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SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 669th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Tuesday, 28 September 1993, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. DES ILES (Trinidad and Tobago)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

1. The agenda was adopted.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that the current meeting was devoted to consultations with the Secretary-General of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Mr. Benny Alexander. The participation of PAC in the democratization process in South Africa was essential in order to ensure that all the parties that had taken part in the struggle to end apartheid would participate in the rebuilding of the country.

ADDRESS BY MR. BENNY ALEXANDER, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA (PAC)

3. Mr. ALEXANDER (Secretary-General of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that the euphoria generated over seemingly positive developments in South Africa was unwarranted. The widespread speculation on the need to end sanctions following the unbanning of PAC and other liberation movements in February 1990 had proved shortlived in the face of continuing violence practised by the Pretoria regime and the signing of the much-touted National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991 had failed to curb the violence in the country. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) had broken down because it suffered from fatal structural defects. The biggest fraud, however, was the proposed establishment of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC). TEC was not a transitional government, a fact which had been confirmed by both the Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator of the regime. The Council would coexist with the current illegitimate regime, which would control the Council by virtue of its voting structure: the main council of TEC would take its decisions by a 75 per cent majority and the two liberation movements, representing the vast majority of South Africans would be able to cast only 2 out of 26 votes while the de Klerk regime, with two votes of its own, would have minority veto power over all decisions. Moreover, not less than an 80 per cent vote of the Council could override a decision by the regime to declare a state of emergency. Such a majority would be hard to obtain. TEC also guaranteed that the South African Defence Forces would remain the official army while the liberation armies were reduced to the role of auxiliary wings of SADF. In a nutshell, TEC was a dummy institution and a typical colonialist trick to co-opt the natives. The PAC National Executive Council had therefore decided not to serve on the Council, although it would continue to participate in the negotiations and take part in elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.

4. It was an undeniable fact that violence continued unabated in South Africa. During July and August 1993, the death rate in South Africa had exceeded that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ninety per cent of violence in South Africa was attributable to the de Klerk regime, which employed foreign mercenaries and local death squads, and armed a secret white organization, the Broederbond, to wreck the democratization process. The signatories of the National Peace Accord had failed to end the violence because the perpetrators of the violence were signatories of the Accord. PAC was of the opinion that those signatories could not comprise a joint peace-keeping force. Only the establishment of an

(Mr. Alexander)

international peace-keeping force could guarantee the holding of free and democratic elections.

5. PAC believed that since the proposed Transitional Executive Council neither contributed a new government nor a considerable shift of power, all remaining sanctions against South Africa should remain in place pending the adoption of a new constitution and free elections.

6. Those advocating the lifting of sanctions against South Africa which, according to the United Nations Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, had committed a crime against humanity, had maintained sanctions and blockades against countries like Cuba, Iraq and Libya for alleged violations of human rights. Investors should come to South Africa only after the establishment of a new constitution and a new stable government controlled by the African majority.

7. Most multinational corporations involved in South Africa were technology intensive rather than labour-intensive, which meant that those with the highest educational qualifications and experience, namely the white minority, stood to gain from the lifting of sanctions.

8. Moreover, South Africa continued to destabilize neighbouring countries such as Angola. Assistance to neighbouring States which were still suffering from the effects of years of destabilization must be continued and increased.

9. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Centre against Apartheid should arrange for wide distribution of Mr. Alexander's statement and noted that the Special Committee would reflect the statement in its report to the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.