

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 November 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.C. STELLE (United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKOV
Mr. A.N. SHEVCHENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

Secretariat:

Mr. H. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I call to order the forty-fourth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

Does any representative wish to speak? If not, I will speak in my capacity as representative of the United States.

The two co-Chairmen, in New York have announced agreement to reconvene the plenary meetings of the Eighteen Nation Conference on 26 November. I believe that today's meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee, therefore, presents an opportunity to review briefly what has taken place at the meetings of this Sub-Committee during the recess. While I have been absent from the two most recent meetings of the Sub-Committee, I have taken the opportunity to examine carefully the verbatim records of the forty-second and forty-third meetings and I wish in the course of my statement today to comment upon a few of the events of those meetings.

Let us for a moment look at the situation in our Conference when the plenary meetings were recessed on 8 September 1962. At that point in our quest for a nuclear test ban, the United States and the United Kingdom had submitted two complete draft test ban treaties. One (ENDC/58) was a comprehensive test ban treaty covering the cessation of tests in all environments under effective international control. The West made it clear that it preferred this comprehensive draft to the second that it offered (ENDC/59) which was the draft of a partial treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

After having taken these initiatives, the United States and the United Kingdom awaited the reaction of the Soviet Union and hoped for corresponding initiatives from the Soviet Union. The Western delegations proposed continued meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee during the recess so that no time would be wasted in the effort to reach the earliest possible agreement, preferably by 1 January 1963. As of the present, however, no such Soviet Union initiatives have been put forward in this Conference to further us on our way towards agreement. This is the first conclusion my delegation has been forced to draw concerning our work of the past three months. We still await with eagerness proposals by the Soviet Union to match those far-reaching initiatives taken by the West on 14 and 27 August 1962.

(The Chairman, United States)

In addition, over the past few months we have seen no major changes in the position of the Soviet Union in this Sub-Committee. What small changes we have seen have been, unfortunately, steps to the rear-- slight backward shifts on the part of the Soviet delegation. While none of these shifts has been entirely clear against the rather hazy backdrop which constitutes the details of the Soviet Union position, each of these small steps or clarifications has tended to make the reaching of an agreement even more difficult.

In an over-all sense the Soviet Union, in the period before our recess in September, appeared to espouse a position which called for agreement on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28). The West had tried to clear up what this meant from the point of view of the Soviet Union with respect to detailed arrangements, but the Soviet Union maintained its posture of constantly repeating generalizations. What general interpretations the Soviet Union did provide led us to believe that no effectively controlled cessation of tests could apparently be reached under the Soviet Union's interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum. Nevertheless the Soviet Union had contended that its position was different or had changed from its former proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11).

Shortly after the Conference recessed, however, my Soviet colleague outlined in the Sub-Committee three proposals on the basis of which he alleged agreement could be reached. For the first time in a long while the Soviet Union re-introduced the old Soviet Union proposals of 28 November-- purportedly abandoned by Mr. Zorin on 19 April 1962-- as the first basis for reaching agreement. Next the Soviet representative interpreted, or, I should say, re-interpreted, the eight-nation memorandum to mean exactly what the Soviet Union had proposed on 28 November 1961. He claimed in fact that the eight-nation memorandum was really only a logical extension of the Soviet Union's 28 November proposal and in complete conformity with it.

The last basis on which Mr. Tsarapkin said agreement could be reached was the acceptance of the United States-United Kingdom partial treaty ban, together with a moratorium-- either written or unwritten-- on underground nuclear weapon tests. However, this again is exactly the 28 November position. The fact that a moratorium might be written or unwritten is hardly material. Therefore this first backward step may have really been only a clarification of what the Soviet delegation had sought to obscure while the Eighteen Nation Conference

(The Chairman, United States)

was meeting: that its real position on a test ban had not changed at all since it took its most extreme stand on a test ban on 28 November 1961. Nevertheless this clarification made it clear that the Soviet Union was back once again to its old position.

In addition, there have been several other nuances of backward movement in the Soviet Union's position since the Sub-Committee began its meetings during the recess. In some instances these have involved apparently only further clarification of old Soviet Union positions, but they have given us the feeling that the Soviet Union has abandoned even trying to put a favourable gloss on its old position.

For example, as my delegation noted at our last meeting, we might indeed be quite close to each other in our positions on the international scientific commission. The Soviet Union has not, however, given us much in the way of details about how it would see the commission set up and about how the commission might operate. Indeed, at the last meeting Mr. Tsarapkin again took one more small step backwards when, in response to questions by Mr. Mark, he merely referred to the eight-nation memorandum. Of course, Mr. Mark's questions have not been answered in the eight-nation memorandum, precisely because the eight nations have said that answering such questions is a job for the negotiating parties to accomplish.

Mr. Tsarapkin's avoidance of answering the questions brings us no closer to agreement, and his manner of doing so illustrates either a lack of understanding of the eight-nation memorandum and of the purposes for which its sponsors presented it or a decided unwillingness to come to grips with the problems facing our negotiations. My delegation cannot believe the former could be true of our Soviet colleague; so we are reluctantly led to conclude that the Soviet delegation has no real desire to negotiate, even on areas on which the two sides appear so close together.

With regard to the question of the type of control post or observation post system which should be set up, the Soviet Union has also, during the past few months, backtracked from the position which most of us believed it held. For example, the eight-nation memorandum provides for a system of control posts to be fashioned out of existing national networks on a purely scientific and non-political

(The Chairman, United States)

basis. It recognizes that additional stations might be added. Its aim is to provide a nationally manned system which can detect with the greatest possible accuracy underground seismic events which might be nuclear weapon tests.

Inherent in the memorandum and in the international scientific commission which it sets up is the presumption of a co-ordinated collection of data. At one point the memorandum speaks of "continuous observation" with respect to the control system. It also speaks of the fact that the system's task will be "effective control". At another point the commission is entrusted with the tasks of "processing all data" and of "reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data"(ENDC/28, paragraphs 3 and 4). All this means that the commission will have to have some say in the way in which the data are collected and reported. It means to us that the system of control posts should be integrated and standardized. It means that the working membership of these posts should be local nationals but that the international commission should perform a co-ordinating and supervisory role.

The Soviet delegation, however, has said that we were wrong and that none of the parameters which my delegation has outlined and which have been incorporated in our draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) should apply. Instead the Soviet delegation has insisted that the national system may act in a capricious and unco-ordinated manner, reporting what it wishes, whenever it wishes. The Soviet delegation appears to believe that there should be no standards for reporting and no standards for instrumentation. In short, the Soviet delegation wishes to leave the responsibilities for organizing an effective network completely in the hands of the State or States whose activities the network is designed to monitor. My delegation considers this to be a retrograde position. Certainly no delegation listening to Mr. Zorin last April, when he accepted the eight-nation memorandum for the Soviet Union, could have thought that the Soviet delegation would so quickly have construed its meaning to meet exclusively Soviet ideas and to negate the purpose which the memorandum is supposed to serve.

The Soviet Union has also constantly reiterated during the meetings of our Sub-Committee that there is at this point no need for effective international inspection. During the course of our meetings over the period of the recess the

(The Chairman, United States)

Soviet Union has firmly maintained this position, ostensibly on the basis of alleged scientific evidence which it is not yet ready to discuss with the West or the rest of the World. The Soviet Union has asserted and re-asserted that national facilities are adequate to identify as well as detect all significant underground seismic events so as to leave no possibility that clandestine underground nuclear tests could take place.

However, the Soviet Union and the Soviet delegation have consistently failed to show or demonstrate what they mean by national networks or to provide the scientific data which might support the Soviet Union's claims about their accuracy. Instead the Soviet delegation has tended merely to repeat the texts of newspaper clippings from the Western Press in an attempt to prove its point. We of the West have repeatedly offered to discuss in detail any scientific evidence the Soviet Union may have developed which might justify its stand. However, up to this point the Soviet Union has failed to accept this invitation.

At our last meeting the Soviet delegation made a slight change from its normal practice of justifying the scientific basis of its position by citing Western newspaper clippings. The Soviet delegation quoted an article from the Soviet Press on this subject. Mr. Tsarapkin quoted or paraphrased in extenso from an article in Izvestia of 11 November 1962. However, the article itself is filled with assertions about the Western position on nuclear tests, the data for which are not made available to the readers of Izvestia.

During the course of his extensive quotation from the article, the Soviet representative mentioned only very briefly and only in part a fairly significant statement made by the Soviet scientists who signed the article. I should like to quote the following portion of it in an English translation:

"Certain difficulties in distinguishing between explosions and earthquakes undoubtedly exist, and it would be as harmful to belittle them as it would be to exaggerate them. The problem as a whole, however, is much simpler than those which were solved by the score by scientists in the course of the arms race. At present we are confident in stating that it is not only possible to detect underground tests but that it is also possible to solve this task with considerably simpler means than proposed by the

(The Chairman, United States)

experts at the 1958 Geneva Conference. For this purpose it is sufficient to utilize the national seismic services of countries which have atomic weapons as well as of neutral countries and to strengthen the national means by automatic seismic stations, which would provide full reliability of detection" -- I repeat, "full reliability of detection" -- "of underground tests without any on-site inspection".

With the first of the thoughts expressed by the Soviet scientists we fully agree. There is no doubt that there remain certain difficulties in distinguishing between explosions and earthquakes. We agree that these difficulties should be neither belittled nor exaggerated. What the statement means, however, is that for the first time in a long while the Soviet Union has admitted that not all underground events can be identified by national systems.

All that is required to solve this problem is to provide a system which will be effective in identifying explosions or earthquakes. This need not take place in regard to every unidentified event; it is necessary only with respect to a small number of such events, in order to provide the assurance necessary to deter any State from undertaking clandestine underground tests. Apparently, then, the Soviet scientists agree with us that the problem of identification is important.

We also agree with the Soviet scientists that research and work in the field of seismology should be able to improve the situation with regard to the detection and identification of underground tests. However, these seem to be rather strange words coming from scientists working for a State which in May 1960 refused to allow its scientists to participate in a joint programme of seismic research. We appreciate the Soviet scientists' recognition of the fact that this problem will be easier to solve than others confronting scientists today, but we would have much preferred to have their help and co-operation over the years since 1960.

Finally, the quotation makes it clear that the Soviet Union is talking about national systems' capability for the detection -- I emphasize "detection" -- of underground tests without any on-site inspection. Of course, the United States and the United Kingdom do not desire, nor have they ever asked for, on-site inspections for the detection of tests. Inspections are needed for the identification of tests. Had this Soviet article been written by some group less familiar with the problems of seismology than the Soviet scientists who

(The Chairman, United States)

signed it, it would be possible to excuse the confusion between "detection" and "identification". But the article itself makes this distinction, as I noted earlier in my remarks. To make a sweeping statement about the full reliability of national systems for the detection of underground tests without on-site inspections is either an oversight or deliberately misleading. Considering the knowledge of these Soviet scientists, I can only regretfully conclude that the latter is the case. Such actions on the part of Soviet scientists certainly do not help in the reaching of an agreement on nuclear tests.

We know national systems have a good detection capability. We have proposed in document ENDC/58 that they be used in this way. But a good detection capability is not complemented necessarily by an increase in the capability of identifying seismic events. To say, therefore, that national systems are useful for the detection of underground events is correct, but it is incorrect and misleading to conclude that identification capabilities are equally good and that, therefore, no on-site inspections are required.

We await with interest any future scientific information with which the Soviet delegation may be able to provide us. Thus far it has remained aloof from all truly scientific discussion, but we hope that in the course of our future meetings we may reach some agreement about the scientific bases which underlie the control required for an effective cessation of underground tests.

Therefore, while the record of the Soviet delegation over the past few months clearly shows that the Soviet delegation has moved slightly backward from even its most extreme position with respect to a test ban, the fact that the Soviet delegation is now willing to quote its own scientists leaves some slight room for hope. Certainly my delegation would hope that we have seen the end of the long, tiresome era in which the Soviet delegation provided us with a steady diet of shop-worn generalities about the effectiveness of national systems and the dangers of espionage allegedly inherent in control exercised in the Soviet Union by non-Soviet-bloc nationals. If this is the case, then it is an encouraging sign. We all look forward with interest to what the Soviet delegation may have to say at this meeting and at future meetings.

(The Chairman, United States)

The United Nations General Assembly has asked for a report by 10 December 1962 on the work of our Sub-Committee and of the full Conference on progress towards a nuclear test ban. My delegation is willing to continue to make every effort towards that goal. We hope the Soviet Union will be prepared to work towards that goal in the same manner and will demonstrate its effort by making new and positive contributions to the work of the Sub-Committee.

Mr. GODDARD (United Kingdom): I have returned today to the meetings of the Sub-Committee after an absence of two months or more during which time I have been at the General Assembly in New York. Although I have been absent I have not been indifferent to the progress of these discussions; I have tried to keep in close touch with the developments here.

This Sub-Committee was asked to continue its meetings during the recess in the hope that the sense of urgency would lead to some firm developments even while the matters were being discussed at the General Assembly. I must confess to a feeling of disappointment that, in fact, as I understand it, there is no progress to record. I am sure this will be a disappointment not only to those of us concerned in the talks but to nations all over the world.

Having come back from the General Assembly and having participated in the debates there in relation to nuclear tests, one cannot fail to be impressed by the deep desire of all the nations in the world to see the nuclear Powers come to agreement on this matter, not only for what it would mean in itself -- and that would be very much -- but for the stimulus that it could give to so much of our work in the wider sphere of disarmament. This is really the message that I bring back from the General Assembly, imploring us to overcome our differences, whatever they may be, and to achieve at long last a test ban treaty.

During these two months the discussions here have ranged around the same problems with which we were concerned just before the recess. Just before that recess the United States and the United Kingdom delegations submitted two new draft treaties (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59). We very much hoped at that time that one or other of those draft treaties might have provided the basis for a final solution of this problem. I still believe that either one or other of those could very soon, if there were an expression of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union, lead to agreement.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We could have a complete comprehensive treaty, and all that is necessary for that is for the Soviet Union to revert-- not to accept anything new, but to revert-- to accepting something which a year ago, here in this building, our Soviet colleague renounced: in other words, to accept again the principle of obligatory on-site inspection. That is all we need-- a very small number of on-site inspections a year. If that were conceded by the Soviet Union, if it were to revert to the position it held until 28 November last year, then I believe we could quickly reach a comprehensive test ban. But if that should be too much, surely it is not too much to ask the Soviet Union to accept a test ban in the three environments which cause the greatest anxiety in the world-- the atmosphere, outer space and under water. We could sign an agreement tomorrow whereby we could stop all future tests in these environments while still continuing our work to overcome the difficulties between us in relation to underground tests. I should have thought that was not too much to hope, and I must admit I am disappointed that our Soviet colleagues have found themselves unable to concede either of those points and so enable progress to be made; for, let there be no doubt about it, the vast mass of feeling at the General Assembly this year was desperately in favour of finding agreement, and on the basis of finding an agreement with effective verification. That was clear enough from the way in which the thirty-seven-nation resolution emerged in its final form (1762 A(XVII)) and was passed with such an overwhelming majority. The fact that the United States-United Kingdom resolution (1762 B(XVII)) did not receive the same number of votes is really not a material factor here at all, for many of the representatives felt that, having accepted the principles I have mentioned in the thirty-seven-Power resolution, there was no need to reaffirm them. There is the fact, which we all know and have to accept, that many countries wish to remain non-aligned between the two powerful military blocs in the world. We have to face facts in these matters. It was for that reason, of course, that some nations did not vote for the second resolution. It does not mean that they do not fully support the principles which that resolution set out.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

So there is this urgent need, and there is a compulsion in the air. People are feeling very deeply the effects of what happened in relation to Cuba: that is very evident. I am not going over the history of the Cuban crisis -- it is all well known to us -- but what I do know is that people all over the world were brought face to face with what might have happened and how the world might have been plunged into nuclear war. This has made them think even more keenly about how we must avoid that in the future. This has made them all the more anxious to see us proceed with general disarmament. But they all recognize that if we could only achieve this first step towards general and complete disarmament it would be a major break-through in itself. There is, as I say, this compulsion of feeling that we, the nuclear Powers, surely must respect -- a feeling that somehow or other we must overcome these difficulties and differences that confront us.

Having that in mind, I have looked again -- and tried to look dispassionately -- at the position, to see whether there was any way in which the West could do anything more to try to achieve agreement. Frankly, I really do not see how the West could be asked to move further than it has done already. The Western Powers have moved a very, very long way. They have accepted all that was asked of them in relation to three environments. In relation to the other, they say to the Soviet Union, "If you can show us how to identify, as well as detect, all these seismic occurrences underground without on-site inspection, then we will be only too willing to learn." We are not asking for inspection for its own sake; we are asking for inspection because we believe it to be the only way -- the only way -- in which we can clearly identify whether in fact a treaty, once signed, is being honoured.

I read in the verbatim record of the last meeting of this Sub-Committee some strange words -- I thought -- spoken by the representative of the Soviet Union. I do not want to make debating points out of them. But really when he talked about "proving" that the Soviet Union had carried out tests. There is only one way to prove that, as we understand it, and that is by on-site inspection. If he and his countrymen honestly believe that there are ways of proving without on-site inspection that tests have been carried out, I implore him to tell us,

(Lr. Godber, United Kingdom)

to show us. We are ready to be convinced. We are not bigoted in relation to this at all. But our best assessment, as we have said here so many times, is that there is a residue of these events which we cannot identify. That being so, we must ask for a degree of on-site inspection. That is our position.

Even if that presents great difficulty to the Soviet Union-- and, frankly, I do not see how it can-- there is our alternative offer: to sign a treaty covering the three environments which, as I say, cause such pain and anxiety to people all over the world. There is this draft alternative treaty standing ready for immediate signature. If the Soviet Union does not like the phraseology or the implications of certain clauses in those draft treaties, let the Soviet representatives talk to us about them; let them tell us just what they do not like in relation to them. We submitted these draft treaties in a genuine effort to find a fresh basis of agreement. Really, I do not think the Soviet Union has done justice to those draft treaties, and I do most seriously ask our Soviet colleagues to give some further thought to them.

We are not trying to gain any diplomatic victory here. We are only trying to gain a victory for mankind, a victory for common sense. That is how I see it.

During the past two or three days I have been reading the memoirs of Lord Avon - Sir Anthony Eden, as he is better known - and I cannot help recalling that here in this very chamber, in the 1930s he and others debated the need to come to agreement - not only on disarmament but on other issues too. A great deal of sterile debate took place, and because that generation failed, all our countries suffered the agonies of the last war. Surely we ought to have learned from that. We ought to cease sterile debate. We ought to get down to real agreement. I honestly and deeply feel this, and I believe, with this in mind, that the Soviet representatives have a duty to look again at these drafts which the Western Powers have put forward; to tell us, if they like, where these drafts fall down, where they are not suitable. Let us look at them together. To dismiss them out of hand and to offer nothing instead is not an act of statesmanship; nor does it face up to the feeling, to which I have referred, which followed on the events in Cuba; nor, honestly, does it face up to the declarations which were made by the Heads of the Soviet Union, the United States and my own country at that time, when reference was made to the need for a reprochement in these fields of disarmament and, in particular, in relation to nuclear tests.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We had a debate in the British House of Commons as recently as last night, to which I replied, where there was an obvious feeling that, with the Cuban crisis safely behind us, we hope -- I say "we hope" because it is not, of course, finalized -- there was an opportunity for a reduction of tension in the world, and the first issue in this should be a nuclear test ban treaty. With all this in mind, as I say, the Western Powers have put forward what they think is the maximum they can honestly put forward. It is easy to indulge in polemics about different points and to pick out debating points, but that does not help us to achieve agreement. What is necessary now, I think, is a genuine fresh move from our Soviet colleagues. I think it is time for them to come forward with something new. The Western Powers, for their part, as I have indicated, as recently as 27 August last went to the utmost in an endeavour to get agreement. Now, surely, not only is this moment opportune from the point of view I mentioned before but it does appear that the Soviet Union's present series of tests is drawing to an end; the United States atmospheric series has just ended; and the United Kingdom is holding one small underground test. Of course, other underground tests may continue on both sides. We do not know the extent to which they will go. But surely, with the ending of these two massive series of atmospheric tests, added to the other external issues I have mentioned, this is an opportunity which we have a duty to grasp.

As I say, I am not here to make a debating speech today. I am here, really, to make a genuine appeal to our Soviet colleagues to look again at all this and to see whether it is too much for them to agree to come back to their position of prior to 28 November last year in order to achieve a treaty. Really it is so little.

In this connexion I observe that there have been certain comments by the Soviet Union on what have come to be known as "black boxes", and I see that Mr. Tsarapkin did refer to these at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee. This obviously is a matter of some importance, or one which could be of some importance. After all, the term "black boxes" is fairly vague, and nobody has decided yet what those black boxes would contain or anything in relation to them. But I have read what Mr. Tsarapkin said in regard to this and I think I ought to try to correct in the mind of our Soviet colleague, if I can, one point on which he seemed a little confused.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In the verbatim record of our forty-third meeting he is quoted as saying that extremely authoritative United Kingdom scientists -- and he mentions here Sir William Penney -- had suggested:

"... a system of automatic stations could be organized, which would make it possible to bypass the question of inspection. In that case there would be no need for international inspection on national territories".

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.43, pp. and)

Now, I should point out that, of course, Sir William Penney said nothing of the kind; nor, as far as I have been able to discover, did any other representatives, not even the Soviet scientists at the recent Pugwash conference. I think Mr. Tsarapkin will probably remember that in fact this scheme was put forward during the Pugwash Conference by three Soviet and three United States scientists. They themselves were careful to emphasize that they made no such claim as that which Mr. Tsarapkin quoted. Their actual words were as follows:

"We have explored the possibility of developing this system ... so that it will substantially reduce the number of necessary on-site inspections."

(ENDC/66, page 1)

again, at the end of the paper, they said:

"We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the International Control Commission will need to request very few on-site inspections."

They went on:

"If this is true, it may provide a new basis for negotiation in the Geneva discussions and ease the problem of resolving the on-site inspection issue." (ibid., page 2)

It will be seen that they did not say that the use of these "black boxes" would or could obviate the need for on-site inspection; they said it could reduce but not that it could eliminate. That is a very important distinction, because it comes back to the point which I have made so many times before, here and in other places, that the minimum need that we have is for a degree of obligatory on-site inspection.

Now, we ourselves have studied this proposal of the "black boxes" with considerable interest. It is possible that they might help us to reduce the magnitude of the inspection problem. We are, therefore, prepared to start detailed

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

discussion on the subject with both our United States and our Soviet colleagues, just as we are on any matters of scientific interest in relation to this whole subject; but, if these discussions are going to succeed, then it is important that we should all realize from the outset that this idea will not prove to be any magic solution for all our problems. We must all realize its limitations as well as any possible advantages it may have. As I have said, however many "black boxes" there might be, there is at present no cause to believe that they would eliminate the need for on-site inspection, since there will still be some suspicious events.

Perhaps I could quote once more what the actual authors of this proposal say. Their second suggestion reads as follows:

"The numbers of the sealed automatic stations in the network should be large enough so that it provides a good check on the seismic data supplied by all stations."

They go on to point out:

"Such an arrangement will substantially reduce the probability of unidentified seismic events." (ibid., page 2)

That means that if our system is to be effective there will have to be a considerable number of "black boxes" in position; exactly how many and where they are to be situated is of course a matter for negotiation, but we can say at the outset that it is useless thinking in terms of two or three "black boxes". Indeed, our initial estimate is that the number required for the Soviet Union alone -- and I am merely using that as an illustration -- would probably run into three figures. Naturally, the Western Powers will, as always, be happy to accept a proportional number in their own territories; we ask no favours in this regard. On the other hand, most of the boxes would be placed in seismic areas -- which, as we have previously pointed out, comprise only some ten per cent of the total land area of the Soviet Union.

We should then have to work out certain techniques for the placing of these boxes under suitable control measures and a system by which they could be rapidly moved between the reading laboratory and their positions in the field. I should like to stress the importance of this particular aspect, because it is a vital part of such a system. On-site inspection, if it is to be effective, must be prompt. One should aim, therefore, at getting inspectors on the spot within a day or two of

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

the event which they are called upon to identify, while the immediate local effects are still evident. It is useless, therefore, simply to remove the boxes for routine checking at periodic intervals. If there is to be a delay of several weeks between an unidentified event and the processing of the data, then the whole scheme is doomed to failure from the start.

I hope I have not given too discouraging a picture of the difficulties involved -- it is not my intention to do so at all -- but it does seem to me that, before we get into detailed discussion of the subject, we should be quite clear as to the sort of problem we are talking about. After all, the term "black box" is merely an attempt to describe a recording station using fairly standard techniques, in a sufficiently small compass to be portable, and capable of being made tamper-proof. It remains to be seen to what extent this is feasible from both technical and organizational aspects. A system of this kind could succeed only if both sides were to show the fullest possible co-operation. The more complicated a system is -- and this one would certainly be very complicated -- the more important it is that everything should run smoothly. Nevertheless, as I have said, the United Kingdom delegation is certainly ready to look at this proposal as well as at any other.

But I do come back to the point that I made earlier, that we in the West have really moved a very long way in seeking to meet fears that the Soviet Union has expressed -- fears which, quite frankly, we find it very difficult to see are reasonable fears. I do not want to be polemical at all in anything I say here, but I find it very difficult indeed to take with any degree of seriousness the Soviet Union's statements about dangers of espionage in relation to the proposals we put forward in our draft treaty of 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58).

I really do think that it is time we had some serious reaction from our Soviet colleagues with regard to this, having in mind these extraneous pressures to which I have referred, this longing throughout the whole world to find some break-through. Really I think it is up to the Soviet Union to respond. We in the West will look at any proposal they make in this respect with care and with sympathy. All we ask is that they move away from this wholly negative position which they adopted almost a year ago here in Geneva.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I hope the Soviet representative will feel that it is worth seeing what can be done in his own Government and seeing if it cannot find some way of responding to what is, I assure Mr. Tsarapkin, a genuine appeal; because the issues here are so great, the opportunities are great now, but maybe they will not be so for very long. We have a real opportunity now, and I believe that if our Soviet colleagues would respond with some move towards us, for a change -- and I think we are about due for a change in that respect -- they would find us very ready and very sympathetic in our response.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): All of us here know that the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, went to Washington in order to elaborate the United States' position on the question of the cessation of tests and to prepare for the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, taking into account the wishes and demands of the peoples reflected in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Mr. Godber was also absent for more than two months. He went to London where he evidently consulted his Government. He also headed the United Kingdom delegation at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. He confessed here that, as he put it, he could not fail to be impressed by the pressure, the deep desire for an agreement on the question of the cessation of tests and the insistent demand which was apparent in all the statements made in the General Assembly that an end should be put to all nuclear weapons tests. Nevertheless, his subsequent statement showed that, although he had been greatly impressed, it was a superficial impression; it did not penetrate deeply into his consciousness, whereas the policy of the United Kingdom Government is still the same as before. Of course, we were entitled to expect that both Mr. Stelle and Mr. Godber would come here with some new proposals which would really help us to break the deadlock in our negotiations and to carry out the instructions given to us by the General Assembly to submit by 10 December our report on a positive solution to the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. But from what has been said today both by the representative of the United States and by the representative of the United Kingdom we see that the situation remains as it was before. From both of them we heard the same four-year-old refrain: obligatory on-site inspection; automatic seismic stations or "black boxes", as the Western press calls them, do not eliminate the need for inspection, and so on.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In a word, the picture is clear. The situation which existed in our conference before Mr. Godber's departure for London and New York and Mr. Stelle's departure for Washington is still the same now that they have returned from those cities. And it is certainly rather strange to hear from their lips appeals to the Soviet Union to change its position and introduce something new.

We have introduced something new. We have accepted the compromise proposals of the non-aligned countries. Unfortunately those compromise proposals cannot be implemented owing to the position of the Western Powers who continue to demand on-site inspection. That is the whole trouble.

To sum up, we are compelled to note with great regret and disappointment that our negotiations have not received the new impetus which we expected to be given them by the statements of the United States and the United Kingdom representatives who have just returned from the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and from Washington.

What more can we say? We do not think that this is the last word of the United States and United Kingdom representatives. Perhaps this is merely their first statement. Perhaps they have not yet collected all their thoughts or looked through all their papers; or perhaps they have not yet prepared their main statements. We can wait. I do not think that the United States and the United Kingdom can turn a deaf ear to the demands of millions of people throughout the world, to the demands of every state in the world, of every government, that nuclear weapon tests should cease.

We are compelled, however, to note once again and with great regret that our negotiations remain at the same point as before without any prospect of moving forward on account of the position of the Western Powers, which has been stated today by the representative of the United States and by the representative of the United Kingdom.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If no other representative wishes to speak I should like, in my capacity as representative of the United States, merely to say that I associate my delegation completely with what has been said by the representative of the United Kingdom.

(The Chairman, United States)

We do sincerely believe that there is a real opportunity now for an agreement. We do sincerely believe that there is tremendous pressure for an agreement. We do sincerely believe that it is up to the Soviet Union to make some move towards an agreement; and any move made by the Soviet Union will be carefully and sympathetically considered by the United States.

If no other representative wishes to speak, shall we set the date for our next meeting? I understand that there is agreement that we might set Tuesday, 27 November as the date for the next meeting. Since the plenary Committee is reconvening on 26 November, we might want to leave it open to the incoming Chairman, in consultation with his colleagues, to adjust that date if the circumstances seem to make such adjustment desirable.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.