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**Chairman:** Mr. Toru HAGIWARA (Japan).

**AGENDA ITEM 29**

**Programmes of technical assistance:**

- (a) Report of the Economic and Social Council (A/3848, chap. III, part B, A/3909, part A);
- (c) Establishment of an international administrative service (A/C.2/200)

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

1. Mr. OWEN (Executive Chairman, Technical Assistance Board) referred to three developments which would be of great significance for the future course of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance: the creation of the Special Fund, which should lead to the fulfilment of much which had been encouraged by technical assistance, the establishment, on a small scale experimental basis, of an international administrative service, and the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to seek participation in the Expanded Programme and the work of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB). Those developments should greatly enrich the international resources serving less developed countries and those concerned with the administration of the Expanded Programme were prepared to co-operate with the new services in every way.

2. On the whole, 1957 had been perhaps the most encouraging year since the inception of the Expanded Programme. Voluntary contributions had reached a new record of nearly \$31 million, while recipient Governments had provided an additional \$2.2 million in the form of local cost payments. As the expenses incurred by those Governments on their own account had been more than double the direct expenses of the Programme, it could be said that over \$100 million had been devoted to activities connected with the Expanded Programme. During 1957, 132 countries and territories had received assistance and more than 2,500 experts from sixty-seven countries had been employed. Fellowships had been awarded to 2,061 persons—a slight drop from the preceding year—for training in seventy-five countries and territories. Finally, \$2.5 million, nearly 10 per cent of the total Programme, had been spent on equipment and supplies, which had been purchased from more than fifty countries.

3. There had been a considerable change in the geo-

graphical distribution of technical assistance: there had been a notable increase in the proportion received by the newly-independent countries, mainly in Africa, but also in Asia. However, it had not proved possible to meet the needs of those countries for assistance of the sort which the Expanded Programme was providing elsewhere. Indeed, the shifts in the geographical distribution of effort over the last two years had largely been accomplished with the help of allocations from the Working Capital and Reserve Fund.

4. One important development had been the continued improvement of the quality of the Programme, in the evaluation of which Governments, participating organizations and the resident representatives were increasingly closely associated. Considerable progress had been made in the co-ordination of various government departments in relating technical assistance projects to national development programmes and various other programmes of economic and technical assistance, but further efforts were required in that respect.

5. In analysing the results achieved in 1957, it was often difficult to determine the total impact of any particular project, as many took time to yield results. Nevertheless, in fields such as the improvement of techniques of production, tangible results had been achieved in a short time. Other projects had prepared the way for large-scale capital investment or would promote domestic or foreign trade. Finally, certain projects were of great value, because they enabled Governments to save vast sums.

6. Turning to the current year, he said that the picture for 1958 did not differ greatly from that for 1957. Thirty-five countries had increased their contributions, with the result that there had been a slight increase in total resources in spite of an adjustment in the matching provision attached to the largest contribution. Technical assistance "delivered" would probably reach \$32.5 million. The process of improving methods and procedures was continuing in such matters as the salary and allowances arrangement for project personnel, the awarding and administration of fellowships, currency management and programme planning and implementation. A new edition of an explanatory booklet, known as the "Green Book", containing the description of the Expanded Programme and a compilation of the legislative provisions governing the Programme, had been distributed to delegations at the beginning of the year, and a revised edition of the Project Handbook, first issued in January 1958, was being reproduced.

7. Once again, the contingency authorization had made it possible to meet unforeseen and urgent requirements. Initial planning on the Lower Mekong River Basin development project had been financed in that way, as had the locust control campaign undertaken by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations early in the year, when locust infestation had

interests of their sovereign rights and in the wider interests of peace, would not manufacture nuclear weapons and would forgo the right to develop them. His delegation hoped that the suggestion made in the Irish amendments (A/C.1/L.207), urging the "nuclear Powers" to refrain from supplying nuclear weapons to other States, would receive serious consideration. Such an appeal must derive its strength from the hope that the concern it expressed was shared by all the "nuclear Powers".

37. The third benefit of an agreement to suspend tests was that it would establish for the first time a world-wide inspection system. In his delegation's view, that was really the key to disarmament, and it was encouraging to know that at least in one limited field it had been possible to remove the issue of control from the realm of controversy and propaganda. The fact that the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests had shown that a control system was feasible had therefore cleared away one major difficulty in the way of political agreement. Moreover, if such a control system could be made to work successfully, the experience gained would, as the Secretary-General had observed in his memorandum, be invaluable preparation for implementing, with the least delay, further world-wide inspection and control systems as agreements were reached on other disarmament measures (A/3936, para. 7).

38. The fourth and perhaps the most important benefit which would come from an agreement to end nuclear tests under effective international control was a lowering of tension and an increase in understanding and international confidence.

39. The New Zealand delegation would not wish to ignore the difficulties which must be overcome in order to complete an agreement even on the limited issue of ending tests. One of the main problems which would have to be resolved was the universal application of any measures agreed upon at Geneva by the three "nuclear Powers". In that connexion, the problem arose of extending the control system to the mainland of China.

40. A properly safeguarded agreement to end nuclear tests was therefore an urgent necessity. However, one of the substantial benefits his delegation looked for in suspension of test explosions would be lost if the suspension were not to be the prelude to a wider disarmament agreement resulting in balanced measures of genuine disarmament bringing about reductions in conventional as well as nuclear armaments.

41. His delegation agreed that all the possibilities presented by a technical approach to such disarmament problems as left room for study of a non-political nature should be explored promptly and fully. While unanimity among technical experts would not mean much without unanimity at the political level, it seemed clear that Governments would attach no value to mere protestations of faith. They would want to be satisfied that they could be protected against non-compliance before they committed themselves. Technical studies of inspection and control systems, therefore, had a contribution to make in the essential process of building confidence. His delegation hoped that the study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of a surprise attack would be followed by similar technical studies on other initial disarmament measures.

42. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico), introducing his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208), recalled that Mr. Padilla Nervo, head of the Mexican delegation, had explained in his statement of 13 October (946th meeting) the reasons of principle and the practical reasons for the draft, the sole purpose of which was to ensure a resumption of the disarmament negotiations which had been broken off more than a year previously.

43. The step taken by his delegation would in no way interfere with the general debate or with the consideration of and voting on the draft resolutions under items 64, 70 and 72 of the General Assembly's agenda, which had been referred to the First Committee. His delegation wished the Committee to examine the important procedural question it had raised after the substance of the problem now under discussion had been studied.

44. As the opening of the proposed informal conversations would depend on agreement between the representatives of the Powers mentioned in the Mexican draft resolution, it would be for the Chairman of the First Committee, after consulting them and the Secretary-General, to set the date of the first meeting. Again, it would be for the Chairman to decide, with the consent of the parties concerned, when his report should be submitted to the Committee.

45. The Mexican delegation, as its Chairman had stated on 13 October, fervently hoped that the negotiations which would begin at Geneva on 31 October 1958 and the work of the next meeting of experts who would examine measures to prevent surprise attacks, would be crowned with success. While the United Nations must continue its endeavours to arrive at a general balanced agreement on disarmament—one of its principal purposes—anything that represented genuine progress towards disarmament was to be welcomed. Moreover, his delegation was convinced that the active participation of the General Assembly, the plenary body of the United Nations, was not merely desirable and useful, but essential. That explained and justified the step it had taken in submitting the draft resolution.

46. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it transpired from Mr. Moch's statement that France intended to make nuclear test explosions, that it would endeavour to make such tests harmless and that it would not regard any agreement reached at Geneva without its participation as binding. As Mr. Moch had himself recognized, there was less and less support for France's view on the question of nuclear tests. It would be readily understood that the USSR was unable to support it.

47. With regard to the reduction of military budgets, his delegation had never denied that the idea had been originated by France, but it noted with regret that France deemed it impossible to put the idea into effect at the present juncture. France's whole attitude might be summed up as wishing to hand over as many questions as possible to committees of experts, without previous political commitment.

48. Mr. Moch had emphasized the continuity of French policy in the matter of disarmament. Unhappily, that continuity was entirely negative, as the policy had been one of rejecting all practical disarmament measures.

49. Mr. MOCH (France) requested the USSR representative to read carefully the text of his statement.

15. In 1957, most of the projects approved had been executed as planned, except in the Middle East and Africa, where the general situation had not been propitious, and where the programmes planned in some countries had been too ambitious in relation to the resources available. To ensure prompt execution of planned projects, TAA was now asking Governments to supply all necessary information about the proposed duties of experts and qualifications of fellows, at an earlier stage than before.

16. General conclusions on programme trends could only be safely drawn by studying changes extending over a period of several years. Moreover, it was clear that an analysis of the programmes as a whole would not necessarily lead to the same conclusions as an analysis of the programmes country by country. It was important to remember in that connexion that, under the country programming procedure, the distribution of the available funds among the various fields of activity and the establishment of priorities depended upon the Governments themselves.

17. Subject to those observations, it could be noted that, in 1957, there had been increases in projects relating to the assessment and development of natural resources, transport and communications, and economic surveys. In addition, there had been significant developments during the year relating to assistance in the field of public administration. For the first time, the Secretary-General had presented to the Economic and Social Council a separate and detailed report on that question (E/3085),<sup>2/</sup> and, in its resolution 681 (XXVI), the Council had recommended to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General be authorized to provide Governments, on request, with the services of experts who would carry out administrative duties of an operational or executive character.

18. The idea underlying the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations was so revolutionary that it was difficult not to feel a certain impatience with the slowness of the progress achieved. Nevertheless, there was reason to believe that the very existence of the technical assistance programmes, and the work carried out under them, would be among the most glorious achievements of the age, which was the first in which it was believed practicable to make the benefits of civilization available to the whole human race.<sup>3/</sup>

19. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands) thanked the Executive Chairman of TAB and the Director-General of TAA for the information they had given. He hoped that fresh ideas and suggestions for making the best possible use of the meagre resources provided for the programmes, would be put forward during the debate.

20. It was already obvious that efforts would have to be made, not only to achieve greater efficiency in the procedure for establishing and approving programmes, but also to ensure a considerable increase in contributions. The fact that a large number of countries had announced their intention to participate in the financing of the Special Fund—which was a matter for congratulation—would inevitably tend to slow down the rate of growth of the Expanded Programme. However, in view

of the desirability of maintaining a certain balance between the two programmes, he believed that, as long as the combined resources of the Special Fund and of the Expanded Programme did not exceed \$100 million, a slowing down would present no great drawbacks, provided that a target figure of approximately \$40 million was maintained for the Expanded Programme. With that consideration in mind, the Netherlands had increased its contribution to the Expanded Programme by 10 per cent. Furthermore, the system of providing assistance in return for payment, approved by the Economic and Social Council in 1957 (resolution 658 B (XXIV)), was an excellent means of increasing the resources of the various programmes. The Netherlands delegation hoped that an increasing number of the countries concerned would have recourse to that system.

21. He noted that the Council had already taken important steps—particularly with regard to the future relations between the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund—to increase the efficiency of the programmes. It was now necessary to make a clear distinction between the categories of projects which would be included in the Expanded Programme, and those which would be the responsibility of the Special Fund, in order that the Governments and those administering the programmes should know where they stood, and in order to prevent any competition from developing between the two agencies. However, in order to reduce administrative costs, TAB services should be made available to the Fund, particularly, in local operations. Generally speaking, the planning and execution of the Expanded Programme projects could only benefit from the existence of the Fund.

22. The Netherlands delegation had been pleased to learn that the second General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency had decided to participate in the Expanded Programme. It was to be hoped that the Economic and Social Council would quickly approve the Agency's candidature and ask TAC to give favourable consideration to requests for technical assistance in the new Agency's field, even if—as the Netherlands delegation had forecast at the 157th meeting of TAC during the Council's twenty-sixth session—an amount of approximately \$500,000 should be necessary for that purpose.

23. TAC had indicated that the procedure for developing programmes at the national level had proved satisfactory. The Netherlands delegation shared that view, but hoped that TAB, in its report on the matter, would propose measures to give even greater flexibility in the execution of the Expanded Programme, while retaining the basic principle which was necessary for the maintenance of good relations between the participating agencies. The recipient countries could themselves help to improve the system by following the recommendations which appeared in operative paragraph 2 of Council resolution 700 (XXVI).

24. U THET TUN (Burma) said that his country received substantial technical assistance in the economic and social fields, but that, as far as its central administration was concerned, it was left largely to its own devices.

25. The establishment of an international administrative service would be welcomed by most of the underdeveloped countries whose administrative machinery was still in the development stage. Those countries had,

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 8.

<sup>3/</sup> The complete text of the statement made by the Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration was distributed as document A/C.2/L.370.

in some cases, already prepared organization plans, but they lacked qualified personnel to carry them out.

26. It had been said that the presence of foreign administrators, in countries which had recently acquired independence, might recall the period of colonialism and give rise to fears that they would remain permanently. It was reassuring to note, in that connexion, that Economic and Social Council resolution 681 (XXVI) provided that the duties of officers of the

international service should "normally include the training of national personnel to take over the responsibilities temporarily assigned to the internationally-recruited specialists". However, as administrative duties frequently acquired political aspects, it would be preferable to limit the role of the internationally-recruited specialists to purely technical matters, and to speak of an "international technical (or specialist) service".

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.