It will increase the threat of nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences for the peoples of the world.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

As was stated in the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on 14 October this year:

"Those States which would allow the stationing of new medium-range nuclear missiles in their territories would assume grave responsibility before all peoples for the ensuing consequences for peace and tranquillity in Europe, as this would precipitate another round of the nuclear arms race in the continent."

The Foreign Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty also confirmed at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers, held in Sofia:

"Their States never strove and do not strive for military superiority for themselves, and they recall the statement of the States parties to the Moscow meeting on 29 June 1983 that they will never allow military superiority over themselves."

It must also be emphasized that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including Czechoslovakia, would be obliged to adopt counter-measures to guarantee their security. The time to prevent a new, dangerous step in the arms race in Europe is very limited, but there is still time. One thing is necessary - that the United States renounce making bald statements such as those we have heard during the present session of the General Assembly. It must approach the Geneva negotiations on the basis of respect for the principles of equality and equal security, in the interests of the peoples of all the countries of the world. The question of European security cannot be isolated from global security.

This year started with an important event - the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in the capital of Czechoslovakia, Prague. At that meeting the highest representatives of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty put forward proposals to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The relevance of the conclusion of such a treaty, in the light of the present international situation, is obvious. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have on numerous

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

occasions confirmed their readiness to have exchanges of views with the States members of NATO and all other countries on various aspects of it and to embark upon its timely consideration in a businesslike way.

The exclusion of force in relations between the States members of the two basic military and political groupings of the world would be a genuinely historic act, which would contribute to a radical improvement in the international atmosphere and to the elimination of the threat of war. That is why we again address ourselves here as well to the States members of NATO, calling upon them to demonstrate a responsible, constructive approach to this important issue. We hope that these countries will, in view of the need to strengthen certain principles of the United Nations Charter, heed the appeal of the socialist countries.

Scarcely anyone will cast any doubt upon the proposition that the central question of our time is the prevention of nuclear war. That task is of great concern to all the peoples of the world, which are alarmed by the prospect of a world-wide conflagration. The participants in the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War, representing the peoples of 132 countries, 1,984 national organizations for peace, trade unions, student and church organizations, political parties and more than 100 non-governmental organizations, stated firmly:

"Mankind is now at its most important crossroads in history.

One step in the wrong direction, and the world can find itself hurled, without any possibility of turning back, into the abyss of a nuclear war."

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

The participants at this world-wide conference unanimously and categorically condemned nuclear war as being the most heinous crime against mankind. They also condemned the policy which increases the possibility of unleashing a so-called limited, or possibly even general nuclear war, and stated that such a war would lead to the destruction of civilization and life on our planet.

This unquestionably important statement of the most authoritative forum of representatives of world public opinion pointed the way for Governments represented at the present session of the General Assembly of the United Nations - and which are even taking part in its work at this very meeting to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. These people are awaiting from their Governments not fruitless and most frequently confrontational rhetoric but are looking for concrete, concerted action, for political and material measures aimed at the elimination of the ever-increasing direct threat of nuclear war and the threat to human life.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, have always systematically spoken out in favour of the adoption at the international level of effective measures aimed at the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this respect they have also submitted their own concrete proposals at the United Nations forum. The initiatives taken to secure implementation of these measures are precisely the hallmark of the foreign policy of the countries of the socialist community. The adoption of these proposals would give rise to a whole range of practical measures - including the most radical steps toward disarmament - aimed at the elimination of the military threat and would ease tension in international relations.

It should be pointed out that one of the most important premises for co-ordinating such measures, of course, is a clear, definite, categorical condemnation by Governments of nuclear war and doctrines leading to its outbreak. It is unrealistic to expect any substantive progress on the question of the limitation of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament if the international community ignores the fact that theories of waging nuclear war are official doctrines of specific States possessing nuclear weapons.

I wish to remind members of the Declaration, adopted in 1981 on the Soviet Union's initiative, on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, which stated that the first to use nuclear weapons would be committing the gravest crime against humanity. However, in contrast to this the circles of the military-industrial complexes, in collusion with the most reactionary forces of the West, have during the past two years stepped up the pace of their implementation of a programme for the elaboration, development and production of increasingly more sophisticated types of nuclear weapons aimed at achieving unilateral military superiority by the United States and designed to undermine international stability.

Washington confirmed in a document published for the military command that the escalation of the conflict to the level of nuclear war remains the most important element of United States military strategy. In July of this year several billion dollars were allocated to the production of the first series of MX rockets and thereby the United States made a further step towards building up weapons for a nuclear first strike.

The promotion of such programmes, as was pointed out by the Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty conference, which took place in Prague in January of this year, stated that:

"This was closely linked with the strategic concepts and doctrines of first nuclear strikes, of limited nuclear war, of a prolonged nuclear conflict, and that all of these aggressive doctrines which threaten the world are based on the premise that apparently it is possible to become a victor in a nuclear war by being the first to use nuclear weapons."

The position of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and of the other socialist States with respect to such theories is unambiguous and clear beyond any doubt. Any inference to the effect that by unleashing nuclear war it is possible to come out the victor is devoid of any reason. If a nuclear war were to be unleashed, there would be no victors. Such a war would inevitably lead to the annihilation of whole peoples, colossal destruction and catastrophic consequences for civilization and life itself on earth. As was stated in his speech at the present session of the General Assembly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of our country, its targets would not be individual cities but entire continents and the whole of Europe might become one gigantic Hiroshima.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

That is why the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic firmly supports the draft declaration submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, which set forth a new initiative on the condemnation of nuclear war as "the most hideous crime against the peoples." This is included at the present session of the United Nations as an important and urgent item. The firm and unqualified condemnation for all time by all States Members of the United Nations of nuclear war and preparations for its unleashing through the deployment, development and spreading of doctrines and concepts designed to validate the use of nuclear weapons, as provided for in the draft declaration, would unquestionably be an act of political significance of the first order. This would also contribute to the necessary stabilization of the international climate and to the establishment of premises for a more effective series of negotiations on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic believes that this highly humane and very relevant proposal, which is in keeping with the vital interests of the whole of mankind, will meet with the broadest support of States Members of the United Nations and will become the basis for the adoption by the United Nations of radical measures aimed at the elimination for all time of the threat of nuclear war and of the threat to human life.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

The problem of the prevention of nuclear war is complex and has many facets. There are as many components of its final solution as there are channels for the unleashing of a nuclear conflict. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is of the opinion that the most effective means of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and its catastrophic consequences would be for all States possessing nuclear weapons to agree to end the production of those weapons and to reduce and ultimately eliminate their stockpiles of such weapons.

The proposal of the countries of the socialist community in this regard is well known. The first step - an extremely important one - could be a freeze, both quantitative and qualitative, on all existing nuclear facilities and weapons, including all components of nuclear arsenals and all types of nuclear weapon delivery systems, by countries possessing such weapons. This is precisely what is suggested in the new proposal submitted by the Soviet Union as an important and urgent item for the consideration of the present session of the General Assembly. The purpose of that proposal is that consideration be given to the possibility of stopping the build-up of nuclear arsenals and the further improvement of nuclear weapons as a precondition of the subsequent reduction of nuclear weapons.

The most important element of the Soviet proposal relates to the need for a moratorium on all nuclear tests and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for the production of nuclear armaments. The draft envisages appropriate control measures and calls for joint efforts to bring about a radical reduction and ultimately the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

This, in our view, is a most relevant, justified and realistic proposal which is in keeping with the vital interests of the whole of the international community and with the frequent appeals of the world community. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, as is well known, expressed the conviction as early as the meeting of their leaders in June of this year that in the interest of the peace and security of peoples it is urgently necessary for all the nuclear Powers, and in particular the USSR and the United States, to put a freeze on nuclear weapons, as well as to take other urgent measures.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

The idea of a freeze of nuclear weapons is now widely discussed throughout the world, including within the United Nations. Its merit lies in the clarity of the objective and the fact that it would block further proliferation of nuclear weapons and the improvement of such weapons, as well as in the fact that it would be very easy to implement, whatever arguments might be adduced by the militarists for the purpose of discrediting the idea of the freeze of nuclear weapons, in particular by opposing a freeze on the ground of the impossibility of controlling it, and so on. However, the lack of consistency in their position is obvious even to the peoples of their own countries.

It is our profound conviction that the freeze on nuclear weapons is today a key element in the efforts to avert the threat of nuclear war. Last year, the General Assembly, on the initiative of India, Mexico and Sweden, qualified the freeze of nuclear weapons as a matter of "the utmost urgency" (resolution 37/100 B).

In appealing to the nuclear Powers, in the first place the USSR and the United States to implement this measure, we welcome the important initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement at the New Delhi Conference at the beginning of this year in calling for the adoption of "urgent and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war" (A/38/132), including the cessation of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Thus the primary task facing the present session of the General Assembly and our Committee is to examine and adopt a detailed programme for a freeze on nuclear weapons throughout the world. A draft resolution has been submitted by the Soviet Union, the State which has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We hope that other countries which have not done this so far will assume a similar obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a step by the nuclear States, especially the United States, which possesses a gigantic arsenal of nuclear weapons, would be equivalent to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

I hope that the discussion of the questions of the condemnation of nuclear war and the nuclear-arms freeze, and all the other priority items on our agenda relating to the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, will this year lead to substantive and positive results in the interest of the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of the security of the peoples.

The solution of these important, complex problems of our time calls, first of all, for the political will of States to engage in a constructive exchange of views and to co-operate in the preparation of agreements based on mutual respect for the principles of equality and equal security.

For our part, we sincerely desire the achievement of this objective.

The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has limited its statement today to a few extremely important aspects of the question of the prevention of nuclear war and the solution of other problems connected with nuclear armaments. We reserve our right to speak later to set out our position on other items on the agenda.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): First of all, Sir, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I would like to extend to you my hearty congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. This is the first time I have taken part in the work of this Committee and it gives me great pleasure to work with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee, as well as all the representatives present. I shall certainly try my very best to further the work of this Committee.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Over the past year, the world situation has continued to be beset with tensions and turmoils as a result of the intense rivalry between the two super-Powers. While old issues remain unsettled, new issues keep emerging one after another. Some regions remain to be engulfed by war flames, and armed aggression and occupation are being continued. The independence and sovereignty of many States have not been given their due respect and world peace and security are under serious threat.

In the field of armaments, the arms race between the super-Powers has become even more acute instead of being relaxed. Under the pretext of "maintaining parity", each side is trying to seek and maintain military supremacy over the other. Both sides are expanding, improving and renewing their arsenals at an unprecedented rate and scope. A new round of arms race is under way. The two sides are increasing the variety and quantity of their nuclear weapons, raising the hitting accuracy, survival capability and destructive power of their nuclear weapon systems and improving the means of commanding, control and communications for a nuclear war. To complement their nuclear strike force on the earth, they have furthermore in recent years been enthusiastically developing outer space weaponry based on the latest scientific and technological developments. At the same time, continuing their efforts to strengthen their conventional armaments, they are also developing heavy conventional weapons using newer technology and employing greater destructive power. These are by no means exaggerated descriptions, but a reality witnessed by the average people every day. The arms race has become an important component in the super-Powers' endeavour to realize their strategic targets.

The super-Powers' arms race has not only posed a direct threat to the peace and security of all States, but has also increased the danger of the outbreak of a new world war. This cannot but arouse the grave concern of the people throughout the world. Peace-loving countries and peoples strongly demand that aggression, expansion and the arms race be halted. They have worked tirelessly for disarmament. It is not at all accidental that in recent years a massive peace movement has emerged in some countries, the mainstream of which reflects the just desire for peace of the broad sections of people in these countries.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

However, contrary to the wishes of the peoples of the world, the super-Powers have shown no sincerity in disarmament, verbally professing disarmament only for the purpose of covering up their frenzied arms race. No progress at all has been made in the field of disarmament despite innumerable rounds of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations and countless meetings and conferences devoted to disarmament. Fierce bargaining is going on between the two super-Powers in START and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations. The proposals put forward by each side are all designed to weaken the other and maintain its own supremacy. Owing to the contention and confrontation between the super-Powers, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva has achieved virtually no progress of substance on any item on its agenda. The number of resolutions that our Committee adopts each year has been on the increase, but they hardly provide solutions to real problems. It is fully justified for people of all countries to feel strongly dissatisfied with all this.

Like other peoples in the world, the Chinese people love peace and aspire to a peaceful international environment in which they can build up their own country. China has consistently pursued a policy of safeguarding world peace and opposing hegemonism. China favours disarmament. We are for genuine disarmament and against sham disarmament. We oppose arms expansion under the camouflage of disarmament. In order to promote disarmament, China put forward at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a proposal for disarmament, outlining its objectives, measures, verification and negotiation. The basic principles underlining this proposal are as follows: First, disarmament cannot be separated from the struggle to safeguard international security and oppose hegemonism. Secondly, the two super-Powers should take the lead in disarmament. Thirdly, nuclear disarmament should go hand in hand with conventional disarmament. Fourthly, small and medium-sized States are entitled to maintain their necessary forces for national defence; the disarmament process should in no way jeopardize the independence, sovereignty and security of any State. Fifthly, disarmament agreements should include strict and effective measures for

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

international verification. Sixthly, all States should participate on an equal footing in the discussion, negotiation, and supervision of the implementation of disarmament agreements. In our view these principles are comprehensive and fair as they are based on the consideration of the interests of all sides.

As nuclear weapons have unprecedented and enormous destructive power, nuclear disarmament draws particular concern of the people of the world. In accordance with the above-mentioned basic principles, China put forward at the second special session on disarmament a proposal concerning the cessation of development, and reduction, of nuclear weapons by nuclear States, calling on the two super-Powers to **take** the lead in cutting, by a wide margin, their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of various types. In order to promote further nuclear disarmament, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian recently proposed before the General Assembly that after the Soviet Union and the United States have taken practical action to stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and agreed on reducing by half their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all types, a widely-representative international conference should be convened with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the general reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon States. The starting point of this proposal by the Chinese Government is to make nuclear disarmament a continuous, uninterrupted process so as to achieve the final goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

The final document of the first special session on disarmament correctly pointed out that States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for disarmament. It is entirely reasonable that nuclear disarmament should start with the two super-Powers. They were the first to get themselves armed with nuclear weapons and then they launched a continuous nuclear arms race. It is therefore only natural that they should be asked to take action first in nuclear disarmament. They possess over

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world. Only a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons on their part can render nuclear disarmament really significant. And even after a 50 per cent reduction on their part, they would still be left with nuclear weapons that far exceed the nuclear weapons of all the other nuclear weapon States put together, and they would still have the "overkill" capabilities.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Other nuclear States should, of course, also undertake their responsibility concerning nuclear disarmament. On the very day when China first successfully conducted its nuclear test, it undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has developed a limited nuclear force for self-defence and for breaking the super-Powers' nuclear monopoly and promoting nuclear disarmament. China has just proposed that an international conference be convened after the super-Powers have agreed on reducing their nuclear weapons by half -- not after they have actually carried out such reduction -- to discuss matters concerning the reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear States, which will be implemented at a later stage according to a reasonable ratio and procedure, and lead to the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons. This further testifies to China's consistent and responsible approach towards nuclear disarmament.

China's proposal on nuclear disarmament is based on the reality of the nuclear armaments in the world today. It is therefore fair and reasonable, as well as practical. We hope it will receive serious consideration and a positive response from the parties concerned.

I should also like to say a few words on the proposals for a "nuclear freeze". We maintain that it is quite understandable for some non-aligned and neutral States to have proposed a "nuclear freeze" in order to make the super-Powers stop their nuclear arms race. However, the fact that a nuclear Power with a gigantic nuclear arsenal which is intensifying its efforts in every possible way to seek nuclear supremacy has also put forward a similar proposal cannot but make people ponder over its real motives. "Freezing" alone, if not accompanied by concrete measures for reducing and destroying nuclear weapons, could only in effect legitimize and perpetuate the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers, which will enable them to maintain their nuclear hegemony and pose a menace to the people of various countries. This obviously is detrimental to genuine nuclear disarmament; nor is it conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

People are now deeply concerned about the super-Powers' intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia. Naturally, China too is much concerned about it. We hold that all the nuclear weapons reduced, no matter from where, should not be moved to other regions but should be destroyed; the reduction of nuclear weapons should not be confined to the European region either. The Soviet Union should reduce by a wide margin the large amount of intermediate-range nuclear missiles already deployed in Asia and the Far East, so that the grave threat to which the countries in this region are exposed may be lessened.

Nuclear disarmament can in no way be carried out in isolation. It should be integrated with the struggle against the hegemonism of the super-Powers if it is to achieve any results. The super-Powers must change their course of behaviour and shoulder in earnest their special responsibility towards disarmament so as to reach agreement truly conducive to nuclear disarmament. China is ready to work together with all peace-loving countries and peoples for the urgent task of nuclear disarmament, which has a direct impact on world peace and security. We are convinced that nuclear weapons will eventually be destroyed by mankind, and not vice versa.

Mr. CALLEJAS (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first time I have spoken in the Committee, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, most warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this Committee, which is a guarantee that our work will be guided with your characteristic talent and dynamism.

The number of items on disarmament allocated to the First Committee is clear proof of the vital importance of this question for all the peoples of the world.

The fact that as long ago as 1959 the General Assembly set itself the final goal of achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, defining this question as the most important one facing the world, also demonstrates the complexity of the problems involved in this issue.

(Mr. Callejas, Honduras)

Quite rightly, the efforts of the United Nations have been focused as a matter of priority on the conclusion of agreements to govern the manufacture, testing, stockpiling, transfer and prohibition of thermonuclear weapons. It is obvious that the use of such weapons would have devastating effects, and it would be pointless to dwell on these horrors.

However, since the military conflicts in the world today are being carried out with conventional weapons, in recent years the United Nations has also attached importance to regulating the use of such weapons, although limiting itself to those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

In the view of the Honduran delegation, and as it declared at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, held in June last year, it is also urgent for us to achieve a reduction of all kinds of conventional weapons to the levels strictly necessary for the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity and for maintaining public order.

We believe that the search for attaining this objective must be supplemented by, and carried on simultaneously with, effective action by the international community to avoid illegal arms trafficking, and the strengthening of the peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. The effect would be to make truly effective the principle of the non-use of force in relations between States. My delegation is very happy to be able to say that with respect to Central America these aims have been reflected in the document of objectives adopted recently in September, in the context of the activities carried out by the Contadora Group, which constitutes a very encouraging starting-point to achieve peace in the region.

In keeping with this position, Honduras maintains that we must promote universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Furthermore, we believe that the régime of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be further strengthened by improving the methods of inspection and control of the transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes and by obtaining a commitment by the nuclear Powers to undertake and conclude serious comprehensive negotiations designed to putting an end to the arms race and the development of the technology for producing new weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Callejas, Honduras)

Finally, we wish to reiterate our complete support for the promotion of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and southern Asia, on the basis of the well-tested frame of reference provided by the machinery of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Those are some of the steps which, in the view of my delegation, would help to reduce the distrust and tension that now exist in various regions of the world and to increase the effectiveness of the lofty ideals proclaimed in the United Nations Charter.

Mr. GBEHO (Ghana): It is with some hesitation that I take the floor at the beginning of the general debate in the Committee on the agenda items dealing with disarmament. I am hesitant because there has been such a glaring lack of any specific improvement in the disarmament and arms control negotiations since the end of last year, and one naturally runs the risk of repeating the same arguments as those which characterized the debate during the previous session. However, upon reflection, it is clear that none of us can afford to be silent or timid in the face of the ominous threat that nuclear arms proliferation poses to mankind. We must speak or else perish.

Since the debate on the same item last year, discussions have been held and innumerable articles written underlining the international community's common concern over the increasing threat to international peace and security. At the same time the super-Powers have traded harsh rhetoric. The East-West tension has been used as a pretext for bypassing the United Nations and for undermining internationalism. In spite of this regrettable development, it is already clear that those ad hoc alternatives are fraught with serious weaknesses and that no forum or initiative on conflict control will command the attention and respect of the international community as much as those negotiations held under the auspices of the United Nations. Even though little or no progress has been achieved, partly because of the transformation of United Nations forums into platforms for acerbic rhetoric, it is equally important for the attainment of the objectives of disarmament that United Nations

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

forums should remain the vehicle for important and meaningful attempts to reach international understanding and agreement. So it is with pride that my delegation again joins in the debate in the First Committee because we believe that this deliberative effort offers a reasonable promise of success.

It is unfortunate that the credibility of the United Nations has been especially undermined recently and its role in international affairs grossly misrepresented. The adversaries of the United Nations argue forcefully that the First Committee is not the negotiating forum for disarmament, that our debates here are not structured to produce concrete arms control results and that there is still hope that a breakthrough will be achieved solely through bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers. We wish also to emphasize, however, that disarmament is an international responsibility and therefore requires multilateral attention to assist negotiations. This is the reason that led the international community to assert during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

The First Committee, therefore, has a special and onerous responsibility, as the General Assembly's deliberative body on disarmament, to attempt to achieve an international consensus on the framework for disarmament issues, especially at a time when a nervous international community is bereft of any assurance that a nuclear catastrophe can be averted. We hope, therefore, that the debates in the Committee will create at least the right atmosphere and guidelines for attempting new initiatives in the arms limitation and disarmament talks.

These are laudable and legitimate aspirations, but we all know that the atmosphere in relations among the nuclear Powers could not be worse than it is at the present time. In terms of the objective conditions required for delicate disarmament and international security talks, the past 12 months have been very poor, to say the least. The period has been characterized by bitter rhetoric between the two super-Powers, an almost automatic rejection of each other's proposals for arms control, a surprising show of bellicosity and a gradual drift towards war. In this politically and militarily dangerous atmosphere, we have seen the heightening of cold-war

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animosities to the point where it is no longer an exaggeration to say that any issue could touch off military conflict, with unimaginable consequences for the whole of the human race.

When we met at this time last year the concept of a limited nuclear war was very much in the minds and hearts of some nuclear Powers, even though the collective voice of ordinary men and women all over the world was strident in denunciation of that theory. Happily, today one does not hear too much of that theory, and, if our interpretation of events is correct, that belief will not be pursued with any fervour in the foreseeable future. My delegation welcomes this development, even if it is without absolute certainty, because it holds us back from one more ominous step towards total destruction. If nuclear war were to break out, it would, in our view, quickly degenerate into a global catastrophe, because it would involve the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as the short-range and intermediate-range missiles in the arsenals of all the nuclear Powers. There can be no doubt therefore, that any outbreak of nuclear war would lead to the final destruction of our life and our planet.

At the same time last year we heard a reiteration of the almost universal desire for a nuclear weapon freeze on the part of the nuclear Powers. Unfortunately, the proposal has not been accepted yet by all sides and is therefore threatened with extinction. We have examined carefully the arguments and concerns of those who fear that a freeze would limit the forces on which they might call in time of war or destroy their bargaining powers in crucial negotiations but, while we are not insensitive to their fears, we fail to share their outright rejection of the freeze proposal.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

In our view, a freeze would in the beginning affect only existing missiles, which are more than sufficient to destroy all of mankind. Moreover, it is important to understand that a nuclear-weapon freeze is not an end in itself. It would have to be the beginning of an exploration of other follow-up processes that could lead ultimately to complete disarmament.

One of the other main arguments against a nuclear freeze concerns the perennial question of verification. It is, of course, legitimate and logical to raise the issue of verification when a truce is being arranged between antagonistic forces. However, our own study of the whole question of verification, coupled with the recent admission by certain highly-placed officials of nuclear countries, confirms that verification would not be as difficult to institute as we are often led to believe. Indeed, experts believe that a comprehensive freeze would be easier to verify than more limited arms control agreements. In any case, would it not be logical to expect that in such an exercise only verifiable missiles would be regarded as frozen? We believe that opposition to the nuclear-weapon freeze proposal ought to be seriously reconsidered, because the best hope for, and best beginning of, control of the nuclear arms race is a nuclear-weapon freeze. We once again urge the nuclear Powers, therefore, seriously to reconsider the issue and to heed the plea of world public opinion, which is unequivocally on the side of a freeze.

Another area with a realistic chance of success concerns the total cessation of nuclear-weapon test explosions. Ever since this proposal was placed on the international nuclear agenda, it has received only perfunctory consideration from the nuclear Powers, especially the super-Powers, which obviously do not see it as serving their vested interests. But it must be raised and pursued because it provides a litmus test of the sincerity of nuclear Powers when it comes to arms control. As long as test explosions are necessary for the qualitative development of nuclear arms and for the invention of new generations of such arms, the banning of all nuclear-weapon test explosions remains one of the best measures against any further proliferation. We believe that this option has not been pursued vigorously enough, and we wish to appeal to all States to attach the utmost importance to it and to accord it the highest priority.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

The proliferation of nuclear arms continues as nuclear Powers deepen their distrust of one another, beat the drums of war and deploy existing and new generations of nuclear arms the better to target them on one another. We are informed that one side exceeds the other in the number of lethal weapons in its arsenal and that there is therefore a need to overtake and outdistance it in the qualitative and quantitative development of new systems. The irony in this argument is that we all know that the disparity in the relative nuclear-weapon capacity of the two super-Powers is at best negligible. In other words, both sides some time ago achieved relative parity in their arsenals and do not need more warheads to catch up with each other. In any case, what is the wisdom of fashioning more deadly and numerous missiles when those already available are more than enough to blow this planet and its people into non-existence? We believe we express the anxiety of millions of men and women around the globe when we cry out to the super-Powers that their Pershing, Cruise, MX, Polaris, SS-19 to SS-23 and SSCX-4 missiles are more than sufficient to maintain their cynical balance of terror and that the international community should halt this dangerous and wasteful escalation. The arms race cannot and will not be won; rather, it will destroy us.

If the insatiable craving of the super-Powers for more and more missiles threatens our human existence, international peace and security are no less threatened by the now undisputed acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime of South Africa. With the assistance and malevolent genius of countries such as Israel and Taiwan, the Pretoria régime has now acquired nuclear weapons with which to strengthen the bastion of its apartheid policy. This ambition of South Africa was detected by international observers almost two decades ago, but some influential States Members of the United Nations refused to heed the warning, either because they were themselves economically involved with South Africa or because they believed the simplistic explanation that the so-called communist threat to southern Africa was very real around the Cape of Good Hope and that South Africa's defence capacity needed to be strengthened in order to resist a takeover. Both reasons are historically and factually untenable. Through direct and indirect collusion, certain prominent countries of the West have armed that garrison régime with the most lethal of weapons, with which it can better terrorize the entire region of Africa and the shores of the Indian Ocean.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

Quite apart from the apartheid stance of the racist régime, there are certain other objective reasons why South Africa should not be allowed to become a respectable member of the nuclear club if we are to be faithful to the Charter. First, South Africa has proved itself to be one of the most belligerent of States since the time of the Second World War, as shown by its incessant military aggression against African countries in the sub-region. Secondly, South Africa has demonstrated its resolve not to heed resolutions of the Security Council, which is the United Nations body charged with responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thirdly, it has refused thus far to place its nuclear programme under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Fourthly, since 1961 the General Assembly has supported the declaration of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It is highly prejudicial to international peace and security, therefore, to continue to tolerate the nuclear-weapon activities of this garrison régime which has refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has conducted unwarranted aggression against its neighbours, and which publicly declared in 1977 that:

"If we are attacked, no rules apply if it comes to a question of our existence. We will use all means at our disposal, whatever they may be."

In such circumstances, I ask those Member States which assist South Africa in its nuclear programme to put their racial solidarity aside for a moment and ponder whether the interests of international peace and security are aided or jeopardized by the possession of a nuclear weapon by the racist régime. A nuclear war can be caused by the deliberate or irresponsible use of weapons. The mere possession of stockpiles by South Africa, and the tradition of its extremist military action against front-line States, could also lead to a nuclear catastrophe, since such an unthinkable phenomenon could be caused as much by miscalculation as by an improper safeguards régime. Those who underwrite this weapon should therefore think seriously about these things.

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

As a member of the developing world, my delegation cannot conclude its remarks on disarmament and arms control without once again bringing to the attention of the Committee the irrationality of spending almost \$800 billion a year on the arms race while millions around the world are dying of hunger and malnutrition. The moral orientation of our generation is certainly perverted if we fail to see the connection between disarmament and development. It is to the discredit of the United Nations that for the selfish interest of a handful of its Member States which are also nuclear Powers, the international community has shelved the historical report of Inga Thorsson and her colleagues on the relationship between disarmament and development. The destiny of mankind will be better assured if we are able to marshal the political will necessary to turn our scientific, technological and financial resources from a dangerous and wasteful arms enterprise towards the global developmental effort sorely needed.

If my delegation has concentrated on the nuclear arms race, it is not only because it poses the greatest threat to mankind. Equally disturbing is the ever increasing escalation in conventional arms. The destruction that conventional arms continues to spread in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, should convince all of us of the wisdom to control the development and stockpiling of this deadly category of arms which has reached unbelievable levels of sophistication. In this regard, I wish to reiterate the appeal to our two brothers, Iran and Iraq, to lay down arms and to seek agreement and restitution through dialogue and arbitration. The havoc that war has brought on them is enough. Their respective peoples are now entitled to peace and security.

Certain international events in the last few months have clearly brought home to many how real and how close an outbreak of nuclear conflict can be. For the first time since the shooting down of the Korean Airline plane, many people around the world have been seized by genuine fear of a nuclear conflict and there are already signs that this fear is finding expression in the greater participation in anti-nuclear

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demonstrations. Nuclear weapons, under cold war conditions such as now envelop international relations, can only constitute an even greater threat to our very existence. It is our collective responsibility to find a way out of this situation, and we must jointly work towards complete and general disarmament, as well as the building of confidence between the super-Powers.

To conclude, my delegation wishes to place the following proposals before the Committee for consideration and recommendation to the negotiating parties and bodies involved in the search for arms control and disarmament:

First, we urge all nuclear Powers, especially the two super-Powers, publicly to reaffirm their commitment to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the nuclear super-Powers should commit themselves to a mutual and verifiable nuclear-weapon freeze, with immediate effect.

Thirdly, nuclear States should agree to develop a convention for the total cessation of nuclear-weapon test explosions by the end of 1984.

Fourthly, the European States should seriously consider setting up a European disarmament conference in the near future to consider the gradual removal of all nuclear missiles from Europe and to work out the modalities for a mutual reduction of conventional forces in order to diffuse the tension that Europe currently is experiencing.

Fifthly, to consider, as a matter of extreme urgency, a meeting at the summit level between the super-Powers, with a view to reducing the cold war tension that prevails between them and to working out certain concrete initiatives in confidence-building measures.

These measures must be accompanied, in our view, by a greater involvement in the multilateral effort to help reach early agreement. To this end, we endorse the United Nations system as an appropriate forum and recommend the re-introduction of the proposal to create subsidiary organs of the Committee on Disarmament, especially a body to handle matters pertaining to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and another body to consider the prevention of the spreading of the arms race to outer space.

These are not new proposals. They have been made individually at

(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

different stages of the international debate and at different times. We believe, however, that, if taken together now as a package, they may constitute the most effective means of impacting upon the search for arms control and disarmament. We hope that they will at least spur serious thinking on this crucial subject which is of interest to all mankind.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.



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FIRST COMMITTEE
6th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 19 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

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- Mr. Canales (Chile)
- Mr. Florin (German Democratic Republic)
- Mr. Cheikh Sylla (Senegal)
- Mr. Morelli Pando (Peru)
- Miss Dever (Belgium)

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20 October 1983
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 58 to 63, 139, 141,
143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. CANALES (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, the warmest congratulations of the Chilean delegation on your election. Your professional qualities and your wide experience in the United Nations are a guarantee of the balanced and impartial conduct of the Committee's work.

The First Committee begins its work this year in a very depressed atmosphere. Multilateral negotiations and bilateral talks held in order to seek agreements on disarmament have not achieved the expected results. They have not met the interests of the majority of the international community or responded to the increasing concern felt by the world public, which has gradually become better informed and sees with alarm the inability to direct the progress of science and technology towards peaceful uses, although that is the only way to ensure the survival of mankind, which is constantly threatened by the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe.

My delegation shares the view expressed in the Secretary-General's report that in no area is the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter more important and more closely tied to the survival of millions of people than in the field of disarmament and arms control. We believe, like the Secretary-General, that nuclear disarmament continues to be a matter of the utmost priority for each and every member of the international community and in particular for the major Powers, which have the responsibility and the duty to contribute to the creation of a climate of stability, security and peace.

In paragraph 109 of the Final Document, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed at the second special session on disarmament, it was stated that general and complete disarmament under effective international control continues to be the ultimate goal towards which all efforts in this

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

field should be directed, a goal which we fully share. That document sets out the way in which the process of disarmament could be initiated and systematically maintained. It sets out the principles and priorities for the creation of a realistic and pragmatic framework within which matters relating to disarmament could be effectively treated through revitalized, representative machinery, in a process of negotiation and deliberation.

Unfortunately, the reality is very different. The years that have gone by have shown not only that the Final Document has remained a dead letter for some States but also that tensions and conflicts in various parts of the world have contributed to the complete frustration of its purposes and have in fact stimulated an increase in armaments in the countries of the third world, to the detriment of their social and economic development.

We note today, therefore, a very obvious absence of political will on the part of those who hold the historic responsibility for reducing the huge production and accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The frustrating results of the negotiations on disarmament are in sharp contrast with the world that seeks peace. The appeal of the Secretary-General for vigilance concerning the application of the principles and provisions of the Charter is imperative. The dilemma concerns the choice between the use of force or the threat of the use of force with the attendant risk of a nuclear holocaust and the path of co-operation indicated in the Charter. In this connection, it is essential that we strengthen the rules and procedures set out in the Charter, since they constitute the appropriate framework for our search for just and permanent formulas for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

On this particular aspect, my delegation has on various occasions stated, and now reaffirms, the need to strengthen the legal norms for the compulsory solution by peaceful means of international disputes as the only way of avoiding war and destruction.

In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, in his statement in the general debate in the General Assembly, emphasized the

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urgency of seeking formulas which

"would allow this Organization to follow closely the evolution of certain problems in order to guide them towards peaceful means of the prevention and settlement of disputes in accordance with international law and human rights. Perhaps some helpful action in regard to unsolved divergencies might be taken when these involve risks of potential confrontation. In this manner there could be timely co-operation in the initial stages with the parties directly concerned, thereby possibly averting confrontation."

(A/38/PV.16, p. 4-5)

We welcomed the approval of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes adopted by the previous session of the General Assembly. That Declaration, which originated in the work of the First Committee, stresses the close link between the peaceful settlement of disputes and disarmament and international security.

There is increasing concern at the present stagnation of the principal negotiations, at both the multilateral and the bilateral level, in the field of disarmament. There is no doubt that the international situation has seriously deteriorated, in particular the relations between the major States possessing nuclear weapons. This has had serious repercussions on disarmament negotiations and is a destabilizing factor in the international process. We are convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, with its new programme of work, will be able to work out a more appropriate framework to ensure effective progress. The Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body on this subject, has still not been able to make a detailed analysis of the most sensitive problems linked to nuclear disarmament, despite the many efforts, initiatives and concessions by the Group of 21.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

The mandate of the First Committee over the past year has been to promote effective progress in the disarmament process. To that end, a large number of resolutions have been adopted which have done little to improve the general international situation.

At the same time, the talks on medium-range nuclear arms and strategic weapons have shown no positive signs of progress. We hope that with an effort of political will, commitments can be obtained that will lead to future progress.

There continue to be different views on the process of disarmament, and the question of disarmament and international security is becoming increasingly critical. The total amount of world military expenditure exceeds \$800 billion annually, and there is every indication that this figure will increase progressively, as it has done thus far.

The scenario within which the process of disarmament must be developed presents serious difficulties, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. We believe it is essential that the United Nations should help, through an effective policy free of any discrimination or demagoguery but characterized by pluralism and dialogue, to rationalize its role in disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

Otherwise, every time we adopt a resolution we shall be harming the effectiveness and the image of our Organization. We are convinced that the deliberating bodies of the United Nations should be guided by the principles and recommendations contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, and should make every effort to reflect the true meaning of disarmament as a political objective.

In this connection, my delegation fully endorses the comments made by the representative of the Bahamas last Monday at the opening of the general debate.

My delegation wishes to make some brief comments on the need to seek methods which could help, through imagination and political realism, to ensure implementation of the commitments undertaken when the Final Document was adopted by consensus, in particular paragraph 45, which declares the priority of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

The risk of a nuclear war becomes more likely every day, in view of the present size of the nuclear arsenals and the state of tension which is characteristic of the relations between the major Powers. There can be no doubt that the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament must lie with the major Powers, which together possess 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons. This demonstrates that the vertical disarmament, both quantitative and qualitative, to which the parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation have committed themselves, is still not taking place, nor, indeed, has the permanent and legally binding renunciation of nuclear arms been made.

Furthermore, we must bear in mind that if we do not control, reduce and eliminate this type of weapon, then the likelihood of horizontal proliferation will increase, which would lead to even greater difficulties in controlling the arms race and which would further increase the threat of a nuclear war.

This situation requires us to make greater efforts to forestall the dangers implicit in further horizontal proliferation of these fearful weapons of mass destruction, a proliferation which has already happened in a number of countries.

Chile, as a coastal country of the Pacific, reiterates its vehement opposition to any form of nuclear testing in that ocean. Such tests not only affect the marine environment, but also endanger the whole regional ecosystem. We hope that the ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of nuclear tests will finally achieve some positive results in the course of its 1984 session, as urged in resolution 37/72. We understand that the technical aspects of this problem have already been sufficiently explored.

A total test ban in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 51 of the Final Document, and other substantive disarmament measures, are a matter of political will. We make an appeal to the nuclear weapon States, calling on them to set aside the dubious advantages of such tests, as a contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament, to the non-proliferation régime and to the promotion of international confidence-building.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

While reiterating our adherence to the aims of vertical and horizontal nuclear non-proliferation, including geographical aspects, we also call for greater international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In that respect we believe that it is extremely important to give effective backing to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a view to giving support to one of its functions, that of controlling the nuclear plans of States through the application of an appropriate and balanced safeguards system, without prejudice to the strengthening of the effective nuclear co-operation which is the principal function of that body and constitutes the most effective means of promoting nuclear development for peaceful purposes.

My country expresses the hope that the next meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy can reach agreement on the agenda of that Conference. We understand that the central item of the Conference will be the establishment of universal principles for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nothing else. We hope that that Committee will be able to achieve that, on the basic assumption that proliferation will not be discussed, or that if it is, it will be solely in relation to nuclear weapons in the terms of General Assembly resolution 32/50.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

My country views with alarm the deterioration of security in the third world. The fragility of the international system is shown by numerous conflicts, seemingly local in nature, which have historic causes of social injustice and territorial disputes, to give a few examples, and which involve many countries in various parts of the world, including the major Powers. These conflicts have also brought about the acquisition of conventional weapons, often exceeding the natural needs of national defence and security.

Until there is appropriate control of the transfer of such arms to the developing countries, the regional arms races will remain a latent problem. In this respect, we believe that the agreements on regional security and disarmament constitute a promising approach. We believe that the Group of Experts can finally present its report in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 36/97 A.

In this respect, my country has encouraged the initiative taken by Colombia to include on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States an item entitled "Convention for the Creation of a Mechanism for the Inspection of Arms and Military Equipment in America". Such a proposal makes possible an exchange of views on a matter of great concern to the area.

Chile has been particularly interested in the problems related to outer space and has co-operated in a determined manner with all the scientific and technical efforts aimed at promoting the peaceful uses of outer space. We expressed our concern about this matter in this very Committee 10 years ago.

Our country suggested the creation of a Latin American space agency, which, through regional co-operation, could contribute to keeping space technology for economic and social development. It is precisely this interest which now causes our serious alarm and concern at the increasing proof that the arms race is being extended to outer space. This is an urgent matter, not only because of the need to maintain outer space as the common heritage of mankind, but also because an arms race in outer space would further increase our fears of a nuclear conflagration.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

The development of space technology could still be used for destruction and death instead of for the peaceful use of outer space. Proof of this is the development of anti-satellite systems. We hope that in the Committee on Disarmament, soon to be the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, there will be the political will to make substantive progress on this item.

My country welcomes the proposed creation of an international satellite monitoring body, which would certainly greatly help to achieve better international understanding and co-operation. We also view with interest the initiatives to extend the principle of the non-use of force to outer space.

The difficulties of fulfilling the commitments that the international community entered into with the adoption by consensus of the Final Document and of taking effective disarmament measures have also had consequences for economic development. As a developing country, Chile considers that the problems of disarmament and development are closely linked. It is undeniable that if there are no resources for development there will not be peace, and those who contribute to the unchecked arms race bear a responsibility that they cannot shrug off, since they threaten the survival of mankind with their armaments policies, in particular with nuclear arms and through their obstruction of the process of co-operation for development to the benefit of universal, lasting peace.

My delegation supports the recommendations of the Group of Experts - governmental experts - on this item. We take this opportunity to reiterate our support for this initiative. In so far as the reallocation of military resources would strengthen the establishment of a new international economic order, our country will encourage any action leading to the attainment of this objective.

The Antarctic Treaty was perhaps the first instrument negotiated at the height of the cold war to contribute to the concept of détente. The Treaty has brought together countries with different political systems in one of the most remarkable and welcome examples of international co-operation.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

The Treaty created the first zone of peace - demilitarized and denuclearized - in the world, and it undoubtedly constitutes a model agreement on disarmament, one which should be an inspiration to us in our work. The Antarctic Treaty, agreed upon in 1959, established the first - and, unfortunately, the only - on-site inspection system, in which all parties recognized the right to send observers with the broadest terms of reference to control the effective implementation of the principles and purposes of the Treaty. Article 7 gives ample freedom of access, including aerial observation, at any time to each of the regions of Antarctica.

My delegation will refer more specifically to this matter when we deal with agenda item 140.

My delegation is fully aware of the existing political difficulties in trying to reach a consensus on the problems of disarmament, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. However, we believe that the survival of mankind is a goal which should take us beyond national interests and which goes beyond ideological controversies and political-strategic and power rivalries. The ending of nuclear tests, the creation of new denuclearized zones and the conclusion of agreements aimed at the total elimination of these weapons will benefit the whole international community.

If we are to achieve that end, we must be able to count on a political effort by the two super-Powers and the **other** nuclear-weapon States to make effective concessions involving balanced reductions as an important step towards general and complete disarmament under adequate international control. Such concessions would be an effective contribution towards creating a favourable atmosphere for initiating realistic disarmament negotiations.

Finally, I repeat that my country will co-operate with any initiative which will contribute pragmatically to nuclear and conventional disarmament. I also reiterate our renewed support for the various approaches offered in the Final Document.

Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from Russian):

I congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the important post of Chairman of the First Committee. I express the hope that under your guidance, and relying on your rich experience and diplomatic abilities, this Committee will conclude its work successfully.

I congratulate also the other officers of the Committee on their election to those posts.

The General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, stated the following on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic's membership of the United Nations:

"The most urgent task facing the United Nations at present is to unite the efforts of States in the struggle against the threat of war and to mobilize all the potentials and reserves conducive to peace".

Those words describe our relationship to the United Nations since, for us, peace is not merely a moral principle. For our State, in which nobody at all could profit from an arms race; for our State, whose people have set themselves the great and lofty objectives of development and who wish to contribute to the solution of the global problems of mankind, the preservation of peace is the primary priority.

As we speak today in the First Committee at this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the situation for Europe and the entire world is indeed a fateful one. The scheduled deployment of new American nuclear weapons in Europe compels us more than ever before to choose between two options: either to set forth upon the road leading us back to détente, removing nuclear confrontation and guaranteeing the military balance between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries through a lesser number of weapons; or, by deploying the new American first-strike weapons, to increase precipitously the danger of a devastating nuclear inferno. The German Democratic Republic, which is located on the dividing line between the

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

two most powerful military alliances, is doing everything in its ability to take account of the lessons of the past and of the needs of the present and to avert any dangerous development. We cannot allow for the dangers of the outbreak of another war from German soil - this time with American weapons.

The plan to deploy American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe is part of the doctrine that a nuclear war can be fought in Europe and won. It is part of a system of plans which, disregarding the rights and interests of other States, are aimed at the attainment of world supremacy. For that purpose, an unprecedented arms drive on land, on water, in the air and in outer space is now being carried on, and there are many new acts of military intervention and the use of force in all parts of the world, ranging from the Middle East and Africa up to Central America. This is a dangerous course, all the more so because first-strike weapons, in view of their technical parameters, are able to reach their targets in only a few minutes. This means that the peaceful settlement of disputes provided for in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter would be impossible. At the same time, this is a rather Utopian course.

The States members of the Warsaw Treaty have unequivocally declared that they are determined, and able, to prevent the other side from breaking the military balance and gaining military superiority. The Eastern side does not seek a monopoly - and I need mention here only the French and British nuclear medium-range systems - and NATO should not be allowed, either, to have a monopoly on these weapons systems. There is no doubt that the perpetuation of the escalation of the arms race would continue to aggravate the already extremely tense political situation and to hamper solutions by way of negotiations. Nobody at all could benefit from this.

The security of all States, both European and non-European, would suffer great harm. Although the decisions are taken in Europe, it is not only or exclusively a European problem. One should never forget that those who, despite the destructive power of the present arms potential, especially

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

in nuclear weapons, refuse to work for solutions by way of negotiations based on the principle of equality and equal security are following a course that runs counter to the basic requirements of common sense. This is particularly true of the negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of medium-range weapons in Europe.

The proposals of the Soviet Union offer us a basis for working towards results that would deal with the legitimate security interests of all parties concerned. They include many options, ranging from a genuine zero option - that is, the elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe, both medium-range and battlefield weapons - up to a readiness to eliminate all missiles that will have been the object of a reduction in the European part of the Soviet Union provided that a mutually acceptable agreement is reached on reducing nuclear weapons in Europe as a whole, and including the renunciation by the United States of the deployment of nuclear missiles as well as the reduction of the number of air-based medium-range weapons.

In short, the Soviet Union proposals do not envisage for the Soviet side a single missile, a single aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, a single nuclear warhead more than there would be on the NATO side. There can be no serious argument against these proposals. Therefore, we are convinced that a solution can still be achieved through the Geneva negotiations.

We therefore agree with all those who call for continued negotiations instead of the deployment of new weapons. This historic opportunity must be fully used, as was emphasized in the following proposal made by the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States on 14 October 1983 in Sofia:

(Mr. Florin, German
Democratic Republic)

"... if agreement is not reached at the talks by the year's end it is essential that the talks should be continued with a view to reaching it in the conditions of the renunciation by the United States and its NATO allies of their schedule for deploying new medium-range nuclear missiles."

This is a fair offer, inasmuch as the USSR has declared that under such conditions it would be willing to continue observing its unilateral freeze on medium-range missile systems deployed in the European part of its territory and to carry out a unilateral reduction of such systems. Those who reject this opportunity to conclude the negotiations successfully have only come to the negotiating table for the purpose of concealing their own over-armament plans.

Talks that representatives of my country have had with a great number of politicians over the past few weeks and months have made it clear that there is grave concern about any further exacerbation of the international situation and that there is an earnest desire to achieve results, through negotiations, which would prevent an escalation of tension.

This, of course, is quite understandable. Any policy that gambles with the fate of mankind must necessarily evoke resistance among all those who, irrespective of their political or ideological differences, oppose preparations for a nuclear war. In order to implement their arms budgets and programmes, those who pursue a policy aimed at gaining military superiority, have recourse to increasingly adventurous methods. The aircraft provocation against the Soviet Union and the accompanying campaign to foment anti-Soviet hysteria were further proof of this. We strenuously reject all attempts to stifle the voice of common sense by whipping up emotions. At the present time there is the arms drive, provocation and the propaganda campaign, all of which have increased the danger of war more than ever before since the end of the Second World War. At this time, we reiterate our urgent appeal that we do everything in our power to lessen tension in international relations and to intensify international dialogue and co-operation.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

The United Nations should exert its full authority to counter attempts at justifying and propagating a nuclear war and to oppose warmongering. The German Democratic Republic, therefore, fully supports the suggestion of the Soviet Union that this General Assembly should adopt a declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war.

The Final Document of the United Nations first special session devoted to disarmament regards the prevention of nuclear war as the most urgent task of the world today. The measures contained in the Final Document were adopted by consensus. At the United Nations second special session devoted to disarmament there was again a unanimous appeal for urgent action to avert nuclear war.

Following this appeal the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority several resolutions on the prevention of nuclear war calling for urgent and effective measures. The Warsaw Treaty Member States and the non-aligned countries, following summit meetings of their groups, adopted documents which reflect considerable identity of views on practical measures to this end.

At this year's session of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, representatives of socialist and non-aligned countries submitted working papers containing specific suggestions on effective measures and how to implement them. Important prerequisites already exist for the achievement of concrete steps:

First, there is the general conviction of the urgency of the need to lessen and eliminate the danger of a nuclear war;

Secondly, there is a predominantly uniform view on the practical approach;

Thirdly, there is the demand of peace-loving forces which reflects the increasing desire of peoples in the East and West, North and South that effective measures be taken.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic
Republic)

It is absolutely imperative to stop the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. A relatively simple and feasible step that would be taken could be to put a freeze on nuclear weapons. This world-wide demand is supported by a large majority of States that are represented here and is reflected in resolutions already adopted at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. In their Prague Declaration the Warsaw Treaty Member States strongly advocated a freeze on nuclear weapons, starting with the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States.

In view of the existing approximate balance in the nuclear potential of the USSR and the United States, which has repeatedly been confirmed by Presidents of the United States and in international documents, favourable conditions already exist for such a freeze. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the initiative of the USSR at this session of the General Assembly for a freeze, both quantitative and qualitative, with appropriate verification, on the nuclear arsenals of all nuclear-weapon States, particularly those of the USSR and the United States. This would put a halt to the quantitative build-up of all components of the nuclear weapons arsenals as well as to the deployment of new types of nuclear arms. It would also impose a moratorium on all tests of nuclear warheads, as well as on new types of nuclear delivery vehicles and on the production of fissionable material destined for nuclear warheads.

We fully agree with the letter of the Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko. We, too, consider the freeze on the nuclear-weapon arsenals as an important starting point for subsequent substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. The thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly should adopt an appropriate resolution to this effect.

(Mr. Florin, German
Democratic Republic)

In this connection, we welcome the fact that the Ministers and heads of delegation of non-aligned countries, in their communiqué on the meeting which was held in New York this year, called for a freeze on the production, stockpiling and stationing of nuclear weapons. In addition, it is necessary to have international guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons. At the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the USSR solemnly entered into a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of China had entered into a similar commitment. However, the other nuclear-weapon States have not yet responded to the appeal made by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

A commitment by all five nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would open up the way to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, as also called for at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly by a convincing majority of Member States. We expect the current session of the General Assembly to emphasize still more strongly the demand for a binding commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Attempts to justify the first use of nuclear weapons, including even attempts to misuse Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, are not only a juridical perversion but also an attack on the basic values of human civilization. Equally wrong is the objection that since we have to deal with the question of preventing wars in general it is impossible to give a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The prevention of nuclear war means the prevention of a catastrophe that would threaten the very survival of mankind. This fact should always be cited to counter attempts made to minimize the dangers and say that people might get used to them. For many years the overwhelming majority of States have been calling for the conclusion of an international treaty on the non-use of force. Such a treaty would constitute an important legal instrument for the purpose of preventing wars of any kind.

(Mr. Florin, German
Democratic Republic)

Finally, there is the proposal made by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that they conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations. A commitment by the member States of both alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against each other would put an end to any use of military force. And, of course, this proposal also envisages the prohibition of the use of force against third countries. The treaty would also be open to States which are not members of either of the alliances. Regrettably, we are still awaiting a response from NATO to this proposal.

The Soviet Union, in submitting its proposal on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth, has made a valuable contribution to ensuring the peaceful use of outer space and preventing a new, dangerous escalation of the arms race. The proposal is fully supported by the German Democratic Republic.

The proposed treaty would not only impose on all States a political and legal obligation to refrain from the use of force in outer space and from space, but also back up this obligation with specific practical measures, such as the ban on the testing and deployment of space-based weapons. Furthermore, this draft treaty would help those States which are particularly interested in the complete prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. It envisages a radical solution to that problem. The unilateral commitment by the USSR not to be the first to deploy any anti-satellite weapon in space is clear proof of its determination to do everything possible to prevent an unrestrained arms race in outer space and to facilitate the conclusion of an appropriate treaty. In view of all this the General Assembly should adopt a relevant resolution at this session.

This session of the General Assembly is also expected to take decisions on other important issues of arms limitation and disarmament, including the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Our country will continue to advocate the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe and other regions.

(Mr. Florin, German
Democratic Republic)

We attach particular significance to the Swedish proposal to create a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons on both sides of the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries. The German Democratic Republic is willing to include its entire territory in such a zone and to abide by the principles of equality and equal security.

It is important to strengthen further the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We believe that this session of the General Assembly should begin the preparation of the Third Review Conference of the parties to that Treaty. It is also essential to begin the preparation and implementation of the comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament. In this connection, priority must be given to the prohibition of neutron weapons.

Attention must also be paid to the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. In this connection, the United Nations should call on all States to refrain from any action that might impede agreement in this field.

Serious negotiations undertaken in good faith on these matters, on the multilateral, the regional and the bilateral level, are urgently necessary. They can be successful if all participants are prepared to work intensively for generally acceptable results. Positive results can be achieved in the present international situation, as was demonstrated by the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting. What is needed is political realism, common sense and goodwill. The German Democratic Republic contributed quite considerably to opening up new opportunities in Madrid, giving a fresh impetus to détente and peaceful coexistence. This is particularly true as regards the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which it has now been agreed to hold.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

At this session of the General Assembly, our delegation will do everything possible to make its contribution to improve the conditions for progress towards ending the arms race and ensuring peace. The world must return to the road of common sense and political realism. The process of détente of the 1970s eliminated colonialism, strengthened peace and gave a sense of confidence to mankind. If a few people are dissatisfied with that, it is no reason for others to emulate them. On the contrary, our goals must be to achieve détente, dialogue, co-operation and agreements on the basis of equality and equal security.

Mr. CHEIKH SYLLA (Senegal) (interpretation from French): The Senegalese delegation, Mr. Chairman, would like first to convey to you and the other officers of the Committee our most sincere congratulations on your election to guide the work of our Committee. In carrying out the difficult and demanding tasks which the Committee has entrusted to you, you can be sure of our support and co-operation.

Our contribution to the debate in the First Committee will be that of a small peace-loving third world country which has neither the desire nor the means of causing the slaughter entailed by war. We are, therefore, a country which cannot in any way have any decisive say in the elimination of a scourge, namely the arms race. But peace is a universal aspiration and, in view of our clear interests and our own logic, we are led to speak out for our right. That right is to ensure that our fate, which is that of many other countries similar to our own, should not depend upon fluctuations in the relations between those which today have the power to decide on the destruction of the world.

That right also justifies our demand that the omnipotent of the world show proof of an attitude which is in conformity with the magnitude of the responsibilities their power imposes on them. Such an attitude should show that,

(Mr. Cheikh Sylla, Senegal)

through concerted effort and constructive dialogue, it is possible to make peace an attainable goal. Such an attitude is all the more necessary since the situation in the world today imposes upon us a choice on which the survival of mankind will depend. Those of us who have no voice no doubt carry little weight in this important and vital debate, but we must not become fatalists because neither war nor peace is bound to happen. We should therefore like to continue to believe that if we raise our voices together we shall perhaps one day make ourselves heard.

The fact remains that we are living at a turbulent time in international relations. In virtually every field, the world situation is worse today than it was a year ago. Violence has become a normal fact of our daily life; tensions have increased; the dividing line between military conflict and the massacre of civilians is becoming blurred and passion has become unrestrained. Events have confirmed that man is capable of inventing wondrous devices as well as the most infamous. The question therefore is which choice are we to make.

Are we to choose peace, in which case everyone would have everything to gain, and we would begin with the spirit of justice, tolerance and the recognition of the dignity of nations and peoples on an equal footing? Or is our choice to be that of war, in which case all of us would have everything to lose? That is the choice to which selfishness, prejudice and intolerance lead. That second choice, which seems to be the one that prevails today, would lead to one thing only, namely, that the fires which are being kindled in various parts of the world today would one day burst into a full-fledged world conflagration.

The warnings and appeals made by many international organizations, scientists and eminent personalities and the anxiety expressed by a broad section of public opinion are listened to only half-heartedly by the major Powers, which seem to be caught in a trap

(Mr. Cheikh Sylla, Senegal)

of their own making. The deterrence, implicit or explicit, on which the strategies of the two sides are based, seem to have led to an impasse, for while the stated objective of both sides is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, neither is actually prepared to eliminate those weapons. In order to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used, it is essential to convince the other side that they could possibly be used against it. Thus discussions are held on limitation, on a freeze or on the reduction of nuclear weapons which, in any case, exist in numbers far larger than those necessary to destroy the planet. The destruction of those weapons, however, is not discussed. And since each side continues to believe that the other side will attack if it has a good chance of winning, weapons continue to be stockpiled. What is more, the technical performance of those weapons has improved, because the more sophisticated the weapon the more it will convince the other side than any hope of winning would be in vain, as if in this type of logic nuclear victory would be possible. The balance of forces, on which we are told world security is based, has a tremendous disadvantage in that it cannot be measured in objective terms. Therefore, everyone measures it according to his own criteria and places the responsibility for disrupting such security on the other side.

The firm tone of the statements and the efforts to keep one step ahead in this infernal race thus increase in proportion to the fear and mistrust of the other side. It is on this psychological problem that the peace and security of the world today rest.

The fact that we are all aware of the dangers inherent in this situation should prompt us to redouble our efforts to create the necessary conditions for dialogue and negotiation, because there is no alternative. The commitment undertaken along these lines by the Non-Aligned Movement, which represents two thirds of the countries of the world, deserves the support of all men of goodwill. It is indeed in order to encourage such negotiations

(Mr. Cheikh Sylla, Senegal)

that the Committee on Disarmament, a body which is to play the primary role in disarmament questions, was set up in Geneva five years ago. That Committee, whose work has not yet been conclusive, should have directed its efforts towards effective disarmament, in its capacity as a negotiating forum capable of winning the confidence and support of the international community.

However, we must recognize that, despite the efforts made by a large majority of its members, the Committee has been unable to start serious negotiations on questions to which the first special session devoted to disarmament had given priority, such as the total banning of tests and the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mr. Cheikh Sylla, Senegal)

In the same way, the discussions on the proposed comprehensive programme of disarmament, the text of which was the result of several years of work in an ad hoc group, still show no sign of a positive development.

When the Committee on Disarmament fails to make progress on certain items that have been on the disarmament agenda for more than a quarter of a century, perhaps we should concentrate our efforts on increasing our awareness of exactly what is involved so that we may break this deadlock. To this end, the World Disarmament Campaign should be a matter of priority for us as an instrument in the cause of peace. It should enable us to create the collective militant effort which could exert the necessary pressure on Governments to show a little more common sense. Until new disarmament measures are arrived at, we should, I believe, try to put to the best use what has been achieved so far.

In this connection, one question on which the Committee has not made any meaningful progress - and which is not even a disarmament measure - is, in our view, of paramount importance, since it concerns security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. It has become almost a truism to say that it is only fair that States which have renounced such weapons should be given guarantees against their use or the threat of their use. We see this, together with access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, as the legitimate counterpart of the renunciation of such weapons, to which our countries have freely consented. This question is for us Africans of paramount importance, particularly since it should also do away with the threat to our continent represented by the nuclear programme of racist South Africa.

We believe we are all the more justified in stressing this point since certain statements made recently cannot but lead us to doubt the effective value of existing negative security guarantees. Indeed, in his statement to the Committee on Disarmament last April the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Oliver, referred to an important personality from one of the principal members of a bloc of countries, who had stated in Copenhagen the previous June:

(Mr. Cheikh Sylla, Senegal)

"The problem is not so much to know where these nuclear weapons are stockpiled or located as to know where they will explode ... The truth is quite simply that nuclear-weapon-free zones offer not the slightest protection against the use of such weapons. On the contrary, the only time in history when nuclear weapons were used it was precisely in a nuclear-weapon-free zone and against nuclear-weapon-free towns. Japan did not have the atomic bomb in 1945. Nuclear-weapon-free zones give an advantage to those that wish to attack or threaten them with nuclear weapons. To translate this particular aspect to the present political scene, it may be wondered whether a régime that does not respect the territorial integrity of a nation in time of peace will respect nuclear-weapon-free zones in time of crisis or war. The only protection against the use of nuclear weapons is the possession of such weapons."

Of course this was not a statement of official policy but, nevertheless, it underscores the justification and the urgent need for providing effective security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon-States through precise and binding commitments.

The inclusion on our agenda of the item relating to the Third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should enable us, in the light of the discussions held in the Committee on Disarmament on this matter, to go into greater detail on this important problem.

The prevention of war is not simply a matter of the level of armament. Today it is unanimously recognized that the reduction of tension throughout the world necessarily implies taking into consideration the vital need for development, because, if weapons are the means of war, the scourges of poverty, ignorance and sickness are the sources of war both present and future. The study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the result of three years of work, which was presented the year before last constitutes in this regard a highly important document. Therefore we await with impatience the report of the Secretary-General on the study which we requested the United Nations Institute for Training and Research to undertake last year on the possibilities for the creation of an international disarmament fund for development.

(Mr. Cheikh Sylla, Senegal)

We listened with pleasure and interest to the masterly address by the President of the French Republic to the General Assembly, in which he referred to the highly constructive proposals in that regard. The one relating to the convening at the earliest possible date of a conference devoted to the problems concerning the relationship between disarmament and development seems to us to be of particular importance. We hope that the major military Powers will be able to respond to that generous appeal without delay. That would be a big step in the right direction and it would give greater hope that solidarity will prevail over egoism, for the benefit of all.

I will conclude by expressing the satisfaction of my delegation at the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has accepted the principle of increasing the number of its members. Such an increase, which in any case meets the concern that had been already expressed at the two special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will enable the new members, which we hope will be chosen according to the criteria in effect in the United Nations, to make a positive contribution to the deliberations of that body. It is to the credit of the Committee that it has thus shown the spirit of open-mindedness and understanding which is indispensable for ensuring that the dialogue for peace will make progress, a dialogue which presupposes that each and every one can make himself heard but will also be prepared to listen to what others say with full respect for and understanding of different views.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Peru, who will speak in his capacity as current Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru), Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour and pleasure of presenting to the First Committee of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly the annual report for 1983 of the Committee on Disarmament, which is contained in document CD/421 and Corr.1 and 2. Copies in all the working languages of the report, including the annexes, will be available shortly.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Chairman,
Committee on Disarmament)

I should like to draw attention to certain matters dealt with by the Committee during the present year. With regard to the recommendation made by the General Assembly last year at the thirty-seventh session, the Committee decided to change its title from the beginning of its 1984 session to "Conference on Disarmament". This new title will not have any structural or financial implications, and the rules of procedure will continue to be essentially the same. Nor will the change of name in any way imply a change in the functions of the secretariat, which will be maintained as defined in the rules of procedure.

The Committee also decided that the number of its members could be increased by a maximum of four States. The new members will be elected by consensus, after consultations with the Chairman. The agreements reached will be communicated to the General Assembly at its next regular session.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Chairman,
Committee on Disarmament)

All the substantive items of the Committee's programme were carefully considered by the members. With regard to certain important items, the Committee is still in a phase of pre-negotiation, analysing and identifying problems, noting cases of consensus where they exist, and setting aside those items on which there is no consensus for later consideration. On certain items on which negotiations were held, some progress was achieved; generally speaking, the lack of progress in critical areas reflects the adverse climate prevailing in the world today, which inevitably affects disarmament negotiations in all forums.

The two items "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", were given particular attention by all members, obviously because of their paramount importance. Their consideration will be continued next year, and in this respect I should like to express the hope that practical agreements and organizational agreements can be rapidly adopted so that those items can be dealt with urgently and in a meaningful and constructive manner. Progress has also been made with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. With regard to other items, work will continue next year.

I am sure that the members of the First Committee will give the annual report their particular attention. The report sets out the complex character of the questions at present under consideration, the nature of the existing differences of opinion and the difficulties which will have to be overcome in order to reach the necessary consensus.

Speaking personally, I should like to state that the problems are not insurmountable and indeed must be solved before it is too late. It is essential that the countries principally concerned should make a special effort to create the conditions in which negotiations can lead to fruitful results. If the climate of such negotiations were to improve it would, in my view, be possible to expect rapid agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a nuclear ban, and a ban on chemical weapons. Indeed, we have all been expecting these results for some time now and I am sure that this session of the General Assembly will turn its attention to these items with special care and with urgency.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Chairman,
Committee on Disarmament)

I believe it is timely to recall that the Secretary-General, in his last report to the General Assembly, after having made a special reference to these same substantive items, made the following comment:

"At its thirty-seventh session, the Assembly adopted a record number of resolutions on disarmament matters, including over 20 dealing with nuclear questions. They reflect the deeply felt concern of many Governments with the present situation. World public opinion is increasingly reacting against the constant threat of extinction hanging over humanity ..." (A/38/1, p. 6)

In conclusion I should like once more to express my gratitude to the members of the Committee on Disarmament for the support and co-operation I have always received from them, and to convey to Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee, to Mr. Vicente Berasategui, and to all the staff in Geneva as a whole my gratitude for their assistance.

Miss DEVER (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, at the outset I should like to tell you how happy we are to see you preside over our Committee. Your thorough knowledge of the issues, your interest in disarmament questions and your well-known qualities as an experienced negotiator are certainly good guarantees that our work will proceed smoothly.

Yesterday, we heard the representative of Greece speak in his capacity as President of the Council of the European Community, and we heard him speak of the hopes and fears of the 10 countries that make up that Community. I should like to add to what he said on our behalf a few comments and thoughts on problems to which my country attaches particular importance.

In the last few years, the Government and people of Belgium have seen, with a growing sense of dread, the threat looming over our country and over Western Europe as a whole take sharper and clearer shape, in the form of a new category of nuclear weapons. We realized the gravity of this threat from the outset, and so our Government had to include among the possibilities of what

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

might happen to it the possibility that one day it might suddenly find itself faced with a tragic dilemma threatening our very existence as a nation: either yield to threats, or accept the danger that Belgium might simply disappear. That is a fact, a fact which cannot be denied.

Faced with this fait accompli, our allies and we ourselves reacted in a moderate and responsible manner. Because we abide by our obligation to seek a solution to our disputes by negotiation, for we entered into this obligation under the Charter, and also because we are convinced of the ultimate futility of the arms race, we set a deadline of four years for reaching some agreement, four years during which we deliberately refrained from acquiring the means to avert this new threat to us through deterrence.

Who would not feel a certain anguish at seeing that this deadline is now arriving without our having been able, thus far, to avert through negotiation this threat that we denounced four years ago? Yet some people are trying to use this sense of anguish to create an atmosphere of crisis at the approach of the deadline set four years ago. The fact remains that it is not the expiry of the deadline that is responsible for the difficult time we are living through: rather it is the upsetting of the nuclear balance through the unilateral action of the USSR that is responsible. That balance must be restored, and no one can say that we spared any effort to ensure that it be restored at the lowest possible level. Compare the situation existing today with that which existed four years ago when we made our offer of negotiation. Which party has used the time to increase its advantages? As I said earlier, we know the futility and the cast of the arms race. We are also convinced that, in the present circumstances, it is only a balance of force that can guarantee the security of us all. We believe, and indeed we strongly hope, that through negotiations it will be possible to give each of us the same security at a reduced level of armaments.

I felt that I had to take up first of all the problems that are the immediate concern of my Government. But they should not obscure other problems that can affect our not too distant future, and I am thinking in particular of the importance of the United Nations to meet the challenges of today.

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

I can only echo the cry of alarm of the Belgian Foreign Minister,

Mr. Leo Tindemans, when he spoke in the General Assembly and said:

'Multilateralism is in a state of crisis ... This serious crisis, which could be fatal for international society, has manifested itself in many areas.

"In particular, it effects what is done - or rather what is not done - in one area to which we attach the highest priority: that of disarmament."

(A/38/PV.7, p. 87)

The Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, has also said in his recent report on the work of the Organization:

"In no area is the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter more important and more closely tied to the survival of humanity than in the field of disarmament and arms limitation." (A/38/1, p. 4)

The Charter of the United Nations indeed created a universal framework within which harmonious international relations were to develop, thereby making it unnecessary to have a high level of armaments. We all know what has happened to this. It is not because we do not have the means, if not immediately to achieve general and complete disarmament, at least to achieve a progressive monitoring of weapons and the elimination of some kinds of weapons, but that we are not making good use of the means available to us. It would seem that the search for what is possible, which is the very crux of any negotiation, is increasingly being sacrificed to mere rhetoric.

The United Nations is not **effectively** using its potential, whether it be in the First Committee, in the Committee on Disarmament or even in the Disarmament Commission. The debates in those forums are too often, to use the words of our Foreign Minister, Mr. Tindemans,

"marked by sterile confrontation, as a result of which each party finds itself back at the starting point with nothing - or at most very little - concrete having been accomplished." (ibid.)

I should like to give some examples to illustrate this and at the same time to suggest some remedies that might improve the situation.

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

The First Committee of the General Assembly should prepare and keep constantly up to date a programme of action, whether to give a new impetus to negotiations at present under way or to open up new fields for negotiations. I am sorry to say this, but we adopt an increasing number of resolutions every year, often parallel and on identical subjects, without making any effort at harmonization. Are we so convinced that we are right that we simply disregard the views of others? Above all, are we sufficiently convinced that the only possible course is that of compromise and thus negotiation?

There is indeed an obvious need to improve our working methods. The initial efforts made this year along these lines under the guidance of our Chairman, Mr. Vraalsen, are indeed commendable and we support them. Belgium hopes that this work will be continued and we are willing to contribute to it. In this connection I should like to make a few preliminary suggestions.

The agenda of our Committee should be rationalized. As it is presented today, it is simply adding one item on top of others from previous years and the only result is that our work is further complicated and unnecessarily overburdened. And what can we say about the recent practice of, at the last minute, adding new items to the agenda formulated in such a way that they systematically ignore the overall framework within which the problems raised in those items would have to be studied? The Officers of the Committee should shoulder broader responsibilities, ensuring that the Committee does not adopt overlapping draft resolutions, and should try to regroup those draft resolutions which deal with related matters. We should also avoid submitting almost identical draft resolutions year after year. I do not think the political messages of the texts would in any way suffer. A representative group could be asked to do more work on these proposed reforms so that they could be applied as from the beginning of the next session of the General Assembly.

Another problem that is paralysing United Nations action is the tendency to impose uniformity on the work of the various bodies dealing with disarmament even though each has its own specific function. I have just described the situation

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

in the First Committee. I do not think, either, that the United Nations Disarmament Commission has lived up to the hopes we had for it, despite an initial commendable effort this year. If we are to avoid its duplicating the work of the First Committee we have to try to channel its work better by giving it limited and specific tasks which could create the conditions for negotiating multilateral agreements in specific areas. In this connection we attach particular importance to the role that the Commission could play in preparing guidelines in the area of confidence-building measures which could be applied at both the world and the regional level.

As for the Committee on Disarmament, we fear that it is now losing its essential characteristic as a negotiating forum and is simply being watered down into another deliberative body.

The crisis of multilateralism in the field of disarmament is the result of confused understanding of its possible contribution to the solution of the problems we face, particularly that of the nuclear danger. The responsibility of the nuclear Powers, particularly the two major nuclear Powers, is quite obvious. The role of the United Nations is not to replace them but rather to encourage them to negotiate between themselves measures to reduce their arsenals. That is the justification for our support for the Geneva negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The recent debates on the prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, have, however, highlighted the role that the United Nations can play. I am thinking in particular here of the Committee on Disarmament, which should try to identify those measures that could be the subject of multilateral negotiations.

At the last session of the Committee on Disarmament the Belgian Foreign Minister proposed that confidence-building measures within the context of preventing nuclear war should be negotiated multilaterally. Such measures could deal with nuclear information, notification of activities in this area, prevention of accidents, the conduct of nuclear States, consultations in the event of crisis, and communications. We are encouraged by the generally positive

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

response to our proposal. The measures that we envisage are indeed limited but nevertheless they would be a way of starting, with respect for the positions of each State on the problems of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear tests, the dialogue between the five nuclear-weapon States to which I have just referred. Such measures would amount to major progress in easing tension. They would also be a significant political development. The adoption of such measures would also show that multilateral and bilateral efforts in the nuclear field must complement each other, as in other aspects of arms control and disarmament.

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

But what we need most is negotiation and, when conditions permit, the Committee on Disarmament must be fully able to discharge its mandate. There are, of course, problems of crucial importance but they are so complex that negotiation is difficult at this stage. But this should not prevent us from negotiating without any further delay what is now negotiable. The Committee on Disarmament must at last prove its effectiveness by producing draft conventions, modest ones now but, we would hope, more ambitious ones in the future. And indeed, an objective that we should give our full attention to would be the conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

The importance of such an achievement would mean that the Committee on Disarmament should have everything it needs to enable it to conclude these negotiations successfully. Last June, in Geneva, the Belgian Foreign Minister urged the Committee to devote all the time needed to this issue. As yet, his appeal has not been heeded.

In 1983, we will have spent less than three months on this. The credibility, not only of the Committee but of the entire system, would be at stake if we show ourselves unable to remedy this situation early next year. We insist on this all the more strongly because discussions have shown that positions are not frozen. Some points of agreement have emerged, for example, on the scope of application of the convention, on procedures for declaring stockpiles of chemical weapons, and on fact-finding machinery in the event of allegations that the convention had been violated. But there are also grounds for disappointment. Detailed proposals on verification, whether relating to the destruction of stockpiles or to the dismantling of installations used for the production of chemical weapons, or even to non-production of chemical weapons in civilian industry, have not yet been taken up despite efforts on the part of several delegations to explain the position.

We know that chemical weapons constitute one of those areas where there is essential need for adequate verification. There seems to be a meeting of minds on the need to include verification machinery in conventions on disarmament. Negotiations on chemical weapons offer a particularly promising field in this respect. One must move beyond the field of principles and specifically consider the nature of the problem so as to make it less dramatic. The United States

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

offer to open up to international verification one of its installations for destroying weapon stockpiles is most welcome. We trust that it will be followed by other similar initiatives, thus leading to further progress in this essential area. I should like at this point to recall the proposals made by Belgium at the second special session on disarmament aimed at resolving the problem of verifying observance of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. These proposals still stand and would apply both to the future convention on the banning of chemical weapons and to the implementation of resolution 37/98 D. We still feel that these proposals offer the most satisfactory framework for a negotiated solution.

We also believe it is still possible to conclude very quickly a convention banning radiological weapons, while continuing work on the infinitely more complex subject of banning attacks against nuclear installations.

We would like to recall what we said earlier about this tendency to be over-ambitious at the risk of achieving nothing. The credibility of the Committee on Disarmament could, indeed, be challenged after five years of futile efforts. The successful conclusion of negotiations on radiological weapons would indeed be particularly welcome in this respect. A complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space are also questions which call for the conclusion of important agreements.

Here, again, the Committee on Disarmament has means of action available to it, even if they are still limited. In the first instance, it now has a Working Group which will take up all aspects of verification of a nuclear-weapon test ban, in the second, it has decided, in principle, to set up a working group which could carry out a preliminary exploration of the problems of an arms race in outer space.

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

We feel that we must take advantage of these possibilities and, in this way, significant progress could be made, provided that we can move beyond procedural debates that paralyse the work of the Committee. To want to start off by negotiating treaties when the ground has not yet been cleared would not seem to be a constructive approach. Rather, it would tend to harden existing antagonisms.

Many other aspects of the problem of disarmament to which Belgium attaches the greatest importance, were discussed by the representative of Greece, speaking on behalf of the ten States members of the European Community. I therefore need not dwell on them. However, in a later statement, my delegation would like to take up in further detail the question of the regional approach to disarmament, to which Belgium attaches particular importance.

I should also like to emphasize our interest in the relationship between disarmament and development and in the recent proposals made on this matter by the President of the French Republic. Here, as in other areas of disarmament, Belgium will try to make as effective a contribution as possible. The decisions we have taken, for example, in appointing a special Belgian ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament, and in appointing an ambassador to deal with problems of peace, are proof of our wishes in this connection and of the hopes that we place in the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. Elfaki (Sudan)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. van DONGEN (Netherlands): May I first of all express through you, Sir, the Netherlands delegation's satisfaction at the election of Ambassador Vraalsen as Chairman of this Committee. Equally, our congratulations go to you and to Mr. Gheorghe Tinca as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee. The composition of the Bureau assures us, by the experience and professional qualifications of its members, that our debates here will have an orderly and positive outcome.

Our thanks go to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Gbeho of Ghana, for the work he did last year.

My delegation welcomes this opportunity to share with you, Sir, and with our colleagues from all parts of the globe some of the Netherlands' thoughts and views regarding the ongoing efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Today's world does not present a rosy picture. Both the developed and the developing world are confronted with serious economic and financial problems which adversely affect the international situation as a whole. Against this background of world-wide economic stagnation the arms build-up, both conventional and nuclear, continues unabated. This general situation is an awkward one. The world community appears to be unable to organize itself more rationally, to sort itself out, and thereby to avoid the colossal waste inherent in the arms race and devote more of its resources to the economic well-being of mankind.

That being so, honesty compels us to admit that the increasing arms expenditures are mainly a reflection of the existence of fundamental political contrasts. In addition, the continuing use of force in contravention of the United Nations Charter aggravates the prevailing distrust, thus bringing us farther away from the climate of confidence that would promote disarmament.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

Since we last met in this Committee, the international climate that has prevailed in the world has not improved. East-West relations continue to be strained, though it has thus far been possible to avoid a major military conflict in Europe. But, at the same time, armed conflicts outside Europe unfortunately continue to take place owing to regional instabilities.

However regrettable this general state of affairs may be, we should not allow it to discourage us but, rather, should continue to devote our best efforts to balancing and stabilizing an international situation fraught with danger, through concrete and realistic measures. Our foremost objective should be the elimination of the scourge of war, which the Charter defines as its main aim. Measures in the field of arms control and disarmament should be concrete and realistic: Concrete because words by themselves cannot show us the way out of the many problems facing us. We must translate our discussions and our negotiations into concrete, equitable and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament, capable of inspiring the confidence the world is so desperately in need of. Realistic because only realism can prevent us from reaching for the unattainable and instead help us to bring about what is within reach.

Realism means considering the world as it is, not as we should wish it to be - without illusions but also without defeatism. It dictates the course we must follow - that is, that only painstaking negotiations will allow for progress. It will admittedly be piecemeal, yet progress along these lines can be made.

Realism should also guide us when we consider the factors that have prevented the outbreak of a war in the European theatre, given the present nature of armaments on both sides. It obliges us to acknowledge that such a war has primarily been prevented by the very existence of what sometimes has been called the balance of terror. Nuclear deterrence has provided the basis for the existing stability. We may not, and indeed do not, like such a situation, but dislike will not make it disappear. Consequently, any realistic disarmament negotiation should use this fundamental fact as a point of departure. Whatever measures result from negotiations, they should avoid effects to the detriment of this basic stability.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

Maintenance of such a precarious stability is not the ultimate answer to the question of how to ensure peace and security in the world. But for the foreseeable future there is no viable alternative to the present-day strategy of nuclear deterrence. Stability should be preserved to the maximum extent possible, but, I hasten to add, this must be achieved at much lower levels of armaments. This task is all the more urgent since the built-in dynamics of the arms build-up threaten the stability we are so anxious to maintain. Quantitative and qualitative developments are taking place which have the potential to destabilize the situation. This is what disarmament and arms-control measures should prevent. In concrete terms, this should mean that at no stage of the disarmament process should the existing mutual deterrence be affected. Such realistic disarmament measures should in particular aim at avoiding any undermining of the second-strike capabilities existing on both sides. Neither the fundamental philosophy underlying the conclusion of the 1972 anti-ballistic-missile Treaty nor the Treaty itself should be undermined.

To sum up, my delegation feels that the continuing objectives of the international community in the field of arms control and disarmament should be to prevent war, nuclear war in particular, through the maintenance of stability and the prevention of developments of a destabilizing nature.

I should like to dwell for a moment upon this very important concept of stability. Clearly, stability is one of the basic principles underlying the efforts of the international community to preserve peace and, at the same time, achieve disarmament and arms-control agreements. When used in this context, the concept of stability implies essentially that military forces be structured in such a way that neither side has any reason to fear offensive operations by the other. In this sense, stability is related to the equally important principle of balance. But there is more to it. Stability implies also that forces on both sides be so structured that there is no premium on attacking first. The notion has found wide application in the nuclear field, but it is also highly relevant to the conventional field and, as we shall see, to current developments in outer space.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

It goes without saying that the international community, as it has structured itself in the various disarmament forums, bears a very heavy responsibility. Our nations, our peoples demand of us that we spare no efforts to make headway, and they are fully entitled to do so. My delegation admits that the current international climate is not notably propitious to reaching concrete results in disarmament negotiations. The serious international situation, however, is not an excuse for slackening our efforts but, rather, an additional reason to intensify them. It is obvious that progress in the field of disarmament could contribute to the easing of a tense international situation.

The strategic arms reduction talks (START) and the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union offer the opportunity for these two countries to put into effect their special responsibility in regard to these matters. The START negotiations are the key to the achievement of a stable strategic balance at substantially lower levels. In this connection I want to emphasize the importance of achieving both substantially lower levels and greater stability.

The Netherlands welcomes the additional proposals the United States has made both in the previous and in the present round of START talks. These proposals take into account a number of specific Soviet concerns. We hope they will be reciprocated and thus lead to progress in the negotiations. A START agreement is of vital interest not only to the two parties directly involved but to the world as a whole. Of special importance to the Netherlands are the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We continue to believe that the complete elimination of land-based longer-range INF missiles would be the best solution for all concerned. Zero on both sides remains the ultimate goal. Should it prove impossible to reach that goal in one step, then an interim solution should be sought providing for equal ceilings at the lowest possible level. Recently the United States has taken new initiatives which meet a number of Soviet concerns. We call on the Soviet Union to respond positively to these initiatives and to meet the legitimate Western security concerns created by the SS-20 deployments.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

In the particular context of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, stability and reasonable balance are as vital as they are in the field of strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet Union, having first disrupted the balance by building up its formidable force of SS-20 missiles, is now trying to convince the world that it is the West that is endangering stability by its plans partially to redress the situation. Apparently, the zero option should apply to the West only, while the Power that first raised the level of this type of armaments should go scot-free. The success of the INF talks, in which the Netherlands has a vital interest, will require abandoning such false logic and misleading propaganda and showing instead a genuine willingness to come to an equitable agreement.

What I have already said will, I hope, have made clear that the Netherlands attaches the highest importance to efforts aimed at making progress on nuclear disarmament measures. At the same time, I have stressed that we should be realistic. Nuclear weapons will not disappear overnight. In fact, their very existence has given rise to the paradoxical situation in which nuclear weapons simultaneously constitute the threat of and the deterrence to the unthinkable: the unprecedented catastrophe of a nuclear war. It would be unrealistic to assume that nuclear weapons could disappear or be disinvented; but what we can do is strive for a gradual reduction of our dependence on these weapons for our security, seek a balance at much lower levels and halt all developments which could have destabilizing consequences. To this end, more stable relations in the conventional field are also essential.

Attention tends to focus on nuclear issues. This is understandable but it should not make us neglect the issue of conventional weapons, whose power of destruction has been vastly increased by modern technology. Conventional forces absorb a much larger share of the world-wide expenditure than nuclear forces. Furthermore, the use of conventional weapons is, unlike that of nuclear weapons, a daily reality in many parts of the world. In Europe peace has been preserved but the conventional imbalance remains a potential source of instability. This conventional imbalance is one of the reasons of Western Europe's dependence on nuclear deterrence for its security. An agreement in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions could be an important first step towards the aim of a stable conventional balance at lower levels in Europe. Progress in the field of conventional

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

disarmament would reduce our dependence on nuclear deterrence and increase the possibilities for reductions in nuclear weapons. In January a new conference will start in Stockholm, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which will seek agreement on a set of confidence- and security-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe. Such measures could do much to strengthen stability in Europe, by creating greater transparency and removing some of the uncertainties about military activities that can only too easily give rise to fear and misunderstanding.

The European situation clearly indicates how difficult it is to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons once they have become part and parcel of a regional balance - a balance that is bound to be complex. What we can and must do is to try and prevent a similar situation arising elsewhere in the world. Further proliferation of nuclear weapons would constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. The aim of strengthening the régime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty is therefore a cornerstone of the Netherlands policy on nuclear disarmament and arms control. It follows that even-handed proposals to keep certain parts of the world free from nuclear weapons - like the announced Egyptian initiative - arouse our keenest interest.

The Netherlands is fully aware that progress in the negotiations on the existing nuclear armaments systems will have beneficial effects on non-proliferation, but it is possible to do more. My delegation wishes once again to underline the great importance it attaches to a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is our firm conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution to non-proliferation, horizontal as well as vertical, which can hardly be overestimated. As such, a comprehensive test ban treaty would be a major contribution to more stable relations in the world - provided, I hasten to add, that it would do away with all test explosions for all times in all environments. In other words, the Netherlands attaches great importance to the comprehensive character of such a treaty. Its scope should encompass the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Failing to prohibit such explosions would make verification virtually impossible.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

One should not lose sight of the fact that the technologies used for nuclear-
weapons testing and for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes
are basically the same. As a result, military benefits could be derived
from either type of explosions, and a treaty that would leave room for
explosions for peaceful purposes would render a comprehensive test ban
treaty devoid of meaning.

We are convinced that while a number of problems, technical as well
as organizational, remain to be solved, adequate verification of a future
comprehensive test ban treaty is feasible. The Netherlands would appeal
to all delegations at present involved in the deliberations in the Committee
on Disarmament on a comprehensive test ban treaty to approach the remaining
problems in this field in a positive and realistic frame of mind.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

May I now turn to the subject of the so-called negative security assurances. We remain convinced of the importance of continuing efforts to reach agreement on a common formula which would encompass all the assurances which each of the nuclear-weapon States has individually given to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such a common formula - to be incorporated for example in a Security Council resolution - would lend added weight to these individual assurances and would, we hope, increase the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not be the victim of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Agreement on such a formula would thus strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The key to the solution of this question is, of course, primarily in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States, whose responsibility it is to bring their respective negative security assurances closer to each other. The Netherlands, however, takes a keen interest in this issue and remains prepared to lend a helping hand wherever useful and possible.

I mentioned earlier the primary importance of stability to prevent war and maintain international peace and security. The notion of stability is particularly relevant to outer space.

Man's entry into outer space has opened prospects hitherto undreamt of by mankind. The progressive exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes has been of enormous benefit to all peoples, in accordance with the desire expressed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Many exclusively peaceful endeavours, such as research into the earth's resources, were furthered by satellites and their ground support specifically designed for these purposes. At the same time, their use for military purposes, as components of defensive and, in some cases, offensive systems, was actively pursued. In many cases military and civilian functions are combined in one and the same satellite. On the whole, the military functions of satellites seem to have a stabilizing effect. Observation, early-warning and communications satellites are essential elements in verifying compliance with arms-control measures, in preventing surprise attacks and in ensuring maintenance of communications in periods of tension and conflict. This observation leads us to the inevitable and realistic conclusion that, at least for the foreseeable future, complete demilitarization of outer space is not a desirable goal.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

If one then concludes that satellites are on the whole important to stability, it follows that anti-satellite weapons are destabilizing. Anti-satellite weapons are a matter of grave concern. Their entry into the arena might well be the first step in a long and costly arms race in outer space. Their development and perfection may lead to a situation that puts a premium on attacking first. Because of the important role satellites play in overall defence capabilities, eliminating these satellites at the outset of a conflict might give the aggressor a very substantial advantage. This is, I believe, a clear example of a situation we should avoid.

We propose to deal simultaneously with the problems posed by anti-satellite weapons from two angles: satellites should be declared inviolable and, in conjunction with such a measure, the testing, stationing and use of specific anti-satellite systems should be prohibited. This is the approach that was suggested in the Committee on Disarmament by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans van den Broek, on 29 March this year.

Far be it from us to underestimate the complexity of the verification aspects. We recognize, for example, that there are no quick fixes to the problem of residual capacities, should specific anti-satellite systems be banned. Collateral measures could perhaps reduce this problem. Yet the view seems to be widely held that, within the scope of the measures we propose, verification may be difficult but not impossible.

I stress again that in the field of arms control in outer space, as in other areas of disarmament, absolute verification is impossible. Protective measures to enhance the self-defence capabilities of satellites - at least the most vital - may therefore be found to be indispensable. A parallel appears to emerge with the prospective chemical weapons ban: an acceptable verification picture from a security point of view could consist of a combination of a set of verification measures adequately tailored to the scope of the agreement, a certain level of protection and, possibly, collateral measures. In addition, States should keep the residual-capacities problem manageable.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

The Netherlands Government has taken note with interest of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth, recently submitted by the Soviet Union, and we shall come back to this draft at a later stage.

I now turn to the subject of chemical weapons. At the outset, I wish to recall that the Netherlands armed forces do not possess chemical weapons, that the Netherlands Government does not consider introducing these weapons into its armed forces and that it rejects the stockpiling of chemical weapons on Netherlands territory. This position reflects our view that stability does not seem to depend to a meaningful degree on chemical-weapons capabilities. It is therefore disappointing that, intensive negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament notwithstanding, a decisive breakthrough in favour of the speedy conclusion of a chemical-weapons ban has not yet been achieved, though small steps were made that broke the ground towards narrowing down some existing differences.

An important contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament saw the light in the form of an elaborate model for the destruction of chemical weapons, presented by the United States delegation. We hope that countries holding strong views on different concepts for the destruction of chemical weapons and the verification thereof will present them without further delay, so as to stimulate a dialectic process. An opportunity for a detailed exchange of views will be offered a few weeks from now at Tooele Army Depot, Utah, where the United States has invited all interested delegations to attend an on-site demonstration of the United States destruction-model. We hope that this important initiative will contribute to a breakthrough in the negotiations, with a positive spill-over effect to other areas of the much-desired convention. Thanks to the efforts of the Canadian chairmanship, presiding in a most stimulating manner over the chemical-weapons negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, a rough draft of such a convention is now on the table. All members of the Committee on Disarmament should now make a concentrated effort to formulate precisely their respective treaty concepts, with a view to resolving remaining differences so that a full draft convention can be presented to the General Assembly in the near future. The urgency of this task is highlighted by continuing reports on the use of chemical weapons against defenceless peoples in developing countries.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

Mr. Chairman, I conclude - none too early, you may think. But the weight and the complexity of the issues at stake did not allow for casual treatment. Even less do they justify efforts to pretend that they can be solved by the use of slogans, however appealing these may sound. All States, great and small, must bear their share of the responsibility to keep the peace and our world livable. The Netherlands nation is deeply conscious of that duty. Where I have stressed the need for stability as well as for realism in the field of arms control and disarmament, I have done so to indicate our approach to the problems. The Netherlands will try to live up to its reputation and will do its bit, soberly, reasonably and tenaciously.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States): It is a real pleasure to be here today. Looking around this chamber, as I have, I see many colleagues with whom I have enjoyed immensely working in the past, over the past two years. It is a good feeling to come back to such familiar ground, especially as in my new position I look back to my United Nations days in general and to the First Committee meetings in particular with a special fondness. I am especially pleased that a dear personal friend, Ambassador Tom Vraalsen, has assumed the chairmanship of this important Committee.

The First Committee is, as we all know, confronted with many critical security and arms control issues. Resolving those issues is the major challenge of our times if we are to help make the world a safer place for succeeding generations in the place that we inherited from previous generations. Our task is nothing short of doing everything in our power to ensure that all people may realize their potential in a world that offers them security and freedom.

Last year in this same forum, my predecessor and my friend, Gene Rostow, called for a change in the climate of world opinion. He appealed for a demonstration of universal goodwill, for the exercise of the powers of reason and for all nations to heed the words and to follow the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

I wish that I could tell Gene Rostow today, and that I could tell everybody in this chamber today, that all nations had heeded those calls. But I cannot. The continuing troubles in the Middle East have been of grave concern to my Government and to the Governments of many other representatives sitting in this room. We see continuing aggression in Afghanistan and wars in the Near East, South-East Asia and Africa. We see attempts to foster conflict in Central America, in particular to destabilize the duly-elected Government in El Salvador. The Korean airliner tragedy underlines the different standards that exist and that run counter to what is right for the family of nations.

My purpose here is not to belabour the troubles which separate this body, but to try to focus on a better future. The United States is dedicated to that goal. When President Reagan stood before the General Assembly just a few weeks ago on 26 September he reaffirmed the United States Government's commitment, and his personal commitment, to reducing nuclear arms. He made an unequivocal pledge to those gathered in the General Assembly, saying that:

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

"The United States seeks and will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We are ready to be flexible in our approach - indeed, willing to compromise."

(A/38/PV.5, p. 7)

I take this opportunity to reinforce that pledge made by President Reagan.

The United States is embarked on one of the most ambitious arms control agendas ever. That fact often is insufficiently understood and is sometimes, if not often, misrepresented.

Our goal is, pure and simple, to enhance stability by significant nuclear arms reductions. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) we have repeatedly demonstrated flexibility on key issues which divide the two sides. During last summer's round we proposed a draft treaty that addressed several of the concerns voiced by the Soviet Union. Our draft treaty provides a basis on which an agreement that serves the interests of all can be found.

During the current round we are continuing to press for progress. As President Reagan recently announced, the United States delegation will propose a mutual guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads and a build-down of bombers, all designed to encourage stabilizing systems. The United States is willing to negotiate trade-offs between United States advantages and Soviet advantages in ways that will move towards a more stable balance of forces.

In the START negotiations our basic objectives remain unchanged. We seek a safer, more stable strategic balance at force levels much lower than those which exist today. We seek in particular to remove any incentives on either side to launch a first strike. For our part, we cannot be satisfied with merely capping the nuclear arms race at the current, very high, levels.

We have seen some movement in the negotiations, but not nearly as much as we had hoped. So far, the Soviet Union has failed to respond to our initiatives in a manner that would permit significant progress.

In these negotiations our primary focus has, of course, been on weapons systems. But we also recognize that other measures can help promote stability and reduce the risk of war. With this in mind the United States has proposed confidence-building measures in START calling for the pre-notification of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises. We have proposed specific means of improving

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

communications between the two Governments in a crisis. These initiatives are designed to strengthen barriers against the outbreak of war through accident or miscalculation.

The unprecedented and relentless Soviet buildup of triple-warhead SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles - these are the SS-20s that were explained so well by Ambassador van Dongen in his statement this morning - threatens our allies in Europe and in Asia and heightens tensions around the globe. Faced with this problem, the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been seeking a negotiated solution to achieve a balance in such longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

To achieve that balance, the United States initially proposed the elimination of this entire category of nuclear weapons on both sides. In short, we undertook to cancel all planned deployments and production of such missiles if the Soviet Union would eliminate its existing SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and agree not to produce any more such missiles. We continue to see this as the best solution for Americans, for Europeans, for Asians, and for the Soviet people. It is also the very best - to be parochial about my interests - for arms control itself.

The Soviet Union has been unwilling to accept this far-reaching approach to security and stability. I think it is fair to say that the only thing that anybody has seen wrong with the zero option is that the Soviets have refused to accept it. Therefore, to try to move these negotiations forward, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, put forward a proposal earlier this year for an interim agreement that would result in substantially reduced, equal levels of United States and Soviet warheads on a global basis. More recently, President Reagan proposed other steps to try to meet stated Soviet concerns.

As representatives here realize, he expressed, first, a willingness to consider in the context of equal global limits a commitment not to offset the entire Soviet global longer-range INF missile deployment through United States deployments in Europe. We would, of course, retain the right to deploy such missiles elsewhere within the global ceiling.

The President expressed, secondly, a willingness to consider proposals involving aircraft that are consistent with our criteria for an agreement. The President expressed, thirdly, in the context of significant reductions to equal levels, his willingness to apportion the reduction of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in an appropriate manner.

Quite clearly our hope is that this further demonstration of our flexibility will lead to agreement in Geneva. The Soviet Union, however, has refused to negotiate on the basis of equality. Instead, the only basis on which they have said they would negotiate is what amounts to what the President called at the United Nations a "half-zero" option, that is, zero deployments for our side and substantial deployments for their side. They want in effect to perpetuate a complete Soviet monopoly in these missiles, with all the threats to free peoples and to stability that this monopoly implies.

In both the strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms control negotiations we look to the Soviet Union to reciprocate the flexible and constructive approach taken by the United States. With such co-operation from the Soviet side we could report substantial progress in these vital efforts at next year's Assembly, unlike this year's Assembly, where, unfortunately, we cannot announce such progress.

While we push ahead to reduce existing nuclear arsenals, we must also continue vigorous efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Few principles have been more widely accepted in these halls than the fact that nuclear-weapon proliferation constitutes a grave threat to international stability and to the security of all nations. We can be encouraged by the progress we have made working closely together. The number of countries that have opted for nuclear weapons is much smaller than many feared or predicted earlier. I am reminded that in the early 1960s President John F. Kennedy said that there was a prospect of some 25 or even, I believe, 30 nuclear-weapon States in the early 1980s, and because of efforts that we have bolstered and summoned on this issue we are not in the situation that President Kennedy feared over 20 years ago.

But we cannot become complacent about this consensus or rest on our record. Preventing Proliferation requires continued dedication, constant vigilance, fresh initiatives and steadfast support for the barriers to proliferation that now exist.

The third conference to review the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to be held in 1985, affords all parties the opportunity to renew their commitment to the Treaty. As we start planning the conference -- which we in the United States Government are helping to do -- it is my hope that we can encourage all States which have not yet adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so. Let us also work together to reaffirm and strengthen the vital function this Treaty serves in support of the peace and security of all States.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

We are, of course, actively engaged in a number of other arms control endeavours. One of the most important - and one which was discussed earlier by our colleague from the Netherlands - is the effort to rid the world of chemical weapons. To this end the United States is working with other members of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, where our representative is Ambassador Lou Fields, to elaborate a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the destruction of existing stockpiles.

As evidence of the importance we place on this, Vice President Bush launched a major United States initiative at the Committee on Disarmament last February to accelerate the negotiations being undertaken by Ambassador Fields. At that time we introduced a comprehensive document detailing our views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. Then in July Ambassador Fields shared with the Committee our work on illustrative procedures for destroying chemical weapons and for verifying that procedure.

To give those involved in the negotiations a better insight into the problems involved, and a better personal feel for the issues we are dealing with in the Committee on Disarmament, we have now invited the member and observer delegations to that Committee to attend a workshop in mid-November at the chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele Army Depot in Utah. That workshop will demonstrate the United States programme for chemical weapons destruction. We hope that this workshop will stimulate further discussion and progress on means of verifying a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

As we pursue such arms control measures, we must not close our eyes to the environment in which we are working or to actions that go against and can undermine what we are seeking to accomplish. President Reagan's recent address noted areas in which we have serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements already negotiated - agreements the Soviet Union has itself agreed to. It is particularly tragic that the use of chemical warfare in Asia - about which this Committee has heard a great deal from me personally over the last two years - continues today, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention, customary international law, and our sense of human decency - I think everybody's sense of human decency.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

We cannot turn our back on this tragic situation. If we are serious about arms control, then we are serious about compliance issues and we must continue to call attention to problems of compliance so long as they exist. In the chemical weapons area we should actively support efforts to investigate evidence of their use. We look forward to the recommendations of the experts on means to deal with the matter pending completion of a new chemical weapons treaty. Their recommendations will be given very careful attention.

We should also rededicate efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to banning a whole class of radiological weapons before they are ever produced. Given the political will it should be possible, in our view, to reach agreement soon on a consolidated treaty text to outlaw such weapons. We and others in the Committee recognize that, compared with more compelling priorities, a radiological weapons treaty may be viewed as a modest accomplishment. But even modest accomplishments can have value and can help move us further along in our critical work.

The arms control agenda does not end with START, INF and the Committee on Disarmament. The United States and its allies in Western Europe, for example, have taken initiatives to seek reductions in conventional forces in Europe. The East has recently shown some willingness in principle to consider a more realistic framework for monitoring such reductions. We hope that concrete progress is possible. The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is getting under way to work out agreements to reduce the risk of war arising through error or miscalculation. The United States, with its allies, will be taking a positive approach to this important undertaking.

The United States is, as well, reviewing other possible areas for significant arms control measures. We continue, for example, to seek ways effectively to verify nuclear testing limitations. We are also reviewing possible ways of reducing the risks of conflict in space.

The simple fact is that arms control is one of the most intellectually challenging, emotionally gripping and profoundly important endeavours of our era. Working together we have come a fair distance in only two decades. The limited test ban Treaty, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the biological and toxin weapons Convention, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the SALT I Treaty, and the outer

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

space and sea-bed Treaties have all been successfully concluded. I believe they serve, to varying degrees, as critical cornerstones in channelling and curtailing weapons programmes and thereby leading to greater stability.

Our work is far from finished, however, and future progress is likely to present even more challenges. The key issues we face today are extremely complicated, technically, politically and militarily. There are no simple solutions. Sweeping and unverifiable declarations of intent must not be confused with effective arms control.

Reaching agreements that actually strengthen security and promote peace may well prove much more difficult and time-consuming now than they have in the past. The task is also ever more compelling.

As we seek to reduce the threat of war it is useful to remind ourselves of some very key principles. These are principles of arms control and of security in a larger sense.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

First, arms control agreements and the process of negotiating them are not ends in themselves. They are a means to enhance stability, security and understanding between nations and thereby to reduce tension and conflict. Accomplishing those objectives requires agreements that are equitable, verifiable and militarily significant.

We cannot and must not sacrifice progress for the sake of perfection. At the same time, we must not be lured by agreements which might appear appealing but, on reflection, do not really serve the goals for which they are intended. Empty agreements would be easy. But agreements that inflate expectations without much in the way of concrete benefit would not, on balance, serve our interest.

Secondly, just as effective arms control does not come easily, it also takes considerable time and patience. Negotiation of the NPT, for example, took more than five years. Other agreements required even more time. There is no quick and easy route. I am often reminded that the Austrian State Agreement took over 10 years of negotiations. We might not have a free, democratic, neutral and independent Austria today, without the presence of Soviet troops, had the West compromised its principles and objectives at any point in that 10-year span.

A third principle is that the attempts of the United States and its allies to maintain an effective deterrent and military balance are essential for stability in the world and as an incentive for the arms control process really to work. In this light, the Reagan Administration has pursued programmes to strengthen defences and redress the imbalances that have come about over the past decade. These are the imbalances that I have described in detail to this Committee over the past two years. These programmes provide strong incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate with us for genuine arms reductions.

Effective deterrence and effective arms control have both become more difficult to achieve quite simply because of Soviet conduct and Soviet weapons build-up over the past decade. Since 1972 the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons have increased threefold. It has dedicated an estimated 12 per cent to 14 per cent of its gross national product to defence. This compares with less than 8 per cent for the United States. Moreover, while the West has unilaterally retired over 1,000 nuclear warheads in Europe since 1979, the Soviets have steadily increased theirs. By word and deed, the Soviets have shown that they regard

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

military power and the correlation of forces, as they call it, including nuclear forces, as the foundation for projecting their power and influence around the world.

The United States has no interest in an "arms race" with the Soviet Union. The "arms race" of course, has been discussed a great deal in this room over the last two years. President Reagan has made it clear that we seek only to restore a stable military balance and to do what is necessary to assure deterrence and reduce the risk of war.

The fact is that the number of weapons in the United States nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years. Despite all the talk that takes place in parts of the United Nations about the relentless ever-increasing arms race on both sides, I repeat that the number of weapons in the United States nuclear stockpile is today at its lowest level in 20 years. Since the mid-1960s, the nuclear stockpile quantity has declined considerably. The number of nuclear weapons in our total inventory was one third higher in 1967 than it is today. In more graphic terms, the United States today deploys some 3,000 fewer nuclear weapons than it deployed in the late 1960s. The total megatonnage of our nuclear weapons today is one fourth -- that is, 75 per cent less than what it was in 1960. Statistics of that kind defy the rhetoric about the ever-increasing arms race and are to the credit of the American side. The goal of our programmes and arms control policies, as I outlined at the beginning, is to reduce nuclear arms even further, and in an equal manner as between the United States and the Soviet Union, in a way that will increase stability.

A fourth general principle is that arms control cannot be divorced from the broader context of the international climate. President Johnson's plans for a Moscow visit to launch SALT I and the whole SALT process were dashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. The Carter Administration's approach to SALT II was very deeply affected, as everyone knows, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

The United States and other policy-makers on the world stage should not -- and the United States and the Reagan Administration will not -- unnecessarily link or burden arms control efforts by tying them to other facts of Soviet behaviour and conduct in various parts of the world. At the same time, we in democratic societies with freely elected representatives of the people cannot ignore that those realities can, and at times will inevitably, have an impact on the climate for our arms control efforts.

The final principle is that success in arms control requires sustained political will and purpose. Only by our being steadfast will success be at all possible.

It is important to recognize that, in the long run, success will hinge on the ability of the political leadership in free societies to inform and to build consensus on arms control issues. Our deepest values and our democratic principles demand this. Discussion, debate and dissent form the very fibres of free societies and are key signs of our strength. Regrettably, those voices for real peace and against war, for human rights and against tyranny, for effective arms reductions and against arms build-up are stifled in closed societies. As reflected in last year's relevant United Nations resolution, which was adopted unanimously, those voices should now be allowed to be heard. The United States delegation will have more to say later on this issue to build upon the work of the First Committee on a consensus basis last year.

We are on a long and difficult road on which every nation has an important responsibility. We recognize that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, but no State can escape some responsibility for the arms control issues that confront us today. Since 1945 we have witnessed over 150 conventional wars or guerrilla actions, which have killed over 10 million people -- staggering statistics.

The continuing struggle for peace is in many respects indivisible. Like my predecessor, Eugene Rostow, I hope for a brighter tomorrow. I believe it is possible. It is not easy, but it is possible. It will require that we all admit the existence of the problems we confront. They cannot be resolved if they are denied.

The continuing struggle for peace is not a casual undertaking. It is deadly serious and it is everybody's business. If all States in this Assembly involve themselves constructively there will be a real prospect for a brighter tomorrow.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): The Nigerian delegation is happy to see Ambassador Vraalsen presiding over the affairs of the First Committee during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. As a worthy representative of Norway, a country with which Nigeria enjoys excellent relations, he can rest assured that my delegation will extend to him its full co-operation in the discharge of his responsibilities. My delegation would like to place it on record, with appreciation, that he has undertaken intensive and extensive consultations both here and in Geneva in order to facilitate the work of our Committee. It is our hope that his efforts will bear fruitful results. We also avail ourselves of this opportunity to convey to the other officers of the Committee our felicitations and best wishes.

The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, ominously threatens the very survival of the human race. The prospects of a civilization being led dangerously and inexorably on the road to self-extinction provide us with the motive force, a reasoning and a rationality for the development of options which open to us the possibility and the prospects of effecting a change in the postures of States, which by investing so heavily in the arms race seem bent on hastening the process of human destruction. We are convinced, however, that neither these major proponents of the arms race nor any State, for that matter, would rationally wish death and destruction to the human race of which they themselves form a part.

The United Nations must seek to re-establish its moral authority and relevance in the solution of problems confronting it, particularly in relation to halting and reversing the arms race, thereby ensuring the continued survival of our civilization.

In contributing to the debate on the related issues of international peace and security, disarmament and development, the delegation of Nigeria retains as its basic premise the conviction that although disarmament is complex and sensitive because of the security perception of States, which is built upon the quantity and quality of their military efforts and capability, it is still considered possible and indeed feasible to achieve disarmament given the political will of States to negotiate in good faith.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

It can no longer be regarded as a figment of the imagination to suggest that the most urgent task facing humanity today is the prevention of nuclear war. Dangerous doctrines of limited winnable or survivable nuclear war, or of flexible response, not only have lowered the nuclear threshold but have made the outbreak of nuclear war a threatening reality. In this regard, my delegation noted with considerable interest the views regarding nuclear war expressed by President Reagan when he addressed the General Assembly on 27 September 1983. On that occasion he said:

"A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I believe that if Governments are determined to deter and prevent war, there will not be war. Nothing is more in keeping with the spirit of the United Nations Charter than arms control". (A/38/PV.5, p. 3)

In that statement we see the President endorsing some of the views held by a great majority of the international community concerning disarmament negotiations. The first concerns the need to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, which, as the President himself has admitted, cannot be won. The second concerns the important role played by political will in disarmament negotiations.

Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war: they are weapons of mass annihilation. While it is legitimate and proper that States should seek to provide, as a first duty, for their security, it is obvious to all that the current level of sophistication of weaponry available to States is out of tune with their defence and security requirements. And, what is more, the frenzied pursuit of a weapons option as the sole instrument for conflict resolution not only exacerbates international tension but destroys mutual trust and confidence among States and runs counter to the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter, to which we have all willingly subscribed as representing, in a general sense, the collective conscience of the international community.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

While there is a shared responsibility to halt and reverse the arms race in the interest of human survival, civilization and progressive development we cannot gloss over the unacceptable situation in which global security has been held hostage to the security interests of a handful of States. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, which bear special responsibility for the arms race, should also accept the primary duty and obligation to achieve substantial reductions in their military arsenals as a first step towards general and complete disarmament. For when it becomes possible, and indeed fashionable, for States to talk of developing and pursuing global strategies, of creating spheres of influence, of ministering to self-imposed worldwide responsibilities, of being specialists in crisis management - the embers of which crisis they created and fanned in the first place - it is clear that the very basis of constructing the peace process is undermined.

It is also clear that no people or groups of people, irrespective of their level of development or political consciousness, can subject themselves or allow themselves to be subjected to perpetual domination. It is therefore not only extremely dangerous but, equally, untenable for any State or group of States to wish to impose its values on any other State or group of States. Such a situation provides fertile grounds for friction, tension and revolt.

This quest for domination has unfortunately manifested itself in various forms. The pattern of economic relations between the North and the South demonstrates the willingness of the former to perpetuate its domination over the latter through the adoption of appropriate policies and an unwillingness to contribute to the achievement of an international economic system based on equity and justice.

There is no doubt but that the control of nuclear weapons is the key to the possibility of peace. That is why all efforts must be geared towards the eventual elimination of these weapons in particular and the prevention of nuclear war in general. In this context, we must reiterate our conviction that modalities such as the acceptance of a nuclear

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

freeze, which would imply both a quantitative and a qualitative freeze on nuclear weapons, systems of such weapons and their means of delivery at current levels, a moratorium on weapons testing in all environments by all the nuclear-weapon States, a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and a gradual but substantial reduction in existing stockpiles, and so forth - all these retain the possibility of the achievement of nuclear disarmament over a period of time.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Of particular importance is the necessity of elaborating, with a minimum delay, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as part of the far-reaching objective of curtailing the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately the Committee on Disarmament, which has been seized of this question, has thus far failed to make any progress. We note with concern that it has not been possible for all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the Ad-Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban established by the Committee. We cannot envisage the conclusion of a nuclear test ban that fails to win the concurrence and commitment of all the nuclear-weapon States. In other words, in order for an effective nuclear test ban to be achieved it must be comprehensive and verifiable, and it must elicit a commitment of absolute compliance by all the nuclear-weapon States in particular and by all other States in general. In the circumstances it is our hope that the two remaining nuclear-weapon States will reconsider their position and, in the interest of the common good, agree to join forces with the other three in the elaboration, within the single multilateral forum of the Committee on Disarmament, of a binding nuclear test-ban treaty.

Although some useful work has been done in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of defining the issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making progress towards a nuclear test ban, the point must continue to be made that the central issue of concluding a nuclear test ban must not be sidetracked in a haze of technical ancillary questions. A nuclear test ban involves both a political decision and a technical consideration. The political decision, which must in the international interest be taken right away, is to request the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without further delay to the elaboration of a nuclear test-ban treaty on the basis of an appropriate mandate.

Of equal importance is the need to conclude as soon as possible a convention aimed at the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. My

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

delegation believes that such a ban should envisage a commitment to the non-production of chemical weapons, chemical agents and their precursors as well as the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and agents.

While the integrity and contribution of the chemical industry to the processes of development of countries should be encouraged rather than jeopardized, it is the view of my delegation that a general-purpose criterion, rather than a selective prohibition of chemical substances, stands a better chance of plugging the loopholes which would permit the diversion of such substances from peaceful to military uses on the part of a country that so decides.

Pending the elaboration of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons it is highly desirable that States which already possess such weapons or intend to manufacture, deploy or stockpile them on the basis of the technology and facilities available to them exercise the maximum self-restraint, including a moratorium on such manufacturing, deployment or stockpiling.

In this connection we cannot fail to note with concern the recent decision by one nuclear-weapon State to proceed with the production of a new generation of chemical weapons. At the same time we must not gloss over the reported cases of the use of chemical weapons in combat situations by certain States in certain regions of the world in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We must here reiterate our position of principle that when such allegations are made international efforts must be exerted to establish the truth of the matter beyond all reasonable doubt, both as a means of establishing mutual trust and restoring confidence among States and as a means of ensuring that the provisions of the relevant international instrument are being faithfully observed.

We note with interest that the Committee on Disarmament has continued its consideration of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons which, as of now, are said not to exist as a weapons system, but which can readily be developed and deployed at short notice on the basis of existing technology. Such a convention has validity and relevance in so far as

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it prevents the addition of another weapons system to an existing awesome stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. We believe, however, that the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities should form an integral part of such a convention, in particular because the radiological consequences of such attacks can be as destructive as those of a nuclear explosion and also in view of the necessity of protecting nuclear facilities as a contribution to the development efforts of States.

A natural concomitant to real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament will be a sustained effort to achieve significant reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces. In other words, progress in nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to approaching conventional disarmament. It is therefore not productive to wish to accord parity of status to both aspects of the arms race.

Such an understanding must not be taken to imply a diminution of impact of the conventional arms race on the socio-economic experiences of States. Rather, it seeks to emphasize the need to achieve conventional disarmament on a global basis and on the understanding that the security of no State will, as a consequence, be either jeopardized or diminished or its sovereignty undermined.

The extension of the arms race into outer space must be seen not only as a dangerous phenomenon but also as a disturbing one. For while it was once possible for us, in our collective psyche, to think of outer space as representing a haven, with connotations of unlimited expanse and freedom, it is now clear that the development and deployment of various forms of satellite with military orientations by a handful of States has made that conception of outer space obsolete. As though the intractable dilemma which the current arms race on land, on the high seas and in the ocean depths creates were not enough, those nations have sought to make the entire human environment a theatre of war. They must be told that enough is enough. The prospect of a war conducted from outer space must be seen as not only an invasion of man's last frontier; it

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should also send chills down the spines of all men of good conscience. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall that the extension of the arms race into outer space, with its deleterious consequences on the human environment and on ecology, runs counter to the spirit of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Events in the recent past have shown that the extension of the arms race into outer space poses a real threat to international peace and security. For instance, the development of a space-based anti-satellite defence system has introduced a new dimension into space warfare prospects. Furthermore, the increase in the use of anti-satellite weapons, high-energy lasers and particle-beam weapons certainly negates the spirit of the 1967 Treaty and other pertinent legal instruments whose objective is to promote the exploration and use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes. My delegation believes that it is incumbent on the General Assembly to re-emphasize international concern on the subject, underscore the urgency of the situation and prevail on the Committee on Disarmament to undertake expeditiously substantive negotiations on the question with a view to reaching an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The current reality is that the non-nuclear-weapon States are constantly being reminded that unless they play ball in line with the wishes of the nuclear-weapon States their very security cannot be assured. It is in recognition of this reality that the non-nuclear-weapon States have sought, in vain thus far, to assure themselves and, at the same time, be assured in an instrument of legally binding character that they will not be victims of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. And yet the majority of these States, by agreeing to become parties to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, have forsworn the nuclear weapons option. And what is more, the nuclear-weapon States, in response to these legitimate demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States, have made unilateral declarations with conditional guarantees. I must submit that the conditionality attaching to some of these declarations robs them of their content, value and applicability. In the circumstances, we demand that, as a minimum and as an earnest of their good intention and commitment not to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States should agree unconditionally to conclude a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, with the minimum of delay, within the multilateral forum of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria) ✓

Within this perspective, my delegation wishes to draw attention once again to the threat posed to the security of the African continent by South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability. Nuclear weapons in the hands of a racist minority régime constitute an instrument of blackmail, oppression and repression. Besides, in the case of South Africa that capability has also been used for aggressive purposes against neighbouring African States. Africa's commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free continent remains valid and is consistent with its determination to pursue development in peace. Thus every effort or action aimed at destabilizing the continent or frustrating the achievement of the objective of a denuclearized Africa is not only an unfriendly act but also one that has to be resisted, either individually or collectively, as appropriate. We call once again on those Member countries which have willingly given solace, support and co-operation to South Africa in its development of this capability to change course and rethink their options, in the interest of international peace and security.

Having regard to the present state of play in the bipolar military situation, the singular lack of progress in disarmament talks, the demonstrable unwillingness on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to undertake meaningful disarmament measures and the very defensive postures of Governments in relation to their military effort and capability, it seems to my delegation that the only visible option, which should be further explored in the present circumstances, is the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament. World public opinion enlightened as to the evils of the arms race, especially its destabilizing character and its capacity to distort the socio-economic options and priorities of States, will, it is believed, prompt Governments to take the right decisions in favour of disarmament. Such mobilization within the context of the World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982, should have as its objective to inform, educate and provide a forum for the free exchange of views in all objectivity and in all the regions of the world. In the view of my delegation, it is extremely important that such mobilization of world public opinion should not be muzzled but encouraged to result in productive consciousness.

(Mr. Ljewere, Nigeria)

As part of the mobilization of world public opinion, the United Nations fellowship programme on disarmament should continue to provide education and training in disarmament as an investment in human development.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which has since come to represent a blueprint and a frame of reference in the collective effort towards disarmament, must be seen as a bold and imaginative first step on the tedious road to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The expectation was that, drawing inspiration from its various provisions, in particular its Programme of Action, Member States would find themselves disposed to undertake constructive debates and negotiations leading to the adoption of concrete disarmament measures. This has of course not been the case and, although the validity of the Final Document was reconfirmed by consensus during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the attitude of some States in subsequent disarmament talks has been to seek to call into question the continuing validity of the Final Document. This is regrettable.

As a further effort to move out of the seeming impasse, the comprehensive programme of disarmament was conceived as a novel but unified perspective, with modest steps in disarmament, taking account of the various sensitivities - individual, bilateral and multilateral, and regional as well as global - within a realistic target date. It was the expectation that the Committee on Disarmament, to which the programme had been submitted for negotiation, would be able to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982, an agreed text for adoption. This proved impossible. The hope was, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament would submit a renegotiated text for adoption during the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

My delegation is pleased to note that the Committee on Disarmament has now been able to present a modified text of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We wish to express our gratitude to the States members of the Committee for their efforts in that endeavour, and most especially to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

indefatigable and highly motivated Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico for having undertaken an almost impossible task. He certainly deserves our commendation, given the attitude of inflexibility on the part of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

It has become increasingly clear that any multilateral effort at developing a common perspective in the fight against the arms race and its very dangerous consequences has to pander, first of all, to the moods and sensitivities of the two super-Powers, and by extension to those of the other nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States. That is why we think that the state of play in the bilateral relations between the two super-Powers has a profound impact on the progress, or lack of it, in all disarmament talks. In this connection we have been noting with increasing concern the unfolding, in paltry and hesitant spurts, of the bilateral United States-Soviet Union talks on medium-range nuclear weapons and of the strategic arms limitation talks which have been going on intermittently in Geneva. We should like to suggest to the two countries that those talks and the interests and concerns of the rest of the world really cannot be mutually exclusive. Those countries have a responsibility to the world to reduce tension in their bilateral relations and to achieve substantial progress in disarmament. They must not renege on that duty.

Before concluding, I should like to make a few comments on organizational matters which by their very import have far-reaching implications for the ability of the United Nations to fulfil its central role in the field of disarmament negotiations. My delegation has noted with interest, and indeed with satisfaction, the recent decision to upgrade, and the subsequent upgrading of, the Centre for Disarmament into a full-fledged department, the Department for Disarmament Affairs. That decision was taken in full recognition of the enhanced role which has been envisaged for the Department in view of the growing complexity of disarmament efforts and the necessity for the Department for Disarmament Affairs to service adequately the various conferences, meetings and consultations under United Nations auspices which bear directly on disarmament. We look forward to receiving during the current session of the General Assembly a status report on how far and in what manner the change has been implemented.

Secondly, by a resolution of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament was requested to consider redesignating itself as the Conference on Disarmament. From that Committee's report to the current session of the General Assembly it is clear that it has considered the request on its merits and has agreed to redesignate itself as the Conference on Disarmament. We laud

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

that decision and express the hope that the enhanced status of the Conference on Disarmament will entail a consequent commitment on the part of its members to fruitful debate and to the preparation of binding international instruments leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Mr. HARON (Malaysia): The quest for security in an insecure world is a perpetual driving force that moves men and nations. So irresistible is this driving force that men are apt to lose sight of the essential paradox of security: that while it is often perceived and understood in terms of an absolute, it can realistically be achieved only in relative measure. In chasing the illusion of absolute security they only feed the insecurity of their environment, heightening in turn their own sense of insecurity.

To the big and powerful of this earth, the temptation to see security in absolute terms - to see their security as being exclusive of the security or insecurity of others - can be quite overwhelming. There is much impatience with the importunate insistence of the less fortunate that the security of the powerful and the security of the others, far from being mutually exclusive, are in fact mutually strengthening. Nor is this delusion of absolutism much helped by the tendency of the small and the weak themselves to regard overall security as being directly and solely related to the state of play between the big and the powerful, and not as the sum total of their own separate prospects.

Almost 40 years ago came the end of the Second World War, which was supposed to end all wars. Out of the ashes of Hiroshima came the chilling realization that a third world war would entirely obliterate existing human civilization. The nuclear terror provided a most powerful inducement for the nuclear Powers not to stumble into direct war, but it did not prevent them from grafting their rivalries on to internal and regional conflicts of every conceivable kind in regions deemed to be of strategic importance to them. Subsequent autonomous developments over time in key areas, especially in the European theatre, fired not least by the fears of their peoples and Governments of a possible nuclear disaster, helped for a time to force self-restraint upon the super-Powers, ushering in a brief flirtation with the politics of détente. Both super-Powers were practically dragged along, moving step by painful step to reaching agreements on European security through summit conferences, the Helsinki agreement, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

(Mr. Haron, Malaysia)

But the sense of relative security that prevailed in Europe could not, unfortunately, be extended to areas not considered to be strategically vital, and therefore seen as being up for grabs: the third world. The notion of symmetry of power conceded by one Power was not, it seemed, sufficient incentive for the other to pass up the opportunities available in the internationalist duty of assisting societies and States in supposed revolutionary transformation. Assistance was almost always characterized by generous inflows of conventional armaments. The result, invariably, was the spectacle of rival countries and rival groups within countries battling each other with foreign-made and foreign-supplied weapons at the expense of their social, economic and political advancement. Assymetry of expectations between the super-Powers with regard to the third world saw détente degenerate into disillusionment and mutual recrimination; the gains of the period, modest as they were, quickly eroded. Although since Hiroshima men have said that a nuclear war is unwinnable and therefore unthinkable, today the super-Powers are again poised to introduce newer, more lethal weapons systems, as if such a war were now thinkable, and therefore winnable. Will all these developments end in frenetic lunacy?

As we meet during this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, we cannot but be singularly conscious that we are meeting under changed and changing circumstances. We cannot draw much comfort from developments on the international scene. The brief flowering of détente in the early 1970s has withered in the chill of super-Power relations in the early 1980s, as fundamental rivalries and antagonisms and competition for spheres of influence reassert themselves.

In view of this gloomy trend, my delegation would like to underscore the need to urge the super-Powers to resume their search for détente in an earnest, realistic and comprehensive manner which would safeguard international security everywhere. The task of establishing a new détente will have to be approached not only on the level of disarmament, nuclear and conventional, but also on the level of political understanding and accommodation. There is an urgent need for both parties to come to an agreed, well-defined perception of a code of behaviour in their relations with the countries of the third world. Had this issue been resolved by the super-Powers in the basic principles of relations of 1972, SALT II might well have paved

(Mr. Haron, Malaysia)

a path guiding us through the dangerous minefield of the nuclear age. Admittedly, there were some serious weaknesses, but the agreed principles were workable enough to provide an opportunity for a hopeful first step on to what could have been a rung of the ladder leading to a world order free from nuclear terror.

(Mr. Haron, Malaysia)

The third world countries have in the interim steadily gained importance as factors in regional balances. Thus it is no longer adequate for the super-Powers either to interact with them as mere extensions of their respective blinkered ideological concerns or as extensions of their mutual accommodation. They, who are both the subjects and the objects of arrangements and understandings, should be equally involved in the determination of their security prospects. There must be a multilateral approach to security, if only to take cognizance of contemporary reality.

With regard to the disarmament process itself, my delegation is of the view that there are cogent arguments for the notion that no one should be starry-eyed, however well meaning, in the unilateralist belief that if only one side were to start to disarm first the other side would respond positively. We are far from being a global metropolis, with its own law makers and enforcers. Self-serving, self-righteous and indeed utterly selfish institutional, national or ideological commitments, which are the order of the day will never permit the idea of a unilateralist approach. Only a fool-proof intelligence monitoring and collection capability held equally by the parties concerned or mutual confidence and trust may incline one party to take the first step. Sadly, these elements are still absent amongst us.

The concern of the hundreds of thousands all over the world alarmed at the mad momentum of the arms race cannot however, go unheeded. Those responsible for the atomic horror both in the West and in the East owe them a moral and political obligation, just as much as they owe to their own respective civilizations, cultures and ideologies the obligation to increase the prospect for a real peace, in place of an uneasy nuclear peace based on the balance of terror.

Although realism dictates that we have to accept in the final analysis that the decision to disarm resides mainly in the hands of the big Powers, Malaysia does not believe that the rest of us should resign from our respective roles in the matter of disarmament. In our view, all countries

(Mr. Haron, Malaysia)

should join together in the creation of conditions in which disarmament would constitute the natural order of things for the big Powers. In this regard, Malaysia, together with its partners in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), has consistently striven to make our own contribution towards world peace and security.

For us in ASEAN security has always been perceived in the sense of ensuring not merely the physical safety of our peoples against internal and external attacks but most especially their continuing political, social and economic advancement. We have fulfilled to a substantial degree the personal and national aspirations of our peoples and, in a situation somewhat analogous to that existing between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, would very much welcome peaceful coexistence with the neighbouring States of Indo-China. Unlike Europe, however, ASEAN has adopted a strategy of restraint through neutrality rather than nuclear deterrence through military alliances. The ASEAN approach seeks a denial of big Power rivalries in the region while maintaining equidistance and respecting their legitimate interests in international relations. In the context of South-East Asia, a structure of peace and stability modelled upon the European experience would be not only irrelevant but also highly dangerous. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 1971 laid the basis for concerted action to free the region of South-East Asia from external Power rivalry in any form and manifestation. External Power rivalry had been the scourge afflicting regional peace and stability for more than five centuries, and it is our hope that the States of Indo-China will work with ASEAN in the context of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality to rid South-East Asia of that scourge and so inspire the growth of similar zones elsewhere.

Our deliberations in the First Committee deal essentially with the symptoms of international insecurity not its causes. It is a testimony to the seriousness of the situation, however, that we are driven to cope with so many symptoms lest they overwhelm us even before we can address the malady itself. While we work on the nuts and bolts of disarmament, we should not lose

(Mr. Haron, Malaysia)

sight of the need to attempt to trigger the survival response mechanism of the super-Powers as well. No matter how blinkered each may be by its ideological conditioning and cultural commitment, it cannot remain oblivious to cost-benefit analysis. There is no such thing now as a margin of safety, given their nuclear parity. The alternative to détente is a nuclear holocaust which will destroy not only men but also their beliefs, civilizations and ideologies. Where, indeed, is the glory, one might ask, in dying for a cause, when the cause itself dies with one?

Mr. PEREZ GUERRERO (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to offer the Chairman and the other officers of the Committee the cordial congratulations of my delegation on their election. The Chairman's country and the region to which it belongs have had a constant interest in disarmament problems, and this augurs well for the work of the Committee.

The international situation, particularly in view of the lack of specific results in disarmament negotiations, can only be described as highly disturbing. When one considers also the arms race between the great nuclear Powers, which shows signs of accelerating even further, the insecurity and instability of the world in which we live are brought sharply into focus.

Moreover, the results of the work of the deliberative and negotiating bodies of the General Assembly are discouraging. Hence the urgent need to make the United Nations and its organs a more efficient political institution, capable of strengthening the system of international security, which involves not merely disarmament aspects but also those related to economic development and social well-being, which are without doubt factors conducive to peace. International peace and security cannot be achieved without a combined effort towards disarmament and development. When we look at the picture of the world today we see how true that is.

It is not merely a matter of the number of items considered and the number of resolutions adopted. In fact the results in quantitative terms may have been in inverse ratio to the achievements in qualitative terms. The increasing number of items and resolutions has not meant real progress in the difficult task of disarmament. On the contrary while 58 resolutions were adopted at the last session

(Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela)

of the General Assembly, we are confronted with a virtual standstill, in spite of the efforts of the group of countries which, like mine, are convinced, as Ambassador Garcia Robles has said, that a drop of water, falling steadily, is capable of boring through rock.

As the Secretary-General has rightly observed, it is essential that the various organs of the United Nations not be used exclusively as forums for political debate. Nothing is more pertinent in the case of the First Committee, where resolutions are adopted calling for the preparation of more reports which in turn lead to more resolutions.

(Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela)

We must recognize the urgent need for us to adopt realistic approaches to disarmament, and for the decisions and resolutions that we adopt to prompt Governments to act. We endorse the words of the Secretary-General when he says in his report:

"In no area is the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter more important and more closely tied to the survival of humanity than in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. The prevention of nuclear war remains the unique challenge of our time, since such a war would be the ultimate negation of all human endeavour." (A/38/1, pp. 4-5)

We must, for example, see that the First Committee is not used as an instrument for certain Governments to make statements intended to win political advantages from those they regard as their adversaries in the world strategy game, statements often made solely for the purpose of convincing the public of their good intentions.

As a result of this attitude, every year this Committee has more items assigned to it and more resolutions are adopted. As pointed out in the outstanding publication on disarmament of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), those resolutions contain only appeals and solemn declarations in no way different in their content from those adopted year after year since the 1960s. Worse still, instead of resulting from a convergence of positions through negotiations or possible consensus between Member States, the resolutions signify disagreement or divergences in the approach to the major disarmament problems. There is an evident lack of political will to reach agreements or arrangements in the major tasks of disarmament.

We therefore welcome the appeal of those who have said that the first task that this Committee should concentrate on is that of an attempt to rationalize its working procedures, in order to give substance and realism to its work. This is even more urgent in view of the state of stagnation in disarmament negotiations at the present time at virtually all levels, with the exception, at least formally speaking, of aspects related to disarmament in the Final Document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of the convening of the forthcoming Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, to be held in Stockholm in January 1984.

(Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela)

We are disturbed by the fact that the positions adopted by the two super-Powers in their bilateral negotiations in Geneva are tending to become more radical and inflexible. It seems that the prospect for a short-term agreement at the talks on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe are fading; nor do the talks on strategic arms limitations (START), the follow-up to the SALT process, seem to stand much chance of success, especially when their slow progress is compared with the dynamic pace of technological developments. These developments permit the replacement of obsolete weapons with others, perhaps fewer but more expensive, more powerful and more efficient in dealing out death and destruction, one of the few goals which have been achieved in this tormented world - a true aberation.

There is every prospect, therefore, of a new round in the rearmament programmes of the great Powers, with better siting of weapons and new areas for the deployment of ever more sophisticated weapons, as evidenced by the already declared arms race in outer space - in other words, another phase in the East-West confrontation.

We are also disturbed by the attitude adopted by one nuclear Power towards the trilateral talks which have been taking place on a nuclear test ban, as well as the refusal of two nuclear Powers, in the multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, to take part in the recently created Ad Hoc Working Group. Like other countries, we favour the earliest possible resumption of the trilateral talks, together with those to be held in the Committee on Disarmament. In this regard, we must draw attention to the tendency of certain Powers to try to turn the Committee on Disarmament into another deliberative forum in order to avoid any kind of genuine negotiations which could lead to specific disarmament agreements. It would almost seem that they want to avoid agreements such as that prohibiting once and for all the testing of nuclear weapons; an agreement on chemical weapons; agreements on negative guarantees; and the adoption of legally binding measures prohibiting military attacks on nuclear installations. All this could be achieved through strengthening the obligations contained in the 1949 Geneva Protocols or the adoption of another instrument, such as an additional protocol to a possible Convention on radiological weapons.

(Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela)

None of the delegations here doubt the urgent need to prevent a nuclear war, because it is not only the most urgently needed measure but the one most in accord with man's rationality, unless we wish to share the pessimistic outlook of the late thinker and writer, Arthur Koestler.

It is timely to remind the nuclear Powers that they should start negotiations in a constructive spirit, in keeping with the commitment that they entered into in the preamble to the partial nuclear test ban Treaty and article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as a request has been made for the inclusion on the agenda of an item on the convening of the third review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The logic and common sense of all Member States must make it clear to them that if the nuclear-weapon States are not genuinely prepared to negotiate verifiable and effective agreements leading to a significant quantitative and qualitative reduction in all existing nuclear-weapon systems, and those currently being developed, one cannot expect a genuine interest in undertaking a legally binding commitment not to acquire, possess or use them from States that do not possess such weapons, but might see them as a means of gaining political or military advantage.

Moreover, the door will always be open for those who at any time feel that for reasons of national security they do not wish to be bound by a commitment which seems to represent only obligations for them, without the necessary equivalent commitments by the nuclear-weapon States and those States which are in a privileged position because they have an advanced nuclear technology or the means to develop it.

(Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela)

Recent events, such as the conflict in the South Atlantic, the stagnation of the negotiations in the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and the postponement of that Conference, have highlighted the differences between the views advanced by the various groups of Member States on the concept of non-proliferation and the restrictions it implies through the classification of States into categories - that is, whether they are developing, industrialized, and/or nuclear-weapon States. This order in the scale of privileges and rights of Member States implies that the concept of non-proliferation is no longer based simply on the concept of the possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons, or other explosive devices. Instead, it represents a desire or attempt to prohibit the possession, transfer or restriction of certain nuclear technologies regarded as sensitive - in other words, likely to lead to proliferation.

For similar reasons, doubt has been expressed about the viability, in the world in which we live, of what are termed nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the one inhabited area where there is a legally established nuclear-weapon-free zone, that established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we have seen how difficult it is to reconcile the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon States and those States' interests.

(Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela)

This means that in fact there is no guarantee against the military use of nuclear energy or of nuclear weapons themselves, as long as they continue to exist and can be used as instruments of coercion. That argument applies similarly to the so-called negative security guarantees.

This is sharp contrast with the increasing awareness of the peoples of the international community of the dangers inherent in the frenetic arms race. Hence the increasingly urgent need for the fullest possible flow of information to all the inhabitants of the earth about the dangers of the arms race and its many implications. In this respect, the World Disarmament Campaign is of great importance. That is why Venezuela offered to be host to the regional seminar on disarmament for educators in the Americas held in Caracas from 4 to 7 October, which was jointly organized by the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

In this connection it is relevant to emphasize the importance of the work being done by UNESCO in the promotion and encouragement of education for peace.

The challenge facing us, as the Palme report rightly observes, is to ensure that, confronted with the unrestricted nuclear arms race, people all over the world do not ignore the danger involved or lose faith in their ability to change the course of events. Throughout history we have seen how many wars have started while peace talks have been going on. Let us act together to make sure that this never happens again.

Mr. RAHA (Nepal): In our common quest for peace and development no other issue occupies as much importance and urgency as does disarmament. Yet this has been the area which has seen less progress and more problems. Despite our concern and commitment, the disarmament negotiations have not so far yielded tangible results. Instead we have been a helpless witness to the ever escalating arms race in both the nuclear and the conventional field. The massive arms build-up not only has disturbed the environment of international peace and security but also poses a serious threat to the very survival of mankind. While all States recognize the need for disarmament and arms control, the tendency to seek security in the accumulation of arms seems to be growing. If the continuing deterioration in the relations between the two super-Powers has been responsible for perpetuating the arms race, the deepening crisis in various parts of the globe has further aggravated the vicious cycle of mistrust and military build up.

The central responsibility for the peaceful management of international crises rests with the United Nations. The present international situation has led to a weakening of this instrument, which we consider vital to ensuring co-operation and common security. We share the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General over the rapid erosion of the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, and support his appeal that this instrument be used in a more determined way and that steps be taken immediately to strengthen its security role.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was a dismal failure. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament is virtually barren and the Disarmament Commission, in spite of the recent streamlining, continues to be a forum for long-held national prejudices and concern.

I should now like to turn to some of the items on our agenda.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

As the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament indicated, the principal goal of disarmament is to ensure the survival of mankind by eliminating the danger of war, in particular nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are increasingly regarded as more of a threat than a means of protection, even by those for whose defence they are intended. Long-held concepts of national security are now being challenged. For an increasing number of people a nuclear war would be, as the Secretary-General puts it, "the ultimate negation of all human endeavour" (A/38/1, p. 5). We view the growing popular movement in favour of nuclear disarmament with much expectation. We hope it will exert sufficient pressure on the major Powers to halt and reverse their nuclear competition. While this question concerns the survival of all, the solution lies ultimately in the hands of the nuclear Powers, and particularly the two super-Powers. We therefore reiterate our satisfaction at the fact that negotiations are still under way between them on intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic arms reduction, and we renew our appeal for an early and meaningful conclusion. It is our hope that they will rise above narrow considerations of bargaining for advantage. Nepal believes that continuing dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States is necessary to open the way to the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Nepal is deeply concerned over the lack of progress towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. We consider that to be an important step to halt the vertical sophistication and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both super-Powers have undertaken solemn obligations under the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for a comprehensive test ban. A comprehensive test ban, more than any other measure in the field of disarmament, is a matter of political will. As vital technical questions are no longer any problem, it is a matter of great regret that the Committee on Disarmament has failed to report any progress in those negotiations. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, my delegation supports the idea of a moratorium on nuclear tests.

(Mr. Rana Nepal)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty continues to be the single most important international instrument of the non-proliferation régime. The obvious signs of strain in the non-proliferation régime call for renewed efforts to strengthen that international instrument. The extension and development of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency would also contribute greatly to the strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation Treaty. The greatest contribution to the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation régime would, however, have to come from the nuclear-weapon States, in fulfilment of their obligation under article VI of the Treaty, concerning nuclear non-proliferation.

My delegation reiterates its stand that non-nuclear States which are not party to any military alliance are entitled to a categorical and legally binding assurance that they will not be subject to a nuclear attack. We regret the lack of progress in this regard in the Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

Nepal continues to believe that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the basis of agreement freely arrived at between States of a region can be an important step towards nuclear disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco provides a model for other regions of the world, and we welcome efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

Among other important priority items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament is the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. A great deal of useful work has been done towards the elaboration of an agreement on chemical weapons. Without the active support of the two major Powers and a clear demonstration of political will, there is apprehension that the opportunity to close the deal will be lost.

My delegation has repeatedly called for measures to curb the production and transfer of conventional weapons. The primary move in this regard would be to take practical steps towards reducing the armed forces and armaments of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, particularly in the regions where there are concentrations of troops and armaments. At the same time, however, we must not overlook the growing tendency among the developing countries to accumulate armaments and engage in higher military expenditure. This tendency not only diverts their scarce resources from the critical areas of developmental needs, but also generates tension and mistrust in the region concerned. We hope that the group of experts set up to study conventional disarmament in all aspects will come out with practical steps in this area.

The growing trend among the super-Powers to use outer space for military purposes could add an immensely wasteful and dangerous dimension to the arms race. Nepal shares the international concern and supports the call for elaboration of further legislative measures to prevent the arms race in outer space. We look forward to serious negotiations in this area in the Committee on Disarmament.

The lack of progress in the implementation of the General Assembly Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace continues to cause us anxiety. My delegation unequivocally supports the convening of the Colombo Conference on the Indian Ocean within a specified period and without preconditions. We entertain

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

no exaggerated hope that the convening of this Conference will bring peace to the region. The improvement of the political climate in the region could greatly contribute to the success of the Conference, which could be an important step towards the implementation of the Declaration.

I have briefly stated the position of my delegation on a few of the pressing items on our agenda. We shall have occasion to express our views in more detail when individual items are taken up for consideration. The tentative programme of work of this Committee for this year is designed to give more time for deliberations on specific issues. We attach much importance to the debate in this Committee. With a diplomat of the skill, ability and experience of our Chairman to guide our deliberations, we feel confident of the positive outcome of our meetings. I take this opportunity to extend my delegation's felicitations to him and the other officers of the Committee on their election and to pledge our full co-operation with them in the difficult task that lies ahead in this Committee.

Mr. GARCIA ITURBE (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): Allow me first of all, Ambassador Elfaki, to extend to you the Cuban delegation's congratulations on your election to the post of Vice-Chairman of this Committee, to lead, along with the other officers, the work of the Committee during the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We are familiar with the constant concern with and dedication to disarmament questions that you have shown in the Non-Aligned Movement.

We congratulate also Ambassador Vraalsen on his election to the chairmanship of the Committee. We are aware of his country's interest in these questions. That interest, together with his personal experience and skill as a diplomat, is a guarantee that under his leadership the work of this Committee will be carried out satisfactorily and that we shall achieve the greatest possible results.

I take this opportunity, too, to congratulate Ambassador Gbeho of Ghana on the efficient manner in which he led our work last year; and I extend our congratulations to Ambassador Tinca of Romania on his election as a Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

The meetings of the First Committee are beginning this year in a world climate that is hardly propitious to international peace and security. There is growing tension, with sources of conflict in various parts of the world; a good part of the technologically most advanced industrial capacity in the world is devoted to creating means of destruction rather than to satisfying mankind's needs, combating hunger and sickness and improving the living standard of human beings.

In spite of the insistent appeals that have been made by the international community for peace, disarmament, international co-operation and peaceful coexistence, the forces of reaction and warlike adventurism are trying to assert themselves by means of aggressive positions, without taking into account the dangers that this entails. As the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement said at the New Delhi Conference:

"... the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war". (A/38/132, annex, para. 28)

The use and the threat of the use of force are evident today in various continents, especially in the Central American and Caribbean regions, where we are witnessing a rich and powerful nation, the United States, carrying out a shameful, dirty war against the heroic people of Nicaragua. The brazenness and power of this imperialist is such that the United States Congress is discussing the amount of money to be allocated to this war - it is now expected that \$50 million will be so allocated - but, what is more, it even wants credit for the actions that have been carried out, such as the recent attacks on the ports of Corinth and Puerto Sandino.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

With the same brazenness they admit the utilization of bases in Honduras and El Salvador both to send supplies to forces subsidized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States and to train those forces and use the bases to attack Nicaragua directly.

Is this how the Government of the United States intends to support the strengthening of international security and the adoption of confidence-building measures among States? Or can it be that it believes it is co-operating in such strengthening by its inordinate military deployment in various parts of the world?

Those who wish to revive the policies of the "big stick" and "manifest destiny" yearn to add more actions to an already long list of military interventions that, since 1848, have totalled more than 60 in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean, not to mention adventures on other continents.

In violation of General Assembly resolution 37/118 they continue to carry out aggressive military manoeuvres in various regions of the globe, not only in Central America, but also in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, none of which contributes to a solution. Such activities only aggravate the problems that threaten international peace and security. The escalation is on such a scale that more than 330,000 men are now engaged in military activities outside that country's borders.

In addition, we are faced with the constant and increasing danger of nuclear war, whose destructive potential and effectiveness is daily being increased by further technological developments. For example there is the Pershing II missile with its targetable nuclear warheads that ensure accuracy within 120 feet after a 1,000-mile flight; there is the oft-mentioned MX missile, whose destructive potential is many times greater than anyone can imagine. When we add to these the nuclear potential that already exists in our world there is enough to transport us in a fraction of a second back to the Stone Age, but this time without homo sapiens.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

A new arms race, this time in outer space, is beginning to take shape in the form of the development of new weapons of increased technological complexity. The anti-satellite attack system (ASAT) project being developed by the United States Government is designed to militarize outer space and to utilize its military potential as a form of domination over and subjugation of peoples, with the express intention of employing such domination for that purpose. That was, in fact, admitted by Mr. Edward C. Aldridge, Under Secretary of the United States Air Force, when he said:

"We do not have to stretch our imagination very far to see that the country that controls outer space can control the world."

The race towards destruction seems to have no limits, and when technological development and science begin to control man, he is on a course towards his own destruction.

We might also add the incredible development of chemical, radiological and bacteriological weapons which, together with the production, stockpiling and continued development of such weapons represents a considerable threat to mankind.

In the course of the First Committee's work my delegation will speak in detail on various items on the agenda. However, we should at this time like to draw the Committee's attention to the adverse effects of the policy of confrontation that some are trying to force upon our work.

An analysis of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session that was submitted yesterday by the Ambassador of Peru, Mr. Morelli Pando, is necessary in our Committee's work in order that we may focus clearly on the reality confronting us. That report states that the Committee on Disarmament began its session on 1 February - and one might think that the document is in error when, later, one reads that at the plenary meeting on 24 March, six weeks later, the working agenda was adopted. But no, there is no error.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

Regrettably the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, a body that has received numerous urgent petitions and requests from the General Assembly to proceed without further delay to negotiations on priority disarmament issues, needed more than six weeks to adopt its working agenda. This, let us state quite bluntly, was due to the opposition of a small number of countries to the placing on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament the item on the prevention of nuclear war. Leading those countries was the United States. That might seem odd, but it is a fact. Several paragraphs of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament of the General Assembly, which was adopted by consensus in 1978, clearly recognize the urgent priority nature of the question of preventing an outbreak of nuclear war. Subsequently, in the communiqué adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana a few days prior to the opening of the work of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, the Ministers called upon that special session to adopt urgent measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Later, in the Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament, participating States reaffirmed the validity of the 1978 Final Document, that is, inter alia, they recognized the urgency of avoiding nuclear war. Even more recently, at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, a resolution was adopted that clearly called upon the Committee on Disarmament to undertake as a matter of the highest priority negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

To the foregoing we might usefully add the many petitions made by non-governmental organizations and eminent scientists throughout the world.

Nevertheless, as its report makes clear, the Committee on Disarmament needed more than six weeks, owing to the stubborn opposition of the United States and some of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to resolve the question of placing on its agenda an item with regard to

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

preserving mankind from certain destruction. In the end, even though a solution apparently acceptable to all was finally agreed upon and a watered-down version of the item was placed on the agenda, the Committee on Disarmament was unable to enter into meaningful negotiations on that highly important item owing to the opposition of those same States.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

But it was not only on the item on the prevention of nuclear war that the Committee on Disarmament was impeded from carrying out its negotiating activities. It is clear from its report to the Assembly that a total ban on nuclear-weapon tests has suffered the same fate in which all that has been achieved thus far is disregarded, and the commitments entered into are not honoured.

The Government of the United States now declares that banning nuclear-weapon tests is a long-term objective and that it will not undertake negotiations on this subject.

What, it may well be asked, happened to the obligation it assumed in signing the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, under which a commitment was entered into permanently to suspend all nuclear-weapon tests and the determination was expressed "to continue negotiations to this end"?

Is or is not the attitude that has now been adopted - one which would be imposed on the international community - a flagrant violation of the obligations assumed under the Moscow Treaty or not?

An equally important aspect of the problem was raised in the 1978 Final Document, when, in paragraph 51, it appealed for the urgent conclusion of the trilateral negotiations that were currently under way.

Far from concluding successfully, as was hoped, the negotiations were suspended unilaterally, and there is no indication that they will be resumed.

A similar picture is presented to us when we read that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament dealing with the prevention of the nuclear arms race and with nuclear disarmament. This item has been on the Committee's agenda for some time now, but also for some time now pressure has been brought to bear not to begin negotiations on this subject.

In my delegation's opinion, we should clearly point to the responsibility of this tiny group of Member States that have obstructed the start of concrete negotiations on matters of the greatest importance for the survival of mankind.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

What right do a few have to impose their will and try to deceive the peoples of the world with exchanges of views, grandiloquent statements and informal meetings in an effort to create the impression that negotiations are under way when, as a matter of fact, that is not the case at all?

Negotiations on nuclear disarmament items should have started a long time ago in the Committee on Disarmament, but the lack of political will on the part of the very States that are opposed to preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war and to a ban on nuclear-weapon tests has made such negotiations impossible thus far.

The arms race, and in particular the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, poses an increasing danger to international peace and security and considerably increases the likelihood that a nuclear conflict with incalculable consequences will break out. In addition, nuclear proliferation and the support given by various countries to Israel and South Africa in the development of such weapons increases the danger of nuclear war for the peoples of the Middle East and Africa and constitutes another means of coercion and force in the hands of Zionists and racists who are doing nothing to help détente and international security.

We cannot accept the arguments with which some would convince us that negotiations to put an end to nuclear weapons depend on extraneous factors and are linked to other areas of inter-State relations, when there is no respect whatsoever for United Nations decisions on disarmament.

The urgency and the necessity to begin negotiations to put an end to the improvement and development of nuclear weapons lie in the very nature of these weapons, for they pose a threat to the very survival of mankind.

The communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, held just before the second special session on disarmament, clearly states that, even though the international political climate affects negotiations on disarmament, the deterioration of the international situation makes it even more urgent and necessary to intensify dialogue and negotiations.

(Mr. Garcia Iturbe, Cuba)

More recently, at the Seventh Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in March in New Delhi, the Heads of State or Government stressed the need to freeze the development, production, stockpiling and emplacement of nuclear weapons and appealed for disarmament negotiations to be accelerated.

The Cuban delegation supports a freeze of nuclear weapons at their present levels and their immediate reduction; it supports the condemnation of nuclear war and the adoption of urgent measures to avoid its outbreak; it supports the immediate banning of all nuclear-weapon tests; it supports the adoption of a treaty banning the use of force in international relations; it supports the prohibition of the use of force in all its forms; it supports a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes; and it supports a ban on the use, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The peoples of the world want to live in peace; those who feel that they are truly representative of the will of their peoples cannot but strive to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and promote general and complete disarmament and the elimination of all forms of chemical, radiological and bacteriological weapons, or any other means of destruction capable of taking the life of any human being or of destroying the resources needed for man to thrive and prosper.

Sub-paragraph (d) of article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba says that "our country is working for lasting peace in dignity based on respect for the independence and sovereignty of peoples and on their right to self-determination". In his book, The World Economic and Social Crisis the President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers, Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro, appealed for "a tireless struggle for peace, for improving international relations, for halting the arms race, for reducing military expenses drastically and for insisting that a considerable part of these sizeable funds be allocated to the development of the third world".

That will be the policy guiding the work of the Cuban delegation in this Committee at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION
*Official Records**

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FIRST COMMITTEE
8th meeting
held on
Thursday, 20 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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Mr. Sheldov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)
Mr. Dorji (Bhutan)
Mr. Shah Nawaz (Pakistan)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. SCHEMIDT (Denmark): Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to offer you and the other members of the Committee my sincere congratulations on your election. Your professional skill, Sir, and your wide experience, not least in disarmament matters, are well known to all of us.

I would like to refer to the statement made the day before yesterday by the representative of Greece, speaking on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community, which statement, of course, we fully endorse.

The international situation and developments in the field of international security and disarmament during the year that has passed since the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations cannot be described in optimistic terms. Progress, if any, has been slow and the deteriorating international climate has certainly not provided an impetus to the major Powers in their pursuit of concrete results. Instead of arms limitation and disarmament, we have witnessed a further acceleration of the arms race, the introduction of new and more sophisticated weapons systems, and the continuation of armed conflicts in many parts of the world.

At the same time, and in response to these deplorable developments, people all over the globe have, on an unprecedented scale, raised their voices in a call for peace and disarmament. This, at least, is an encouraging development that should give inspiration and motivation when the arms race and disarmament issues are discussed.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

In his report to last year's session, the Secretary-General stated that

"The United Nations itself has been unable to play as effective and decisive a role as the Charter certainly envisaged for it."

(A/37/1, p. 1)

In the same vein, the Secretary-General's report of this year considers, that "actual developments of the past year have been far from encouraging".

(A/38/1, p. 2)

It is more necessary than ever and of crucial importance that no effort be spared to enable the United Nations to play the role envisaged for it in the Charter. This holds true especially for disarmament and security issues. No problem can be solved without good will on the part of all nations and the maintenance of dialogue.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

Paragraph 8 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament states that our final goal is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. It is a moral obligation of all nations to pursue this goal actively. In the view of my delegation, it is very important that the First Committee, in order to move closer to attaining the common goals we strive for, concentrate its efforts on the issues which are given high priority in the Final Document.

My Government remains strongly committed to supporting the Secretary-General's efforts towards strengthening the United Nations. In this context I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the joint report of the five Nordic countries entitled "Strengthening of the United Nations" which has been circulated as an official document No. A/38/271-S/15830 of the General Assembly and the Security Council. In the report the five Nordic Governments propose a number of concrete measures, which, if implemented, could have a significant impact on the future work of the United Nations, in the fields of international security and disarmament, among others.

My Government had the privilege of participating in the drawing up of the report on the important United Nations study on disarmament and international security. This report calls for the strengthening of the United Nations system for international law and for wide international co-operation - in preference to force - as the rational basis for relations among States.

Disarmament and international security are closely interrelated issues which should be approached along parallel paths. The disarmament process should be based on the preservation or enhancement of the security of all States. A strong and efficient United Nations security system would be an important contributory factor towards this end.

The conclusions of the study fit well with the thoughts which the Secretary-General expressed in his report of last year - in short: no amendments to the Charter of the United Nations are needed; improvement could well be achieved within the existing framework of the Charter.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

Particularly in a field like disarmament the necessary impetus does not arise out of nothing. Adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles for relations among States, as laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, remain the key to achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. And such an atmosphere is, in turn, a clear prerequisite for progress towards halting the arms race and towards disarmament.

It is encouraging to note that although the causes of tension and mistrust have not been removed and although, for that reason, there has been no real progress in international relations, this year it was possible to reach East-West agreement on a substantial and balanced concluding document at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) follow-up meeting in Madrid. It is significant that further East-West co-operation within the CSCE framework has been secured, in principle, through the agreement to hold another follow-up meeting in Vienna and a number of expert meetings. The decision to convene a Conference in Stockholm on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, naturally, of particular importance.

We believe that this development in the European context could have a positive influence on general East-West relations, to the advantage of global efforts towards disarmament and arms control.

Taken as a whole, multilateral negotiations in the nuclear field can be said to be stalemated pending the outcome of the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe - the INF negotiations - and strategic weapons systems - the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

My Government still considers those negotiations to be of the most crucial importance. Failure to reach an agreement could have very grave consequences for the future. We hope that the two Powers can live up to the special responsibility which the possession of the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons in the world imposes on them, and we urge both parties to show the necessary flexibility. We hope and we believe - that the negotiations will lead to concrete results before the end of this year.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

In an effort to halt the nuclear arms race the proposal to impose a freeze as a first step towards nuclear disarmament was discussed last year at length in this Committee and this year several proposals on this issue have been put forward. The expediency of a freeze and the possibilities of verifying it and judging its implications for the overall military balance between the major nuclear Powers have been disputed. Believing that all possibilities for agreements in the nuclear field should be explored, my delegation expresses its support for negotiations on a mutual freeze and reduction at the global level of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Restraint in the nuclear field is not solely a matter of concern to the nuclear Powers. All responsible nations must join forces to prevent a nuclear war and an extension and expansion of the nuclear arms race.

An important step was taken in 1963 with the conclusion of the partial test ban Treaty. By banning nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, the Treaty has contributed significantly to the reduction of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. But as an arms limitation or disarmament measure the Treaty has been of limited importance since it has not been acceded to by all nuclear Powers and since it has not banned underground nuclear test explosions.

In June of this year a draft of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament. A complete banning of nuclear tests would be an important factor in curbing further development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem of adequate means of verification remains unresolved, but important work on this and other crucial issues is going on in the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, the activities of which my country follows actively. It is a promising development that among the parties and experts dealing with these matters there is a growing conviction that a viable

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

international verification system could be within reach. We urge the Committee on Disarmament to continue to give priority to negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In the meantime, States which have not already done so might demonstrate their willingness to halt the nuclear arms race by ratifying the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

The issues of a nuclear test ban and nuclear non-proliferation are closely interrelated. Even if the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 has not yet been acceded to by all States, the régime established by virtue of that Treaty may be considered a not negligible success, which is all the more noteworthy against the otherwise dismal background of the general situation in the disarmament field. This achievement certainly deserves an even more solid underpinning in the future. That might be brought about, inter alia, by universal accession to the Treaty and support of the safeguards system under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the activity of which deserves our approval. Furthermore, a review conference on the Treaty is envisaged for 1985.

Many countries, including my own, have joined in the request to the Secretary-General for the inclusion of an item on this issue in the agenda of the present session. My delegation, for one, looks forward to a discussion under that item and hopes to contribute its share in the efforts to ensure an efficacious framework for this exceedingly important conference, the results of which will have a crucial bearing not only on the Treaty itself, but also on the international situation in a wider sense.

Over the years, a number of proposals have been promulgated regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. The Final Document from the first special session on disarmament recognizes that, under certain conditions, which should be kept clearly in mind, the establishment of such zones could constitute an important disarmament measure. In the Danish view, this still holds true, as these zones could contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to regions where not all States are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Various agreements, such as the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have so far, it seems, managed to limit the implications for outer space of the accelerating arms race. However, there are indications that weaponry already operational or in the process of being developed may threaten peaceful outer space.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

It is therefore encouraging that a number of interesting proposals have been put forward with a view to meeting this challenge, and that the majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament appear to have reached agreement on setting up an ad hoc working group which might clarify our perception of problems looming in this field. In the Danish view, the grim prospect of an intensified arms race in outer space underlines the necessity of serious efforts within the Committee with a view to ultimate negotiations on effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing that arms race.

To the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, which is already quite comprehensive, has been added a new item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". We hope that the disarmament efforts will benefit from the upcoming debate on this item. Considering, however, the grave risk that a conventional war between the world's major-Power blocs might develop into a nuclear catastrophe, a very important element in the debate should, in our view, be the question of how to prevent war as such. In this connection we hope that the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament will promote a better understanding of the security perceptions in the different regions of the world, which of course differ widely.

Since 1971, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been discussed in the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor as a separate issue.

It is indisputable that large-scale use of those weapons could conceivably have deleterious and irreversible effects on the ecological balance and cause unspeakable human suffering.

We urge all parties to show goodwill and flexibility in order to speed up negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this issue.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have put forward comprehensive working papers. And several other countries participating in the negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament have produced working papers on the various technical aspects of a convention on chemical weapons. All those papers must be backed by political willingness.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

For several years now the Committee on Disarmament has also tried to reach agreement on a convention banning radiological weapons. Although doubts have been raised as to the value of such a convention as long as radiological weapons have not been developed, we support the continuation of this work in the Committee on Disarmament and hope that a draft convention will materialize.

This year two new agenda items came up for discussion in the Disarmament Commission. Special interest was attached to the deliberations on the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the so-called Palme report (A/CN.10/38), which was published shortly before the second special session on disarmament. The report was welcomed in my country, and we have been anxious to learn, through the discussions in the Commission, the views on it of other member States.

The report introduced into the United Nations the new concept of common security. The thinking behind this concept was in many ways familiar to us. It was indeed a noteworthy and significant achievement that prominent personalities of different political convictions from various regions of the world proved able to reach agreement on a new approach to disarmament.

My Government supports the view that all States must unite in an effort to reach a common understanding of security and disarmament. What we cannot do alone we must do together. But we also have to consider that the application of the principles of common security must be tailored to the political and military realities in specific situations. As rightly stated in the report, disarmament measures should be balanced and be the result of negotiations in which all parties concerned must have a say.

The other new item on the agenda of the Commission was the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures and the implementation of such measures based on the recent United Nations study on the subject.

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

As I have already stressed, confidence among States is essential if progress is to be achieved in arms control and disarmament negotiations. We believe that a major and significant cause of mistrust is the lack of reliable information on the military activities of other States and on other matters pertaining to mutual security.

In the gloom caused by the present state of disarmament and arms control negotiations, one is cheered even by mere flickers of light. One such flicker was the recently concluded Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil thereof, which proved able to achieve consensus on a final document in a largely harmonious atmosphere. It is indeed encouraging that the Treaty appears to have functioned as originally envisaged. This is borne out by the fact that no Party to it has so far wished to invoke its provisions on complaints and verification. In the Danish view, it is furthermore encouraging that there was agreement on the necessity of providing adequate information on relevant technological developments before the next Review Conference, which will take place not later than 1990.

The conventional arms race continues, so does the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, and the demand for more and more sophisticated weapons seems unlimited. It is therefore more necessary than ever to identify ways and means of dealing with this important aspect of the arms race within the machinery of the United Nations.

In the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, nations agreed that:

"Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament." (Resolution S-10/2, para. 81)

(Mr. Schmidt, Denmark)

As is the case with so many other declarations in the Final Document, there has not been any significant progress with respect to the declaration on conventional weapons and armed forces. Nevertheless, we certainly have the impression that perceptions are constantly moving in favour of a greater awareness of the need to put an end to the conventional arms race. This trend was particularly apparent in the debates during the second special session on disarmament. Since then the Secretary-General has repeatedly stressed - also in his report of this year - that conventional arms also constitute a threat to international security and that, considering the many wars fought with conventional weapons, effective measures to promote conventional disarmament are also essential.

Looking at the world today we are certainly not in need of incentives to start working on the problems of conventional disarmament.

In resolution 36/97 A, originally submitted by Denmark, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to set up a Group of Experts to study all aspects of the conventional arms race. Since the last session of the General Assembly, the Group has held five meetings and made much progress. But, owing to the very wide area to be embraced and the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved, the Group will need more time to complete its work and submit a final report to this Assembly, as requested in resolution 36/97 A. Completion of the study is of the utmost importance for future efforts on conventional disarmament. We hope, therefore, that the General Assembly will at this session agree to request the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. I shall revert to this matter in due course.

In concluding this statement, I should like again to refer to the Secretary-General's report for this year in which he says:

"In no area is the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter more important and more closely tied to the survival of humanity than in the field of disarmament and arms limitation."

(A/38/1, p. 4)

Mr. HARLAND (New Zealand): I shall begin my first statement in this Committee by congratulating you, Sir, on your election as Chairman. Your wide experience in the United Nations and your judicial approach to the problems before us make me confident that the Committee's work this year will be both orderly and productive. I can assure you of my delegation's full co-operation for those ends.

I do not intend today to offer a comprehensive statement touching on all the matters on our crowded agenda. New Zealand's views on the range of disarmament issues have been fully set out on other occasions, particularly at the second special session on disarmament in 1982. Instead, I wish to concentrate on explaining New Zealand's approach to those issues that are of particular concern to us at the present time.

Foremost among my Government's concerns is the nuclear arms race and the need for real progress towards an equitable and balanced reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. As anyone listening to the general debate in the General Assembly over the past few weeks will have heard, this concern is widely shared by the countries of the South Pacific. Our region may be remote from the centres of population and power in the world, but the nature of nuclear weapons is such that their very existence causes us profound concern. Nor are we in the South Pacific remote from the activities involved in the development of these weapons of destruction. Ours is, I think, the only part of the world where nuclear testing is still being conducted outside the main metropolitan territory of a nuclear-weapon State. The continuation of this situation, despite our strong protests, remains a matter of serious concern to the Governments of New Zealand and other South Pacific countries.

(Mr. Harland, New Zealand)

New Zealanders have had reason in the past to be concerned about the dangers of the arms race, but at no time in the past has the level of public concern been higher than it is today. The tensions that now exist between the super-Powers, the dangers that are created by each new development in weapons technology and the appalling waste of resources involved in the arms race, all make it more imperative now than ever before that real and rapid progress is made towards nuclear disarmament. For that progress we are dependent whether we like it or not, on the nuclear Powers themselves. Only they can reduce or abolish nuclear arms. What we can do is to use this forum, the United Nations, and any others open to us to encourage them to get on with serious negotiations that are aimed at real reductions in their nuclear arsenals, with appropriate emphasis on verification.

At this time we are anxiously watching the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons for signs of progress. We welcome the flexibility recently introduced by the United States in an attempt to meet Soviet concerns. It is vital, we believe, that all avenues of communication and dialogue between the two super-Powers should be kept open. In the absence of dialogue, mutual distrust can only grow. The tragic end of Korean Airlines flight 007 is a terrible illustration of consequences of such distrust. So we attach particular importance to confidence-building measures as a means of gradually reducing distrust and suspicion.

New Zealand wants to make sure that its voice, along with those of other concerned non-nuclear-weapon States, is heard by the negotiating super-Powers. We see the solution to the nuclear problem as the major challenge of our time. If progress cannot be made on the central issues, then we urge the negotiating parties to examine interim measures and compromise proposals that could contribute to a lessening of international tensions. In this regard, we have given careful attention to the Secretary-General's comments in his 1983 report that:

"The extension of the mutual observance of current limitations would also be helpful in order to allow consideration of a new longer-term approach. Future limits on qualitative improvements and modernization could provide a useful subject of discussion in both sectors of the Geneva talks. The object, while preserving military parity, should be to promote equal security for all at progressively decreasing levels and under effective international control. (A/38/1, p. 5)

(Mr. Harland, New Zealand)

We in New Zealand wholeheartedly endorse the Secretary-General's approach to this question.

The sense of frustration that non-nuclear Governments and their people feel at the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament is both real and understandable. But that frustration must not be permitted to reduce us to apathy and inactivity. In the General Assembly, in the Disarmament Commission and in the Committee on Disarmament, the search for practical and realistic disarmament measures must continue. We believe that there are useful areas for action by countries like New Zealand that are not directly involved in the Geneva disarmament talks. Current arms agreements should be strengthened by the widest possible adherence to the Conventions that enshrine them. At the same time new ways should be sought to limit the qualitative improvement of nuclear, chemical and conventional arms. Our aim should be to contain the arms race and to prevent its future diversion into new channels.

As my Prime Minister said in the General Assembly on 4 October, the New Zealand Government attaches great importance to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are particularly concerned about the conduct of nuclear tests in our own region, but we recognize that this is a problem that cannot be dealt with on a purely regional basis. In any case there is, in our view, no clearer step that the nuclear Powers could take to demonstrate their commitment to the reduction of nuclear arsenals than the conclusion of a treaty, with appropriate verification procedures, for the permanent banning of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. For many years New Zealand has been active in preparing and sponsoring a draft resolution each year calling for the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of priority. We are currently working on a draft resolution to meet current circumstances and we expect to introduce it on a later stage in the Committee's work.

We are convinced that the longer the delay in concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the greater the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Certainly the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban would put an end to the inconsistency in the positions of the nuclear-weapon States, who seek to persuade other States that nuclear weapons are unnecessary and undesirable, while they themselves continue their testing programmes. For our part, we attach the highest importance to controlling the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons

(Mr. Harland, New Zealand)

as well as the perpendicular. In that regard, we view the non-proliferation Treaty as a vital, if imperfect, instrument which we would like to see more widely accepted. We strongly hope that the non-proliferation Treaty review conference in 1985 will lead to a strengthening of the Treaty régime, together with the International Atomic Agency's safeguards system, on which it depends. A successful outcome to that review conference will be of vital importance to us all.

(Mr. Harland, New Zealand)

As my Prime Minister observed in the General Assembly, it would help to show that the process of multilateral legislation on disarmament is not at an end.

In concentrating on the need for nuclear disarmament we should not overlook the significance of other possible arms control measures. For our part, we continue to believe that a convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons should be concluded as soon as possible and we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will continue to make progress towards that end.

I spoke earlier of the need to build confidence and trust if we are to halt and reverse the arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Nothing could be more central to the development of confidence in international arms control arrangements than the adequacy of the procedures established for their verification. New Zealand fully recognizes that it is essential for Member States, and particularly for the nuclear-weapon States, to have a reasonable assurance that arms control measures can be verified. What seems to us to be required is greater openness in the provision of information, and flexibility in considering verification proposals, especially on the part of those States that have so far shown reluctance to co-operate in these areas. The development of the United Nations' own capacity to verify and control the implementation of disarmament agreements is also important. As a practical contribution in this area, with particular reference to the verification of a comprehensive test ban, we have arranged for New Zealand scientists to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group on seismic events, in Geneva.

The lamentable fact is that we are still discussing disarmament in terms of agreements hoped for rather than agreements reached. The arms race continues. With the high levels of political tension that exist at the present time, it is small wonder that people around the globe are pressing for urgent progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals. For such progress we are principally dependent on the nuclear Powers. But lack of progress is the concern of all peoples and all Governments. The dangers to which every one of us is exposed by the absence of progress means that we can never accept the view that disarmament is a subject to be left to those Governments which possess nuclear or other sophisticated weapons or to those which have developed expertise over the years in the field of disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Harland, New Zealand)

It is for this reason that we attach great importance to the discussion of these issues in the United Nations. We look forward to the Committee's discussions and will do our best to make a constructive contribution.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): It is a great pleasure, sir, for the Argentine delegation and for me personally to convey to you our most cordial congratulations upon your election to serve as Chairman of this Committee. Last year I had the privilege of sharing with you the vice-chairmanship of this body and I had an excellent opportunity to appreciate your professional and human qualities, which will ensure active and efficient guidance of our proceedings. You can always count upon my delegation's entire support in the fulfilment of this task.

I should also like to convey my congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen, the representatives of Romania and Sudan, on the confidence that the Committee has shown in them by electing them to discharge their important task.

The programme of work that we have adopted includes a stage by stage consideration of specific groups of topics; that is why there will be more than one Argentine statement in this debate. Today I shall restrict myself to putting forward some general considerations concerning the huge problem of nuclear weapons.

It is an undeniable fact that the profound universal concern that now exists concerning disarmament relates almost exclusively to nuclear weapons. It is not ignoring the importance of other aspects of this topic to assert that the only weapons of mass destruction capable of affecting all of us without exception, no matter how far we may be from the conflict zone, are nuclear weapons.

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, meeting in New Delhi in March this year, clearly defined in their Political Declaration the substance of the issue, when they said, "it is an issue of human survival" (A/38/132, p. 14). They asserted that

"the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, in both its quantitative and its qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation". (ibid.)

That is why the Heads of State or Government

"rejected all theories and concepts pertaining to the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any circumstances". (ibid.)

In the course of the last meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the non-aligned countries submitted an important document which underscored

"the unacceptability of a world system based on the continued development, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons". (A/CN.10/45, p. 4)

This is the view of a large segment of the international community, and I would venture to think that it is shared by the broad majority of the population in States that are not members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

However, it is obvious that the actual situation is very different and becomes more serious every year. Any objective analysis of the status quo reveals a continuously deteriorating situation which increases and intensifies the danger of a world conflagration with unimaginably horrifying consequences.

The tragedy is that the vast majority of the international society are inert and impotent in the face of this race, which can only be qualified as suicidal, although they are fully aware of the fact that their fate and their very survival are constantly threatened and that little, indeed nothing, can be done about it.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers and of the military alliances which they head is, therefore, tremendous. They are leading us to an intolerable situation. In 1945, the nuclear arsenal was minimal and its destructive capacity, while awesome, today seems to be modest in comparison with the 50,000 nuclear warheads, each a hundred times more powerful, which are possessed by a few States. They also have relations among themselves which are marked by rivalry, enmity and mistrust.

On the other hand, the nuclear factor does not have relevance merely in the field of the current competition between the two large military alliances. The general development of international relations in its various manifestations is also deeply influenced by the existence of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon Powers continuously use them even though it may only be implicitly. Behind that shield, colonial domination is either supported or tolerated; demonstrations of force are carried out which are designed to intervene in the domestic affairs of States and to impose given political systems; displays of military power are given for purposes of intimidation, an example of which is the strategic military base being established in the Malvinas Islands, which is injecting an element of destabilization into the South Atlantic, with world-wide repercussions.

This situation caused by the presence of nuclear weapons everywhere was graphically described by Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose authority derives from the functions he discharged. He said the following:

"Nuclear weapons shape the global context and the climate within which local conflicts occur at this time. The fact that nuclear weapons are not used in a customary way, such as occurred in the period of gunboat diplomacy, does not mean that they are not present and that they do not constitute a threat. The core of the problem is that a great number of crises in our era have already been affected by the existence of nuclear weapons and by the resultant change in the balance of power."

Mr. Brzezinski wrote this in the summer of 1982, soon after the nuclear weapons on board the British fleet had made their presence felt in the South Atlantic.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It is this self-same undeniable reality which led the New Delhi summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement to express:

"grave concern that certain nuclear-weapon States have deployed or intend to deploy nuclear weapons in various regions of the world".

(A/38/132, p. 15, para. 32)

In this context, we consider that the Swedish delegation's initiative is interesting, related as it is to the naval armaments race. We consider that it should specifically be focused upon a study of military nuclear aspects of the massive naval presence in all regions of the world. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries dealing with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, expressed last April their concern about the serious implications of military and naval manoeuvres as well as other operations carried out by nuclear-weapon States, during which nuclear energy is utilized for non-peaceful purposes and weapons are being deployed near non nuclear-weapon States, thereby imperiling the security of non-aligned countries.

Nuclear weaponry is a function of the desire by some nuclear-weapon States to dominate. Hence, we should not be surprised that the current negotiations are failing, that others have not even begun; and that commitments solemnly entered into are not respected. This includes legally binding international instruments. We are also witnessing the further emplacement of nuclear weapons, adding to the already excessive number of existing weapons.

Nor should we be surprised by the attempt to change the disarmament priorities that were set forth in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, or by the fact that the United Nations is increasingly being shunted to one side in the disarmament process, if one can call it that. Moreover, it should come as no surprise that efforts are being made to divert attention to the developing countries, as if they are the cause of international tensions and the ones able to imperil the survival of mankind.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

What we cannot be expected to do is impassively to accept this situation, to ignore it, or not to react to it in time. Unfortunately, this co-existence with nuclear weapons imposed upon us by a small number of States may lead to a dangerous familiarity. Those weapons have been with us for four decades and today have spread to the four corners of the world. With sinister fertility there is a constant rebirth of doctrines which, whatever they may be called, are designed to explain and justify not only the possession of nuclear weapons but even their possible use. Some countries have gone so far as to invoke the Charter of the United Nations to legitimize the possible use of nuclear weapons, asserting that Article 51 does permit this option even where the defence is in response to an attack with conventional weapons. This is reflected in paragraph 22 of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group established by the Disarmament Committee as indicated in document A/38/27, para. 76. Here the question arises: if a nuclear conflict broke out on the strength of Article 51, what Security Council would survive to take the measures stipulated in that Article? A prime example of this type of thinking is the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, an unsustainable and indefensible doctrine that sacrifices the security of the whole world for the so-called security of a few countries.

If we accepted the validity of the premise that the security of those countries is based upon the possession and possible use of nuclear weapons, the logical conclusion of that reasoning would be that in an international order of States with equal rights, where all are entitled to the same level of security, each State should have its own nuclear arsenal. This is the absurdity implicitly advocated by some nuclear-weapon States. What is even worse is that, because of the insistence, in the name of a so-called realism and on the basis of the existing discrimination inherent in certain international instruments imposed by some of those Powers, we might drift imperceptibly into a kind of resignation to the situation which would be just as dangerous as the nuclear threat now looming over us.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

This is unacceptable, as are the continuance of an inexorable arms race towards self-destruction and the use of nuclear power in pursuit of obsolete aims of colonial domination. States which do not possess, do not want to possess, do not need to possess, nuclear weapons, which do not value them and have no trust in them, must erect an unscalable moral and political wall in the way of what constitutes a real case of international terrorism, if we consider that one of the accepted meanings of the word terrorism is "domination by terror".

It is only fair to recognize that not all nuclear-weapon States are following a similar policy. Moreover, within these States there is an increasingly widespread feeling of revulsion against these weapons. I could mention numerous examples, all very well known. However, what is particularly interesting and significant is the growing number of persons who, after having discharged high-level responsibilities in the field of security and defence, and thus having the opportunity to gain a particularly clear picture of the implications and consequences of a nuclear conflict, when they return to private life seem to acknowledge the strength of the evidence and deny the validity and, indeed, the utility of the doctrines which in public office they defended forcefully, although perhaps with decreasing conviction.

Thus, we consider that in the General Assembly and in all disarmament forums we must first, reject any theory or doctrine that would presuppose the continuance of the existence of any nuclear weapons; secondly, reject any attempt to legitimize the possible use of nuclear weapons on the basis of Article 51 of the Charter; thirdly, reject the imposition of a so-called realism implying that the international order should continue to be based upon the foundation of power that nuclear weapons provide; fourthly, reject the false option based on the idea that in order to achieve nuclear disarmament we must accelerate the conventional arms race.

During this session we will have to take a decision on various draft resolutions directly or indirectly related to the questions I have referred to in this statement. The Argentine delegation will take a stand on them on the basis of what I have said, basing its position on total opposition to nuclear weapons and to the terrible consequences of all kinds that they entail.

Mr. SHELDON (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, first of all, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic wishes to join in the congratulations already addressed to you and to the other officers of the Committee. We would like to wish you success in carrying out the responsibilities you have been given.

At this time, the world is going through a crucial phase. The complicated international situation has reached a dangerous level of tension. Every realistic political leader must realize that when weapons are daily becoming more sophisticated, the arms race is likely to get out of control. At the same time, there is a further escalation of the imperialist policy of force and confrontation; there are violations of the national independence and sovereignty of States; there is the establishment and strengthening of spheres of influence; there is a worsening of old conflicts and a heating-up of new ones. Again and again appeals are made to strengthen preparation for a nuclear war, to create conditions for victory in that kind of a war and the right to a nuclear first strike is being defended.

These aims are in conflict with the conscience of mankind. They are not compatible with any standards of morality which have been adopted by civilized society. The source of these aims and of the policy of implementing them is well known. It is the United States of America and its closest allies, which have openly adopted a policy of ensuring that the United States will achieve military supremacy over the Soviet Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will achieve supremacy over the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This is a policy of dealing with other countries from a position of force and the general intention is to attempt to impose the will of the United States and its allies on the world.

The United States, in the most direct fashion possible, is participating in military and subversive activities in the Middle East, in Africa, in Central America and in other regions of the world. They are also carrying out such actions against the peoples of Afghanistan and Kampuchea. What today determines the behaviour of Washington in international affairs is not a concern for a healthy political climate on this planet, but a desire for confrontation and for a nuclear weapons race, not mutually beneficial co-operation, but imperialist ambitions. These political preparations are going hand in hand with appropriate material preparations. One after another, the United States

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is adopting decisions to create the newest possible types of the most destructive weapons and new means for delivering them. I am referring to intercontinental missiles, aircraft cruise missiles and submarine-based missiles. Decisions have been taken to deploy them in the United States, in Western Europe, in the Far East, in the seas and in the oceans. At the same time existing types of weapons are being modernized, and their number is increasing. Record amounts are being appropriated for all these preparations. The American war machine is speeding up more and more dangerously.

We should remember that during the entire period after the Second World War there was not a single moment when the United States genuinely lessened the speed and development of its war machine or when they took the smallest action to prevent the growth of their military potential. If anything has been reduced in the United States military arsenal it has been replaced by a more powerful means of annihilation and destruction. All of these mountains of lethal weapons are being accumulated, not to protect the Pentagon generals from the fate of the foot soldiers in the army of the unemployed, but to be used.

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The recent revelation of the directives of the Pentagon and the National Security Council of the United States shows that the United States is intending to use its military forces to deliver nuclear first-strikes against targets on the territory of the USSR and other countries in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and they are providing for the use of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Intoxicated by militarism, they are planning to carry out nuclear strikes also on the territory of their own allies.

This is why we consider extremely timely the Soviet proposal on the condemnation of nuclear war and the declaration that the formulation, enunciation, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts designed to substantiate both the "legitimacy" of the first use of nuclear weapons and, generally the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war are criminal acts.

The illusion of military supremacy and the policy of positions of strength are especially dangerous in the nuclear age, which has established its own rules. The destabilization of intergovernmental relations carries with it the danger of a nuclear war, and the catastrophic consequences of that kind of war would leave no nation untouched.

At one time the claims of national security could more or less justify the attempt to emerge victorious from a war. Now, however, the only realistic way to strengthen national security is to eliminate the threat of a new world war, especially a new nuclear war. Thus, in present conditions, national security is very closely linked to security on the international level. Such is the truth in the nuclear age.

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In a recent statement, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, emphasized the following:

"In the nuclear age, we cannot view peace through the prism of narrow, selfish interests. Responsible statesmen have only one option: to do everything possible to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. To take any other position would be shortsighted, if not suicidal."

A real possibility exists of eliminating the threat of world war and avoiding a nuclear catastrophe. The first essential is that the action of States in the international arena is based on the principle that the security interests of other States must not be harmed. This principle is the basis of many international agreements. In the 1970s the principle of equality and equal security was broadly acknowledged in Soviet-American documents signed at the highest level. That principle is also incorporated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and has been confirmed in a number of subsequent decisions of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries take it as axiomatic that in resolving the questions of curbing the arms race and of disarmament the principle of equality and equal security is fundamental and significant. That principle, which is the basis of the position of the Soviet Union, is dictated by historical experience and by the conditions of the nuclear age. It reflects the obvious fact that no party to treaty negotiations will agree to harm its own security interests. That means that States participating in negotiations should strive not for supremacy over one another, but rather for the establishment of parity of military force at the lowest possible level.

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It is a clear lesson of life that only on the basis of strict observance of this principle is it possible to overcome the difficulties inherent in the objective and subjective aspects of the solution of such a complicated problem, affecting the basic security of States, as that of limiting nuclear weapons.

The principle of equality and equal security was acknowledged by at least three previous United States Administrations. Unfortunately, as I have already said, the present United States Administration has adopted another policy. It directly rejects action on the basis of that principle, although parity as an objective reality continues to prevail. To justify its policy of an arms race, it even uses statistical data - much to our amusement - which tell us about the reduction of American nuclear potential in the past. But the real data show the opposite. Information on present plans for the future and particularly that published today in The New York Times, tells us about the intention of the United States to continue the escalation of the arms race by allocating huge amounts for that purpose - almost \$2 trillion in the next five years.

The Geneva negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons remain deadlocked, because of the unwillingness of the American side to act on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The United States adopts a one-sided approach in its attempt to achieve military supremacy, to upset the existing balance of forces. On the other hand, throughout the negotiations the Soviet side has shown a constructive and genuinely flexible approach. It has done and continues to do everything it can to break the deadlock in the negotiations and to reach mutually acceptable agreements, which would prevent another very dangerous upswing in the arms race in both the areas being discussed in the negotiations. Whether or not such agreements are reached depends on the United States and on the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a whole.

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A further fundamental truth in the nuclear age is that the higher the level of military opposition and confrontation, even where there is a strategic balance, the less stable and the more uncertain that balance is. This means that there is a greater potential for sliding into a nuclear conflict. The socialist States have repeatedly pointed out that in that new round of the arms race nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction will become even more complicated, and therefore it will be much more difficult to draft international agreements to limit those weapons, and that peace will become even less stable and more fragile.

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For this reason it is important not to allow a new upward spiral in the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. An important Soviet proposal on a nuclear arms freeze submitted for consideration at this session of the General Assembly is intended to achieve precisely that goal. It is still not too late to stop. That is the leitmotiv of yet another Soviet proposal, on the conclusion of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. The purpose of such a treaty is to avoid an arms race in outer space. A characteristic step accompanied this constructive proposal by the Soviet Union in the area of limiting the arms race and of disarmament - namely, the commitment not to be the first to launch any type of anti-satellite weapon into outer space. That decision is a further concrete demonstration of the good will of the Soviet State and of its determination to strengthen peace and the security of peoples. We should like to think that the United States would follow that example.

This year, 1983, is important and decisive. How events develop this year will largely determine whether the arms race will speed up or slacken and whether world stability and security will be strengthened or tension will grow to a critical point. In 1983 the socialist countries embarked upon a clear programme to fight for peace, security and disarmament. In the Prague Declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in January, and in the joint statement adopted in Moscow in June by the State and Party leaders of the socialist commonwealth, our leaders at the highest level proposed a detailed package of immediate and effective measures to ensure stability in the military strategic situation, to limit the arms race, to maintain and strengthen détente and to preserve everything positive that had been achieved in international relations in the 1970s. Further confirmation of this package of measures was given in the Sofia communiqué of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty countries, which took place a few days ago.

The implementation of a broad programme of measures to curb the arms race whether in nuclear or in conventional weapons, would open up the way to eliminating the threat of nuclear war and bringing about genuine disarmament. A broad plan of action was put forward at the Prague meeting, and here I refer to the initiative on the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries. The heart of such a treaty would be the obligation on those States not to be the first to use weapons against each other, whether nuclear or conventional, and consequently the obligation not to use military force in general, against one another.

In 1982 the Soviet Union unilaterally assumed the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That was a further extremely important and responsible manifestation of good will by the socialist commonwealth. On the other hand, the NATO countries, in refusing thus far to react positively to that proposal, are demonstrating to the entire world their unwillingness to agree to equal, stable relations in a world unclouded by military tension.

The socialist countries vigorously advocate the drafting of a programme for step-by-step disarmament. The achievement of agreements within that framework for the prohibition of the development and production of new systems of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating various types of such weapons and their means of delivery would establish the preconditions of movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has said that it is prepared to reach agreement on appropriate controls which would guarantee the implementation of that programme by the nuclear States. For the purpose of such control, specific measures in the area of nuclear disarmament could be used, as they already are, in particular in the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system.

The drafting at the earliest possible time of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would be of the greatest significance in the process of limiting the nuclear arms race. The question of the banning of chemical weapons has become more, not less, acute. The recent approval in the United States of appropriations for the production of a new lethal weapon, a binary chemical

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weapon, is a dangerous step in the direction of stepping up the chemical weapons race. To avoid that, it is essential that there should be rapid and substantial progress in drafting a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Unfortunately some States, led by the United States, are not showing a responsible approach to these negotiations. What is more, they are hindering progress where success is already within our grasp. The United States, in order to whitewash its use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and to hide the lack of constructiveness in its position, is resorting to fabrications, which have repeatedly been refuted.

The rapid development of science and technology is an important factor with serious consequences as regards limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament. These consequences make the limitation of the modern arms race and verification of that limitation a more complicated, if not an impossible, task. A special cause of alarm is the programme recently adopted by the United States and the weapons development programme, currently under way. These weapons are based on very modern scientific discoveries and achievements.

All this, in the opinion of the Byelorussian delegation, increases the timeliness and urgency of the adoption of measures on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We feel that the time has come to take practical action to solve the problem in a broader sense, by the renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technological achievements for military purposes. Our delegation intends to give special attention to these questions.

The problem of limiting the arms race is not simply a question of weapons of mass destruction. In the light of the continuing sophistication and growing power of conventional weapons, the destructive force of which, according to some assessments, is approaching that of weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary to make new efforts to bring about a substantial decrease in the present level of conventional weapons and military forces, both globally and in individual regions. The proposals of the socialist countries in this area are well known and they form a real basis for moving in the necessary direction.

(Mr. Sheldov, Byelorussian SSR)

Bearing in mind that the stepping up of the arms race is closely linked with the increase in military expenditures, the socialist States have for many years now been appealing to the Western countries to reach practical agreement not to increase military expenditures but to reduce them, either on a percentage basis or in absolute terms. At a meeting of Party and State leaders in Moscow on 28 June of this year the participating States again made a constructive appeal to the member States of NATO to get down immediately to direct negotiations on an agreement not to increase their military expenditures after 1 January 1984, and on specific measures to achieve a practical, mutual reduction of those expenditures in the subsequent period, so that the resources thus released could be used to meet the needs of economic and social development, including the needs of the developing countries.

(Mr. Sheldov, Byelorussian SSR)

We must point out that thus far the NATO States have not responded to that proposal.

The tasks facing the international community in the field of disarmament are great and broad; they are very complicated. But the solution is not hidden in some inaccessible place. It can still be arrived at. The key to this is the manifestation of the political will to seek and to find mutually acceptable agreements for which the peoples of our planet are waiting.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is prepared to join its efforts with those of the delegations of all peace-loving States so that at this session of the General Assembly we can adopt concrete decisions to bring about progress in limiting the arms race and in disarmament.

Mr. DORJI (Bhutan): I take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. Also, may I request you to convey to the other officers of the Committee our felicitations on their election.

Arms expenditure this year may even reach the \$800 billion mark. That is indeed a staggering figure, especially when it represents more than a cumulative sum of 6,000 years of the present gross national product of a small country like mine. It seems that every effort of the international community directed towards complete and comprehensive disarmament is being thwarted. None the less, because of the inherent dangers of the spiralling arms race and its wasteful expenditure, we are compelled to speak each year to implore certain members of the world community to see reason and to emphasize the strong link between disarmament and development.

Clearly, as the arms race accelerates military expenditures increase. In turn, the burden of increased military spending is at the expense of development spending. The effects are more pronounced particularly for the developing countries. The absurdity of arms expenditures has often been pointed out, and we all continue to wonder why more is being spent only to have less security.

(Mr. Dorji, Bhutan)

In the general debate many Heads of State or Government, as well as others, addressed themselves to the sizeable resources that could be diverted from military expenditure to development. My delegation, like many others, believes that there is more than just a casual relationship between disarmament and development. This link needs to be stressed and every effort made to reduce the wasteful arms expenditure. Much of the savings realized should be channelled to development assistance, particularly for the poorer nations of the world. To achieve this objective, we look to the major military Powers with the largest arsenals of weapons to set the trend by agreeing to freeze and begin to reduce their arms expenditures.

In the field of disarmament, serious concern has been expressed about nuclear weapons, and rightly so since they affect the very existence of our world. The danger of nuclear war is increasing as international relations deteriorate. Moreover, to add to our fears, there is the growing possibility of an accidental nuclear conflict. Notwithstanding the calls for nuclear disarmament, nuclear armaments have reached new heights of sophistication and destructive power. There is therefore a need to agree on universal, non-discriminatory means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Last year my delegation expressed its concern about the concept of a limited nuclear war, which we consider dangerous and as distorting reality. No nation believes that a nuclear war is winnable. We have heard this repeatedly expressed by all delegations in the United Nations. Most recently the President of the United States in his address to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and stated that it must never be fought. The President of the Soviet Union has also expressed similar thoughts.

While my delegation welcomes such statements, we wonder why States continue to strive to improve and perfect their nuclear capabilities. In effect, nuclear Powers should cease to develop nuclear weapons of even greater sophistication. Clearly, the success of nuclear disarmament lies in the hands of the super-Powers, and we urge them to continue their negotiations to that end.

Mr. SHAH MAHAZ (Pakistan): My delegation joins the other delegations in congratulating you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. This is a well-merited honour in recognition of the important role that you have played in the manifold activities of the United Nations and the prominent interest that your country has shown in disarmament. I should also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election, as well as to pledge the fullest co-operation of my delegation in the successful completion of the work before us.

We have listened with great attention to the statements made in this Committee during the course of the general debate. Mankind throughout the ages has yearned deeply for peace and security, but never before has this need been as critical as it is today for never before have we had to contend with the threat of total annihilation. Consequently the burden of responsibility that we are called upon to assume has never been so heavy nor the opportunity to respond rationally to this challenge so fleeting.

The threat posed by the existence of large nuclear arsenals is felt deeply. The outburst of public opinion all over the world against nuclear weapons is real and by no means a mere expression of some vague and naively neutralist sentiment. At the heart of it lie fundamental and powerful motivations. In a world dominated by the super-Powers and by military alliances, the smaller, non-aligned States find themselves as helpless bystanders, witnesses to a spiralling nuclear-arms race which they deplore, knowing that if allowed to proceed unchecked it would lead to certain death and destruction for all.

It is true that the arms race in all its aspects is not a disembodied phenomenon. It is a manifestation of the existing uncertain global political and security climate, and is directly related to the increase in the level of international tensions caused by the growing resort to the use of force in the conduct of inter-State relations. A case in point is the military intervention in Afghanistan four years ago with all its attendant consequences for regional stability and in global terms on East-West relations. It is no mere coincidence that that military intervention in Afghanistan preceded a sharp deterioration in the international political climate and dealt a severe reversal to the fragile concept of détente. The small and medium-size States have a vital stake in an improved international security environment for the preservation

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

of their own freedom. The climate of insecurity and deepening confrontation between the super-Powers is therefore a matter of the utmost concern to all of us. We believe that a determined effort is needed to break the vicious circle of international tensions generating a new arms race, which in turn exacerbates international tensions. A way out of this vicious circle would be consciously to reject the option of increased armaments as a response to national security problems and instead to pursue diligently the course of arms limitations and disarmament. This is the only certain method of lowering existing political tensions.

Prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament remain the central issues to which we must address ourselves. The nuclear-arms race and the continuing increase in the number of warheads, as well as the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, must be reversed. The deployment of new, more lethal, more accurate weapon systems has to cease. The alternative is a frightening prospect even for a world already living under the spectre of a nuclear holocaust. A lowering of the nuclear threshold means a dangerous contraction in the margin of time required and available for reflection and cool decision making.

An agreement on a nuclear-test ban is the indispensable first step towards progress on the entire range of nuclear disarmament issues. It will be self-deluding to believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty, if it were to become a long-term goal, will not have negative effects both on nuclear disarmament and on vertical as well as horizontal non-proliferation.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a nuclear test ban, established by the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva has, during its last session, followed its programme of work with great diligence. It has discussed and defined issues relating to verification and compliance, as called for by its mandate. It has also proceeded further and carried out a detailed examination of the various elements and means of verification of a nuclear test ban. This work has been supplemented by a detailed technical study of the same issue by the seismological working group. But further progress is contingent upon and possible only if the political decision to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty is forthcoming.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

diminish the legal status of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Equally, the question of verification of compliance must be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Confidence in the observance of the convention is for us a most important consideration.

In the field of outer space the urgent need for action is all too apparent. Outer space cannot be allowed to become another arena for the arms race. Negotiations must begin forthwith to conclude agreements to prevent its militarization. There is no longer any doubt as to the imminence of the development of the so-called futuristic weapons for use in outer space. Knowledgeable observers are already talking about a new generation of weapons of blinding speed and destructiveness, capable of destroying all the satellites in the sky and intercontinental ballistic missile warheads in the upper atmosphere. These are frightening portents of a critical future, which is rapidly moving from imaginative science fiction to ominous destructive reality.

My delegation continues to hold the view that there must not be any let-up in multilateral efforts towards disarmament. We also continue to believe firmly that we must not allow ourselves the luxury of an all or nothing attitude. Complementary to global efforts on such a priority item as nuclear disarmament, we can and should test less spectacular approaches. Pakistan's initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia and for the agreed reduction of conventional forces is designed to bring about security and stability through disarmament at the regional level. A determined implementation of disarmament measures at the regional level would, in our view, strengthen disarmament efforts at the global level.

Equally, it remains the firm view of my delegation that, where possible, interim arrangements must also be arrived at. I refer here to the question of concluding an effective agreement to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In the absence of progress on nuclear disarmament, which remains the unshakeable goal, interim arrangements can play a significant part in allaying the fears of non-nuclear-weapon States as regards their security. Work in this regard in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva has been most discouraging. In fact, the position of some nuclear-weapon States on this question is one of deep concern for us. We hope that those States will review their present attitude and become more responsive to what are the legitimate expectations of the non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

I referred earlier to the international political climate and to the disregard by some States of universally recognized norms governing the conduct of inter-State relations. The Secretary-General, in his annual report, has rightly pointed out that:


"In no area is the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter more important and more closely tied to the survival of humanity than in the field of disarmament and arms limitation." (A/38/L. p. 4)

In a world dominated by nuclear-weapon Powers, competing military alliances and global rivalries, the smaller non-aligned States can rely only on the moral authority of the United Nations and on the principles enshrined in the Charter, particularly those governing non-interference and the non-use of force, for ensuring their security. We in Pakistan attach the utmost importance to the upholding of those principles and to a policy of seeking friendship and peace in our region.

We live in an interdependent world - one which is becoming increasingly so. The arms race between the two major alliances, which is a product of their narrowly conceived security interests, has created conditions of military and economic insecurity world-wide. The magnitude of the expenditure on armaments presents a chilling contrast to the situation in which hundreds of millions of people in many parts of the world go hungry and shelterless. We must never forget, nor for a moment, that this misuse of resources on such a colossal scale can only sharpen the already hazardous polarization in our world. The threat to our security comes as potently from economic injustices as it does from the accumulation of weaponry. In the realization of a new international order, economic security and military security are two faces of the same coin. Disarmament, development and security are three inseparable elements on which a durable structure of peace has to be built. A consensus between the privileged and the under-privileged, between the strong and the weak, between the North and the South on how to reorder our world must encompass both the economic and the military dimensions.

I have indicated the general views of the Pakistan delegation on the items before the First Committee. We hope to make further observations and contributions on specific issues later.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.



FIRST COMMITTEE
9th meeting
held on
Friday, 21 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

- Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany)
- Mr. Morelli Pando (Peru)
- Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh)
- Mr. Mongbe (Benin)
- Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria)
- Mr. Hollai (Hungary)

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

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24 October 1983

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. van NELLE (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I would first like to offer you my warm congratulations on your election to that important office. In view of the close relations between our two countries, it gives me special pleasure to see you presiding over this Committee's proceedings. Having appreciated your circumspection and skill in handling the preparations, we are confident that this session will benefit considerably from your guidance.

A word of thanks goes also to Ambassador Gbeho for his contribution to the Committee's work as last year's Chairman.

The representative of Greece has already spoken in his capacity as the current President of the Council of the European Communities and I fully endorse the views he has presented to the Committee.

All who have addressed this session of the General Assembly have pointed to the dangers of the present international situation. With growing concern and alarm we witness in many parts of the world the flagrant violations of the principle of non-use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Since the 1970s détente and co-operation between East and West have suffered severe setbacks.

We therefore appreciate the Secretary-General's unambiguous references in his annual report to the dangers to world peace and to the tensions between East and West.

It is impossible to tell what the consequences of the increase in tensions will be. Addressing the Assembly on 29 September, Foreign Minister Genscher said:

"Today once more international discussion focuses on East-West tensions rather than on comprehensive North-South co-operation in pursuit of development in the third world. Once again the East-West confrontation is preventing the United Nations from doing its job of preserving world peace."
(A/38/PV.11, p. 18)

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

The First Committee, intended as a forum for debate on world-wide security and disarmament issues, is increasingly becoming, against our wishes, a forum for East-West confrontation, for a discussion of strategic matters concerning the super-Powers hardly relevant or appropriate to the complexity of the subject-matter, and for questions of security in Europe. Urgent problems of security in Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other hand, are neglected. We consider that the fundamental security interests of the non-aligned countries, in particular, deserve more attention.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

None the less, we should not give up in resignation - precisely not at the present time and precisely not here in the United Nations. Safeguarding peace and preventing war are more important than ever. Allow me, therefore, to outline our policy in this respect.

The goal of the Federal Republic of Germany, and its criterion, is to maintain peace in freedom. In a policy statement on 4 May, Chancellor Kohl said the following:

"German foreign policy means above all safeguarding freedom and consolidating peace in Europe and the world. To us an active peace policy is a political necessity and a moral obligation."

This has been the objective of every Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The safeguarding of peace and the pursuit of disarmament are indispensable elements of our peace policy. That policy is based on our membership in the European Community and in the Atlantic Alliance, whose purpose is to prevent any war.

We all know that progress towards arms control and disarmament is made difficult when negotiations take place in a climate of mistrust and political tension. Conversely, a stronger system of collective security and the unconditional observance of the comprehensive ban on the threat or use of force prescribed by the United Nations Charter would enhance confidence between nations and thus also be conducive to agreements on arms control and disarmament. What terrible consequences exaggerated mistrust can have was illustrated by the shooting down of the Korean civilian airliner, which evoked indignation and fear all over the world.

In the 10 years that it has been a Member of the world Organization the Federal Republic of Germany has strongly supported the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The United Nations is the most important forum for the discussion of global security and disarmament issues. It will not be possible to achieve an effective balance of security interests in a world characterized by growing interdependence unless all nations play their part. Seen against the background of poverty and want in many countries, the world's arms bill of \$800 billion this year is a shocking fact. The responsibility for this lies with the community of nations, for it is only through common efforts that this trend can be stopped.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

The seriousness of our efforts to achieve the aims of disarmament and arms control in all fields is borne out by, among other things, our active involvement in the United Nations, especially in this First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Later in the session my delegation will be covering our work in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament concerning chemical and radiological weapons, a comprehensive test ban, outer space, and other matters. Today I should like to illustrate once again the fundamental objectives of our policy.

We want specific, militarily significant and balanced disarmament steps, the observance of which must be reliably verifiable. We want an argumentative and realistic dialogue among all nations of the world on the goals and concepts to be pursued. As in the past, we shall concentrate our work on areas where progress can actually be made, even in times of international tension. Here priority is given to the prevention of war, especially confidence-building through openness and transparency. These goals are in the interest of all nations. They should therefore be acceptable to all.

My Government and its allies have time and again declared that the foremost aim of their security policy is to prevent war and to create the foundations for lasting peace while safeguarding freedom. The most important means of preventing war is the unqualified observance of the principle of non-use of force. The Heads of State or Government of the Atlantic Alliance declared at their meeting in Bonn on 10 June 1982: "None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack." Let me emphasize once again here today: this comprehensive and unequivocal pledge by the Alliance never to be the first to resort to weapons must, in our view, be the quintessence of any sincere policy aimed at safeguarding peace and security.

I should now like to turn to the latest Soviet proposals on arms control and disarmament. In the general debate the Soviet delegation focused attention on two draft resolutions which it wants to be treated with priority. One concerns a declaration condemning nuclear war, the other a freeze on nuclear weapons.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

These subjects have featured prominently in previous statements by the Soviet Union in the United Nations. My Government has on several occasions commented in detail, both in this Committee and in the Committee on Disarmament, on the Soviet position regarding the prevention of war and wishes once more to make its stance unmistakably clear.

The Soviet Union complains of a war hysteria which it itself started and which it stirs up anew day by day, and it criticizes the arms and modernization measures of the West - measures, which it has itself been carrying out for about six years and which it is still carrying out. In contrast, the Atlantic Alliance did not immediately respond to this arms build-up with a build-up of its own. On the contrary, it has offered negotiations and the complete renunciation of an entire weapons system.

As to the Soviet drafts, a declaration condemning nuclear war appears at first sight to express the heartfelt sentiment of no doubt every peace-loving individual. The Federal Republic of Germany and its allies, too, utterly condemn nuclear war. But they do not condemn nuclear war alone; they condemn any war. The fact that the Soviet draft declaration does not mention conventional war of the kind currently being fought in various parts of the world - Afghanistan, for instance - is not a chance omission. A second look at the draft leaves us in no doubt: the implication of such a text would be to deny a country or an alliance the right to defend itself against an aggressor having superior conventional capabilities with all the means at its disposal - mindful of the principle of proportionality - including, in the extreme case, nuclear weapons. It is plain to see that a declaration of such substance stands in sharp contrast to the right of self-defence embodied in the United Nations Charter.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

I would recall in this context that the Federal Republic of Germany upon acquiring sovereignty, signed an agreement renouncing nuclear weapons. By virtue of this we insist on the right not to be threatened by such weapons and if that threat persists, to secure the protection of an ally. Thus the Soviet proposal is not acceptable to my country, whose security ultimately depends on the nuclear shield of the United States.

Any narrowing down of the general ban on the threat or use of force to specified types of use is incompatible with that principle, which is of necessity of a comprehensive nature. It would amount to a qualification of the concept of force and hence to a restriction of the right of self-defence.

The deterrence guaranteed by the North Atlantic Alliance has been one of the main reasons why no armed conflict has occurred in Europe since the Second World War, in spite of the various political crises. It is in the interest of all nations that peace and stability in Europe should be maintained. We Germans know better than most that even a conventional war would bring terrible devastation to central Europe. Hence we, in particular, cannot and will not expose ourselves to such a risk. It therefore remains vitally important to us to continue to prevent war by means of effective deterrence.

But this illustrates only one aspect of our position on the problem of nuclear weapons. Though the Alliance cannot, under the existing circumstances, relinquish the right to allow such weapons to be deployed on its territory as a deterrent to any kind of war, it has strongly urged both sides to reduce their nuclear arsenals substantially.

This brings me to the second Soviet draft (A/C.1/38/L.2) calling for a freeze on all nuclear weapons. The Committee will understand my assessing this proposal against the background of the military situation with which my country in particular, but also a number of non-European countries, see themselves confronted. Basically, it is a situation in which the Soviet Union, which has superior conventional capabilities and continues to enlarge them, has in recent years rapidly and continuously expanded its intermediate-range nuclear potential by deploying modern SS-20 missiles and thus built it up

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

into a huge threat to its neighbours. I therefore put it to the Soviet Union: why has it since 1977 uninterruptedly produced and deployed this weapon system, which I emphasize is directed not at the United States but against the Soviet Union's European and Asian neighbours, in spite of the fact that there are no comparable weapons in those countries and therefore no comparable threats to the Soviet Union?

In its statement to the General Assembly on 4 October the Soviet Union maintained that there existed:

... in all areas ... strategic nuclear arms, medium-range weapons in Europe, the conventional armed forces of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty - an approximate equality between the two sides".

(A/38/PV.13 p. 34-35)

The Soviet Union made this contention years ago and has repeated it every year since, regardless of the fact that the number of its warheads has continued to increase. Mr. Brezhnev also stated the same thing during his official visit to Bonn in May 1978. At that time the medium-range category consisted of 550 SS-4s and SS-5s with an equal number of warheads, but only 50 SS-20 missiles with 150 warheads, a total therefore of 730 warheads, while the West had nothing comparable with which to match them. When Mr. Brezhnev made another statement on 23 February 1981, reiterating the assertion of approximate balance in connection with the announcement of the Soviet moratorium, the Soviet Union had already increased its SS-20s to 200 with over 600 warheads, and still had, in addition, 400 SS-4s and SS-5s, which meant that it had over 1 000 warheads on intermediate-range missiles at its disposal. Today it has over 350 SS-20s with over 1,000 warheads, whilst the total number of Soviet intermediate-range warheads exceeds 1,300. Now, in view of this one-sided threat to Western Europe and countries geographically close to the Soviet Union, can one speak of an approximate balance?

Every advocate of the freeze concept must realize that such a proposal is tantamount to expecting the countries threatened by the SS-20s to acquiesce in a codification of the Soviet superiority and to live with that threat for an indefinite period, unable to resort to adequate counter-measures.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

The most sensible solution to this problem, created by the Soviet Union, and one which would take account of the security of all concerned, would be an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union providing for either the complete renunciation of land based long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), a category which poses a special threat, or at least a reduction to the lowest possible level. This the West has proposed in Geneva, but the Soviet Union has to date agreed neither to a mutual renunciation nor to a limitation of these weapon systems on a basis of equality. The United States, following intensive consultations with its allies, has now submitted new proposals in Geneva which allow to a considerable extent for the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union. With these new proposals the West has put forward all the elements for a fair and balanced agreement. If the Soviet Union so wishes, such an agreement can be worked out even before the end of this year.

With its new proposals the United States has demonstrated its willingness to compromise and its flexibility, not only in the field of INF, but also with regard to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which are even more important in terms of achieving a global balance of power. The build-down concept, in particular, shows the American determination to achieve substantial reductions in the strategic sphere. An agreement on this with the Soviet Union would, for the first time, establish a binding basis for a progressive reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and thus respond to the hopes of the nations of the world.

This build-down concept is a more adequate and at the same time more attractive solution than a mere freeze. The argument often put forward in defence of the freeze concept, that whilst reduction negotiations are in progress the arms build up continues, applies equally to a freeze. A freeze, too, could not become effective until agreement had been reached on the difficult question of verification. An agreement on a freeze would require the same amount of time as an agreement on the verification of an accord on reduction.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of
Germany)

It all boils down to this. An adequate defence capability, an unqualified renunciation of force that is actually carried out, as well as concrete, balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament steps, coupled with a policy of dialogue and confidence-building, are the only realistic instruments with which to safeguard peace. The West not only feel themselves committed to this realistic and consistent concept for peace, they also practise it. We want security based on equilibrium and co-operation, not one that is rooted in intimidation and the fear of others. The condemnation of nuclear war alone and the call for a freeze at the present level are one-sided and superficial proposals that are not conducive to enhancing stability and strengthening peace.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

One contribution to the enhancement of stability, in our view, is the strengthening of confidence between States. Many speakers at this session of the General Assembly have deplored the alarming loss of confidence of States in their relationship with one another, particularly in East-West relationship but also in many parts of the world.

By an argumentum ex contrario this state of affairs shows the significance and urgency of new initiatives designed to restore confidence. Times of tension and crisis, more than others, call for the maintenance of a dialogue between States.

Confidence building is a fundamental principle of State conduct; trust in the predictability, the peaceful intention and the co-operative behaviour of other States forms an indispensable basis for the members of the international community to make their contribution to the orderly interaction of States. This is true not least for co-operation in the areas of economic and development policy.

In the central domain of peace and security, we speak of confidence-building measures. By this term we designate patterns of behaviour which States observe to signal and to prove credibly over time that their intentions towards their neighbours are of a peaceful nature. Confidence-building measures are designed to strengthen the trust of other States in the non-existence of specific military threats. However, they attain this confidence-enhancing effect only if the States applying these rules manage to demonstrate convincingly that their intentions and acts are mutually compatible.

Mere declaratory announcements, often enough offered for purely propagandistic purposes - such as we have heard again during this session of the General Assembly - do not meet the requirements of confidence-building measures in this accepted definition. On the other hand, firmly agreed measures which enhance openness and transparency regarding the military posture of a State are well within this definition, as are measures which provide for the prior announcement of military activities - for instance, military manoeuvres - and for clarification regarding their dimensions; and, further,

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

measures by virtue of which States forgo, in a verifiable manner over a period of time, the use of certain technically possible military options under the precondition of undiminished security.

Confidence-building measures fall short of being disarmament measures; they leave military potentials intact. However, considering the difficulties that we are encountering in our search for negotiated disarmament steps on the bilateral and multilateral levels, it is doubly urgent to prepare the ground for a positive outcome of negotiations by agreement on confidence-building measures which attenuate confrontation and reduce the fear of armed conflict. Confidence-building measures thus become a catalyst, a key for genuine disarmament steps.

This insight has motivated the Federal Republic of Germany for a number of years to contribute to the conceptual development of confidence-building measures and to efforts aimed at their world-wide acceptance. I should like to remind the Committee of the United Nations Study Group on Confidence-Building Measures, presided over by the representative of the Federal Republic in the Committee on Disarmament; of our initiative at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament for an International Symposium on Confidence-Building Measures - an event which took place in May of this year with broad international participation; and, finally, of the efforts begun this year in the United Nations Disarmament Commission to secure the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures. The Federal Government hopes that the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be in a position, on the basis of the promising first segment of its work, to prepare definitive recommendations in the course of 1984 which will then be submitted to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

In the same spirit the Federal Government was actively involved in the successful completion of the Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid. Notwithstanding the heavy strain on international relations, it perseveringly worked for a forward-looking concluding document. That document is now before us; it has cleared the path for a Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Conference, which will commence in Stockholm on 17 January 1984, is a necessary complement to the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced reductions of conventional armed forces in central Europe with its inherent geographical limitation.

In the concluding document of the Madrid CSCE Review Meeting, the objective of the Conference has been fixed as follows:

"... to undertake in stages new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

We are thus entitled to expect that the future Conference on Disarmament in Europe will help give more substance to the prohibition of the threat or use of force - a pivotal command of international law - in the practice of mutual relations among all participating States.

This squares fully with the political views and objectives of my Government. Agreed rules for more transparency and predictability in the military field should serve to exclude the use of military power for purposes which are contradictory to the prohibition of the threat or use of force, but also facilitate verification of whether all States concerned in the establishment, and the use they make, of their military potential conform to the interdiction of force and to the requirements of a purely defensive security policy. The concluding document of Madrid has stipulated in addition - fully compatible with the firmly held views of my Government - that the confidence-building measures to be agreed upon must be of military significance and politically binding, as well as adequately verifiable.

We also expect positive impulses for the further development of confidence-building measures on a global scale, and for the activities of the United Nations in this field, from the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, in which the Federal Government will actively participate.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

Confidence-building measures are an essential ingredient of political strategy aimed at the prevention of war, including nuclear war. Precisely in the nuclear area, the United States of America and the Soviet Union prepared the field in the 1970s by agreeing on a first series of confidence-building measures. In his speech in Berlin in June 1982, President Reagan attempted - and my Government welcomed that attempt - to build on this shared set of rules of behaviour by suggesting additional nuclear confidence-building measures. Since then, the United States Government has clarified, as well as amplified, this package of suggestions.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of
Germany)

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the concrete proposals which the United States of America has submitted in the framework of the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) concerning agreements on confidence-building measures. It would be highly desirable for the Soviet Union to respond specifically in those negotiations and give its consent to agreements in this area.

In the course of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany sought to demonstrate, in a working paper submitted in conjunction with other partners, the contribution that confidence-building measures can make especially to efforts to prevent nuclear war. It has further developed its ideas in the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament during the current year and enumerated a wider array of individual measures which States could take, in part to prevent accidental conflict as a consequence of a technical mishap or miscalculation, in part to eliminate the root causes of armed conflict by enhancing confidence in general.

My delegation greatly appreciates the Belgian delegation's special contribution to the further conceptual development of the idea of confidence-building measures in the nuclear domain. It is now up to the nuclear Powers themselves, among them, in the first place, the two super-Powers, to draw on the intellectual contribution of numerous delegations and agree on further confidence-building measures of this kind.

At the same time, it is an important task of the Committee on Disarmament and of the United Nations itself to examine in what manner the larger international community could contribute to the development and application of confidence-building measures for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war.

Nothing is more conducive to the creation of confidence than the confidence in an adversary's peaceful behaviour which emanates from empirical insight into and the transparency of its military conduct. Efforts to attain greater transparency must therefore be at the centre of confidence-building. For this reason, the efforts of the General Assembly and of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to render military budgets more transparent and more comparable and to fix rules for their verifiable reduction merit particular praise.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of
Germany)

I should also like to point to efforts, which took the form of a resolution for the first time at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, to make progress in the evaluation of military force relationships and the improvement of information on military capabilities. It is essential that these efforts to achieve greater transparency be continued in the multilateral framework and that an ever-growing number of members of the international community, including members of the socialist group of States, share in these endeavours. Efforts aiming at greater transparency acquire a qualitatively new dimension in an age of excessive arms build-up in many parts of the world.

Perhaps more than ever the present session of our Committee faces the risk that the centre of gravity of the debates and of draft resolutions may shift to comprehensive declaratory demands which are partly utopian and partly the expression of parochial interests without objective validity.

Such tendencies are indeed to be observed. We must jointly strive to fight them and to redirect the attention of all to our obligation to take the objective security situation in the respective regions, the requirement of undiminished security for all States and the common interest of all Members of this Assembly in the maintenance of stability, security and peace as yardsticks for our work.

My delegation, jointly with others, will make a determined effort to oppose unilateral attempts to politicize our work and to abuse this Committee for the imposition of one-sided interests with a comprehensive concept for the prevention of war and the enhancement of peace, based on the Charter of the United Nations. We are interested not in spectacular projects and resolutions, superficially seductive, but in patient work to intensify our global dialogue, in a sustained effort aimed at the formulation of a common approach to security and disarmament.

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): I take great pleasure in congratulating you on behalf of the Peruvian delegation, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your recognized experience in disarmament affairs is a guarantee of the wise conduct of our work. I wish also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

The prolonged persistence of serious confrontations in various parts of the world jeopardizes international peace and security. At the core of this state of affairs we find the spiralling renewal of the policy of antagonistic blocs, an aberrant substitute for the systems of collective security of the United Nations, which has so far been prevented from ensuring the full and universal effect of its principles.

Together with the qualitative escalation of nuclear weapons, the danger of which is less and less under human control, there is a discernible constant, which is the lack of the will to negotiate on the part of the Powers that are mainly involved.

Non-nuclear-weapon and non-aligned countries such as Peru view with perplexity and legitimate concern the so far fruitless bilateral negotiations in Geneva. Instead of receiving thorough information about these talks, as the General Assembly requires, the international community simply gets the unilateral declarations which the super-Powers deem necessary for their respective public relations purposes.

As an eminent United States citizen recently said, there does not now seem to exist the desire for understanding that led to the 1963 Treaty and other similar treaties. Indeed, the situation today may be more serious than it was 20 years ago, in the sense that the possible failure or deadlock of the bilateral negotiations now under way could lead to a step backwards that could include the cancellation of those treaties, with incalculable consequences.

It is in the light of these facts that we should consider our agenda item on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of a preparatory committee for the forthcoming Review Conference on that Treaty. Many full parties to the Treaty, including Peru, renounced the possession of nuclear weapons by virtue of the 1968 Treaty, on the understanding that the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to carry out effective negotiations to eliminate such weapons.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

But that has not proved to be the case, as was made clear by the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore those parties are entitled to make it known to the nuclear Powers that their lack of political decision to start the process of nuclear disarmament may, apart from anything else, jeopardize the future of this highly important Treaty.

Peru supports the establishment by common agreement of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones. This attitude is consistent with its status as a fully-fledged party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has established what is, strictly speaking, the only nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. That is why Peru, together with other countries, has made known its concern at the possibility that a nuclear Power outside our continent, a party to the Additional Protocols to that instrument, may have introduced nuclear weapons into the South Atlantic.

It is striking to note that there are still differences of opinion as to disarmament priorities despite the Final Document of 1978 of the first special devoted to disarmament which drew up a list of priorities that, while immutable and unequivocal with regard to nuclear disarmament, does not exclude simultaneous related efforts in the field of conventional disarmament. In the view of my delegation, this is the sense of the continuous appeals made on the subject by the Secretary-General.

In this context the arms race must not be seen as the sum total of the various regional arms races. As an essentially world-wide phenomenon, the arms race, particularly as regards conventional weapons, has reached qualitative and quantitative levels which to a large extent are directly or indirectly determined by the Powers possessing the largest military arsenals.

Similar thoughts are prompted by analysis of the Final Document of 1978 whose provisions with regard to the transfer of arms deserve to be mentioned since they are substantively linked to the arms race. A point of particular importance is the provision in that Document relating to the need for consultations between countries supplying arms and those receiving them.

Within an unbalanced international structure, the lack of understanding between the two great military and economic blocs, on the one hand, and between those blocs and the third world, on the other, has increased and international society finds itself in the situation where certain States or groups of States seem

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

to act solely for their own interests in disregard of the common interests of all mankind.

At a pace that is in inverse ratio to that of the production and transfer of arms, international development efforts are showing signs of stagnation. After countless conferences and forums covering subjects that range from the political to the technical, from the regional to the international, from the sectoral to the global, one is repeatedly confronted with the frustration of the developing countries with the consequent danger, which has been foretold but about which nothing is being done, of a new threat to world peace.

Much has been said in this forum about the economic and social cost of, and the waste of scientific resources resulting from the accumulation of armaments, bearing in mind the exponential increase in the production and upgrading of arms. Realizing that this cost is detrimental to their progress and well-being, the developing countries, through their broadest collective entity, the Non-Aligned Movement, have been promoting disarmament, as can be seen from the latest summit meeting held in New Delhi.

In this constructive spirit, my delegation views with all due respect the initiative of the President of France, who called for a conference on disarmament and development at the earliest possible date as an appropriate framework within which to confront once and for all these two closely related aspects - armaments and underdevelopment.

While not part of those areas of the developing world with the highest military expenditure, Latin America has taken a number of responsible initiatives in favour of arms control and limitation, as a consequence of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Peru has been in the forefront of those initiatives in the subregion, with special emphasis on the problems of conventional weapons and related matters.

The successful outcome of all these efforts is always facilitated by the fact that Latin America is relatively removed from the focal points of international tension. Unfortunately, events which took place only recently and others which now affect the Central American subregion have made the region as a whole vulnerable and thereby exposed to the danger of a breach of important principles and sovereign rights as well as to the direct effects of the world arms build-up.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

In keeping with its mandate under the Charter, the General Assembly year after year reflects the demands of all the peoples of the world for peace and discharges its functions by periodically renewing statements of principle and guidelines for action adapted to the current complex and most serious international crisis.

However, it would be useful to determine whether the General Assembly is really meeting the challenge of that crisis with its usual responses, many of which are repetitive, or whether the Assembly should, on the contrary, look for more selective responses in the light of the mounting gravity of the situation.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly gave the international community the most advanced and in every sense the most balanced document that had ever been produced on disarmament within the framework of an international forum. The General Assembly then reflected an extraordinary convergence of views between East and West and between North and South and laid down norms valid for the future. But the results achieved in 1982 were generally quite the reverse, leading to the negative outcome of the second special session devoted to disarmament, which in turn reflected worsening international relations. However, even in those circumstances it was recognized that the Final Document of 1978 was still fully in effect.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

Given this background, therefore, we would do well to examine the possibility that this General Assembly might concentrating, though not exclusively, on the promotion of measures to be undertaken initially in the short term, but which would form a necessary part of a broader and more profound process of disarmament in the future.

With this approach, there would be no change of principles but merely changes in procedures concerning how to make a realistic and effective start on tasks preliminary to disarmament, but necessarily linked to the need to reach this goal in accordance with the priorities and guidelines of the 1978 Final Document.

As regards short-term measures, prominence should be given to confidence-building measures, which have so far been somewhat sporadic and confined to a limited geographic framework. None the less, their application as a consequence of the Helsinki Agreements, and the progress that can be expected from the forthcoming meeting in Stockholm, suggest that they could be systematically and extensively applied, particularly by the nuclear Powers and those possessing the largest military arsenals, in order to establish the climate necessary for later disarmament action. In this respect considerable progress has been made - although it could have been taken further - in the Disarmament Commission, whose work on the subject will have to continue actively this year.

As many delegations have pointed out, it should be noted that confidence-building measures are not an end in themselves and would soon fail to achieve their goal if they were not accompanied by other measures demonstrating the determination of the great Powers to proceed with the disarmament process.

Ambassador Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, has recently drawn our attention in this Committee to ten resolutions which he rightly deems to be basic in the disarmament field, and which were all adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. If one compares those resolutions with the subject matter discussed by the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating organ, it may be concluded that the most urgent goals, among those of most importance, are the following:

(Mr. Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

My delegation has listened with great attention to the statements made in this Committee during the course of the week. One after another preceding speakers have underlined the sombre state of affairs which prevails in the world today. The unprecedented arms race, further intensified by the introduction of the most sophisticated and lethal weapons into the arsenals of the two super-Powers and other militarily significant States, threatens not only international peace and security but also the very existence of mankind. It should be crystal clear to all of us now that world peace and security cannot be assured through the accumulation of arms. Some will try to justify their participation in the arms race by asserting that it was necessary to guard their national security. But has it given them security? On the contrary, they have bought greater insecurity at higher cost. Furthermore, the massive military expenditure stands out in sharp contrast to the current critical international economic situation. The social opportunity costs resulting from the diversion of scarce resources for military use are writ large in both the developed and the developing countries.

Bangladesh has in the past expressed its disappointment at the failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are all painfully aware that unprecedented international tension prevented substantive agreements on issues of vital importance in the field of disarmament. What we have witnessed during the past year is a further deterioration in the international situation and a sharp escalation in the arms race, both nuclear and conventional. At the same time, new strategic perceptions have been introduced in the field of international security. These actions are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Programme of Action of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The heightened international tension and the unprecedented arms race have aroused grave concern among peoples throughout the world about the impending threat of nuclear war. There is also a greater realisation of the heavy price the world is paying in terms of social opportunity costs resulting from the current arms race and its negative impact on the world economy and ecology. The massive anti-nuclear and anti-war movements in various parts of the world, both East and West, have underlined the universal awareness of the harmful effects of the arms race. This awareness should be further fostered with a view to promoting the World Disarmament Campaign.

(Mr. Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

Bangladesh is totally committed to the cause of general and complete disarmament. Our participation, at the highest level, in the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament demonstrated the importance we attach to the question of disarmament and international security. As the Head of Government of Bangladesh, Lieutenant-General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, said in his address to the seventh summit Conference of non-aligned countries:

"We are committed to general and complete disarmament. We support a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Our decision to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was based on our firm conviction that there can be no durable peace except through the elimination and destruction of nuclear weapons and their stockpiles. We believe that the limitation of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction is an important first step in creating an atmosphere of trust and confidence and the relaxation of international tensions."

General Ershad also stated:

"The unrestricted use of scarce resources for military purposes has on the one hand created a sense of fear and uncertainty among nations and on the other led to universal social opportunity cost. We can and we must rectify the situation. The resources must be released for the benefit of mankind. It is now universally acknowledged that a redirection of resources from the production of armaments would help both the developed and the developing countries by providing a much-needed stimulus to production, investment and international trade."

Bangladesh, in pursuance of its commitment to the concept of general and complete disarmament, acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We are, however, distressed to note that, despite over 100 States having acceded to that Treaty, nuclear proliferation continues unabated. We are convinced that any use of nuclear weapons, whether or not limited in scale, would inevitably escalate, and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, even though they were not remotely involved, would be equally threatened. It is our common duty, therefore, to adopt concrete measures aimed at the prohibition of nuclear

(Mr. Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

weapons. The legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States and neutral States as regards threats to their security needs to be allayed. The nuclear-weapon States should provide them with negative security guarantees. We therefore feel that while negotiating the comprehensive programme of disarmament priority consideration should be given to ensuring that all States refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Simultaneously there should be a total freeze on the production, deployment and research and development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Similarly, the production, deployment, research and development of new chemical weapons should be suspended, pending the conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty. The attempts to use outer space for military purposes should be halted and it should be declared the common heritage of mankind, to be used for humanity at large.

Bangladesh believes in peace, peace in the region and in the world, through strict adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. It is a matter of great regret that, despite our pledges to forsake the use of force or the threat of the use of force as a means of solving international disputes, such acts continue with impunity all around the globe. We would like to stress that without faithful and sincere adherence to the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of all disputes, and non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States there can be no durable and just peace in this world.

In our efforts to build a solid base for the relaxation of international tension we have consistently supported the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-weapons-free zones in various parts of the world. The creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean is a matter of particular importance to us

(Mr. Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

and we maintain that the successful implementation of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) will be in the interest of peace and security. It is in this context that we have actively participated in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and supported the convening of the Conference in Colombo to draw up an instrument for ensuring peace and security in the region, free from big-Power rivalry.

(Mr. Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

We are, however, aware that the success of the Colombo Conference will depend on the participation of the super-Powers and other militarily significant States, as well as the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean.

Bangladesh has also been making consistent efforts to promote peace and stability in South Asia through the creation of a climate of trust, understanding and co-operation in the region. Our joint effort with six other countries of the region has already achieved concrete results and we have been able to identify specific areas of co-operation. Very recently, we held the first ever meeting of seven South Asian Foreign Ministers. We in Bangladesh remain confident that as this regional co-operation develops so will the overall climate in the region.

Bangladesh, one of the least developed countries, firmly believes that there is a close relation between disarmament and development. The colossal financial and other resources which have been consumed by the armaments race ought to be directed to eliminating world poverty. As the Chairman of the Group of 77 during the last 12 months, we have made sincere efforts towards de-escalation of the arms race and optimum utilization of the available resources for the social and economic development of the developing countries. In his statement to the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, His Excellency Mr. A. R. Shams-ud Doha, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh stated:

"The interaction between disarmament and development, the glaring discrepancy in the amount spent on armaments as against development, do not bear recounting. Suffice it to say that the voice of this General Assembly must be heard loud and clear in support of concrete measures to promote disarmament and to divert resources from armament to development. One concrete way of doing this would be to institute without delay some measure of international taxation on all expenditure on nuclear arms.

"This session of the United Nations General Assembly must also take concrete measures to arrest the increase in armaments and particularly nuclear weapons. We must devise ways and means to depoliticise, as far as possible, the consideration of such questions within the United Nations."

(Mr. Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

We are convinced that the complex and interrelated issues connected with the question of disarmament can only be addressed in a multilateral context. Bangladesh, therefore, firmly believes that the United Nations has a central role to play in the field of disarmament, and has consistently supported the strengthening of United Nations machinery to help the Secretary-General in his disarmament efforts as well as in his peace-keeping role. To this end, we supported the proposal to expand the Committee on Disarmament. In keeping with our enduring commitment to work for general and complete disarmament, Bangladesh has applied for membership of the Committee on Disarmament and is ready to contribute to all future disarmament negotiations undertaken by that body.

In conclusion, the Bangladesh delegation would like to emphasize once again that we are meeting at a crucial juncture in the history of mankind. Never before has the human race been so dangerously close to the precipice of total self-destruction. Our awareness of the great dangers posed by the mad race for armament, and our consensus on the need to take urgent practical steps towards disarmament, must be translated into reality, to usher in an era of global peace and security. We have listened to many substantial and concrete proposals made in this regard during this session. What is important is that these proposals be studied and examined carefully in the coming days. Considering the almost unanimous view that the arms race is the single biggest threat to humanity, it is inconceivable that we should not take effective measures here at this session of the General Assembly at least partially to redress the situation. It is our sincere desire that all States, particularly the most powerful and militarily significant ones, should display self-restraint and moderation and enter into serious negotiations on disarmament.

In my statement I have indicated the general views of the Bangladesh delegation on the agenda items before us. We hope to make further observations on specific issues later.

Mr. MONCBE (Benin) (interpretation from French): I have great pleasure, Sir, in beginning this statement, which I make on behalf of the delegation of Benin, by congratulating you on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee for this thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Your election to that important post clearly is a tribute by the members of this Committee to your outstanding qualities and shows the great respect in which the international community holds your country, Norway, which has always played a considerable role in international relations. My delegation is convinced that, that, thanks to your long experience and wisdom, our work will be crowned with well-deserved success.

I address a similar tribute to the other officers of the Committee and I assure you all of the positive collaboration of the delegation of Benin.

I should be failing in my duty if I did not express to Ambassador James Victor Gbeho of Ghana the admiration, gratitude and pride of my delegation concerning his calm and skilful conduct of our meetings last year.

A thoughtful examination of the items on the agenda of our Committee again this year arouses in feelings of great anxiety and frustration. Regrettably, we have to note that because of the scant progress made in the area of disarmament the General Assembly is forced year after year to inscribe the same topics on its agenda, while new items are added whose only merit is to show the worsening international situation.

Is it still necessary to say that the world is prey to an unprecedented danger of widespread conflagration because of the ill will of the major political Powers? Eminent Heads of State or Government and heads of delegations of sovereign countries, come to the thirty-eighth session from all parts of the world, express that feeling at the rostrum of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Mongbe, Benin)

It was indeed to set a better understanding of this serious threat and to deal with it that Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement - to whom my delegation wishes to render a respectful tribute - invited eminent world leaders to come to New York. I hope the important messages which they addressed to the international community through our Organization have sufficiently mobilized consciences to serve as a point of reference for the work of our Committee.

The delegation of Benin is profoundly concerned over the continuing arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and over the incredible increase in military expenditures that is taking place despite of all the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of other international organizations.

The new escalation in the nuclear arms race of which the world has been the impotent witness for some time, arises from a futile search for supremacy by the major Powers, and from the consequent climate of mistrust and fear which has permeated international relations.

How many more resolutions, how many more appeals, how many more conferences, seminars and other meetings will be needed before the nuclear Powers resolutely detach themselves from the pressures of national pride, the spirit of hegemonism, and on the depraved appetites of the companies in the military-industrial complex?

How long will it be before those Powers understand, as the Palme Commission emphasized in its remarkable report last year, that:

"No nation can achieve absolute security through any kind of military superiority."

My delegation is convinced that nuclear weapons, by reason of their present quantity and quality, are no longer mere weapons of war, but rather the instruments of complete annihilation. That is why my delegation finds difficulty in understanding the determination of certain military Powers to pour astronomical sums of money into building an arsenal which is daily growing more sophisticated.

(Mr. Mongbe, Benin)

My delegation exhorts the major Powers to stifle their selfish impulses, to show their faith in the survival of mankind and to embark firmly upon the road to complete a general disarmament. International peace and security cannot be guaranteed except through the effective elimination of all types of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons.

My delegation, by rejecting the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which increases the risk of a nuclear holocaust, supports the idea of negotiations and the adoption of effective measures to prevent nuclear war.

My delegation reaffirms its conviction that disarmament is something too important and vital to be left to the major Powers alone. Disarmament is the business of all countries, large or small, rich or poor, powerful or weak. The United Nations therefore has a central role to play in this area which is certainly part of its basic responsibilities.

Consequently the different United Nations bodies, which make up the framework for multilateral negotiations in the area of disarmament must be supported so that they can more effectively carry out their mandate and adopt specific disarmament measures.

While awaiting general and complete disarmament, for which it wishes most earnestly, my delegation supports any measures to ban immediately the threat or use of nuclear weapons. It will support any draft resolution calling for a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons, as well as any draft which proposes the rapid conclusion of a complete test ban treaty. We will support any genuine action designed to impede effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their forms, or to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. Outer space, a universal heritage, must be used only for peaceful purposes.

My country supports the idea of and efforts directed towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace based on arrangements, conventions or agreements freely negotiated by the various countries in the regions concerned. The creation of such zones will inevitably bring peace and security closer at both regional and international levels.

(Mr. Mongbe, Benin)

In this regard, my delegation is deeply concerned over the massive strengthening of the military machine of South Africa. Indeed, this country, encouraged by the political, economic and financial support which it receives from certain Western Powers, is headed towards the acquisition of a nuclear capacity, which would make it a real danger to the security of the African continent and indeed of the whole world.

My delegation, like those of all peace-loving countries, condemns any collaboration with the racist régime in Pretoria in the military and nuclear fields. The proponents of apartheid, in pursuit of their mad policy, can use nuclear weapons as instruments of terror and blackmail, which would be dangerous to international peace and security. Therefore, it is imperative that the appropriate organs in our Organization assume their responsibilities arranging for all Member States to join in a consensus to apply the arms embargo against South Africa.

My delegation is equally concerned over the situation which prevails in the Middle East, where Israel is emerging as a dangerous military Power in the region.

The implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace must finally begin through the dismantling of all military bases being built up there and of the rival fleets confronting each other there. That should also be accompanied by the holding and successful outcome of the Conference which has been so long postponed, and which is to take place in Sri Lanka in 1984.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Benin wishes to reaffirm that the principles and priorities set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are still valid, and that the measures advocated there remain a goal to be achieved. We invite all countries to work in good faith to that end.

My delegation feels that in spite of the general disappointment over the second special session devoted to disarmament it did nevertheless reach a consensus on a world disarmament campaign.

(Mr. Mcngbe, Benin)

As a large number of speakers before me have pointed out, the political will of all nations is necessary to reverse the continually escalating arms race, especially that between the two super-Powers, and to adopt effective disarmament measures. The success of joint efforts for international security and for the survival of mankind require as much. The achievement of this aim requires the deepest commitment by all to work sincerely and unremittingly to halt the lamentable and senseless waste of resources and to use the resources thus released for the economic and social development of the developing countries, and for improving the quality of life of the peoples in the developed countries.

In other words, I would quite simply say, like so many others have said before me, that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. By creating a climate of confidence among the different nations our Organization will win its wager on peace and security and will for ever eliminate the explosive situation which is polarizing the world and mortgaging the work of economic and social development, and thus mortgaging the betterment of mankind. By so doing mankind will henceforth succeed in emphasizing and strengthening the development work without which there will be no well-being or security, and will finally succeed in making science and technology powerful agents and factors for global development instead of allowing them to degenerate into the handmaids of war and destruction.

(Mr. Mongbe, Benin)

I have expressed the conviction and the hopes of my delegation that this challenge of our time will be answered by a commitment free of any selfish or hegemonist designs, free of any hint of domination - in short, free of any mistrust. We hope the commitment will be based on friendship among peoples which desire peace.

General and complete disarmament is an imperative to which all States in the world must subscribe.

Mr. SAHNOUN (Algeria) (interpretation from French): Let me start, Sir, by congratulating you, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Algerian delegation, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. To the pleasure of seeing an experienced and judicious man in charge of our work is added that of being able to congratulate a friend of long standing. Our congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee, whose well-known abilities will also be a great help in our work.

As Chairman of the Committee, you are succeeding Ambassador Victor Gbeho, who, at a particularly difficult time, succeeded in conducting the work of the First Committee at the thirty-seventh session with the serenity, forthrightness and faith that we all recognize in him.

It has been a commonplace for several years now to describe the prevailing international situation as grave and disturbing. It is true that the international environment for a long time now has provided ample argument for the most pessimistic accounting. The situation has rarely, however, offered so much justification for feelings of insecurity and disquiet as it does now.

The perils generated by the current system of international relations are greatly increased by the profound and lasting manifestations of a world economic crisis, the many flashpoints of tension in the world and the recrudescence of the spirit of the cold war in relations between the blocs. Moreover, the plan to restructure the world economic system has been blocked, the very essence of the international dialogue in the cause of peace is now jeopardized and efforts to achieve disarmament have been frustrated.

(Mr. Sahnoun, Algeria)

This session is different from preceding ones in that there is unanimous agreement that a state of crisis exists and a very clear awareness of the need to do something about. In this respect, it is significant that the general debate in the Assembly was enhanced by the presence at United Nations Headquarters of nearly 40 Heads of State or Government. Their presence represents not only an expression of concern at the worsening of international relations but also an invitation to responsible political dialogue to eliminate the causes of the crisis, cushion its effects and at the same time provide mankind with all the conditions necessary for freedom, peace and well-being.

The sphere of armaments alone combines all the facets of an explosive situation. The latest statistics, as the Committee knows, show that some \$800 billion are spent in a single year. These figures take on a special significance when we realize that the two military alliances account for 80 per cent of the total. But in any case they are tragic, senseless and Kafkaesque when we think of the potential for destruction which they imply, at a time when tens of millions of human beings throughout the world die each year from hunger and hundreds of millions more survive in subhuman living conditions.

This inflation of budgets is accompanied by an increase in arsenals of nuclear weapons, the development of new systems and the sophistication and miniaturization of these weapons. New military programmes are being launched or are about to be launched. In this unprecedented frenzy, even outer space has been the subject of clear aggression.

An obvious symptom of this madness is shown by the two racist régimes, which are engaged in programmes designed to enable them to possess and control nuclear weapons, and their aggressive manoeuvres have been identified as a threat to international peace and security.

The dangerous international situation is of course the result of the relations of force and the power politics which have for too long constituted the corner-stone of international relations. While individual actions may have aggravated the situation or highlighted one or other aspect that is particularly dangerous, the present state of the world results primarily from the true and profound logic of our conflictual bipolar system.

(Mr. Sahnoun, Algeria)

Since their invention and as they have developed, nuclear weapons have created a subconscious illusion that they can be used for the maintenance of peace, by providing security through deterrence. Need we recall, however, that deterrence, by leading to a build-up and systematic upgrading of arsenals of nuclear weapons, has neither increased nor improved world security, or even that of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Need we recall that peace supported by weapons is not peace at all.

While deterrence might sometimes appear to bear the promise of ruling out the use of nuclear weapons - while at the same time increasing the possibility of such use - the technical and doctrinal developments in the last two decades reveal all the risks of a malfunctioning of the policy of deterrence. Whether it be in the features which are inherent in the new generation of weapons or in the doctrines which underlie their possible use, all the reasons for and the risks of the extermination of mankind are combined. Moreover, is not our faith in human reason increasingly weakened by the intrinsic and uncontrollable risks connected with computers?

How long can man retain his indispensable reason, the wisdom and the necessary speed of analysis to prevent a possible holocaust? I am not being alarmist, I am being realistic.

Nuclear deterrence and all the doctrines and strategies deriving therefrom, as well as the balance of nuclear forces which it postulates and which is in essence unsteady, have only helped exacerbate tension, create distrust and increase insecurity in the world. They have revealed the illusory nature of any quest for military supremacy, and also the vanity of trying to achieve security through armaments. Paradoxically, the merit of the nuclear age will be that it demonstrated more clearly the interdependence of States and the indivisibility of world peace and security.

(Mr. Sahnoun, Algeria)

However, we realize that today urgent and specific actions are required to meet the most pressing needs and thus alter the perilous course of events. A certain number of actions can be taken to this end; they are within our reach. First, all of us - and particularly the two military alliances - must prevent any action that might result in the continuation of the escalation; secondly, everything should be done to promote and consolidate a genuine dialogue aimed at the solution of problems; thirdly, bold initiatives are needed to reduce international tension and help the world break out of the present psychological atmosphere in East-West relations so fraught with danger.

(Mr. Sahnoun, Algeria)

While the multilateral negotiating process continues to be the right framework for the promotion of genuine disarmament measures, it is none the less vitally necessary today for the bilateral Geneva talks to reach a successful conclusion quickly, not merely to reduce the current level of nuclear weapons but also to save Europe, already crammed with weapons, from a new and particularly dangerous escalation.

From this point of view, the prevention of nuclear war, since it concerns the very existence of all mankind is the ultimate priority.

A ban on the use of nuclear weapons or at least of the first use of such weapons is, in this context, a first measure to relax tension and stave off the threat of nuclear war. Similarly, the freezing of nuclear arsenals, particularly the two most important ones, as a starting-point for drastic reductions, is certainly a measure that should be encouraged.

Our Committee is a deliberative body with no decision-making power to affect the real situation of the arms race and of disarmament. It clearly has few specific ways of exercising a decisive influence on the international situation and improving it. Nevertheless, by virtue of its universal nature, the diversity of opinions expressed in it and the broad range of issues considered by it, it constitutes - if we are really serious - a privileged crucible for the expression of an international political consensus in favour of disarmament, thus echoing the demand now being made by a public opinion more concerned and mobilized than ever before. People of goodwill will certainly derive the necessary political impetus from this for far-reaching action. In the same way they will also find new paths to explore and ideas to delve into. These precincts invite us to replace the dangerous confrontation of weapons with the serene and fruitful confrontation of ideas.

Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): Sir, at the outset I should like to congratulate you on your unanimous election as Chairman of the First Committee and to wish you every success in fulfilling your responsible and difficult task. My congratulations and best wishes go to the other officers of the Committee as well.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation is satisfied to note that the problems of disarmament, including the prevention of a nuclear war, received a particular emphasis in the recently concluded general debate in the General Assembly. This is a source of encouragement, not only because the goals of achieving disarmament, removing the danger of nuclear war and establishing peaceful co-operation among States are accorded absolute priority in the foreign policy of the Hungarian People's Republic, but also because we can take satisfaction from the fact that under the impact of recent, regrettably negative, processes, there is a growing number of countries and communities that are fully aware of the utmost urgency of solving these problems.

The people and Government of the Hungarian People's Republic are deeply concerned at certain developments in recent years. I refer, in particular, to the following: multibillion dollar arms programmes and military budgets are being approved; new types of nuclear weapons and weapon systems are being mass produced; new kinds of conventional weapons are being developed, which have a destructive power similar to that of weapons of mass destruction; attempts are being made to deploy nuclear weapons with sophisticated means of delivery in territories and areas where there were no such weapons previously and as close as possible to the borders of the Warsaw Treaty countries; a war hysteria is being whipped up, bringing about an atmosphere in which the slightest misinterpretation of any action could result in uncontrollable situations; deliberate attempts are being made to change the military-strategic situation in the world, to upset the existing military balance which, under prevailing international circumstances, would further threaten world peace.

The most alarming of all these trends is the emergence of new types and systems of nuclear weapons, which have raised the danger of coercion to a higher level than ever before, not simply because nuclear weapons, as distinct from all earlier weapons which humanity has suffered from, potentially carry in themselves the risk of the devastation of entire civilization, but above all because recent nuclear-weapons-related technological developments initiated by a nuclear-weapon State in its striving for strategic superiority could easily be identified as a deliberate effort to increase its ability to wage a nuclear war. And since they are coupled with a doctrinal evolution along the lines of a strategic counter-force posture, they have given birth to concepts like those of a limited and protracted nuclear war and of pre-emptive

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

first-strike possibility as proof of the constant feedback existing between technology and policy. They have contributed to overcoming many of the technological and political barriers which, since 6 August 1945, have separated the possession of nuclear weapons from their possible use. Would not this worrisome trend in itself, apart from all the other arguments, suffice to convince all of us without exception of the necessity of undertaking effective measures to prevent a nuclear war?

This important task, that of preventing a nuclear war, is an urgent though a complicated one. It is not easy to find rapid-acting or ready-made solutions. Nevertheless, earlier and more recent proposals by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries could be rightfully seen as endeavours to open up new vistas for the warding-off of a nuclear war.

The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons or of both nuclear and conventional weapons might be a substantive contribution to lessening the danger of a nuclear war through strengthening confidence and reducing military confrontation. During the past few years, the socialist countries have made several proposals on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Those proposals deserve serious consideration, for an important lesson affecting disarmament in a wider context can be drawn from their evaluation. Their fate goes to show that although objections to certain proposals might be taken into due consideration, the proposals would never come any closer to realization if those objections only served as mere pretexts and if greater security was not sought through disarmament measures based on the principle of equal security.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

As far back as 1976 the Warsaw Treaty member States, in a declaration signed by their political leaders at the highest level, proposed that all States signatories to the Helsinki Final Act should pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another. They received no official reply.

In 1979 the Foreign Ministers of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty proposed to the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe the conclusion of a treaty containing a commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons. Silence was the answer.

Taking into account the dilemma caused by the fact that the question of limitation and reduction of strategic and European nuclear weapons remained unsettled while the danger of a nuclear war was ever increasing, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty in January 1983 - that is, this year - proposed to the States members of NATO the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force, whether nuclear or conventional. The States addressed have so far taken no concrete measures.

From the point of view of averting the danger of nuclear war, the Hungarian People's Republic attaches paramount importance to the commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. While it is an axiom of international relations that negotiations and agreements cannot be forced upon States, the nuclear age has another fundamental truth: there is no task more important than the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. We therefore believe that those nuclear Powers which have not yet assumed such an obligation should take reciprocal steps. Similar commitments by those other nuclear Powers would be received with great relief by international public opinion.

This year the Soviet Union made another important proposal in order to remove the threat of nuclear war, namely, that the General Assembly condemn nuclear war resolutely, unconditionally and for all time. That endeavour has the full support of the Hungarian delegation. The Soviet proposal fully corresponds to the letter and spirit of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on 22 June 1973. In article I the parties agreed that

"an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons"

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

and that

"they will act in such a manner... as to avoid military confrontations and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them".

With the nuclear-arms race going on, however, condemnation of nuclear war and renunciation of the first strike may remain ineffective.

The quintessence of the subject is whether the nuclear-arms build-up initiated by a great Power really enhances the security of the State involved and how it influences the security of other nations and international stability as a whole. First of all, there is a solid empirical basis for proving that any kind of superiority, be it quantitative or qualitative, is but temporary. This axiom may be assumed to retain its validity in the future. At the same time, present efforts to gain superiority differ radically from earlier ones in that they direct the arms race towards an ever-growing increase in the relative advantages of a pre-emptive first strike. Thus, doubts about future intentions grow stronger than ever. Such aspirations are not only irreconcilable with respect for the principle of equality and equal security, as commonly agreed to in various treaties, but are also detrimental to the security of every State pursuing such aspirations. It might sound paradoxical, but it is true that a relative increase in superiority actually brings a decrease in national security. The world has reached the stage in the development of military technology where the strengthening of national security cannot be artificially separated from the strengthening of international security. It is our firm conviction that in the period to come national security can be enhanced only in an organic relationship with international security and through arms limitation and disarmament rather than through an arms build-up. In order to achieve that goal, the arms race must be stopped in a comprehensive way so as to have all its future channels effectively blocked.

In our view, the proposal of the Soviet Union urging all nuclear-weapon States to agree to freeze, under appropriate verification, all nuclear arms in their possession in both qualitative and quantitative terms could serve as a comprehensive approach to the prevention of a new round of the nuclear-arms race. This initiative is wholeheartedly supported by my delegation.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

My delegation takes the view that the most important task in averting the danger of war and strengthening world peace is the strengthening of security in Europe. This conviction is rooted not just in the fact that Hungary is located in Europe which would lead us to declare that area to be the most important one. The principal source of this conviction is the fact that the European continent is the site of an enormous concentration of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, and is the area of direct contact between the armed forces of the two major military alliances. Therefore the efforts to upset the existing military balance in Europe, and especially NATO's intention of carrying out its decision to deploy new United States medium-range missiles on the soil of a number of West European countries, pose an extremely serious threat not only to the European peoples, the Hungarian people included, but also to the security of all mankind by increasing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. With the deployment of new United States missiles in Western Europe, the warning time would be reduced to less than six minutes, a time-frame that on several occasions proved to be hardly enough to identify false alarms in the case of strategic systems. One need not have a bold fantasy to imagine the consequences of a false alarm if the said new weapons were deployed. The whole **situaticn** would be different from previous ones. It would be characterized by a total lack of confidence and by common insecurity in peacetime. It might become fatal in case of a military or political crisis and lead to an overall nuclear catastrophe.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

That is why Hungary, together with other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, considers its main task to be to prevent the starting of a new round of the nuclear arms race in Europe and to achieve a limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons there. Our intention is clear and honest. The political declaration adopted last January by the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized that the best solution would be completely to remove both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and that, should it not be possible at present to reach such a really "zero" solution, it would be expedient to pursue the course of drastic reduction in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. It is in the spirit of this principle that the Soviet Union has put forward a series of constructive proposals in order to reach an agreement at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. The current position of its negotiating partner, however, precludes the possibility of a solution. That approach is not in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security on which disarmament measures must be based, and all the proposals conceived in this spirit have, in spite of their illusive diversity, one common purpose, namely to upset in NATO's favour the existing regional and global balance. And this is what cannot be accepted. The entire behaviour of the other side suggests that its real purpose is perhaps not to reach an agreement but to delay the talks and to deploy the new missiles in Western Europe.

We deem it urgently necessary that the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe be conducted in a constructive spirit and that maximum efforts be exerted for a speedy conclusion of concrete agreements at those talks. The success of the talks requires that no action be taken which might complicate them. On the contrary, steps are needed to help create an atmosphere favourable to progress, and all States, especially the European States, should in every way facilitate the success of the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe. We still hope that there is a possibility of finding a mutually acceptable solution. That hope is reflected in the communiqué issued at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party held on 12 October. The communiqué reads in part as follows:

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

"In this situation it is indispensable for Governments and political factors having a sense of responsibility for the destiny of the world to adopt a judicious attitude to international issues. The peoples of the European countries and all mankind are interested in avoiding the deployment of nuclear weapons where there are no such weapons at present and in reducing the number of such weapons where they are already stationed. Our country - that is, the Hungarian People's Republic - and people also have an interest in maintaining the historically established military balance and in mutually acceptable agreements being reached at the Soviet-American arms limitation talks, particularly at the Geneva talks on medium-range nuclear weapons. The Central Committee believes the possibility still exists of an agreement on the non-deployment of new American missiles in Europe".

In view of the great dangers inherent in a new round of the arms race the world simply cannot allow the continuation of the present state of affairs.

The disarmament community will only be able to match the challenge posed to world security if States give up routine counter-arguments opposing real and meaningful solutions. This is no easy task to accomplish but, if we succeed, results will have justified our efforts.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Some delegations have referred to the comprehensive programme of disarmament in their statements, and several delegations have approached me informally asking whether I have given any thought to the question of how the Committee is to deal with that question. I wish to make some observations and a suggestion in this connection.

As representatives are aware, in its report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly (A/38/27), the Committee on Disarmament has submitted a text for the comprehensive programme of disarmament drafted by the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group and has recommended that the text be given further consideration by the General Assembly during its present session. In this context, I should like to refer to the remarks made by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, in his statement in this Committee on 17 October. The First Committee is thus faced with the question how to organize its consideration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

I have given considerable thought to the matter and I have also sought the advice of a number of interested delegations. Taking into account the views expressed during those consultations, I suggest that we set aside one meeting, or if need be two meetings, for consideration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. More specifically, I propose that during the afternoon meeting on Monday, 31 October, and if necessary the afternoon meeting of Tuesday, 1 November, priority be given to delegations wishing to make statements concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament. To the extent that time is available to the Committee after having heard those statements, delegations would however be free to speak on any of the items designated for consideration during phase II of our programme of work, but priority will be given to statements concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The decision as to further action with regard to the present text of the comprehensive programme can be taken by the Committee after having heard the statements during the meetings reserved for this purpose.

(The Chairman)


If there are no comments or objections, I shall take it that the proposal which I have just made is acceptable to the Committee.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall this afternoon come to the end of phase I of our programme of work. As previously agreed, however, the general debate on all disarmament items will continue next week.

Beginning on Monday afternoon, 24 October, we shall also embark upon phase II. As delegations will recall, that phase will be devoted to an exchange of views on a number of disarmament items, which are listed on pages 1 to 4 of document A/C.1/38/2 and Add.1. Delegations will note from that document that no deadline for inscription on the list of speakers has been indicated as far as statements relating to phase II and phase III are concerned. We have not established any deadline, but for practical reasons, it would be highly appreciated if delegations wishing to speak would put their names on the list of speakers as early as possible.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.



FIRST COMMITTEE
10th meeting
held on
Friday, 21 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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Mr. Murin (Czechoslovakia)
Mr. Said (Tunisia)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Imai (Japan)
Mr. Rossides (Cyprus)

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25 October 1983

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. VONGSAY (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (interpretation from French): First of all, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the delegation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, I should like to congratulate you most sincerely on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. Your experience in First Committee issues will, I am convinced, make it possible for you to guide our work towards concrete results. I should like also to express my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in March this year, the international situation was examined and concern was expressed in the following terms:

"... the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, ... has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations." (A/38/132, para. 28)

That concern on the part of the international community at the aggravation of the world situation, which can be seen clearly in the deterioration of the process of détente, the intensification of the arms race and the threat of nuclear disaster, has also been mentioned during the general debate in the General Assembly which came to an end just last week.

Instead of a policy of détente, imperialist circles have opted for one of confrontation, by trying to kindle new flashpoints of tension in different parts of the world or by trying to maintain existing ones. In order to regain lost ground or to maintain their spheres of influence they have unhesitatingly intervened directly in regional conflicts. Events in the Middle East, Chad and Central America are all eloquent examples of this. Their desire for hegemony has prompted them to proclaim particular regions of the world - those with vast natural wealth - as areas of vital interest to them.

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

It goes without saying that such a policy could only lead to the arms race, to the excessive acquisition of weapons, because they wanted to gain military superiority over others in order to impose their will and have the upper hand in all circumstances. This led to the production of increasingly improved weapons, increasingly sophisticated weapons, in terms of their destructive capacity, such as the neutron bomb and new chemical weapons, called binary weapons, not to mention their delivery systems, such as the intercontinental MX missiles and strategic B-1 bombers, although the nuclear arsenal that already existed would have been enough to destroy the world many times over. In order to justify this policy to the public and to obtain an increase in their military budgets, myths were spread about the supposed military superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries, the supposed Soviet threat, or the supposed use of chemical weapons by certain Governments in Asia. Even worse, they went as far as to gamble with the lives of the innocent, such as in the case of the South Korean aircraft.

Furthermore, in order to prepare for or persuade the public to accept the possibility of a nuclear war, dangerous theories were put forward, such as those of the nuclear first strike, limited or prolonged nuclear war, or the possibility of winning a nuclear war, and so on.

If such a tendency continues, it is not only international peace and security that will be threatened, but also the very survival of mankind, because at the present stage of progress in science and technology it would be an illusion to believe that a nuclear war could be won. As was rightly stressed by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries in New Delhi, nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war, they are instruments of mass annihilation. This is why they have rejected the use of such weapons in any circumstances whatsoever.

Hence, given the serious threat to the survival of mankind, it is important that the major Powers, especially the nuclear Powers, adopt urgently practical measures to curb the arms race, particularly that in nuclear weapons, and to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. In this connection, in their New Delhi Message, the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries made the following appeal to the nuclear Powers:

"They should agree on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and stop further production and deployment of nuclear weapons." (A/38/132, p. 56)

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

In this context the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union on condemnation of nuclear war (A/C.1/38/L.1) and nuclear-weapon freeze (A/C.1/38/L.2) seem very appropriate. They serve to supplement other earlier initiatives by the Soviet Union, such as the Soviet Union's unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and its proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. If these initiatives were accepted and followed up by all the nuclear Powers the nuclear arms race could be curbed and the danger of nuclear war eliminated. These two proposals, therefore, have the firm support of my delegation.

Another subject of concern to the international community at the moment is the question of the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in certain Western European countries. These intermediate-range nuclear missiles whose first strike capability is undeniable, would not only make nuclear hostages of the peoples of the European continent but would also endanger the lives of other peoples in the world, since a nuclear war, whatever those that unleashed it might want, could never be limited. Reprisals would be inevitable.

Therefore, in the interest of world peace, it is important that the Geneva negotiations on this subject achieve positive results, and to that end, that the interlocutors demonstrate good will and realism. In this connection, the most recent Soviet proposal, made by President Yuri Andropov and reaffirmed by the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty held in Sophia from 12 to 14 October, deserves serious consideration. Similarly, the proposal made by the Socialist countries concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could contribute to the establishment of mutual trust. Europe, which has been the arena of several major conflicts, including two world wars, must not become the arena of a third world war, this time a nuclear one.

Another equally dangerous enterprise is the militarization of outer space. We are aware of the efforts made by the United Nations to make outer space an area of exclusively peaceful co-operation and exploration. However, for some time now the tendency to extend the arms race into outer space has become increasingly clear. A budget of several hundred million dollars has even been

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

allocated for this in 1985. If this undertaking is not stopped it will become the sword of Damocles for our world. This is why we appreciate the commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to install the anti-satellite weapon, just as we support its proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. We feel that the conclusion of such a treaty together with a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, which was also proposed by the Soviet Union, in 1981, will make it possible to remove this sword of Damocles from the earth and thus to meet the wishes of the international community.

Although the warlike policies of the imperialists give rise to increasing concern among the peoples, it is encouraging to see that everywhere in the world there are movements made up of peoples of all social strata acting in the interest of peace and against the arms race. Last year, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we witnessed an enormous pacifist demonstration here in New York. There are also widespread demonstrations in certain West European countries against the deployment of Euro-missiles. This is the expression of the will of responsible, intelligent people concerned about their survival and that of coming generations - people for whom my delegation has a great respect, because by their deeds they are demonstrating the views of the majority.

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

These increasing pacifist movements confirm in a sense the success of the campaign for disarmament launched by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to this issue.

True, the process of disarmament is a complex one, but in our view the principles and priorities stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and the measures and objectives defined in it, are still fully valid. It is therefore up to all of us to work toward their realization.

By way of conclusion, may I be permitted to quote this passage from paragraph 4 of the New Delhi Message:

"The non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well. The nuclear-weapon Powers must heed this voice of the people of the world." (Ibid., p. 56)

Mr. MURIN (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): Today the Czechoslovak delegation would like to continue the statement of its position on some very important items of our agenda. In particular we would like to refer to questions dealt with in the report of the Committee on Disarmament (A/38/27) in Geneva. The first thing that strikes any reader of the report, apart from the general increase in the volume of the work, is the absence of any perceptible progress towards, any real results, in reaching agreement on specific measures to limit the arms race and bring about disarmament, a task which was transferred to the Committee in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The reasons for this state of affairs in the Committee can best be deduced from the positions taken by a group of States, and by individual States in the Committee, on the items on its agenda.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as an active member of the Committee from the time of its establishment, together with other countries of the socialist community, attaches great significance to its effective functioning as the sole international organ for negotiations on disarmament and the working out of agreements. In the past this Committee has repeatedly demonstrated its potential, serving as a forum for working towards agreement on a number of extremely important measures to curb the arms race. We were all the more perplexed therefore, like many other delegations, to see long drawn-out and fruitless discussions continuing in the Committee at a time when there is such an urgent need to achieve practical progress in resolving those very issues that are being discussed in the Committee.

The key to improving the effectiveness and the fruitfulness of the Committee's work lies wholly and entirely in the hands of its member States. Let us take, for example, what would appear to be a relatively simple question, that of adopting the agenda. If all member States of the Committee had approached this task with the desire to ensure uninterrupted and positive work on the part of the Committee in a spirit of respect for the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the approach adopted by the socialist and non-aligned countries, we are sure that the adoption of the agenda would not have needed more than one or two meetings. Yet this procedural discussion alone dragged on in the Committee for a full seven weeks, thus taking up a considerable portion of the time allocated to the Committee for its substantive work this year.

It would not be surprising if Member States of the United Nations attending this thirty-eighth session were to see such working methods not as a means of ensuring progress but rather as evidence of the reluctance of certain States to begin serious and businesslike negotiations, and of, a desire to block existing disarmament negotiating channels. The same

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

applies also to one of the important central issues of the day: namely, the prevention of nuclear war and the related problem of nuclear disarmament.

The Czechoslovak delegation, in its statement at the beginning of this discussion, set forth its position on the fundamental aspects of this problem, and including the questions of condemning nuclear war, and the freezing of nuclear armaments, items included in the agenda of this session of the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union. We wish to state one firm conviction that the question of preventing nuclear war should also be given the highest priority on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

In this regard, we cannot fail to be alarmed at the attempts of Western Powers, particularly the United States, to impede the practical consideration of measures to prevent nuclear war, including their refusal to agree to setting up a working group of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject. Generally speaking, the tactics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members of the Committee on Disarmament, as is clear from their statements and the documents presented, all come down to limiting the question of preventing nuclear war to secondary and insubstantial measures on confidence-building, leaving untouched all existing and potential means of touching off a nuclear conflagration.

If the international community were to agree to such an approach, this would mean opening the door wide to the unhindered intensifying of the nuclear arms race, in combination with the further development of the doctrines and concepts of waging nuclear war, with the specious justification that all of this, so it is alleged, would take place in circumstances of increased confidence.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

We express the hope that the United Nations General Assembly will reject such an approach and appeal urgently to the Geneva Committee to enter into practical negotiations on measures to avert the threat of a nuclear conflict.

It should be recalled in this regard that at the last session the group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament again reaffirmed their well-known proposal of principle for the holding of negotiations on the cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles up to and including their total elimination. The countries of the socialist community have also repeatedly expressed their views on the practical aspects of holding such negotiations, including participation in the conference and the procedure for bringing about agreed measures on nuclear disarmament that would result from those talks. Those proposals, if approached in a responsible and deliberate way, could be a turning-point in efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament. We hope that next year the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in getting down to businesslike negotiations along these lines.

In this regard, we note with satisfaction the similarity, if not the actual proximity on the essence of the problem, in the approaches of the socialist and non-aligned countries towards solving the complicated problem of nuclear disarmament. That was something which emerged in the statements of delegations of those countries both in the Committee on Disarmament and at this session of the General Assembly. Of course, we also actively support efforts undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament in order to conclude work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the essence of which should, without any doubt, consist of nuclear disarmament measures. In our view, the real significance of this programme would be determined primarily by the extent to which it would promote the adoption of effective international measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. We wish to express our readiness to work constructively and in co-operation with all States for the implementation of such a programme.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

This year will mark the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the historic Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear weapon test in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow in 1963. Since that time one of the most important items on the Committee on Disarmament's agenda remains the problem of total and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This problem is most intimately linked with the question of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and, in this regard, has become extremely urgent and of immediate significance.

Nevertheless, debate on the question of working out and concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests which occurred in the Committee on Disarmament this year did not yield any positive results. To all appearances there was an absence of progress on this important and urgent question as a result of the political decision by the Western countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, to defer indefinitely the conclusion of a treaty on this subject - in that way making it possible for them to put into effect broad programmes of nuclear overarmament, including the creation and introduction of new varieties of nuclear weapon.

Proof of that, along with other factors, is also the negative approach of those countries to the draft fundamental provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests submitted by the USSR delegation at last year's session of the General Assembly. After all, it is well known that the draft was a form of creative codification of agreements and understandings achieved in the past on a number of aspects of this problem in the course of trilateral negotiations among the delegations of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. These understandings included, as representatives know, mutual understanding among the three parties to the talks on such important and substantive items as the question of the régime to govern nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and control measures over the implementation of the treaty. Thus a favourable opportunity did exist to translate the talks in the Committee and the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Testing Ban into the language of an agreed text of a treaty, which would be based on the existing level of

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

understanding. Probably the negotiations could genuinely have developed along those lines if the United States and the United Kingdom delegations had not begun to depart from the understandings already achieved and taken a stand incompatible with the results of the trilateral negotiations and attempting to justify their reluctance to agree to the total prohibition of nuclear tests by what they alleged to be insuperable difficulties of a technological and other nature which were inherent in this problem. But, in spite of these manoeuvres, the essence of the question, we are sure, still remains absolutely clear to the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations - that is to say, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is a subject for political decision.

We believe that the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament will take the necessary steps to make progress towards such a decision.

In the over-all unfavourable results of last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, the outcome of the Committee's work on chemical weapons is no exception. Although one must appreciate the tremendous amount of work that was done and the active participation of a large number of delegations, agreement on a final draft convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the elimination of their stockpiles and the submission of such a draft to the United Nations General Assembly is, nevertheless, a problem which remains unresolved.

In the course of the last session the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, evinced a constructive approach and desire to achieve a positive outcome to the negotiations, accommodated the positions of Western and certain other States members of the Committee, made additional proposals and took additional initiatives designed to overcome the remaining difficulties, and that includes work in regard to the question of the non-use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

Along with the efforts to break the deadlock on the question of chemical weapons in the Disarmament Committee, the members of the Warsaw Treaty came forward with a new major initiative for the elimination of chemical weapons in Europe, as contained in the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Foreign Ministers which were adopted in Prague early this year. The constructive and flexible position of the socialist countries did not meet, unfortunately, with an equivalent response from the Western side. Instead, the famous decision of the United States on the manufacture of binary nerve-paralysing gases was published and we are witnessing a continuation of the anti-Soviet campaign of falsehoods with regard to the alleged use of chemical weapons. But no matter how much one twists the facts in the question of the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons as well, what one is actually confronted with is not technical or material hindrances - even less moral ones - to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The one real obstacle in this area is the reluctance of certain States to give up the opportunity to continue to use chemical blackmail against the socialist countries, which has played such an important part in the aggressive plans of militarism. We are convinced that the United Nations General Assembly will throw the weight of its authority behind a positive and final decision on the chemical weapon problem.

An important area in the struggle for the elimination of the threat of war in today's world is the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space. As we know, the United Nations General Assembly in 1981, on the initiative of the USSR, included the question of the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any type on its agenda and it instructed the Committee on Disarmament to try to solve this problem. Nevertheless, as emerges from the report submitted this year by the Committee on Disarmament, practical preparations for this draft treaty have not even begun, for certain reasons, while the threat of an arms race in space, with all the concomitant catastrophic consequences for international peace and security, has reached a dangerous brink - that is to say, the actual possibility of it materializing. The prospect of large-scale militarization of outer space and intensive preparations for carrying out military operations there, on which even now billions of dollars are being spent every year,

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

has rightly aroused the serious concern of Members of the United Nations. After all, the use of force, particularly military force, in outer space would have extremely far-reaching consequences for the whole of our planet. The fact that preparations to this end are continuing and are beginning to assume definite outlines and qualitatively new types and systems of armaments are beginning to take concrete shape, is something which is also leading to a deterioration in the international climate, a decrease in trust in international relations and it is something which could also lead to the destabilization of the international agreements already concluded on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

In this regard, we believe it necessary to stress the profound concern about the position of members of NATO which, at the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, undermined the creation of a working group with a clearly defined mandate which would have enabled the beginning of practical negotiations on this extremely urgent problem. We express the hope that the United Nations General Assembly will this year adopt an unambiguous appeal to the Committee on Disarmament to get down to concrete work towards reaching an agreement on international measures in this area.

At the same time, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic welcomes the new, important and timely proposal of the Soviet Union with regard to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. This proposal has taken fully into account the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and is aimed at their further strengthening and concretization, in this particular case, with regard to the activities of States in outer space. We hope that this proposal will meet with the widest possible support from Members of the United Nations and will serve as a basis for the adoption of effective measures to prevent the militarization of space.

A very important positive role will also be played in this regard by the assumption by all space Powers of an obligation not to be the first to place in orbit any anti-satellite system, thus adhering to the moratorium declared unilaterally by the Soviet Union on 19 August this year.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

Czechoslovakia intends to continue to make every effort to bring about perceptible progress towards the constructive solving of questions of the limitation of the arms race and bringing about disarmament, guided in this by the principles of equal co-operation with all States. In this regard, I should like to refer to the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, adopted on the initiative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in 1979. The idea of strengthening mutual co-operation among States in the interests of disarmament, we are firmly convinced, continues to have tremendous potential which, if fully exploited, would do a great deal to help ease the present tense international situation. In this spirit, our delegation, at a subsequent stage of the First Committee's work, will introduce its own concrete proposals. Our delegation would like to limit this statement today to the points we have already made on the most important and most urgent individual items, as we see them, on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. In due course, we shall set forth our position on the other outstanding aspects of the agenda of this Committee.

Mr. SAID (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): The Tunisian delegation is particularly pleased to see you, Mr. Chairman, presiding over the work of our Committee. We are aware of the particular importance you have always attached to disarmament issues and we are convinced that you will endeavour to ensure that the work of the First Committee this year meets the expectations of all. We are also convinced that the well-known competence and dedication of the other officers of the Committee will be of considerable help to you in the accomplishment of your task.

We are beginning our deliberations on questions relating to international security and disarmament this year with a new outlook and a new time-frame.

Bilateral negotiations are now under way on the reduction of strategic weapons and on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The stakes in these negotiations, as everyone knows, are high. These negotiations are now coming up against obstacles, but we also know that a deadline has been set for the negotiations. We are today just a few weeks away from that deadline.

We are told that if by the end of the year agreement is not reached in Geneva, deployed new nuclear devices will be in Europe; and at the same time the other side affirms that in that case appropriate counter-measures would immediately be taken. Of course, following those counter-measures we could expect counter-counter-measures, which in turn would be followed by new, appropriate reactions.

While we are here discussing disarmament, we see before our eyes the classic scenario which characterizes the arms race and illustrates the process of escalation, for which there is no end in sight.

If we study closely the arguments of the two protagonists we are struck by the implacable logic underlying the reasoning of each and the development of that reasoning; and we are even less surprised by the conclusions that each side reaches to defend its position. That implacable logic would no doubt be of considerable intellectual interest if it were not that the fate of the world itself is at stake.

In his report on the work of the United Nations, the Secretary-General tells us in this regard that

"Each side seems determined to respond to any advance achieved by the other side by matching it rather than by making concessions." (A/38/1, p.5)

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

These are therefore deliberate attitudes from the outset which, if followed through, are irreconcilable. Have negotiations thus been begun with full knowledge that they could not succeed? Have we been from the outset lulled by our illusions?

We are entitled to ask this question because in the era of nuclear weapons we know that our fate, the fate of all, is being played out in Geneva and in some capitals of the world.

It is important that those who are at the negotiating table at Geneva know that we are very concerned by what they are saying and by the results. With the deadline set for these negotiations just a few weeks away and taking into account the turn they seem to have taken, the Tunisian delegation wonders whether the United Nations General Assembly should not consider, since it is in session, making a solemn and urgent appeal to the Geneva negotiators to reach agreement, for such agreement would undoubtedly respond to the interests of all the peoples of the world.

Thirty-eight years after the Second World War it seems to us that the world today is faltering. There has been Yalta, the cold war, détente and once again tension. We are getting lost today in another crisis of identity. The rumblings of war that we hear and the threat of nuclear war inevitably engender fear, and fear gives rise to militant pacificism, which in turn can be exploited to bring about a revival of militarism and even arrogant nationalism. Everything is in a state of flux and the maintenance of the status quo ante becomes problematic. We have observed that the ancient European continent is again today becoming the nerve centre of international relations and it cannot be forgotten that in the twentieth century it was in that same Europe that two world wars originated.

The danger today is much greater. It has taken on a new dimension. Heroic death in action, once exalted, is no longer at issue. Nuclear war is no longer even a combat. The ending of the world is no longer exclusively a divine power since certain Heads of State have, with the nuclear weapon, acquired that same power. The peoples therefore can only serve as a rear guard and bear the brunt of wars that are not theirs.

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

Those throughout the world who raise their voices proclaiming their aspiration to peace are also proclaiming a right to life for themselves and for their descendants. We hope that their voices will be heard by those that possess such supreme power. The World Disarmament Campaign, which was launched last year and which we hope will this year arouse great interest, should in this respect play a decisive role in both directions: in interesting the world public in the cause of disarmament on the one hand and in making those in power aware of the wisdom, which we hope will be persuasive, of the vox populi on the other.

Just as we stress the urgent need for agreement in the bilateral negotiations, so we recall the central role that the United Nations should play in disarmament issues. As we all know, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended in failure. In fact, no tangible progress has been achieved since our first special session on the subject, in 1978. It has not been possible to prepare and adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As regards the comprehensive programme of disarmament, we believe that a new opportunity has been given us. The Assembly today has a revised text, less ambitious, it is true, than the 1982 one, but which could constitute an acceptable basis. We appeal for a concerted effort by all concerned with a view to its adoption this year.

Other questions of equal importance are still at the study or negotiations stage in the Committee in Geneva. We hope that the members of that body will demonstrate the necessary good will to hasten progress in their work, especially as regards negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

Similarly, we expect the Geneva Committee to submit without further delay a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

We believe that the revision of its working methods will enable the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its task more effectively. By accepting in this respect the principle of including new members in its work, the Geneva Committee

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

is opening the way for new contributions, which we hope will be positive, while guaranteeing the effectiveness of its action. As the sole forum for multilateral negotiations it seems to us to be irreplaceable.

My delegation would like to express its pleasure at the inscription on the agenda of this session of the item concerning the implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Tunisia, which is a party to that Treaty, will be making its contribution to the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference on this Treaty, which we believe to be a fundamental instrument concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

We consider that control in the nuclear sphere is the responsibility of all. Refusal of such a safeguard remains a major obstacle to the realization of several peace objectives, such as the establishment of nuclear-free zones, be it in the Middle East or in Africa. The establishment of such zones is in our view essential to reduce tension and promote the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

But we believe it would be pointless to try to proclaim the Middle East and Africa as nuclear-free zones as long as Israel and South Africa, which are in a position to produce such weapons, refuse any control in this field, as long as they continue to receive from outside massive and highly sophisticated weaponry and continue with impunity their co-operation in the production and testing of nuclear weapons.

Along the same lines, we remain firmly dedicated to the idea of transforming the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace, security and co-operation. We believe that efforts made in that direction at the bilateral, regional and world level can help us to attain that objective.

None the less, conflicts and unresolved disputes in the Mediterranean region remain obstacles to the establishment of the much desired zone of peace. The Palestinian problem is one of the major obstacles. We believe in any event that the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace will have a fortunate and direct effect on the peace and stability of the world.

I would not like to conclude my statement without mentioning the inseparable link that we see between disarmament and development. In this respect, we should like to recall our support for the recommendations contained in the study on this issue under the chairmanship of Mrs. Inge Thorsson of Sweden, recommendations that we hope will be implemented by the entire international community. In our view, disarmament, development, peace and security all remain closely related.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has already had occasion to set forth in our Committee its views on questions relating to the prevention of nuclear war, including the new Soviet initiatives on condemning nuclear war and on the freezing of nuclear armaments. Today we should like to draw the Committee's attention to one further important question, the urgent need for preventing an arms race in outer space, thus reducing the threat of nuclear war.

The critical urgency of the task of preventing the militarization of space is increasing every day. The attempts of those who are striving for military supremacy and are working out systems and means of waging war in space and from space are creating a genuine danger that, as in the case of the mastery of atomic energy, one of the other great achievements of the twentieth century, the leap into outer space, will be used not so much in the interests of mankind as for the creation of the threat to its very survival. Whether this danger actually materializes, or whether it will be averted, depends to a decisive extent on the policies of States. The experience accumulated by mankind in the conquest of outer space makes this undeniably clear.

The launching in October 1957 of the first artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union saw the beginning of the space invasion, a peaceful invasion in the name of scientific progress and for the good of all mankind. Guided by precisely these objectives, the USSR from the very first days of the space age favoured the development of business like international co-operation in space, and on 15 March 1958 put forward a comprehensive programme for the prevention of the use of outer space for military purposes understanding as it did that one was in practice impossible without the other.

Historical experience has confirmed the correctness and reality of this approach to outer space. In circumstances where realism and a sense of responsibility to mankind have prevailed in State policies over other considerations it has proved possible to achieve mutually acceptable understandings designed to prevent the militarization of outer space. The impressive array of agreements of this kind is a precious achievement for mankind which must be cherished and increased.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Of particular importance in the area of limiting the military use of outer space is the 1967 Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which laid down the important international legal obligation not to place in space nuclear weapons or any other types of weapon of mass destruction. The Moscow Treaty of 1963 prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. A great achievement towards the limitation of the military use of outer space was the conclusion in 1977 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, including outer space. Important provisions which reduce the possibility of the military use of outer space are contained in a number of other bilateral Soviet-American agreements.

It was those agreements which precisely provided the basis for the possibility of international co-operation in the realm of the conquest of outer space, and this convincingly demonstrated the fact that States belonging to opposite social systems or with any other differences between them in no way excludes the possibility of the peaceful use of outer space by each of them, individually or jointly.

At the present time, however, the continuation of this co-operation, and what is most important, the whole policy of the use of space in the interests of peace and keeping it free from military preparations, is now under threat.

What is extremely significant is that it is precisely those who have been unwilling to enter into broad international co-operation in space who are trying to place weapons there, the deployment of which in outer space has not yet been prohibited by international agreement.

In the belief that this cannot be permitted, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any type, which was submitted to the United Nations in August 1981. As is known, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, on the initiative of the USSR, adopted a resolution which requested the Committee on Disarmament to embark upon practical negotiations in order to work out urgent measures to prevent the spreading of the arms race to outer space. However, it has not been possible so far to start concrete negotiations on this problem in that Committee.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

I think everyone knows who is sabotaging the possibility of working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. In the Committee on Disarmament the United States has had recourse to various kinds of procedural manoeuvring and delaying tactics. This is understandable since the efforts of that country are, in accordance with the special presidential directive for the next decade, aimed at developing weapon strike systems and placing them in orbit.

The scenario for this kind of adventuristic course - that is the only term by which it can be described - is becoming very clear now. First, under the screen of a campaign of falsehoods about the "danger" of lagging behind the Soviet Union in anti-satellite weapons, the United States is busy developing an anti-satellite system, using existing military technology - F-15 fighters and homing missiles - which is now ready for testing and will be operational in 1987. At the same time, the United States side has broken off negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of anti-satellite systems. Having thus put its foot in the door, the United States is planning next to create more sophisticated anti-satellite systems, including laser beam satellites for the instant destruction of space objects of the other side. The Pentagon is also beginning to take practical steps to organize, control and command combat operations in and from outer space. A special United States Air Force space command is being established for these purposes.

In this regard, great hopes are being placed in manned reusable shuttle spaceships, the testing of which is almost entirely subordinated to the needs of the Pentagon. These spaceships are designed for constructing and placing in earth orbit military satellites and space stations and for testing various guidance and destruction laser systems, as well as for direct use as a means of combating satellites of the other side. In its turn, according to the designs of militaristic circles, the development of this technology should in time open the way to the creation of big orbital combat stations equipped with beam

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

weapons intended for destroying targets in outer and air space; later on this sinister dialectic of military technology development will lead to the emergence of space systems for striking directly at major targets on earth: command and communications centres, armed forces, economic facilities and populated areas.

These unprecedented 'star war' plans of aggression in and from outer space against the earth, which have so captured the imagination of United States strategists, are being formulated in the United States with long term goals in mind. Meanwhile, efforts are being made to find a military-political rationale for these ideas. There can be no other explanation for the idea of developing a space anti-missile system advanced in the speech on 23 March 1983 by the President of the United States -- a system which, he said, is supposed to provide defence against nuclear missiles.

To believe that the danger to the world posed by thermonuclear arsenals can be removed by means of new kinds and types of weapons is perhaps the greatest illusion -- or, to be more exact, the greatest delusion -- of the nuclear and space age. Promises by the proponents of space anti-missile systems to save the peoples of the world are like the siren calls luring the gullible to certain death.

Many authoritative specialists in the USSR, the United States and other countries estimate that a space-based anti-missile system capable of protecting against a nuclear first strike is technically impossible. The primary goal of militaristic circles is to use a space anti-missile system to defend against a retaliatory strike -- that is, to secure the impunity of a United States nuclear first strike. The assumption is that in a retaliatory strike it would be more difficult to penetrate an orbital anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The danger is all the greater since such a use of an ABM system fits in perfectly with today's United States strategic doctrines oriented towards unleashing nuclear aggression. The deployment of orbital ABM systems would most seriously destabilize the strategic and political situation and would immeasurably increase the temptation to be the first to press the nuclear button.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It is argued that a space ABM system is capable of reducing the destructive effects of nuclear war but this argument too is divorced from all reality, for the development of such a system would first of all stimulate the build-up and improvement of offensive strategic weapons, the development of anti-ABM systems and crash programmes for new kinds and types of space weapons, which would represent a further increase, in absolute terms, of the accumulated potential for global destruction.

As for the economic aspect of this matter, the cost of space-war systems, including orbital ABM systems, would eclipse the total material and intellectual resources wasted by humanity on destruction over the centuries. The proposed appropriation of \$2 billion to \$3 billion to the Pentagon next year for space ABM systems is just the first stone in a future avalanche which, even according to the extremely tentative estimates available at present, will swallow up hundreds of billions, and even trillions, of dollars. These truly astronomical funds will be taken away from the funds for the essential needs of the hungry, the sick and the illiterate and channelled into creating in outer space even more terrible means of destruction of human life and property, thus increasing many times over the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The creation of anti-missile weapons is contrary to the aims of strategic arms limitation and, in particular, to those of the Agreement on limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1972. Indeed, there is an inseparable link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons that was set forth in the 1972 Soviet-United States Agreement. At that time both sides recognized the importance of mutual restraint in the ABM field for reversing the entire strategic arms race. Now the United States intends to upset this relationship. Realistically minded statesmen, public figures and eminent experts from the USSR, the United States and other countries - all those who cherish peace - refute the claim that security can be achieved through the creation of ever newer kinds of weapons, either on earth or in outer space. Their conclusion is unequivocal. Immediate measures are needed to prevent the arms race from spreading to the infinite expanses of outer space. It is essential to stop before it is too late and before a line is crossed beyond which it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to turn back. Indeed, it would be much simpler not to allow the space jinn out of the bottle than to try to put him back into it later.

Last July over 100 members of the United States Congress and more than 40 eminent scientists and arms-control specialists sent letters to President Reagan calling for an immediate agreement with the Soviet Union on establishing a bilateral moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

For its part the Soviet Union has proposed that Soviet and American scientists hold a meeting to discuss possible consequences of creating large-scale ABM systems. At the All-Union Conference of Scientists to Save Humanity from the Threat of Nuclear War, for Disarmament and Peace held in Moscow last May Soviet scientists made known their authoritative opinion on this issue. The appeal adopted by the Conference emphasizes that we must think about limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons rather than about defence against them. There can be no doubt that an objective scientific analysis will demonstrate the futility and danger of this latest American concept.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

I would like to remind the Committee that in spring this year a group of eminent American scientists and public figures sent a cable to Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, containing an appeal to ban space weapons. The authors of that appeal called attention to the fact that the testing and stationing of any weapons in outer space would considerably increase the likelihood of the outbreak of war on earth, and they stressed the urgent need to take measures to prevent that risk.

In his reply to the authors of that appeal, Yuri Andropov pointed out that the Soviet Union will continue to do its utmost to see that

"outer space remains forever free from any weapons, that it does not become an arena for military confrontation and that no threat comes from outer space against those who live on earth".

Consistently pursuing its policy of principle aimed at preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space and of using outer space for peaceful purposes in the interests and for the benefit of all people, and taking into account the urgent need to erect a reliable barrier against turning outer space into a source of mortal danger for the whole of mankind, the USSR proposed in August of this year to negotiate the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth and submitted a draft treaty on this subject to this session of the General Assembly.

An important characteristic of this draft treaty lies in the combining of political and legal obligations of States to refrain from the use of force against one another in and from outer space with practical steps designed to avert the militarization of outer space. Specifically, it forbids the resort to the use or threat of force in outer and air space or on earth using to that end space objects orbiting the earth, placed on celestial bodies or otherwise deployed in outer space as a means of destruction. The draft treaty also forbids resort to the use or threat of force against space objects.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union is also proposing a comprehensive ban on the testing of and deployment in outer space of space-based weapons designed to destroy targets on earth and in air or outer space. It is also in favour of a radical solution to the problem of anti-satellite weapons and the complete renunciation by States of the development of new anti-satellite weapons, as well as the elimination of such systems already in their possession. The parties to this treaty would also undertake not to destroy, damage or disturb in any other way the normal functioning of space objects of other States or to alter their flight paths. Furthermore, it is proposed to ban the testing and use for military purposes, including anti-satellite purposes, of manned spaceships, which must be used exclusively to solve the manifold scientific, technological and economic problems.

The Soviet draft treaty contains very specific proposals for verifying its observance by States. It is envisaged that along with the use of national technical means of verification States parties would undertake to carry out consultations and co-operation among themselves, including recourse to appropriate international procedures within the United Nations, as well as to the services of the consultative committee of States parties to the treaty. The procedure for convening the consultative committee is set out and the right of any State party to nominate its representative to serve on that body is specifically stipulated. Thus the verification system as proposed in the draft treaty is based on an effective combination of national and international forms of verification.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The most recent Soviet proposal is therefore a major step towards averting the threat of war against humanity in and from outer space. It has been prepared with due regard for the views and suggestions which have been put forward in recent years by many States in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament.

To reach agreement, there must be the political will, expressed in deeds rather than in words, to seek and, more important, to find, ways of preventing a conflict in outer space or the use of space-based weapons in a conflict on earth.

With a view to creating a more favourable atmosphere for working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, the Soviet Union has, in addition to its new proposals, taken an extremely important decision: the USSR has undertaken not to be the first to place any kinds of anti-satellite weapon in outer space, that is to say, it has declared a unilateral moratorium on launching such weapons for as long as other States, including the United States, refrain from placing any kind of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

Such a decision represents yet a further demonstration of the goodwill of the Soviet Union and of its determination effectively to strengthen international peace and security. It is to be hoped that the United States will follow this example.

The implementation of this package of far-reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union would make a major and truly tangible contribution to the achievement of the goal approved earlier by the United Nations: to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet proposals indicate the path to follow if the militarization of outer space is to be stopped so that it remains a free zone of businesslike co-operation and peaceful exploration. This task is difficult, yet perfectly feasible. The USSR is proposing that this task be addressed without further delay. The prevention of the militarization of outer space is in keeping with the interests of all countries and peoples. As the discussion of this problem at this session has shown - and this includes the discussion in our own Committee - it is one to which the overwhelming majority of States attach enormous importance. The delegations of the Congo, Nigeria, Peru, Ireland, the Netherlands and other countries have all pressed for an early solution to this problem.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union is ready to consider, in a constructive spirit, all proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

However, we should like to point out to the Committee that difficulties have already emerged which seem likely to impede efforts in that direction.

This, at any rate, is indicated by the initial reaction of the United States State Department to our proposal - a reaction that cannot by any means be described as constructive. Briefly, this reaction amounts to distorting the purport of our proposal and sowing doubts beforehand as to the feasibility of reaching practical agreements as proposed by the Soviet Union. The United States is also resorting to such frivolous claims as that the Soviet Union's proposal, according to them, contains nothing new compared to the draft treaty the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations in 1981. What kind of distorting spectacles must be used to prevent anyone from seeing that in actual fact the new Soviet proposal goes much farther than the 1981 version? Thus the new draft provides for a ban not only on the deployment of any space-based weapons designed to destroy targets on earth, in air and outer space but also on the testing of such weapons. The Soviet draft envisages the adoption of verifiable measures to prevent the development of future space-weapons systems. The draft treaty provides for a ban on the development of new anti-satellite systems, and the elimination of existing systems.

As to doubts about the feasibility of achieving practical results, such doubts do not arise in connection with the Soviet proposal, which leaves no room for doubt, but rather in connection with the position of the United States as set forth yesterday in this Committee. The statement made by the United States representative, which was incidentally on the vague side, about exploring ways of reducing the risk of conflict in outer space cannot possibly be reconciled with the programmes of militarization of outer space that have been spelled out in much greater detail by the United States and are actually being implemented. Nor can that statement be reconciled with Washington's hasty negative reaction to the latest Soviet proposals. Finally, I should like to emphasize particularly

that the time for study and consideration is long past: the time has come to act to prevent an arms race and conflicts in outer space.

The decisive moment has arrived: either States will immediately sit down at the negotiating table and start work on a treaty on this subject or the arms race will spread to outer space.

The Soviet Union is clearly and plainly proposing a course that would benefit mankind: the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. If this would help, we would also be prepared to enter into separate talks on anti-satellite systems. We are prepared to take the first steps towards a solution to the general problem of prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth on a bilateral basis, also. We reaffirm the willingness of the Soviet Union - a willingness we already expressed last year at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly - to resume negotiations with the United States on anti-satellite weapons. It is now up to the United States side to respond.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the representatives of all other States in this Committee will take a responsible approach to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth, and will make possible the adoption at this session of the General Assembly of an authoritative recommendation that will enable us to begin working on the practical solution of this vital problem.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by extending, on behalf of my delegation, a sincere welcome to you and to express our satisfaction at seeing the Ambassador of the friendly nation of Norway in the Chair of the First Committee. We have no doubt that, under your experienced and skilful guidance, our deliberations on these very important disarmament issues will be led to a successful and fruitful conclusion. Our congratulations are also extended to the Vice-Chairmen and to the other officers of the Committee.

Japan has consistently maintained the fundamental foreign policy of refusing to become a military Power and of devoting its considerable national resources to the cause of world peace and prosperity. As is well known our Constitution is based firmly on the ideal of peace. Moreover, Japan's three non-nuclear principles spell out very clearly and beyond any doubt its posture on the subject of nuclear weapons. I do not think that there is any possible room for misunderstanding of Japan's position of not possessing and not producing nuclear weapons and not permitting their introduction into Japan. The Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Abe, emphasized these points in his statement in plenary meeting at the current session of the General Assembly. Japan is determined to make meaningful contributions to the peace and stability of the world in accordance with its basic foreign policy.

Of greatest concern to Japan is the prevention of nuclear war so that the world may be passed on intact to posterity and that future generations may be free from the fear of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is the most essential element in the process towards such a goal. We believe that this is an important task which the international community as a whole must vigorously pursue. It is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States, in particular, take full cognizance of the grave responsibilities they bear for international security and make maximum efforts in the direction of effective arms control and disarmament.

In this sense, it is only natural that Japan and for that matter States throughout the world are showing great interest and concern regarding the progress of the two sets of ongoing negotiations on the most crucial issues of the day. I am referring to the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the strategic arms reduction talks (START). They have high expectations that these negotiations will yield substantive results. The focal point in the

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations is how the SS-20 missiles will be treated, since, because of their extended range, mobility and destructiveness, they greatly affect the East-West military balance. Because of these advanced characteristics and capabilities the SS-20 missiles pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the entire world, a threat which cannot be ignored. Japan has long maintained the position that due consideration must be paid in the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations to the security of Asia and that a solution should be sought from a global perspective.

I should like to take this opportunity to say that Japan earnestly hopes the recently announced new initiative of the United States will be seriously and positively studied by the Soviet Union.

With regard to the strategic arms reduction talks, we understand that their significance lies in the fact that they aim at maintaining a long-term and stable nuclear balance, at as low a level of armament as possible, between the United States and the Soviet Union through a large-scale reduction of their strategic nuclear arsenals. We welcome the recent United States proposal containing the build-down concept as a way of realizing a steady reduction of existing nuclear weapons. We should like to express our sincere hope that the Soviet Union will demonstrate corresponding flexibility in the negotiations, so that the path to an agreement will be opened up as soon as possible.

In discussing arms control and disarmament today, we must recognize that the present international political situation has become more complex and weapon technology more highly sophisticated. These two factors have made it increasingly difficult correctly to identify and assess the ways and means for achieving disarmament. What is required under these circumstances is efforts to move forward, one step at a time, with concrete and feasible measures. Idealistic slogans alone, unaccompanied by concrete proposals, will not be sufficient for the accomplishment of our task.

In this context, I should like to comment on two elements which in our view are essential for the attainment of disarmament.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

The first is confidence-building, in the original sense of the term. We must redouble our efforts to build and strengthen a sense of mutual trust among nations. We believe that measures for confidence-building between States, if undertaken with sufficient regard for specific regional, political, military and other conditions and requirements, not only will help prevent conflicts but will significantly contribute to the promotion of disarmament.

Secondly, we believe that verification is an important aspect of arms control and disarmament. It is a practical means of consolidating and further strengthening mutual trust and confidence among States which must underlie any disarmament arrangement. Japan has long emphasized the importance of verification. At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly we expressed the hope that a multilateral verification organization could eventually be established within the framework of the United Nations. Relevant to this approach is, we believe, the important concept of international satellite monitoring. We shall follow with much interest the way in which the Secretary-General's report on this subject is received and how it will develop in the future.

Another important example of an international verification system is an international network to detect seismic events, which is related to a comprehensive test ban. Japan has contributed in the past with regard to this subject by submitting various working papers to the Committee on Disarmament. These include papers with such titles as "Verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban", "Views on a system of international exchange of seismic data" and "Working paper on a contribution to an international monitoring system using a newly installed small seismic array of Japan", to mention just a few of the most recent ones.

It is the view of my Government that verification is important in the following four ways. The verification process can help to preclude the precipitate development of conflicts between States by providing opportunities for consultations; at the same time, this process can deepen mutual trust among nations, which is a prerequisite for disarmament. Verification provisions which are incorporated into agreements and supported by the technical means to detect violations of those agreements will have a deterrent effect against

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

such violations. Finally, the establishment of an international verification system will help further to promote multilateral disarmament efforts, such as those of the United Nations.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Of course, each of those points requires further in-depth examination, which must begin with a clear identification and an orderly arrangement of the issues. The definition of circumstances which would warrant a mandatory on-site inspection is one such issue. Japan will spare no effort in continuing to make effective contributions to this work.

I now turn to nuclear disarmament measures themselves - in particular, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which has been Japan's primary concern over the years. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would of course be an effective means for halting the further sophistication and diversification of nuclear weapons, as well as for preventing a possible increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. In view of the current level of technological sophistication, we regard the questions of verification and compliance as central to a comprehensive test ban in the 1980s. Japan thus appreciates the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has established an ad hoc working group on these matters and has sought to clarify the different views and positions of Member States. Japan strongly hopes that at its session next year the Conference on Disarmament will strengthen these efforts in order to narrow the differences between Member States, and that it will continue seriously to consider these issues. It is hoped that the Conference will re-establish without delay the ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate so as to reach an early agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

In this connection, my delegation welcomes the recommendation of the ad hoc group of scientific experts concerning the new experimental exchange of seismic data to be conducted next spring, utilizing the internationally available data network. Japan intends to participate actively in this exchange, as it has in the past, and hopes very much that as many States as possible will do so as well. It is our view that efforts of this nature, although they may not seem very dramatic, constitute valuable, concrete steps towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Today, the advancement and spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has reached a level where 3 to 4 per cent of the world energy demand is met through nuclear power generation. While the knowledge and capability for such purposes are being disseminated widely, it is regrettable to observe that the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation is also growing. In order to accommodate the world's energy needs on a stable basis, further emphasis on the maintenance and strengthening of the world's non-proliferation régime, as embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is a matter of the highest priority. We therefore reiterate our appeal to those countries which have not yet done so to take appropriate measures and accede to the Treaty at an early date. This appeal, in our view, is particularly timely since the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is on the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty stipulates that efforts towards genuine and effective nuclear disarmament measures should be constantly pursued in good faith in response to the trust of those non-nuclear-weapon States which are voluntarily relinquishing the nuclear option. If the impression should develop that nuclear-weapon States have not made sufficient efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, I am deeply concerned that this might affect the credibility of the NPT régime itself. It is appropriate in the context of the NPT also to reiterate Japan's strong hope for substantive progress in the ongoing United States-Soviet negotiations. At the same time, let me reaffirm the importance we attach to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This area should be further encouraged and promoted, with adequate protection provided against military attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities.

I mentioned earlier that the prevention of nuclear war was a matter of the greatest concern to Japan. I also stressed the importance of nuclear disarmament. But it may be noted that the present military balance in reality is maintained by the totality of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Within the domain of conventional weapons, the world's attention is at present focused on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Because Japan's keen interest in this issue is already well known, I need not go into it now. We wish to note, however, that during its session this year the Committee on Disarmament, with the participation of experts, conducted in-depth discussions on such important issues as the destruction of existing chemical weapons and verification thereof; the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons; and a definition of chemical agents to be prohibited. These efforts by the Committee, and particularly its ad hoc working group, are to be highly commended. At the same time, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the negotiations themselves have become more complex as detailed substantive issues have entered the discussions. Nevertheless, I am confident that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to streamline these issues and make progress towards the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. I hasten to add that Japan will continue to make contributions by providing detailed proposals and factual analyses to the Conference on Disarmament, as it has in the past.

It is hardly necessary to refer to the fact that, in addition to chemical weapons, many other important disarmament subjects are now under consideration in the various multilateral negotiating and deliberative forums. I should like to limit myself today to simply expressing Japan's concern that the rapid development of space technology which we have been witnessing recently could lead to an intensified arms race in outer space. I am pleased to note that the Committee on Disarmament has discussed this issue as one of its agenda items. It is the hope of my delegation that during its session next year the Conference on Disarmament will establish an ad hoc working group and begin a substantive examination of this very complicated and sensitive subject.

On the occasion of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Japan proposed that some of the materials concerning its atomic bomb experiences be turned over to the United Nations. We did so in the hope of promoting public understanding of the destruction that even a relatively small nuclear weapon, as it might be called today, can cause. I am pleased to note that this proposal has now been implemented in the form of the United Nations Permanent Exhibit on Disarmament. Also at the special session we extended an invitation to the participation in the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament.

(Mr. Imai Japan)

The 25 fellows recently visited Japan, with trips to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and I hope they found the programme in Japan useful. These two steps, of course, do not constitute substantive disarmament measures. However, since the actual experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are no longer the sole possession of Japan, but should be regarded as the common property of humanity, we hope that these modest steps will be useful in spreading throughout the world our genuine concerns about nuclear weapons.

The call for disarmament has never been as fervent as it is today, but the stark realities of an increasingly tense international political situation and the extraordinary development of weapons-related technology are delaying genuine achievements in the disarmament field. In these circumstances, courage and patience are particularly necessary as we continue our efforts to explore and accumulate step by step, concrete and effective disarmament measures. I would like to conclude my statement by reaffirming Japan's commitment to continue working for disarmament with such courage and patience in order that future generations may be free of the fear of nuclear destruction and that they may live in a world of peace.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We have reached a time in history when the need for an effectively functioning United Nations emerges, as never before, as compelling and urgent. The significance of the deliberations of this Committee at the present juncture should not be overlooked. It is fortunate that a person of your high calibre and experience, Mr. Chairman, should be presiding over our meetings. I wish to convey my delegation's congratulations to you and the other officers of the Committee.

A closely interdependent world composed of many sovereign nations cannot possibly function towards peace, security and survival in a nuclear and space age without an effectively functioning organization. We have the United Nations, therefore we should see that it is restored to its effectiveness as required by the Charter, so that it can answer its primary purpose of ensuring international peace and security. The deliberations in this Committee have thus to be centred on the effective functioning of the security system provided for in the Charter concurrently with disarmament efforts. The two have to be dealt with in a parallel way so that those efforts may be productive.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

The Charter, in its Preamble, expresses the determination of the peoples of the United Nations

"to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure ... that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest".

That means that the basis of the function of the United Nations is international security, as distinct from that of the League of Nations, the basis of whose Covenant was disarmament.

There is nothing in the Charter which obligates Members of the United Nations to throw away their armaments, but it makes it compulsory for them to comply with the provisions concerning international security through the United Nations so that the shedding of arms will follow naturally in sequence, and this is affirmed by Article 1 of the Charter, which states that the primary purpose of the United Nations is

"to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression ...".

The way was thus opened through international security to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Without such an effective prohibition of the use of force, disputes cannot be settled peacefully, because the stronger side will rely on the use of its forces to have its own way if it is unhindered by any provisions existing in the world Organization.

In dealing with disarmament, within the context of international security, I wish to refer to the burning question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which appears now so remote from conclusion that the Committee should be reminded that this year is the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, the achievement of which was a landmark at the time. However, the undiminished underground nuclear testing which has since increased and is continuing, is a matter of very serious concern.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

The partial test-ban Treaty incorporated in its preamble an undertaking concerning the continuance of relevant negotiations with the aim of achieving a ban on all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The partial test-ban Treaty was thus treated as only a part of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to be completed soon afterwards.

The General Assembly already in 1963 called upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to prepare, as a matter of high priority, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The absence of results necessitated a repetition of that call by the General Assembly the following year -- 1964 -- and the same appeal went forth from subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, without effect.

The last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was requested to conclude, by the tenth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Now we have reached the twentieth anniversary, and nothing has happened.

As appears from the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that there is no technical obstacle to the conclusion of such a treaty. It is only the lack of political will of the countries concerned that prevents it; and that lack of political will is a result of a momentum for the continuance and further escalation of the arms race, in preparation for more destructive weapons of self-annihilation.

We believe that the suspension of all nuclear testing is of vital significance to the problem of halting the arms race, with the enormous dangers it involves, for a number of obvious reasons. The momentum of the nuclear arms race is ever increasing through the technological development of nuclear weapons. The proposals of the peoples of the world for a freeze on the development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons is of particular significance and importance. We therefore whole-heartedly support them, not as a solution to the problems but as a constructive step towards solution taken by the peoples of the world to influence those responsible in the right direction.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

All the main disarmament problems in the United Nations are in the last analysis but the consequence of the ineffectiveness of Security Council decisions resulting in the manifest lack of order and security in a world of increasing anarchy and terrorism. We are now in the midst of an escalating and immediately threatening arms race, while conflicts in a polarized world multiply and intensify. We, therefore, feel the time has come to seek an improvement in this situation through an effective United Nations and to insist on it by all means in the firm belief that ultimately co-operation for peace and survival is possible when there is a United Nations functioning effectively in accordance with the terms of the Charter. In these critical times, all our efforts must turn in that direction.

Our delegation fully supports and endorses all collateral measures aimed at averting a threatened conflagration.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

I should now like to refer to what was very rightly said by the representative of the Soviet Union in his statement when he asked:

"whether the slide towards the nuclear abyss can be halted and whether we can move on to another road in world politics". (A/C.1/38/PV.3, p. 47)

We welcome this question because it shows concern about matters which are very important in making the United Nations effective. For our part, our reply is, yes, by restoring the proper function of the United Nations in fulfilling its primary purpose of insuring international peace and security through compliance with the provisions of the Charter, whereby the decisions of the Security Council will be effective, thus making the security system provided for in the Charter operative.

This procedure, of course, is under consideration by the Security Council in closed meetings regarding compliance with Articles 43 and 47 of the Charter, to restore to the decisions of the Security Council their effect and validity. It is encouraging that this is happening. There have been 18 closed meetings of the Security Council in which the subject has been discussed and, as we all know, the President of the Security Council has indicated that this matter is under serious consideration. We hope that results will soon be achieved, because this is not a matter which allows of the exercise of political will; it is a matter of an existing obligation and commitment under the Charter for the Security Council to function and for its decisions to be effective. Therefore, lengthy consideration of compliance with already existing obligations under the Charter is not required. I repeat, it is not a matter of political will, of a Member State of the United Nations being able to exercise its political will one way or the other. It has to comply with its commitment under the Charter. It was pointed out in The New York Times on 13 April 1983 by James Reston that the major Powers do not respect the Charter, so how can they try to enter into other treaties when this most solemn treaty is being violated by them. Therefore, the article concluded, before they try to enter into other treaties they must comply with the provisions of the Charter. This shows that public opinion is alerted to the lack of any serious effect on international security through the United Nations.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

Another hopeful sign is the establishment of the Palme Commission, composed of eminent statesmen and presided over by the Prime Minister of Sweden, which has pronounced itself against the negativeness of security based on a doctrine of mutual deterrence or parity in weapons and for the positiveness of common security. This is the line that we should consistently follow so that we may get results. This is our position, and I believe that the United Nations can become effective in these critical times if it asserts itself in the way it should.

We have to consider certain realities that cannot be ignored and must be faced by the international community. The Powers that conduct the arms race, by their position, are also those that dominate the disarmament effort. As a result, the arms race is a galloping reality, the disarmament negotiations a stagnant pretence.

We do not complain against anyone, for this situation is the result of a momentum. It is a momentum that was created at the very start of the United Nations by bypassing provisions of the Charter that would make available to the Security Council the means of giving effect to its decisions, thereby depriving the international community of the system of security through the United Nations required by the Charter.

Hence, we were taken back to the era before the United Nations when there was no security other than through armaments. Now that we have the Charter, with provisions concerning the non-use of force, we have violated the Charter by creating a situation in which the main organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, whose decisions have to be enforceable, remains ineffective.

Recent events in the international field have brought into sharp focus the inability of the Security Council to give effect to its decisions and the grave dangers this entails. In past years, a series of decisions adopted unanimously by the Security Council have been ignored and bypassed with impunity by the States concerned.

The characteristic importance of the Security Council derives from the fact that it is the only organ of the United Nations whose decisions must be implemented by enforcement action where necessary. When, however, the Security Council is deprived of the means of enforcement and its decisions remain unimplemented, they lose their effect and validity and become a pretence; they are, in reality, mere recommendations, as are the resolutions of the General Assembly. The importance of

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

the resolutions of the General Assembly, however, lies in the fact that by representing the totality of the United Nations membership they are an official expression of world public opinion. The same cannot be said of the Security Council and its 15 members. This state of affairs runs counter to the Charter in the most vital function of the United Nations.

It is a well-known adage that law without enforcement is not law, and similarly, a Security Council without enforcement is no "security" council but a pretence. Yet the entire system of security provided for by the Charter and the whole function of the United Nations concerning its primary purpose of international peace and security rests on the effectiveness of the Security Council.

In the final documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament emphasis was laid on the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in disarmament. Where is that central role and primary responsibility if the decisions of the Security Council are repeatedly and deliberately ignored?

It is time the United Nations asserted itself. In this direction the Secretary-General has made a significant move.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

The Secretary-General, in his report of last year (A/37/1), came out very emphatically in favour of increasing the effectiveness of Security Council decisions. He very courageously placed the matter before the Security Council, and it has been considered, as I have said, at 18 closed meetings of the Security Council. But the meetings have not produced any concrete results, so the matter remains open. If the Security Council keeps postponing it as a matter for consideration and does not give the Council the validity and effect which it deserves, as required by the Charter, the Secretary-General must act in his own right under Article 99 of the Charter. If he does so, as I am sure he will consider doing, his role will be historic, because he is the only person who has the means of challenging the attitude of the Security Council. This raises a matter of serious concern and I think that the whole of the United Nations and every Member must support the Secretary-General in his efforts to establish peace and security in the world through respect for the Charter. The present crisis in human affairs is caused not by the incapacity to deal with it, but by the failure to recognize its root cause and, indeed, by an inclination to ignore it. There is in our time a widespread tendency to avoid all reference to the main cause of the ineffectiveness of the Security Council's decisions and to treat the matter as though of little consequence. The cause can be traced back to the original default or failure of those responsible for ensuring compliance with the specific provisions of the Charter to make available to the Security Council the means to give effect to its decisions.

I should now like to say a few words with regard to the influence of the spirit of man in world affairs and, indeed, in the United Nations. In the last analysis, our problem is one of adjustment to the demands of a radically changed world. The change was very sudden. The advent of the nuclear weapon necessarily brought a radical change, and a need for adjustment to the change, for which man was not ready. Therefore, he finds himself in great difficulty in adjusting. In whatever stratum he may be, man is the same; he cannot adjust so quickly to such an enormous change. Therefore, in order to be

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

effective we have to invoke the spirit in man, because the spirit is man's communion with the universal mind and partakes of its moral flow. When awakened, it leads man to the right decision. If the spirit is awakened, he cannot go wrong; he will take the right decision.

Therefore, what we most need now in the United Nations is the spirit of man. Let us hope that being already a part of the Preamble to the Charter, it may find its way into the United Nations and bring about the change that we need for positive action towards peace and security.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

United Nations

**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

*Official Records**



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FIRST COMMITTEE
11th meeting
held on
Monday, 24 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 11TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

OBSERVANCE OF DISARMAMENT WEEK

The CHAIRMAN: This morning the Committee is observing Disarmament Week and it is a particular pleasure for me, on this occasion, to welcome to the Committee the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. We appreciate the fact that they have found time to be with us today. This testifies again to their dedication to the important work which is being done within the framework of the United Nations towards disarmament and arms control.

I have pleasure in calling upon the President of the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT of the GENERAL ASSEMBLY (interpretation from Spanish): Once again, on the anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations, we mark the beginning of Disarmament Week, the week in which we attempt to focus attention, both here and in many other parts of the world, on the efforts needed to make progress towards disarmament.

Once again the world is seeing exacerbation of conflicts and worsening of international tension, lives cast away, property destroyed, families and societies caught in the deadly exchange of gunfire and hatred. On many occasions we have manifested our sorrow at the sufferings of the Lebanese nation and other peoples in different lands. Today we must express our profound feelings of sadness at the losses yesterday in Beirut. And over all the events of the past 12 months have loomed ever darker the threatening storm-clouds of an escalation of the nuclear threat, while charge and counter-charge, proposal and counter-proposal, have been made in volley after volley, seemingly perceived by the other side as intended for visual effect rather than for practical purposes.

Each side in the separate bilateral negotiations concerning strategic arms and intermediate-range nuclear forces, on which so much public attention is at present focused, has marshalled its arguments and sought to demonstrate its resolve. Nevertheless, no progress has been achieved and we have before us the prospect of yet another vicious twist in the spiral of the arms race. The world as a whole is spending enormous amounts of money, while at the same time a quarter of the world's population does not know where the next day's meal will come from.

(The President of
the General Assembly)

We are observing Disarmament Week this year at a time when the international situation is becoming increasingly threatening. Tensions and conflicts have intensified in several parts of the world. The arms race is poised, consequently, on the brink of a leap into a new phase of deadlier weapons of greater speed and accuracy. World military expenditures are reaching astronomical proportions, and the basic needs of millions of people, especially in the third world, continue to be denied them. The search for absolute security by the great Powers serves only to increase their sense of insecurity, and the nuclear arms arsenals pose a general threat to the very survival of mankind.

(The President of
the General Assembly)

This is truly a revolutionary situation that concerns all peoples and nations equally. We cannot go on in this way without gravely tempting fate. It was Einstein who warned that the advent of nuclear weapons had changed everything - except our ways of thinking and reacting to one another. Arnold Toynbee, the British historian, who analysed the rise and fall of civilizations, revealed that militarism and the arms race have been in the past the most common causes of the decline of 14 civilizations. Of course I do not refer to armed forces for national defence which are essential for self-preservation.

We must stop reacting to other societies in a military manner. We must cure the military mind before it is too late. It is significant that hundreds of thousands, millions, of people are staging anti-nuclear demonstrations. The irreversible consequences of nuclear war will affect all human beings everywhere. World public opinion has realized this and people - men, women and children - in many countries have begun to express their feelings in a variety of ways. It is they who will be the victims in a nuclear war and they are having their say about the risks to peace that they are not prepared to accept.

It is the fatal perversity of some men that makes them seek to guarantee peace by threatening the future of mankind, but what sort of peace is it that is based on terror? Terror by its very nature cannot be balanced and is likely to lead to error and war. Are we so bankrupt intellectually that we have nothing better to rely on for peace than the so-called balance of terror? Relations between human societies can never be peaceful if they are based on terror.

The military approach to political and security problems has never led to their solution. A decade ago President Kennedy was right in his belief that "the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a military solution". The indifference of the military mind to life itself is a symptom of a terrible form of inhumanity, and the nuclear weapon symbolizes this inhumanity in the most extreme manner possible. There is much weight in the affirmation of those who believe that militarism is the characteristic not of an army but of a society. We cannot afford to think of the use of force in this age of nuclear weapons.

(The President of
the General Assembly)

Plato and Socrates believed that man was capable of rational choice and that a bad choice was the result of faulty thinking. The future of mankind depends as never before on rational thinking and right choice. We must return to the wise ways of thought of our ancestors who brought mankind to the present great heights of our civilization.

Here in the United Nations our Charter sets out as the first of our purposes the maintenance of international peace and security, and yet the world seems to have precious little of either. It is widely recognized that disarmament and international security must go hand in hand. No nation can be expected to risk its fundamental security in a climate of international mistrust and suspicion engendered by an arms race, particularly one of the dimensions that we are witnessing at the moment.

With all the moral responsibility and authority at my command as President of the General Assembly, I call on all Member States, particularly the leaders of the major Powers, to exercise the utmost care and caution in the coming weeks and months. What is needed is a bold, imaginative step to reduce tensions, to improve international relations, to promote development as well as international economic co-operation, and to turn away from the precipice that confronts us.

In launching the World Disarmament Campaign the General Assembly sought to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding of and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. That Campaign, still in its early stages, is already attracting public attention to the nature of the international machinery, whether bilateral or multilateral, which persistently fails to find ways of achieving progress towards a better and safer future. A decisive element in restoring public confidence in an effective United Nations would be a demonstration in this Committee's deliberations here and in the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 that common interests can be identified, that compromises can be made and agreement can be reached that will set the international community on the road towards disarmament.

(The President of
the General Assembly)

Our foremost task is to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the survival of mankind. At the same time negotiations on measures of disarmament should be pursued with greater imagination and realism and with emphasis on those eternal qualities that unite people rather than on those ephemeral things that divide us. Through the process of dialogue and discussion human societies can remove their misconceptions of one another and create the right climate for reaching agreement and accommodation. The United Nations was intended to be a forum for mutual understanding and for harmonizing the actions of nation States in the attainment of common ends. Let us use the United Nations for the purpose for which it was created.

Let us rededicate ourselves to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and let us work together by word and deed to save succeeding generations from the danger of a world war - a nuclear war. The nuclear weapon is our common enemy, but, more than that, we are our own worst enemy. There are limits to everything - limits to enmity, limits to the arms race, limits to deterrence and limits to freedom of action. But there are no limits to the further evolution of the human species towards that higher goal of peace, justice and freedom.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the Secretary-General.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from Spanish): It gives me great pleasure to address the Committee during its first meeting in Disarmament Week. I firmly believe that there is a need to take advantage of this important debate so that the Governments and the peoples of Member countries should concentrate, as much as possible, on the urgent need to make a start on the reduction of the increasingly vast and sophisticated arsenals of armaments. This is not the first time that we have met for this purpose. Notwithstanding the evident fact that at the present time there is much greater awareness of the grave dangers inherent in the arms race, particularly the nuclear one, it has to be acknowledged that the Governments of the world have not yet found the necessary formulas to achieve either a limitation of armaments or disarmament. We are not blind to the fact that, as is borne out by new evidence every day, the world is at a dramatic crossroads, because whatever path is chosen can have a direct impact on the destiny of the world and on the well-being of all its inhabitants. This is particularly so in the field of disarmament.

However, nothing justifies despair or resignation. We have valuable opportunities within our reach. On the one hand, the two major nuclear Powers are holding bilateral talks on strategic missiles and on intermediate-range missiles. It is true that these negotiations are taking place under the oppressive shadow of great tension and of profound bilateral disagreements. None the less, from the point of view of the security and prosperity of those same Powers, as well as of the other countries and peoples of the world, there is no doubt that the importance of an equitable and reliable agreement designed to reduce nuclear arsenals and limit their technological up-grading and their deployment transcends the importance of any bilateral disagreements. We well know that the problems involved are highly complex, but we must also admit that if the negotiations were to fail, the inevitable result would be a further intensification of competition in the nuclear-arms sphere and a new source of danger and fear for mankind. The negotiating Powers must duly weigh their colossal responsibility not just to their own peoples but indeed to the entire international community.

Given the particularly urgent nature of the situation with regard to intermediate-range weapons, it is my hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will give serious thought to the adoption of provisional measures which, should it prove necessary, would give more time for negotiations to achieve

(The Secretary-General)

positive results. In the sphere of strategic armaments, I believe that both parties must consider the possibility of setting up less dangerous and more stable systems, pending the attainment of the ultimate objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons, but right now the most important thing is that the negotiations must go on. If they were abandoned the parties would have missed an opportunity which may well not present itself again and they would find themselves moving along a road fraught with dangers, while the other path, which offers more hope, would be unexplored. On the other hand, the broader forum of the Committee on Disarmament also provides opportunities for progress in the limitation of the threat posed by armaments and the enormous economic burden they represent. The comprehensive and useful studies which have been carried out with a view to the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, the complete prohibition of nuclear testing and other disarmament questions are the basis for future progress and must be put to good use. The draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons is at an advanced stage and I take the liberty of urging a renewal of efforts to bring about its prompt conclusion. Let us bear in mind that it is easier to reach an agreement on banning the deployment of a system of armaments or on the manufacture of a new series of weapons before and not after those systems and weapons have become an irreversible reality. Consequently, we must urge that the negotiations within the framework of the United Nations should continue with greater determination in order to establish a peaceful régime for outer space before military systems which could impede future negotiations are actually deployed there.

These are just some of the subjects to be considered in the Committee which is now dedicating all its efforts to disarmament issues in the light of their paramount importance for world security. It is fitting and auspicious that Disarmament Week should be starting on 24 October, the thirty-eighth anniversary of the United Nations. Apart from its concern with the arms build-up, as expressed in Article 26, the United Nations Charter, rather than defining the prerequisites for the maintenance of peace, attaches paramount importance to the need to avoid the use of force in the settlement of disputes and, on the other hand, establishes the principle of collective responsibility, entrusting its application to the Security Council, in order to guarantee the security of all the Member States. These provisions provide the firmest basis for the actual

(The Secretary-General)

reduction of armaments and can resolve the most tragic contradiction of our age, which is the fact that increasing expenditures on security fail to achieve security, but instead constitute - as the Charter implies - a diversion of human and economic resources to armaments which in turn gives rise to acute insecurity, especially in the developing world.

I thus appeal to the Governments represented in this Committee, as they proceed with their important work, to bear in mind the considerable progress which can be made in disarmament through a patient and constructive dialogue, in strict compliance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. This is the best way of achieving the rational utilization of the world's resources in order to meet the needs of so many millions of human beings and it is also the best road to a just and lasting peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Senegal, Mr. Sarré, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States.

Mr. SARRE (Senegal) (interpretation from French): This year we are celebrating Disarmament Week in what is unfortunately a somewhat pessimistic atmosphere. This is a period fraught with conflicts, when tensions have been constantly exacerbated and seem to be the harbinger of war rather than peace. This disturbing situation should confer special importance on this occasion. The improvement of international relations in an atmosphere more conducive to the promotion of disarmament is a particularly urgent matter for Africans, because not only do we live, like peoples in other parts of the world, under the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, but in addition, we are powerless as we witness the squandering of enormous resources, which could have eradicated several times over the scourges that we and other peoples of the third world suffer from, namely, disease, hunger and ignorance.

(Mr. Sarré, Senegal)

Thus our bitterness can be understood, as we see that indifference to our appeals has turned into deafness when any question arises that relates directly to the freedom and dignity of the peoples of the third world, and yet when we emerged four decades ago from the nightmare of war, we hoped that mankind would be able in future to prevent the outbreak of a new war by building a new system of international relations based on confidence, co-operation and solidarity. Today justice and peace have become a reality only for a small number of countries in the world. For the overwhelming majority the historic injustice that condemns them to living on the periphery is becoming increasingly intolerable, especially since the great scientific and technological advances that have been made in our time would have made possible considerable improvements in the lot of mankind at a cost far less than that of armaments.

At times the world seems to have forgotten the sense of what it is striving for. It is strange indeed to try to conquer outer space and to install devices of death there, and at the same time standing idly by while witnessing the deadly scourges of our time ravaging the world. In addition to these evils of our century, common to all of us, which we are trying over the short term to eliminate, we Africans have another danger to face, that of having to live side by side with a régime which everyone hastens to condemn, but which has nevertheless succeeded in obtaining help to discover the secret of how to produce atomic weapons. This threat is particularly real, since there is no evidence that South Africa, which does not hesitate nowadays to invade and occupy a good part of its neighbour's territories, would hesitate for a moment to use atomic weapons in times of crisis or in war. We believe that at this time the nuclear Powers have a decisive role to play in eliminating that threat. They should enter into specific binding commitments, guarantee observance of the non-nuclear status of Africa and refrain from transferring any nuclear technology to racist South Africa, whose policies they so vehemently condemn.

That would not be too high a price to pay to preserve the achievements of the non-proliferation régime, especially when we consider the consequences for international peace and security of possession by the leaders in Pretoria of atomic weapons, since everyone knows that their racial policies is likely sooner or later to lead to an unprecedented explosion.

(Mr. Sarré, Senegal)

On this question of disarmament, so vital to the future of the world, the small countries have no alternative but to preach reason to the major Powers of the world which have in their hands the key to our common destiny. Yet, we are not sure that our appeals will be heard, still less heeded. All we can do is to hope that by appealing directly to national and world public opinion, as proposed in this Disarmament Week, we can create militant political forces capable of bringing the necessary pressure to bear on the various Governments to induce them to realize finally that there is no alternative to disarmament and peace if we do not want to see the smouldering embers of war throughout the world explode into a world-wide conflagration.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call Mr. El-Fattal, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and Chairman of the Group of Asian States.

Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic):

Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer you my delegation's cordial congratulations on the occasion of your election, and at the same time to thank you for giving me this opportunity to address the First Committee at this special meeting, on behalf of the Group of Asian States, over which it is my honour to preside.

The occasion that we are celebrating today is the beginning of Disarmament Week, which it is the custom of the United Nations to celebrate annually, since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, which, in its Final Document, instituted Disarmament Week to promote the aims of disarmament.

Although we are celebrating Disarmament Week for the fifth consecutive year, we see with regret and bitterness that thus far the nations have made no progress towards disarmament. Moreover, the international community feels that no progress has been achieved in the spheres covered by the first special session on disarmament and that no worth-while measure has been taken to bring about disarmament, although the second special session on disarmament, in 1982, which was itself a failure, stressed the importance of disarmament. The international situation has been steadily worsening. There is a climate of distrust prevailing which affects relations among the major Powers. The signs of a cold war are

(Mr. El-Fattal, Syrian
Arab Republic)

beginning to loom over international relations and as a result the arms race seems to be a priority for certain Powers, in particular the nuclear Powers.

The conventional arms race has accelerated recently as a result of the fears of certain countries, especially small and developing countries, that the policy of aggression, intervention and occupation is becoming common practice. The fears and misgivings of the countries of the world are due to the build-up in the arms race and its consequences: in other words, the danger of a nuclear war that would wipe out the whole of mankind. We all realize that a nuclear war would not be limited, that there would be neither victor nor vanquished, and that a nuclear war could not be confined to a specific region. Thus a nuclear war would mean the end of the world.

If Disarmament Week, which we are now celebrating for the fifth time, has secured any positive results, it is the feeling of indignation of the peoples of the world, who are standing out against the arms race and the installation of nuclear weapons. Disarmament Week has been successful in that respect, and has made public opinion in different parts of the world more sensitive to these issues.

In speaking about Disarmament Week and evaluating its results I would like first to take up two important issues closely related to disarmament and which constitute a matter of global concern: the relationship of disarmament to development, on the one hand, and international security, on the other.

(Mr. El-Fattal, Syrian Arab
Republic)

The great enemy of development in the third world countries is their increasing desire to acquire weapons, since in order to defend their frontiers, their independence and their resources against the Zionist, fascist, racist régimes in various parts of the world, or against aggressive imperialist forces, the developing countries are forced to buy weapons and to squander their financial resources on those purchases instead of devoting them to economic and social development. A quick glance at the situation in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East clearly shows how gloomy the picture is in those regions. Millions of people are afflicted with sickness, illiteracy, hunger and malnutrition in those countries. The \$800 billion spent annually on the purchase of weapons would have been enough, if used rationally, to change the situation of those countries. There is no denying that disarmament is not a matter that concerns only the nuclear Powers, and in particular, the super-Powers. It affects all the countries of the world, most of which are represented in this hall.

I wish to point out the essential link between disarmament and international security. International security will continue to be under threat as long as a policy of the might, hegemony, domination, aggression, annexation, and the occupation of foreign territory remains the official ideology of certain régimes in various parts of the world and is carried out by force of arms. We have no guarantee that we can avoid a conflict by pinning our faith to the possibility of using nuclear weapons within a limited area and to a limited extent. Peace-loving countries have categorically rejected this doctrine. The Asian countries are non-nuclear-weapon States, and any Asian country which is trying to make use of nuclear energy is doing so for peaceful purposes. We support the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and most of us have already signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

What we find particularly disturbing on the other hand, are the attempts of the Zionist régime in occupied Palestine to develop weapons of mass destruction in co-operation with the racist régime of South Africa. International intelligence-gathering has shown that the enemy has already acquired a nuclear-weapon capacity, and it should be noted that it has refused to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. El-Fattal, Syrian Arab Republic)

At the beginning of this Disarmament Week, let us reaffirm that we shall spare no effort in this cause and restate our full support for our Organization, in which we have placed all our trust, so that we can carry out this difficult task and seek solutions to the problems the world must face today.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon Mr. Gurinovich of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, who is speaking on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): I have the great honour of speaking as Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States at this special meeting at the beginning of Disarmament Week. This present Disarmament Week happens to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of the Moscow Conference, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. That Conference adopted, among other important documents, a four-Power declaration on questions of general security; in those harsh years of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and China stated, in paragraph 4 of their declaration - that they recognized the need to establish, as early as possible, a universal international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and whose membership would be open to all such States, large and small.

Two years later the United Nations Charter was drafted, signed and entered into force, the Charter of an organization which now has 158 Members.

In the declaration to which I have referred the parties recognized the need to establish and maintain international peace and security in the post-war period and - again - I quote from the declaration - with the least possible diversion of world human and economic resources for armaments.

They went on, in paragraph 7 of the declaration, to state that they would confer and co-operate with each other and with the other Members of the United Nations in order to achieve practicable comprehensive agreements for the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

It must be acknowledged that peace-loving forces have succeeded in achieving certain definite results in their struggle for the limitation and prevention of the nuclear arms race in various respects. Evidence of this is provided by the drafting and adoption of a number of treaties and conventions on the subject that are now in force. Otherwise, the situation would be even worse.

But we are also obliged to note that the threat of nuclear war has grown considerably, that the nuclear weapons now in existence are being constantly developed, that those means of destruction and annihilation which used to be given the old-fashioned name of conventional armaments are in no way comparable to the armaments of the Second World War, and that now annual military expenditures are much higher than they were during the years of the Second World War.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

In other words, it is the fault of the forces of imperialism and reaction, that it has not proved possible to achieve the aim of the least possible diversion of world human and economic resources for armaments. The acute need for this not only has not been reduced, but indeed has grown, taking into account the tasks facing mankind in the elimination of hunger, disease, illiteracy, housing shortages, unemployment and inflation, in overcoming the economic backwardness of the young independent countries and of individual areas and population groups in the developed capitalist countries, and in guaranteeing stable and constant economic and social progress for all peoples.

We do not want the Disarmament Week proclaimed by the United Nations to be limited to the customary ritual speeches. We want it instead to become a powerful stimulus to joint efforts to strengthen peace, to avert the danger of nuclear war, and to achieve agreements on real measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, up to and including general and complete disarmament.

The World Disarmament Campaign, in which the peoples of the world are taking part ever more energetically, must play a part in this endeavour. It is our duty to heed the voice of the peoples and respond to their yearnings.

I should like to make a slight digression from the official style of my statement at this point. We all know that the children of different countries react identically to what they find pleasant or what they find unpleasant: they all laugh and cry in the same way. Once they have learnt to speak, naturally in their own language, they all express identically their attitude to what is good and to what is bad. As the years go by, differences come about in their attitude to what is happening around them. They then begin to adhere to different political, moral and other views and take a different position on religion and the state of affairs within their own country and abroad. But today practically all the peoples, regardless of race and the social structure of the country in which they live, all people of good will, from schoolchildren to old-age pensioners, whatever language they speak, all want the same thing. In a polyglot world we hear ever more loudly proclaimed the same demand: peace, not war; disarmament, not a nuclear catastrophe; co operation, not confrontation.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

We are deeply convinced that the time has come for the politicians and diplomats of all countries at long last to make a similar choice and, combining their efforts, find constructive and mutually acceptable solutions to the pressing problems of our time, including those in the sphere of disarmament. They must respond to the demands of the people in whose name they speak in the international arena.

The United Nations is now discussing a whole range of disarmament questions and each delegation is making a detailed statement of its position on them. In this connection, I wish briefly to recall that the States of the socialist community, proceeding from the provisions of their joint documents adopted in Prague, Moscow and Sofia this year, have already submitted for consideration a complete set of constructive proposals. In the communiqué of the conference of Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Sofia on 13 and 14 October this year, the participants:

"stressed the special importance and urgency of the proposals and initiatives of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty towards averting nuclear war, carrying on and enhancing the process of détente, halting the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and launching disarmament, strengthening security and developing co-operation in Europe and the world as a whole. They expressed the determination of their States to make every effort to implement these proposals and initiatives".

Fundamentally our proposals relate to the condemnation of nuclear war: the prevention of nuclear war; the need for all nuclear Powers which have not yet done so to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; the renunciation of the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear weapons and the reduction of those weapons, and the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments; nuclear disarmament; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and a simultaneous freeze by all the nuclear Powers, primarily the Soviet Union and the United States, on nuclear weapons, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

Our proposals relate to agreement not to increase military expenditures; the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces; the prohibition of the militarization of outer space and the use of force in space and from space against the earth; a ban on and the elimination of neutron and other weapons, including new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; and the liberation of Europe from chemical weapons as a first step towards a world-wide prohibition and elimination of such weapons.

In short, acceptance of our proposals would amount to the renunciation of the use of either nuclear or conventional weapons by any State against any other States.

In other words, we advocate agreements on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. We advocate a world without wars and without the accumulation of stockpiles of armaments. We call upon all other countries to associate themselves with our efforts to achieve these aims by making use also of the possibilities of the World Disarmament Campaign, to which the socialist States have made an appropriate contribution.

We advocate that all peoples should be freed of the danger of a nuclear disaster and have an opportunity to devote their efforts to creative purposes, in conditions of undisturbed peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of El Salvador, Mr. Rosales Rivera, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Latin American States.

Mr. ROSALES-RIVERA (El Salvador)(interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour to speak at the beginning of this commemorative Week, which is part of the World Disarmament Campaign, on behalf of the Latin American Group which, as in the past, gives its full support to all initiatives relating to this item.

The deterioration of the international situation makes it particularly urgent that attention be given to disarmament, for the climate of international tension and the various sources of conflict in the world are all events which foster the escalation of rivalry between the super-Powers. Latin America as a

(Mr. Rosales-Rivera, El Salvador)

whole fully supports the fight for disarmament at all levels as regards conventional weapons, intermediate-range missiles, long-range nuclear forces and, of course, outer space, which must be preserved from use for strategic or military purposes. Regrettably, this last dimension has become the object of the efforts to gain nuclear supremacy.

The area of conventional weapons is a source of special interest to Latin America. The arms race cannot be dissociated from its harmful effects on the economic development and social development of States. Armament and development are opposing directions. Unfortunately, threats to the security of States and imbalances caused by the unequal growth of the military weapons of certain countries in the same subregion conspire against the reduction of military expenditure. Plans for economic and social development are curbed and vast basic needs remain unsatisfied.

This is illustrated in resolution 37/95 A, in which the General Assembly:

“Declares once again its conviction that it is possible to achieve international agreements on reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

“Reaffirms that human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries.” (resolution 37/95 A, paras. 1, 2)

(Mr. Rosales-Rivera, El Salvador)

The figures on world-wide military expenditures are astronomical - more than \$550 billion a year - and the amount spent on economic development is insignificant in comparison. The link between disarmament and development is very relevant and important and has therefore rightly been stressed in international forums. The present trend must be reversed, in the interest not only of the countries of the third world but of the international community at large which would stand to gain. Furthermore, the accumulation and upgrading of weapons do not themselves bring security. On the contrary, the world has become more insecure and a riskier place in which to live because of the arms race.

In détente, there is a perception of good faith and confidence and a sense of security which is a psychological resource conducive to a greater degree of co-operation among States that can, in turn, bring about a reduction in armaments and take us closer to the concept of general and complete disarmament. This premise, based on the building of an atmosphere of mutual confidence, applies to conventional weapons and to nuclear weapons and other sophisticated methods of warfare.

We believe that substantive progress in the Geneva bilateral negotiations would have a positive impact on multilateral negotiations. Both forms of negotiation are interrelated.

When we consider the present state of the reduction of conventional weapons, we very often find that among those involved are not just the two States concerned in the conflict. In the event of a nuclear arms race, however, it is the super-Powers which bear the burden of responsibility for the fate of the world. The others concerned play minor roles even though, paradoxically, a failure in negotiations and a nuclear war would irrevocably affect all mankind. That is why the voices of all the peoples of the world, as potential victims of a nuclear war, must be heard in equal measure in representative international organizations such as the United Nations, the special sessions of the General Assembly which have been held under the aegis of the United Nations, and also in secondary bodies such as the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Rosales-Rivera, El Salvador)

In this regard, Latin America supports the work of the Ad Hoc Committee for the World Disarmament Conference. That Conference, as the Ad Hoc Committee has said, must be the result of consensus, bearing in mind the appropriate conditions. In addition, it should be preceded by proper preparation and commitment to universal goals and universal participation.

Although the awareness of the threat of a nuclear holocaust to the fate of the world has been particularly keen in the developed countries as a result of the media -- and this certainly applies to Western Europe and North America -- there has also been a reasonable level of concern in the third world.

Most people in Latin America consider that their overriding needs have to do with everyday matters such as bread, housing, clothing and work. An understanding of the problems of nuclear war has been shown mainly by the intellectual elites and by Governments. But to be honest, it is not a need which is felt among the masses. Each social community expresses its own concerns.

Latin America was nevertheless the first region which concerned itself with the threat of atomic weapons. The Tlatelolco Treaty and its protocols are eloquent proof of this. Now other regions of the world are following our example.

Of course, in the whole problem of disarmament, the element of effective international control is of primary importance, for it supports the psychological factor of confidence and the subsequent verification that commitments entered into are truly honoured. So there must be reasonable machinery for verification.

The United Nations has been dealing with the question of disarmament as one of its primary objectives. This is clear from Article 26 of the Charter. Ever since its beginning, this world Organization has been associated with this difficult undertaking which has been slow and elusive and which has often been in a state of stagnation. This is the context in which we must view the report of the Committee on Disarmament.

It would seem that the resolutions adopted year after year on disarmament are in inverse ratio to their effectiveness. But they must be seen as an expression of the concern which exists on the subject. The present generations must meet this challenge for their responsibilities go beyond what would have been imaginable just a few years ago, for they are dealing with the destiny of mankind.

(Mr. Rosales-Rivera, El Salvador)

As was stressed by the independent commission, in the nuclear era war cannot be an instrument of policy but merely a mechanism for unprecedented destruction. This places the problem of disarmament in a context beyond the applied sciences and advanced technology. It goes beyond the field of politics and enters the field of ethics. No generation has the right to determine the fate of future generations nor does it have the right to eliminate the human race. The power of nuclear destruction is immense.

For all these reasons, Latin America gives its support to disarmament and applauds initiatives to mobilize world public opinion in the world Disarmament Campaign, to which this week is contributing, a week which begins precisely on United Nations Day. Is it not ironic that just a week ago we celebrated World Food Day and were told that 450 million people are suffering from hunger, while today more than \$1 million a minute are being spent on the arms race? Can we continue with this dialectic of contradictions which the present generation is witnessing?

Latin America trusts that common sense will prevail.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of France, Mr. Louet, Chairman of the Group of Western European and Other States.

Mr. LOUET (France) (interpretation from French): In my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Western European and Other States, I take great pleasure in congratulating you, Sir, on your accession to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I wish also to congratulate the other offices of the Committee. We are sure that your concern for objectivity and your great competence, which we all recognize, will lend great impetus to the work of the First Committee.

For the sixth consecutive year, the General Assembly is celebrating Disarmament Week, beginning today, 24 October, the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. It might be useful to recall that the practice instituted by the first special session on disarmament is a response to the legitimate concern for involving the peoples of our countries in the efforts being made to promote disarmament. While it is primarily for our Governments to carry on a determined quest for significant progress in this field, the difficulty of the endeavour and the magnitude of the stakes make it quite right that their efforts should be accompanied by a flow of information to the populations who should be made more aware of what is happening.

(Mr. Louet, France)

This concern is now more justified than ever at a time when there is increasingly acute awareness of the danger to peace of the lack of progress in this field. We are thus convinced that the activities in connection with this Week will help unite the entire international community in the search for ways of reducing military arsenals. After all, this is what it is about and it is worth recalling this in a context and at a time when there is no lack of declarations of good intent and when the need for specific significant measures was never more clear.

I should like to reaffirm the support of the Group of Western European and other States for all the efforts to achieve genuine disarmament in a more harmonious and united international community.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records*



FIRST COMMITTEE
12th meeting
held on
Monday, 24 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

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Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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- Mr. Kor Bun Heng (Democratic Kampuchea)
- Mr. Blanco (Uruguay)

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3 November 1983
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. BERG (Norway): I wish at the outset to express the great shock felt by my Government and the people of Norway following the tragic and senseless events in Beirut this weekend. Our deeply felt sympathy goes first of all to the bereaved families of the victims. Through you, Mr. Chairman, I should like to convey my sincere condolences to the families and to the American and French Governments, through their representatives in this Committee.

Disarmament and arms control are today the subject of increasing attention, not only in an East-West context, but in the world at large. All over the world a strong public opinion is demanding an end to the arms build-up, conventional as well as nuclear. I see no other way to deal effectively with this major challenge than to redouble our efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control agreements which are balanced, equitable and verifiable. Especially on this United Nations Day, I should like to express my sincere hope that the untiring efforts of this Committee will assist us in this respect.

The corner-stone in the process of halting the arms build-up and reducing armaments should be full adherence by all States to the obligation under the United Nations Charter to refrain from the threat of use of force. In our view this obligation is unequivocal and binding. It must remain a fundamental code of conduct in international relations. Nothing can add to or detract from our Charter in this respect. It was fully in keeping with this basic provision of our Charter, therefore, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit meeting in Bonn last year solemnly declared that NATO weapons, be they conventional or nuclear, would never be used except in response to attack.

In the years ahead, it seems to me, we must increasingly seek agreements that clearly assist us in building more stable relationships among States, while seeking undiminished security at the lowest possible levels of armaments.

In this context and in a global perspective, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) - the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union - are of particular significance. These talks may well

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lay the foundation for the strategic arms posture as we approach the next century. We have noted with satisfaction that both parties, in their proposals, have listed significant reductions as their objective. We consider that the latest United States proposals contain new and significant elements of flexibility, aiming at a substantial build-down of the most destabilizing weapons. It is our hope that this approach will be reciprocated, thus paving the way for real progress in START.

For the past two years a great deal of attention has been focused on the negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The United States, in close consultation with its allies, is now negotiating with a view to reaching an agreement that may obviate NATO's need to modernize its nuclear forces in Europe in response to Soviet deployment of long-range nuclear missiles that can reach Western Europe.

It is the view of my Government, as well as that of other NATO Governments, that the ideal outcome of the Geneva talks remains a total ban on this class of new weapons, as proposed by NATO countries. As this does not appear realistic for the time being, the United States, in full agreement with its European allies, has proposed an interim agreement and has recently introduced new compromise proposals in Geneva in an effort to meet Soviet concerns. In our opinion, all the important elements are now on the table for an agreement in Geneva which would take due account of the security concerns of the parties involved.

It is our sincere hope that the Soviet Union will now respond positively to the latest Western initiatives and engage in serious negotiations with a view to reaching concrete results before the end of this year. We feel confident that the USSR will not see it as in its interest to leave the negotiating table in Geneva as the INF talks are now entering what may well turn out to be the decisive stage. In this respect, it has not gone unnoticed by my Government that the Warsaw Treaty States, at their recent Sofia meeting, stated that possibilities do still exist for reaching an agreement in Geneva.

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The NATO Governments, for their part, are quite prepared to spare no effort to reach an agreement and to continue the negotiations into 1984, if need be.

Last year this Committee took up the question of a nuclear freeze. I should like to state emphatically that my Government is not, in principle, opposed to this concept, which has been looked upon by many as a means of halting the nuclear arms race. On the other hand, it must be clearly stated that the most pressing need today is to obtain substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals. In the longer run, however, I see no conflict between the need for reductions and a freeze. In fact, a freeze might at one stage be entered as a natural element in an effective disarmament and arms control process. While recognizing this, we must at the same time make certain that a call for a nuclear freeze does not actually complicate ongoing efforts to reduce and eliminate existing stocks of nuclear arms.

My Government believes that in our efforts to halt the nuclear arms build-up a comprehensive test ban must remain a priority measure. A comprehensive test ban would make a significant contribution to the objective of terminating the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and the introduction of new weapons. It would, furthermore, constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of direct relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation.

In our opinion, a comprehensive test ban should prohibit all nuclear test explosions in all environments on a permanent basis. Such a ban would necessarily have to include an efficient verification system. In this connection, great importance must be attached to the development of a global seismological network. Norway has participated actively in the Ad Hoc Working Group of seismological experts in the Committee on Disarmament since its establishment in 1976.

As an active observer in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, of the Committee on Disarmament, Norway welcomed the agreement on a work programme for the Working Group's deliberations this year. We regret, however, that subsequent discussions have revealed differences of opinion, in particular concerning the mandate of the Working Group. It is still our hope that a formula can be found in order that the Ad Hoc Working Group may continue its efforts in a substantive way in this most important field during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament.

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The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains another major challenge of urgency. The Norwegian Government attaches great importance to the Third Review Conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is to be held in 1985. It is our hope that that Conference will not only preserve the status quo, but also strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

In our view, the vertical and the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are of equal importance. The nuclear-weapon States have undertaken obligations concerning vertical proliferation under article VI of the NPT. Concrete results in this respect would provide a considerable impetus in terms of halting horizontal proliferation also. It is our view that full-scope safeguards should remain a precondition of all exports of relevant nuclear material, equipment and technology. Similarly, all non-nuclear-weapon States should accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear activities. Finally, we should spare no effort in order to achieve an even broader adherence to the NPT.

Norway was honoured to preside over the Second Review Conference concerning the sea-bed Treaty, in Geneva in September this year. It is indeed significant that the Conference was able to adopt a final declaration by consensus reaffirming strong support for this arms-control Treaty. In line with past practices, we intend to present the results of the Conference to this Committee and to introduce a draft resolution on the Review Conference.

In our efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms build-up, we should not and must not overlook the dangers inherent in the increasing conventional armaments. We should, in particular, bear in mind the possibility and the desirability of raising the nuclear threshold by means of achieving a stable balance in conventional forces.

This interrelationship is of particular relevance to Europe, given the conventional imbalance in that region. In the Vienna talks on conventional force reductions the Western participants have put forward proposals for reductions to equal and lower levels with a view to establishing increased stability in Europe and thus raising the nuclear threshold. Security in Europe would be enhanced and East-West relations improved if we could produce concrete progress in the Vienna talks.

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The process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe complements the efforts which are under way in Vienna. The concluding document of the recent Madrid meeting strengthens the Helsinki Final Act in the field of contact, dialogue and negotiations between East and West in the present strained political circumstances.

My Government regards the convening of the Conference on disarmament in Europe as being a major achievement in East-West relations. It will be an important task of the Conference to come to grips with the danger of military and political destabilization resulting from the existing imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. Our aim must be to agree on concrete measures to restore confidence in each other's motives. This could, in fact, open up new prospects for progress in ongoing and future disarmament negotiations.

In our view, it is essential to prevent the Conference on disarmament in Europe from developing into fruitless exercise on general principles and declaratory proposals. We should start effective negotiations on concrete confidence-building and security-building measures as soon as possible, strictly respecting the criteria laid down and the mandate agreed upon in Madrid by the 35 States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. These measures should, in particular, be designed to create more transparency and predictability in the military field. In particular, they should aim at reducing the danger of surprise attacks and of the use of military forces for political purposes.

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The confidence-building process should not, however, be restricted to Europe. My Government has therefore welcomed the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany to have the global aspects of confidence-building measures dealt with by the United Nations and, this year, by the Disarmament Commission. We do not consider such measures a substitute for disarmament but rather a valuable contribution towards the enhancement of peace and security and the attainment of our objectives in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Greater transparency in military expenditures is another important means of creating increased confidence among States. Norway has actively supported the efforts of the United Nations at several sessions of the General Assembly to obtain more information on military budgets. In the hope that the ongoing work of the expert group will provide a new impetus to our endeavours in this field, we have expressed our willingness to assist further by putting a Norwegian expert at the disposal of the group. We are also ready to support other measures in this field, such as holding a conference on military expenditures.

The acceleration of technological innovations is an important element of the present arms build-up. Nowhere is this development felt more strongly than in our quest to prevent an arms race in outer space. The Norwegian Government welcomes the fact that this question has been included on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. We sincerely hope that a consensus will be reached early next year on a mandate for a working group to start substantive discussions of the issues involved. In this context further measures are needed to ensure future strategic stability in outer space. With this objective in mind, we welcome all serious and realistic proposals. Emphasis must still be placed on prohibiting anti-satellite systems. Even though we are fully aware that these are complex matters, our efforts must aim at mutually agreed, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control.

Permit me also to mention the considerable importance that my Government attaches to the efforts to prohibit other weapons of mass destruction, in particular the work of the Committee on Disarmament to conclude a future chemical weapons convention. In our view, a ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on the destruction of existing stocks represents one of the most important disarmament measures being negotiated today.

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It seems to us that a certain momentum has recently been building up in Geneva in this respect, although not as speedily as we had hoped. Nevertheless, the record on substantive provisions to be included in a chemical weapons convention worked out in the Committee on Disarmament, under able Canadian chairmanship, is a significant development. It is our hope that the present momentum in the Committee on Disarmament can be successfully exploited in order to produce definite progress. Every effort should now be made to reach agreement on outstanding questions with a view to formulating a convention text.

In particular, this would apply to the question of verification. Over the years, the Norwegian Government has made efforts to contribute to the work of the Committee on Disarmament and has presented working papers based on research undertaken in Norway. During the forthcoming sessions we shall continue our research programme relating to verification issues under a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

Before concluding my statement, permit me to make some comments on certain institutional questions. During the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Norway took an active part in the endeavours aimed at streamlining institutional arrangements in the field of multilateral disarmament. In particular we had the honour to introduce the omnibus resolution A/37/99 K with its five operative parts, which was adopted without a vote.

In this connection I should like once again to welcome the establishment of the Department for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations Secretariat under the very able leadership of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Martenson.

My Government has long actively supported efforts in the United Nations as well as in the Committee on Disarmament aimed at obtaining a limited expansion of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. In our capacity as an active observer, we have participated in all working groups of the Committee on Disarmament and we have, as I have already mentioned, contributed to the Committee's work related to a chemical weapons convention and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Accordingly, we very much welcome the recent decisions of the Committee on Disarmament to redesignate itself the Conference on Disarmament and to expand the membership of the Committee by no more than four States. At this juncture, I should like to reiterate our firm interest in becoming a full member of

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the Committee. At the same time, I would hope that consultations may be expedited with a view to implementing at an early date the recent decision by the Committee on expansion of its membership.

In resolution 37/99 K the General Assembly decided that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) should function as an autonomous institute. We also welcome this decision as we welcome the re-establishment of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, which now also serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR.

During this session the Norwegian delegation intends to submit a draft resolution concerning the draft statute of UNIDIR that was recently adopted by the Secretary-General's Advisory Board acting as UNIDIR's Board of Trustees. We hope that this draft resolution will be adopted without a vote in order to prepare a solid basis for the future work of the Institute. Norway has also supported UNIDIR by contributing financially in order to help it carry out independent research on disarmament and on related security issues and will endeavour to continue to do so.

Let me also mention that since its inception Norway has given its support to the World Disarmament Campaign. We believe that the United Nations has a vital role to play in the dissemination of information concerning disarmament in a balanced and objective manner and in all parts of the world. In our view, the Campaign should be based on as broad a base of data and knowledge as possible. For this reason my Government has recently granted \$25,000 to promote activities of relevance to the attainment of the objectives of the Campaign.

In concluding I should like again to stress the importance attached by the Norwegian Government to disarmament and arms control as an integral part of our security policy. Norway is a small country located in a strategically very sensitive area. Yet, in a world characterized by growing interdependence, our concerns and interests cannot be governed by national or even regional considerations alone. In fact, the vital interests of the international community as a whole are at stake when we address the need to control and reduce the role of armaments in the world. To achieve this fundamental objective, we need to engage actively in concrete negotiations rather than to indulge in abstract principles. We now need binding commitments rather than declarations of intent. It is in this spirit that the Government of Norway will continue to approach the important issues now before us in this Committee.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I wish to begin by expressing on behalf of my Government to the delegations of the United States and France, Australia's deep sympathy in the awful losses they suffered in Beirut yesterday.

Seven months ago the Australian people elected a new Government. It is a Government formed by the Australian Labour Party. It is a social democratic Government. This present session of the General Assembly is the first to have taken place since that change of Government in Australia. It is appropriate therefore that this present statement of the Australian Government's policies and attitudes should be of a fundamental character.

The Government assumed office in an international climate which presented daunting challenges in the field of peace and security. It immediately took a series of decisions which elevated significantly arms control and disarmament goals within Australian foreign policy. Henceforth Australia will pursue those goals with unprecedented determination and vigour. The resources required for that work have been provided even though, for economic reasons, resources are scarce. These decisions reflected directly the wishes of the very substantial majority of the Australian people.

It is crystal clear that the Australian people want to see an end to the nuclear arms race. They are determined that nuclear weapons should not proliferate to yet further countries. They reject completely the notion that the arms race should extend from this planet into outer space and they deplore the \$700 billion spent each year on the arms race. They are deeply concerned that much of this expenditure breeds violence and they believe that the overall level of it constitutes a scandalous waste of human resources and ingenuity. Throughout Australia there are substantial organized community groups - the groups we call non-governmental organizations - which continue to work on and discuss the issues of peace and disarmament. Their work is vital. In a democracy such as ours it both informs and criticizes Government policy. Those groups are thoroughly heterogeneous. They include people of all political persuasions, all ages, both sexes and all occupations. This is very significant. The voice of these people is addressed to the Australian Government and beyond our Government to the world community. It calls for an end to the madness of the arms race. It asserts the belief that what all people desire, most centrally, is a decent standard of living worked out in a framework of peace. They reject any idea that our technological genius should be allowed to bring about the destruction of humankind.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

What is fundamentally at issue here is a view of the nature of life and of human history itself. That view rejects the notion that war and violence are in some way inevitable because, in some unstated way, war is seen to be an inherent part of human nature. It is also a profound cry in support of the principles for which the United Nations stands - freedom, independence, self-determination - and it is a warning that these principles and goals are the first victims of war and armaments.

This peace movement will not go away; it is not a passing phenomenon. It will remain as long as those basic human goals and desires are challenged by war and armaments. It will remain because it is a fundamental assertion of the value of life itself. This phenomenon is by no means unique to Australia. On the contrary it is universal, and we in the United Nations must respond to it. This is our responsibility and the exercise of that responsibility can be effective only if we seek arms control and disarmament agreements which are balanced, verifiable and consistent with the maintenance of security. Australia will follow that path.

We welcome the Secretary-General's call to us all to recommit ourselves to the application of the principles of the Charter. This, in our view, is one of the most urgent necessities within today's international relations, and we see a direct relationship between that recommitment and the urgent need for a reinvigoration of the arms control and disarmament process. It is only by this means that peace can be assured.

Australia is a Western country, sharing with those others which form the Western association of nations a commitment to democracy, freedom and the conduct of international relations on the basis of mutual respect between States and of the rule of law. On 15 September this year the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, made a statement to the Australian Parliament which was of fundamental importance for those who would seek to understand Australia, its place both within the West and in wider international relations, and the role which Australia can play and is determined to play in promoting the cause of peace and disarmament within the United Nations. That statement was on the conclusions of the review of the ANZUS Treaty, the Treaty which links Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Simply, that review led to an unequivocal reaffirmation of the ANZUS alliance as fundamental to Australia's national security and foreign and defence policies. It was also made clear, however, that Australian adherence to

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the ANZUS Treaty does not in any way derogate from its right to make national decisions in foreign policy and defence matters.

In reporting to the Parliament on the ANZUS Treaty review the Minister for Foreign Affairs said this:

"I think it important to reiterate, for the record, that this Labour Government in matters of international relations presumes to be neither neutral nor non-aligned. We clearly have our commitments and our alignment is frequently and convincingly demonstrated. Our independence and national interests are served greatly by these associations but within them we exercise independence and judgement, are prepared to disagree with allies where it is in the best interests of our alliance and certainly where it is in the best interests of this nation. The fact that these things can be done and the alliance remain intact is an indication of the maturity of the relationship."

Finally, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that one of our major policy roles within our position as a Western country would be to fulfil our moral obligation to work for nuclear and conventional arms reduction and disarmament. The task is urgent. The lives of all of us are overshadowed today by a nuclear arms race of dreadful proportions. None of us wants it, yet it seems to be proving increasingly difficult to stop.

Concrete action, such as in the intermediate-range and strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva must continue, but we must also seek to break the circle of mutual suspicion that is the source of the problem in the first place. In our view that circle is formed by the perceptions held of each other by the United States and the Soviet Union. We must ask those two great States to consider this and to seek to change it. It is clear that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is passing through a difficult phase. Both sides have acknowledged this fact and it is clear that neither seeks such a situation. Productive and co-operative relations between the United States and the Soviet Union must play an essential role in resolving problems afflicting the world community. Strained relations between the super-Powers affect the whole range of complex dealings which they have with one another and the consequences of such strains spill over into issues affecting all of us.

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Most fundamentally we are affected as co-inhabitants of a world which could be destroyed by the nuclear weapons held by the super-Powers. We all have the most pressing interest in seeing reductions in these nuclear arsenals. The responsibility of ensuring that such reductions are achieved falls on the Powers which possess such weapons. Clearly, strains in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union do not contribute to creating a favourable atmosphere for negotiation and inevitably the will of the parties to make the hard choices required if we are to make progress in nuclear disarmament is affected.

The Australian Foreign Minister has called for efforts to encourage and assist the super-Powers to develop a new framework for constructive relations and for them to look again at the assumptions on which they approach one another. As he said in the general debate in the Assembly just a few weeks ago:

"Whatever judgement Soviet leaders may make about the system in the West, they have no justification for a view that it is bent on the destruction of the Soviet people's security and welfare. In their theoretical analysis of the world and their vision of the future, those Soviet leaders must concede a secure and lasting peace to the West and to the non-aligned and developing countries. It is not legitimate to seek their subversion and overthrow.

"In the West, as we also assess future prospects, we must concede a proper place for the Soviet Union - not only in terms of power but also as defined by the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Soviet peoples.

"...

"... we [should] encourage and assist the super-Powers to moderate antagonisms, to obtain new understandings, perhaps to find new mechanisms for political action and consultation ..." (A/38/PV.17, p. 68)

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The task that both the United States and the Soviet Union face is a task of historic magnitude and urgency.

There must be no over-simplification of the differences between these two great Powers, but their greatness calls for them to reshape their dialogue now, before it is too late for all of us, and then to play their unique part in strengthening this United Nations.

With regard to the current arms control and disarmament agenda, Australia is determined that there be an end to the nuclear arms race and a reduction in the number and kinds of nuclear weapons held by nuclear-weapon States. We are determined that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons be strengthened and adhered to universally.

Linking these two objectives, we seek an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time.

We shall seek an international agreement to ensure that the arms race does not extend to outer space.

Nuclear issues are central to the survival of mankind, but people die daily, and in alarming numbers, through the use of conventional weapons. Military budgets must be reduced. The arms race must be curbed. The question of military transfers, whether overt, covert, or illegal is obviously of importance.

Australia believes that these three areas are ideal subjects for negotiation by the United Nations. We shall be exploring, with others, the most effective means of taking such action.

Chemical weapons - the so-called "poor man's atomic bomb" - are abhorrent. Their effects are devastating and inhuman; they are cheap and easily stored; they are "ideally" suited for use in the developing world. Clearly they must be outlawed. Australia will continue to strive to see that an international convention, with this effect, is concluded as soon as possible.

In conclusion, I want to add Australia's voice to those who have already appealed for a new spirit of co-operation. The fact is that it is easier to express hostility, to form patterns of behaviour on the basis of existing prejudices, than it is to take the leap of the imagination and faith that is required in working out arms control and disarmament agreements.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Security is at stake - that is clear - and that can be a source of genuine anxiety. We must face this realistically, but if we pursue our common goals with determination and imagination we shall overcome that anxiety and each time we do that we shall grow in strength and confidence. We might then discover that it is true that there is nothing more fearful than fear itself, and we might also ensure our survival.

Mr. NATORF (Poland): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has already congratulated you on your election to the chair. It has also assured you that you can look forward to full and constructive co-operation on our side. Since I am speaking for the first time at this session of the Committee, may I, in my personal capacity, once again congratulate you warmly and wish you success in discharging your mandate. My congratulations and good wishes are also extended to other officers of the Committee.

The general debate at this session of the General Assembly that was concluded only two weeks ago, as well as the discussion at present being held in this Committee, have shown us the reflection as in a mirror of the grave concern of the overwhelming majority of the peoples in the world at the dangerous trends in the development of the international situation. Feelings of profound and legitimate anxiety have been forcefully expressed at the ominously stepped-up arms race, aimed at achieving military superiority and first-strike capability, undertaken by the military-industrial complex in the United States and incorporated in the policy of its Administration. In the aforesaid debates, the dangers stemming from the accelerated advancement of military technology and saturation of the globe with lethal weaponry have been demonstrated, with the simultaneous warning that the very survival of mankind is at stake.

In the address to the General Assembly of the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Professor Henryk Jablonski, and in the statement before this Committee by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Henryk Jaroszek, we presented our point of view on the negative phenomena existing in the political, military and economic spheres of the present international situation. We emphasized, inter alia, that the planned deployment in Western Europe of the

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newest American medium-range nuclear-weapon systems endangers world peace, jeopardizes the security of Europe, as well as threatening the national security of Poland and its most vital interests. We pointed out that mankind today is walking a tightrope, beneath which there is the abyss of nuclear catastrophe; with the nuclear arms race unchecked, with the permanent growth of nuclear stockpiles and development of deadly technology, its balance may be easily lost. We also expressed our hopes and outlined our actions.

The Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Professor Jablonski, in his address to this session of the General Assembly said:

"Despite the unsatisfactory international situation, and in defiance of the activities of opponents of peaceful co-operation between nations and of instigators of tension, our aim remains a programme of positive action, hand-in-hand with all those who want the same. We have the perseverance and the goodwill to carry us along that road". (A/38/PV.13, pp. 13-15)

We have underlined that, difficulties in international relations notwithstanding, there exists a possibility of averting the danger of war and preventing the risk of an outbreak of world conflict, especially nuclear; there exists a possibility of containing the arms race and stopping the policy of confrontation.

On the agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly there are three new items, proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which were allocated to this Committee for consideration. They are all of great importance and of utmost urgency.

The Soviet proposal "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth" deals with an issue that is becoming extremely topical. Being a progressive follow-up of the 1981 proposal for a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the present initiative provides for a comprehensive ban on testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons designed to destroy targets on the earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space. Simultaneously, it makes provision for a complete denunciation of the development of new

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anti-satellite systems and the elimination of existing systems. It includes the clearly expressed readiness of the Soviet Union to conduct separate talks on anti-satellite systems, including talks with the United States on a bilateral basis. The unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union on the placing of any kind of anti-satellite weapons in outer space is yet further evidence of its willingness not to allow the arms race to enter outer space.

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The Soviet proposal is being put forward at a time when the United States is getting ready, according to press reports, to begin testing new weapons designed to attack satellites, and when programmes to develop and deploy new weapons for fighting so-called star wars in outer space are being undertaken as a means of eventually acquiring a first-strike capability. This most timely initiative of the Soviet Union emphasizes very forcefully that the time to take up the issue constructively is now, and that tomorrow it might be too late. It is aimed not only at ensuring the peaceful use and exploration of outer space for future generations, but also at easing existing tensions on earth by showing, in a clear-cut way, the possibilities and perspectives of useful dialogue on even the most difficult subjects.

The item entitled "Condemnation of nuclear war" deals with an issue which is of top priority among the issues of our generation. The draft declaration submitted by the USSR, resolutely and unreservedly condemns and declares as criminal acts the formulation, enunciation, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts designed to substantiate the "legitimacy" of the first use of nuclear weapons, and, generally, the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war.

There is no need to stress the timeliness and importance of this initiative. One can hardly fail to notice the continued discussion held in some United States and Western quarters on the possibility of the carrying on, and the winning, of limited nuclear warfare, on the feasibility of a pre-emptive first nuclear strike, and on the chances of surviving and winning a total, full-scale nuclear conflict.

At a time when certain circles are obsessed with gaining nuclear superiority, with pursuing a policy of interference in the internal affairs of others, and with influencing international relations by the policy of diktat, the adoption of the proposed declaration would be a major move showing the willingness of the international community to build a possible safety barrier against entering on the dangerous path towards nuclear catastrophe.

Because of its tragic experience in the past, Poland, on whose territory the Second World War started and whose losses and suffering were so great, has the special right and moral obligation to remind all nations of that holocaust, and to appeal to them to join in a condemnation of nuclear war. Let us hope that all countries - and particularly those countries of Europe in which two world wars were

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fought and which know full well the disastrous consequences of war - will answer this appeal affirmatively.

It is with concern that we have noted some statements expressing the belief that the Soviet draft resolution on the condemnation of nuclear war implies that a country would be denied the right to defend itself against an aggressor with all the means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons. First, these statements overlook the fact that it is the Soviet Union and its allies which have proposed concluding a treaty on the non-use of force between the States of the Warsaw Pact and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such a treaty would prohibit the use of any force, including that of conventional means. Secondly, in regard to the non-use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has stated unequivocally it will not be the first to use these weapons. And, thirdly, one might easily say that such statements are, in fact, very close to the theories of pre-emptive nuclear strike. Therefore, the arguments used in those statements are, to say the least, not convincing.

Instead of looking for alleged ill intentions on the part of the Soviet Union, and for the so-called hidden gaps in the draft resolution, it would be much better if, in the interest of improving the international atmosphere, the Soviet proposal were given the most serious consideration and support.

The proposal for a nuclear arms freeze to be undertaken by all nuclear-weapon States would make it evident that a means of moral and political character can be combined with a tangible measure which, if adopted, could have a tremendous positive impact on the international situation. The Soviet proposal for a cessation, subject to effective verification, of the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of both delivery systems and weapons; a renunciation of the deployment of new kinds and types of such weapons; a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and of new kinds and types of their delivery systems; and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of making nuclear weapons, would be a decisive factor in shaping the security situation in the world. It would rebuild and strengthen the mutual trust among the nuclear Powers that is so badly needed for improving the overall political climate in the world. It would lead towards further practical steps in nuclear disarmament. It would not permit a new spiral of the arms race to begin.

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The three new Soviet proposals derive from the previous initiatives. They are closely and logically linked with them and constitute their further development. They stem from the fact that nuclear war would be the greatest tragedy for mankind. This fact cannot be undermined by any theory, assumption or speculation, no matter from what source and place it originates. The proposals also proceed from the premise that putting an end to the nuclear arms build-up and preventing a further spiral of the nuclear arms race is one of the most pressing tasks for humanity.

These proposals are put forward at a time when there is a real danger of an outbreak of nuclear conflict, since the evolution of Western military doctrine has been approaching an essential change in assumptions. By creating an alternative of practical steps which do not diminish the security of either side, the Soviet proposals are of crucial importance under the existing circumstances.

Together with those proposals which have previously been put forward by the Soviet Union, the present initiatives constitute an integral component of the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. Their main thrust is directed at averting a nuclear catastrophe. They have their basis and support in the broad-ranging programme of peace reflecting the co-ordinated approach of the countries of the socialist community. This programme is contained in the Declaration issued at the meeting of the political consultative Committee of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Prague last January; in the joint statement issued at the meeting of Party and State leaders of seven socialist States held in Moscow, last June, and, most recently, in the communiqué issued at the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Sofia.

At that meeting, it was stated that the conviction of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty was that even in a complex and aggravated international situation it is possible to find, through dialogue, solutions for all problems in relations between States, if there is a political will to do so, if a well-balanced and constructive approach and spirit of co-operation are displayed; and if the vital interests of the peoples - the interests of peace and security - are taken into consideration.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

Poland welcomes the three new Soviet initiatives and gives them its full support. They are new and major milestones in the long record of the tangible steps and efforts of the Soviet Union undertaken in the cause of nuclear disarmament. These initiatives meet the expectations of the international community. They also fully coincide with the long-standing efforts of the non-aligned countries in the field of disarmament. They give a straightforward answer to some of the thoughts, ideas and concerns expressed, inter alia, at the summit Meeting of the leaders of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

Furthermore, they also address directly Soviet-United States relations, that is the relations between the two Powers which bear a special responsibility for maintaining peace in the world and which, because of their potentials, play a particular role in international relations.

In his statement of 28 September 1983 the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Yuri V. Andropov, said inter alia:

"All who today raise their voice against the senseless arms race and in defence of peace can be sure that the policy of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries is directed at attaining precisely these aims. The USSR wishes to live in peace with all countries, including the United States. It does not nurture aggressive plans, does not impose the arms race on anyone and does not impose its social systems on anyone."

The Soviet initiatives, with their constructive approach, constitute, in our opinion, important and feasible measures. It is the duty of this Committee to give the Soviet proposals the most serious consideration for there is no more important and vital task than averting the danger of a thermonuclear holocaust.

Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic): I wish, Sir, to first extend to you my congratulations on your election as Chairman of this important Committee. We are sure that, thanks to your efforts and your long experience, the work of this Committee will be crowned with success. I also congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election.

Some days ago our Committee began its general debate on questions relating to disarmament and international security, which are matters of great concern to all the peoples of the world. Despite our recognition of their importance and the close links between them, however, the course that events have taken has been a source of profound disappointment and disillusionment as far as the achievement of our objectives is concerned. International relations have not improved. It could even be said that the international situation has deteriorated and has taken a very serious turn, which can only lead to a conflagration that risks leading to a nuclear war. This is due to a series of circumstances marked by very serious problems and complex international crises which the international bodies have not so far succeeded in resolving.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)

Among these problems I would mention the armaments race, which still constitutes one of the most alarming problems confronting mankind. This is particularly true of the nuclear arms race, which since its appearance on the international scene has added a new dimension to the very concept of war and has become a source of serious concern, fear and terror threatening the survival of mankind. These dangers have been aggravated by the production and accumulation of nuclear weapons by certain countries, the improvement and sophistication of these weapons and their means of delivery, in addition to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and chemical and other no less destructive weapons.

The doctrines used to justify the nuclear arms race, which are based upon the balance of terror and deterrence, and the publicity concerning the possibility of a winnable limited nuclear war have been additional factors exacerbating the situation.

To examine the question of security from the military point of view and that of the balance of terror and mutual deterrence would be to subject the security of peoples to the decision of a limited number of countries possessing the power and the weapons - countries which consider only their own interests and those of their allies with no thought of the interests and the security of other peoples. The assurance of such security is a way of imposing trusteeship by the minority over the majority of peoples and constitutes a denial of the rights of peoples that have struggled for their freedom and independence, to throw off the domination of others and to live in peace and security. Security based upon force and the doctrine of deterrence and the balance of terror is contrary to internationally accepted principles and international instruments on the strengthening of international peace and security.

Furthermore, the security situation in the world shows quite clearly that security based upon force is extremely fragile security, for the accumulation of destructive weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and their ability to destroy the world several times over has not provided real security. The accumulation of these weapons only creates a general feeling of insecurity.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)

The Final Document adopted by consensus, stresses that the accumulation of weapons, which was in particular nuclear weapons, is a very serious threat to the survival of mankind rather than a protection of human civilization. The accumulation of these weapons in no way contributes to the strengthening of international security. The disturbances and the disorder that prevail everywhere in the world are proof of this.

The arms race has encouraged recourse to force or the threat of force in international relations. The phenomenon of the use or the threat of the use of force has become the basis of the policy of the forces of imperialism and the colonialist régimes in order to impose their rule by force. This has taken different forms, such as direct aggression, the use of colonialist military forces - above all those of the United States - in different regions of the world, and acts of provocation carried out by the fleet and military aircraft of the United States, not to mention acts of provocation off the shores of Libya and in its airspace, the fomenting of trouble within the country and of civil and regional wars, and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries by United States imperialism. These colonialist policies have transformed several regions of the world into theatres of conflict and zones of increased tension. These are particularly serious in the Middle East, on the Mediterranean shores, in Africa, in the Pacific Ocean region, in Europe and in the Caribbean, as well as in other regions. All of this constitutes a very serious threat to international peace and security.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

There can be no doubt that total disarmament is an objective which we should all pursue. The United Nations, in conformity with the Charter, should assume a major responsibility in respect of disarmament. In order to permit the United Nations to discharge its role, we have combined our efforts to eliminate the seeds of war and conflict which lead to international conflicts, above all by countries possessing nuclear weapons, which bear particular responsibility for the prevention of war. It is up to these countries to show signs of political will and a serious intent to overcome the obstacles which now block the road to the adoption of measures for general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

Among these obstacles, I have in mind the failure to respect resolutions and programmes adopted by the General Assembly, some of which were adopted by consensus. This fact constitutes an obstacle to the work of the Disarmament Commission, which is the only forum for multilateral negotiation in this area. The report submitted in document A/38/36 shows that very little progress has been made in respect of disarmament and, above all, as concerns matters of great importance for the peoples of the world, such as the ban on nuclear tests and the refusal to use the threat of nuclear force.

We have a very negative picture of the situation as it exists in the world. When we look at all of this, when we consider our collective responsibilities in respect of disarmament, my country supports the efforts made by the United Nations and would appeal to all Members of the United Nations responsible for disarmament and security to discharge the tasks incumbent upon them by virtue of the Charter and in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security, and to contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations on disarmament. In order to achieve this, my country will support every bilateral and multilateral effort being made which reflects the aspirations of the peoples, as expressed in resolutions and in the peace movements which we are witnessing these days, since all countries are threatened.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

History shows that this is the case. History since the last two wars shows that the threat of war is still with us and that the destruction and devastation caused by these wars continues to have an effect on the peoples, above all for the Libyan people, whose territory was a theatre of the Second World War where large stretches of Libyan territory have never been cleared of the mines that were sown there in the war, and every year these mines cause hundreds of victims. The consequences of these wars are there to show us, still today, what would be the outcome of another war, especially a nuclear war.

There will be no sense in talking about disarmament at a time when certain countries are declaring their intention to station nuclear missiles in Europe and thus to increase the tension and the confrontation between the two great Powers. In view of the negative consequences of this, the bilateral negotiations on such strategic weapons have not yet had any outcome, despite the declarations of intention and despite the initiatives taken by the great Powers. This is because of the absence of any will for disarmament in this particular area and in particular because of the mistrust among the super-Powers and the lack of interest in other factors of disarmament. The decisions adopted to instal weapons of mass destruction in various parts of the world and the militarization of outer space will result in a new cycle of the arms race.

Among the factors which increase the danger of nuclear weapons, I would cite the vertical proliferation and the acquisition of such weapons perfected by colonialism and, in particular, by the imperialist countries which are steadily developing weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, I would refer to the report which mentions the acquisition by the régime in South Africa and the Zionist régime in Palestine of nuclear weapons, which are not only a threat to peace and security in the Middle East and in the African countries, but to the peace and security of the world as a whole.

The acquisition of these arms by the two racist régimes was due to the support of Western imperialist régimes, in particular, the United States of America. Their co-operation in the exchange of expertise and the development of such weapons had been discussed in many reports, and I would limit myself to mentioning here document A/38/24, part III, which describes the co-operation between the two racist régimes in the development of strategic missiles, which could be installed on aircraft and which could fly over the territory of a State very rapidly and could easily cause destruction at a distance of 2,700 kilometres.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

In another document, we see that the United States and certain Western countries are encouraging these two racist régimes by their nuclear and military co-operation. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by these two racist régimes in South Africa and Palestine are violations of resolutions which make Africa and the Middle East nuclear-free zones, and are a threat to the peoples of the two regions because of the aggressive and bellicose nature of the Zionist entity.

To show our good faith in our struggle for disarmament, and in order to give force to the commitment which we have signed in the Charter, namely to preserve future generations from the scourge of war, we should adopt practical and tangible measures prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. We should also develop a treaty on the overall prohibition of nuclear tests and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, the creation of nuclear-free zones, and the creation of zones of peace and security.

In this context, although we condemn nuclear weapons, we approve of nuclear energy in its peaceful uses for economic development.

My country, like all other States, has liquidated colonialism and has put an end to foreign domination. What is more, my country calls upon others to transform the Mediterranean into a zone of peace by eliminating all factors of instability caused by the existence of naval forces and colonial naval bases and the installation of nuclear weapons, which are a threat to peace and security in this zone. We also support the appeal that the Indian Ocean be made a nuclear-free zone, as well as a zone free of all foreign naval forces. These aims will never be realized as long as aggression is continued in the world and as long as injustice exists.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

Thus, while we spend \$800 billion on armaments, millions of people are deprived of the most elementary necessities, 750 million persons throughout the world are the victims of hunger, more than 1.5 billion lack medical care and millions of others are illiterate. This is at a time when a single country spends \$240 billion every year on weapons and \$4.5 billion every year on its rapid deployment force. According to the strategic analysis review published by the Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies in New Delhi, if this military budget continues to the year 2000 nearly \$940 billion will be spent on armaments.

I think that we should free these resources and put them at the service of mankind and world peace and security.

Mr. ELFAKI (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): First of all, I wish to express our condolences to the delegations of the United States of America and France at the serious loss of life in Beirut.

This year the session of the First Committee of the General Assembly is taking place in a situation characterized by tension, anxiety and the increased threat to all mankind caused by the stepping-up of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, which daily heightens international tension and impedes efforts to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence, mutual trust and co-operation among States. That threat also impedes the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially those concerning respect for the sovereignty of States, the non-use of force or the threat of force against the security of States, the political independence of States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Although responsibility for applying the principles of the United Nations Charter falls on all States Members of the United Nations, it is particularly incumbent upon the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the super-Powers, to protect mankind from the scourge of a war of mass destruction. The nuclear weapons that the major Powers have developed and acquired have radically changed the concept and the character of warfare. They have made the questions of halting the arms race and freeing the international community from the threat of war questions that pertain to the very survival of the human race and of civilization.

The stepping up of the arms race and the dangers inherent therein - that is, the deterioration of political relations among States and the greater risk of a nuclear or a conventional war - have made us more aware today than ever before that

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

international peace and security can only be guaranteed through general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament under effective international control. General and complete disarmament can come about only through an effective international institution in which the political will of States can be expressed and whose very basis is the principle of equality among States, objectivity and impartiality - elements which form an indivisible whole.

In considering the role of the existing disarmament agencies, I wish to refer to the sole international negotiating forum within the United Nations, that is, the Committee on Disarmament, which has recently come to be called the Conference on Disarmament. The creation of that body as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament was dictated by several considerations. By way of example, I shall mention: First the fact that disarmament has direct repercussions on the vital security interests of all States. Therefore all States must fulfil their duty by making effective contributions to the development of international measures designed to bring about disarmament and strengthen international security.

Secondly, nuclear disarmament constitutes the most important security guarantees for all States in the world, especially since nuclear-weapon technology has weakened the concept of national boundaries. Those boundaries were established in the past to prevent conventional types of warfare and guarantee the security of all States. However the security of any State will be diminished and will remain so without the elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

Thirdly, the concept of the strengthening of security is the main concept underlying all disarmament measures.

We, therefore welcome the recommendations of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the review of its composition and the admission of new members in order to conserve equitable geographic distribution and the balance that must be maintained among all States.

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

I now wish to turn to the question of the mandate of the Disarmament Commission and the questions on its agenda. Concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race, it is most regrettable that although the international community, in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stressed the fact that the most important of the dangers threatening mankind was that posed by nuclear weaponry, nothing has been done in that connection. The Final Document stressed in particular that the accumulation of weapons, and in particular nuclear weapons, was now a threat to the survival of mankind rather than protection of civilization.

"Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth." (A/S-10/4, para. 11)

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

What is also deplorable is that the Disarmament Commission has not succeeded until now in establishing a working group on this important subject and for implementing effective measures to curb and reverse the arms race.

We hope that the Committee on Disarmament will intensify its efforts during its next session to adopt a joint approach so as to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly for nuclear disarmament.

As non-nuclear States have done, Sudan attaches special importance to the item concerning effective means of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. We must unfortunately note that the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to make any headway in this field because of the adherence of nuclear-weapon States to their unilateral declarations that have been made concerning such assurances. We should like to assert once again the special responsibility incumbent upon nuclear-weapon States to give assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States not to use such weapons against them nor to threaten to use them.

The stubbornness of the nuclear-weapon States concerning the elimination of reservations and exceptions that were made in their unilateral declarations runs counter to their commitment to give sound guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the non-use of such weapons against them. While we demand these assurances from the nuclear-weapon States, we are aware of the fact that these will not stop us from demanding the most effective assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, namely, nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We follow very keenly the efforts of the Working Group on the comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the chairmanship of Mr. Garcia-Robles. In this connection, we note with regret that, despite the efforts made by the Working Group, no agreement has been reached on the difficulties that prevented the full establishment of that programme in its final version. The programme calls for the acceleration of negotiations in order to smooth out difficulties and to reconcile views on those questions on which there is no agreement as yet. In Geneva at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries placed emphasis on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I should like to express our support for the proposal made by Mr. Garcia-Robles which is intended to smooth out difficulties and to reconcile

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

views on those questions on which there is as yet no agreement and to submit to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly of a revised Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Sudan is also concerned over the question of the cessation of the arms race in outer space and attaches great importance to this issue in view of the repercussions of the arms race on international peace and security. With the rapid progress taking place in space technology, we are today in a position to know what the potential is for the peaceful technical, scientific, economic and cultural development for our countries. It is all the more regrettable, since the General Assembly has decided that outer space is the common heritage of mankind, that we see it becoming a new arena, a new laboratory so to speak, for anti-satellite weapons and intercontinental ballistic weapons and anti-ICBMs.

Today we are at the crossroads. Either we adopt urgent measures designed to put an end to the arms race in outer space so as to use that area, which has been termed the common heritage of mankind, for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all, or else outer space will become a new theatre for the arms race.

Last year a meeting was held on this subject and deep concern was expressed over the possibility of extending the arms race to outer space, and the international community was called upon to adopt effective measures in order to put an end to this race and to the militarization of outer space. The forum for implementing that measure is the Conference on Disarmament, and the Assembly has asked it to establish a working group in order to re-examine this item. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be in a position, in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it, to examine this question at its next session.

We have followed with some optimism the work being done by the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons and the measures necessary to ban such weapons. We are also closely following the progress achieved, which we hope will be increased, in drafting the treaty that we are all anxiously awaiting. We are also closely following the activities of the Working Group entrusted with drafting of a convention on chemical weapons and on verifying a ban on chemical weapons. We hope that fresh progress will be recorded in preparing a treaty that will not be discriminatory and can receive the support of the greatest number of States. We are convinced that the existing means of control, monitoring and verification are sufficient for a partial test-ban treaty to be prepared and implemented.

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

We do indeed attach great importance to the Committee on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body and as the body responsible for the work being done in Geneva. This year the Committee has made some progress, inter alia, in relation to confidence-building measures. We attach particular importance to these measures and their role in the field of general and complete disarmament. We think that at a time when the process of disarmament seems to have come to a halt, and the arms race is proceeding at a dizzying speed, particular attention should be given to these measures because they could lead to both nuclear and conventional disarmament and could further the cause of general and complete disarmament. Those confidence-building measures do not concern only the super-Powers. They could strengthen confidence among developing countries themselves, because confidence based on faith in the good will of States to co-operate is an essential element in the conduct of States, and could help to lower tension, strengthen confidence among States and avoid misunderstandings or wrong assessments of the state of affairs.

We are convinced that in order to perfect a positive concept of confidence-building measures, the question should be looked at as a whole, which would lead to the adoption of political, economic and social measures. Reduction of the danger of war will be impossible in the absence of a climate of confidence in international relations. This confidence must be based on respect for the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law, as well as on the principles in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. On the basis of this new idea we welcome the proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany, and we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to examine those principles and guidelines, which could form the basis for confidence-building measures.

This year the General Assembly is to examine the proposals in the important report of the Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament under the title "Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament". We welcome the report of this body in the field of international efforts to bring about disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security. Moreover, we support the recommendation of the Committee on Disarmament that this report should be taken into consideration in the context of current and future disarmament work.

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

Reduction of military budgets, which is one of the items on our Committee's agenda for this year, must be examined within the context of an international approach to disarmament which takes due account of the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. My country, which has had the honour of being one of the first group of States to report the military expenditures of their countries to the Secretary-General, attaches particular importance to this question, and wishes to appeal to all States, particularly those with large military arsenals, to make every effort to reach international agreements on the reduction of military budgets which could later lead to a genuine reduction of forces and military budgets and thus to the strengthening of international peace and security.

The report adopted by the First Committee last year, which was prepared by a group of experts under the chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson and entitled "The Relationship between Disarmament and Development" provides a very constructive approach to the release of the human and financial resources now allocated to armaments for channelling into economic and social development. We support the recommendations in the report and should like countries to take account of them, particularly the countries with the largest military budgets and those which are spending the most on nuclear weapons.

In concluding this section of my statement, I should like to express my regret that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to adopt a report by consensus on the nuclear capacity of South Africa. That item has appeared on its agenda every year since 1979. It is clear that the racist régime of Pretoria resorted to the military option, and in particular the nuclear option, after its banishment from the international scene, and has made use of its weapons to persecute and oppress the peoples both within and outside its borders. The racist régime, in order to attain its military objectives and to develop nuclear weapons, has even co-operated with certain States Members of this Organization, in particular with Israel. The nuclear potential of the racist régime of South Africa, used to carry out its racist policies is a matter of deep concern to the African countries, which in 1964, at the first African summit meeting expressed their desire for Africa to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Sudan, inspired by its commitment to abide by the resolution of the Organization of African States (OAU) to make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, calls on the Committee to take steps to prevent the racist régime of South Africa from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. It likewise calls on the General Assembly to adopt measures to end the

(Mr. Elfaki, Sudan)

co-operation between South Africa and States providing it with nuclear technology. Sudan demands that Security Council resolutions relating to international security be complied with, in order to meet the danger represented by the nuclear power of South Africa and its effects on international peace and security.

Making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone has proved impossible because of Israel's stubborn refusal to submit its nuclear installations to international control and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We ask this Committee to make recommendations concerning the need for all States to respect their commitments to the United Nations Charter and to halt all nuclear co-operation with Israel likely to increase its nuclear potential, and requiring Israel to accept all non-proliferation measures, to place its nuclear installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accept the Agency's safeguards system.

In conclusion, I wish to refer to the bilateral talks which are going on outside the United Nations. Mrs. Thorsson of Sweden said in her report that there was hope that these negotiations would lead to an improvement in the international climate. The absence of any progress in the negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces and of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Geneva negotiations and the talks on force reductions that are also taking place in Geneva, is a source of deep concern and frustration. The failure of these negotiations could lead to a most dangerous escalation in the arms race, in both nuclear and conventional weapons. We appeal to both super-Powers to pursue their negotiations with more determination and sincerity, because we know now that any failure could have very serious consequences and grave repercussions on international peace and security.

Mr. KOR BUN HENG (Democratic Kampuchea) (interpretation from French): I should like to join with other delegations who have expressed their condolences to the delegations of the United States and France in connection with the events of yesterday in Beirut.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address to you the sincere and warm congratulations of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea on your unanimous election as Chairman of this Committee. This election is a well-earned homage to your personal qualities. It is an honour to your country, Norway, which has made a great contribution to the cause of international peace and security, as well as to that of the independence of countries. Your competence, wisdom and long experience which are well known to all of us are the surest guarantees of the success of our very complex deliberations here. My delegation would also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee and assure you of our complete co-operation.

As in previous years, the General Assembly at its last session adopted a series of resolutions on disarmament. However, the list of items on the agenda of our Committee remains even longer and more impressive than ever. The arms race is increasingly unrestrained and the world situation is more distressing than ever. The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London emphasized in its last report that, while no tangible facts were available on the quantitative evolution of the arms race, qualitative competition makes control of armaments increasingly difficult.

However, this does not mean that we should be fatalistic about it. We think that, in this vital area for the survival of mankind, perseverance and a genuine determination to succeed are indispensable qualities and that, consequently, we should denounce and unequivocally condemn all rhetoric and any attempt to use the rostrum of the United Nations for propaganda designed to mask the arms race.

My delegation is ready to support any sincere or effective measure designed to prevent nuclear war, which is the supreme challenge of our time. However, we should like to discuss in more detail the question of conventional weapons. Although they do not have the destructive power of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and extremely deadly and destructive. What is more, they absorb four fifths of the military budgets of the world. Moreover, since the end of the Second World War, the various wars which have been waged in many regions of the world - such as that which Kampuchea, my country, suffered five years ago - have all been fought with conventional weapons.

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Kampuchea)

In his report on the activities of the Organization, the Secretary-General stated:

"The situation relating to conventional arms is a source of increasing concern. It is necessary to bear in mind that the many millions killed in war since Hiroshima and Nagasaki have all died from conventional weapons."

(A/38/1, p. 6)

During the general debate in the General Assembly, many countries echoed this concern. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, His Excellency, Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, stressed:

"We must not forget, however, that wars can be fought with fewer, or less deadly, weapons. It is not enough to look at the means of war; we must identify the causes and try to eliminate them." (A/38/PV.8, p. 96)

My delegation fully appreciates the wisdom of this approach to the problem, which contributes to the realization of the noble aim proclaimed almost four decades ago in our Charter of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

The tragedy of my country today, victim of a war of aggression and genocide conducted by Viet Nam, more than justifies my delegation's belief that it has a duty to participate in the international community's effort to identify and eliminate the causes of the wars now being waged in various regions of the world, and thus to help in curbing the arms race.

I should like to mention two striking events of recent years which continue to be a great source of concern to the international community because they undermine respect for the cardinal principles of the United Nations Charter and even the role of our Organization.

The first of these events took place in my own country, Democratic Kampuchea. I should point out that, scarcely three months after being admitted as a Member State of the United Nations in September 1977, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam launched the first of its present day invasions against my country, which was repulsed in January 1978. Scarcely five months after the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament in June 1978, that same Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on 3 November 1978 signed with the Soviet Union a veritable military alliance under the guise of a "treaty of friendship and co-operation". On

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25 December 1978, with massive Soviet military assistance, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam launched its second invasion of Kampuchea, which has continued to this very day.

The second event occurred a year later. Two weeks after our General Assembly had adopted the resolution proposed by the Soviet Union on "inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations" (resolution 34/103), the Soviet Union itself invaded Afghanistan.

These two wars of aggression, committed in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law against two sovereign States Members of the United Nations and of the Non-Aligned Movement, are being fought, under the slogans of, in Kampuchea, "friendship and special solidarity", now transformed into a "militant alliance", and in Afghanistan under the slogan of "fraternity and natural alliance". However, from the beginning the international community has clearly understood the real aims of those committing these acts of aggression: expansionism, and regional or world domination.

Exploiting the peoples' desire for peace, these expansionists continue to talk of "disarmament", "détente" and "peace", while their actions are the contrary of what they profess. They are using the rostrum of the United Nations, and of other international organizations, not for frank discussion based on a sincere desire to apply specific measures of disarmament, but rather for grandiloquent declamations to camouflage their accelerated arms race in both conventional and nuclear weapons.

In South-East Asia and in the Pacific, while its representatives are making their rhetorical flourishes on peace and disarmament, the Soviet Union continues to increase its nuclear and conventional armaments.

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We have learnt that 108 Soviet missiles of the SS-20 type, with three nuclear warheads each, have been deployed near Lake Baikal, and that construction is in progress in order to double the number of these missiles, which, since their range is 4,800 kilometres, can thus easily reach targets in South-East Asia.

Furthermore, 40 backfire bombers are deployed in the same area and in the Kamchatka Peninsula, and 30 more backfires are deployed on aircraft carriers of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean.

We have also learnt that the Soviet air force in East Asia has increased from 300 aircraft in 1966 to more than 1,700 today, that is to say, almost six times. The Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean consists of 765 ships, including 220 nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. It is the largest fleet of the Soviet navy and also the largest in the world. Furthermore, we know that the Soviet military presence in South-East Asia is eight times what it was 20 years ago.

As for Viet Nam itself, in exchange for military assistance and support of many kinds from the expansionist super-Power in carrying on their war of aggression and genocide in Kampuchea, the authorities in Hanoi have placed at its disposal the military bases of Cam Ranh and Danang. At the present time, 20 Soviet warships, including six submarines, of which three are nuclear, are cruising in the South China Sea and carrying out constant surveillance of the vital lines of communication between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Straits, through which pass 50 per cent of all of the world's oil tankers. Soviet aircraft of the Bear D type based at Danang do reconnaissance flights on a regular basis over the South-East Asian countries and over northern Australia, while other aircraft of the Bear F type operate as far as the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union has installed a vast network of electronic surveillance in Viet Nam and is in the process of transforming the ports of Kompong Som and Ream, in Kampuchea into aero-naval bases, thus enabling its ships to reach the Malacca Straits rapidly and become master of the Gulf of Thailand.

In order to provide itself with the means necessary for its expansionist policy, Viet Nam which since 1975 has proclaimed itself "the firm and sure advance-post of the socialist camp in South-East Asia," continues to maintain an army of 1.2 million men, to which should be added 2 million men and women in the militia and other para-military units. One Vietnamese in 16 is thus under arms. In proportion to its population, Viet Nam possesses the largest army in the world.

(Mr. Kor Bun Heng, Democratic
Kampuchea)

In absolute figures it is the third largest army in the world. In proportion to its population, Viet Nam maintains the largest number of soldiers in foreign territories - that is, more than 200,000 soldiers in Kampuchea and more than 60,000 in Laos.

In order to supply this army, which is in the service of Viet Nam's expansionist policy, the authorities in Hanoi devote more than 50 per cent of their national budget to military expenditure. It is obvious that Viet Nam could not maintain this impressive war machine without the enormous Soviet assistance, which is estimated at more than US \$2 billion a year. But today, with their war of aggression in Kampuchea bogged down, this Soviet assistance is no longer sufficient. That is why the Hanoi authorities are trying to entice certain countries, exploiting their humanitarian feelings, to provide economic assistance. But it is well known that every dollar of assistance to Viet Nam, even humanitarian assistance, is immediately transformed into a weapon with which to kill the people of Kampuchea and help Viet Nam pursue its policy of expansion in South-East Asia.

The expansionist Vietnamese policy is the direct cause of this frenzied over-armament. The powerful Vietnamese war machine has devastated Kampuchea and massacred several hundred thousand of my compatriots by means of famine or arms, conventional arms and by chemical and bacteriological arms, to which my delegation will revert in a subsequent statement. The maintenance of this war machine has led to a steady fall in the living standards of the people of Viet Nam, which are today worse than they were in 1975. The impoverishment of Viet Nam is general.

The draining of the human and economic resources of Viet Nam in the service of this policy of expansionism is explained by the 50-year-old dream of the Vietnamese Communist Party of creating an Indo-Chinese federation under Vietnamese domination, which would constitute a first step towards the establishment by the end of this century of a union of socialist republics of South-East Asia. This expansionist strategy is openly professed at the Ai Quoc Institute, which is the training school for the Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.

We all know that there is a dynamic interaction between the arms race and wars of aggression or expansion, which destroy the independence of States and international security and prevent economic development. The Declaration of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament states explicitly that

(Mr. Kor Bun Heng, Democratic
Kampuchea)

"The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation." (resolution S-10/2, para. 12)

This interaction is manifested in Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Chad - to mention only the most recent instances - where aggressive wars destroy the independence of States, threaten the security of peoples, endanger regional and international peace and security, and run the risk of leading to a generalized conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons.

In this sense, the struggle against wars of aggression and expansion is an important contribution to the efforts of the international community to put an end to or at least curb the arms race. Only by stepping up the struggle, in close co-operation and with international support, will we compel the aggressors to end their war and withdraw their forces of aggression.

In the specific case of Kampuchea, my country, a prerequisite for the settlement of the problem generated by the Vietnamese war of aggression is the total and unconditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea. This would enable the people of Kampuchea to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination.

When this sine qua non has been fulfilled, the tragedy of the people and nation of Kampuchea will end. A zone of peace, freedom and neutrality can be established in South-East Asia, putting an end to the arms race in this region of the world, in the interest of the entire international community.

Mr. BLANCO (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I wish to extend to you my heartfelt congratulations upon your election to the post of Chairman of the First Committee. I am convinced that your skill and experience, together with the noble traditions of your country, Norway, will be very important factor in guiding the work of the First Committee to a successful conclusion. I also wish to greet the other officers of the Committee to whom, along with you, Sir, I offer the constructive and complete co-operation of my delegation. I should also like to extend our greetings to your predecessor, Mr. Gbeho of Ghana, for his efforts in guiding the work of the First Committee at the last session of the General Assembly.

Before beginning my statement, I should like to express my sincere condolences to the delegations of the United States of America and France for the tragic events which took place yesterday in Lebanon.

At the end of a major war, the authors of our Charter were guided by the overriding concern of preserving peace, and perhaps today, United Nations Day, it might be useful to recall one of the precepts that guided their efforts. They formed this Organization to carry out the task of preserving peace and made that its first objective, together with that of maintaining international peace and security. Recourse to force, or the mere threat of force, were banned. The Security Council had the monopoly of coercive measures, including the use of force. According to the Charter self-defence remained as a kind of extra option until the Security Council is in a position to act.

The Charter presupposes that Member States would place all means at their disposal at the service of the Council, including special contingents of their armed forces. It was envisaged that the General Assembly would establish principles for disarmament and for regulating weapons as part of the principles that were to govern international co-operation for maintaining peace and security. At the same time, the Security Council would also be responsible for preparing plans for the establishment of a system of arms regulation which it would submit to Member States.

Under the Charter system it was also assumed that the prohibition of the use of force and the control of coercive and enforcement measures by the Security Council would create appropriate conditions for establishing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, thereby consolidating peace.

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

It was hoped that the political conditions that prevailed at the time would last, particularly the solidarity among major Powers and that there would be an understanding between them which would make it possible to act collectively if faced with common threats. With such an outlook, the right of veto appeared as a last resort, an exceptional measure for very few and extreme situations.

We all know full well that this is very far from the reality of today's world. Nobody can ignore the division of the world into blocs and alliances, the existence of strong antagonisms and conflicts, the growing arms race, the open manifestation of violence and terrorism and the recourse to force beyond the bounds of international legality.

We live in an insecure world in which peace is precarious, where the ability of small and medium-sized countries to develop their policies without the risk of external interferences has diminished and where the uncertainty of nuclear catastrophe prevails.

We should ask whether it is still possible to reconcile the principles of the Charter with the harsh realities of today and to deal with the excesses of the present situation within the United Nations system. The work of the First Committee is really at the centre of this matter. It would be futile to ignore the present. It would also be regrettable to accept the situation passively, but between one attitude and the other there is a broad area for creative effort and the delegation of Uruguay will act with this in mind.

General and complete disarmament must be the final objective of our efforts, but this objective cannot be pursued in a vacuum, disregarding tensions and conflicts. The accumulation of weapons cannot be dissociated from the context of political conditions; and at the same time, conflicts and tensions are aggravated by the accumulation of weapons.

It is therefore necessary to break this vicious circle in order to consolidate peace. I believe that in the first place the obvious point of departure is the political will of States to act in strict conformity with the rules of international law, in particular in strict observance of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. The frequent reference to these in the most varied cases and circumstances sometimes leads us to forget about their real content, which is essential for the topic before us. Indeed, an important part of

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

the tension is produced when one or more States do not agree with the political system or ideology of another or others, and then try to change it, directly or indirectly, to mold it to their own criterion and eventually to subject it to their domination or influence.

Destabilizing actions, support for terrorist and subversive activities, the promotion of adventurism by mercenaries, undercover intelligence work to promote changes in other countries are deplorable facts of daily occurrence which generate tension and violence. It is clear that in the midst of such a process of interference it is utopian to think of disarmament.

Therefore, we need to act in this field as a priority issue. Among other steps we should consider the renewal of the commitment of non-intervention, of respect for the political, economic and social processes of other States, and perhaps formulate certain basic rules of behaviour, certain guidelines of conduct, based on numerous existing international instruments on the subject, and then establish flexible mechanisms for evaluation.

In any event, it is essential to have an informed, alert and more and more demanding world public opinion, of respect for non-interference, which would be looked upon as a reciprocal and non-discriminatory mode of behaviour, applied across the board, both in similar as well as alien systems.

The strict observance of international law should be accompanied, in the second place, with confidence-building measures, that is to say, with positive acts which foster understanding and goodwill. From this perspective, precepts of good neighbourliness will play a very important role. It is also possible here again to agree on a series of guidelines and criteria which will serve to heighten friendship and constructive relations. This should also be supplemented by systems of assessment and follow-up.

Thirdly, the proper functioning of the United Nations is essential. Hence, my delegation attributes singular importance to the proposals of the Secretary-General concerning the development of United Nations operations for maintaining international peace and security through appropriate collective action. In this connection, the need to support and promote collectively the action of the Secretary-General and to try to adjust existing mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, rendering its application more systematic is essential. Uruguay, consistent with its long tradition on the subject, would like a

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

jurisdictional approach to the settlement of disputes to be fully developed. It would be desirable if we could all unite in an appeal to all Member States to accept the automatic jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36 of its statute. Likewise, it would help create an appropriate climate of confidence to include, in domestic law, rules at the highest level, making it compulsory for States, in their international relations, to use peaceful means in settling disputes, including arbitration and international jurisdiction.

Some of the aspects that I have indicated go beyond the agenda of the First Committee. Nevertheless, my delegation believed it necessary to refer to them as a whole because the possibility of creating a propitious environment for disarmament depends on all of them.

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

It is obvious that it is necessary to make headway in the field of disarmament as such. It is clear that without specific steps in this direction confidence and international security will continue to deteriorate. Disarmament might have appeared to the drafters of the Charter to be a viable and not too remote objective, in the context of the political situation at that time. Nevertheless, the Organization was not given the juridical powers in order to impose it. The final decision remained in the hands of Member States. This implies, therefore, that in juridical terms disarmament is only possible through negotiation. This simple juridical fact coincides, furthermore with the present political reality. In the light of all this, the path of negotiation is the only possibility.

The nature of the question of disarmament generates negotiating mechanisms outside the Organization, and I suppose it is normal that this should be the case. Although the preference of my Government is that negotiations be within the context of the United Nations, the use of other courses might be necessary in the present circumstances. The present pattern of political and military forces, as well as the concentration of the biggest arsenals of the most destructive weapons, underscores the very serious responsibility of the major military Powers in seeking satisfactory formulas for disarmament. Although the present scenario is not encouraging, the very nature of the question, which is vital for the entire world, should prevail over any other consideration. This is why we must hope and wish that the talks in Geneva and Vienna, as well as the bilateral dialogues, will have positive results. Any headway made in these forums would undoubtedly contribute to reducing tensions. Moreover, it would give a very strong impetus towards disarmament everywhere not least in the United Nations.

I think that in this sense we should reaffirm our support for the letter and the spirit of the resolution adopted at the thirty-seventh session concerning the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, which urged the parties to seek significant results. A similar appeal is made in connection with other negotiations.

The method of negotiation should prevail also in the work of this Committee and that of the General Assembly. The search for a broad-based and genuinely accepted consensus provides the political basis necessary for resolutions to make the greatest impact and become operative and effective instruments for peace.

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

My delegation considers, therefore, that progress in the disarmament process must be sought in parallel in the various forums by means of realistic negotiations conducted in good faith. In the final analysis these would complement each other and lead to the objective of general and complete disarmament.

The context of existing political and military conditions shows clearly that disarmament not only must be achieved through negotiations, but also must be balanced and mutual, and the agreements which are reached must be verifiable to the satisfaction of all parties. Measures or programmes which do not confirm to these conditions will be ineffectual and will lack political support. Disarmament cannot be imposed; nor could disarmament that involved any imbalance of forces or imposed duties on one party only be accepted.

The present situation, dominated in practically all its facets by strategic equilibrium, is not a satisfactory solution as a formula for peaceful coexistence. Being in itself a precarious situation, it entails risks with universal repercussions. To envisage a state of permanent tension and fear in major areas of the world is a serious mistake. Peace through terror cannot be the aim of our efforts. We must work for peace and security under the rule of law.

Although since the Second World War the industrialized nations have enjoyed prolonged periods of peace, this has not been the situation for many developing countries. It would appear, tragically, that here too the same differences exist between one group of countries and others.

Therefore an order in which it would be possible, selectively, to admit external influences - the drafting of mercenaries, destabilizing activities from outside, including subversion and terrorism for many countries - is unsuitable. These are for most of those represented here the daily threats which are most tangible and are the reason for increasing armament.

In the so-called regional crises or conflicts - which some call "peripheral" - there are very often local characteristics and factors. But it is clear that in general these are exacerbated and used, if not created, by foreign and alien forces and interests.

This wide zone of instability and tension should be analysed; otherwise, the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence will inevitably lead to an increase in the arsenals of these countries as their sole form of preserving their national

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

integrity. This process has a negative impact on the development process, generating an inappropriate diversion of the meagre resources that are available.

The limited results of the special sessions devoted to disarmament and the impossibility so far of adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament leaves the initiative with the General Assembly. As I have said before, Uruguay aspires to general and complete disarmament, achieved or consolidated through the United Nations and enshrined in international instruments of a treaty character. Recognizing realistically the difficulties that exist in attaining this objective totally and simultaneously, my delegation resolutely supports measures towards this end, even if they are only partial.

Accordingly, we believe that measures should be adopted limiting or prohibiting the testing or use of nuclear weapons and other particularly cruel weapons of indiscriminate scope and with especially injurious effects. I wish to stress the importance of, among other things, a convention on chemical weapons as well as assurances of the control of nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be strengthened and expanded along the lines of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The military use of given areas, such as the sea-bed, Antarctica and outer space should be prohibited.

Special mention should also be made of the need for a system of guarantees for States which have voluntarily renounced nuclear weaponry.

My delegation considers that agreements reached on specific subjects or with regard to specific geographic areas constitute positive steps in the right direction. The sum total of these partial agreements could result in a growing network of firm disarmament commitments. The General Assembly could give a bigger impetus to this trend, which has existed for some time.

Among other actions, we should consider a resolution which would reflect the set of subjects and areas in which there are agreements, as a form of the expression of the political will of the international community. A document of this type could facilitate assessment of progress and the difficulties. Perhaps, because of its political impact, it would encourage decisions in those areas in which least has been done. It could provide a means of negotiating measures of disarmament which preserve the necessary balance and reciprocity.

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

In the past, the General Assembly has adopted a very large number of resolutions on disarmament. The terms of these, taken as a whole, eloquently express the horror of war and the general will to remove the threat of it by disarmament.

Hence, I believe that this strong political thrust, which deserves emphasis and support, should not be distorted or transformed into an indirect attempt to influence the balance of power between the great Powers. This, besides being ineffective, would drive a wedge between the collective efforts of the nations and its fundamental aim of promoting peace and disarmament. Uruguay will continue to support, through the United Nations, this manifestation of political will by the majority of the international community.

In the view of my delegation, however, it is necessary to tackle the rationalization of these drafts, which very often duplicate and repeat, by focusing on clear-cut, central themes on basic principles. In this way they would gain political thrust.

In this connection, we support the comments of Mr. Imre Hollai of Hungary, in his statement as the outgoing President of the General Assembly, as well as those made by you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe, furthermore, that in the interest of rationalization, we must endeavour to ensure that the drafts are action-oriented and practical. It might also be appropriate to consider a simple means of carrying out assessments and providing information.

(Mr. Blanco, Uruguay)

Concomitant with what I have said, I should like to express support for the strengthening of the means available to the United Nations for verification and compliance and, in general, for peace-keeping operations.

In this context, the delegation of Uruguay is prepared to work actively and constructively in the collective task of strengthening international peace and promoting disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: The representatives of France and of the United States have asked for the floor at this time.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): On behalf of the French delegation, I want to express our most sincere thanks to the delegations which have expressed their condolences during this meeting on the deaths of the French soldiers killed in Beirut in the discharge of their mission on behalf of peace. The French delegation was particularly moved by their expressions of sympathy and friendship.

Mr. AKALOVSKY (United States of America): My delegation wishes to convey the heartfelt condolences of the United States to the delegation of France and to the grieving families on the tragic loss of life among its soldiers in Beirut yesterday.

The United States delegation also expresses its deep and sincere appreciation of the expressions of condolence that have been extended to my Government and to the families of the United States marines and sailors killed and injured as a result of a similar heinous act in that city.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second.

Mr. TARI (Israel) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time I am speaking here, I have great pleasure in congratulating you, Sir, upon your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. Your moral authority is an invaluable support for us in our difficult and complex deliberations.

Some statements made today oblige me to exercise my right of reply. My delegation does not wish to lend itself to the transformation of this Committee into a new arena where questions of the Middle East would be discussed yet again in a hollow and empty fashion to the detriment of the very serious tasks that have been assigned to our Committee. I am convinced that this is not at all the wish of most delegations here, concerned by dramatic and perhaps approaching deadlines.

I shall therefore confine myself at this stage to speaking out against the falsehoods and outrageous statements, some of which are an offence to history, directed against Israel. It is not surprising either that it is precisely the delegations of Syria and Libya that have indulged in this exercise today, with the special authority that is given to them by their countries' constant support of international aggression and terrorism, the consequences of which, as we see every day, are increasingly tragic.

The delegation of Israel would like to reserve the right to reply in greater detail on the substance of the matter at a later stage.

Mr. AL-ATASSI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation has no intention of responding to the false allegations by the representative of Israel, who is trying to distract the attention of the representatives from the true realities of Israel's aggressive and warlike intentions. This morning we talked about the true facts of Israeli nuclear armament. They are a matter of common knowledge. The report of the Secretary-General, which we have every year, offers the most convincing proof of this fact. What is more, the collaboration of that régime with the isolated régime of South Africa is another incontrovertible reality and a fact deserving of condemnation by the world community as a whole. I do not know why the Zionist representative condemns us for throwing light on Israeli intentions and for showing the reality of its intentions to all representatives here. All Israel's statements are falsehoods, an act of hypocrisy designed to camouflage the warlike and

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)

aggressive nature of that entity. Today, on the occasion of the celebration of United Nations Day, it is incumbent upon us as States Members of the United Nations to compel Israel to respect the United Nations Charter and to comply with all resolutions adopted by our Organization. It is high time that State ceased violating international laws because the violation of international law should be condemned and punished.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that to date three draft resolutions have been presented and are now available to members, namely, the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/38/L.1, A/C.1/38/L.2 and A/C.1/38/L.3, under agenda items 143, 144 and 50 respectively.

(The Chairman)

I should like also, for the benefit of those who might not have been here last Friday, to call their attention to the fact that the Committee took a decision at that time on how to deal with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The decision was that two afternoon meetings would be set aside on Monday, 31 October, and Tuesday, 1 November, for consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It was decided that on those two days priority would be given to delegations wishing to make statements concerning the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. However, to the extent that time remains available to the Committee after having heard those statements, other delegations would be free to speak on any of the items designated for consideration during phase II of our Programme of Work, but I should like to repeat that priority will be given to those delegations wishing to make comments or statements on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The list of the speakers for the two meetings I mentioned is open and I would invite members of the Committee to inscribe their names on it as early as possible in order to enable the Committee fully to utilize the time and resources available to it.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

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FIRST COMMITTEE
13th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 25 October 1983
at 10.30 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Mr. C. P. N. Singh (India)

Mr. Tornudd (Finland)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The task of preventing nuclear war is above all predicated on the need to remove the threat posed by nuclear weapons. In concentrating efforts in this area we should not, however, disregard the danger stemming from the other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical and other weapons the arsenals of which continue to grow and improve.

The present level of science and technology makes it possible today to create such means of warfare which are capable, even in a non-nuclear war, of destroying within a short time all life over vast territories. This is especially true if we take account of clearly discernible prospective kinds of weapons based on new physical principles.

The race in other weapons taking place against the backdrop of a growing nuclear threat is destabilizing the situation in many parts of the world, and increasing the danger of local conflicts becoming nuclear.

Recently, the threat posed to humanity by such weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons has sharply increased.

The world has not forgotten the large-scale chemical war waged by the United States in South-East Asia in the sixties and early seventies. An international symposium held last January in the city of Ho Chi Minh, attended by over 160 scientists and specialists from 21 countries, came to the conclusion that this was the first such massive use of chemical weapons in history, with grave long-term genetic and ecological consequences.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Not satisfied with having the world's largest chemical arsenal sufficient to destroy all life on earth - it is based on agents many times more lethal than those that were used in Viet Nam - the United States has now embarked on a new round in the chemical arms race.

In the next five years the United States is planning to allocate about \$10 billion on a programme of chemical rearmament, which will be spent on the mass production of new types of chemical weapons, improving methods of their use and constructing storage facilities abroad. The total number of chemical munitions is to be almost doubled, from three to five million units.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The so-called binary weapons occupy a particular place in this programme. Binary weapons, in the opinion of militarist forces, are extremely convenient. The manufacture of their components and their transport to the places of assembly are relatively safe operations and this keeps the United States territory where these operations are to be carried out free from the risk of chemical contamination. As for the dangerous procedures of assembling these munitions, storing binary weapons and deploying them in a combat mode, these are to take place outside the United States, primarily in Western Europe, where, in addition to the new United States medium-range missiles, it is planned to deploy new chemical munitions. Tentative plans are being devised to spread these chemical weapons to other parts of the world, including the United States base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, in South Korea and in the Pacific. Reports that the racist régime of Pretoria is organizing the production of binary weapons and their delivery vehicles with the help of Western technology give further cause for concern.

Arms usually described as conventional also pose a serious threat to humanity. These have long ceased to be conventional in the true sense of the word, not only in terms of their mission but also in terms of their characteristics. These weapons are becoming increasingly accurate, have an increasingly longer range and are becoming more destructive. In this field also the United States has set out to create systems whose introduction would have far-reaching destabilizing effects. It is busy developing still newer generations of one-shot, one-kill, weapons, whose effectiveness is completely independent of distance, weather or visibility. Non-nuclear systems for destroying multiple targets and entire reconnaissance strike systems combining weapons systems, target detection and evaluation systems, and fire-control systems are being developed. Command and control systems are being automated and the strategic mobility of conventional armed forces is being enhanced.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The arms race is being escalated not only on land but also on the seas. Thus mammoth programmes for the building up of the offensive capability of the United States Navy are in progress. The number of combat ships is scheduled to rise to 600 in the next few years. Among major construction projects are three nuclear-powered aircraft-carriers, 22 hunter-killer submarines, an anti-aircraft cruiser and 38 destroyers and frigates. The naval air force is to receive new aircraft replacement. The primary goal of the United States naval programmes is to secure absolute superiority, as has been stated bluntly by United States Secretary of the Navy Lehman, as well as to assert for the United States the right to pursue with impunity a gunboat policy and a naval stick diplomacy against countries and peoples of the world thousands of miles away from United States shores. We have witnessed this in the last few days. The same aims are to be served by the rapid deployment force being set up in the United States to be dispatched to various parts of the world.

Seeking military superiority in all components of combat capability, the United States is thus building the material basis for its stated strategy of direct confrontation, which is oriented towards waging a so-called comprehensive war - that is to say towards the first use not only of nuclear but also of chemical and other weapons already in the initial phase of a conflict and deep inside enemy territory.

Naturally, these tendencies cannot but cause the most serious concern.

The Soviet Union, which has never sought military superiority and will in no circumstances permit others to have military superiority over it, believes it necessary to prevent another spiral in the arms race in both nuclear and other areas while there is still time.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

To halt the arms race where it is being pursued and to prevent its emergence where it is not taking place - this is our approach to this problem. The achievement of this goal requires realism and a sense of responsibility concerning the destiny of the world, as well as political will on the part of all concerned.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is defined as a priority disarmament task in a series of United Nations resolutions, including the decisions of two special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Soviet Union, for its part, is in favour of taking all necessary measures to ensure that there is no place on this planet for instruments of chemical warfare.

In the Committee on Disarmament we are working for a convention which would ensure the total cessation of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the elimination of existing stockpiles and of the means of manufacturing such weapons.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In consistently advocating the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons on a world scale, the Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, believes it is also useful to take parallel steps towards the same goal at the regional level and within the European continent in particular. In this connection the implementation of the initiative of the Warsaw Treaty States aimed at freeing Europe from chemical weapons would have great significance. The talks that are proposed to that end, far from competing with the work of the Committee on Disarmament, would on the contrary stimulate a speedy search for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

In order to facilitate a constructive process of negotiation on the elimination of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed the renunciation of the production and deployment of new types of those weapons and of their deployment on the territory of other States. In order to answer the question why the prohibition of chemical weapons has not yet made any progress it is necessary to look at the position of the other side. What are the facts?

The United States is steadily ignoring our proposal to resume the Soviet-United States negotiations on this question which the United States broke off as far back as 1980 even though during those negotiations it had proved possible to find a number of solutions, which were subsequently accepted by the Committee on Disarmament. The United States also shrugs off the proposal to open talks on freeing Europe from chemical weapons. Further, the United States does not heed the appeals of the General Assembly to refrain from producing new types of chemical weapons. In the Committee on Disarmament, too, United States actions are in no way conducive to an early prohibition of chemical weapons.

Indeed, the United States opposes the prohibition of chemical weapons in their entirety, including the types that it used extensively in Viet Nam. The United States covers up its reluctance to eliminate chemical weapons in their entirety from the arsenals of States by deliberately unacceptable demands on verification,

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while alleging that it is the Soviet Union which does not want verification. These allegations, are, however, totally divorced from reality.

The Soviet position on the question of prohibiting chemical weapons provides for a package of national and international verification measures. These include, inter alia, consultations, the furnishing of information of various kinds on the stockpiles of chemical weapons and their production capabilities, on progress in implementing the convention and on the production and use of various chemical substances for peaceful purposes, the establishment of a consultative committee of States parties to the future convention, and so on. In case any justified doubts should arise with regard to a violation of the convention, the possibility of on-site inspection on a voluntary basis is provided for. These procedures would make it quite possible to ensure adequate confidence in compliance by all parties to a future convention.

Moreover, to get the negotiations going, the Soviet Union last year pronounced itself in favour of verifying the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons by means of systematic mandatory inspections within a quota to be agreed upon. It was also proposed that the production of extremely toxic lethal chemicals for purposes other than the production of chemical weapons should be subject to similar verification procedures.

In response to this step the United States has merely hardened its approach to the question of verification. A working paper on the prohibition of chemical weapons submitted by the United States to the Committee on Disarmament last February contained what amounted to a virtual rejection - in reversal of its previous stand - of the voluntary nature of on-site inspections in case of suspicion with regard to a violation of the proposed convention. Furthermore, while it had previously insisted on systematic verification of the destruction of the stockpiles and facilities, as well as of the production of highly toxic lethal chemicals for the purposes of protection, this time the United States put forward,

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in addition to that, new demands for mandatory on-site inspections to verify the stockpiles of chemical weapons and the activities of the civilian chemical industry. The new proposals of the United States are a step backwards in its position and are not in any way justifiable in terms of verification of a prohibition of chemical weapons. In other words, the working paper of the United States delegation in the Committee on Disarmament convincingly demonstrates that if anyone is to be charged with reluctance to agree on verification it must be the United States itself. This is yet another example of the disparity between the words and the deeds of United States diplomacy.

Such a position, namely, the lack of willingness to search for ways to narrow down substantive differences between positions, cannot possibly be camouflaged by the ostentatious activity of United States diplomacy at the talks, by its endeavour to focus on discussing secondary technical details - as evidenced by the tour of a chemical arsenal in Tula - or by attempts to give the impression that on the whole things are not so bad in Geneva and that only the intransigence of the Soviet Union blocks the way to further progress.

The falsehoods to which the United States delegation has resorted at this session concerning the alleged involvement of the Soviet Union in the supposed use of chemical agents in some regions of the world represent yet another manifestation of the destructive course followed by the United States of America on the issue of a ban on chemical weapons. The groundless nature of such fabrications has been fully proved in a number of papers prepared by Soviet scientists and specialists and distributed in the United Nations, by the results of studies carried out by an Australian military laboratory and published last spring and by the findings of a report of eminent United States and British scientists which was submitted earlier this year to a conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

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Despite these artificial obstacles to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union remains convinced that urgent and resolute measures should be taken to get out of the impasse in connection with the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons and to speed up the preparation of an agreed text of a draft convention on this subject. Motivated by the desire to create the best possible conditions for activating further negotiations and to save them from the pernicious effect of the preparations for chemical warfare, the Soviet delegation is submitting today a proposal to freeze the production and deployment of chemical weapons pending the conclusion of an international convention on the subject.

This interim measure towards agreement on the complete elimination of chemical weapons would not be detrimental to anyone. At the same time, its implementation would effectively confirm the willingness of States totally to exclude these weapons of mass destruction from their arsenals.

The Soviet Union reiterates its appeal to redouble the efforts aimed at preventing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and to reach agreement to renounce all use of new scientific and technological discoveries and achievements for military purposes.

As regards the limitation of the race in conventional weapons, the USSR again applies a comprehensive approach. The Soviet Union deems it essential to make efforts to end this dangerous race at a global level and has, as is known, advanced numerous proposals to this effect in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere. Unfortunately, no real steps in response to the appeal on this subject made in 1980 by the overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States have been forthcoming. Nevertheless, we still keep open the door to negotiations and reaffirm our willingness to seek an agreement with the other permanent members of the Security Council, as well as with other militarily significant States, not to

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increase - that is, to freeze on a reciprocal basis - their armed forces and conventional armaments. Such an agreement could become effective at an agreed date and could constitute an initial step towards subsequent and, furthermore, substantial reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, both on a global and on a regional basis. There is no doubt that this would contribute towards reducing military confrontation between States, strengthening regional stability and consolidating international security as a whole.

The importance of a regional approach towards limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional armaments deserves special mention. Such an approach, being consistent with the efforts undertaken at a global level, sometimes makes it possible to take into account more accurately the military and political peculiarities inherent in a given region, thus contributing to the elaboration of more far-reaching measures. Effective steps aimed at limiting the conventional arms race on a regional level are especially important, as we see it, in those regions in which large stockpiles of arms have been accumulated or where the situation threatens international peace and security. In this context, we attach great importance to an agreement in the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, where military confrontation is particularly dangerous. As far back as November 1973 the socialist countries advanced a programme of reductions the implementation of which would make it possible to reduce the military groupings of both sides in this region by almost 300,000 men, thousands of tanks, hundreds of aircraft and a large portion of other military equipment. But the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were not prepared for this.

In the search for agreement, the Warsaw Treaty States have met the West more than halfway and have submitted more than 20 compromise proposals that take its position into account.

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Earlier this year they proposed a fundamentally new, simple and practical approach aimed at solving the so-called data problem artificially created by the NATO countries and achieving really tangible results. The draft agreement based on this approach provides for the reduction over a period of three years of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces in Central Europe to equal collective limits of 900,000 men on each side, irrespective of the differences in the data on the number of troops both sides have at present, while each side would determine for itself the magnitude of reductions in its armed forces which would be necessary to reach the above-mentioned limits. This draft contains an extensive set of confidence-building and verification measures, including the establishment of permanent observation posts to monitor the withdrawal of forces from the zone of reductions and their introduction into this zone, on-site inspections on a voluntary basis and periodic exchanges of information about troop levels - in a word, measures which would give a reliable assurance of compliance by the parties to an agreement with the obligations they would assume.

Thus, all the necessary elements are in place for a speedy elaboration of the text of an agreement. And if in 10 years of negotiations not a single line has been put on paper, the entire responsibility for this rests with the NATO countries, which do not want to negotiate on a realistic and mutually acceptable basis, which renege on their own proposals and which seek military advantages for themselves through unequal, much greater reductions in the forces of the Eastern participants.

Moreover - and we should like to direct particular attention to this - the United States and its allies are engaged in a dangerous build-up of their troops and armaments in the zone of reductions.

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In the Federal Republic of Germany alone the United States has in recent years increased its contingent by 35,000 men. Over half of the new United States nuclear missiles, which will create a real threat for the security of States not only in Europe, but also far beyond it, are planned for deployment precisely on the territory of the three West European countries located in the Central European region.

The root cause of the continuing deadlock in Vienna lies in the position of the NATO countries and in their reluctance to renounce their course aimed at achieving military superiority - and in nothing else.

We believe that the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that is due to start its work next January in Stockholm has an important role to play in reducing the levels of military confrontation on the European continent. The objective of this conference has been outlined. Its first stage will be devoted to discussing and adopting confidence and security-building measures which will cover the whole European continent and the adjacent sea and ocean areas and airspace over them. It is important that the work of the Conference be conducted from the beginning in a businesslike manner, and that it be part of the efforts aimed at erecting a barrier against the arms race in Europe. It is clearly incumbent upon all the participating States to make a contribution if the Conference is to succeed. For its part, the USSR will do its utmost to ensure that the Conference adopts the most meaningful measures in this area.

The traffic in arms represents another channel of the arms race, and there is no denying the fact that it must be blocked. The United Nations Secretary-General's annual report on the work of the Organization, submitted at the current session, quite rightly expresses concern over the state of affairs in this

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field and contains an appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States to consider "... the possibility of reviving the bilateral talks on conventional arms transfers, which were suspended in 1978". (A/38/1, p. 6)

I should like to remind the Committee that the Soviet Union is known to have repeatedly proposed to the United States the resumption of the dialogue on this question which it suspended just at the time when the outlines of a possible solution began to take shape. Far from responding to our proposals, the United States has openly avowed its reliance on the traffic in arms as an instrument of its foreign policy. As for the USSR, in response to the Secretary-General's appeal, the Soviet delegation is authorized to reaffirm our readiness to resume the Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation of traffic in and supply of conventional arms. In so doing, we have no objection to involving other States in the consideration of the subject of limiting the traffic in arms.

In view of the growing danger of the arms race on the seas, the Soviet Union believes that it is high time to take up the question of limiting naval activities, of limiting and reducing naval armaments, and of extending confidence-building measures to the sea and ocean areas, particularly to areas where the sea routes are busiest or where there is the greatest risk of conflict situations. For that purpose, we are proposing to launch negotiations with the participation, above all, of major naval Powers and other interested States.

The Soviet Union advocates a real limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments and, at the same time, actively promotes efforts aimed at finding solutions, facilitating confidence building among States, including of course, the military field. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has said:

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"Given the speed of action and the power of modern weapons, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion is particularly dangerous. Even an absurd accident, miscalculation or minor technical failure could have tragic consequences. It is important therefore, to remove fingers from the trigger and to place arms under a reliable safety catch."

The Soviet Union has repeatedly come forward with concrete initiatives on this subject. Thus at the Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms we have made far-reaching proposals aimed at preventing crisis, which would, within the framework of future agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, considerably strengthen confidence in the strategic field. Our initiatives to follow-up on the confidence-building measures as implemented under the Helsinki agreements are also well known. Nor do we refuse to consider constructive proposals on the subject by other countries.

We would like, however, to emphasize the following. We are convinced that confidence-building measures should be formulated and applied with a view to achieving military détente, arms limitation, disarmament and settlement of conflicts, rather than in isolation from these objectives. They must not divert the attention of States from the elaboration of genuine disarmament measures, let alone replace them. That is why we strongly and decisively oppose any attempts to promote the illusion that a continuation of the arms race and an unchecked build-up of nuclear and conventional arsenals would in some way be consistent with the strengthening of international peace, security and stability or even with a reduction of the threat of war, if such a build-up takes place in conditions of transparency which allegedly creates the necessary confidence. Unfortunately, this is the meaning that some States are trying to inject into confidence-building measures, and this includes States represented in the First Committee.

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The practice of international relations has demonstrated that mistrust and suspicion among States are generated by the policies of certain circles, by their desire to act from a position of strength, by their attempts to place the arms race in ever newer and more dangerous orbits, rather than by a lack of transparency. To claim in these conditions that an increase in the volume of information about armed forces and armaments can building confidence is to engage in self-delusion. The absence of political will to stop the arms race and reluctance to seek mutually acceptable agreements on the basis of equality and equal security cannot be remedied by any flow of data on arms and armed forces, by any studies on the comparability of military information, etc.

We are convinced that what is needed above all to dispel mutual suspicion and to restore trust is to normalize the situation and to abandon the preaching of hatred and enmity and the propaganda of nuclear war. And quite logically, the main way of establishing trust and confidence is to halt the arms race and return to calm and correct relations among States and to détente. Indeed, the present tense situation requires urgent measures which could, even now, substantially reduce mistrust between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO States, and ease mutual fears of possible aggression. Motivated by these same considerations the socialist countries have proposed to the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace, at the heart of which would be an obligation of the member States of the two alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other. The conclusion of such a treaty would undoubtedly have a very favourable effect on all further developments not only in Europe but throughout the world.

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Thus far, we must inform this Committee there has been no response from NATO to this proposal; yet we hope that common sense will eventually prevail and that representatives of the States concerned will begin a joint businesslike discussion on the subject.

The Soviet Union is also willing to seek ways to strengthen security in the Far East. For instance, we have proposed that the positive experience gained in implementing certain confidence-building measures in Europe be considered in terms of its application to the Far Eastern region. The Soviet Union is prepared to engage in a discussion of this question in a practical way with the participation of the People's Republic of China and Japan. We have listened attentively to the statement of the Japanese representative about the dedication of his country to non-nuclear principles. A question, however, arises as to whether this is really so, and whether Japan is indeed interested in strengthening stability, security and confidence in the Far Eastern region if it refuses to engage in a specific discussion of confidence building in a region where our two countries are neighbours and where there are foreign bases and nuclear weapons, while at the same time it has officially declared in its White Book on defence its intention to promote in every possible way United States global nuclear strategy.

The agreements in force relating to arms limitation and disarmament have made a tangible contribution to generating a climate of confidence. In recent years an entire system of international and bilateral treaties and conventions on both weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms has been established. Its potential should be put to maximum use in order to adopt new and more far-reaching steps in appropriate fields.

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The Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons is to enter into force in December 1983. The Soviet Union proposes that for the purpose of concluding new additional protocols to the Convention we should not stop there but should continue talks on further steps to restrict or prohibit the use of what are termed "inhumane" weapons, such as phosphorus anti-personnel weapons. We are in favour of concluding new and supplementary protocols to this Convention. We are also in favour of strengthening the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and we are in favour of further steps to prevent an arms race in that environment. We continue to believe that a major task is to involve more States in those and other international agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Those present in this room know full well what kind of agreements we have in mind. We, like many other States, highly appreciate the positive achievements represented by these agreements.

But good words are not enough. It is important to promote effectively their further strengthening and the enhancement of their authority.

Unfortunately, we have of late witnessed quite a few actions, including in particular those of the United States, which are aimed in a different direction that is, towards undermining these agreements. This applies above all to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical agents. This is exemplified, in particular, by the diversionary tactics employed by the United States and its allies to undermine the Geneva Protocol on the pretext of establishing special verification machinery for the Protocol.

This revision of the Geneva Protocol, attempted in violation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, can do irreparable harm not only to the Protocol itself but also to the entire system of international relations existing in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

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The USSR is offering a simple and realistic way out, namely, to include a provision banning the use of such weapons in the convention on chemical weapons under preparation in the Committee on Disarmament. For verification purposes that convention's verification machinery would be used, including on-site inspection on a voluntary basis. This step takes into account the views of those States that believe that a ban on the use of chemical weapons requires reinforcement by appropriate verification measures, but does not lead to a revision of the Geneva Protocol, which has been in force for over 50 years.

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Attempts to convene a special conference to revise the verification machinery of the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons have created a dangerous situation concerning this Convention. We believe that there are no grounds for raising the issue of this Convention's verification machinery. However, we think that issues related to the Convention, including its verification machinery, could be examined at the next Review Conference.

It cannot be denied that there is a dangerous tendency towards the proliferation of all kinds of studies which provide an opportunity for opponents of disarmament to avoid concrete negotiations on limiting the arms race by resorting to talk about examining its technical aspects. The Soviet Union is strongly opposed to using studies as a substitute for practical steps to curb the arms race. We believe that the studies already in progress should not be used as a pretext for refusing to engage in businesslike negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament issues. With this understanding in mind, we are not opposed to extending the mandate of the group of experts preparing a study on conventional armaments.

The history of the subject of the reduction of military budgets provides vivid examples of the results to which an obsession with studies, to the detriment of practical steps to curb the arms race, can lead. As long ago as at the twenty-eighth session, the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal to reduce the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and to allocate part of the funds thus saved for assistance to the developing countries.

Ten years have elapsed since this proposal was endorsed in the United Nations. Yet during this entire period no real progress has been achieved in reducing military expenditures. Instead, there has been an examination of proposals on "accounting models" and "comparability" concepts, which are aimed

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exclusively at avoiding a solution to this problem and distracting attention from the massive build-up of military budgets, including those of the United States and other NATO countries.

We are proposing that at this session, in order to give a renewed impetus to the search for a solution to this important problem, the General Assembly call upon all the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States to reach agreement not to increase military expenditures after 1 January 1984 and on specific measures for the subsequent practical mutual reduction of those expenditures. These measures could include reductions of military budgets both in percentage and in absolute terms, as previously proposed by the Soviet Union. The funds released as a result of a reduction of military expenditures would be used for economic and social development, including that of developing countries.

Those are our ideas concerning possible ways of resolving some urgent issues relating to the curbing of the arms race in chemical and other weapons. In these areas we adhere to the same approach based on principle as in the nuclear field. There are no weapons that the Soviet Union would not be willing to limit or prohibit on a mutual basis, and there is no problem that it would not be prepared to solve on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Moreover, in respect of any specific measures we are prepared to go as far as the other side.

Mr. C. P. N. SINGH (India): The First Committee is indeed very fortunate, Sir, to have at its helm during this critical period a Chairman of your wide diplomatic experience, sagacity and wisdom. Your devotion to the cause of disarmament is well known. Your country, Norway, and mine have traditional bonds of friendship which have been strengthened by our common desire to strive for a world in which peace and prosperity prevail. Under your able stewardship, we hope

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this Committee will achieve some important and concrete results at this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I should also like to felicitate the other officers of the Committee on their election to their important posts. I pledge my delegation's full support and co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities.

Earlier this year, when the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement met in New Delhi, they declared that the greatest peril facing the world was the threat to the survival of mankind as a result of nuclear war. The Final Document, adopted by consensus at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, raised hopes for progress towards disarmament. Unfortunately, in the past few years the chill of a new cold war has dampened these hopes. Tensions and mutual suspicion have increased and there has been a renewed escalation of the nuclear arms race. Détente has disappeared and military budgets, those of the great Powers in particular, have spiralled upwards. The increasing tensions of the present international situation have provided a fresh impetus to the arms race, which in turn creates further tension and lack of confidence. In a situation so fraught with fear, suspicion and insecurity, relatively small events have a tendency to become magnified. The threat of a nuclear war in the circumstances becomes more imminent.

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The deterioration of the global, political and strategic environment is manifested especially in the new qualitative dimension of the arms race. Weapons being developed and deployed now are of greater accuracy, shorter flying time, greater destructive power, and they are of a kind that makes verification by national means, of the type envisaged under the strategic arms limitation agreements, impossible. The extension of the arms race to outer space and the search for new systems, such as laser weapons, further accentuate the threat of a nuclear war.

There is a special dimension to the increasing arms race which is threatening new areas and regions of the world. In order to further the strategic interest of a few great Powers, sophisticated arms are flowing to certain countries in greater quantity as well as quality, irrespective of their legitimate defence requirements. New facilities and forces are being created and existing bases are being enlarged within the developing world, accentuating tensions and thereby increasing the threat to the security of the region concerned. A sense of insecurity and mistrust pervades the entire world, encompassing both the industrialized and the developing countries. Against this background, our primary objective must be to preserve peace, by first renouncing the use, or threat of the use, of nuclear weapons, simultaneously putting a freeze on the nuclear arms race, and then reversing the trend by implementing concrete measures of disarmament.

The main impediment to nuclear disarmament is the belief held by nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence and are preservers of peace, and also that a nuclear war has been avoided over the last three and a half decades by the deployment of massive arsenals of nuclear weapons. There is greater awareness now among the nuclear-weapon States themselves that the existing nuclear

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arsenals can destroy the world several times over. It is conceded by a number of former military commanders that effective command and control over a nuclear-weapon exchange would be impossible. Not only sages and pundits but also former strategists and policy-makers who believed fully in the efficacy of nuclear weapons in preserving world peace, have now themselves disavowed the notion that a nuclear war can be waged to achieve any political objectives.

It is cynical for nuclear-weapon Powers to hold on to the dangerous concept of deterrence that entails destruction not only of nuclear-weapon States themselves but also of the rest of the world. If deterrence has brought with it security, what kind of security is this when nuclear stockpiles keep increasing and conventional wars by proxy continue to be waged? Security for too long has been viewed essentially in military terms by the nuclear-weapon States. Security, however, is a concept which also has political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. The definition of security in terms of nuclear deterrence has led nuclear-weapon States to search for an illusory strategic balance. But they have not striven towards any balance in their approach to international relations leading to political understanding or to a more balanced development of the human and economic potential of the world which could be the real guarantor of security.

The mutual interest of survival of nuclear, as well as non-nuclear-weapon States and the economic interdependence between industrialized and developing countries together negate the concept of deterrence and underline the urgent need of pursuing policies that are really conducive to achieving lasting and durable peace.

The present state of negotiations on virtually the entire range of disarmament issues is stalemated. Within the framework of its agenda, the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, during its 1983 session, considered a number of pressing disarmament issues, such as a nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race

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and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and related matters, security of non-nuclear-weapon States, chemical and radiological weapons, prevention of the arms race in outer space and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Unfortunately, there has been hardly any progress on any of the major issues.

There is an increasing tendency to emphasize unimportant and subsidiary issues in such a manner that the over-riding objective of preventing a nuclear war and proceeding towards nuclear disarmament is impeded at every stage. Undue stress has been laid on piece-meal and peripheral aspects of disarmament, matters that do not directly touch the existing nuclear arsenals or do not affect the nuclear-weapon States directly, such as an a priori emphasis on verification and compliance treated in isolation from actual disarmament measures, confidence-building measures, nuclear-weapon-free zones, non-proliferation in the non-nuclear-weapon States, conventional disarmament, chemical weapons that nobody really wants and radiological weapons that do not exist and that cannot be described or defined accurately. These disarmament matters of secondary or peripheral importance have been deliberately brought to the forefront in order to give a semblance of activity or progress in the disarmament field and to delay progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Despite the untiring efforts of Mr. Garcia Robles, the high hopes created by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament regarding the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, have been belied. In the multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, as much as in the direct negotiations being conducted at present by some of the nuclear-weapon States, real negotiations have been replaced by polemics, used not for reaching agreements but for perpetrating their outmoded security doctrines and mobilizing public opinion in favour of these pernicious doctrines and the frenzied nuclear arms race based thereon.

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While the danger of nuclear war and the disastrous consequences of the nuclear arms race continue to engage the attention of the international community, a new and sinister peril is raising its head, namely the danger of an arms race in outer space. Space has been rightly called the last frontier of human endeavour. The exploration of space, the mastering of the technology of sending rockets to distant planets, the launching of sophisticated man-made satellites, are all elements of an exciting new chapter in the history of human achievement. Yet, like so many achievements of man in the past, this emerging mastery over space too is sought to be perpetrated in the service of death and destruction. Vast sums of money are being allocated for research into military uses of outer space and for the development of weapons that would be deployed in outer space.

Unless urgent action is taken by the international community to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space, there is little doubt that this last frontier of human endeavour would soon turn into a new battleground for the powerful nations on earth. While India is a developing country, it has taken a keen interest in the exploration of space and has achieved modest progress. India's achievements in this field are the result of its own scientific and technological endeavours and equally of the close co-operation it has enjoyed with several countries, including the USSR, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. We are convinced that beneficial international co-operation in the exploration of outer space can continue to develop only if outer space is preserved as the common heritage of mankind and used for the benefit of all mankind.

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In the field of disarmament and international security, we proceed from the premise that partial solutions or measures of a limited nature taken in isolation from the priority issues cannot bring us nearer the goal of general and complete disarmament unless conceived of within an overall perspective which lays down clear objectives, priorities and methods of implementation for disarmament measures. If all the elements of an overall plan, a global strategy, were not observed scrupulously and if the priority issues were ignored or sidetracked, the entire system of international security would be grossly distorted and would result, ultimately, in international anarchy. We feel that the pursuit of the goal of the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries has a rationale only if this is conceived of in the context of the reduction and eventual elimination of existing nuclear-weapon arsenals. However, while non-nuclear-weapon States have remained committed to using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, the nuclear-weapon States have continued to develop, produce and stockpile more sophisticated arsenals of nuclear weapons at an accelerated pace. This is an obvious example of the kind of distortion that can occur if a global approach is not strictly adhered to and the priority is deliberately allowed to be disturbed.

Our delegation's approach to the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is well known. The creation of such zones makes sense only if they are conceived of as part of a credible programme for the urgent achievement of nuclear disarmament. It is rightly acknowledged by the international community that the initiative for the creation of such zones must come from the countries of the region concerned and must follow the process of mutual consultations among them. Further, the region to be covered must be viable in the sense that it is a well-defined geographical and geopolitical unit. In view of the fact that any nuclear war will engulf the entire world, we believe that the nuclear-weapon-free zones idea has become unrealistic. The proposal to set up a

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nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia does not, in any of its aspects, meet the requirements widely recognized by the international community. South Asia is an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region and cannot be artificially isolated as a self-contained entity. Nuclear weapons have been deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, foreign military bases are being maintained and more are being sought in the Indian Ocean area. Naturally, the situation is further complicated by the fact that not all countries belonging to South Asia share a common perception and common security concerns. The proposal was put forward without any prior consultations among the countries concerned. In keeping with our consistent and clear-cut opposition to this proposal, my delegation will reject the proposal if it is once again brought before the First Committee.

The First Committee has traditionally considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. It is more than a decade since the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI). Over the years, the Ad Hoc Committee has been working towards the implementation of this Declaration, with varying degrees of interest being shown by the Powers most responsible for the steady deterioration of the security climate in that part of the world - the great Powers. Ever since the expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee consequent upon the adoption of the resolution on this subject in 1979, it has been the earnest hope of the littoral and hinterland States that the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean would contribute towards the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean and to the eventual realization of the objectives of the 1971 Declaration.

The evidence of the last few years has belied this expectation. As a result of the systematic dilatory tactics adopted by some of these countries, the dates

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for the convening of the Conference, scheduled to have been held in 1981 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, are yet to be finalized. Indeed, the position has deteriorated to a point where no time-frame at all can be considered for convening such a conference. The persistent refusal on the part of these States to commit themselves to a time-frame and the laying down of preconditions relating to the harmonization of views and the improvement of the political and security climate leads one to question the motive of their participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. My delegation remains committed to the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean as a necessary step in the implementation of the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The task before the Ad Hoc Committee should be to work for the implementation of the Declaration and not to scuttle it. We earnestly hope that before long we shall be in a position to move ahead in this regard.

During the forthcoming deliberations we shall also consider the relationship between disarmament and development. It is rightly acknowledged that the arms race on the one hand and development on the other are in a competitive relationship, particularly in terms of their claim on scarce resources, both financial and highly skilled manpower resources. Moreover, the arms race has been a principal factor responsible for the introduction of many rigidities and distortions in the world economy and world economic relations. The structural nature of the present global economic crisis derive principally from those distortions and rigidities. The arms race is behind the destabilization of the international monetary system. It has also distorted the desired evolution of healthy international exchange in a period of growing economic interdependence. By the same token, the catalytic effects of arms limitations and disarmament are bound to broaden the base of détente, contribute to the growth and stability of the world economy and lead to the

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channelling of some of the released resources for the benefit of the developing countries. We in the developing world are convinced of the interdependent nature of the economies of the developed and the developing countries. Sustained development of the North has to be tied to the accelerated development of the South. Similarly, in the political field, international relations must not be pursued in terms of conflict and competition or of gaining supremacy in nuclear strategic arsenals or conventional capability. This co-operative approach alone can lead to the establishment of the new international economic order and preserve international peace and security.

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In the present circumstances, it is our view and the view of a number of neutral and non-aligned countries that the nuclear-arms race has to be stopped before it can be reversed. The political issue of prime importance today is the prevention of nuclear war and the first and most urgent step in this direction is to agree at once on the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. On the initiative of the non-aligned countries, including India, the General Assembly has repeatedly declared the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity. During the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament my delegation put forward a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, in order to provide a concrete and practical basis for the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament. During the last General Assembly session a number of non-aligned countries sponsored a draft resolution requesting the Committee on Disarmament to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on such a draft convention. Unfortunately, efforts to establish a working group in the Committee on Disarmament to go into this question have not succeeded. It is our hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to begin negotiations on the draft already transmitted to it by the General Assembly.

Along with the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, another item of priority is a freeze on the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, together with a comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons, as well as an agreement on a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. After these urgent measures to halt the nuclear-arms race are implemented, steps to reverse the race by reducing the stockpiles according to a mutually agreed time schedule could then be undertaken, to achieve general and complete disarmament.

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The most dismal failure of the Committee on Disarmament during its session in 1983 was its inability to commence negotiations on the prevention of a nuclear war. The Committee could not reach any agreement on even setting up an ad hoc working group to carry out such negotiations. The General Assembly cannot but take a very serious view of this situation and give a political directive to the Committee to initiate negotiations on this issue, which critically affects the very fate of mankind, when it resumes its work at the beginning of 1984.

The peoples of all countries of the world desire peace; non-aligned countries in particular have been laying stress on peace and disarmament. In fact, during the very first non-aligned summit, held in Belgrade in 1961, the Heads of State and Government proclaimed that disarmament was an imperative and most urgent need of mankind. This was reiterated during the most recent summit meeting, held in New Delhi. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Chairperson of the seventh non-aligned summit, has characterized the Non-Aligned Movement as the biggest peace movement in history. We are encouraged by the fact that the call from nearly two thirds of the Member States of the international community is now joined in by large numbers of people from the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. This increasingly widening concern of the peoples all over the world about their survival, and their ever-growing willingness to come out in the streets and protest against the nuclear arms race, now represent the main hope for the survival of mankind. There is no doubt that a more vigorous mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament will have a positive impact on disarmament. We support the World Disarmament Campaign and believe that one of the important tasks of the United Nations and its specialized agencies is to educate the people of the world about the dangers of a nuclear war, the harmful consequences of the arms race and the positive relationship between disarmament and development. Mankind's ultimate

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desire is survival. If the peril that the world faces today is recognized by all, we may yet succeed in the task of ensuring the survival of the human race and a better tomorrow.

Mr. TORNUDD (Finland): May I begin by expressing my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, Sir, in the Chair of this First Committee. My Government and I myself have come to know you through the years as an able representative of your Government and a trusted colleague. Already before the start of work in this Committee, you demonstrated the kind of determination and efficiency that make us confident that you will lead this session of the Committee to a successful conclusion.

Our congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee.

I should also like to express the deepest condolences of my Government to the Governments and peoples of France and the United States on the tragic loss of life of members of the multinational force in Beirut over the weekend.

Today representatives of 35 States gather in Helsinki to prepare for the first stage of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, to be convened in Stockholm in January 1984. In its first stage the Conference will negotiate and adopt new confidence-building and security-building measures. Their purpose is to reduce the risks inherent in the present situation in Europe, the most heavily armed continent in the world.

The preparations now under way in the capital of Finland are a link in a long chain of events. We expect that they will lead to the operation of an entirely new negotiating body and thus to the adoption of further measures to promote security in Europe.

Europe remains at the centre of Finland's concern about security, disarmament and arms control. In our view, the checking of the continuing arms build-up,

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quantitative and qualitative, is of particular urgency in Europe. We find it useful that issues of disarmament in Europe will not be handled exclusively by the leading nuclear Powers and representatives of the military alliances. These issues are of direct concern to all States in Europe in their efforts to strengthen their own security.

Security should, in our view, be seen as a broad concept which cannot be reduced merely to a matter of military balance. It rests on stability and continuity, and it depends also on confidence and the knowledge of each other's intentions. The States concerned have created, through joint efforts, a negotiation structure covering all areas of co-operation in Europe. We welcome the inclusion of disarmament in this co-operation, first of all focusing on such measures as can help to reduce the risks of misapprehensions and miscalculations that could breed war.

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A major part of the concern over security in Europe has to do with the presence of nuclear weapons. They are not weapons in the old sense of the word and no rational political aims can be pursued by reliance on their use. To limit a nuclear war would scarcely be possible and its devastating effects would be felt by all nations. Thus nuclear weapons are political instruments. They do not serve any direct military purpose, but the threat of their use exists. No nuclear Power has considered it possible to exclude the use of nuclear weapons totally, although they have recognized the enormous responsibility that their possession implies.

The ultimate goal of the international community is to ensure the implementation of the principle of non-use of force. It is therefore necessary to achieve general and complete disarmament, including the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. During previous sessions of the General Assembly my delegation has emphasized the importance of limiting nuclear weapons so that there are no new owners of such weapons, no new deployment of such weapons and that no new types of such weapons are introduced. The use of force is prohibited by the Charter, but the peoples of the world are entitled to specific assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. They should never, in our view, be used in any circumstances.

Awareness of the danger of nuclear confrontation and the inadmissibility of the use of nuclear weapons should lead to further agreements by the nuclear Powers and the international community including, as a central component, a commitment not to use nuclear weapons.

First and foremost, the dialogue and negotiations between the leading nuclear Powers concerning all categories of nuclear weapons should continue, regardless of any changes in the international situation. The talks on strategic arms limitation have had a profound effect on peace and stability in the whole world. All nuclear arms control talks have a political impact on the entire international climate. The negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear forces bear witness to

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this. We hope that the parties will take further steps to reverse the present trend in the arms race. Security will not increase with the acquisition or deployment of new and even more destructive nuclear weapons but rather through their limitation and reduction in number. The world expects the dialogue between the nuclear-weapon States to help to turn the arms race in the opposite direction.

All arms control and disarmament efforts have both a military and a political dimension. They are mutually complementary. The two leading nuclear Powers have manifested their ability and will to conclude accords to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. In their agreement of 22 June 1973, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that an objective of their policies was to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons. They further agreed to practise restraint in their relations towards each other and towards all countries and to pursue a policy dedicated towards stability and peace. This agreement was an important step towards preventing, through international co-operation, the outbreak of nuclear war or military conflict. The experience gained from the conclusion of this agreement should be fully used in the further efforts carried out by the international community. Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States are an important means of reducing the nuclear danger. Finland, for its part, has given up the option of acquiring nuclear weapons of its own. Our Government has also declared that Finland will never allow any nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. The non-nuclear-weapon status of Finland is thus comprehensive. As a consequence we are entitled to demand that such weapons are never, in any circumstances, used against us and that we are not threatened with them. Unilateral assurances - albeit different in content - so far given by the nuclear Powers are welcome. The security needs of the non-nuclear-weapon States would, however, best be served through negotiated arrangements, binding and comprehensive in nature.

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The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is yet another measure by which States could build confidence, enhance security and lessen the danger of nuclear conflict. Such zones must be created freely by the States concerned, but it is evident that in order to be effective all such arrangements should be subject to negative security guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States. The initiative of my country with regard to a comprehensive Nordic arms control arrangement is well known. Finland will continue to pursue this objective.

Another effective means available to the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to reduce the nuclear risk is offered by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the view of the Finnish Government this Treaty remains the best instrument to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Some nations have chosen to stay outside the Treaty and refused to accept international safeguards on their nuclear activities. This hampers international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the benefits of which should be available to all nations. Progress in disarmament is of decisive importance for the effective implementation of the Treaty.

Finland pays particular attention to the careful preparation for the third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in 1985. We intend to participate actively in the preparatory work for this conference. In this connection I wish to re-emphasize the importance that an agreement on a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions would have both for the continued successful implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for progress in the disarmament field in general. We welcome the Swedish proposal for a draft treaty as a valuable contribution to the actual negotiations on this subject. The nuclear-weapon States cannot escape the great responsibility that they must bear with regard to the commitments already undertaken by them to work out a viable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

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I shall now go on to comment on some other areas of the work of the Committee on Disarmament to which Finland gives particular attention.

The first is that of chemical weapons. As a continuation of its long-standing project on chemical weapons verification, Finland presented last summer the seventh research report entitled "Identification of precursors of warfare agents, degradation products of non-phosphorus agents and some potential agents". The report will be made available to delegations in the First Committee. This research project is aimed at contributing to the creation of a technical infrastructure for a future mechanism to verify compliance.

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Finland remains prepared to offer its services in the verification of compliance when a treaty is concluded. We welcome the progress in the Committee on Disarmament concerning the verification issue.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is gaining further urgency. The 1967 outer space Treaty and other relevant treaties already prohibit various military activities in that particular environment. The present legal framework does not, however, meet the challenges of foreseeable developments in this field. The problem of preventing an arms race in outer space is both politically and legally a complex undertaking. Outer space is already used for an array of activities which have a scientific, civilian purpose of great importance. In addition, early warning and verification technology is important for the purposes of many arms control agreements.

Finland believes that the Committee on Disarmament should embark as early as possible upon substantive negotiations on outer space with a view to safeguarding that environment from a further arms race. We hope that at this session the First Committee will carefully study all proposals presented in this domain and pave the way for such negotiations.

Finally, with regard to the question of the enlargement of the membership of the Committee and the effectiveness of its work, the Government of Finland has for a long period actively followed the work of the Committee on Disarmament and sought full membership in that Committee. If elected, we would seek to co-operate, in accordance with our policy of neutrality, with all members of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly with those outside military alliances. Our record in the field of disarmament is known. If we are given the opportunity, we are ready to meet new challenges in this field.

Mr. JANNUZZI (Italy): Mr. Chairman, let me express to you first of all the warmest congratulations of my delegation on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am sure you will believe me when I say that we are extremely pleased to see such a distinguished and able representative of a friendly country, a country which is an outstanding example of true democracy, rationality, respect for freedom and human rights and with an active love for peace, presiding over our debates in such a difficult and troubled moment in history.

Year after year the First Committee of the General Assembly provides the world community with an opportunity to reflect on what has been achieved in the field of disarmament and international security, to analyse the causes which are at the root of the arms race and to deliberate upon the most appropriate ways "to save" - in the words of the Charter - "succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

We think it is important to reiterate at the outset our firm conviction that the need for arms control and disarmament today is more urgent than ever. The tragic attack against a civil airliner which caused the death of 269 innocent victims was a severe blow to international dialogue. That event, as you know, provoked the deepest emotion in the whole world, but it is now our task to resume the dialogue, since disarmament and arms control negotiations must continue as the security and the very survival of all peoples of the earth are involved.

In this connection, may I add from the very start that Italy attaches the greatest importance to the continuation of the East-West dialogue. Détente, in our view, has no alternatives and my Government is ready, as in the past, to play a constructive role in easing the tensions which have arisen as a consequence of recent events.

The easy response to the current tensions of the international situation would be to argue that only disarmament or only defence fundamentally matter. However,

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to insist that only one or only the other of these alternatives can enhance security and preserve peace is to misunderstand the basic components of security policy under present circumstances. The sensible position is to recognize that disarmament and defence complement and support each other, at least as long as universal respect for the principles of the Charter is yet to be obtained, and the threat of force, and even the use of force, remain a reality.

Security must be considered as a shared asset and States must show reciprocal restraint in their quest for peace. Moreover, in our view, security goes beyond the military field. The growing economic gap between developed and developing countries is not only one of the most serious problems of our time but also a source of instability which is a matter of concern to all of us. Any consideration of the security aspects of the world situation cannot ignore the increasing importance of the North-South dialogue within this context. The United Nations is the forum where all the facets of this problem can be combined and therefore it has a most significant role to play in the promotion of conditions of stability worldwide.

I have previously observed that, in the nuclear age, security must be considered as a shared asset. Such a concept of security is based on mutual trust and openness, rather than on fear and secrecy. Confidence-building measures are a means acknowledged and advocated by the United Nations for improving the prospects for arms control and disarmament. A substantive and detailed debate over the concept and objectives of confidence-building has taken place this year for the first time in the Disarmament Commission. As a result, the growing importance of confidence-building measures was generally recognized. We regard such a development as a significant step towards the world-wide affirmation and acceptance of this instrument for promoting stability and safeguarding peace, and we

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acknowledge that confidence-building measures should vary in accordance with the different situations existing in the different regions. For our part, we believe that the convening of the forthcoming Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is a recognition of the importance being attached to confidence-building measures and we hope that concrete and effective measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe will emerge from that Conference.

Italy believes that the Conference will be a unique opportunity to promote better conditions for security and stability in Europe and, as a consequence, in the world as a whole. The Italian Government has been deeply involved in the elaboration of an appropriate mandate for the Conference and is determined to make a constructive contribution to its work.

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States that pursue a policy of transparency and openness with regard to their military capabilities render an essential contribution to the enhancement of international security. Participation in the United Nations exercise in reporting and comparing military expenditures should be an important aspect of such a policy. It is indeed regrettable that some States, particularly in Europe, still seem to regard the concealment of any military data - including those concerning their military budgets - as a component of their security. We believe that transparency, comparability and verification are the necessary prerequisites to achieving some positive results in the area of reduction of military budgets.

The statement delivered on behalf of the 10 member countries of the European Community by the representative of Greece, the content of which my country of course entirely endorses, makes it unnecessary for me to address a number of more specific items at this stage. I shall therefore confine myself to expressing our views on some of the issues to which we attach a special importance, in particular, the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The first question is embodied in a specific item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee, unfortunately, cannot as yet report on an in-depth consideration of this item. But it can report about some meaningful preliminary progress achieved in devising a common approach to the issue. First of all, an agreement emerged about the importance of discussing the subject and of establishing an ad hoc working group. Secondly, various proposals were submitted by all sides containing specific suggestions for the formulation of a mandate. The negotiations that ensued succeeded in considerably narrowing the differences. We believe that a final agreement can be reached early next year that will allow the Committee on Disarmament to exercise fully its responsibilities in this field. Now

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that the competence of the Committee on Disarmament to deal with the substance of the matter has been firmly established, and that prospects for setting up an ad hoc working group appear promising, our deliberations here should be aimed at accelerating the momentum in Geneva, but refraining from introducing divisive issues.

My delegation has stated several times that it attaches great importance to the question of the banning of anti-satellite weapons, since their deployment could have a destabilizing effect. However, we must acknowledge the fact that when an ad hoc working group on this problem is established in the Committee on Disarmament, it must proceed, first of all, with an examination of all aspects relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and thus, all existing proposals and future initiatives. Such preliminary work is indeed a logical prerequisite to any constructive consideration of this complex problem. It is a sound approach and it should not be pre-empted by premature initiatives which could only jeopardize its results.

It is the conviction of my delegation that this year's General Assembly resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be built upon the elements of convergence which have emerged in Geneva, in order to encourage and support substantive discussions within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the area of chemical and bacteriological weapons, Italy pursues, first of all, the objective of the conclusion of a comprehensive and, again, verifiable convention, which indeed it is possible to achieve in a relatively short time. For that purpose, it is essential that all sides be adequately instructed and willing to take an active part in the negotiations. In 1983, unfortunately, this has not been the case for all delegations, some of which did not give sufficient recognition

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to the fact that the convention will only be effective if it is coupled with an effective system of control and verification. We hope that the five-months' recess in the negotiations will be fully exploited in order to give new impetus to this vital issue. Pending the conclusion of such a convention, all efforts should be made to ensure world-wide compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons, as well as with the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention which bans the possession of those weapons.

Therefore, we strongly support the establishment, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of an effective mechanism to investigate promptly any allegations of violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In the same spirit, we regard as extremely useful the holding of a special conference of States parties to the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention, to establish effective procedures for compliance with its provisions.

I would like at this point to add a few remarks about the new and disturbing situation which has arisen in the last eight years in western Europe, a region of the world to which Italy belongs and the security and stability of which had long been ensured by a balance of forces between East and West.

Since the second half of the 1970s, the security of western Europe, as well as of other regions of the world, has been threatened by the deployment in Soviet territory of large numbers of SS-20 missiles. The deployment of these qualitatively new and highly destabilizing intermediate-range nuclear weapons has taken place at a time when no reason, political or military, could justify the decision to proceed with it. On the contrary, this deployment took place at a time when the international community, and the European Community particularly, was placing high hopes on détente and co-operation between East and West.

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Faced with this situation, Italy's concern has constantly been to work for restoring at the lowest possible level the balance of forces which has been broken since 1976 by the deployment of Soviet SS-20s. This was the sense and purpose of the decision made in December 1979, and let me point out that this decision was not to start to install missiles immediately but called for negotiations to eliminate or reduce the levels of longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) on a global basis, while providing for a programme aimed at restoring the balance of forces, should negotiations fail to achieve this purpose.

The Soviet response to this legitimate and indeed self-restrained expression of our security concerns has been frankly disappointing. The INF negotiations which started in Geneva in November 1981 have so far yielded little, if any, results. The efforts of the Soviet side at the negotiating table have concentrated on just one goal, that of preserving, with minor adjustments, the military superiority it has achieved in Europe in terms of longer range INFs. While deploying over 200 SS-20s, each of them with three nuclear warheads, since December 1979, the Soviet Union has continued to claim that an approximate parity existed in Europe in that field. This insistence by the Soviet side in denying an imbalance which is so obvious and so increasingly threatening for European stability, is not the least source of concern for the European countries, particularly the non-nuclear ones - including, of course, Italy - which are or feel, exposed to that threat.

As I said before, our ideal goal has been and remains the complete elimination on a global basis of these destabilizing weapons, the so-called zero option. Since the INF negotiations have shown that this goal is at the present time unrealistic, alternative proposals have been tabled by the West in Geneva, all of which represent a bold attempt to achieve significant progress in nuclear disarmament

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through deep reduction in longer-range INFs. The last of these attempts were the proposals put forward by the President of the United States in his address to the General Assembly at the beginning of this year's session. These initiatives, which were undertaken with the full support of, and after intensive consultations among, the Governments concerned, including the Italian Government, have once more shown the flexibility which exists on the Western side and its willingness to seek sincerely a mutually acceptable solution to the problem. In fact, all reasonable concerns expressed by the Soviet Union were taken into account in these proposals, thus paving the way to an equitable agreement on INFs.

The response of the Soviet Union did not depart from its previous refusal to acknowledge the fundamental security concerns and interests of West European countries. We regret this. We hope, of course, that this position will change with time. Positive results can still be achieved in Geneva and we firmly believe that, just like the United States has been negotiating while the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s was in progress, the Geneva negotiations must not be interrupted at this stage. Deployment in western Europe, if started, will in its early stages have limited military significance and will represent, above all, a political signal. The process envisaged is a gradual one, which will at no time acquire an irreversible character, thus leaving ample opportunities for an agreement.

Therefore, we welcome the intention stated by the United States to continue to negotiate as long as needed to reach a positive result in Geneva and we hope that the Soviet Union will itself recognize that an equitable agreement would serve its interests far better than those threatening alternatives which have been mentioned in very recent times.

The INF negotiations in Geneva are just one aspect, however important, of a wider problem. Deep concern has been repeatedly expressed at the lack of progress

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in talks on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war in view of the catastrophic consequences that the outbreak of an atomic conflict would have for the survival of humanity. Italy attaches the utmost importance to these themes which are so vital for international security and, in light of their immense implications for the future of mankind, believes that a high priority should be given to concrete negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, on these issues. The ongoing talks on INF in Geneva, which I have already mentioned, and the strategic arms reduction negotiations (START) on the reduction of the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, are both negotiating processes which we follow closely with the purpose of supporting and promoting, as much as we can, their continuation and intensification.

The Italian Government hopes that the negotiations on strategic weapons will lead to deep reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Such reductions should concern in the first place those systems which are more destabilizing and should be coupled with appropriate confidence-building measures in the nuclear field.

Seeking to reduce weapons and forces substantially, not just to limit their levels of deployment in this or that country, is the most effective way to avert the danger of war, in particular a nuclear war. There can be no higher priority for our endeavours than this one. This Committee and the General Assembly have rightly devoted much of their attention to this task during previous sessions. The Committee on Disarmament has taken up this subject of supreme importance in the same spirit. Although it was not possible to agree on the appropriate format to deal substantively with it, we are confident that these difficulties will be overcome in the future. Many concrete and practical proposals exist which constitute a good basis on which to start serious work. I wish to recall in particular those formulated in Geneva by the Federal Republic of Germany and by Belgium, which we strongly support.

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Many countries, including Italy, have stressed the fact that the struggle to save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe must be conceived as part of a wider struggle to establish world public order itself. In fact, in this small, interdependent world, aggression should be inadmissible and peace indivisible. Precisely because we live in a nuclear age, States should strive to prevent not only nuclear war, but war itself. Wars starting with conventional weapons can easily escalate into a different kind of war.

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Progress in the existing negotiations on nuclear disarmament would also provide the most suitable momentum for achieving a comprehensive test ban. As a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1969, Italy continues to regard a comprehensive test-ban treaty as an important objective.

The Committee on Disarmament has done useful work on various aspects of a test ban, in particular those relating to verification and compliance, which remain the crux of the problem. With the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty approaching, it is hardly necessary to recall the need for positive results in this sector of nuclear disarmament in order to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Italian Government has traditionally made an active contribution to the world disarmament process in all the forums in which the issues of disarmament and arms control have been discussed and it is ready to continue on this path in the future as well. We must not forget, however, that the arms race is the symptom and the consequence of a widespread feeling of insecurity and uncertainty rather than the cause of the present deterioration of the world situation. The breakdown in world public order which prevails today, in spite of the existence of the United Nations and of its Charter, is at the root of today's tension, which in turn increase the possibility of war.

Unfortunately, institutions and instruments for strengthening international security are undergoing a process of gradual erosion. The report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Organization is enlightening in this regard; its conclusions are lucid and inescapable. The strengthening of the international organizations, the building up of respect for international law and the recognition of the social as well as the economic content of security, to which all countries are called upon to contribute, have to go hand in hand with disarmament efforts. These can be effective only if they take place in a climate

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of mutual confidence and trust. Declarations of good intent and good will are not sufficient at this stage; they must be coupled with a readiness to undertake some specific - even if minor - positive step in order to enhance reciprocal confidence.

It is especially the urgent task of the international community and of the international organizations to exert every possible effort in order to reverse, by means of specific, appropriate action the alarming tendencies that prevail today and to promote a renewal of dialogue which will constitute the basis for real progress in the field of disarmament.

Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire) (interpretation from French): I congratulate you, Sir, on my own behalf and that of my delegation on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. My delegation joins all those that have spoken before us in praising your personal qualities and those of your colleagues in the Bureau and expresses the hope that, thanks to your merits, our work will be crowned with success.

As we face the challenge of disarmament and the spectre of nuclear war, and as we strive to allocate our resources for the well-being of mankind, I note with pleasure that your country, Norway, is a beacon pointing the way, since we know that Norway is one of the very few countries in the world devoting more than 1 per cent of its gross national product to assistance to third-world countries, thus demonstrating by specific action of great significance its dedication to the cause of peace and international solidarity.

Even a cursory analysis of the general debate at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly shows that our Organization - and therefore all mankind - is worried; and everything that is happening in our international society suggests that we have every reason to be worried. While mankind has never before made such progress in science and technology, we must also recognize, unfortunately, that

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never before has mankind strayed so far from peace, solidarity and the triumph of the ideals of the rule of law.

Not only has protectionism come to the fore, not only have hotbeds of tension developed and intensified in many places, not only have cynicism and aggression become common currency without our having even the strength or the clear-sightedness to condemn them, but, worse, the arms race is escalating day by day, bringing mankind closer to the cataclysm that we all so greatly fear.

Nevertheless, in spite of this growing and increasingly obvious threat, we are behaving like people who are unaware of what is going on or who believe that without our knowing it or even wanting it some foreign Power will be kind enough to protect us from this threat.

What other explanation could there be for the destruction of the South Korean civilian airliner? How else, despite the specious arguments invoked, can the absence from the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union be explained? How else can the overt or covert acts of aggression throughout the world - these remote-controlled, proxy wars, these endless negotiations on strategic weapons or Euro-missiles, and so on - be explained?

That is why my delegation believes it is high time we became aware of this threat, shoulder our responsibilities and, abandoning our parochialism, took measures to safeguard peace and the future of mankind.

If we continue to play with fire, there is no doubt that one day at least some of our feathers are going to get singed.

(Mr. Umba di Lutete, Zaire)

If the problems of disarmament and peace could be settled by a mere stroke of the pen, if all mankind were not concerned and if the consequences of our heedlessness were not so tragic, it would suffice to say that, after all, the major Powers should, in the final analysis, be allowed to destroy themselves and leave us in peace. Unfortunately - or perhaps fortunately - even if those Powers wished to leave us in peace, we should be involved in these events in one way or another.

It is therefore urgently necessary to tackle the real problems properly. We have wasted enough time. And we must point out also that, even with good will, it is not in this forum that real decisions on disarmament are adopted. Be that as it may, it should not prevent us from making our voice heard.

And even if we conclude reasonably well-prepared agreements, as long as the political will is lacking and as long as those that are truly responsible cling to their positions, little progress will be made.

In this respect, while we recognize the complexity of the problem - which is at once political, technological and psychological - we cannot fail to stress that the way we tackle these problems hardly gives rise to optimism. Thanks to the personal efforts and merits of our Chairman, it has been possible, for example, to regroup certain subjects. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that the existence of 28 items - some of which have been subdivided into three or four subitems - convey the impression that perhaps far too prominent a place has been given to technology in a field in which, as we have said, an awareness of the danger and the necessary political will should come first.

It is a little as if we were going round in circles: yesterday's resolutions simply give rise to today's resolutions and yesterday's reports lead to further reports. That could be a vicious circle or at least a squaring of the circle.

(Mr. Umba di Lutete, Zaire)

How can we get out of this impasse? In our opinion, by trying to simplify an already complicated question, and by getting down to the essentials. What is essential, in the opinion of my delegation, is general and widespread disarmament. Of course, nuclear weapons are the most dangerous and that is why, in the opinion of my delegation, we must ban the manufacture and testing of these weapons and eliminate those that exist. It might be naive to say this, but this is the only solution. For as long as there are weapons in the hands of the adversary, then the others might feel that they must have them too in order to maintain a certain qualitative and quantitative superiority. That will lead to polemics and only encourage a race for supremacy. In order for disarmament to be real and possible, we need an effective generally accepted system of controls. All the rest is mere details.

Should we maintain a balance at around 800 or 600 warheads? Should each delivery vehicle have two or three warheads? This is a little bit like trying to determine the sex of angels. At the present stage of the destructive power of these devices, two or three delivery vehicles will not guarantee victory.

I am not saying that we should not have balance; on the contrary, balance is needed. But balance which is not true balance is a false balance, or at least it is only a balance of fear. And fear, as is well known, is a poor adviser.

We have some sympathy with those who are seeking zones of peace and nuclear-free zones throughout the world. But what is the true significance of this? Does this mean that certain continents and other regions should be doomed to war and destruction? When these regions and continents have been destroyed, what about the others? As we have already said, we are all concerned. We shall be saved together or we shall perish together. Let us have no illusions. Let us not deceive ourselves.

(Mr. Umba di Lutete, Zaire)

We have learned - and this is certainly praiseworthy - that some Powers have solemnly declared that they will never use nuclear weapons first. That is encouraging and it is a first gesture. But once again, what is the true significance of that? What would happen if a major Power committed massive aggression with conventional weapons of mass destruction? Would not the other country, the victim, have to defend itself with whatever means it had available?

That is why, in the opinion of my delegation, the sole solution lies in complete disarmament, in condemning aggression, which must be banned, and in the creation of an effective system of control. For as long as there are wars of aggression, there will always be self-defence. And aggressors, to avoid self-defence, will always try to use major methods of destruction.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

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FIRST COMMITTEE
14th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 25 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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Mr. Vo Anh Tuan (Viet Nam)
Mr. Nuñez Mosquera (Cuba)
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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139 to 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

The CHAIRMAN: The first speaker this afternoon is the representative of the Holy See, on whom I now call.

Sister Marjorie KEENAN (Holy See): The Holy See, in speaking for the first time in this Committee, Sir, is happy to offer you its warmest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee.

The Holy See extends its deepest condolences to France and to the United States on the tragic loss of life so recently suffered.

At the end of this general debate on disarmament questions, the delegation of the Holy See is grateful to be able to address the members of the First Committee, thereby showing its particular interest in disarmament as an essential component in the establishment of a more stable peace in the world. The Holy See, here and in other forums, has repeatedly stressed the importance of disarmament, of lessening and eliminating the threat of war, and in particular nuclear war. In this brief intervention, therefore, the Holy See delegation would like to concentrate on certain aspects of the subjects at present under discussion, always in the light of promoting the dignity of the human person and the quality of life in society.

It has become increasingly evident in recent years that the life and well-being of the peoples of the world are dependent on factors that are outside their immediate control. This is patent in the economic, financial and monetary realms, where the very mechanisms on which international life is now founded are being called into question. This same phenomenon is equally, if more subtly, at play in disarmament and security questions. This lack of ability to effect decisions, be it on the part of people or at time, of nations, is more and more

(Sister Marjorie Keenan, Holy See)

frequently perceived and experienced as a negative interdependence militating against the common good of humanity.

An example of this negative interdependence may be found in the present situation prevailing in the field of nuclear armaments. While such arms are held by only a few, other States, and indeed people across the world, feel threatened by them and are yet impotent to do more than urge the nuclear-weapon States to halt their arms build-up and to reduce the threat of such weapons.

In the field of conventional armament, this negative interdependence is evident in the economic and social fields. Studies increasingly demonstrate that, when large sums of money are spent on arms, be it in the industrialized or the so-called developing countries, there is a negative effect on economic growth and development. This is particularly tragic, as the Holy See continues to stress, in the case of countries with extremely limited resources where unmet human needs dominate.

There is certainly no need to dwell on the interdependent nature of many of the present limited conflicts. While these are very often rooted in local socio-economic and cultural situations, such conflicts are increasingly becoming the scene of international confrontation, thus adding to the already existing tensions between powerful States.

This situation of negative interdependence is hardly conducive to disarmament but is rather the sign of a troubled world, of an uneasy peace that renders increasingly important and urgent steps and agreements which will lead to that positive interdependence among nations on which the United Nations is founded.

At a time when the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control appears extremely difficult to attain, it is of the greatest importance to restore to nations and people the sense and conviction that peace is

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possible, that the arms race can effectively be halted. In the present situation, a positive contribution towards the restoration and strengthening of hope in the reality of a peaceful world would be to identify even those limited measures which actually and effectively bind together the security interests of States and to state them formally in international agreements. The multiplication of such partial steps would gradually build up effective international solidarity and would likewise greatly reinforce major efforts to reduce the threat of war. This patient effort in the interest of peace and the well-being of humanity would require the avoidance of what Pope John Paul II has called the phenomenon of rhetoric, as well as the taking of hasty decisions that merely serve as short-sighted propaganda victories. This determination to multiply areas of common interest for the good of humanity would also call for an effort to cut across the mental distinctions and rigid priorities that are sometimes established between nuclear and conventional disarmament, between global and regional approaches. Basically it would require a realistic assessment of the possible within the present serious situation in an effort to identify more and more closely a nation's self-interest with the common good of humanity.

This attempt to identify such areas of common interest has already found expression in several important negotiating efforts. The early conclusion of these negotiations would have a very positive influence on the present international climate, itself a cause of some of the blockages encountered in these very negotiations. In addition to these already existing efforts, the international community, through the United Nations, has identified new areas or subjects for negotiation which must be undertaken not only to halt the present arms race but also to prevent its spreading to new arenas. It is obvious that the path of negotiation is more difficult in times of heightened tension, increasing the

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importance of strictly binding and verifiable agreements. Negotiation is, however, the way to peace and the basis of the more open dialogue among peoples and nations that builds trust and respect. Negotiations require, as Pope John Paul II recently said to the diplomatic corps in Austria,

"an honest and sincere diplomacy which renounces deceitful cunning, falsehood and intrigue [and which] respects the legitimate claims and demands of partners".

There are certain important negotiations which have been under way for long years and which therefore hold out certain hopes to the peoples of the world. On the other hand, failure to achieve results in these very negotiations is indicative of the inability to halt the arms race in general. The completion of, or real progress in, such negotiations would therefore be an extremely positive sign of hope. Among such negotiations are those related to a comprehensive test ban, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and the peaceful use of outer space.

Twenty years ago the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests. At that time Pope Paul VI saw in it "a proof of goodwill, a pledge of harmony, and a promise of a more serene future". The long-awaited conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be a much-needed guarantee of the willingness to take serious measures to ensure the well-being of humanity.

Closely related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1971 the Holy See, certainly not a military Power, acceded to that Treaty because of its belief that the aims of the Treaty corresponded to its own mission of peace and that they constituted an important step towards the promotion of a just and stable basis for peace and

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co-operation among peoples. In the intervening years the nuclear-power States have not yet been able to fulfil their obligations as regards nuclear disarmament; nor is there as yet universal adherence to the Treaty. Horizontal proliferation remains a constant danger when vertical proliferation continues unabated. In this light the coming Third Review Conference merits careful preparation. Steps to halt the nuclear arms build-up, as well as a more universal adherence to the Treaty, would both alleviate the fears of the world's people and open the way to other disarmament agreements.

Chemical weapons have long been regarded with particular abhorrence, and it is difficult to conceive of any circumstance in which the use of such weapons would be justified. Since certain agreements, limited in nature, already exist in this area, it would give great hope to humanity if a treaty were concluded that would definitely remove this category of weapons from the world's arsenals. A strong verification and complaints procedure would also remove from international discussion reports of the possible use of such weapons, thereby increasing the climate of international trust.

Finally, the Holy See will continue to urge that effective agreements be reached that would ensure that outer space remain the common heritage of humanity and that it be used only for peaceful purposes that would benefit all.

Negotiations are one basic means of increasing trust and of building up positive interdependence. Another means would be confidence-building measures, seen both as a necessary complement to more formal negotiations and as going beyond them.

(Sister Marjorie Keenan, Holy See)

The Holy See is therefore happy to note that the first phase of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, agreed upon at the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, will be devoted to confidence-building and security-building measures. The consensus reached on the holding of that Conference is in itself positive. In addition, ongoing consideration of confidence-building measures within the United Nations would certainly benefit other parts of the world and could facilitate regional agreements that would reinforce global efforts towards disarmament.

One great sign of hope in the efforts towards disarmament is the increasing consciousness of the relationship between disarmament and development. Positive interdependence would indeed be increased were some of the vast sums spent on arms used to better the lives of people, particularly the poorer people of the world. The Holy See is therefore particularly happy to see that consideration is being given to the establishment of a disarmament fund for development, something that Pope Paul VI urged in Bombay in 1964. While recognizing the difficulties of such a project, the Holy See considers it to be of present symbolic significance and that it could eventually effectively contribute to the alleviating of basic human needs in the event of the conclusion of disarmament agreements and the conscious decision to reduce military budgets in favour of development.

The Holy See has long been concerned about the relationship between science and armaments. The proper object of science is the betterment of life, and it is a tragic deviation that the resources of science should be turned towards death and destruction. The immense possibilities for collaboration among nations in the field of science, where positive interdependence is in some cases already a reality, makes this misuse of science weigh heavily on the international conscience. Pope Paul II, speaking at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and elsewhere, has repeatedly stressed that the cause of

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humanity will be served only if science is joined with conscience. The Holy See hopes that this moral aspect will be given consideration in the discussion of research and development in the field of armaments.

In concluding, the Holy See delegation would like once again to express its support for the work of the United Nations. It has an irreplaceable contribution to make in the building of international solidarity. Through it, the peoples of the world can find hope that nations and States are able to work together for the good of all. For this to become a reality, however, the authority of the United Nations must be recognized and strengthened. This can be done only if its actions are credible in the eyes of the world and if its decisions are not the result of short-sighted selfish interest. Likewise, whenever the United Nations is circumvented its power is weakened. Whenever it is used properly its moral authority is enhanced. While an imperfect instrument, the United Nations is the bearer of hope. Its Charter remains the pledge of the will of almost the totality of the nations of the world, and hence of the peoples of the world, to work together for the peace and security of all.

Mr. HUQ (Bangladesh): Sir, our delegation has already had the privilege of congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee. During the past few weeks we have seen ample evidence of your diplomatic skill, which reinforces our firm belief that this Committee will achieve some concrete progress under your stewardship.

In our general statement last week we indicated the position of the Bangladesh delegation on various disarmament issues currently before the Committee. While doing so we reiterated our firm conviction that we must put an end to the continuing escalation of the arms race in order to ensure the peace and security

(Mr. Huq, Bangladesh)

that would preserve our planet. We also mentioned that disarmament should be our immediate and central objective. In our statement today we would like to deliberate specifically on the question of nuclear disarmament.

The tragedy of Hiroshima proved beyond any shadow of a doubt the immeasurable power of destruction of the nuclear weapon. The somatic and genetic effects on living beings of radiations emanating from it are horrifying. This one weapon alone is sufficient to annihilate the whole human race - nay, all living beings. The time lag in realizing this threat of the obliteration of our species was not long. Following the detonation of the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, the scientists came forward with this grave warning without any loss of time. The awareness and the response to this warning in almost all the countries of the world were spontaneous. Consequently, as early as 1954 the question of the cessation of nuclear tests was discussed by the General Assembly. Since then the Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions aimed at preventing and discouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but to what effect? We observe to our great dismay that the militarily significant States, particularly the super-Powers, are year after year stockpiling more and more sophisticated and powerful nuclear weapons.

It may be highlighted here that since the time of Hiroshima stocks of nuclear weaponry have reached such gigantic proportions that a fraction of the weaponry currently in our possession could destroy our civilization many times over. Are we not convinced that any nuclear outbreak, however limited, would not only bring in its train high casualties but also expose the survivors to radioactive radiations which in turn would be a potential source of genetic deformation, handing down the mutant genes to future generations, causing the growth of a degenerated and deformed population and/or the development of an entirely new species. This is indeed a horrifying thought.

Mr. LAKHOUIT (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I wish first, Sir, to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee and to assure you of our complete co-operation in the exercise of your important function. We extend our congratulations also to the other officers of the Committee.

The work of the present session of the General Assembly gives the international community a new opportunity to consider the present situation in the field of disarmament and international security. The possibility given to our Committee, at this stage of its work, to have a comprehensive discussion of the various agenda items inscribed in the framework of the general problem of disarmament represents, in our view, a procedure that not only has the advantage of enabling us to have a general debate by which, it is hoped, we shall gain valuable time, but also, and above all, has the merit of allowing us to establish a synthesis and draw some conclusions on a problem whose division into different chapters should not detract from its basic importance and whose subject remains, in our opinion, the same - namely, our concern at the highly disturbing level reached by the arms race and the progress achieved by science and technology in this field.

In that respect, my delegation, together with some others, has had the opportunity to recall in this Committee that the direct confrontation between the major Powers is leading inevitably, today more than ever before, to greater distrust and to the use of force to ensure that the interests that are at stake prevail. We have also demonstrated the role of the small States in the face of such a situation and, above all, the results achieved at the level of international relations thanks to the intervention of these States, which have contributed effectively to attenuating differences and to replacing confrontation by dialogue. We feel that it is thanks to the efforts of these States that we can now congratulate ourselves on disarmament negotiations which, for several years now, have had relatively encouraging results.

(Mr. Lakhouit, Morocco)

To speak only of the United Nations, these efforts have been made in the General Assembly and in our Committee. In that connection, despite the unfortunate failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the achievements of the first special session are still, in our view, completely valid and constitute a valuable step on the road to disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. In particular, they have made it possible for the first time to establish in our Organization a genuine mechanism for multilateral negotiations on disarmament; that is, the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, of which my country has the privilege of being a member.

In this respect, my delegation has repeatedly expressed here and elsewhere the importance that the Government and people of Morocco attach to our participation in the work of that Committee. I can once again state that we shall spare no effort, in that forum and in all circumstances, to make a positive contribution to the general effort to progress in the negotiations towards better results.

The report submitted by the Committee this year deals with the main problems considered during its past two sessions. It is true that the results did not live up to our hopes, but it would not be an exaggeration to say that important work has been done this year and that essential aspects of the problem of disarmament have been examined in a useful way.

Among the basic questions that the Committee has studied and that are on the agenda of our Committee, I would mention the negotiations that have taken place - indeed, they should have been taking place for a long time now - on a treaty aimed at extending the prohibition of nuclear tests to all environments. My country, which has adhered to the 1963 Treaty on a partial ban on tests of nuclear weapons, has always stressed the necessity of concluding a comprehensive treaty banning tests of these weapons in all environments and forever.

(Mr. Lakhuit, Morocco)

This treaty must necessarily apply to all the nuclear States, and we deplore the fact that two delegations from among those States have not been able, this year again, to participate in the preliminary work of the Committee on that question.

My delegation is deeply aware of the specific difficulties involved in the negotiation of such a treaty. None the less, we hope that the consensus of the General Assembly on the prohibition of these tests will be expressed during this session in a single resolution asking the Committee on Disarmament - or, rather, the Conference on Disarmament - to make progress in the negotiation of a treaty on this question, without prejudging the various advantages or shortcomings of existing proposals on the matter.

I do not wish to dwell on this question, nor do I wish to recall here the danger now facing the world because of the renewed escalation of the nuclear arms race, in its two-fold dimension - quantitative and qualitative. For, as the Political Declaration adopted by the seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, states:

"... the renewed escalation ..., as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations". (A/38/132, annex, para. 28)

(Mr. Lakhouit, Morocco)

My country, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has always considered it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be at the mercy of the security interests of a few nuclear-weapon States. We have always affirmed that measures to prevent nuclear war and to bring about nuclear disarmament must necessarily take into account the security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States as well as the nuclear-weapon States. In this respect, we have always stressed the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, through the adoption of an international instrument which is drawn up by common agreement and contains effective international provisions to preserve all non-nuclear-weapon States, without discrimination, from the use or the threat of the use of nuclear arms.

(Mr. Lakhout, Morocco)

By signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty Morocco has renounced nuclear weapons permanently in a legally binding manner. We remain convinced that in the absence of other instruments the strengthening of the international non-proliferation régime is the most important and effective way of preventing an unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this connection the third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, preparations for which will begin in the near future, provides an opportunity for renewed efforts to obtain universal adherence to the Treaty and for the implementation of genuine non-proliferation measures, such as the provision of nuclear material and equipment and fuel cycle technology and servicing, and measures to extend and improve the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Another question continues to arouse the interest of my delegation: the prevention of the arms race in outer space. In our view, this question remains all the more important because the progress made by mankind in the conquest of outer space, through science and technology has, unfortunately, been accompanied by increased efforts by certain Powers to use outer space for military purposes, the very same Powers that are parties to the 1967 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in which it is stipulated that outer space should be used exclusively in the interests of mankind. Yet thousands of satellites already in orbit are actually being used, or rather misused, for military purposes, such as to serve as bases for guidance and navigation systems for weapons of mass destruction.

Accordingly this year, in the Group of 21, my delegation reaffirmed its support for the creation in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group with a mandate to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 37/83 and paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Lakhouit, Morocco)

Other questions were studied in detail by the Committee on Disarmament at its last session. High priority was given in particular to negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons. Much useful work has been accomplished by the Ad Hoc Working Group on this question, in spite of the many complex technical problems arising out of this question. Nevertheless, we have the impression that there are prospects for an agreement on a total and definitive ban on chemical weapons, even though many important problems concerning verification remain to be resolved.

With regard to the question of radiological weapons, although certain aspects of the problem have yet to be resolved, we are indeed pleased at the thorough discussions and negotiations conducted this year in the ad hoc group on this question, which made it possible to understand better certain aspects of the problem and to advance, slowly but surely, towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of these weapons.

The many negotiations now under way on partial aspects of disarmament should not lead us to lose sight of the major interest and primary importance that should be given to the question of general and complete disarmament.

Together with many other delegations, we believe that the procedure of studying certain disarmament problems separately, and trying with varying degrees of success to deal with certain of these aspects of disarmament one by one, will at the same time make it easier for us to make progress towards a comprehensive disarmament programme, even if it takes a long time. For solutions arrived at separately on individual aspects of the arms race, such as most of those we are currently considering, in fact involve only the interests of the nuclear Powers, while international tension, insecurity and threats to sovereignty and freedom throughout the world are largely the result of the conventional arms race. There are more countries concerned by the threat of that kind of war than there are those concerned by a nuclear war; in other words, the nuclear-weapon States are, after

(Mr. Lakhuit, Morocco)

all, so few that they can undertake direct discussions concerning their interests, while the immense number of problems facing the rest of the world are not likely to be resolved solely by a halt in the nuclear arms race.

That is why we were among the first to draw the attention of the United Nations to the need to proclaim certain regions of the world as nuclear-weapon-free zones. We were pleased that the Latin American countries succeeded some time ago in signing a Treaty on the denuclearization of the Latin American continent, and we hope that other regions will follow that example. I have in mind in particular the Middle East, South Asia, and the African continent, which has not yet been recognized as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in practice, although as early as 1961 the Africans, supported by the majority of the Members of the United Nations, succeeded in having a certain number of resolutions to that effect adopted.

Morocco will continue to make every effort in the United Nations to see that an international commitment is arrived at to guarantee effective observation, by the largest possible number of States, of the declaration of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Similarly, we remain in favour of the establishment of regions where a balance of weapons must be guaranteed, because we see that, above all in the third world, the arms race arising out of the existence of disputes between the countries of this or that region constitutes a serious handicap to the mobilization of the full potential of our countries for economic and social development. We are aware that, in order to implement the principle of allocating the savings made by the Powers through disarmament to the development of the rest of the international community, it is particularly necessary for us to make every effort ourselves not to squander limited resources on an arms race whose beginning we can see, but whose end we can never guess.

Those are the general comments my delegation wished to make on certain items on the agenda of our Committee. We reserve the right to speak on some of these issues in greater detail in the course of the coming weeks.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Sir, permit me to offer you, on behalf of the delegation of Sri Lanka, our congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. My delegation extends its fullest support to you in carrying out your difficult duties. We also wish to offer our congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

As we look back to the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, we can see that we came to this Committee in 1978 with some justifiable optimism that the work on disarmament, which was the exclusive responsibility of this Committee, would follow a new and more promising direction. We had agreed earlier that year on a consensus Final Document, which included a consensus on how we might set up new and reformed institutions or machinery designed to democratize the disarmament process and, which, we hoped would even advance it by some small step towards the goals we had set. As it turned out, however, our optimism was only short lived. In 1979 and 1980 other events overtook us which belied that earlier optimism - events which before long had their impact on disarmament both in general and within this Committee.

By the time we came to the second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982, we had, not a reversal, but an accelerated revival of the arms race, and this Committee became a forum for rhetorical exchanges of charges and counter-charges with the attendant apportioning of culpability. That second special session, as we all know, not merely failed to produce a document, but also gave only what might be described as a grudging, or even qualified, acknowledgement of the 1978 Final Document.

In successive years since 1978, we concluded our deliberations with the reluctant admission that each year was the most inauspicious for disarmament - and 1982 was no different.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

When we look back on developments over the past year the picture we see is a very discouraging and dangerous one. The international situation has seriously deteriorated. Trust and confidence have been replaced by fear and suspicion. The language of dialogue has been abandoned for the harsh rhetoric of charges and counter-charges. And running through the past 12 months has been a relentless escalation of the arms race in all its aspects. It may therefore be justifiably asked what purpose is served by our deliberations, our resolutions and our exhortations if those who hold it within their hands to improve or degenerate the climate of international relations do little nothing to respond positively to our collective pleas.

The answer, of course, lies in the collective responsibility of all of us to manage this interdependent world, to steer its progress and advancement in conditions of peace and security for all. It is that responsibility which we exercise in this Committee despite the frustration and failure of successive years. The lack of achievement, the attainment of little or nothing, does not deflect us from the need to keep persisting, for, as a European philosopher said:

"One has to be hard-headed and persistent in one's idealism. The great truths are not perceived immediately in the brain of humanity; you have to hammer them in, again and again, nail by nail, day by day. It is monotonous and ungratifying work, but how important it is."

The security of States such as mine does not lie in the acquisition of nuclear or conventional weapons on any large scale. Our national security is safeguarded primarily by our fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of our people to a decent standard of human existence. It is, we believe, best served and protected by the strict observance by all States of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, by respect for our sovereignty, independence and territorial

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

integrity, and by non-interference and non-intervention in our internal affairs. The optimum conditions for promoting our national security are found in the creation and preservation of common security for all people who inhabit this planet. The failure to attain such common security has an impact on our own national security, leaving us as the hostages of those who relentlessly pursue the arms race in all its dimensions. We in Sri Lanka do not even pretend to aspire to the nuclear option; we do not belong to any military alliance; we have no significant military strength; and we shall continue to rely on common security for our protection against the threats that the arms race pose for us.

This condition of ours impels us to speak up loud and clear here, and in other forums, against the arms race in all its aspects and against the continued reliance on the theory of deterrence to preserve peace and international security. We see the nuclear arms race as the greatest possible threat not only to those who have acquired nuclear weapons or who live under the nuclear umbrella, but to all mankind. We see it as a colossal waste of limited resources which, if pursued at the current pace, will exacerbate the problems of the world economy. The nuclear arms race and reliance on nuclear weapons have not put an end to wars on this planet. They have not created lasting international peace and security. They have not freed the world from crisis and tension. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have helped to create greater fear, suspicion and distrust. The nuclear arms race of the past 37 years is, in our view, the most serious indictment of mankind in its failure to find a more humane, rational and effective way of managing international relations.

In the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, we agreed that

"effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat

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of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons." (resolution S-10/2, para. 20)

But more than five years after the adoption of this document and after having reaffirmed it last year how far we remain from doing anything meaningful to prevent nuclear war. Every reasonable, balanced proposal that could lead to the prevention of nuclear war, to a freeze on the level of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, to the halting of the testing of new types of nuclear weapons and to the refinement and improvement of existing ones, and to the prevention of their proliferation has failed to win the joint support of all the nuclear-weapon States. The net result is an endless expansion of nuclear arsenals, the biggest responsibility for which is borne by the two major nuclear-weapon States. It comes as no surprise therefore, that the level of distrust, frustration and cynicism amongst the peoples of the world about arms control negotiations has increased with unflagging speed. Every part of the spectrum of society finds representation in the assemblies of people protesting the nuclear arms race and calling for radical steps to halt the accumulation of nuclear weapons. The veering of the public towards unilateralism in disarmament is indeed partly influenced by the very failure of Governments to demonstrate serious interest in halting the nuclear arms race. The defence of deterrence and of the balance of terror as a barrier to nuclear war rings hollow in the ears of those millions who have lost their economic security and who fear that their very existence is threatened by the drift towards nuclear confrontation.

We who come from the third world regard the struggle against nuclear weapons and against the possibility of nuclear war as an integral part of the struggle for a new international political order and a new international economic order

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reflecting the realities of the world today. We are accustomed to our statements being cynically dismissed as the rhetoric of the poor and weak. There is casual disregard shown for our pleas for meaningful disarmament negotiations, but such disregard for our views neither discourages us nor dissuades us from keeping in focus what is the most serious threat to all mankind.

My delegation, therefore, finds no difficulty in supporting in principle the proposals for a freeze on the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as set out in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly last year. We find these proposals reasonable at the present time. They are a positive, concrete step which could initiate a meaningful process leading to a cessation of the nuclear arms race. The freeze proposals that have been made may not be perfect in every detail, but overcoming apparent infirmities need not be impossible for the nuclear super-Powers, whose capacities and capabilities spawned the nuclear horror that confronts all of us.

My Government, despite any reservations it might have regarding bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, welcomed the two sets of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. These negotiations signified to us that the two super-Powers were willing and prepared to pay heed to the incessant clamour for restraint in the pursuit of the nuclear arms race. The negotiations, in our view, were an earnest of the faith of both sides in negotiations. But what we see now is disquiet and dismay. If the putting forward of proposals itself brought agreement, there would have been a series of agreements by now. What we are left with, however, is the prospect of no agreements between the super-Powers. It is our view that time has not run out. Equally, the urgent need and universal desire for agreement have not declined; they have been heightened.

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We see no purpose in each side attempting to place blame or responsibility on the other for what has or has not taken place so far. What is of paramount importance is that the two sides do not relax their determination to reach agreement on the basis of equality and equal security. Agreement in Geneva on the bilateral negotiations alone will not bring peace and security to the world, but will certainly pave the way for the much needed process of confidence and trust to be built. We hope that realism and responsibility will prevail and that the negotiations will continue without interruption until agreement is reached.

The Committee on Disarmament has now completed five years of work under the mandates given to it in 1978. Its report for 1983 provides us not only with a record of what it has achieved or failed to achieve, but testimony as to how difficult and complex is the disarmament negotiating process in an international climate that is hostile towards reducing the arms race and moving towards arms limitations. We regret that the Committee on Disarmament achieved only very limited progress in 1983. We are of the view that the Committee did face some prospect of advancing its work on negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war, a nuclear test-ban treaty, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a ban on chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but the onset of crisis, growing distrust and eroding confidence, dissipated whatever hopes that may have been entertained.

The work in the Committee on Disarmament on items relating to nuclear disarmament issues falls far short of our expectations and the wish of the international community. The Committee's failure to resolve disagreement on the expansion of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a comprehensive test-ban treaty is a serious disappointment. This issue is at the core of preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation and of the refining and improving of nuclear weapons.

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But the strongly held perceptions of certain States have prevented a consensus from emerging in the Committee on Disarmament to further the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group. My delegation also regrets the non-participation by two nuclear-weapon States in the Ad Hoc Working Group. We earnestly hope that those two States will participate in 1984, thereby improving the prospects for meaningful deliberations in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

My delegation attaches special importance and priority to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the Committee on Disarmament, at UNISPACE-82 and at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly we advocated strongly that the international community try to take preventive action before the problem gets too complex, too rigidly integrated with existing disarmament issues. During the last 12 months all of us have had new evidence of the real dangers that could emerge if urgent action is not taken to prevent what is an unquestionable drift towards outer space becoming the arena of the arms race. Science fiction and the imaginative scenarios of film-makers have been overtaken by real-life developments which convince us that the arms race in outer space is a distinct possibility. This has been repeated many times in the past few days in this Committee. In the Committee on Disarmament, continuous efforts were made to act on the basis of the two resolutions that were adopted by the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the question, but those efforts failed to produce agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My delegation hopes that this Committee will succeed in agreeing on a course of action that will help to advance the possibility of an early start on preventing an arms race in outer space.

My delegation regrets the growing indifference directed towards the subject of disarmament and development. The report of the expert group on the subject is in

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danger of passing into the limbo of forgotten things. But the continuation of the arms race and its escalation continue to be a serious drain on the resources that are needed to transform the socio-economic landscape, not only of the less and least developed, but also of the more developed, industrialized countries. We attach great importance to further study and investigation being made in this area. There can be no lasting peace and security in this world as long as the widening disparities in socio-economic conditions between the industrialized and developing countries persist. As long as the arms race continues to consume over \$1 million a minute, the prospect of sustained world-wide economic recovery is distant. The economic malaise of the developed world and the stagnation or regression of the economies of the less developed countries are affected by the arms race. The study by the expert group has shed clear light on these problems. Much more remains to be done. My Government hopes that this Committee will consider seriously the possibility of giving adequate attention as to how the question of disarmament could be given greater and renewed attention in the immediate future.

Let me now turn to an area of special concern to Sri Lanka - the Indian Ocean. The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, which is one of the most volatile regions of the world, have been striving since 1971 for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Considerable progress has been made by these regional States, including acceptance in 1979 of the seven principles of agreement for the implementation of the Declaration. The permanent members of the Security Council, major maritime users and others interested have also been participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. I do not intend to go into detail on the slow

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progress of the work of the Committee because it is currently engaged in negotiations on a draft resolution, which it hopes to present to this Committee later on in our session. I do not want to prejudge their negotiations. However, I should like at this stage to address an appeal particularly to the permanent members of the Security Council to appreciate the aspirations of the littoral and hinterland States and to co-operate with them in order to complete all preparations for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka next year.

The statements in this Committee this year have once again demonstrated that there is nothing more urgent, more important and pressing for all of mankind than making progress towards lasting international peace and security. All our Governments are committed to this goal. It is the biggest aspiration of all our peoples. But it has eluded us despite our annual sessions of the Assembly, the resolutions and the expressions of deep commitment to work for peace and security. Last year the General Assembly adopted an unprecedented number of resolutions on disarmament and international peace and security. Those resolutions were to serve as a stimulus towards greater real effort by all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to take effective, meaningful steps for creating conditions leading towards international peace and security. We have the same opportunity again in this Committee. My delegation hopes that the Committee, through its deliberations and its resolutions, will give a new, more powerful political impulse that will help to nudge us all towards effective, urgent action to create the right conditions in which international peace and security could be created.

Mr. BRONNIKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): Our delegation would like to explain its views on a number of items relating to the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race and express some views on the course of the discussion in the First Committee.

In many statements that have already been made in this room we have heard well-justified alarm expressed about the growth of the threat of nuclear war. Representatives of States of the socialist community and a number of non-aligned countries have given us a realistic appraisal of the situation. They have properly indicated what the source of the threat to peace is. It is the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic bloc which are striving to disrupt the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and have called for a concerted search for more effective ways and means of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and preserving life on earth. This is a responsible position, genuinely in the interest of peace.

Representatives of NATO countries have also paid lip-service to their devotion to the cause of peace. However, recent events have given us new confirmation of how their words diverge from their deeds. The United States, heading the NATO bloc, is moving soldiers in to ride roughshod over the sovereignty of States in various parts of the world. It is doing this today with regard to one of the States Members of the United Nations.

On the question of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race, representatives of NATO countries say that they are ready to act for peace, but in fact, with a vigour worthy of a better cause, they are seeking not a limitation of armaments but what is known as arms accumulation, with which they try to mask their over-armament. They are not seeking a denuclearized but a super-nuclearized Europe. They are arguing not to eliminate nuclear weapons, but to make them ever

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more sophisticated and to create ever fresher opportunities for faster and more accurate first nuclear strikes. This course is unacceptable, because it leads to a further escalation of tension, to new and ever more dangerous twists in the spiral of the arms race, and ultimately to a world-wide nuclear conflagration, the flames of which will engulf everyone.

The Soviet Union and other States of the socialist community are proposing another course and they have done so insistently, demonstrating an attitude at once of principle and of flexibility. They have done and are doing everything in their power to halt the slide to nuclear war. The situation is so dangerous and complex that it calls for the adoption of a whole series of measures, moral, political and material.

In this regard, new Soviet proposals on questions of limiting and halting the nuclear arms race that have been submitted to this Assembly are profoundly and internally linked. The Soviet Union proposes the condemnation of nuclear war as repugnant to the human conscience and reason and the declaration that any attempt to legitimize the launching of a nuclear war is a criminal act. This important Soviet proposal is buttressed by another which indicates measures of a material nature which would put an end to the endless and increasingly dangerous spiralling of the nuclear arms race. I am referring to the item before this Committee entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons". It is always typical of Soviet initiatives that they are consonant with the vital interests of the peoples of the world and this is the situation this time too. The movement in favour of a freeze on nuclear weapons has been joined by broad masses of people numbering millions, and where millions of people are involved there really is a serious political factor.

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Today, people from different continents, from States with different social and political systems, have rallied to the call for a freeze. They join forces in spite of the fact that they quite often belong to opposing political camps and occupy very different rungs of the social ladder, as has happened now in the United States. The demands for a freeze are reverberating powerfully in parliaments and in city streets and squares.

Of course, the General Assembly cannot fail to reckon with the will of the peoples. The Soviet Union is proposing that the General Assembly should urgently appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze, with appropriate control of all their existing nuclear armaments, in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is ready to begin with a freeze on a bilateral basis on its nuclear armaments and those of the United States. The putting into effect of a freeze would, in present circumstances, be an extremely important and effective step that would make it possible to halt the nuclear arms race. The Soviet proposal is in essence a simple one. It is perfectly feasible if there is a genuine wish on the part of the other nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate in practice what they so often proclaim, that is, the will to bring about peace and halt the nuclear arms race. For this to happen it would be necessary to halt the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, that is to say, nuclear weapons already in those arsenals, and also to renounce the deployment of any new types of nuclear weapons. If these measures were combined with a moratorium on the testing of new types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the freeze would be watertight, offering no room for any unsavoury manoeuvres or loopholes.

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It is important correctly to understand the concept of a freeze and the place of such a step in the overall context of limiting the nuclear arms race. Some opponents of the initiative we have proposed claim that what the world needs is not a freeze on nuclear weapons at the present level but a reduction, and the greater the reduction the better. This is precisely one of those good intentions with which the road to hell is paved. This is the kind of argument which is used as a rule to avoid doing either of those things, that is to say, in order not to agree to a freeze and not to reduce nuclear arsenals. But, as everyone knows, the Soviet side has consistently put forward proposals also to reduce nuclear weapons in all areas. We must not let slip any opportunity of limiting or halting the nuclear arms race.

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A nuclear-weapon freeze, as proposed by the Soviet Union, in no way means any freeze on action designed to reduce nuclear weapons. The process must be uninterrupted and the freeze must be something that would ensure a higher degree of trust in international relations and it is precisely the measure that is designed to step up efforts to achieve, as soon as possible, agreement on substantial limitations and radical reductions in nuclear armaments with a view, as an ultimate goal, to their final and total elimination. The urgent need for this is indicated in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, document A/C.1/L.2. Thus an immediate freeze would be an effective means of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

Another argument of the opponents of a freeze on nuclear weapons amounts to this: as they see it, only one side stands to gain from a freeze, that is, the Soviet Union, which, according to them, enjoys military supremacy.

I have some doubts about the sincerity of those who put forward this argument. They are very well aware that there exists a military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and that that balance has been recognized by different Administrations in Washington and the fact of strategic parity was a matter of record in the signing of the SALT-II Treaty and even after that, in the United States and in other NATO countries, the existence of nuclear parity was recognized, both on global and regional levels.

Here, for example, is what was stated by the former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke, in an interview with USA Today on 6 June this year:

"I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have constantly pointed out that at the present time there does exist an approximate balance in strategic nuclear power between the United States and the Soviet Union."

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We may suppose that no one will challenge Mr. Warnke's competence or that of the American Chiefs of Staff or dream of charging them with pro-Soviet sympathies and when, here in the Committee, representatives of certain NATO countries attempt to overwhelm representatives with figures, designed, as they see it, to open everyone's eyes to what they claim to be the existing advantage of the USSR in nuclear weapons, they are, in doing this, banking on the total ignorance of their listeners and their inability to analyse and appraise facts.

This Committee of the General Assembly is not the place to hope for any success in trumping up such fantastic fabrications, making arbitrary use of exaggerations or glossing over facts. They venture to talk about a so-called Soviet military threat, as if no one knew that thousands of nuclear warheads massed in the United States, in Western Europe, at sea and on the oceans must have been targeted long ago on the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Without batting an eyelid they claim that the United States has displayed a certain passivity in the build-up of armaments in the 1970s and now in the 1980s. It is almost as if they had virtually disarmed unilaterally, which, if you please, is the reason for the mythical lagging behind of the United States. What did this passivity amount to in actual fact? In the course of the period of the alleged inactivity of the United States, they equipped their strategic forces with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles which represent a qualitatively new and dangerous stage in the arms race, they equipped their forces with new Minuteman-3 missiles, Poseidon C-3s, Trident 1s and, as a result, the number of nuclear warheads in the military arsenals of the United States increased by a factor of 2.5. There was a qualitative improvement of the nuclear-missile systems; the accuracy of such systems as Poseidon C-3 and Minuteman-3 more than doubled, and this of itself increased their strike capacity almost five times over. In 1979, Minuteman-3

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missiles began to be re-equipped with new warheads with even greater strike accuracy. The development of new weapons was carried on in the 1970s, as one of the American papers put it, at an insane rate. It was precisely then that we began to see the development of the B-1 and Stealth bombers. In the second half of the 1970s, we saw the beginning of the manufacture of one more type of armament-strategic cruise missiles. Active work was done to manufacture such means of mass destruction as the neutron bomb, the cosmic laser beam and radiological and chemical weapons and active work is also going on to develop nuclear weapons of a new generation. It was precisely in the 1970s that the idea was conceived and work was begun on a plan for topping up the American strategic potential and forward-based systems in Europe with medium-range nuclear missiles, cruise missiles and Pershing 2s. Programmes for creating these weapons were worked out in detail as far back as the first half of the last decade, when the USSR had not even developed a single SS-20 missile. This year we have witnessed the adoption of decisions to deploy MX strategic missiles and the proclaiming of plans for space warfare.

So this is the true picture of the famous passivity, much vaunted by the United States Administration, but what is the world to expect when the United States actually begins its planned course of activity in the arms race? So references to Soviet supremacy, the passivity of the United States and the build-up of its nuclear armaments and the Soviet military threat are so many cynical attempts to justify an unbridled build-up of the United States nuclear missile potential to the advantage of the military-industrial complex.

I now come to another argument - if I may so put it - of the opponents of a nuclear-weapon freeze. I shall confine myself just to a typical quotation, words directly addressed to those who want to undermine faith in the feasibility of a freeze:

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"You state that the freeze would be very hard to negotiate - an opinion wholly at odds with that of our chief arms-control negotiators from William Foster to Paul Warnke. Among other things you state that a production freeze would be 'unfeasible' to verify - despite the testimony from former C.I.A. Director William Colby and other intelligence experts that a comprehensive freeze will be easier to verify than more limited arms-control agreements or the President's Start proposal."

This is an excerpt from a letter sent to the New York Times by two United States Senators, Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield and other members of Congress, Edward Markey and Silvio Conte, and written on 19 April this year.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union, in putting forward the freeze proposal, was attempting to accommodate anyone who might experience any apprehension or misgiving about the nuclear arsenals of the USSR or of the United States, which are the most powerful in the world. Hence the above-mentioned proposal, that it should be those very two States that should first and simultaneously establish a freeze on their nuclear armaments in a bilateral basis by way of an example to other nuclear States. Of course, all other nuclear-weapon States should follow that example as soon as possible. Accordingly, the Soviet Union stands ready, immediately, to translate a freeze programme into the language of treaty obligations and then to implement it step by step and fully.

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As soon as that happens the whole world will breathe more freely, and one may state with conviction that in a completely different political climate it will be easier to reach agreement on the reduction of stockpiles of such weapons in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security. At the present time - and the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session expressed its firm conviction in this regard - conditions are more propitious for giving effect to the idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze. We must take full advantage of this opportunity and support the initiative of the Soviet Union, which is constructive, specific and comprehensive. At this session a number of delegations of different political persuasions have actively expressed their support for the idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze.

An extremely dangerous situation has now arisen in Europe as a result of Washington's intention to embark in the near future on the deployment in certain Western European countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of new United States medium-range nuclear missiles. It is well known that the United States is already putting the finishing touches to these preparations. In the present circumstances the Soviet Union is compelled to take additional measures to ensure the security of both its own country and its Warsaw Treaty allies, but this is not our choice. The parties to the Warsaw Treaty are in favour of a political solution, and as they reaffirmed at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers held in Sophia in October. They called for the early achievement of an agreement in negotiations. Such an agreement should provide for a renunciation of the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles and an appropriate reduction of existing nuclear medium-range systems, and

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the missiles which would be subject to such reduction would be entirely eliminated, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Agreement on medium-range nuclear systems in Europe should be based on the principle of equal security and equality and promote the stability of the military strategic situation and the balance of forces. This balance of forces should be based not on the build-up of nuclear armaments but on their reduction to lower and lower levels.

One more step which is long overdue, and which would make it possible to halt the dizzying escalation of the nuclear arms race would be the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests. The United States Administration is stubbornly opposed to producing such a document, but only recently we witnessed the twentieth anniversary of the ratification by the United States of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, which laid down the obligation of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, for all time."

Fifty years have elapsed since the United States, this time under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, assumed one more similar obligation. More than 10 years ago the Secretary-General of the United Nations, speaking at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, stated that there were no longer any technical obstacles to a comprehensive and total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries for their part are doing everything in their power to achieve that goal. In 1982 the Soviet Union proposed draft basic articles for a treaty on a total and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, which took into account earlier work in that area. This is an excellent basis for rapid progress. The recent proposal by Sweden in the Committee on Disarmament is also of interest.

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The question of a total ban on all nuclear-weapon tests has become very urgent recently in the light of reports that the United States is working on a new generation of nuclear weapons which, in the view of United States experts themselves, can lead only to a further lowering of the threshold of nuclear war. A precursor of such a weapon is the neutron weapon, which has aroused the most profound indignation among the people of the world. We must immediately start work on a convention prohibiting the manufacture, stockpiling, deployment and use of the neutron weapon. The socialist countries support the idea of an immediate start on work on a programme of stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament which would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In order to guarantee the implementation of this programme by nuclear States, obviously there must be appropriate control. We believe that, for the purpose of such control use could be made, in respect of certain measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, of the experience gained through the control operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We are in favour of strengthening security guarantees for those States which do not possess nuclear weapons, through the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. We are also in favour of other measures designed to prevent the threat of nuclear war.

We believe we should not permit the spread of nuclear weapons. In particular we must prevent them from getting into the hands of aggressive and reactionary régimes situated in the various flash points around the world. An important factor for strengthening stability as a whole, and the security of non-nuclear States, would be the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. The implementation of existing proposals on this subject, particularly in northern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa, would be a substantial

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positive step, as would be the implementation of the proposal to create in Europe a nuclear-weapon-free battlefield zone along the line dividing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

There is no lack of readiness on the part of the socialist countries to come to an agreement on limiting the arms race, and this includes the nuclear arms race. This is demonstrated by their numerous initiatives, which have constantly been at the centre of attention at the sessions of the General Assembly and in other forums at which questions of limiting and reducing armaments are discussed. This is also demonstrated by a number of acts of goodwill undertaken by the Soviet Union on a unilateral basis.

Here we would particularly highlight the obligation undertaken by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This obligation is of genuine historic significance, and makes it possible for all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare before the whole world, openly and honourably, their fundamental intention, and to demonstrate their readiness to carry out their responsibilities for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. The importance of taking such a step, on the part of those States possessing nuclear weapons which have not yet done so, has been stressed in statements by the representatives of Mexico, Sweden and other countries. It is now time for the West to depart from its negative line, a line so devoid of any constructive elements, so full of fruitless rhetoric, and embark on a search for mutually acceptable decisions. The peoples of the world expect this of them.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the statement by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union

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of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Andropov, on 28 September 1983, in which he stated, inter alia:

"All those who are raising their voices today against the insane arms race and in defence of peace can be assured that the policy of the Soviet Union is aimed precisely at achieving that goal, as are the policies of the other socialist countries. The Soviet Union wants to live in peace with all countries, including the United States. It is not preparing any aggressive plans and is not imposing an arms race on anyone; nor is it imposing on anyone its own social order. Our ambitions and ideas are embodied in the specific proposals we have put forward to bring about a decisive breakthrough towards an improvement in the international situation. The Soviet Union will continue to do everything in its power to defend peace on earth."

Mr. VO ANH TUAN (Viet Nam) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, speaking for the first time in this Committee, I should like first of all, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you our warmest congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee and to assure you of our full co-operation. My congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee.

The general debate at this session of the General Assembly, like the statements of representatives who have already spoken in the First Committee, have made extremely clear the growing concern of the international community in the face of the very serious deterioration in international relations. The détente of the 1970s has been undermined and replaced by cold war hysteria. Old hotbeds of tension are being re-ignited and new explosive situations are being created. The arms race has entered a new and terribly dangerous phase, which relates to all kinds of arms, nuclear as well as conventional, and all military activities in all parts of the world. Although nuclear arsenals are crammed to bursting, new arms programmes have been adopted, costing billions of dollars, to develop, manufacture and deploy new generations of increasingly sophisticated and deadly nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Apart from the wholesale manufacture of neutron weapons and new generations of chemical weapons, including the so-called binary weapons, the decision has been taken to deploy the MX strategic missiles, to build a new type of intercontinental missile, known as the Midgetman, to build B-1 strategic bombers and to develop new systems of arms designed for combat in and from outer space. Now nuclear arms are being stockpiled and deployed in practically every part of the world, on land and sea and across the oceans.

(Mr. Vo Anh Tuan, Viet Nam)

According to experts, Europe, which was the scene of two world wars, has witnessed a concentration of armed forces and nuclear warheads 20 times higher than the world average. Nevertheless, there are feverish efforts under way to deploy by the end of this year hundreds of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in certain Western European countries, capable of hitting targets not only in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union but also over a large area of Asia and Africa. Other regions have not been spared either. Along with the extension of the network of military bases in foreign countries, installed against the will of the peoples, and the dispatch of rapid deployment forces in the service of the big-stick policy in areas said to be of vital interest from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to Central America and the Caribbean, vast tracts of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans have been filled with nuclear weapons from Diego Garcia to Okinawa. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the South African apartheid régime and the Zionist régime of Israel, with the assistance of certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, is no less a grave threat to international peace and security.

The pursuit of world hegemony through military supremacy is both the underlying and immediate cause of the endless arms race. What is extremely dangerous for the Asian, African and Latin American countries is the use by the United States Government of its absolute military superiority over these countries in order to intimidate, threaten and destabilize them, and to wage, either directly or by proxy, wars of aggression against peoples fighting for their independence and freedom, as happened only this morning in Grenada. The international community must react appropriately to prevent a repetition of such a shameful invasion against another people, particularly one which is economically and militarily weak.

(Mr. Vo Anh Tuan, Viet Nam)

In spite of the fact that there has been no world war over the last four decades, the quantity of bombs and ammunition used in this period of peace against the liberation struggle of the peoples has reached record figures in this century. The quantity of arms and weapons used in the Viet Nam war alone exceeded the total used in the course of the two world wars combined.

Those who advocate the use of force and arms in the service of their policy of world hegemony are resorting to war hysteria, to slanderous subterfuges and criminal provocation in order to justify their insane arms race. The myth of Soviet military superiority is one of their major arguments in spite of the fact that the approximate military balance between East and West is a fact acknowledged by objective Western analysts and even United States politicians.

Slanders with regard to the supposed use of chemical weapons in Asia, recently rehashed in this very room by certain delegations, should not lead us to overlook the abominable crimes committed by those who actually waged prolonged chemical warfare against the peoples of the three countries of Indo-China.

In a world saturated with nuclear weapons, not counting other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, the gravity of the international situation is such that a single irresponsible action by a statesman, or merely an accident or technical error, is enough to bring the world to a global crisis with unforeseeable consequences. The prevention of a nuclear world war has therefore become the highest priority of our time, the most urgent task of the day.

The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, reaffirmed by the second special session, showed clearly that if:

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"... the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament" ... is to remain "general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..." "... the immediate goal ..." is "... the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace". (A/S-12/32, annex 1, p. 2, paras. 3 and 4)

Although all countries geographically large or small, militarily strong or weak, have their say on the question of war and peace, the nuclear-weapon States, as the Final Document stressed, bear particular responsibility for adopting measures to avert the launching of nuclear war and the use of force, including the use of nuclear weapons in international relations.

The New Delhi summit of the Non-Aligned Movement solemnly declared:

"Disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue; it is an issue of human survival period." (A/38/132, para. 28)

That is why:

"Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Heads of State or Government, in the name of humanity, demanded an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States." (Ibid., para. 30)

The peoples of the world demand that the negotiations unilaterally broken off on disarmament be resumed and that the negotiations under way in Geneva and in the Committee on Disarmament be carried on in good faith in order to produce tangible results. Viet Nam vigorously supports any initiative from any country that would be likely to bring about concrete measures to curb and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and gradually lead to disarmament on the basis of equality and respect for the equal security of all countries.

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The success of Soviet-United States negotiations on medium range missiles in Europe is of great importance for world peace and security. Viet Nam warmly welcomes the constructive unilateral measures taken by the Soviet Union and deplores the fact that the other side has been using the negotiations as an excuse to deploy new missiles in Western Europe. In light of the extremely dangerous situation now prevailing in Europe, the Swedish proposal to establish a tactical nuclear-weapon-free zone on either side of the line between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries is perfectly timely.

Pending nuclear disarmament, my country calls on all nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to be the first to use these weapons. The unilateral undertaking to this effect by the Soviet Union should give rise to a similar commitment on the part of the other nuclear Powers.

The new proposal before the Committee on the condemnation of nuclear war is founded on the concern to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, which is in keeping with the deepest aspirations of billions of human beings on our planet. There can be no doubt that pursuant to resolution 37/78 I on the prevention of a nuclear war, submitted by a group of non-aligned countries, the adoption at this session of a declaration vigorously condemning nuclear war once and for all, would be a very positive contribution by United Nations to the creation of an international climate favourable to reducing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and the drawing up of practical agreements relating to the limitation and gradual reduction of nuclear weapons.

The idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze enjoys universal support. The thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly adopted two resolutions, 37/100 A and 37/100 B, on the initiative of India, Mexico and Sweden, calling for a nuclear-weapon freeze. The seventh summit of the Non-Aligned Movement at New Delhi appealed for a freeze on the development, manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. My delegation shares the view that a simultaneous freeze, both

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quantitative and qualitative, of nuclear weapons, by all nuclear Powers beginning with the Soviet Union and the United States, is the best means of halting the increase in all the components of nuclear arsenals and is likely to increase confidence between nuclear-weapon States, and this in turn would make it possible to break the vicious circle in the arms race. The new proposal submitted to this Committee on a nuclear-weapon freeze is in keeping with the above-mentioned objectives and contains a series of concrete measures conducive to agreements on substantial limitations on and drastic reductions of nuclear weapons, with a view ultimately to their total elimination.

The prevention of the arms race in outer space is another subject of major concern for the international community following the interruption of Soviet-United States negotiations on anti-satellite weapons, the refusal of the United States to undertake not to be the first to place anti-satellite weapons in space and the implementation of their space military programme known as Star Wars.

In 1981 the General Assembly, in resolution 37/83, stressed that the international community should adopt further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The present proposal to conclude a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth is drafted along the same lines and will help to prevent any attempt to turn outer space into an arena of confrontation and a source of devastating war for the whole of mankind. My delegation shares the view that the implementation of all the measures proposed in the draft treaty would make an important and appreciable contribution to the realization of the common aspiration of all peoples, that is, the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

The three constructive and realistic proposals submitted by the Soviet Union to this session of the General Assembly, following a series of important measures put forward by the members of the Warsaw Treaty with regard to arms control and disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, constitute a further demonstration

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of the goodwill of the countries of the socialist community, their willingness to do everything in their power to avert the danger of a nuclear confrontation, to improve the international climate and to consolidate world peace. These initiatives reflect the high sense of responsibility and goodwill constantly demonstrated by the socialist countries with regard to the question of war and peace in the nuclear age, a question concerning the very survival of the human race.

My delegation whole-heartedly supports all the above-mentioned proposals. We are also ready to support any constructive proposal on disarmament from the non-aligned and other peace loving countries.

The peoples of the world, aware of the gravity of the times, are determined to join forces and take firm action in defence of their most sacred right, the right to life. Hundreds of millions of people from east to west, north to south, have taken part in anti-nuclear demonstrations, the culmination of which was the World Assembly for Peace and Life against Nuclear War held in Prague last June, in which the peoples of 130 countries took part, without distinction as to social status, political persuasion or religious conviction.

It is my delegation's belief that a nuclear catastrophe is not inevitable. It can and must be prevented. It is therefore imperative for all governments, primarily those of the nuclear weapon countries, to show political will and a sense of high responsibility by placing the vital interests of humanity above the narrow short-term interests of their own countries.

Mr. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): Like the delegation of Viet Nam, my delegation has had the opportunity to refer to some of the items on our agenda for this session. This afternoon we shall speak in particular on the need to prohibit nuclear-weapons tests, the urgent need to adopt measures to stem the nuclear-arms race, the need to prevent the arms race in outer space and to adopt urgent measures making it possible to build confidence among States.

(Mr. Nuñez Mosquera, Cuba)

The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is an issue which has been inscribed on the agenda of this Committee for some time now as having the highest priority. The General Assembly of the United Nations, year after year, has asked the organ of responsible for multilateral negotiations on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament, to begin specific negotiations with a view to putting an end to nuclear-weapon tests. The immediate precedent for this is resolution 37/72, which gave clear expression to the urgent need for multilateral negotiations to begin on a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom were specifically requested, by virtue of their special responsibilities, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-tests explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoriums. We must accordingly make an objective assessment of the reactions to that request on the part of those three nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet Union spoke in favour of the resolution last year, and in the Committee on Disarmament asked that the mandate of the ad hoc working group dealing with this issue should be broadened so that the relevant negotiations could begin without further delay, since, as many delegations have pointed out, the present mandate of that ad hoc working group is very limited and does not permit of any to negotiations on this issue, which would be in the interests of the large majority of States represented here. Furthermore, as Ambassador Petrovsky said last week in this Committee, the Soviet Union, is prepared to implement the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and the prohibition of underground explosions for peaceful purposes, and has proposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. In the view of many delegations, the implementation of these measures would create a climate conducive to negotiations on the prohibition

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of nuclear-weapon tests and would be a demonstration of political goodwill, as well as a valuable contribution to the building of confidence among States.

The United States, on the other hand, not only has stated its objection to the resolution which calls for a start on negotiations to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests, but also, in the Committee on Disarmament itself, has systematically acted to prevent the drafting of a negotiating mandate for the ad hoc working group, and has tried to revive old technical problems concerning verification, ignoring the new possibilities offered by the advances of science and technology.

Some time ago the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out that there were no technical problems with regard to the preparation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and that all that was required was a political decision in this respect. Furthermore, the group of scientific experts working under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament, has demonstrated irrefutably that it is possible to verify satisfactorily compliance with a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, through a network of seismological stations, with a high degree of effectiveness and reliability. It is true that in order to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests all that is required is a political decision and the willingness to negotiate on the part of all States; but political will must be sought here in the United Nations; it must exist in our capitals. In this connection it is clear how much political will exists in the United States to negotiate a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests when we are told that that is a long-term objective and that nuclear tests are necessary in order to develop and perfect warheads, to maintain arsenals in an operational state, and to assess the effects of the re-use of nuclear weapons. Put simply, this is a policy of nuclear deterrence, reaffirmed with the intention of keeping nuclear weapons ready for use at any time.

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Given this situation, we must reaffirm with renewed emphasis the request that the organ for multilateral negotiations on disarmament should, at the beginning of its 1984 session, give the relevant working group a broader mandate so that the negotiations so often requested by the international community may begin, with a view to drafting a treaty on a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and for an indefinite period. This question is of the highest priority for the international community and we must not allow artificial obstacles to be placed in the way of those negotiations.

It is urgently necessary to begin these negotiations in order to halt the quantitative and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, but in addition to this it is a commitment assumed by virtue of several international agreements on disarmament, a commitment by those very States that are today acting in violation of those agreements, above all, the United States. In this respect it is worth repeating that it is ridiculous to claim that others should adhere to given international instruments when the very State making the claim is flagrantly violating those agreements. This Committee cannot evade its responsibility to see that there is an immediate end to nuclear-weapon tests. Regrettably, of the United Kingdom delegation has also, acted against resolution 37/72 in the Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to refer now to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the attainment of nuclear disarmament.

Last year the General Assembly adopted a resolution in this connection also, resolution 37/78 C, which called upon the Committee on Disarmament to prepare a nuclear-weapon disarmament programme and to establish an ad hoc working group for that purpose. Since that idea is contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, which the Assembly approved by consensus in 1978, and that Final Document also was ratified by consensus

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in 1982, we are forced to conclude that some States were not acting in good faith either in 1978 or in 1982, since we see that those same States are opposing, in this case too, the establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of a working group to begin the relevant negotiations.

This item has been given priority on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament since 1979; none the less, thus far there have been only informal meetings for exchange of views which have served to demonstrate how the self-proclaimed "champions of democracy" and of "respect for public opinion" have tenaciously and persistently throughout these years opposed the demand of the overwhelming majority of States represented here. Of course, arguments have been put forward to oppose those demands, and the basis of those arguments is always the familiar "Soviet threat" and the "need" to make preparations to ensure victory in a nuclear war.

In a study on the United States Air Force entitled "Air Force 2000" it is clearly indicated that the United States must be prepared for a long war, and that that war could be won by the Americans "even after a massive nuclear exchange". Those are no mere words; they are concrete deeds that affect the survival of mankind, and are committed with no regard for the rights and claims of mankind.

As has already been reported, the plane reserved for the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Pentagon in case of a nuclear attack, the plane from which it is intended that a nuclear war would be directed, is leaving Andrews base near Washington and will now be located at Grissom base in Indiana. It was argued that Andrews was not secure against nuclear attack. Logically, such an attack would not come from the nuclear-weapon States, which have solemnly renounced the first use of those weapons. If the United States has any doubts about commitments assumed by those States, then it should go to the negotiating table to sign an agreement to that effect. To act otherwise would clearly mean that it is preparing to strike the first blow.

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In these conditions, we must ask whether the end result of this military hysteria must necessarily be the disappearance of mankind or whether we shall succeed in our efforts to prepare a programme of nuclear disarmament. Such a programme must be negotiated without delay and we must struggle for the attainment of that objective. This Committee cannot evade its responsibilities in that connection.

It is logical in any negotiating process to respect the views of all parties, but we cannot take seriously arguments put forward in opposition to disarmament negotiations when we see negative reactions to the proposal concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons; that there has been no reaction to the proposal concerning the non-first-use of either nuclear or conventional weapons; that the reaction to the idea of a freeze on the production, development and deployment of nuclear weapons again has been negative; and that there has been a negative reaction to proposals regarding negotiations on the priority issues identified at the General Assembly's special session on disarmament in 1978.

I wish now to make a few comments regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In its resolution 37/83, adopted last year, the General Assembly specifically requests the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject with a view to undertaking negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. That resolution was drafted painstakingly so that a compromise could be achieved on what appears to be the principal obstacle in this field: the question of the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, or of a number of agreements each imposing different restrictions, among other things on anti-satellite weapons.

Events have shed light on matters and we are now able to see clearly the main obstacle to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

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The call for the beginning of negotiations on this issue is too much for the States which oppose nuclear disarmament and are prepared only to agree to the establishment within the Committee on Disarmament of a working group for the exchange of views on a few aspects of the problem, and not actually to enter into a negotiating process.

It is now clear that the militarization of outer space is a real danger, and it is necessary that we strive energetically to prevent it.

We have heard it argued that it is necessary to pinpoint the legal aspects of the problem, on which no norms yet exist, so as to complete the legal system which will prevent an arms race in outer space. The fact is that the problem that threatens us cannot be minimized by or concealed behind procedural moves.

We know that regulations exist concerning outer space, among them such instruments as the Moscow Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear-weapon tests in that environment, and the outer-space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The militarization of outer space, however, can take on more complex forms, and we must confront them directly if we wish to prevent confrontation from spreading to that environment. We must now prevent the emplacement in outer space of a whole range of new and more sophisticated weapons that are not covered by any existing prohibitions, including laser weapons and particle-beam weapons.

There has been an attempt to deploy complete complex system of anti-satellite weapons. That is the intention of the costly United States ASAT project, for which funds have existed since 1980 and which, in reality, is an attempt to strengthen the nuclear first-strike capacity of the United States, together with anti-missile systems. That first-strike capability is complemented by the categorical refusal to make a commitment, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

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It has been stated by persons of the most divergent viewpoints that plans to develop an anti-missile defence system are not technically viable, and are indeed strategically dangerous.

It was not without reason that the Soviet-United States agreements of 1972 - which would be violated by deployment of the announced anti-missile system - imposed certain restrictions on such systems, for, as experts have observed, these are closely related to offensive strategic systems.

If the existing plans to extend the arms race to outer space - which are very nearly in their final phase - were to be carried out we should be much further from possible agreement on offensive strategic weapons, especially given the qualitative improvement in these weapons. Furthermore, from the political standpoint, these plans are opposed by the majority opinion, often expressed, in favour of achieving security at ever lower levels of armament.

The deployment on the pretext of strengthening security of new and more sophisticated weapons systems, which would inevitably give a new impetus to the arms race, is completely inadmissible.

The Cuban delegation firmly supports the initiation of multilateral negotiations on this issue. This must be urgently requested by this Committee. We further support the resumption of the bilateral negotiations on outer space as a desirable and necessary step towards preventing an arms race in that environment.

I wish in conclusion to make some comments on the establishment of confidence among States. My delegation considers that there can be no confidence without a clearly expressed will to negotiate and to reduce the level of armament. But, most important, there can be no trust if there is a lack of respect for the principle of the self-determination of peoples and if force is used against sovereign States, as has often occurred in Central America and the Caribbean.

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The creation of confidence requires respect for the independence, sovereignty and integrity of other States and non-interference in their internal affairs.

In this connection I wish to denounce in this forum - on whose agenda the question of confidence-building is an important item - the military invasion being carried out by the United States in Grenada, adding a further link to its chain of acts of intervention and aggression against the peoples south of the Rio Bravo.

At this very moment, 1,500 troops of the United States Army and Marine Corps, making use of all types of heavy armaments, including aircraft, are attempting to impose their will on the people of Grenada by force of arms. The United States soldiers are attacking the camps of Cuban construction workers who are collaborating in areas basic to the Grenadian economy. Our construction workers are defending themselves and fighting heroically.

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The United States Government will bear sole responsibility for the consequences of this new adventurist action, which is staining with blood the waters of the Caribbean Sea once again. Yet another act of aggression has been committed against our America, and it has been demonstrated once again that Washington's policy is the gunboat policy.

We condemn the United States military aggression in Grenada as running counter to international peace and security and to trust and co-operation among States.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): I should like at the outset to convey to Ambassador Vraalsen my delegation's sincere congratulations on his assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. I wish at the same time to assure him of the full co-operation of my delegation in the performance of the duties of his high office. My delegation also extends its congratulations to the other Committee officers.

The international situation in which we are now meeting is characterized by an atmosphere of increased insecurity, anxiety and frustration. The world continues to witness a very dangerous escalation of the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, and in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Various factors have been responsible for this situation, most notably the further deterioration of relations between the super-Powers and the still unresolved conflicts engulfing many parts of the world. Regrettably, the worse the international security situation becomes, the less chance disarmament has of proving itself to be a viable means by which to search for the establishment of peace and security.

With the deterioration of relations between the super-Powers, which has become alarming, some may be tempted to conclude that it is useless to pursue further disarmament efforts. If we still lived during times when there were no nuclear

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weapons, such an attitude might perhaps be plausible, but now, the worsening of relations between those two countries should, on the contrary, compel us to rededicate our commitment to the cause of disarmament. It is a duty and a challenge for non-nuclear-weapon States, non-aligned countries in particular, to proceed with all deliberate speed to implement concrete formulas for bridging the seemingly unbridgeable positions of those two most powerful nuclear-weapon States, with a view to reaching agreement on matters affecting the security concerns of all States.

The international community simply cannot afford to slacken its efforts, especially its efforts to seek and put forward practical measures to solve urgent problems of nuclear disarmament. The numerous resolutions on disarmament which were adopted during last year's General Assembly session alone - totalling no less than 58, of which 20 dealt specifically with nuclear disarmament - are proof of our continuing concern about and endeavours regarding disarmament. The non-aligned countries, far from being helpless spectators of the power-play between the two super-Powers, are continuing to co-operate with others in a collective endeavour with the goal of preventing nuclear war. It may, for instance, be recalled that the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at their seventh conference, held at New Delhi in March this year, issued a timely warning when they stated in the New Delhi Message, that the non-aligned countries,

"speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well." (A/38/132, p. 56, para. 4)

For the time being, all these exhortations may be falling on deaf ears, but this should not discourage us from continuing our efforts.

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Indonesia remains of the view that the prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent task confronting all States. The prevention of nuclear confrontation means nothing more than the preservation of our civilization as we know it today. Thus, the security concerns of all States must be taken into consideration, not only those of the nuclear Powers and their respective allies. Because the peoples of the world are the potential victims of any nuclear conflict, negotiations on preventing such a conflict cannot and should not be confined to countries possessing nuclear weapons. In no area is the need for democratization of the decision-making process more acute than in the field of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, multilateral negotiations, in parallel with bilateral negotiations, are indispensable.

My delegation has noted with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament has for the first time inscribed on its agenda an item on the prevention of nuclear war. However, we cannot but express our regret that the lack of consensus on a mutually acceptable machinery has so far prevented real substantive examination of the subject. It is the sincere hope of my delegation that the present session of the General Assembly will come out with recommendations urging the Committee on Disarmament to expedite its work on this issue, which is of the highest priority.

Since the end of the Second World War, the international community has been preoccupied with the rising tide of armaments, and with the failure to halt the arms race, which has grown steadily in intensity and has assumed dangerous proportions. During this time, world military expenditure in real terms has more than trebled, and the destructive capacity of both nuclear and conventional weapons has reached unparalleled levels. The result, none the less, is a false sense of security which further confuses understanding of the essential questions relating to arms limitation and disarmament.

It is important to recognize that the rapid pace of weapons modernization constantly introduces new destabilizing elements into the military contest and into

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strategic calculations. Moreover, the complex nature of contemporary armaments and the accompanying technological advances involving a broad range of weapon systems render it impossible to evaluate with any certainty the direction of any shift in the balance of forces. All of this has led to subjective, arbitrary and self-serving judgements, leading to worst-case analyses and scenarios being developed. As technology became the focal point in the field of armaments, the arms race underwent a profound transformation, from a phase of traditional, step-by-step escalation to an exponential phase of steep, fast and unpredictable spiraling. This expansion in the magnitude and destructiveness of modern arms has reached unprecedented levels primarily because of technological improvements in nuclear weapons.

The year 1983 may well be a watershed in the continuing efforts of the international community to stem the tide of the arms race. As we all know, the major nuclear Powers are planning to embark upon the manufacture and deployment of new nuclear-weapon systems, or upon the introduction of already existing systems in areas where they have heretofore not been deployed. This escalation is not being undertaken unilaterally, but rather in a way which we have all warned against for so long; it is taking place in a vicious circle of action and reaction. In fact, if escalation is the natural outcome of such a process, then the reverse should also be possible. In the absence of information to the contrary, one may conclude that not even symbolic gestures, such as dismantling a single weapon system or delaying the development of a new system, are given any serious consideration by these States, despite the fact that each of the super-Powers has an arsenal capable by itself of destroying the earth many times over.

Thus, what we propose is hardly a case of unilateral disarmament or the total elimination of nuclear weapons. What becomes apparent is that the competition has taken on a momentum of its own, without any rational reason for it.

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Therefore deterrence has become a way of rationalizing this irrational momentum in nuclear-weapon escalation; for, if deterrence were indeed a viable doctrine, then the elimination of a single weapon system by only one of the Powers should not negate deterrence, since enough nuclear-weapon systems would still remain to inflict incalculable consequences not only on the adversary but on the whole world.

The international community does not expect the United States and the Soviet Union to see eye to eye on the plethora of issues confronting mankind; nor does it expect to see a cessation of their global political competition; but the international community demands that this competition should not vitiate the atmosphere for fruitful dialogue leading to meaningful progress in arms limitation and disarmament.

Further, nuclear-weapon States continue to pay lip service to multilateralism, just as they do to the goal of nuclear disarmament. However, the reality is that they no more want non-nuclear States to gain a meaningful role in the negotiations - and this is fully reflected in the Committee on Disarmament - than they want genuine equality of all nations to be the overriding factor in international relations as a whole.

Thus, given this untenable attitude on the part of some nuclear Powers towards all other States, it is essential that we utilize the multilateral negotiating forum for the purpose of keeping collective pressure on them, so that they will at least feel compelled to continue the negotiations. This in itself would impose certain restraints on their freedom of unrestrained nuclear arms expansion.

There is a truism that politics breeds strange bedfellows, but have we not also found that nuclear-weapon States in effect have created a commonality of attitudes towards the non-nuclear countries? This is amply demonstrated by the

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lack of movement, indeed a complete silence, on the part of certain nuclear-weapon States in regard to providing unconditional security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, many of which have renounced the right to acquire these deadly weapons of mass destruction. Pious declarations are not enough. What are needed are legal guarantees, which alone would ensure the security of non-nuclear States pending complete nuclear disarmament.

All these adamant attitudes and postures by some nuclear States have led to frustration on the part of many Governments. This may well end in either of two serious consequences: first, despair, resulting in States seeking protection under one or the other nuclear umbrella, leading to an expansion of bloc alignments; or, secondly, proliferation to avoid bloc entanglements and to have an independent means of ensuring security. Thus we can readily see how the credibility and viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons could be easily undermined. In addition, the non-proliferation régime may be undermined because not all of its objectives have been fulfilled and its discriminatory aspects have not been removed. My delegation fully expects that, in the context of the failure of the Second Review Conference, the forthcoming preparatory sessions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty will address these critical issues and achieve an equitable solution.

In Indonesia's view, it is no longer sufficient merely to express concern at the threat posed by nuclear weapons to the security of States. The imperative need, especially in the context of the threat of nuclear war and the escalation of the arms race, is to pursue consciously a policy of denuclearization and thereby commit ourselves to the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. My delegation believes that efforts towards establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world would make a significant contribution towards the total

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elimination of nuclear weapons. This is of transcendental importance to Indonesia, as it is situated astride vital sea lanes linking oceans and continents and therefore is not immune to great-Power strategic rivalry, which of late has assumed dangerous proportions. In this regard, the Indonesian Foreign Minister reaffirmed at the meeting of the Association of South-East Asia Nations held in Bangkok last June that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be one of the elements in the creation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. For its part, Indonesia has long advocated such a zone, reiterating this proposal both in the General Assembly and in the Non-Aligned Movement.

As regards the arms race in outer space, it is no longer a question of possibility but it is fast approaching one of reality. We are all aware of reports that the super-Powers are about to embark upon the actual development of prototypes of space weaponry. In view of this perilous situation, it is no longer appropriate to procrastinate, and the international community must initiate substantive examination of the issues involved, leading to effective and practical negotiations and agreements to prevent the further militarization of outer space. In this regard, we should take due note that in the Committee on Disarmament a working group has been agreed upon in principle, although a definition of its mandate is yet to find consensus.

It is worth noting that technology has also greatly changed our understanding of conventional weapons. The greater sophistication of these weapons with regard to accuracy and yield has virtually rendered heretofore invulnerable defences totally unprotected. In addition, the costs of these weapon systems are astronomical, and the pressure to acquire them is all too evident. In this regard, the transfer of these weapons which is conducted in the context of great-Power rivalry further threatens the independence and non-aligned status of many States. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming report on the study on conventional

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disarmament will shed new light on its ramifications and ways in which to control and curb the development, production and transfer of such weapons.

Second only to nuclear weapons, the world views with abhorrence the growing arsenals of chemical weapons. It is encouraging to note that this is the only one of the areas in which some positive movement has occurred. Specific areas have been identified in the Geneva negotiations, which are now approaching the stage of the actual drafting of a convention. It is my delegation's fervent hope that this opportunity will not be missed and that a chemical-weapon convention will join the Conventions on biological and radiological weapons and ban for ever that category of weapons.

Finally, there are two proposals that have received international consensus, due mainly to the pressure of world public opinion, and which will have far-reaching impact on many of the issues that I have referred to. One is to achieve a total freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and the other is a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests leading to a comprehensive ban. The immediate adoption of these two proposals would represent a formidable step in the efforts to prevent nuclear war. Additionally, they would form the initial starting point from which a comprehensive programme of disarmament could be meaningfully launched in accordance with the goals of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Further, if we are to make progress towards our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, we must first and foremost concentrate on several key aspects. In the view of my delegation, these must include, a priori, non-development of new types of nuclear weapons and non-use of the existing ones as well as certain categories of conventional weapons. We face the anomaly that, while there is universal recognition that a nuclear war is unthinkable, there is almost a morbid conviction that the outbreak of such a war is inevitable unless something is done and done soon.

Mr. MURIN (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation wishes to state its views on certain items on our agenda that have a direct bearing on the strengthening of international peace and security and the creation of conditions propitious to progress in the solution of disarmament problems.

A particular role in this sphere is played by the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and particularly the strengthening of the régime provided for in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is a task which has now become extremely timely and urgent in the light of the escalation of the threat of nuclear conflict. The emergence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the aggressive régimes of Israel and South Africa, and thus the spreading of this weapon to the most explosive areas of the earth, would mean a further dangerous exacerbation of the international situation, which in turn could lead to universal nuclear catastrophe.

We are concerned also by the gradual expansion of the circle of so-called neo-nuclear States, whose activities are not subject to international control through the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We share the view that the most effective way of eliminating the danger arising from this would be strict observance of the provisions, and the universalization of, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We hope that an important step in this direction will be taken by the third Review Conference on this Treaty, scheduled for 1985. In this regard we welcome the inclusion of an item on this subject on the agenda of the General Assembly, at the request of a large number of States Members of the United Nations, including Czechoslovakia. We are sure that the General Assembly will take decisions that will ensure the uninterrupted and constructive preparation of the forthcoming important Conference.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

We are ready to work for the early adoption of an international convention that would provide security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; work on this has been entrusted to the Committee on Disarmament. We continue to believe that the first step towards the adoption of such a convention could be identical statements by the five nuclear Powers, buttressed by an authoritative decision of the Security Council.

An important contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security, and an additional barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, would be the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, particularly Africa, the Middle East, Northern Europe and the Balkans. We actively support the proposals of the countries of those regions for the establishment of such zones. At the same time, we welcome the important initiative by Sweden for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free battlefield zone along the line dividing the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. The implementation of this measure would be an extremely important contribution to the improvement of the climate in Europe and the consolidation of overall international security. In this regard, we take a very favourable view of the proposal of the German Democratic Republic to make available the whole of its territory for the establishment of such a zone on condition that a similar measure is taken by the Federal Republic of Germany also.

The convening of the Conference on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean is also long overdue. This has been put off from year to year, and the responsibility lies on the shoulders of the United States. The Czechoslovak delegation decisively supports the demand of the littoral and hinterland States that this Conference be held during the first half of next year in Colombo, the

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capital of Sri Lanka. We believe that the General Assembly should take energetic steps to conclude the preparations for the Conference, and in particular should come to agreement on its agenda.

The questions I have touched upon, taken all together, represent a series of measures designed to limit the danger inherent in the existing international situation which is the result of the continuing arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race. Later in our statement we intend to refer to one more aspect of the world military-political situation that has aroused profound concern on the part of the international community - that is to say, the problem of conventional armaments. This problem covers a whole series of questions relating to the interdependence between conventional and nuclear weapons as well as the independent role of conventional weapons and, naturally, efforts to reduce the quantities of such weapons. I do not believe that there is any need to argue the significance of these items individually. The importance, indeed the urgency, of the items is widely understood by States Members of our Organization. This is demonstrated by numerous statements of delegations during the course of this session stressing the urgency of limiting the conventional arms race. Examples have been adduced of the pernicious effect of the nuclear arms race on the world situation and on attempts to solve problems of economic development. Everyone knows that expenditures on conventional armaments and the maintenance of armed forces constitute a very large proportion - about 80 per cent - of the overall military expenditures of States. Innumerable examples of this could be cited. No amount of statistics, however, can possibly paint the true picture of the tragedy of more than 10 million persons who have lost their lives in the many armed conflicts that have broken out in various parts of the world and have brought devastation to entire peoples and regions

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during the last two decades alone. These conflicts, in which exclusively conventional weapons have been used, have occurred on the territory of 50 or more States, representing approximately two thirds of the world's population. Of course, there are very deep and varied reasons for and roots of all this. But we cannot possibly doubt that the cessation of the conventional arms race would to a decisive extent promote an overall improvement of the international climate and strengthen international security and would have a stabilizing effect on the peaceful development of international events.

An important step in this direction was taken by the conclusion in 1980 of a Convention prohibiting or restricting the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. One particularly inhumane category of conventional weapons was therefore banned. But we must not stop at that. After all, everyone knows that the progress of science and technology at the service of militarism is leading to the constant development and manufacture of ever more destabilizing types and systems of conventional weapons.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

In essence, the borderline between conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction is being blurred and the introduction of these weapons in conflict areas in the world serves only to increase even further the threat of war. The study of these undoubtedly alarming facts is being dealt with incidentally by a group of United Nations experts, appointed by the Secretary-General of our Organization. Clearly, the time has now come for the adoption of more decisive international measures to call a halt to the conventional arms race and for a reduction of these weapons.

The position of Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries in our approach to the solution to this problem is marked by its comprehensive nature and its workmanlike pursuit of the goal. We wholeheartedly support the conclusion of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, contained in paragraph 81 of its Final Document, to the effect that:

"Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament." (resolution S-10/2, para. 81)

At the same time, for a number of years now we have been bending every effort to achieve progress in the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and related measures in central Europe. We attach great significance also to convening a Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which will begin work in a few months' time in Stockholm, and we hope that among its results there will be measures promoting the limitation of the conventional arms race, both in European terms and in even broader terms of the process begun in Helsinki.

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We are in general in favour of halting the arms race, both in nuclear and conventional weapons, and a reduction of all types of these weapons on the broadest possible scale. As we know, in 1980, the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, on the initiative of the socialist countries, adopted resolution 35/152 G, calling on the permanent members of the Security Council and also other States which possess a major military potential to work towards agreement on not increasing - or in other words freezing - their armed forces and conventional armaments, on a basis of reciprocity, effective from an agreed date, as a first step towards their subsequent reduction.

This appeal, in our view, is just as valid as it was three years ago and in actual fact it has actually become more urgent. Such an understanding would of itself become an extremely important stabilizing factor in international life, not to mention its most positive effect of releasing resources for purposes of economic and social development. We are sure therefore that it would be right and very timely if the General Assembly were to discuss the question of the adoption of additional measures to implement the above-mentioned resolution.

The Czechoslovak delegation is ready to take a most active part, and to display the greatest initiative, in working for decisions on this subject.

In noting the interdependence between the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and the consequent growth of trust in international relations, I should like to say something about this question too.

As we all know, the question of confidence-building measures has been broadly discussed at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. On the whole, we view this discussion as useful. Confidence-building measures, in our view, should promote progress in solving the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear

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disarmament, and we note with satisfaction that this is an approach shared also by a large number of other States. Our position of principle on this question has been set forth in the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in January this year in Prague, which points out that:

"The easing of the threat of war is impossible without the creation of a climate of trust in international relations. This requires, along with the development of a political dialogue and the adoption of appropriate measures in the economic and military fields, the dissemination of accurate information, a renunciation of any aspirations to great-Power status, racist propaganda, chauvinism and national exclusiveness, or attempts to try to teach other peoples how they should arrange their lives, or to preach violence or to fan the flames of a war psychosis."

I should like to add that this requires renunciation of such aggressive actions as unfortunately are taking place precisely at this very hour in the Caribbean against a sovereign State, an equal Member of the United Nations.

Guided by precisely this approach, we shall take an active part in future work on producing and implementing confidence-building measures at United Nations forums.

A very important place in negotiations on disarmament measures should be given to the question of means of control and verification over the implementation of the agreements under discussion. This is an important question and we are giving it the attention it deserves. The comprehensive implementation of disarmament agreements and the ensuring of strict compliance by all States with the obligations they have assumed, is in keeping with the interests of international peace and

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security. However, we do not intend to resign ourselves to the fact that too often this question is used, not in the interest of true disarmament, but rather for purposes of erecting artificial obstacles to agreement. Clear cut examples of this, of what is in the fullest sense of the word a destructive approach to the solution of problems of control, can be seen in the negotiations on such vital questions as the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing and the prohibition of chemical weapons, and a number of other items. To find one's way in the tangled web of the numerous contradictory and very often clearly artificial and abstract demands with regard to the introduction of various methods of control - such things as transparency, comparability and other things of that kind - is very difficult and sometimes quite impossible, and this is something obviously counted on by those who want to undermine the solution to the problems of disarmament which are being discussed. In addition to this, attempts are also being made to cast doubt on already agreed-upon control machinery, in particular with regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. This approach, based on ideas of control without disarmament, we totally repudiate and call upon all Members of the United Nations to do likewise.

With regard to the question of control, we shall continue to proceed on an item-by-item basis, taking into account the specific demands determined by the character and content of concrete disarmament measures. These examples of the exaggeration of the problem of control in order to block agreement were manifested also in regard to the important question of reducing military expenditures.

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This year marks the 10th anniversary of the adoption by the General Assembly, upon the initiative of the USSR, of resolution 30/93 A (XXVIII), calling upon the permanent members of the Security Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent from the 1973 level, and to allot a portion of the funds thus released for the provision of assistance to developing countries. Since that time the countries of the socialist community have repeatedly stated their readiness to work towards agreement on reducing military budgets in absolute terms, a measure which quite obviously does not require any kind of complex control schemes.

Nevertheless, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken cover, through the course of a whole decade, behind the screen of so-called "transparency" and "comparability", and have rejected constructive proposals from the socialist countries, while at the same time taking the widely known decision to increase their military expenditures by 3 per cent per annum in real terms. Their refusal to take part in constructive negotiations on the reduction of military budgets has also emerged clearly from the report presented by the United Nations Disarmament Commission on a question which has been discussed over the last two years. At the same time, the growth of military budgets continues to rise at a dizzying speed, this year having exceeded the astronomical figure of \$800 billion. We wholeheartedly share the concern of the developing countries and of the many other States which have seen in this course of events a direct threat to peace and a fundamental obstacle to their economic and social development.

The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the General Assembly must take measures to break the deadlock on the question of the reduction of military expenditures. In this regard, we would like to stress the urgency of the proposal of the Political Consultative Committee of the Members of the Warsaw Treaty,

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addressed to Members of NATO, appealing to them to embark immediately upon direct negotiations to achieve agreement on the freezing of these budgets with effect from 1 January 1984, and specific measures for the practical reciprocal reduction of military expenditures in the subsequent period, so that the funds thus released can be used for the economic and social development of all, including the developing countries. We once again express the hope that the NATO countries will respond to this appeal.

In conclusion, I would like to make some remarks on the question of the organization of work of our Committee. The order of work provided for this year, as all delegations know, has somewhat departed from the traditions of the First Committee. We agreed to the changes introduced, on the understanding that they would not hinder, but rather would promote a full and comprehensive discussion of the important items on our agenda, particularly questions connected with the effective solution of the problem of preventing nuclear war. We, for our part, resolutely support the full right of every delegation to speak on any questions which interest them, to make proposals and introduce draft resolutions, and to expect that the Committee, after a constructive consideration of them, will take appropriate decisions on them. We express the hope that this will in fact be the approach to the Committee's work this year adopted by all other delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Japan, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply. May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply should be limited to 10 minutes.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): The representative of the Soviet Union in his statement this morning made reference once again to the nuclear policy of my Government in connection with confidence-building in the Far East. I cannot but express great surprise at the extent of the misunderstanding, or I might even say the distortion, of our basic policy. I think I need hardly repeat once again that our three non-nuclear principles have been made quite clear at the highest political level of my Government on many occasions, as well as in my own statement a few days ago. Also our Constitution, which aims at peace and friendship among nations, is well known to all.

Japan has been working hard for the establishment of stable and friendly relations with the countries of the world and in the Far East, including the Soviet Union, based upon genuine mutual understanding. However, the situation in the region, unfortunately seems to be developing in a way contrary to the wishes of our people. Just to mention a few examples, it has not been possible to conclude a peace treaty because of the existence in Japanese-Soviet relations of the unsettled northern territories issue. An extremely regrettable situation has been developing in recent years as the Soviet Union has deployed and strengthened its military forces in the Far East, including Japan's northern territories.

Moreover, the recent downing of an unarmed Korean Air Line jet liner by Soviet military aircraft in the area north of Japan, runs counter to our desire to strengthen mutual confidence and trust among nations.

These factual examples clearly show that it is the Soviet Union that should first rectify its stance and posture in the Far East if any real steps towards increased confidence and understanding are to be taken. We have said, time, and

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time again that specific and realistic steps must be taken progressively in order to bring about genuine disarmament, and that they must be based on confidence and trust among nations.

What matters is not words but deeds. I hope that the Soviet Union will act in such a manner as to show its sincerity by building relations of mutual trust in the Far East that will include bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

*Official Records**



FIRST COMMITTEE
15th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 26 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 15TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139 to 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MURRAY (Trinidad and Tobago): Mr. Chairman, my delegation extends to you its sincere congratulations on your election to preside over this important Committee. We also offer, through you, our congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Elfaki of Sudan and Mr. Tinca of Romania. As we embark on our work for this session, my delegation is only too well aware of the difficulties facing us, and we pledge our full support to you and the other officers of the Committee in our efforts on a matter which impinges directly on the very survival of mankind.

In addressing this Committee at the thirty-fifth session, my delegation observed:

"The goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains a basic commitment of the States members of the international community; yet little tangible progress has been made over the years towards the attainment of that goal. The prospects for any major improvement in this sad state of affairs in the immediate future appear to be even more evanescent than ever in the light of the rapidly deteriorating international situation brought about not only by the continuing existence of areas of tension in the Middle East and in southern Africa, but also by the opening up of new areas of tension in other regions of the globe where force has been used illegally to violate the territorial integrity of States and to undermine their sovereignty and national independence.

"In this worsening international climate of fear and distrust, and of growing insecurity and instability at both the regional and global levels, it is not surprising that States, be they militarily significant or

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insignificant, are finding increasing difficulty in agreeing on effective measures in the field of disarmament." (A/C.1/35/PV.26, pp. 24-25, 26)

It is a sad reflection on each of us Member States and on the United Nations as a whole that those words are no less pertinent now. The failure of last year's second special session on disarmament and the continuing Geneva talks to produce any concrete measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament serves to reinforce the view of my delegation that we - that is, the international community - are bent on achieving our own destruction.

However, many States, particularly those small States, like ours, with no pretensions to military might, are being carried along on this path to destruction against their wishes. The principle that disarmament is in the individual interest of every member of the international community, as well as being the collective responsibility of all of us here, seems to be increasingly ignored, particularly by the nuclear-weapon Powers. My delegation wishes to reiterate that we non-military and non-nuclear States have a legitimate and vital interest in disarmament: while we recognize the special responsibility placed upon the military Powers, we do not regard them as having a monopoly in decisions relating to disarmament. Indeed, the active participation and agreement of all of us are required if we are to bring a halt to the arms race and reverse the trend towards the production and accumulation of weapons of greater and greater capabilities of destruction. Unless we are able to generate the necessary collective political will, we cannot hope to create the necessary climate in which international peace and security and social and economic development can flourish.

It is crucial that the Geneva talks on intermediate-range missiles continue and that substantive agreements be concluded. For this reason the suggestion by the Ambassador of Mexico in his statement before this Committee on 17 October concerning the participation of a personal representative of the Secretary-General

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of the United Nations in those bilateral negotiations is worthy of serious consideration. The outcome of those negotiations is vital not only to the two interlocutors but also to all citizens of this world; it is, therefore, imperative that our legitimate interests be protected.

In this context we wish to refer also to the Committee - soon to be the Conference - on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, and the need for that body to continue to strive to attain its objectives without being unduly prejudiced by the status of any bilateral negotiations.

During the general debate in the opening weeks of the General Assembly session and in the statements before this Committee various speakers have described the international situation in differing styles and in different languages, but the same picture has emerged: one of international tension and instability, one of fear and mistrust, one of deepening economic crisis and one in which the arms race continues unabated.

While we are here engaged in talks on disarmament, with the participation of all the military Powers, what the real world outside is experiencing can only be described as preparations for war. There is much talk about peace and disarmament, even by the military Powers themselves, while at the same time there continues to be a massive build-up of the world's store of arms: nuclear arms, conventional arms, chemical and bacteriological weapons - more than enough to destroy this planet - and signs that this build-up will now continue in outer space.

We are told that this build-up of arms is necessary in the interests of each participant's national security. We are told that maintaining some parity or equilibrium is essential in stabilizing international relations and preventing the outbreak of another general war. We are told that those possessing stores of arms do so for defence purposes. All this then leads us to deduce that the sum of

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measures taken to promote the individual national security of all nations equals international insecurity. Since that does not make sense to us, my delegation is left to conclude that words spoken in these hallowed halls do not mean what they appear to, and we are really faced with a build-up of arms not for deterrence or defence but with other motives.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the atmosphere for international relations, and East-West relations in particular, is clouded by fear and mistrust to such an extent that confidence-building measures become a prerequisite for any meaningful negotiations on disarmament.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the commitment relating to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and my delegation, grateful for any crumbs in this desert of despair and frustration that is the disarmament effort, welcomes such declarations. We are even loath to question whether the second, or subsequent, use of nuclear weapons is likely to be any less deadly than the first; whether the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on this earth will be significantly different if they are used in attack or in defence. Pondering such things does nothing for one's confidence. What will send Trinidad and Tobago's confidence soaring, however, is an undertaking by these militarily mighty Powers of a commitment not to use nuclear weapons at all and then, by extension, their dismantling of those weapons, which they are then committed not to use. Trinidad and Tobago can think of no greater confidence-building measures at this juncture.

The world today stands on the brink of a nuclear holocaust, primarily because negotiations and discussions on disarmament are characterized by short-sightedness. All of us Members of the United Nations share a collective responsibility for disarmament, but two of our number bear a greater responsibility if only because of the power of the armaments they possess. Thus, on the one hand, short-sightedness is evident in the bilateral negotiations between those two, whose

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focus appears to be on establishing and/or maintaining some "superiority", and disarmament becomes, at best, a secondary issue. On the other hand, within this Organization, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament has also become obscured by short-term aims and objectives: we create organs or sub-committees whose tasks become ends in themselves; we adopt resolutions which are unenforceable or which have little real impact on the fundamental problem. Some 60 resolutions on disarmament were adopted last year, and if anything the past year has seen us move even closer to nuclear war, primarily because those most keenly involved treat those resolutions with scant courtesy. It should be patently obvious now that what is needed is not a proliferation of resolutions designed primarily to score points over the other side but a consensus on a policy through which to achieve general and complete disarmament and establish and maintain international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation welcomed your remarks at the opening of our session pertaining to the need to consolidate our resolutions, and we look forward to some meaningful agreements which will take us significantly closer to our ultimate goal. I wish to emphasize the view that we need not more resolution but a more meaningful resolution to disarm.

It may be worth the consideration of this Committee, the Committee on Disarmament and other relevant organs, and of States, that the optimum means of achieving the ultimate goal may be on a regional basis. Using the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a model, we could designate various regions as zones of peace: the Caribbean, then the Indian Ocean, then Europe, where even now there is the heaviest concentration of nuclear arms; and so on until the entire world and outer space form one total zone of peace. It is not simply the designation but the implementation of true peace that we need.

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The Government of Trinidad and Tobago considers that development can best be pursued in a climate of peace and security. During the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, on 22 June 1982, my delegation observed:

"... it is obvious that the diversion of even a small part of the resources spent on armaments could substantially improve the per capita gross domestic product, industrial employment and capital stock of developing countries. A recent United Nations report on disarmament and development has identified more than 70 possible alternative uses for military research and development capabilities which could be transferred quite easily to, for example, the development production and installation of solar energy devices, agricultural machinery, fishing technology, machinery for mining, manufacturing and construction, hydropower plants and equipment and personnel for education and health programmes." (A/S-12/PV.23)

Estimates put the amount spent on armaments over the last year at a minimum of \$650 billion and apart from this expenditure, there are also those resources, financial and human, which are channelled into the disarmament effort and are thus deflected from constructive developmental activities. My delegation is not so unrealistic as to expect that all resources diverted from military expenditure will automatically be allocated to the developing countries, but we are confident that even if they are mainly injected into supporting the economies of the industrialized countries, that in itself would create some increase in the demand for the products of the developing countries, thereby giving much-needed impetus to export-led growth in those countries. My delegation supports the contention that a more stable and more equitable international economic order is an essential

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prerequisite in nurturing the necessary political and economic climate in which all nations of the world could concentrate on dismantling the systems of mass destruction with which we have become so preoccupied. Just as economic stability is necessary for international peace and security, so too is disarmament a necessary factor in promoting economic welfare.

The massive peace demonstrations over the past weekend are further evidence that even if policy-makers have not recognized the grave danger of extinction facing us, public opinion has. Trinidad and Tobago shares the wish of these popular peace movements for a world free of the persistent danger of total self-destruction. It is the responsibility of each of us Member States to heed the cry of the world's population and to uphold the provisions of our own Charter "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... and to promote social progress and better standards of life". We need to act now.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): I discussed the question of nuclear disarmament on 18 October. Today, I would like to speak on the Chinese position on conventional disarmament.

It is certainly not without reason that people often lay stress on nuclear disarmament when discussing the question of disarmament. However, whether judging from the present world situation or from its possible future development, we should in no case belittle the importance of conventional disarmament.

True, nuclear war will bring an unprecedented catastrophe to humanity. But conventional wars have already done great harm and are still doing so. Since the end of the Second World War, there have been hundreds of cases of armed conflicts and aggression in various parts of the world with the use of conventional weapons and millions of lives have thus been lost. There are even now a number of countries being subjected to armed aggression and occupation. And only yesterday

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there occurred yet another armed invasion of a sovereign State by a super-Power with conventional weapons, an invasion which is a gross violation of the United Nations Charter and the basic norms governing relations between States. Therefore, it will not be possible for humanity to enjoy peace and security unless, while endeavouring to prevent a nuclear war, we remove the immediate threat of conventional wars launched by big and small hegemonists. The people of the world who have gone through two world wars certainly do not wish to see another happen again. But if such a war does break out one day, despite all our efforts to avert it, it will begin either in the form of nuclear war or in the form of a conventional war escalating into a nuclear one. There is no unbridgeable gulf between a nuclear war and a conventional war. In a sense, the prevention of conventional wars can help reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

With these considerations in mind, we hold that while giving priority to nuclear disarmament we should pay due attention to conventional disarmament. Both are indispensable to the whole effort for disarmament. Paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament lists both nuclear and conventional weapons as priorities in disarmament negotiations. Paragraph 46 further states that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. These views are entirely right. We believe that, taken together, nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament will complement and promote each other.

Like nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament should also proceed from the existing stock of various countries' armaments, with a view to maintaining international peace and security. From a global point of view, the conventional arms race is going on mainly between the two super-Powers. Spending most heavily for military purposes and utilizing tremendous resources, these two countries have

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built up the biggest and most sophisticated conventional arsenals, with ever better quality and increasingly lethal and destructive power. They have widespread networks of military bases both at home and abroad and stationed large numbers of occupation troops and other military forces outside their borders. They are competing in the development of long-range offensive forces such as the rapid-deployment forces, the air-borne shock brigades, the long-range air forces and the ocean-going naval fleet. They are not only the largest weapon-producing countries, but also the leading arms dealers in the world. Conventional armaments have always been an important component of the super-Powers' arsenals. These weapons far exceed, in power and number, any reasonable need for self-defence and security and have become instruments for pursuing their policies of foreign expansion and interference.

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Facts have shown that in conventional disarmament, just as in nuclear disarmament, it is the two super-Powers that should take the lead. Paragraph 81 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament justly stresses that

"... States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions".

(resolution, S-10/2, para. 81)

This is entirely correct. For conventional disarmament, the other militarily significant States also have their share of responsibilities to shoulder, but compared with those of the super-Powers, their responsibilities cannot but be of secondary importance. As for the numerous peace-loving small and medium-sized countries, it is absolutely necessary for them to maintain the limited defence forces which are needed for their national safety and security. This has nothing to do with the arms race. It is obviously unfair to hold that all countries in the world should bear the same responsibility for conventional disarmament.

China fully agrees that conventional disarmament should be carried out in conjunction with nuclear disarmament. At the second special session on disarmament the Chinese delegation made the following concrete proposal. All States should undertake not to use conventional forces to commit armed intervention or aggression against or military occupation of any other State. As a first step towards conventional disarmament, all foreign occupation troops must be withdrawn without delay. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and the United States should proceed to reduce substantially their heavy and new-type conventional weapons and equipment, especially those for offensive purposes. After this, the other militarily-significant States should join them in reducing their respective conventional armaments according to a reasonable proportion and procedure to be agreed upon. This proposal is entirely in accord with the realities of

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international relations and the state of various countries' armaments, and constitutes a reasonable and practicable approach to conventional disarmament.

Authorized by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has appointed a Group of Experts to make a study of the conventional arms race in all its aspects and of the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. This reflects the concern of the international community over conventional disarmament. In the past two years this Group of Experts has held five sessions and has made an extensive in-depth study of the problem, doing a lot of hard and useful work. However, we cannot help feeling somewhat disappointed at its failure to complete the report on schedule. We have no objection to extending the mandate of this Group for one more year, and we hope that by intensifying its efforts it will be able to submit its final report to the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): In my statement I should like to express the views of the Bulgarian delegation on several disarmament agenda items, beginning with agenda item 143 entitled "Condemnation of nuclear war".

The question of the growing risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war continues to worry millions of people on our planet. It is a significant fact that during the general debate at this session more than 100 Heads of State or Government and other high-ranking officials stressed that today there is no more important task facing humanity than that of averting nuclear catastrophe. Last week's demonstrations against the deployment of new United States nuclear missiles in Western Europe, unprecedented in their scope and intensity in the whole of post-war history, have been the strongest indication of the anxieties troubling ordinary people throughout the world. Ever wider social strata have come to realize the simple truth referred

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to in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, namely, that "such a war would be the ultimate negation of all human endeavour" (A/38/1, p. 5).

Many speakers pointed out the reasons for the critical predicament of the world today. I would further point out that the concepts and doctrines concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the military strategy of the United States testify to their extremely dangerous evolution towards the massive use of nuclear weapons in various options, such as a first pre-emptive or decapitating nuclear strike, a so-called limited, protracted or all-out nuclear war, and so on. Some may object to this, referring to the statement in the General Assembly by President Reagan, in which he said that if a nuclear war broke out today there would be no winners. The question arises, however, as to whether this statement of President Reagan revokes official United States documents in force concerning the goals and doctrines of the United States in a possible nuclear war. I am afraid it does not. To confirm this it would suffice to take a look at a document entitled "Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defence Guidance", as described in The New York Times of 30 May 1982. This document, with terrifying candour, shows the gravity of the military threat and points, beyond controversy, to its very origin.

Although the consequences of a nuclear conflict cannot be predicted with certainty, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with various experiments and computations, have enabled us to paint as faithful a picture as possible of the unprecedented calamity which a full or partial implementation of the document I have mentioned could bring to mankind. It has now been scientifically proved that after a nuclear exchange the delicate balance of the earth's biosphere could be irreparably impaired and the very genetic basis of life destroyed.

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All these facts are no revelations. They have long been known to the public. Nevertheless, they are still disregarded by those leaders and circles that continue to whip up the arms race with the goal of obtaining military superiority. Official declarations are still made and plans have been elaborated for fighting a global war against the Soviet Union and other nations.

What gives a particularly threatening tone to the various doctrines and official declarations are the multi-billion-dollar programmes, now gaining momentum for bolstering the United States war potential, as well as the plans for setting up new nuclear-missile encampments in close proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The danger of nuclear war is many-sided. None the less, if we are to discuss the most immediate factors contributing to the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, three factors should be pointed out: first, the readiness for the first use of nuclear weapons; secondly, the view in favour of the legitimacy, admissibility and practicability of nuclear war; and, thirdly, the practical actions themselves, leading to an unfettered growth of nuclear arsenals, which are being stocked with newer types of nuclear weapons specifically designed for launching a devastating first strike and achieving strategic surprise.

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The sum total of all these factors has a destabilizing impact on the international situation and fatally undermines the entire structure of international relations. These factors are the backbone of the policy of preparing for nuclear war which poses the gravest challenge to humanity in its millennial history. The attempts to justify this policy by pointing to some values and positive goals are a most blatant affront to common sense.

If certain Heads of Government are really not guided only by pre-election considerations and recognize instead the truth that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, then people throughout the world are entitled to expect practical steps to ease the antagonism and tensions and to resume the policies of peaceful dialogue and détente upon which the hopes of all mankind are placed.

Unfortunately, the United States aggression against sovereign Grenada is the latest confirmation of the legitimacy of the reservations with which such declarations have been greeted. The invasion of this tiny independent State by United States marines cannot be viewed otherwise than as a gross violation of the basic norms of international law and as the latest demonstration of brutal imperialist violence directed against the freedom and independence of peoples.

The latest initiative of the Soviet Union concerning the condemnation of nuclear war in document A/C.1/38/L.1 provides an important opportunity for the world Organization to express the universal sentiment on the most urgent and immediate problem of the present day, namely, the threat of nuclear war. The resolute, unconditional condemnation for all time of nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right - the right to life - would be an important moral and political tenet in the struggle to strengthen world security and for disarmament and would contribute to rallying world public opinion on behalf of this

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struggle. The outlawing of the propaganda of militarist doctrines and concepts legitimizing the first use of nuclear weapons and the admissibility of unleashing nuclear war would have a wide-ranging preventive character. The condemnation of nuclear war would help define the common denominator of the most vital interests of States, irrespective of their social systems, and would further underline the watershed between the endeavours of the international community as a whole and the aspirations of some to preparation and justification of nuclear war.

If the condemnation of nuclear war is a very important task in itself, the need to put an immediate end to the nuclear arms race is at the very heart of the problem in its entire complexity. Another Soviet proposal, in document A/C.1/38/L.2, is devoted to this need, namely, the proposal for a qualitative and quantitative freeze of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States.

The idea of a weapons freeze has quite an instructive history. At the present stage the idea has begun to take root as a practical and effective instrument for the halting of the arms race. This has been prompted by the fact that the escalating stockpiling of nuclear weapons of every type has reached a certain limit, threatening to make this process irreversible and also by the objective fact of military and strategic parity. In this connection, the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session adopted two resolutions on the initiative of India, Mexico and Sweden. The overwhelming majority of Member States voted in favour of them.

The present Soviet initiative contains a clear-cut concept of how to end the nuclear arms race in all its manifestations. Its major merits are realism, practicality and comprehensiveness. It does not envisage a selective approach towards the different types and systems of nuclear weapons, nor does it propose complex quantitative combinations virtually ensuring a growth in military arsenals to new higher levels. What it proposes is the immediate freezing of the

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production, testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Thus all channels of the nuclear arms race would be effectively blocked in conformity with the principles of equality and equal security, and the necessary conditions would be furnished for radical reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

It should also be noted that the nuclear-weapon freeze proposal is not an end in itself, but should be viewed as the starting point for proceeding to mutual nuclear disarmament. It should become the impetus, starting a chain reaction designed to rid the world once and for all of the threat of nuclear death. At the same time, the freeze as an idea and concrete action offers the only opportunity to avoid failure and remove the obstacles to future disarmament agreements which will inevitably arise with the continuing introduction of ever more sophisticated weapons based on new technologies and on so far unknown qualities of matter.

I should like to emphasize, for the sake of those delegations which stressed in particular the need for confidence-building measures, that the halting of the huge war machines will no doubt provide a powerful impetus to the vital process of improving the international climate. As far as the problem of verification of the proposal's implementation is concerned, it should be substantially facilitated by the comprehensive nature of the proposed measure. The problem of verification would be easy to resolve, given a clear mutual goal and practical readiness on the part of the States concerned to work out its realization.

I should like to recall further that the idea of the freeze, as a first stage of genuine and large-scale nuclear disarmament, has almost simultaneously taken shape in various government, political and social circles. The idea of the freeze was conceived as an all-human reaction against the unprecedented nuclear threat, based on common sense and the instinct of self-preservation of people. The

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powerful support it has received throughout the world is a testimony of its vitality and durability.

The significance which the Bulgarian delegation attaches to the proposal for the nuclear-weapon freeze is of particular urgency in view of the growing efforts to spread the nuclear arms race into other spheres, including the militarization of outer space.

The consequences of the militarization of outer space and its employment as a field of aggressive military preparations are impossible to calculate and predict. The transformation of space into a springboard for nuclear attacks, the deployment into outer space of most powerful and sophisticated weapons and military facilities and the elaboration of plans for space and star wars would lead directly to a further aggravation of world tensions and distrust among States. Insurmountable roadblocks would be raised on the road to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Even larger financial resources would be redirected to armament. But the greatest harm caused by such a development would be its unpredictable effect on the strategic balance of forces and the increased chances of an outbreak of nuclear war.

Over the last several years the problem of stopping the arms race in space has been repeatedly discussed in various forums. However, nothing positive has come out of this. The Committee on Disarmament even failed to set up a working group to deal with that matter. The reason for that outcome was the position of the United States and its Western allies which plan to use outer space as a vehicle to gain a decisive military superiority over the Soviet Union and other socialist States.

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This view was expressed in concise form in an article in Business Week, which pointed out that whoever controlled space would be in a position to make a radical change in the balance of forces, which in turn would be tantamount to imposing global domination. This is the true meaning of the frantic activities of the Pentagon in outer space, which pose a direct threat not only to the security of States but also to all positive results achieved thus far in the field of disarmament.

The proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth (A/38/194) is designed to nip in the bud the use of space for military purposes and to guarantee for mankind the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. An outstanding element of this draft treaty is the combination of legal and political obligations on States parties not to use force in space with practical measures designed to prevent the militarization of outer space. The draft treaty provides a cardinal solution of the problem of anti-satellite systems which meets the interests of a number of countries in respect of that issue. The sincere intentions of the Soviet Union in this respect have been underscored by its unilateral assumption of an obligation not to launch into space any anti-satellite weapons.

Today there still exists an opportunity to avert the impending catastrophe. Tomorrow the tempestuous development of military space technology could drag the world into a position of no return. The Soviet proposal is a timely reminder of that menace, and the General Assembly must voice its considered view in favour of keeping outer space as the common heritage of mankind, free of weapons, as set forth in the 1967 outer space Treaty.

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The question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons is still high on the agenda of the United Nations. The concern of the international community is aroused by the fact that while the negotiations on this subject continue in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, certain countries have adopted plans for the qualitative and quantitative upgrading of their stockpiles of chemical weapons. It is a well-known fact that in early 1982 the United States Administration announced its decision on accelerated chemical rearmament, at a cost of \$10 billion, the pillar of this programme being the so-called binary ammunition.

The talks on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons have been going on for some 20 years, and their ups and downs are familiar to everyone in this hall. A number of States, sincerely interested in removing the danger of chemical weapons, have put forward proposals for their prohibition and total elimination. A comprehensive and detailed proposal to this effect is contained in the Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their elimination, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in 1982. A number of other constructive ideas have also been put forward in that Committee in Geneva. At the same time one cannot but be dismayed at the stubbornness and arrogance with which well-known slanderous assertions are being repeated time and again of some alleged use of Soviet chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South-east Asia, assertions which have long been refuted in most convincing and unequivocal terms by experts from various countries. There is no doubt in our mind that these false accusations are meant to serve as a smoke-screen for the continuous build-up of chemical weapons.

The danger of chemical warfare cannot be removed through unsubstantiated recriminations, confrontation or revision of agreements already in force. It will

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be removed only by the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their elimination. Extensive experience and much material have been accumulated in dealing with this matter in the Committee on Disarmament, and also in the Committee's working and contact groups, experience and material which should be used at the Committee's next session in drafting the text of a future convention. The decision of the General Assembly on this subject should be along the same lines.

My delegation would like to reiterate the crucial importance it attaches to the problem of the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We consider the conclusion of a treaty on this matter as one of the most substantive and urgent steps in the whole complex of measures to end the arms race, particularly the qualitative arms race, to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

This problem has long been ripe for a solution. In the course of a quarter of a century all its aspects have been studied in depth and in great detail. All technical issues relating to verification of the treaty's implementation have been solved to a considerable degree. The vast majority of Member States have resolutely upheld, in the General Assembly as well as in the Committee on Disarmament, the position that it is high time that these efforts were embodied in the drafting and conclusion of a relevant treaty. All these facts notwithstanding, it has not been possible so far to reach an agreement. The reason for this state of affairs is known. One of the nuclear-weapon Powers has invariably stated that it considers the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty to be a long-term task and not an immediate goal. With the support of certain other countries it continues to block the reaching of such an agreement. The motivation underlying

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this position is no secret, as it has been reflected in the large-scale programmes for accelerated modernization of nuclear weapons now under way. All these actions are completely at variance with the aspirations of the entire international community, and have aroused legitimate concern.

We wholeheartedly support the widely-held and oft-repeated position that it is high time for the United States to display political will and revise its negative stand, with a view to starting, in the Committee on Disarmament, serious and businesslike negotiations aimed at drafting a generally acceptable treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The working group of the Committee on Disarmament on this question should be entrusted with a mandate which would enable it to proceed to meaningful negotiations. We are convinced that there is a good chance that the treaty would become a reality. The working group has at its disposal a number of important documents and concrete proposals in this regard. In our opinion, a solid basis for its further work is provided by the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union during the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty. Another interesting proposal in this respect was submitted by the delegation of Sweden. The conclusion of such a treaty is long overdue. The People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue to contribute most actively to the attainment of this goal of overriding importance for the international community.

Those are the items which at this stage of our discussion I wished to dwell upon in my statement.

Mr. AL-ATASSI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation has already had occasion to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We did this at the time of the commemoration of Disarmament Week. We are convinced that, thanks to your experience in the field of disarmament and to your wisdom, you will guide the work of the Committee to a successful conclusion. We wish also to congratulate the other Committee officers on their unanimous elections.

Again this year the First Committee is meeting with a very full agenda which contains many of the same items which were considered thoroughly in past years. It is our strong belief that no progress has been made in the field of disarmament. Our debates are repetitious, and our resolutions are practically the same from one year to the next; there has been no substantive improvement in the situation.

We are not advocating the adoption of a large number of resolutions, nor are we discussing the substance of the issues or their universal nature. What we wish to point out is that what is missing now is political will on the part of States, in particular the nuclear super-Powers and those countries which have developed a significant military potential. Also missing is a sincere desire on the part of those States to halt the arms race.

In the present international situation we may discern the harbingers of imminent danger. Our times are characterized by unprecedented dangers, and are reminiscent of the cold war period. This situation, and the concern it has brought about in States and peoples, impelled some 40 Heads of State, most of them from developing countries, to come to this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Most Heads of State or Government are in agreement that there is a very serious crisis in the world and that the international situation is constantly

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deteriorating. They have all expressed their grave concern over this situation, which was created by mistrust and doubt in relations among States, by the intensification of the conventional and nuclear arms race, and by the threat of nuclear war, which jeopardizes the future of mankind.

The explosive international situation is a threat to international peace and security. The peoples of the world, including the peoples of countries which possess a great nuclear capability, have a feeling of insecurity and instability, and fear the outbreak of a nuclear war. Such a war could certainly not be limited, and would unquestionably spare no region of the world. If such a war should take place, it would be a veritable cataclysm.

On many occasions, the peoples of the world have expressed their desire to see détente in the world, to eliminate tensions and to do away with all weapons - not only weapons of war, but also weapons of mass destruction. The question of disarmament is closely related to the desire of the international community to produce a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The second special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1982, met with failure in that effort. The establishment of a comprehensive programme of disarmament requires a reversal of the arms race, and we believe that States have an important role to play in this area.

Another factor in the deterioration of the international climate is the recourse to violence, force and aggression in attempts to settle disputes. The need to curb the hegemonistic desires of certain States is a further direct cause of the tension in the world.

Yet another important factor is the existence of certain States which promote a doctrine of expansion and racial superiority, and which do not recognize the right of self-determination.

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In this connection I might refer to the conduct of the United States and to the invasion by that country of Grenada. This poses a threat to international peace and security. The United States is a super-Power and a permanent member of the Security Council, and thus bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world.

With their conduct, States can poison the international climate, by creating zones of tension and by waging war. I would mention two striking examples of this: the racist régime in South Africa and the racist régime in occupied Palestine. Those two régimes could not exist in a normal world in which peace prevailed. I remind members of the Committee that those two régimes could not survive without the full support of international imperialism, headed by the United States and its Western allies.

The racist Zionist régime in occupied Palestine could not survive without the military, economic and financial support of the United States. That régime's arrogance and cynicism and its establishment of settlements in the occupied territory could not continue without the encouragement of the United States. We need only consider the arms build-up in Israel - which results from arms shipments from the United States - to understand the commitment of the United States to that artificially-created entity. Furthermore, stockpiles of United States weapons in Israel could be used for purposes having nothing to do with Israel's security.

In our approach to questions of disarmament, we base ourselves on a principle which has been borne out by history, a principle supported by non-aligned and other peace-loving countries, namely that there is a close relationship between disarmament and true peace. Peace cannot come about without complete disarmament, and the arms race threatens international peace and security.

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That is why we believe that peace through disarmament should be an integral part of the fight against colonialism and for the elimination of colonialism, apartheid, zionism and racism in all its forms. These are causes of serious tension throughout the world and pose a threat to peace. The Syrian Arab Republic is unswerving in its desire for peace, and it joins with other peace-loving countries in the building of a better world.

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)

The peoples of the world should never resign themselves, give way to despair, await or concede that they are powerless to prevent the outbreak of war. On the contrary, they should strive to maintain peace and security throughout the world; but peace and security cannot be achieved in the world without putting an end to tyranny and foreign interference. My delegation therefore wishes to stress that international peace and security cannot be guaranteed without first eliminating sources of tension created by the Zionist régime in occupied Palestine and the apartheid régime in South Africa.

Part of our country is occupied by an alien régime, Israel, which enjoys the full support of the United States. Without American weapons and America's air cover, Israel could not have occupied and annexed part of our territory. In this connection, I should like to refer to the statement by the Foreign Minister of Syria, Mr. Khaddam, in the General Assembly on 28 September of this year, in which he said that the attainment of a just peace requires:

"the maintenance of a strategic balance in the region between the parties to the conflict, since, under the shadow of military superiority, the superior party would remain intransigent while the weaker party would become more adamant in its attitudes. In this respect we call on the United States to halt all types of aid and support to Israel, especially in the military field." (A/38/PV.9, p. 81)

He also stated:

"The gravity of the situation in our region, with all the dangers of increased involvement by the United States and some of its allies, makes it incumbent on the world Organization to take positive decisions, not only in the interests of security and of Member States, but also to safeguard the security and interests of all countries in the world." (Ibid., p. 82)

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)

We are deeply concerned over the incredible sums of money being devoted to armaments. According to recent figures, over \$800 billion will be spent on armaments this year. With those figures in mind, we would point out that tens of millions of human beings are dying of hunger throughout the world, that millions are living in conditions that could be described as indecent, that illiteracy is widespread throughout the world, and that the diseases suffered by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America are an insult to mankind which lives in fear of the danger represented by the ever-swelling military budgets of an increasing number of countries. There is a constant dynamic relationship between disarmament and development, since the more spent on arms, the less spent on development.

The problem is all the more complex because it is the countries of the third world that suffer the most from this increase in military budgets. Those countries are obliged to buy arms to defend their independence and to protect their natural resources. They are forced to allocate increasingly large sums to buying arms at the cost of the well-being of their peoples. We call upon all the countries of the world, above all the nuclear-weapon States, to reduce their military budgets, and to allocate the money thus saved to development, particularly in the third world.

In past years we have stated the position of the Syrian Arab Republic on the subject of disarmament. We should like to reaffirm that position with regard to the most important questions. If other matters have not been referred to in this statement, it is not from any lack of interest on our part, but merely because we feel that such questions have already been sufficiently considered. What we need today is that all countries should demonstrate their good intentions and political will, so that we can carry out our disarmament plans.

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)

My delegation would, however, like to say that in the light of our total commitment to support the principle of disarmament and the declared aims of disarmament, the Syrian Arab Republic has acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We would call upon all States to take specific steps to ban the use of nuclear weapons and appropriate action to safeguard the security of non-nuclear States. My delegation also calls on all States to ban the use of chemical weapons and to put an end to their manufacture. We call the nuclear-weapon States to abandon the arms race and to devote the funds thus released to the economic and social development of the developing countries. We also call for the demilitarization of outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind.

My delegation supports any action directed to an arms freeze and to ending the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. We also support any action to put an end to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. My delegation would also like to stress the importance of confidence-building measures, and considers that interference in the internal affairs of other States and annexation are factors for insecurity that threaten international peace and security. In addition, my delegation supports nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Indian Ocean, in Latin America, in Africa and in the Middle East and believes that the creation of such zones would help to strengthen international peace and security.

With regard to Africa and the Middle East, my delegation feels that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions, would truly reflect the wishes of the peoples of those areas, in the light of the policy of hegemonism, domination and expansion of some States. The peoples of those regions are facing the serious threat that nuclear weapons will be introduced into those parts of the world through the co-operation of the Western allies of Israel and South Africa. The introduction of nuclear weapons into Africa and the Middle East and the nuclear co-operation between the two racist régimes are sources of great concern to the

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Arab and African peoples, who feel that such actions are violations of international law. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East has been supported by the Syrian Arab Republic and by all the Arab countries. Israel is alone in not supporting the creation of such a zone, for Israel has its own ideas about that proposal. Year after year in the First Committee Israel attempts to put over its own proposals. We consider that this amounts to lies and blackmail on the part of a State which has a nuclear capacity. Today, the whole world is well aware of what Israel is today, and knows that it possesses nuclear weapons, since it refuses to submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection and control and that it persists in its refusal to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel's machinations and manoeuvres have been exposed. Its claim that it wants peace is basically a propaganda ploy designed to cover up its acquisition of nuclear weapons and its aggression against the countries of the region.

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)

The aggression against Syria emphasizes the need for all countries, including the Zionist régime in Israel, to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The question of Israel's nuclear weapons is one that appears on our agenda each year, and is a source of great concern to the peoples of the region and to the international community as a whole. A report submitted by the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session contained the following statement:

"The Group of Experts considers that the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel would be a seriously destabilizing factor in the already tense situation prevailing in the Middle East, in addition to being a serious danger to the cause of non-proliferation in general. However, they wish to add the final observation that it would, in their view, contribute to avoiding the danger of a nuclear arms race in the region of the Middle East if Israel would renounce, without delay, the possession of or any intention to possess nuclear weapons, submitting all its nuclear activities to international safeguards, through adherence to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and with Assembly resolution 35/147, through accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or by unilaterally accepting such safeguards." (A/36/431, para. 83)

We would appeal to the international community to condemn Israel's nuclear weapons, and we believe that our Committee has a special responsibility to invite all States to end all forms of nuclear co-operation with Israel.

I should like to remind members of the First Committee of Israel's aggression against the Iraqi nuclear facility. That facility had been created for peaceful purposes and for the purposes of economic development. Today, the bombing of the

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Iraqi nuclear facility can be seen to have set a very dangerous precedent in inter-State relations, and we would invite all the countries of the world to act to put an end to Israel's arrogance.

Convinced as we are of the need to respect the United Nations Charter, my delegation believes that this Organization has a very special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We believe that it must play a fundamental role in disarmament, and for that reason we have supported the expansion of the Disarmament Committee. My delegation would like to thank the Committee for its efforts in the disarmament field, for we believe that it is the only valid negotiating body for disarmament matters and the only forum that can act to ward off the total destruction of mankind.

Mr. MARTYNYENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): Before beginning my statement, I should like, on behalf of the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, to congratulate you, Sir, upon your election as Chairman of the First Committee and to wish you all success in your work. Our good wishes go also to the other officers of the Committee.

Today the world is struck by the monstrous acts of the United States of America, which has launched a bandit-like attack on defenceless Grenada, a sovereign State in the Caribbean that has been pursuing a policy of non-alignment. Grenada has been attacked from both land and sea with all the advanced weaponry of the twentieth century, and an attempt has been made to impose an American-style democracy upon it. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic decisively condemns that act of banditry; it demands the immediate cessation of the military invasion of Grenada and the immediate withdrawal of the invasion forces from the island. Our sympathies and feelings of solidarity go to the heroic people of Grenada.

The tenor of the general debate during the current session of the General Assembly and the discussions of issues relating to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament in the First Committee are evidence of the profound concern of the overwhelming majority of States at the existing situation with respect to this issue of such vital interest to all peoples. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully shares that concern. The expected progress towards the solution of this major task of our era - the halting of the arms race - has yet to be realized. Moreover, the further intensification of the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, is constantly aggravating the international situation and increasing the threat of a nuclear war. This dangerous situation can and should be corrected by arriving at a just and honourable agreement on the key issues of war and peace, instead of seeking military advantage over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the countries of the socialist group, which is what the United States is striving to do.

In the present circumstances it is necessary to take urgent measures that can eliminate the threat of war and redirect the course of world events towards détente and a healthier climate for international relations. This was the appeal contained in the joint communiqué issued by the leading party and State officials of seven socialist countries at their meeting held at Moscow on 28 June of this year. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic feels that in order to achieve a practical solution to this problem of such vital importance for all of humanity, decisive measures must be taken immediately. We believe that a constructive measure in the direction of preventing a nuclear war would be the conclusion of an agreement on specific measures to halt the nuclear arms race. Such an agreement could be achieved in Geneva at the Soviet-American discussions on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, but to achieve such an agreement the desire of one party

(Mr. Martynenko, Ukrainian SSR)

is not enough. It is necessary for both parties to wish to reach a decision acceptable to both sides, that would avoid a further escalation of the arms race. There is no other solution to this problem.

The question of what to do with medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe is one of the central problems in world's political life. Unfortunately, in the Geneva discussions we find two fundamentally different approaches taken to the solution of this problem. The Soviet Union is in favour of there being no nuclear weapons, either medium-range or tactical, on the European continent. Europe and European security could only gain from such a situation. However, inasmuch as the United States and its allies are not willing to accept such a radical solution to the problem, the Soviet Union has proposed that each side proceed to a three-stage reduction of the number of medium-range weapons. The USSR has agreed to maintain the same number of missiles as those now maintained by Great Britain and France and has also agreed to an equal number of medium-range aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons on each side. The remaining weapons could be reduced on an agreed basis. Such an approach would make possible a genuine equality of forces.

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However, the United States has not agreed to this. The arms race which it is imposing is overtaking the discussions. In order to create favourable conditions for such negotiations, the USSR proposes a temporary freeze on medium-range and strategic nuclear weapons on both sides. This would be the most sensible way of seeking a solution. But the United States does not want to seek a solution that would meet the principle of equality and equal security and be genuinely designed to improve the situation in Europe.

Washington continues stubbornly to insist on its deliberately unacceptable conditions, obviously in order to gain time and drag out the negotiations so that at all costs it can site its nuclear weapons in Western Europe. It is perfectly understandable that if things get to that stage the Warsaw Pact countries will be obliged to undertake counter-measures to ensure their own security, as stated by the Ministry of Defence of the USSR on 24 October; yet we do not want a military solution. That is being imposed by the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We are convinced that such an agreement is just as necessary for the United States of America as it is for the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

In their communiqué, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty countries who took part in the meeting held at Sofia on 13 and 14 October of this year came out firmly in favour of an early agreement in the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, and have expressed the conviction that the possibility of achieving such agreement still exists.

From the very beginning of negotiations on strategic weapons, the Soviet Union has been in favour of working towards the preparation of a mutually acceptable agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security.

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Everyone knows that the USSR has made far-ranging proposals that as an initial stage the strategic arsenals of both sides should be subject to a freeze and then reduced by more than one quarter of the total number of strategic vehicles, without any exception. The number of nuclear warheads would also be reduced to equal levels. There would be a prohibition on the installation of long-range cruise missiles and other types of strategic weapon.

The Soviet side has also made a number of proposals aimed at increasing stability and confidence between the USSR and the United States. Unfortunately, the United States line in these negotiations is aimed not at reducing strategic weapons but, rather, at legalizing the arms race in order to obtain unilateral advantage. Let us take any component of the strategic defensive weapons of the United States and we will see that each of them is to be improved and upgraded. For this purpose MX strategic missiles, the Midgetman and Trident-2 are being prepared, as well as new strategic bombers; there is mass production of long-range and sea-based cruise missiles. In the negotiations the Soviet Union has proposed the elimination of the greater part of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The United States side would then maintain a great advantage in heavy bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles and contemporary submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

We feel that in negotiations on strategic weapons, too, we must have an agreement based on strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security, and not on attempts to get round that principle to obtain unilateral military advantage. Our delegation has already discussed the essence of those proposals in the general debate of the plenary Assembly.

The Ukrainian SSR considers that, under conditions of an intensified nuclear threat, it is essential immediately to work out jointly such practical measures for the prohibition of nuclear war as have already obtained broad international

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support, and for whose implementation only the political will of the States concerned is necessary. Above all, we are talking of the commitment by all States which possess nuclear weapons not to be the first to use them. This question was dealt with broadly in the discussion on the subject.

The USSR, having undertaken a unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, once again confirms that its concern about the elimination of the threat of war is a principal line of its policy. The United Nations has called upon other nuclear-weapon States to follow this example, and has the right to expect similar steps by the United States and its nuclear partners. However, the Western States which possess nuclear weapons have not only ignored the Soviet Union's appeal but are also trying to cast doubts on the obligation undertaken by the USSR and belittling its significance. They are advancing a rather peculiar argument to the effect that the Soviet Union retains its freedom to use conventional weapons.

The socialist countries have given a specific answer to that assertion in the political declaration adopted at the beginning of 1983 by the Warsaw Treaty States - they propose to conclude an agreement between the States parties to the Warsaw Pact and NATO that would contain the mutual obligation not to use any weapon, nuclear or conventional; in other words, not to use force at all in their relations. What prevents the Western countries from accepting the proposal of the socialist countries to conclude such an agreement? The absence of any answer to this proposal which is so important for the fate of Europe and the world speaks for itself. Neither the United States of America nor its nuclear allies want to give up their right to be the first to use nuclear weapons or their doctrine of nuclear war. In that light their argumentation seems totally devoid of substance.

(Mr. Martynenko, Ukrainian SSR)

The creation of a moral and political climate in the world that would substantially reduce the threat of a nuclear war, improve confidence among States and promote more favourable prospects for reaching agreement on nuclear disarmament would be assisted if the General Assembly were to condemn nuclear war. In the draft declaration to that effect submitted by the Soviet Union for examination at the present session, it is proposed that the General Assembly shall resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemn nuclear war as the most hideous crime against the peoples of the world and as a violation of the foremost human right - the right to life. The Ukrainian SSR is decisively in favour of the United Nations adoption of that important document.

A sensible alternative to the threat of a nuclear catastrophe would be urgent measures designed to hinder any increase in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and subjecting them to a quantitative and qualitative freeze. Not only the United Nations but also many other international forums, as well as the social and political leaders of various countries of the world, have recently discussed this idea and see in it a real possibility for reducing the threshold of military operations - the first step towards a genuine measure to reduce nuclear weapons and ultimately to eliminate them completely. That is the aim of the USSR proposal contained in the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear arms freeze", submitted for adoption at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. We express the hope that this important proposal, which is in the interests of peace and international security, will find broad support among States Members of the United Nations.

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Naturally, a simultaneous quantitative and qualitative freeze of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States - and above all by the USSR and the United States of America - is not an end in itself; but that important measure would hinder the development of the arms race, improve stability and confidence among States, reduce the threat of a nuclear war, and would be a step towards the normalization of the international situation. It would ensure the beginning of the specific working out of a programme of nuclear disarmament directed to the total liquidation of nuclear weapons.

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The socialist and many non-aligned countries have long favoured the immediate elaboration of such a programme. However, despite certain decisions of the General Assembly at its last session and the broad support for this by public opinion in many continents, this question has not yet moved from dead centre. The obstructionist position of the United States of America has prevented the Committee on Disarmament from even creating a special working group to conduct the necessary discussions. Whatever arguments are advanced on behalf of this, their refusal to begin such negotiations which would lead to the certain liberation of humanity from the threat of nuclear war can hardly be evaluated in any way other than that of making the vital interests of humanity the victim of militarist plans which threaten the very existence of world civilization.

One of the most important trends in the achievement of world peace and international security and the limitation of the arms race and disarmament is the struggle for a peaceful outer space. Today as never before scientific and technical achievements can be used unfortunately not only to benefit humanity but also to harm it. How serious this threat is can be seen from recent communications on the elaboration by the Pentagon of an anti-missile system based in space and of plans to allocate \$27 billion for this purpose during the next five years. The United States of America has thus demonstrated a total disregard not only for the fate of peace but also for the obligations it has undertaken and is crudely violating the relevant Soviet-United States agreement of 1972. This step by the Pentagon opens up another dangerous round in the arms race which may go entirely out of control. On 18 October of this year, the Washington Post wrote "In this respect, very soon - the precise date is a secret - the United States of America will undertake to test this weapons system, which will be the beginning of a threat

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of a military advantage and superiority in outer space. This competition will become unbelievably expensive and it will be practically impossible to stop it if it ever gets started".

The Ukrainian SSR has consistently opposed transforming outer space into an arena of the arms race. This position corresponds to the adoption of the proposal submitted at the present session by the Soviet Union, "Conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth". A very important characteristic of this is the combination of political and legal obligations of States not to permit the use of force against one another in space or from space through concrete measures designed to prevent the militarization of outer space. We have in mind, in particular, the complete prohibition of testing or deployment in outer space of any type of land-based weapon for attacking objectives on earth, in the air or in space. It also provides for total refusal by States to create new anti-satellite systems as well as the liquidation of the ones that already exist.

We consider that in the light of the attempts by military circles to transform outer space into one more arena of the arms race, including the nuclear-arms race, the adoption of such measures is extremely timely. Of great importance in this connection is the obligation assumed by the Soviet Union not to be the first to station any kind of anti-satellite weapon in outer space, thereby introducing a unilateral moratorium on such launchings so long as other States, including the United States of America, refrain from launching into space any anti-satellite weapons of any type. By so doing, we are hoping to create a firm base once and for all to end discussion of the question of anti-satellite weapons.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supports those who feel it very necessary and of primary importance to undertake at the beginning of 1984 agreement on a text

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prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space against earth. The Moscow agreement on the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere signed 20 years ago was a major step towards a limitation of the arms race.

However, we have not succeeded in achieving this goal primarily because the United States has broken off trilateral agreements on this question and is blocking its discussion in the Committee on Disarmament. Despite the demands of the General Assembly, the United States openly declares that it will continue its tests of nuclear weapons in order to improve and stockpile them. Being in favour of the immediate cessation by all States of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union submitted for discussion at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly basic provisions for an agreement on general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and is proposing that there be a moratorium in the meantime on all types of nuclear tests.

The Ukrainian SSR feels that such questions as the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world is a very timely issue, as well as the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime of nuclear weapons, particularly in light of the nuclear preparations by Israel and South Africa and also for strengthening the security of non-nuclear States. The attention of the Assembly should be directed to questions of meeting the threat from other types of weapons of mass destruction, in particular neutron weapons.

We feel that in light of certain resolutions of the United Nations, it is necessary immediately to undertake concrete negotiations to draw up a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment or use of the neutron weapon. Of very great importance in present conditions is the elaboration and conclusion of

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a general agreement on the non-use of force in international relations. We feel that the General Assembly at its present session could further rapid realization of the Soviet proposal on concluding such an agreement in order that rejection of the use of force or the threat to use any kind of weapon, whether it be nuclear or conventional, would become part of international law.

Today the Ukrainian delegation has laid stress on questions of preventing nuclear war and limiting the nuclear-arms race, which threatens the existence of humanity. We do this out of our conviction that these are vital issues which can and should be resolved jointly by the States, regardless of differences in their social and political systems. To do this all we need is goodwill, observance of the principle of equal security and the refusal to resort to a policy of confrontation or to attempt to seek unilateral advantages.

The Ukrainian SSR, like all socialist countries, will not fail to display the necessary political will and readiness to take all necessary steps to prevent the nuclear threat

Mr. KIRCA (Turkey): Permit me to state at the outset how pleased the Turkish delegation is to see you, Ambassador Vraalsen of Norway, in the Chair this year, along with Ambassador Elfaki of the Sudan and Mr. Tinca of Romania as your able assistants.

The distinguished qualities you have amply demonstrated will most assuredly lay the ground for a realistic, balanced and, we hope, productive exchange of views on security. My delegation takes further pleasure in noting that the officers of the Committee come from countries with which Turkey enjoys particularly good relations.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

As almost all speakers have seemed to acknowledge, once again we are meeting this year in an atmosphere of anxiety, in which paradoxical situations seem to be commonplace, one in which annual spending on armaments has reached the shocking level of \$800 billion in contrast to an absolute and relative decline in levels of resource transfers from the developed world to the developing countries, one in which countries which have renounced and rejected possession of nuclear weapons are frustrated in their efforts to acquire satisfactory guarantees against their becoming victims of weapons of such terrifying potential.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

Thus, there must be other factors, beyond the visible irritations offered by the security scene, that call for close scrutiny. Singling out specific cases from a truly complex mesh of paradoxical situations and pointing accusatory fingers at selected addresses is, at best, nothing more than isolating a burning building from a burning neighbourhood.

Last year in this Committee we said that, in determining our expectations from our present and future efforts in the field of disarmament, it would be essential to focus on those elements and dynamics that define the state of affairs among nations. We ventured to suggest that the single remedy for the apparently undesirable current dynamics would be the maximum exertion of efforts to build mutual trust among nations and thus gradually establish a feeling of confidence.

If we do not do so, while tension and, in not a few cases, actual confrontation are on the gallop around the globe, it does not seem to my delegation, for one, that it is exactly realistic to congregate in this room or elsewhere and challenge each other's tactical abilities in order to work out resolutions, reports, working papers and other sorts of documents that would reflect our own individual views of methodologies tailored to making the world a safer place in which to live.

From the Turkish viewpoint, a safe course of action to follow would be to forego intellectual romanticism and, at times, linguistic deception in favour of simple, sheer realism.

That is exactly why we fail when we approve a certain tendency to negotiate bargains on a certain stratum of disarmament in isolation from all the other strata. Just as security is indivisible, just as détente is indivisible, so too is disarmament indivisible. To put it another way, we do not believe that the world community can achieve much in either nuclear or conventional disarmament when one is highly deficient as compared with the other.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

Unless the minimum essential degree of confidence and mutual trust among nations is achieved and unless the attitudes of nations vis-à-vis one another are reformulated within the context of such confidence, it will be pointless and, to say the least, naive to envisage the concepts, distinctly pluralist, of both nuclear and conventional disarmament. Can one think of, or even philosophize about, any set of documents that would deter a determined chooser from moving up from the lesser of the two evils to the greater?

Last year we stated that, if at the final session of the follow-up meeting to the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe a mandate could be drawn up in connection with a European disarmament conference with a view to negotiating militarily significant, binding and verifiable confidence-building measures that would be applicable to the entire continent of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, that would indeed be a most outstanding achievement.

Despite our wide-ranging pessimism, I venture to suggest that we should not let it go unnoticed that this most outstanding objective has now been achieved. It is only fair to commend the highly diversified participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe - diversified not only economically, politically and ideologically, but also in terms of their security-related affiliations.

The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is due to commence in mid-January in Stockholm, which is undoubtedly a well-chosen venue for a highly significant initiative that will have as its underlying motive the relief of tensions in a continent that is often charged with being the powder-keg of military arsenals, however much that accusation may be contradicted by its record of being virtually the only area of the globe lucky enough not to have experienced actual confrontation in almost four decades.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mr. Turkman, declared from the General Assembly rostrum just a few weeks ago that the establishment of confidence among States is a prerequisite for the success of any disarmament initiative, and that in the attempt to determine, in its first stage, a set of confidence-building and security measures - the parameters of which are very much welcomed by the Turkish Government - the Stockholm Conference will essentially be the first comprehensive endeavour in the initiation of a gradual process of realistic disarmament.

It would be prudent to underline at this stage the prospects of what are perhaps more rational, productive and well-intentioned negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, in which Turkey is intimately involved. We are hopeful and confident that the Stockholm negotiations, with their wider context, will have a positive effect on the apparent bottlenecks in Vienna.

At this point I wish to restate once again Turkey's long-standing position, in a regional perspective, concerning zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We have always firmly supported the establishment of such zones wherever and whenever possible and practically feasible. That, of course, means that certain conditions have to be met prior to the establishment of such zones and that, in turn, calls for an adequate level of co-operation, understanding and confidence between the parties involved. In our view, only after each and every party concludes from its own assessment that such a stage has been reached will it be prudent to get involved in serious undertakings.

At an earlier stage in my statement I said that we believe that disarmament is indivisible. In other words, one initiative cannot remain unaffected by the developments in another. That premise holds true particularly when the two initiatives pertain to the same area of the world.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

The United States of America, Turkey's ally, and the USSR, Turkey's neighbour, are engaged in two sets of negotiations in Geneva. Those pertaining to intermediate-range nuclear missiles seem to attract relatively much stronger popular interest. These negotiations have a vital significance for all of us. Both negotiating parties are undoubtedly aware of this fact. Co-operation and consultation have been meticulously pursued at all stages leading to the present-day situation within the defensive alliance to which my country is party. Most unambiguously, and at certain points very admirably, a common political will has been demonstrated in order to help achieve the consensus so earnestly desired by, we believe, practically the whole world.

My Government welcomed the fact that the latest attempt at compromise was advanced by no less than the President of the United States of America just recently, in this very building. The Government of Turkey sincerely believes that at this moment the world community anticipates a bold and exemplary utilization of these offers aimed at the elaboration of a fair and equitable solution.

In negotiations on another category of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), there is now on the negotiating table a fresh proposal termed the build-down concept. The ultimate aim of these negotiations is to reduce as much as possible the size of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two negotiating parties, while maintaining a stable and durable balance.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

In that respect, the build-down concept seems to us to be a very functional one. Not only would it bring about actual reductions and maintain balance while doing so, but, much more significantly, it would represent a continuous and steady process, contributing to confidence-building at each increment of implementation. This, we believe, is exactly where the true cumulative value of the build-down proposal lies. In these times of inflated tension, could it possibly be at all convincing to disregard this cumulative effect?

In expectation of tangible developments in the intermediate-range nuclear forces and the START negotiations, and in anticipation of the Stockholm Conference, we are now about to embark on a preparatory process with regard to the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While observing the situation in one way might unfortunately, but again undeniably, be leading a good number of us into pessimism in the absence of credible successive interim benefits, perhaps an alternative optimistic approach would be to note that a variety of important things, such as the ones I have just mentioned, are and will be going on which will provide us with an opportunity to demonstrate effectively the earnest goodwill of our Governments that we so often pledge. We sincerely hope that this Committee's work at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly will provide a good starting base for the Third Review Conference, with a view to further enhancing the NPT régime.

Undoubtedly, the NPT régime has been efficiently instrumental in restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it is only fair to note not only that proliferation has more than a single dimension, but also that the NPT régime has an aspect that is complementary to the renunciation by non-nuclear signatories of attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

In dealing with these two problem issues, a highly effective tool would be a comprehensive test-ban treaty. A treaty that would encompass all types of nuclear explosions, in all environments, for all time would certainly be of significant value in checking horizontal and, equally important, vertical proliferation. For as long as such developments cannot be brought about for one reason or the other, nations that earnestly anticipate acquiring nuclear technology for truly peaceful purposes will have to wait. In that respect, it is a matter of concern to the Government of Turkey that well-intentioned attempts in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva have been stalled by less than constructive arguments concerning the mandate of the relevant Working Group, which we here in New York had believed to have been unanimously agreed on as early as last year.

Another area in which chances of future progress in the Committee on Disarmament have gone down the drain owing to mandate-related questions is the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the question of radiological weapons we observe a paradoxical situation. Certain expectations, legitimate though they may be in appropriate contexts, seem to us to be extraneous to the spirit of a future treaty banning such weapons and to constitute the current impediments to the effective prevention of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction from overshadowing the future of mankind.

A short review of the work of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1983 sessions, fortunately reveals an area in which somewhat more promising developments have taken place. With regard to chemical weapons, the Committee - or rather the Conference - will have to embark in its next round of negotiations on such central issues as the destruction of existing stocks and facilities and verification of such processes. The Government of Turkey sincerely hopes that the exemplary workshops to be offered very soon in Utah, and next year in the Federal Republic of

(Mr. Kirca, Turkey)

Germany, will be instrumental in developing more co-operative attitudes on the part of all the parties concerned.

Regardless of our perceptions of the degree of achievement or lack of achievement by the Committee on Disarmament this year, one judgement remains valid. That Committee is a unique instrument which the international community has devised, and it provides a significant forum in which the security perceptions of member countries are exposed to interaction, with a view to probing any and all possibilities of achieving progress in matters of disarmament. That is one interpretation of the essence of the work conducted by that body and the only *raison d'etre* we can think of for its existence. If that were not so, it would be a futile and unconscionable effort to exploit our academic talents for a gradual immersion in technicalities.

In full cognizance of our posture, on the security scene and the particularities of south-eastern Europe, which, in the most realistic sense, call for a balanced - I repeat, balanced - representation in the Committee on Disarmament, the Turkish Government has pursued successive efforts to contribute to bringing about an expansion of this body. We are pleased to observe that the present members of the Committee have now agreed on the admission of new members. We bring to the attention of the parties concerned that our firm candidacy will be maintained.

The Turkish Government remains confident that appropriate consultations will be conducted in a spirit of impartiality, as so explicitly pledged by its Chairman, Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru.

The delegation of Turkey intends to speak, whenever appropriate, on issues that will be taken up later in the session. Meanwhile it pledges to you, Mr. Chairman, that it will display a spirit of co-operation and constructiveness.

Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of my delegation, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of our Committee. I take this opportunity also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee. I reaffirm our intention to collaborate wholeheartedly with you in order to ensure the success of the Committee's work and serve the interests of our peoples by the achievement of our common objectives.

The significance of the debate on the question of disarmament at this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly derives from the considerable importance which most States attach to disarmament efforts and their real objectives: that is, the preservation of peace and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The fact that the international community has called for general and complete disarmament indicates the priority to be accorded to this question and the need to deal rapidly with it, particularly at a time when international relations are steadily deteriorating, and in view of the ever-increasing tension and danger of war, including nuclear war, which is a threat to the very survival of civilization and mankind.

A large number of countries and peoples are confronted with the danger of aggression and flagrant interference in their internal affairs by imperialist forces. The military potential of the imperialists, the escalation of the armaments race, both nuclear and conventional and the creation of sources of tension in different regions of the world inhibit the collective efforts to bring about total disarmament. The nuclear doctrines of the American Administration and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are based upon the concept of nuclear superiority, which in fact provides the idea of a nuclear war. From this point of view, new military programmes have been adopted, new weapons of mass destruction are being developed and efforts are being made to impose extremely dangerous theories on the peoples of the world concerning nuclear war or the possibility of an unlimited conventional war.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

In this connection, we should mention the aggression of the imperialist forces against independent and sovereign States. The behaviour of these forces, which stirs up conflicts among States, is thus an obstacle to the realization of the just aspirations of the peoples of the world for political and economic independence and constitutes a threat to national sovereignty and the security of borders, thereby posing a threat to international peace and security.

The most flagrant example of this policy of aggression practised by the forces of imperialism headed by the United States was the military invasion of the sovereign island of Grenada yesterday morning. This invasion against the peace-loving people of Grenada, in which the most sophisticated United States weapons were used like invasions perpetrated by the United States in other regions of the world, constitutes a threat to the international community and is contrary to the principles of international law as well as the Charter of the United Nations. At a time when we firmly condemn this blatant invasion of the island of Grenada by the United States, we once again stress the responsibility of the international community to stop this policy of interference and intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of other countries, which threatens the security of peoples which have selected their own independent path of economic and social development.

We recommend that measures be taken to stop this military invasion of Grenada and to obtain the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from that territory.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of my country, in his statement at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, said:

"Today, we are a long way from achieving the basic objective of the United Nations Charter, namely the peace for which the peoples of the world are struggling." (A/38/PV.26, p. 38-40)

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report on the work of the Organization, also stressed this sad reality. He said:

"In no area is the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter more important and more closely tied to the survival of humanity than in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. The prevention of nuclear war remains the unique challenge of our time, since such a war would be the ultimate negation of all human endeavour." (A/38/1, pp. 4-5)

This very serious situation with which humanity as a whole is faced is caused by the belligerent policy of the forces of imperialism, which is designed to augment the sources of tension and destabilize peace in the world, thereby defying world public opinion. Imperialist policy threatens the world with a catastrophe, and our task is to unite our efforts to prevent such a cataclysm occurring. That is why we would stress once again our devotion to the common objective of peace, our determination to stop the political and military escalation and to create an international climate beneficial to all the peoples of the world.

Different regions of the world are victims of the aggressive policy of the United States, in particular the Middle East and southern Africa. This imperialist policy of the United States Administration contributes to increasing international tension by seeking to terrorize progressive régimes in these regions, using pressure to expand the zone of imperialist influence and to impose imperialist domination on them, the idea being to exploit their resources for the benefit of its multinational companies and to increase its military and economic potential, using its rapid deployment forces as a means of intervention in order to achieve this aim, in addition to providing military, political and economic aid on an unlimited basis to the present régimes in Tel Aviv and Pretoria.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

" Thanks to the mutual co-operation between the United States and certain other Western countries, the racist régimes of Tel Aviv and Pretoria have become arsenals of sophisticated weapons supplied by the United States and have even been able to acquire nuclear weapons, which represents an even greater risk, not only to the African and Arab countries, but also to world peace and security in general. This co-operation undermines any effort to create nuclear-free zones.

The plots and designs of the imperialists to liquidate the nationalist forces and progressive régimes in the region and to deny the legitimate rights of the Palestinian and Namibian peoples, have made the Near East and southern Africa the most explosive regions in the world. The United States Government strives to compel these peoples to abandon their struggle and to submit to its desires.

United States military intervention in Lebanon shows the danger to the Arab countries of the United States military presence there, which is reminiscent of the colonial era.

Democratic Yemen is on the Indian Ocean and is therefore deeply concerned by the danger threatening the region, where the United States Government is trying to strengthen its military bases, in particular Diego Garcia, and to reinforce its fleet, and in so doing is using provocative military manoeuvres off our coast, after having set up the rapid deployment forces, the operations of which are aimed at a certain number of non-aligned countries and for which a central body has been created. The manoeuvres carried out by United States forces in this region constitute a form of pressure, a threat and an attempt to intimidate the peoples of the region, contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to the principles of international law and non-alignment.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

Democratic Yemen has declared on more than one occasion its constant desire and determination to make every effort to bring stability in the region, to preserve peace and to face up to the imperialist danger there.

In this context we feel that urgent measures must be taken to eliminate all obstacles placed by the United States and its allies with a view to obstructing the proposed conference on the Indian Ocean, scheduled for the first part of 1984 under the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

The principal idea in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament was that the task of nuclear disarmament had first priority. The text of the Final Document of that session remains a suitable basis for the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We have yet to adopt measures to ensure the effective implementation of the resolutions adopted at the first special session to meet the aspirations of our peoples to peace and security.

The non-aligned countries have made persistent efforts to bring about the achievement of the objectives of disarmament. They have put forward a number of ideas and proposals, the latest being the proposal in the final document of the seventh summit conference of non-aligned countries. However, all those efforts have come up against the stubbornness and obstinacy of the forces of imperialism.

At its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly adopted a large number of resolutions. These have not yet been implemented owing to the absence of the political will on the part of the imperialist forces. This makes it necessary for us to take steps to overcome the delaying tactics of the United States and its allies, designed to prevent the initiation of serious negotiation, on disarmament, and their insistence on increasing their military budgets in order to achieve superiority.

In this connection, we attach great importance to the constructive initiatives of the Soviet Union concerning the curbing of the arms race and the preservation of the policy of détente and peaceful coexistence, in the interest of the maintenance of peace in all regions of the world. The Soviet initiatives include its declared commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and other proposals stressing the peaceful character of that country's foreign policy.

Disarmament, peace and development are intimately linked and cannot be separated. Peace is a common aspiration of all peoples, and the struggle to achieve it requires that we put an end to the arms race, achieve complete

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

disarmament and use the funds released by disarmament for the economic development of the developing countries. The escalation of the arms race and the growth of military expenditures by the imperialist forces only increase tensions in the world and are an obstacle to efforts to achieve economic and social development, above all in the developing countries.

In this context, we must stress the importance of the United Nations role in the search for solutions to the problems confronting the world. We shall spare no effort to work with the peace-loving countries of the world to achieve that objective. We reject any attempt to isolate the United Nations and prevent its fulfilling its role in connection with disarmament.

My delegation expresses its gratitude to the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations for the part they are playing in mobilizing international public opinion in favour of the implementation of resolutions on disarmament. We stress the importance of international public opinion in bringing about the implementation of resolutions on disarmament and helping to achieve the goals of disarmament - hence the importance of the peaceful demonstrations in Western countries against the use of nuclear weapons and on behalf of peace. Thus we support the World Disarmament Campaign.

Our peoples aspire to peace and security and in order that their aspirations may be realized it is incumbent on us to work together to adopt collective measures prohibiting the testing, manufacture or deployment of nuclear weapons.

We attach great importance to the participation by all States in negotiations on general and complete disarmament and to the adoption of measures guaranteeing

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons and of treaties prohibiting chemical weapons, the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and an arms race in outer space. The achievement of those disarmament objectives and the reduction of international tension necessitates the political will of the United States and its allies to work seriously, in co-operation with other Members of the United Nations, to overcome the obstacles that have so far prevented that.

In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm once again our complete readiness to co-operate with you, Mr. Chairman.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

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FIRST COMMITTEE
16th meeting
held on
Thursday, 27 October 1983
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 16th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

later: Mr. TINCA (Romania)

later: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139 TO 141, 143 AND 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ABULHASAN (Kuwait) (interpretation from Arabic): I wish first of all, Sir, to congratulate you on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. We believe that, thanks to your experience in the field of disarmament, to your intense activity to promote this very important cause, and to your country's ongoing concern for peace, our work will be crowned with success. Everything we know about you, your wisdom, your diplomatic skill and your sagacity makes us certain that you will lead the deliberations of our Committee to a fruitful conclusion, despite the great difficulties and crises facing the world today, especially in the sphere of disarmament.

I wish also to congratulate the other Committee officers on their election. We are sure that they will make an important contribution to the work of the First Committee.

We have heard many statements in this Committee, and have listened to the statements made in plenary meetings of the Assembly by numerous Foreign Ministers and Heads of State or Government. All those speakers made known their pessimism about the present international situation, which has been deteriorating for several years, and expressed consternation - even terror - that the leaders of States have lost virtually all control over the situation.

In these circumstances a serious crisis could devastate the world, wipe out the fruits of generations of civilization and unleash an international massacre of the innocents.

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

Therefore, the cries of alarm we have often heard are no mere reflection of ideologies or a product of the imagination: they are based on statistics and other data at our disposal which testify to the existence of a serious present danger. We hear daily of further progress in arms technology and of plans for the deployment of new weapons, threatening the security of many countries. We do not question the commitment of statesmen to the defence and security of their own countries, but we cannot accept the frightening dimensions or the intensification of today's arms race. We cannot believe that this will result in the security they so greatly desire, not to mention the security of other countries that lack the nuclear self-defence capability. I refer in particular to the smaller countries among them, which, unequipped to protect their threatened independence and sovereignty, cannot guarantee their future generations a life of peace and security.

All of this stems from the rigid positions of the great Powers in disarmament negotiations. The international community, after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, pinned great hopes on disarmament negotiations. We hoped they would lead to agreements taking into account both the objectives of the great Powers and the aspirations and interests of other countries of the world not involved in the arms race. But the parties to the negotiations were more concerned with their own narrow interests and their own security, and they have actually intensified the arms race. That is at the root of the present grave situation and of the failure of the second special session devoted to disarmament, which was a terrible disappointment for the world.

Even the disarmament negotiations within the Geneva Committee on Disarmament have been influenced by this climate. Over the years the successive meetings of the Committee on Disarmament have demonstrated that no progress is being made on

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

this item of our agenda. Despite the initiatives taken and the efforts made by States, procedural questions have been raised, questions which will not help resolve the problems among States.

The very severe tensions brought about by the intention to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and the resultant feelings of cynicism, can only serve to fuel the existing arms race. This is especially grave since these missiles are unlikely to ensure the security of States, in view of the atmosphere of terror which dominates negotiations on the subject.

Can the world remain indifferent to these events? How long can these disputes continue? The peoples of the world, particularly those most threatened by the present danger, have raised their voices in protest against this state of affairs and demanded that the parties to the negotiations display a certain sense of realism in order to halt and reverse the arms race. The demonstrations we have seen in various European countries calling upon States to freeze their nuclear weapons production and to revise their plans for nuclear-weapons deployment in Europe have to be taken into account. The point is that such deployment not only critically threatens the political security of the countries of the world, but also exacerbates the economic crisis which has been besetting the world for several years now.

There is no doubt that the arms race and expenditures on armaments, made to the detriment of economic progress constitute a real threat to economic prosperity.

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

We are all aware that the resources of the world will be exhausted one day and that it will be impossible to maintain the present level of military expenses without damaging development objectives. A glance at the statistics provided by the press reveals that military expenditures have risen from \$350 billion in 1977 to \$600 billion in 1982 - in other words, about \$1 million every minute of every day. According to the same statistics, there has been a horizontal escalation of the arms race, now involving even the developing countries. What is more, military research has been the very driving force of this arms race, and in many societies military technology is exempt from any and all political control.

Statistics show that about 80 million people in the world work in the military field, either directly or indirectly, while the number of scientists involved in military research is as high as 500,000. Natural resources, too, are devoted to the arms race, the gross production of 14 minerals being allocated to military purposes. In the case of oil, military uses consume about one third of a country's oil consumption.

According to the report of an American expert on military expenses, published in an American journal specializing in the subject, military expenses for 1983 are higher than \$600 billion, and some countries have thus incurred a heavy external debt. This is unprecedented in the economic history of the world.

This report also discloses that the price of a single nuclear submarine is the equivalent of the annual budget for the education of 160 school-age children in 23 developing countries and that, during every minute that passes, 30 children die of hunger or disease; moreover, for the last two years, the United States has spent twice as much on military as on non-military research; indeed, since 1945, more than 9 million civilians have lost their lives in non-nuclear wars. What is more, whereas the Hiroshima bomb was the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT, the power of a

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

single MX missile has the force of 5 million tons of explosives. Of course, the United States intends to deploy missiles of this type in Europe.

Confronted with this escalation of the arms race, which is so dangerous, and considering that the United States and the Soviet Union possess more than 20,000 missiles which could destroy all of human civilization many times over, it is our duty to urge the international community to work to put an end to this extremely frightening development. The States concerned should heed the cries of alarm of the countries of the world and halt their arms race. The whole world is endangered, for it is impossible to believe in the theory of a limited nuclear war.

Consequently, this question is one of interest to all countries equally, since to avoid nuclear destruction the arms race - above all, the nuclear arms race - must cease.

All countries must exert greater efforts to promote disarmament and halt the arms race. This highlights the responsibility of the United Nations, which cannot be shirked. The participation of the public is equally important in the World Disarmament Campaign, as proclaimed by the second special session devoted to disarmament. Its purpose is to shape people's thinking in respect of disarmament and to inform the populations of all countries of the world about disarmament objectives. In this regard, we pin great hopes on the activities of our Organization and on its ability to achieve those objectives.

The agenda of this session includes questions that have already been discussed at previous sessions. Despite our frustration over the meager progress towards the settlement of outstanding problems, we continue to believe that Member States should continue to express their positions on the questions examined by the General Assembly at each session. Kuwait, like other Arab countries, is deeply concerned by the continued occupation of Arab territories and by Israel's military

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

superiority, achieved thanks to American assistance and to possession of the nuclear weapon, which Israel could use against us. The policy of violence, the indiscriminate use of military force against the population of the occupied territories, coupled with the pillaging of the natural resources of those lands, the confiscation of the property of the legitimate owners, and the unlawful implantation of settlements, hardly serves the cause of international peace and security or contributes to the cause of disarmament.

Israel's policy only adds to the existing troubles of the region and perpetuates a situation of insecurity and instability. Unless that course is abandoned, Israel could one day threaten to make use of the nuclear weapon. Yet, despite General Assembly resolutions, that policy of aggression continues.

In conformity with the principle of regional security and in the interest of a regional nuclear-free zone, Kuwait has supported the proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Near East, on condition that, in conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, this proposal contribute to eliminating the Israeli nuclear threat, and that the right of the peoples of the region to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes be protected. This is a very important question for my country, whose natural resources are not renewable and which we can offset only by using nuclear energy.

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

We echo the serious concern of preceding speakers over the deterioration of the international situation and the stall in disarmament negotiations. We appeal to all the major Powers to consider the security of small countries as part of international security as a whole, and to take into account the interests of countries, other than their own.

Mr. AL-RAHMA (United Arab Emirates) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of my delegation, it is my pleasure to extend to you, Sir, our hearty congratulations on your election as Chairman of the Committee. I am convinced that you are quite capable of carrying out the task assigned to you, in light of your wisdom and experience in international relations, and that your talents will contribute to the success of the work of our Committee. I also congratulate the officers of the Committee.

We have reached a stage where the nuclear arms race among the major Powers, and especially the arsenals of nuclear weapons, have exposed human civilization and the progress of mankind to great dangers. The rivalry between the major Powers in their arms build-up has become very serious; it threatens the peace, security and the very survival of the countries of the third world. This state of affairs that has marked our times has created a very explosive situation, characterized by the repeated use of force, the interference in the internal affairs of States and super-Power rivalry. There is no doubt that this situation has had a negative influence on international affairs. For that reason there has been mistrust among the major States.

We invite the major Powers to show good will, adopt effective disarmament measures, reconsider their military policies by taking appropriate action to stop the arms race, eliminate weapons of mass destruction and agree on a true arms freeze as the first step towards general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Al-Rahma, United Arab
Emirates)

The use of outer space for military purposes not only threatens the survival of the human species, but is a major obstacle to international co-operation and the peaceful use of outer space. My delegation hopes that practical positive steps will be taken by the major Powers and that they will use outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

At the special session devoted to disarmament by the General Assembly in 1982 non-nuclear States expressed the wish that measures be adopted to protect them from the use of nuclear weapons and that existing stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons be destroyed, thereby creating nuclear-free zones throughout the world. Nevertheless the Middle East is gravely threatened - by Israel's introduction of nuclear weapons into the area and by the use of weapons that have been banned by international agreements. Recently thousands of innocent Lebanese and Palestinians were killed by those very weapons.*

The international community is well aware of the kind of co-operation that exists between the racists in Pretoria and Tel Aviv in the nuclear field, and of their nuclear testing, carried out in flagrant violation of General Assembly resolutions designed to make the area a nuclear-free zone. This is a serious danger to international peace and security; it also obstructs efforts to make the Indian ocean and the Mediterranean regions zones of peace.

I shall not waste the time of this Committee by replying to the allegations of Israel regarding its nuclear capacity. I would merely refer the Committee to the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/37/434.

* Mr. Tinca (Romania), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Al-Rahma, United Arab
Emirates)

Out of respect for its obligations under the Charter, my country, which is part of the Middle East region and close to the Indian ocean, calls upon the international community to declare the Indian ocean and Middle East regions nuclear-free zones in keeping with resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

In conclusion, we express the hope that the work of this Committee will be crowned with success and that the arms race - especially the nuclear arms race, will finally be halted.

In this connection, my delegation hopes that negotiations between the two super-Powers will continue and that they will establish the basis and principles for the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons as a step towards general and complete disarmament.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation

from Russian): Of all the questions relating to the limitation of the nuclear arms race which are before the international community today priority is given to the prevention of the arms race in outer space. This is a question on which my delegation would like to dwell in this statement. It should not be viewed in isolation and it is not confined merely to questions of space. It has to do with the key problem of the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe.

Outer space could become a source of mortal danger to all mankind. We cannot but be concerned at the plans hatched by the United States to manufacture and deploy space weapons that can strike objectives in outer space and on earth. An important part of that country's unprecedented nuclear arms build-up, those efforts have been undertaken on the pretext of a Soviet nuclear threat; yet nuclear weapons have been used against sovereign, independent Governments, as witness the criminal act of aggression by the United States against the Government of Grenada a tiny sovereign State which threatened no one.

The urgent need for effective measures to prevent the extension of the arms race into a new sphere, namely, outer space, is obvious. This is an urgent demand of the time. In response, and in keeping with our policy of ensuring the peaceful use of space - a policy dating from the very first days of the space era - the Soviet Union - two years ago, submitted a proposal to the United Nations for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. That proposal was approved by the General Assembly; however, owing to the negative position of the United States the drafting of that treaty has not yet actually begun. We can no longer ignore the exceptional importance of preventing an arms race in space. This has been noted in the present discussion by many delegations, including representatives of India, Peru, Sweden, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the States of the Socialist Commonwealth and others.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

Speaking some days ago in the First Committee at the beginning of Disarmament Week, the Secretary-General also stressed the great urgency of this task.

In the light of what has been said, the new Soviet proposal on prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth is very timely and, furthermore, is all-encompassing and constructive in character. The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union for examination by the current session of the General Assembly provides for an organic combination of two factors: on the one hand, the political-legal obligations of States not to allow the use of force in their relations with each other in space and from space, and, on the other, measures of a material nature aimed at banning the militarization of outer space. This is an important feature of the draft treaty. The complementarity of aspects of those two components of the draft is designed to make such an agreement a reliable bulwark against the transformation of outer space into an arena of military confrontation. The material measures provided for in the draft are far-reaching and exhaustive; they also incorporate ideas expressed by various States in forums where the question of preventing the arms race in space has been discussed.

Specifically, we advocate a complete ban on the testing and deployment in space of any space-based weapon for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space. The Soviet Union has proposed a radical solution to the question of anti-satellite weapons: the unconditional pledge of States not to create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may already have.

The parties to the proposed treaty would also undertake to refrain in every way from destroying, damaging or disturbing the normal functioning or changing the flight trajectory of space objects of other States. In addition, the treaty would

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ban the testing and use for military, including anti-satellite, purposes of manned spacecraft, which should be used solely to solve scientific, technical and economic problems of various kinds.

Thus the Soviet Union has submitted a whole series of far-reaching measures the implementation of which would be a major and practical contribution to the achievement of a goal which the United Nations has already endorsed, namely, the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Characteristic of this Soviet initiative is that it is accompanied by a very important and concrete step by the USSR which is evidence of its very serious approach. Our delegation has in mind the obligation undertaken by the USSR not to be the first to launch into outer space any kind of anti-satellite weapon as long as others, including the United States of America, also refrain from any such acts. This is one more concrete demonstration of the goodwill of the Soviet Union - its determination not only in words but also in deeds to strengthen peace and the security of peoples, and to restrain the arms race. We consider it important - and I am sure that this opinion is shared by many other States - for the United States to follow this example. For the time being, unfortunately, the actions of the United States continue to cause anxiety and alarm.

In its statements during the present discussion the delegation of the United States of America has in fact omitted any reference to concrete measures to prevent a widening of the arms race into outer space. In this case, silence is more eloquent than words.

Some days ago the United States press published a communiqué concerning the recommendation of a commission headed by a highly placed representative of the present Administration to deploy a space-based missile system. As is apparent from that communiqué, implementation of those recommendations will begin in the forthcoming financial year. Alarm has been expressed by the peaceful international

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community over the future of space and the earth. The Soviet Union answers that alarm with a complex of peaceful proposals, while the United States produces "Star-Wars" plans. The Soviet Union proposes a unilateral moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons, while the United States furiously pursues a programme for the development of weapons for the waging of war in and from space.

As Richard Garwin, a well-known American physicist and Defense Department consultant on nuclear weapons, has said:

"Space wars are not an alternative to war on earth. As I see it, they are nothing more than a prelude to war on earth."

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

None the less, the United States devotes increasing funds every year to the achievement of these military space aims, and as is known, its expenditures on the military aspects of space research are already higher than those for the civil sector, and far exceed the entire United States military budget. What is more, it lays particular stress on the accelerated designing of anti-satellite systems. The programmes for the elaboration of such space attack systems, together with the Pentagon's development of strategic military plans, are aimed at the organization and execution of military activities in and from outer space.

For these purposes, a special Space Command of the United States Air Force has already been created. According to The New York Times of 17 October last year, Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General Richard Henry stated that "we have to view space as a theatre of operations". Of particular concern is the announcement by the United States Administration of plans to create a large-scale anti-satellite "defence" system on the basis of the latest technical achievements. This system is expected to feature lasers, particle-beams and other new types of space-based weaponry. The United States claims that these weapons will be purely defensive. However, nobody is likely to be taken in by that.

Soviet scientists, in the appeal they issued to all scientists of the world in April of this year, stressed the danger of the military plans of the United States Administration to create a new, gigantic network of earth-based and space-based anti-missile weapons. Those scientists have also issued the sober warning that there can be no effective defences in a nuclear war. Yet United States plans are clearly oriented towards destabilizing the existing strategic balance.

In response to the Soviet appeal, the American Federation of Scientists has stressed that it still fully supports the premise of the 1972 agreement on the limitation of anti-satellite systems and favours strengthening that agreement

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rather than weakening it. Indeed, as leading American scientists have stated, without such an agreement the arms race could become even more dangerous than it is today.

As is known, in April of this year, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that Soviet and American scientists and specialists in this field discuss the possible consequences of a large-scale anti-missile defence system. The United States Administration has yet to reply. United States delegations in international forums talk a lot about the need for broader international contacts and for freer discussions among delegations on questions of war and peace. However, it is nothing but highfalutin rhetoric.

The deployment of various types of anti-satellite or anti-missile weapon systems, no matter how it is rationalized, is designed to give the United States first-strike capability - to allow it to launch an initial knock-out nuclear assault, thereby averting any counter-attack. This plainly betrays a disposition to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The notion of a space-based nuclear umbrella is totally illusory. Such illusions are perilous, because they encourage resort to the use of force based on the belief that it will go unpunished. That, in turn, could be the prelude to pushing the actual button itself. The danger of the new United States military conception is self-evident: it can only bring the world closer to nuclear holocaust. The United States may talk about defence, but in fact it is undermining the whole process of nuclear arms limitation.

Washington's military calculations differ from the very spirit of such important international legal instruments as the aforementioned Soviet-United States agreement of 1972 on the limitation of anti-satellite systems, the 1966 Treaty on

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Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the 1963 Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space or underwater, and other such instruments, whether bilateral or multilateral. The long-term goal proclaimed by the United States Administration is to work out a system of space weapons aimed at undermining for years to come the very idea of limiting an arms race in outer space. The United States hides its unwillingness to agree to any such steps leading to a comprehensive prohibition of an arms race in space as proposed by the Soviet Union behind arguments about the importance of prohibiting anti-satellite systems in the first place. But what in fact is the case? The United States has unilaterally broken its agreements with the USSR prohibiting such systems and refuses to renew them, although the Soviet Union has proclaimed its willingness to do so. The United States ignores the example of the Soviet Union, which has unilaterally adopted a moratorium on the launching of any types of anti-satellite weapons.

According to the statement of the State Department published in August last year, "one of the basic deficiencies of the Soviet draft is the inadequacy of its verification procedures". That is a stereotyped argument; it has been used many times and has limitless applications. It is used by the United States side whenever it wishes to prevent agreements either on earth-based or space-based weapons. By contrast, the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth contains specific and fully acceptable provisions on verification; it provides for consultation and co-operation and for recourse to appropriate international procedures within the United Nations, as well as the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

Treaty. Hence, the Soviet proposals are not limited to the use of national technical means but provide for international verification.

While claiming that prohibition of the launching of anti-satellite systems would give a unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union, the United States Department of State is silent about the fact that the United States began developing and testing anti-satellite systems as far back as 20 years ago. According to reports in the American press, the United States Air Force has long maintained nuclear-tipped anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles on one of the Pacific Ocean atolls. Now the new ASAT-system-equipped F-15 fighter plane has been prepared for a higher degree of readiness. What is more, the shuttle programme is to be used for the same purpose.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

Those are the facts. The present situation shows that a critical moment is now at hand: either the States concerned will immediately sit down at the negotiating table, or the arms race will spread to outer space. The Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth provides an opportunity for ensuring that this evil prospect does not become a reality.

Soviet academician Korolev, who was one of the founders of Soviet space science and who, for a long time, was the principal designer of Soviet spacecraft, wrote that

"Space is for science, and only for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind, which seeks unceasingly to learn the secrets of nature. That is the direction in which Soviet space research is developed and implemented."

The import of the Soviet proposal is quite simply that the Soviet Union wants to continue in that same direction. We do not want to start an arms race where none has existed in the past, and we want to put an end to it where it does exist: that is the essence of our position.

Mr. MEDINA (Portugal)(interpretation from French): It gives me great pleasure to convey to Ambassador Vraalsen my congratulations and best wishes on his assumption of the presidency of this Committee. His long experience in the field of arms control and his unanimously acknowledged talent for dealing with the most delicate diplomatic matters - a talent which I myself have very recently witnessed - are a guarantee that he will successfully discharge his duties.

It is undeniable that international developments since the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly have been marked by factors inimical to achievement of the objectives of disarmament. That period was dominated by a profound crisis of confidence which has made the development and manufacture of new weapons inevitable

(Mr. Medina, Portugal)

and has exacerbated the arms race. This has occurred despite the efforts and initiatives of the international community to put an end to that arms race.

The increase in the resources devoted to the accumulation of conventional and nuclear weapons compounds the difficulties created by the international economic crisis and, consequently, promotes the creation of new hotbeds of political and social tension.

Thus, in spite of all the efforts at creating conditions conducive to disarmament objectives - notably the two special sessions of the General Assembly and the creation of several new bodies or the improvement of existing ones - we are no closer to our goals than we were five years ago at the time of the first special session devoted to disarmament. That is so not only because of heightened confrontation between divergent political interests in certain geographical areas, but also because of the increased number of acts of military aggression, acts of intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and human rights violations. The persistence - or increase - of these acts has led to excessive recourse to the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which in turn has led to a deterioration in international relations, to the weakening of confidence among States and, finally, to the heightening of the arms race.

Experience over the past few years has demonstrated that only by raising the level of confidence among States can we hope to achieve our disarmament objectives. Such heightened confidence would diminish the number of armed conflicts thanks to the increased visibility of States' military activities.

Some progress was made in this sphere when, in spite of stated differences, the participants in the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe reached an agreement which expressed the political will of 35 European States to

(Mr. Medina, Portugal)

improve and broaden the initiative which, since 1975, had been intended to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. One of the most important decisions taken in Madrid was to hold a conference on disarmament in Europe with the initial task of negotiating new measures on confidence and security that would be not only militarily significant, binding and verifiable but applicable to all of Europe.

My Government is determined to co-operate with all other participants in the Stockholm Conference in achieving the Conference's objectives in a realistic manner. We are encouraged by the fact that the Conference will be attended by delegations from the major military Powers.

We also consider that the negotiation of programmes of co-operation and security for other regions geared to their legitimate interests and specific needs would contribute significantly to the strengthening of international peace and security. Valuable support for such initiatives is to be found in existing United Nations studies. I note in this connection the remarkable efforts of experts to devise ways and means of calming regional tensions on the basis of true implementation of confidence-building measures. That could have a positive effect in the sphere of disarmament.

My delegation also expects the Disarmament Commission at its next session to reach agreement on a new body of suggestions, in accordance with the task assigned to it under General Assembly resolution 37/100 D. There is no questioning the fact that the United Nations has a major responsibility and a primary role in the area of disarmament; it must encourage all dialogue aimed at fostering international peace and security.

(Mr. Medina, Portugal)

Although confidence-building measures ought to play a major role in the disarmament process, especially as the decisive factor of a climate conducive to negotiations, they cannot by themselves reduce the level of military arsenals. That can be achieved only by the adoption of genuine measures leading to effective, verifiable and balanced arms reductions.

(Mr. Medina, Portugal)

Such confidence-building measures are no substitute for disarmament measures. Nor can the commitment to negotiate them be an excuse for delaying realistic and concrete negotiations aimed at diminishing military forces.

In this field, the most important task for the international community is that of nuclear disarmament, in spite of the ever-increasing threat posed by conventional forces. The difficulties of the task are illustrated by the fact that the arsenals have been growing, quantitatively and qualitatively, over the past five years. In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament declared nuclear disarmament as the first priority of the disarmament effort.

It is therefore understandable that vast sectors of international public opinion feel that it is not by mere solemn declarations of intent - irrespective of their source - that the danger of a nuclear war can be overcome. That goal cannot be fully achieved in the absence of negotiated measures leading to a ban on the production of nuclear arms and to the destruction of already existing stocks, as part of a realistic and efficient system of verification and in a framework of global security.

Granted, that is plainly a long-term goal. However, partial measures can and must be rapidly negotiated: for example, the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons and on a strategic nuclear arms reduction.

Indeed, medium-range nuclear weapons are now of exceptional importance, because a rapid agreement in this field would permit the elimination of significant quantities of such armaments from Europe. Agreement is still possible, but time is running out. Although my Government supports the proposals of the United States and the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to create the means of response imposed by security needs arising from the imbalance created by

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the Soviet Union's installation of medium-range nuclear missiles, we nevertheless call on both parties to be flexible so that they may arrive at a just agreement that is in the interest of all of humanity and responds to their legitimate security concerns.

My delegation cannot see how international peace and security would benefit by the eventual interruption of such negotiations or by the establishment of new types of missiles in retaliation for the NATO efforts to respond to the threat created by the deployment of the SS-20. On the contrary, such actions would only aggravate the already existing imbalance in the nuclear arms race itself.

Portugal strongly believes that only realistic negotiations can curb this process.

As regards the strategic-arms talks, my Government considers that the principal objective in the substantial reduction of this type of weapon is greater security with fewer weapons. The United States has put forward concrete proposals which Portugal supports, in the conviction that they will help achieve this objective.

The present nuclear non-proliferation régime is the fundamental instrument produced by the international community to prevent the dangerous proliferation of these weapons. It is the product of several agreements, the most important of which are the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and the creation of denuclearized zones. This system has functioned satisfactorily thus far.

But its strengthening is increasingly important, for the ever-growing use of nuclear technology to meet economic needs, and the right of all States to engage in peaceful nuclear research, production and use can seriously undermine the credibility of the international non-proliferation régime unless all Governments

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accept the prescribed framework. Universal accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, implying simultaneously the renunciation of such weapons and the right to free access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is the first step towards this goal. At the same time, the speedy conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty providing for adequate verification measures - negotiations on which have been dragging on for years in the Committee on Disarmament - would advance the formulation of security measures for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States and the creation of new denuclearized zones which, in turn, would contribute significantly to the efficacy of the current nuclear non-proliferation régime.

My delegation fully appreciates the fears of those who, faced with the threat of nuclear conflict, are extremely concerned over the continued development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless we recognize how dangerous it would be to forget the other aspects of the situation - in particular, the risks of overlooking that security is indivisible and cannot exist when there is a serious imbalance between the various types of weapons.

In his connection, we consider that there are three essential points to be borne in mind: first, the fact that the armed forces of the major military Powers are made up of a nuclear element and of a conventional element. Hence, given the differing proportions of those two elements in the armed forces of different countries, nuclear disarmament measures will have differing effects on the levels of security of each of those countries. Moreover, anything that upsets the balance between those two types of weapons cannot fail to pose a great obstacle to nuclear arms reduction.

Secondly, it must also be borne in mind that most of the world's arsenals are made up of conventional weapons, and that more money is spent on conventional than on nuclear weapons.

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Finally, given the role played by conventional weapons at the regional level, most military Powers invest the bulk of their expenditures in that specific type of weapon. Indeed, several States have accumulated arsenals of conventional weapons that arouse the security concerns of their neighbours, thus constituting a factor of instability. This situation is all the more significant, since extraordinary technological progress has been made in conventional arms and has vastly increased their power to destroy and to wreak havoc.

(Mr. Medina, Portugal)

These facts lead me to the conclusion that in the search for greater security and disarmament control measures we must neither ignore nor minimize the relationship which exists between nuclear and conventional weapons. This must be appreciated if we are rigorously to respect the principle of the right of States to undiminished security, as set forth in paragraph 19 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the importance of conventional weapons to all armed forces fully justifies the concern of the international community and the desire to understand the effect of these weapons on international relations. This also helps us to appreciate the scope of the task imposed by resolution 36/97 A of the General Assembly, which was supported by Portugal, and which recommends a study of all aspects of conventional weapons.

My delegation regrets that the experts have not yet carried out their mission, although we are well aware of the complexity of the task assigned to them. We are convinced, however, that this Assembly will request that their efforts be continued and the study completed.

My delegation believes that the role being played by conventional weapons regionally, and the nature of armed conflicts which have taken place since the Second World War, will inevitably lead to the conclusion that the negotiation of disarmament measures among States in any given area would significantly contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. Such negotiation would be aided by the suggestions contained in the study on regional disarmament contained in document A/35/416.

In the same context, we must not ignore the importance of the Vienna negotiations which concern the member States of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, which are aimed at mutual and balanced reductions of conventional weapons in Central Europe. My delegation regrets that we are still very far from having achieved that objective, but we hope that certain signs of change indicating

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a more realistic attitude reflect a political will on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries to negotiate militarily significant, balanced and verifiable agreements.

When it comes to the whole complex of modern weapons, chemical weapons are in a class by themselves because of the general revulsion they arouse which has prompted the international community to take action to ban them. Notwithstanding the 1925 protocol banning the use of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases and the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons, mankind is still threatened by these weapons, and technological developments have made them particularly devastating.

In point of fact, many violations of the obligations assumed under the two aforementioned instruments of international law have taken place over the past few years. The verification machinery set up by the General Assembly has proved inadequate, inasmuch as it gives those countries which wish to evade its objectives the chance to do so. The right of the parties to verify compliance - a requirement of any disarmament or arms-control measure, has thus been undermined. This raises serious doubts about the willingness of certain countries to abide by their freely-assumed obligations.*

Portugal is a party to these agreements and we can only express our profound concern over the situation. We hope, however, that the verification machinery for the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as set forth in resolution 37/98 D will function effectively. My delegation believes that it is time for the parties to the Convention on biological weapons to carry out a careful study of the machinery involved. We believe that the threat of chemical warfare will be removed only if there is an agreed total ban on chemical weapons research, development, production and stockpiling and on the destruction of existing stocks. Negotiations on this

* The Chairman returned to the Chair.

(Mr. Medina, Portugal)

subject have been dragging on for years in the Committee on Disarmament and have encountered problems of verification, on which there are serious differences of opinion. My delegation hopes that such differences will soon be set aside and that people will understand that the effectiveness of the machinery is more important than contrary considerations. In the case of these weapons, in loco inspections are indispensable to the credibility of the convention.

The growing interest of the major Powers in the military possibilities of the use of outer space is bound to disrupt international relations unless measures to associate outer space with the overall problem of the arms race are speedily negotiated. The complexity of the problems involved, makes it essential that such negotiations begin without delay.

My delegation regrets that no agreement was reached in the Committee on Disarmament on the contents of the mandate assigned to the working group on this subject. We hope that these differences will be set aside at the 1984 session. The disarmament and arms control process is complex, especially since it so closely concerns the security and sovereignty of States. Moreover, as an important factor in international relations, it is inevitably affected by dominant tensions and the prevailing climate.

My delegation believes that ambitions for global disarmament must be replaced by more modest objectives having to do with certain sectors relating to specific weapons and to the effective balanced reduction of military arsenals with adequate verification machinery.

Portugal cannot accept projects aimed at unrealistic, poorly defined objectives involving general condemnations; rather, we are thoroughly committed to any initiative that would contribute to effective disarmament and to any realistic, concrete solution capable of strengthening international solidarity and security, so earnestly desired by the Governments and peoples of the world.

Mr. MALINGA (Uganda): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you most warmly on your election to preside over our Committee. I am convinced that, given your fine and capable diplomatic qualities, our Committee will conduct very successful deliberations. May I also take this opportunity to congratulate the other members of the bureau on their election to assist you in the discharge of your onerous responsibilities. You may all rest assured of my delegation's timely co-operation in finding solutions to the pressing issues before this Committee.

Since we last met, new conflicts have emerged around the world. Disarmament and peace negotiations have stalled. World military expenditures have soared to \$800 billion. The world economy, characterized by rising inflation and unemployment, is in shambles. Global poverty is spreading like bushfire. Our performance in curbing the arms race and improving the socio-economic betterment of our peoples is far from encouraging. Regrettably, and admittedly, the future in this regard seems unpromising.

The gloomy picture of our Organization as painted in the Secretary-General's annual report is yet more tragic testimony to the inability of the United Nations to fulfil effectively its primary objective - that is, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

The greatest challenge that confronts us today is the arms race, particularly nuclear arms and the threat of nuclear war. At no time was this threat as real as it is today. Indeed, the nuclear holocaust looms over mankind, its civilization and its right to life.

The enormous amounts of nuclear weapons, stockpiled in the arsenals of a few privileged States, have brought nuclear catastrophe to the doorstep of civilization and threaten man's very survival. The most urgent task of the international community is therefore to prevent nuclear war and to proceed immediately to nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Malinga, Uganda)

As representatives will recall, during the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, my Prime Minister announced the decision of Uganda to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. I am pleased to state that we have honoured our commitment by having become the 119th Member to sign the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. However, notwithstanding its long-term significance for peace, the contribution to nuclear disarmament of a small country like mine can only be a token symbolic gesture, as are the contributions of the majority of Member States assembled here that have forsaken the nuclear-weapon option.

In our view, the greatest responsibility for nuclear disarmament rests with the nuclear-weapon States. These States and their allies have always paid considerable attention to the dangers of nuclear war and to the need for nuclear disarmament, notwithstanding their apparent disinterest in a multilateral approach to these pressing issues. For over the last 40 years, the doctrines and practices of the nuclear Powers have generated and provided incentives for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A situation of what is now commonly known as nuclear apartheid has been imposed on the international community, to its peril. The continuous development, production and stockpiling of these inhuman weapons proceed at an unprecedented pace. Yet it is now abundantly clear to all that, despite the enormous amassing of nuclear arms, the world is no safer to live in than before. In fact, the contrary is true.

The insatiable quest for arms has lately assumed yet another ugly dimension: outer space, that extra-terrestrial entity which has been internationally proclaimed and accepted as the common heritage of mankind, is increasingly being converted into another arena of military and big-Power confrontation. These Powers are parties to the 1967 Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space, which declares that outer space should be utilized exclusively for the benefit of mankind.

(Mr. Malinga, Uganda)

Unfortunately, thousands of satellites already in orbit serve military purposes. My delegation notes with utmost concern the rapid extension of the arms race to outer space. Urgent steps must be taken to prevent the militarization of outer space. The extension of the arms race to outer space is not only potentially destructive but also inimical to already existing international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of outer space in the areas of communications, meteorology and navigation. The Committee on Disarmament should, as a matter of urgency, establish the necessary working group to elaborate a draft convention to supplement the 1967 outer space Treaty so as to make it comprehensive. We, therefore, welcome any genuine initiatives in this field as a positive step in the right direction. Such initiatives can and indeed do serve as a basis for further negotiations and constructive efforts towards the resolution of this complex problem.

Nuclear weapons today pose the greatest danger to mankind. The anxiety of the entire international community in this connection has been amply demonstrated by peoples and peace movements of disparate political persuasions. The nuclear-weapon States must seriously heed the world's clamour for peace and proceed to nuclear disarmament.

We are therefore dismayed at the lack of progress in major disarmament negotiations, namely, the Geneva-based Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); the intermediate-range nuclear forces reduction talks; and the Vienna-based mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Europe. Urgent and concrete steps must be taken to avert nuclear war, limit the arms race and preserve peace. It is very important to conform with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Paragraph 45 of that document places priority on nuclear disarmament; paragraph 47 calls for a halt to and reversal of the nuclear arms race; paragraph 50 of the document deals with nuclear disarmament, leading to the

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ultimate and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are, accordingly, called upon to discharge those responsibilities and to proceed to nuclear disarmament. First, nuclear-weapon tests should be prohibited under a treaty to be elaborated in multilateral negotiations. The three depositaries of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, joined by both France and China, should, in good faith, negotiate the comprehensive banning of nuclear-weapon tests. The continuation of nuclear-weapon tests intensifies the arms race and further increases the danger of nuclear war.

Secondly, the two super-Powers should declare a nuclear-arms-freeze, as called for by General Assembly resolution 37/100 B of 13 December 1982. Such a declaration would provide the necessary trust and an atmosphere conducive to genuine negotiations towards nuclear disarmament, in which all other nuclear-weapon States should participate. Thirdly, all nuclear-weapon States must unconditionally pledge not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatsoever pending the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Finally, all nuclear-weapon States must pledge unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Such pledges should be concretized by an international agreement of a legally binding nature. The measures I have thus far outlined are not comprehensive but, if entered into, can act as indicators of our serious commitment to the cause of peace and disarmament.

I should be remiss in my intervention if I omitted another matter of special importance to my delegation.

By its resolution 37/74 B, the General Assembly last year requested the Disarmament Commission to consider substantively the question of South Africa's nuclear capability pursuant to the findings contained in the report of the Group of Experts on South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field.

(Mr. Malinga, Uganda)

The report of the Disarmament Commission is contained in document A/38/42 (Supplement No. 42).

That a body charged with the issues of international peace and security should fail to arrive at a common formula on the situation in South Africa is mind-boggling. The world has long condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity. Apartheid South Africa's nuclear capability has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. To deny this is to bury our heads in the sand.

(Mr. Malinga, Uganda)

The international record of that régime is too well known to be recounted. We are deeply concerned about the growing South African nuclear threat to Africa. We note with the utmost regret that the repeated calls of the General Assembly since 1964 for the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have not been heeded. The gravity of the implications of South Africa's nuclear capability cannot be overemphasized. The objectives of these sinister designs should by now be clear to everyone.

First, the South African nuclear-weapon option not only frustrates the objectives of the OAU Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa but also poses a threat to regional and international peace and security. Secondly, it halts the process of decolonization in Namibia and racial harmony and freedom in South Africa. Thirdly, it aids South Africa to hold independent Africa hostage to its colonial, racial policies and wars of aggression.

It is indeed regrettable that despite repeated appeals by the international community the Security Council has failed to take effective measures towards the implementation and reinforcement of its resolution 418 (1977). We are alarmed that some Western countries continue to collaborate with South Africa in the military and nuclear fields. All nuclear-weapon States should live up to their international obligations and deny South Africa nuclear technology, for it must be obvious to all that such technology is diverted to non-peaceful purposes. To go against the wishes of the international community is to act as an accomplice in South Africa's lawlessness. In this connection we would welcome any initiative by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to undertake studies on African security. We believe that such work could assist in clarifying the various issues involved and thus contribute towards the efforts to avert the ominous threat of nuclear proliferation and confrontation in Africa.

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Another matter of no less serious concern to us is the failure to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The continued foreign military build-up in the Indian Ocean poses a serious threat to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the region. We reiterate our desire for the urgent convening of a conference to map out effective implementation of that Declaration.

Nowadays the adage that it is in the minds of men that wars are made is taken for granted. It is hardly recognized that it could be in the bellies of men that wars actually originate. Billions of dollars are squandered on the means of destruction while millions of the world's population live in abject poverty, hunger and disease. The supply of military hardware to developing countries has superseded productive and useful development assistance. This unequal exchange and relationship that expresses itself in the form of huge transfers of conventional weapons has inflated the political and economic crises obtaining in and amongst developing countries. Today, no day passes without political, social and economic eruptions in one or other of the countries of Africa, Asia or Latin America. We must once again voice our concern and objection to those who provide active encouragement to the sales of conventional weapons, especially unleashing them to areas of tension. For those who promote them it means power without shame. For those who receive them it is a perpetuation of the exploitation of their peoples without responsibility.

The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America should be left free to determine their own destinies without external interference. Their desire to maintain peace and establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions must be respected.

(Mr. Malinga, Uganda)

In conclusion, my delegation would like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Martenson, and his staff for the work they have done and continue to do in fostering this new-born baby. Despite the financial constraints experienced by the Organization as a whole, it is our fervent desire to see the Department strengthened, to enable it to discharge more effectively its expanding tasks.

We are equally pleased with the conduct of the Disarmament Fellowship Programme, of which this year, for the first time, my country has been a beneficiary. It is our sincere hope that with more blood pumped into it the Programme will expand to satisfy the corresponding needs of developing countries.

Mr. LUCE (United Kingdom): I am honoured to address for the first time this First Committee of the General Assembly, especially when it is chaired by the representative of Norway, Ambassador Vraalsen. The co-ordination of our work could be in no better hands.

I bring here today a clear message from the British Government, a Government recently re-elected by the free vote of the British people. The United Kingdom is resolutely committed to the search for security through disarmament. We stand ready to make whatever contribution we can towards achieving progress. For many years we have pledged ourselves to this end. We have faced setbacks; at times we have been frustrated, but our efforts will not cease.

Our pursuit of disarmament stems from compelling and self-evident truths: that in a world beset by conflict we have a moral imperative to seek a reduction in the level of arms; that in a world beset by poverty we should not devote so much of our resources to armaments; that in a world beset by tensions we must offer our citizens hope for a better future; and that through the process of disarmament our world can best enhance its security and move towards international peace. It is this last aspect in particular that I wish to address today.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

The General Assembly, in the Final Document of the first special session on Disarmament, defined the search for security in disarmament as "a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction of the present level of armaments". The search for security for all nations should be the first priority of the United Nations. It is fitting that this First Committee should tackle that task.

The British Government has long been committed to a policy for defence and security that rests on two pillars. One pillar is our determination that our defence forces should be sufficient to meet all our reasonable defence needs. Clearly, however, our reliance on maintaining a balance, our dependence on adequate defence forces to deter any potential attacker, can be only one essential factor in maintaining peace and security. The other pillar is our search for international agreements which will diminish those needs. Security that can be achieved on the basis of fewer bombs, fewer missiles, fewer destroyers, fewer tanks and fewer rifles on both sides is our fervent wish.

The two pillars reinforce each other. Without adequate defences, agreements on arms control will be that much harder to achieve. A well-known British politician, Aneurin Bevan, once warned against the dangers of being thrust naked into the conference chamber. But without agreements the maintenance of adequate defences will prove even more costly and difficult for us all.

Recent history has proved that such a policy can and does work. Since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 we have witnessed a series of agreements on arms control that have greatly strengthened the basis on which international security rests: the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the outer space Treaty and the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America of 1967, the non-proliferation

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Treaty of 1968, the sea-bed Treaty of 1971, the strategic arms agreements of 1972 and 1979, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the biological weapons Convention of 1972, the environmental modification Convention of 1977 and various other bilateral and multilateral arrangements designed to make the world a safer place. In all these areas, successive British Governments have made a full and positive contribution, and we have been proud to do so.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

In the past few years the record has been more disappointing. But we in the West, as my Prime Minister made clear only last month, stand ready to talk. As she said:

"the day the leaders of the Soviet Union genuinely decide through arms control agreements to make this a safer world, they will be pushing at an open door".

History has also a lesson to teach us about international agreements, and especially agreements on international security. Bad agreements cannot endure. We need realistic agreements with significant impact, balanced agreements which do not put one side or the other at a disadvantage, verifiable agreements in which both sides can have full confidence about compliance. But the painstaking process of putting together international agreements, with all the complexity they entail, may prove laborious. It may take longer than all of us would wish. Some will demand an approach which opts for the appearance of disarmament rather than the substance. We prefer the other alternative: to build, brick by brick, a wall against international tension and conflict; and in that process to provide a solid, a lasting and true defence against war. We believe that it is only on such a basis that the future security of our world can be protected.

The United Kingdom will follow this policy in all the negotiations in which we are directly engaged; it will dictate our approach to the United States-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) - to which we contribute actively through alliance consultation - and to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between those two countries; it will be reflected in the line we take in United Nations discussions. We challenge other nations, and we challenge the Soviet Union in particular, to demonstrate that greater confidence is possible, and that greater trust is justified. The road to peace is strewn with enough

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obstacles. Let us remove at least one of the greatest - the lack of trust in each other's genuine will for a balanced peace.

I spoke a few moments ago of the frustration we sometimes feel at the slow progress towards these goals. Other delegations have expressed a similar sense of frustration. Nor are Governments alone in this. In the United Kingdom there are many campaigning vigorously for disarmament who are not linked in any sense to the Government. Most recently, we have seen the degree of public frustration expressed throughout Europe at the lack of new agreements on key security issues, and particularly on nuclear weapons. These views are no doubt echoed by people in other regions of the globe, not least in the Soviet Union, even if they do not have the same freedom to express them as they do in my country.

We in the British Government share this sense of frustration. But, like other responsible Governments, we cannot content ourselves with slogans, rallies, and facile solutions to this most complex of problems. Security has never been and will never be assured merely by good intentions. For Governments truly seeking peace, the goal is enhanced security through balanced reductions in forces. Peace is too precious a goal to be jeopardized by short-term panaceas, to be threatened by simplistic postures, or to be endangered by meaningless declarations. At the end of the day, when the rallies are over and the last poster has begun to peel from the wall, peace can only be attained around the negotiating table.

Our frustration is two-fold: We are frustrated by the failure of the Soviet Union to respond to positive moves by the West on nuclear disarmament and force reductions. The constructive proposals we have presented in the past two years have been ignored or at best misrepresented in an attempt to achieve unbalanced disarmament at the expense of our security. There is a discrepancy between Soviet words and deeds. In Britain, as I have already said, we fervently wish to

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negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union. But these negotiations must, I emphasize, be serious and in good faith.

In a broader sense we are also frustrated by the lack of realism in the approach to other negotiations, by the failure on the part of some countries to recognize the reality of the international situation, by their insistence on trying to deal with the world as it should be rather than as it is. The dogmatic attitude we have seen in the Committee on Disarmament and the reluctance shown there to adopt practical measures, even on straightforward issues, have been very disappointing.

We are determined, however, that progress must be made. The United Kingdom will continue to take a realistic approach to security during the forthcoming debate in this Committee and in the General Assembly. Last year the General Assembly adopted a record number of 58 resolutions on disarmament and security issues. Regrettably, some sponsors were unwilling to heed the concerns of other countries or to modify the language of the resolutions in the interests of international agreement. The result was a proliferation of votes, often with conflicting implications. This year it is our hope that all countries will co-operate on sensible and practical recommendations which can command the full support of the General Assembly.

And when we come to vote, we have to look beyond the title of a resolution. We must be ready to study its principles, its precise language, and above all its potential contribution to progress in the negotiations. What would be gained by voting in favour of a resolution which could not be put into effect, or which would actually impede the prospects of successful negotiations? We have seen too many spurious "initiatives" aimed at public opinion, which divert attention from

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serious negotiations. The place for proposals is the negotiating table, not the press conference. Deeds, not words, must be the touchstone of sincerity. One vital question must be asked and answered: will this measure contribute to greater security throughout the world? My Government will always be reluctant to answer "No". We hope we can say "Yes". But the question cannot be dodged.

One proposed measure which does not deserve a "Yes" is the nuclear freeze. What contribution to stability could be made by an agreement which simply made the existing imbalance permanent? What sense is there in rewarding the country which has made the most advances in updating its nuclear arsenal, and penalizing those which have restrained the deployment of new weapons in the 1970s? Would the prospects of reaching agreement on balanced reductions be improved if the Soviet Union had already achieved the foremost of its purposes: that is, a total block on the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to modernize its deterrent forces? What incentive would there then be for an agreement on balanced reductions?

It is surely far better to set our sights on the target of drastic reductions in nuclear weapons. The present negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are specifically aimed at achieving this. The scope for progress is clear. It would be folly if these talks were now to be broken off in order to discuss a nuclear freeze agreement, the verification of which would take additional years to negotiate. At best, the momentum in INF and START would be lost. At worst, the incentive to agree to any reductions would disappear.

The negotiations covering the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) of the United States and the Soviet Union are at a crucial stage. It is a matter of grave concern that the Soviet Union and its allies, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, chose United Nations Day, 24 October, to announce preparations for the deployment of yet more missiles in Eastern Europe, which will further increase

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the existing armoury of Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe. As far as Britain is concerned, our objective remains the elimination of all missiles of intermediate range. That would truly be a step to enhance international security. But if this solution remains too far-reaching for the Soviet Union, we can accept an interim agreement providing for equality between the super-Powers. Further flexibility in the United States' position was demonstrated by President Reagan last month in his proposals. A genuine effort has been made to meet the security concerns of the Soviet Union. But an agreement must not codify a Soviet monopoly in longer range INF missiles. We resent the implication in the Soviet attitude that it has a right to dictate to the countries of Western Europe how they should defend themselves. We urge the Soviet leaders to accept an agreement which respects our security as well as their own. It is against this background, of course, that we shall consider with care the latest proposals by President Andropov.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

The other crucial nuclear negotiations - the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) - resumed on 6 October. My Government welcomed President Reagan's reaffirmation this June that his negotiating team would explore all appropriate avenues towards this goal. We also welcome President Reagan's introduction into United States proposals of the new concept under which more than one old warhead would be removed for every new warhead installed. We trust that President Andropov will respond, and will seize this opportunity to secure significant reductions in nuclear arsenals, and in particular in the numbers of nuclear warheads on strategic systems.

The British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has already stated, in his address to the General Assembly on 28 September, our attitude towards the inclusion of the British nuclear forces in these negotiations. I should only like to reiterate one point: that if Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, we would of course want to review our position and to consider how best we could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

I should like now to turn to one of the most hopeful events of 1983 - the adoption by 35 Foreign Ministers in Madrid of a concluding document at a meeting following up the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This document re-commits the participating States to honour the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It provides for specialist conferences and meetings before the third Helsinki follow-up meeting, in Vienna in 1986. From the arms control point of view the most important result is the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, to begin in Stockholm in January 1984. This will have a precise mandate for the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures that are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

The United Kingdom, together with its allies, is committed to this Conference. We shall propose concrete measures designed to reduce tension in Europe through increased openness about the patterns of normal military behaviour. If we could reach agreement on such measures, they would do more materially to reassure European countries about the intentions of their neighbours than high-sounding declarations which are almost always unverifiable. If a State is truly peace-loving it can have nothing to lose by allowing itself to be seen to be so. Increased trust and confidence are our aim. And confidence must rest on openness. The agreement in Madrid demonstrates that 35 countries with dissimilar systems and ideologies can still agree on concrete measures to increase regional security, to build confidence and to reduce tension.

I shall not weary the Committee with a lengthy catalogue of comments on all the current negotiations. But I must draw attention to one key priority in the disarmament negotiations: an agreement on a convention banning manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. To this my Government is totally committed. My Government shares the widespread concern about the reported use of lethal chemical weapons outside Europe. As requested in resolution 37/98 D last year, we have provided the Secretary-General with a list of laboratories which can help in his investigations. It is important that all the facts should be established. It is therefore all the more disappointing that the Soviet Union has refused to co-operate with the Secretary-General in this work.

It remains our objective to see the current negotiations at Geneva on a total ban of chemical weapons pressed to a successful conclusion. Useful work on this has been done in the two sessions of the Committee on Disarmament this year. I believe the detailed proposals by the British delegation have made an important contribution. But progress on the central issue of verification has been far from adequate. I urge all members of the Committee to overcome the difficulties with

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maximum speed. In a world whose attention is concentrated on the awful power of nuclear weapons, the frightful effect of chemical weapons can sometimes be ignored. But a short memory is no excuse for ignorance. The toll of such weapons on the battlefields of Europe may have become history to some. But we must now allow history to repeat itself. The abolition of these obnoxious weapons will be a major gain for the people of our world, civilian and military alike. It is a prize to be seized, and seized soon.

Much attention has rightly been paid to the problem of arms-control agreements in space. The argument that progress in arms control is easier to achieve when the weapons concerned have not yet been fully developed, let alone deployed, is a good one, which the history of disarmament to some degree endorses. But we must not forget that in outer space some military developments can have a positive effect on international security. The use of satellites to monitor arms control agreements is an obvious case in point; and there are others. We should therefore beware of the quick fix, the easy option which could complicate rather than resolve the issue.

That, however, is no excuse for ignoring obvious opportunities for agreement which would truly enhance security. These we shall pursue, and we look to others to join us. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament should take up these questions at its next session, along the lines proposed by Western delegations at the end of August. We hope that objections from the Soviet Union and its allies to the Western proposals will be removed so that this work can now proceed.

The international debate about disarmament is focused largely on the nuclear issues. This is natural. The consequences of a nuclear conflict would be truly horrific. As President Reagan recently said, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But we must not ignore the vital need to constrain conventional forces. We should like to see a greater sense of urgency shown by other countries

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in this important area. The terrible toll reaped by the ordinary bullet, the bomb and the shell has already inflicted far too many scars on the face of our world. We shall therefore continue our efforts to seek reductions in conventional forces through the Vienna negotiations on the East-West balance. In this aim, as in so many other negotiations, we must be assured that an agreement will be balanced and verifiable. We must therefore continue to insist that the number of forces on both sides are agreed prior to reduction; and that these will be reduced in a manner that can be properly verified.

But disarmament must cover all parts of the world and all types of weapons. We shall therefore continue to contribute fully to the United Nations exercise on the reduction of military expenditures. And we are ready to work for a speedy conclusion to the Secretary-General's study on conventional arms. We are disappointed that the completion of this current study has been delayed, but recognize the difficulties inherent in this subject which previous studies and negotiations have highlighted. We trust that the eventual results will provide helpful guidelines for progress.

Any debate on international disarmament efforts must take into account the periodic conferences to review existing agreements. We welcome the work done at the recent Conference on the sea-bed Treaty, which has confirmed the utility of the existing régime. We look forward to an equally successful outcome from the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on which preparatory work has begun. My Government is totally committed to this long-standing and vital Treaty and will do everything possible to see it strengthened. But we are disappointed that existing concerns about loopholes in the Biological Weapons Convention have not yet been met. We shall be considering whether further steps to rectify this could usefully be taken.

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Another topic which has important considerations in the disarmament context is that of Antarctica. As a result of the Antarctic Treaty, the entire Antarctic continent has for almost 25 years been both demilitarized and denuclearized. The Treaty, to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties, has been entirely effective in removing tension from an area of potential conflict. With its provisions for advance exchange of information about activities and for mutual inspection of those activities, it provides an excellent precedent for demilitarization agreements in other areas. The United Kingdom, as an original signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, remains convinced of the value and importance of the Treaty, and urges that nothing be done in this forum which would undermine the Treaty.

Both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee there is an active debate on the prevention of nuclear war. This is only right. We may differ over the means, but we are at one on the end. The United Kingdom welcomes the chance to explain once more the principles by which we believe such an appalling event as a nuclear war must and can be prevented, and the wider context in which this question must be considered. We also welcome the opportunity to explore with other countries new practical measures which would make nuclear war impossible. But we shall approach the debate with the same realism as that with which we consider the detailed elements of nuclear arms control. We shall look for new steps we can take to build confidence between nations. There may be new ideas which can help to prevent miscalculation and to render accidents impossible. We shall look at any suggestions along these lines with care and in good faith. But the essential elements of defence strategy in the nuclear age cannot be lightly discarded, nor can declaratory postures be any substitute for the hard business of negotiating agreements acceptable to all sides. The shifting sands of diplomacy by

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declaration provide no foundation for a stable future. Instead, as I noted earlier, we must labour to construct, brick by brick, a safer world.

The year 1984 has acquired an ominous aura. The despairing vision depicted by George Orwell in his famous novel 36 years ago - a world at perpetual war, subjugated by totalitarian repression and governed by fear - has not become a reality. However, no meeting of the General Assembly can ignore the reality we face: international tensions, constant conflicts, the terrible toll in human lives and suffering. This underlines the pressing need for new agreements which will promote arms control and point the way towards disarmament, and the urgent need for greater confidence and more stable relations between nations.

We must at all costs prevent the dialogue from withering into empty rhetoric and confrontation. We must talk together. We must act together. The Madrid meeting has shown that it can be done, with realism, determination and a willingness to listen to other countries' views. Together we must make 1984 a year of progress in disarmament.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Although we are already in the second week of our deliberations, I wish - as I have not yet spoken in this Committee - to associate myself with the congratulations and best wishes expressed to you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. My congratulations are also extended to your colleagues in the Bureau.

In my statement today I confine myself to one question, that of averting the danger of an arms race in outer space.

Since the dawn of the space age the danger of outer space being used for other than peaceful purposes has loomed over us, but it has never been greater and more acute than it is today, when outer space, the common heritage of mankind, is on the point of being turned into the arena for an unprecedented arms race which may pose unforeseeable threats to the destiny of the world. Pointing in this direction and

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constituting a source of grave concern to the Hungarian people and Government are such developments as: the completion of the development of an anti-satellite missile system by the United States; the development of directed-energy laser and particle-beam weapons; the construction of space shuttle launching facilities for military operations; the launching of a long-term research programme for the eventual construction of a large-scale and highly effective anti-missile defence system with space-based elements; the growing number, and support for, conceptual studies on future space stations and space planes for military use.

All these efforts are, in our judgement, directed towards the implementation of true military space programmes devised to develop a new generation of weapons systems aimed at targets in outer space, in the atmosphere and on earth. We consider the resultant dangers to be extremely grave and the possible consequences to be immensely harmful. We base this judgement on two assumptions.

I should like to refer first to the military aspects. It should not escape notice that many of the capabilities of present or future space systems totally satisfy requirements for a pre-emptive first strike. If this assumption is right - that present and future space systems might be able to satisfy requirements for pre-emptive strikes or counter-force options - the question arises of how far they will enhance security for the country employing them and for the world in general. Though this question is very difficult to answer briefly, one may conclude that some of those space systems contribute to making nuclear weapons more suitable for fighting a nuclear war than for deterring it; increase the relative advantages of a pre-emptive first strike, thus generating well-founded doubts about future intentions; and, in the long run, undermine strategic stability between the nuclear-weapon Powers and in the world in general.

It must be clear to everybody that the concept of extending the arms race into outer space and the concept of mutual security cannot be reconciled.

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On the other hand, an arms race in outer space would call for immense material sacrifices, further depriving mankind of a very large part of the material resources indispensable for development. Suffice it to recall that, for the years 1982 to 1988, \$900 million have been allocated for the development of only one of the components of the new weapons system, the laser-beam system, and that \$10.9 billion are planned to be spent for shuttle-related developments, not to mention the estimated cost of orbital anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, which soars to hundreds of billion of dollars. And one cannot even express in terms of money the loss involved in having the most valuable part of human intelligence wasted on the preparation of a so-called star war of inconceivable consequences instead of using human knowledge for the solution of global problems confronting mankind. We think that such a squandering of the most valuable material and human resources is as dangerous and condemnable as are the military consequences ensuing therefrom.

Furthermore, it seems to us that two additional aspects have to be taken into account. First, there are no national boundaries in outer space, but the weapons and weapons systems placed there would, in their orbital movements, commit violations of frontiers almost every hour of the day, which, it is true, cannot be classified as such under existing international law and usage, but, as regards the real danger, will differ in no way from direct violations of frontiers by means of warfare.

Secondly, it should not be overlooked that those are new systems of weapons that are not subject to the existing treaties limiting the use of weapons in outer space. Therefore, the Hungarian delegation finds it indispensable that a legally

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binding international treaty be concluded prohibiting the development of such systems of weapons, their deployment in outer space and their use for military purposes.

It is regrettable that the Geneva Committee on Disarmament has failed to live up to the related mandate assigned to it by the General Assembly on previous Soviet initiatives. Valuable time has been lost. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic supports the new Soviet initiative, namely, the proposal to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. We are convinced that an overall prevention of the arms race in outer space calls for comprehensive treatment of the whole problem, and we believe that the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union fully satisfies that requirement.

At the same time, we appreciate the unilateral assumption by the Soviet Union of the obligation not to be the first to place any kind of anti-satellite weapons in outer space as well as the readiness of the Soviet Union to negotiate a treaty on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis, and we consider it as an example to be followed. Realism and a certain amount of experience gained in the very complicated process of disarmament efforts underscore, in our opinion, the necessity of starting negotiations immediately and properly exploiting all channels for the lofty purpose of saving mankind from the "blessings" of such an arms race and of an eventual destructive war coming from outer space.

In the foregoing I have dealt with problems remote in space and seemingly in time. This, however, cannot prevent me from being aware of the tragic events of the moment, events that take place on the very surface of our earth. Among them there is one which I cannot pass over in silence. Hungarian public opinion, my delegation and I, were shocked to learn of the act of aggression carried out by the

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armed forces of the United States against Grenada, a full-fledged Member State of the United Nations and a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The reasons adduced in justification for the aggression are unacceptable. Armed intervention is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the United Nations and with international norms and is a serious threat to international peace and security.

My country strongly condemns the aggression and demands the immediate withdrawal of the invading troops.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.