

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 14 September 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.C. STEELE (United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. T. PICKERING
Mr. L. WEILER

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. A.N. SHEVCHENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. P. SMITHERS
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

Secretariat:

Mr. H. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the twenty-sixth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

I think my colleagues would like me, as Chairman, to thank Mr. Cornil and the Secretariat for their cheerful co-operation in extending their services to us as we meet during a recess of the full Conference.

As Chairman, also, I should like to welcome to our negotiations the new representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Smithers, and to take the unprecedented opportunity of welcoming the return to these negotiations, after his first absence from them in over four years, of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin.

And now I have a statement to make in my capacity as representative of the United States. We begin today the first of our meetings during the recess of the plenary Conference. These meetings were first proposed by my delegation as a logical extension of President Kennedy's response to the Mexican proposal that we try to reach agreement on a cut-off date for testing.

As representatives will all recall, the Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, on 29 August 1962, (ENDC/PV.76, p. 23) indicated that the Soviet Government would be agreeable to a termination of testing on 1 January 1963. President Kennedy in his news conference that same day indicated his acceptance of that idea, when he said:

"The world will welcome an agreement that a way should be found to stop all nuclear testing at the end of this year."

Mr. Dean then, with the support of the representative of the United Kingdom, made the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom to continue the meetings of this Sub-Committee during the recess. The proposal was made in the following terms, and I should like to quote them at the outset of this meeting so that there should be no misunderstanding of my delegation's position on our negotiations. Mr. Dean said at our seventy-seventh meeting:

"Therefore, the nuclear Powers at the Conference must work even harder than they have worked up to now in order to meet this cut-off date.

We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will give us an indication that it is prepared to negotiate on the basis of our two treaty proposals and to reach agreement as soon as possible.

(The Chairman, United States)

In order to meet the cut-off date my Government, after consultation with the United Kingdom, formally proposes to the Conference that our Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should continue to meet during the recess period." (ENDC/PV.77, p. 38)

This was, of course, a proposal put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom without any conditions as to acceptance, except that we continue to meet in the Sub-Committee as we did during the period of time when plenaries were meeting and that we do our utmost to reach speedy agreement on a test ban. Mr. Dean clarified the thinking of the United States delegation on this subject when he said, at the time of the Soviet acceptance of the proposal, at the eighty-first meeting on 5 September 1962:

"As I understand it now, the Soviet representative feels that he should be free to advance anything that he pleases in discussions in the Sub-Committee and in our continued negotiations during the recess.

I quite agree. So from our discussion I take it that we are agreed that the Sub-Committee should continue to meet -- I hope, here in Geneva -- with each delegation completely free to negotiate on whatever basis it believes will be fruitful." (ENDC/PV.31, p. 35)

It is clear therefore that we are here with no preconceived agreed ideas of the actual direction which these negotiations might take in order to reach agreement. It is my delegation's view that, since it is we who have proposed continuing negotiations, it is incumbent upon us to set the course for the next period of negotiations; or, if that is not possible, at least to see us out of the harbour safely.

In clearing the harbour there is, in my delegation's view, little utility in not recognizing the rocks and shoals which lie in our course. We would not be honest with ourselves or with our negotiating partners if we did not point these out. In fact, one of the major efforts of this period of intensive negotiations ought to be to face these issues boldly and straightforwardly. My delegation believes that we can all agree that the main area of concern to us in these negotiations is the question of underground tests and the proper control or verification of their cessation.

(The Chairman, United States)

The control of underground tests is a subject on which a good many of those million-plus words and those seven hundred speeches, to which Mr. Kuznetsov recently referred in plenary session, have been expended. These tests have been the central question of our negotiations. It is within this problem that we find our main area of current disagreement. And in one sense our area of disagreement is somewhat narrower than the whole question of verification of underground tests.

We all recognize that there are three cardinal questions connected with the effective verification of underground tests. These particular problem areas are clearly stated in the eight nation memorandum (ENDC/20) and are inherent in the negotiations prior to the submission of that document. We refer of course to the system of detection stations to pick up the signals from underground events; the international scientific commission, whose duty it is to analyze and reach some conclusion about those events; and finally the question of the necessary on-site inspection by which the commission can make the final determination of the nature of any event.

As is clear to all, my delegation believes that there are probably only a few, if any, major differences in principle between us regarding the question of the network of detection stations and the international scientific commission. We have made proposals concerning these questions in our draft comprehensive test ban treaty (ENDC/58). These proposals take into account the eight nation memorandum and they take into account past positions on these questions put forward by the Soviet Union at this Conference and elsewhere. In essence we are not, apparently, far apart on these issues.

There is, however, one question on which we still appear to be apart. This is, of course, the problem of obligatory on-site inspections to assure the positive identification of seismic events which can be detected by distant instrumentation, but which remain unidentified.

It is on this question that we have run into such firm opposition from the Soviet Union and its delegation -- firm opposition to positions advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom, and indeed to positions which only a very short time ago were advanced by the Soviet delegation itself.

The Soviet Union's statements on the question of obligatory on-site inspection and its opposition to it are in effect a kind of two-step opposition -- a sort of defence in depth. The Soviet Union first has told us with respect to on-site

(The Chairman, United States)

inspection that Soviet science and Soviet scientists can detect all underground nuclear events. It has then gone on to imply very strongly that they can also identify all, or practically all, of the events which they can detect.

The second step in this kind of "backward two-step" of Soviet opposition to on-site inspection has been built on Soviet allegations of espionage or intelligence gathering by the West.

In this case the Soviet delegation has said that even if there needed to be, and were, on-site inspections, the West would exploit those inspections for purposes of espionage. The point of view of the Soviet delegation therefore appears to be that its scientists are correct and that ours in the West are wrong. But, the Soviet Union continues, even if the Western scientists are right, the West primarily desires inspections for the purpose of discovering military secrets in the Soviet Union.

Since both these problems -- that is to say ~~the~~ basic scientific need for on-site inspection and the question of espionage -- seem to be of some real concern to the Soviet Union, my delegation believes that they should be discussed in this Sub-Committee frankly and in detail in the hope that we can get our negotiations moving more quickly in this area where disagreement rather than accord now prevails.

First is the problem of the scientific need for on-site inspections. This is a question which has been discussed in the Conference many times and in great detail. At this point, however, my delegation believes there are certain points which we could profitably cover again to make our position clear to the Soviet delegation.

To begin with, we all know that a certain number of underground events will be detected every year by a system of detection stations. These events will include of course a number of earthquakes and also, if the explosions are sufficiently large, a number of underground nuclear explosions. If we are to sign an effective test ban treaty, there will, of course, be no nuclear explosions. But if the treaty ban is to be effective we must have some assurance that the treaty will operate to deter any State which might undertake clandestine nuclear explosions. The only reliable and effective deterrent we have been able to discover thus far is to make positive identification of any nuclear explosion underground a likely occurrence.

(The Chairman, United States)

However, it is here that we run into the question of distinguishing all the earthquakes from underground nuclear weapon tests. I think that both sides are agreed that we can, through distant instrumentation, detect a certain number of such underground events. We differ of course as to the number. Soviet scientists indicate that all such events will be detected, but "all" is a categorically large group of events, and we believe that, on the basis of our scientific advice, that above a certain threshold of seismic magnitude most, but not all, events will be detected.

But once we detect this number of events -- all events, as the Soviet representative say, or a certain number, as our scientists say -- we differ markedly as to how to identify the true nature of the origin of the detected events. At present there is nothing in the seismic signals received by stations to demonstrate specifically and positively that the detonation is of nuclear origin. A certain number of earthquakes may, however, be identified, and the criteria for this identification are included in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) in article VIII, which deals with on-site inspection. In this case only a very few events will be identified as earthquakes -- for example, events whose depth of focus is below sixty kilometres, or very large events in the deep ocean.

Some have questioned the United States statements on this subject by pointing to the announcements of the United States detection of the French tests in the Sahara in early May and to the detection of the Soviet underground tests in Central Siberia on 2 February last. However, I should point out that both of those tests took place in aseismic areas and in known atomic testing grounds. They were not identified by seismic instruments, but rather their location coupled with the very large size of the events -- between forty to fifty kilotons in each case -- made the probability of their being nuclear events so high that there was no surprise when the United States announcement of the tests was later confirmed.

Recent scientific findings by United States scientists have not altered our basic belief concerning the difficulties of identification of nuclear weapon tests with distant instrumentation. These findings have indicated that there will probably be somewhat fewer earthquakes corresponding in magnitude to an explosion of a given yield occurring each year in the Soviet Union than hitherto there were

(The Chairman, United States)

believed to be. In addition, we have improved our ability to detect nuclear weapon tests. With this improved detection capability we will of course have detected a considerably larger number of events which will have to be identified. The question with respect to these additional events discovered as both detection and identification increase is what degree of risk a State is willing to undertake with respect to these events which, although detected, cannot be identified.

The United States believes that it can accept the capability represented by the system to detect underground nuclear events outlined in the United States and United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58). However, the United States believes that there must be some positive means of identification of events detected by that system. Our scientists have indicated that they believe that the only way the events detected by the network of observation posts can eventually be identified is through on-site inspection. The Soviet representatives appear to differ with us on the need to conduct inspections to establish the true nature of the origin of any event. Up to this point, however, we have not seen or heard any evidence upon which the Soviet representatives have based their findings. Much as we should like to believe what the Soviet Union has told us, we can only assume, in the absence of such evidence, that our own present assessment is true.

This being the case, the United States has carefully weighed the risks to its national security of a test ban treaty and it believes that any treaty must include that amount of international inspection which is necessary to give assurance that a treaty is not being violated. It is our belief that the proposal espoused by the Soviet Union, both scientifically and after a careful balancing of the risks on the basis of that scientific knowledge, does not provide the necessary degree of assurance; nor does it act as an effective deterrent against a State which might wish to undertake clandestine tests.

My delegation would now like to turn to the second series of Soviet objections to the obligation to facilitate on-site inspection. As we have pointed out earlier, the Soviet Union has stated that the West desires on-site inspection in Soviet territory for espionage purposes. But let us look at this assertion in some detail.

The Soviet Union, both in the test ban Sub-Committee and in the plenary meetings of the Eighteen Nation Committee, has charged that the West seeks military data on the Soviet Union, and in particular target information. Let us see if

(The Chairman, United States)

inspection under the test ban would actually provide the type of information which the Soviet Union charges that the United States is seeking. Target intelligence would require a vast amount of information about the precise location of the other side's offensive nuclear strike capability, including the precise locations of each of its offensive missiles and bombers. Such intelligence requires precise location of each of these main targets.

But to use a nuclear test ban system of on-site inspection to gather such information would appear to my delegation to be the worst sort of way to approach the problem. Indeed, the chief of any intelligence organization who did so would not remain long in his job. To begin with, there would be very few inspections on Soviet territory each year. There would be none at all under the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty if there were no events eligible for on-site inspection, while as a maximum there would be fewer than the twelve to twenty proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom in May 1961.

Each area to be inspected would depend upon the occurrence of some natural event; that is, of course, if no underground nuclear tests were conducted. The natural events, of course, would occur at random places and in any case roughly all of those natural events would occur in the approximately 15 per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union which is seismic. This means that 85 per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union would be so rarely inspected that it would not, indeed could not, present a national security danger for the Soviet Union.

The areas which would in comparative terms be subject to a somewhat larger number of inspections lie around the periphery of the Soviet Union in rather remote and under-developed regions in which there could be little or no national security danger to the Soviet Union and little target information of value.

In addition, no inspections would be undertaken unless an event had been located according to agreed criteria, and while we have not calculated the mathematical probabilities of an earthquake occurring close to a military installation in the seismic areas of either the United States or the Soviet Union, it seems to us that the chances would be mathematically very small indeed. Furthermore, the area to be inspected around the epicentre as located by an objective international commission and staff would be extremely small. Hitherto, as Mr. Tsarapkin knows well, we have proposed that the area subject to inspection

(The Chairman, United States)

should be between 200 square kilometres and 500 square kilometres, depending upon the location of the detection instruments picking up the signal from the event in question. Now we are proposing a number of square kilometres which, because of our present reliance on national stations which would probably be placed further apart than the network proposed in the 18 April 1961 draft treaty (ENDC/9), will probably be somewhat larger than our former proposal for 200 square kilometres and somewhat smaller than 500 square kilometres.

The United States and the United Kingdom have also in the past been and are now willing to explore with the Soviet Union the means by which a team would proceed to the inspection area and carry out its inspection in the most efficient and unobtrusive possible manner. We have indicated our concern in numerous ways, and in particular have proposed that teams be organized and transported in a way designed to eliminate any possibility of espionage. We have pointed out that we would be willing, on Soviet territory, to permit the teams of inspectors to be taken to the inspection site in Soviet aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots, over Soviet designated flight routes. We have also indicated that we would be willing to undertake any reasonable arrangements to restrict the work of an inspection team to the designated inspection area. We have also offered to permit a number of Soviet observers to accompany and watch over the work of an inspection team to ensure that the team did not undertake activities which would be prejudicial to Soviet security.

My delegation believes that we have made all possible, reasonable and forthcoming proposals concerning the modalities of the conduct of on-site inspection in Soviet territory. However, if there is something which we have overlooked and which the Soviet Union believes to be important, we would be happy to consider it with the Soviet Union in the hope of being able to work out a mutually agreeable arrangement on obligatory on-site inspection.

Another area of concern in which the United States and the United Kingdom have attempted to meet Soviet fears of espionage is the question of the composition of the teams designated to conduct an on-site inspection. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, has engaged in the past in long negotiations with us over the staffing of on-site inspection teams. Mr. Tsarapkin will recall that the United States and the United Kingdom originally provided that teams in the Soviet Union should be made up of nationals of the United States and

(The Chairman, United States)

United Kingdom, and that teams in the United States and the United Kingdom should be composed of Soviet nationals. He will also recall that the United States and the United Kingdom, in an effort to provide for as impartial a staff of inspectors as possible, proposed the inclusion of a certain number, albeit a limited number at that time, of nationals of States not allied with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in teams inspecting territories of those States.

Mr. Tsarapkin will also recognize, we believe, that the United States and the United Kingdom have now come a long way towards meeting the Soviet Union on this issue in our new proposal in our new draft comprehensive treaty for the staffing of on-site inspection teams. In our new draft treaty it is now clear that only one prohibition exists with regard to teams inspecting the territory of any State - a prohibition which precludes the membership on the team of nationals of the State being inspected. This far-reaching change now means that there is no requirement for United States and United Kingdom nationals in inspections conducted in the territory of the Soviet Union. We would hope that qualified United States and United Kingdom nationals would be appointed to such teams, but as I noted before, there is no mandatory requirement that such appointments be made.

In sum, therefore, it seems that the use of truly international and objective on-site inspection teams should go far towards assuring the Soviet Union that these teams will not be used in a manner detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union. To charge, as the Soviet Union has done in past meetings, that on-site inspection constitutes a danger to Soviet national security even before on-site teams have been constituted, seems to my delegation a most unhelpful way to proceed. Certainly, the international inspectors will have no other duty but their duty to the commission to determine the origin of any particular seismic event. Our draft treaty carefully spells out that the international civil servants of the commission are not to receive instructions from any government, and governments also undertake not to try to influence the international inspectors in the carrying out of their duties. To charge that these same inspectors would be agents of the NATO Powers for the collection of intelligence is clearly, I submit, irresponsible.

Therefore, what my delegation, with the support of the United Kingdom delegation, has proposed with regard to Soviet charges that on-site inspection would be used as a means of espionage, is a series of carefully circumscribed measures for carrying out inspection.

(The Chairman, United States)

Inspection, no matter how carried out, would not provide the type of data which is required for military or target intelligence. In addition we have made it clear that we honestly seek in all possible ways to organize the international commission's inspection teams and to set forth their procedure of work in a manner best calculated to prevent the acquisition of information detrimental to any State's national security during the conduct of an on-site inspection.

Again, if these safeguards are not sufficient to assure the Soviet Union that inspections will not be used for espionage, then we must ask the Soviet Union to spell out more clearly the areas in which it believes inspection teams might work against its best interests. We would be happy to consider objectively and reasonably any conditions which the Soviet Government may wish to spell out. It is my Government's earnest wish that we reach agreement on a test ban as soon as possible. If there are areas in which the Soviet Union has doubts or requires further clarification, we would hope that the Soviet Union would be forthcoming so that we may give those areas our closest attention and study.

In conclusion, my delegation believes it should be clear to all that the Soviet Union has not made a convincing case with its argument that Soviet science provides the answer to the identification problem. The only way this case can be made convincing, both to us and to all members of this Conference, is for us to examine in detail the evidence upon which the Soviet Union bases its statements that all tests can be detected and presumably identified. The United States has presented its evidence to the members of this Conference. It stands ready to amplify this evidence at any time. If the Soviet Union were to do the same, it might mean that we could begin to make progress on the question of a nuclear test ban.

With regard to the charges that on-site inspection could be a vehicle for espionage, my delegation believes we have done all we possibly can do to assure the Soviet Union that we are willing to do all we reasonably can to minimize any danger to Soviet security that might be brought about by on-site inspection. We have proposed a number of steps, yet none of these proposals, to the knowledge of my delegation has yet been commented upon by the Soviet delegation. Indeed, these proposals have merely been greeted by a repetition of the Soviet charges that the West desires espionage or intelligence information about the Soviet Union. The more we have tried to meet the Soviet point of view on this question, the louder the Soviet Union has repeated its allegations about espionage.

(The Chairman, United States)

After a careful analysis of both of these Soviet objections to the United States-United Kingdom proposals, I am led to believe that it is not these questions but some other problem which prevents the Soviet Union from accepting the fair and equitable United States-United Kingdom draft treaty -- or at least prevent it as yet from opening meaningful negotiations. It may well be, therefore, that there is some political problem or question which prevents the Soviet Union from accepting an effective test ban treaty.

Of course, one conclusion might be that the Soviet Union desires to continue with nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere for whatever military advantage the Soviet Union believes it can derive from such tests. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the Soviet Union interrupted its unilateral undertaking not to test over a year ago and has since been testing intensively in the atmosphere. The fact that the Soviet Union wishes to continue its tests in the atmosphere is also substantiated by the Soviet refusal up to now to accept the Western proposal for a partial ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Certainly, self-assurance about the scientific basis for the adequate verification of all tests or some insecurity about espionage cannot, as my delegation has just pointed out, be a major cause for the Soviet refusal as yet to accept an effective test ban.

Perhaps the precedential nature of the acceptance of on-site inspection is disturbing to the Soviet Union. But here again the principle that the nature and extent of inspection or control should be sufficient to ensure adequate observance of disarmament obligations is clearly set forth in the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) in principle six which the Soviet Union has accepted. My Government firmly believes that the consequences of the small quota of obligatory on-site inspections in the Soviet Union cannot be worse than the continuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This is particularly true when the very principle of inspection has apparently been accepted by the Soviet Union in the joint statement. It cannot therefore be true, as has sometimes been implied, that the Soviet Union wishes to avoid establishing the precedent of inspection in connexion with an agreement such as the test ban.

Unfortunately, therefore, the only conclusion my delegation is able to reach at the present moment is that the Soviet Union simply desires to continue tests, or, for some other reason which it is not prepared to make known to us, refuses to accept the necessary inspections to guarantee an effective test ban.

(The Chairman, United States)

In doing so the Soviet Union takes on its shoulders the heavy consequences of blocking a test ban treaty. If it were not for this attitude of the Soviet Union we could reach agreement today on a measure to ban tests in those environments upon which we are agreed there is no need for additional controls. We might also in the very near future, given the good will on the Soviet side which, unfortunately, has not as yet appeared, reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

However, if the Soviet Union continues to thwart progress on any sort of a test ban agreement which provides for effective controls, it will also thereby be blocking progress on general and complete disarmament. Many delegations at this Conference have recognized that a test ban, for a number of reasons, has come to be considered the first step on the road to general and complete disarmament. Whether we agree with this analysis or not and whether we accept it or not is immaterial, since for a large portion of the world this has become an accepted way of thinking. To continue to block the efforts to achieve a test ban therefore does much to set back the world's hopes for disarmament.

My delegation earnestly hopes that Soviet acceptance of the United States-United Kingdom proposal to continue our negotiations during the recess with a view to reaching early agreement on a test ban, in time to meet the agreed cut-off date of 1 January 1963, may be the prelude to progress on the part of the Soviet Union.

My delegation very much hopes that the Soviet representative will have something to tell us today about the question of on-site inspection or any other stumbling blocks on our path to an effective test ban. I believe I can speak for both Western delegations in stating that we both look forward with much interest to what Mr. Tsarapkin is going to say to us today, in the hope that there will be at least some small sign of movement. If this is the case, then we can speedily get down to the work which we are here to do.

That is all I have to say at this time as representative of the United States.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for your kind welcome to this Committee.

My colleagues in the Committee, who have had so much experience of nuclear test negotiations, will understand the thoughts which pass through my mind as I take part in these discussions today for the first time. The hopes of ordinary men and women

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

throughout the world are certainly fixed upon us. For them, the testing of nuclear devices is symbolical of mankind's difficulties in the struggle to manage its affairs wisely and for the common good. How happy men and women throughout the world would be if we in this room were able to agree on behalf of our Governments to call a halt to the testing of weapons of nuclear destruction, and thus to open the way to co-operation in the development of nuclear science and technology for the peaceful purposes of mankind. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to seek such a result. We know it to be the wish of the whole British people and we know it to be in the interest of ordinary men and women everywhere. Such an agreement would be symbolical of a real desire by the major Powers to reconcile their differences and to begin that era of co-operation for the common good to which mankind has looked forward for so long, and which is certainly within our reach.

But, if these are the desires of mankind, it is equally certain that they view with disappointment and dismay our failure here to bring them to fruition. Certainly that disappointment is acutely felt by Her Majesty's Government and by the British people as a whole. But if our prolonged and patient efforts to find the means of agreement have so far not succeeded, we in Britain are resolute in refusing to accept that agreement is impossible. We refuse to despair. On the contrary, as we consider the very narrowness of the issues which divide the Soviet Union and the Western Powers and the breadth of common interest which should unite them, we are convinced that agreement is possible provided that the will to reach agreement exists on both sides.

Furthermore, as we look at the disturbed state of the world around us and consider the very rapid growth of science and technology, we believe that the reaching of agreement about a cessation of nuclear tests is a matter not only of the utmost importance, but also of urgency. Every day that passes tends to make the problem wider and more complex and therefore more dangerous and more difficult of solution. For this reason, we desire to see an effective test ban in operation by 1 January 1963. Not only do we desire this and think it to be in the interests of the whole of mankind; we also believe the conclusion of such an agreement to be perfectly within our reach by the time specified, provided that the will to agree exists upon both sides.

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

With those thoughts in mind, and remembering how quickly the weeks and months are slipping by, the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government proposed that we in this Committee should continue to search for agreement in a further series of meetings, instead of going into recess with the Disarmament Conference. With this purpose in mind, I am sent here by my Government, while my friend and colleague, Mr. Godber, is in New York at the United Nations General Assembly, for no other purpose but to work with my United States and Soviet colleagues in search of agreement.

It is at least some comfort in what has hitherto been a bleak and rather unrewarding negotiation that our Soviet colleagues have agreed to continue the talks. Mr. Tsarapkin has come specially from Moscow in response to this Anglo-American initiative. I notice that my Daily Telegraph this morning warns me about Mr. Tsarapkin.

"For Mr. Smithers this will be a testing experience in more senses than one. The redoubtable Tsarapkin, after a spell in Moscow, is again heading the Russian delegation.

"This wily and forceful debater has complete mastery of the infinitely complex background to the test-ban question."

After this rather alarming warning, however, The Daily Telegraph goes on to assure me that

"Mr. Stelle undoubtedly has qualities to match Mr. Tsarapkin.

He and Mr. Smithers should make an effective team."

Well, I hope it may be so. But more fortunately still, from my services as a delegate at the United Nations, I remember Mr. Tsarapkin very well not merely as a wily and forceful debater but as a friendly and charming personality.

Let his distinguished predecessors, with whom my delegation has always had a pleasant personal relationship, seem to have been bound by instructions from their Government to seize upon every point of difficulty only for the purpose of magnifying it and of declaring it to be insoluble. I venture to express the hope that Mr. Tsarapkin has not come all the way from Moscow to Geneva only to display the same attitude.

My Government recognizes the existence of the difficulties. But it seems to discuss them with the Soviet Union not in order to show how great those difficulties are but, on the contrary, to see whether, by detailed examination and negotiation,

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

we can find the means to remove them and thus to reach agreement. For this purpose, as Mr. Stelle has already said this afternoon, we have already made numerous and important concessions to meet the Soviet Union's point of view. These were enumerated in Mr. Godber's speech to the full Conference as lately as 5 September. Perhaps Mr. Tsarapkin has been able to find time to look at that speech. If he has done so, he can be left in no doubt at all as to the view of my Government.

We believe that these are strictly practical problems bearing directly upon the well-being of mankind. They are only soluble by strictly practical and detailed measures. Agreements in principle are valuable so far as they go. They are a beginning. We are agreed in principle upon the general lines of the eight-Power memorandum. But the authors of that document were themselves the first to recognize, as Her Majesty's Government does, that broad generalizations will not provide a solution to these problems. From acceptance of the principles of the memorandum, they and we recognize, we must proceed to work out detailed heads of agreement; and from these details of agreement practical acts must follow. In other words, as Mr. Stelle has already made clear, we from the West have come here to negotiate, as the eight Powers expect and desire us to do. To enable detailed discussion to take place we have put forward proposals based upon the agreed principles of the memorandum. This is the purpose of our two draft treaties. They are intended as a start to serious negotiations. So much of the contents of our drafts has been agreed in previous negotiations with the Soviet Union that the area of disagreement, one would imagine, should be relatively small, though it may be very important.

It is the desire of Her Majesty's Government to reduce the difficulties to the smallest number and to narrow them to proportions which are such that we can reach agreement. The world is full of troublesome and dangerous problems of one kind or another. But, if we are to make progress in these talks, we must concentrate our attention upon the immediate practical difficulties which we for our part wish to solve.

From a study of the record of the negotiations, I notice that Mr. Tsarapkin's predecessors here have frequently dragged into the discussion all kinds of acrimonious matters which arise between East and West in quite other spheres. Now I appreciate, and it is important to remember, that in these days **all** problems in the world are

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

directly or indirectly related to one another in some degree. But it often seems to be the Soviet attitude that unless we can solve all our problems we shall solve none. We shall never make any progress that way. I am sure that it will serve no useful purpose to bring into this strictly practical negotiation, upon a strictly limited but exceedingly important matter, all sorts of polemical complaints about other matters. If I were to try, I could think up and expatiate upon all sorts of complaints against the Soviet Union about other matters, and could relate them to this debate. But I am sure that that would serve no useful purpose. Quite the contrary, and I do not propose to do it. I hope Mr. Tsarapkin shares this view and attitude.

Let us then begin, not by declaring all the matters upon which we disagree, but, first of all, by emphasizing those on which we are agreed. Surely thus far the Soviet Government should be able to go. Let us then take the remaining matters and, one by one, examine them in detail to see whether there is any way of narrowing the differences between us. This surely is the minimum amount of co-operation necessary if any negotiation is to take place, and it is certainly the least that the people of the world expect of us.

The existence of such a negotiation, of course, presupposes that somebody has produced at least a tentative draft, carrying the general principles of the eight-Power memorandum forward into some detailed and practical suggestions. This is what the Western Powers have tried to do in their draft treaties.

So far the Soviet Union has refused to negotiate on these practical details which simply have to be settled if we are to agree; it has refused even to consider our attempt to translate the eight-Power memorandum into practical terms in a draft treaty, in spite of the fact that it has so far made no proposals of its own. So extreme is the Soviet Union's attitude that it has not merely refused to say how much of our own drafts is acceptable, but, contrary to its usual practice of enlarging upon the difficulties which prevent it from agreeing with us, it will not even say in detail which parts of our drafts are not acceptable to it and what alterations it would expect from us to make them acceptable.

The plain fact is that the Soviet Union claims that it needs to maintain a degree of secrecy with regard to its internal affairs which the other negotiating Powers have never aspired to and do not now ask for. If the Soviet Union was willing to

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accept the measures of inspection and verification which are perfectly acceptable to the Western Powers, measures which we have proposed and which we stand willing to implement fully in our countries, then we would already, it seems, have been able to agree to halt nuclear testing in the present negotiations. It is this insistence by the Soviet Union upon a degree of secrecy which the great majority of States do not need or desire, it is this alone, which has deprived the peoples of the world of an agreement to cease nuclear testing. If the Soviet Union must choose between on the one hand, abandoning even a fraction of the secrecy with which it surrounds its affairs, or, on the other hand, the failure of these negotiations, it has up to now made it clear that it will choose the latter.

But although the Western Powers might simply have refused to make any concession to this unreasonable demand for a specially privileged position on the part of the Soviet Union, that has not in fact been our attitude. On the contrary, as Mr. Stelle has made clear today, we have been indefatigable in our search to find ways of meeting the Soviet demands, unreasonable though those demands may be, so that the Soviet Union may be willing to reach agreement with us. That is a main purpose of my presence here today.

I think it would not be unfair to say that an impartial observer, considering the many important concessions made by the West to meet the Soviet point of view, considering the Soviet Union's refusal to make any concession whatever but rather its withdrawal to a more extreme position than that it occupied only a year ago, considering the Soviet Union's insistence upon maintaining a degree of internal secrecy in its country which none of the other nuclear Powers finds necessary, considering that the Soviet Union appears to attach more importance to maintaining that secrecy than to an agreement to ban nuclear tests, and considering the stubborn refusal of the Soviet Union to enter into any detailed discussion of the problem --- that is to say, to negotiate about it --- I think such an impartial observer could be excused if he concluded that it is the desire of the Soviet Government to avoid coming to an agreement to halt these tests. Certainly that is a view which is becoming more and more widespread in the world at large and particularly amongst neutral opinion.

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Let me assure Mr. Tsarapkin that this sorry situation is no source of satisfaction to the United Kingdom Government and people but, on the contrary, one of profound regret and apprehension for the consequences. It is our hope that he has come from Moscow with new instructions -- with instructions to negotiate upon practical details and with instructions to work for agreement. Her Majesty's Government wishes to conclude an agreement or agreements which will bring all nuclear testing to a halt. All our peoples expect no less of us. We wish to reach such agreements in time for them to operate on 1 January 1963. Mr. Tsarapkin's predecessors here in Geneva have had instructions, it appears, to speak the words which have carried despair to the peoples of the world. My Government hopes that Mr. Tsarapkin comes here empowered to join with us in speaking the words of hope which the peoples of the world long to hear -- empowered, that is to say, to negotiate for the purpose of reaching agreement.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to associate myself with what you have said in regard to our new colleague, Mr. Smithers, as the representative of the United Kingdom in our Sub-Committee, and to express the hope that his presence will perhaps be accompanied with more favourable prospects for the work of our Sub-Committee than has been the case in the past.

Secondly, I should like to express my thanks to Mr. Stelle and also to Mr. Smithers for the words of welcome which they addressed to me in connexion with my reappearance here after a certain interval.

Now I should like to turn to more important matters, that is, to the substance of the negotiations which we are conducting here.

I have listened attentively to what the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have had to say at today's meeting. Once again they have made international control the subject of their statements. Both of them have tried to prove the necessity of obligatory international inspection. We can only express our regret at this stubborn desire of our Western colleagues to install an international system of control on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Now I should like to give a brief description of the present stage of our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have entered a new stage. This stage began when on 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union

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put forward a proposal (ENDC/11) envisaging that control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be carried out, not by an international system but by means of national systems of detecting nuclear explosions. The Soviet Government has repeatedly explained to the Western Powers with thoroughness and great patience the reasons which require a new approach to the solution of the problem of the cessation of tests, if we really want to solve this problem and not have never-ending fruitless disputes and bickerings. The incessant intensification of the arms race and the military preparations of the Western Powers, which is characteristic of the present time, precludes any possibility of concluding a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests based on the establishment of international control and obligatory international inspection. In the circumstances where there is no agreement on disarmament and the military preparations of the Western Powers are being increasingly intensified, any international control, any international inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union could be easily used by the Western Powers for the purposes of intelligence work and espionage. That is something the Soviet Union cannot tolerate. For this reason the joint proposal of the United States and United Kingdom of 27 August (ENDC/58), which provides for the establishment of international control and obligatory inspection, cannot serve as a basis for further negotiations, nor can it serve as a basis for agreement. We should like to express the hope that the Western Powers will finally take this fact into account and will in the future not divert the attention of the Sub-Committee to useless disputes concerning these unacceptable proposals.

However, the absence at the present time of the possibility of reaching agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the establishment of international control does not at all mean that there are no other possibilities of reaching agreement on this important question with due regard to the difficulties existing at the present time. It is possible for us to reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests on the basis of control over compliance with such an agreement through the use of existing national systems of detecting nuclear explosions. This was the new approach proposed by the Soviet Union on 28 November 1961. This new approach has also been recognized as a basis for agreement by all the non-aligned States, and they have stated this in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). The possibility of reaching agreement on the basis of such a new approach is also recognized by the Western Powers themselves, who have already

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agreed officially to come to an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests with the use of national systems of control, that is to say, without international control and without international inspection. The trouble, however, is that here again the Western Powers show the inconsistency peculiar to them and refuse to extend such an agreement to underground nuclear weapon tests as well. In other words, instead of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, that is the prohibition of all tests in any environment -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground -- the Western Powers propose that we limit ourselves to a partial agreement. This means that the United States wishes to keep its hands free to continue nuclear weapon tests.

We should like to stress that in this matter there can be no half-way solutions. Palliatives would never achieve our aim. An agreement to stop nuclear weapon tests, as all of us realize, is intended to serve as a dam, blocking the way to the further improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons or the creation of new models of such weapons, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and slackening the race in the field of nuclear weapons. It is a well-known truth that the body of a dam must be solid, equally durable over the whole of its surface in order to stand up to the impact of the forces pressing against it. A single weak spot, not to mention a crack, in the body of the dam would be enough for the whole dam to collapse. Exactly the same applies to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; it must be comprehensive, since any exception from it would have the same disastrous and catastrophic consequences as a crack in a dam. Such a partial agreement would not last long, "it would have ... a very short life" (ENDC/PV.73, p.6), as the representative of Burma very aptly stated at the plenary meeting on 3 September. At that meeting the representative of Burma warned the Committee that:

"... a partial test ban treaty which came to grief could easily do more harm than not having a partial test ban treaty at all".

(ibid., p.7)

There is yet another aspect to the question. The United States representative, Mr. Dean, speaking at the seventy-fifth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on 27 August, 1962, said the following:

"The United States believes that a workable comprehensive test ban treaty is urgently needed" (ENDC/PV.75, p.5).

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Mr. Dean went on to say (ibid., p.11) that such a treaty could serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. If that is really the concern of the United States, then its proposal for a partial agreement is directly contrary to, and utterly incompatible with, such a concern. One has only to take a peep into the future to see how it would evolve in the conditions where the United States would continue to improve its nuclear weapons, to realize that the partial agreement proposed by the United States would be illusory. It would not be of any importance as a means of restraining the nuclear arms race and preventing the further spread of this frightful weapon of mass destruction in the world. One does not have to be a highly experienced and far-sighted diplomat or statesman to foresee such a development of events, where other States, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, seeing that after the conclusion of a partial agreement the United States was continuing its weapon tests, would consider themselves entitled to engage in the same sort of testing. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should realize that in this case the question of the environment in which the United States would go on testing new models of its nuclear weapons after the conclusion of an agreement -- whether underground or not -- would have no significance of principle for other States. What would be of significance for other States would be first and foremost the fact that the United States would continue to improve its existing models and to create new types of nuclear weapons. This fact alone would give other States a good reason to consider themselves free to carry out their own nuclear weapon tests in any environment which they choose, being guided, not by the United States plans, but by their own plans and their own programmes for the development of nuclear weapons. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that scientific and technological progress in the field of creating and developing nuclear weapons is going on so rapidly and is continuously becoming more simplified and accessible to countries having the appropriate level of industrial development that a partial agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, as proposed by the United States, even if all States complied with it, could not prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, nor could it prevent the appearance of these weapons in other States which do not possess them at the present time. Such a development

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of events can only be prevented by the discontinuance of all types of nuclear weapon tests, in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground.

We consider that this question could quickly be settled on the basis of the proposal of the Soviet Union of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) or on the basis of the proposal of the non-aligned countries of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28).

If the United States and the United Kingdom are really striving to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests, as they have repeatedly told us, then there should be no obstacles in the path to an agreement.

In striving to put an end to nuclear weapon tests and to speed up an agreement on this question, the Soviet Government agreed to the negotiations in our Sub-Committee continuing during the recess in the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. It goes without saying that the negotiations in the Sub-Committee should not be used as a pretext to hamper the consideration of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests at the forthcoming seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

The Soviet delegation is ready to exert every effort in order to solve the problem of the discontinuance of all nuclear tests forever within the shortest possible time, and that depends exclusively on the goodwill of our Western colleagues -- the United States and the United Kingdom.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If I may speak in my capacity as representative of the United States, I do not think Mr. Tsarapkin will expect us to be happy about what we heard from him today. My delegation will, of course, look carefully at what he has had to say, but as I heard the interpretation it did not seem as if Mr. Tsarapkin's absence from these negotiations has been profited by to bring forth anything new or anything hopeful. We had hoped that Mr. Tsarapkin would bring with him from Moscow a briefcase which contained at least some slight sign of movement, but what we have heard today seems to indicate that as yet the Soviet Union has not really budged at all from the most extreme of the positions it has ever adopted, namely that which he put forward on 28 November, 1961 (ENDC/11). As I say, we will study what the Soviet representative has said in the verbatim record. I hope that we may find hidden in some subordinate clause some slight indication of something new. That is all I wish to say today.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is sincerely anxious to try to forward these negotiations and I wonder whether it may not be possible to throw some light on the nature of one Soviet difficulty with which we appear to be faced, and if I might, therefore, ask Mr. Tsarapkin a question through you, Sir. As I understand it Mr. Tsarapkin, addressing himself to the partial test ban treaty which is one of the alternative texts which has been tabled by the West, adduced this as evidence of the desire of the United States to continue underground testing. I do not understand how Mr. Tsarapkin reconciles this with the alternative proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/58) for total test ban treaty subject to inspection because, of course, our treaty proposals which would ban all kinds of tests in all environments would subject the United States to inspection. How then would the United States be able to carry on their underground tests, as Mr. Tsarapkin alleges that it wishes to? It seems to me that his argument here displays a misgiving which really has no grounds or foundation, and if he really believes that this is the motive of the United States and really fears that this is the case then he must believe that the United States is not sincere in making its proposal for a monitored test ban in all elements. If the Soviet Union felt that that were so it could prove it very easily by taking up the offer that has been made by the United States and putting it to the test. I should be grateful if Mr. Tsarapkin could elucidate that point a little as it might enable us to dispose of at least one of the misgivings which he appears to have in mind.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I can answer the United Kingdom representative straight away and dispel the misunderstanding which has arisen in his mind as a result of my statement.

First of all, I reject any attempt to qualify as unfounded my statement that by its second proposal (ENDC/59) the United States intends to keep its hands free in order to continue nuclear weapon tests underground. If it is unfounded, then let the United States and United Kingdom add in their draft that they renounce the testing of nuclear weapons not only in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere and under water, but also underground. If they do that, then everything will be in its place and then we shall believe that in its second proposal the United States does not intend to keep for itself a free hand in regard to underground nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

True, the first United States-United Kingdom draft (ENDC/58) speaks about a comprehensive treaty. However, by acting in this way the United States does not risk anything, because in the first draft treaty it agrees to the prohibition of all tests including underground nuclear explosions, knowing beforehand that this draft treaty is absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union and that there is no danger of the Soviet Union catching the United States out red-handed by agreeing to this draft agreement.

Therefore, your argument, Mr. Smithers, that the United States does not intend to continue testing after an agreement, since it proposes in its first alternative to ban all tests including underground ones, is not convincing. It does not work, I would say, since the United States first alternative is absolutely unacceptable. No agreement can be reached on the basis of it.

That is the answer I wanted to give to the United Kingdom representative and I think that everything is now quite clear to him in this regard.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom). I am very grateful to Mr. Tsarapkin for answering at such length. It does certainly throw some light on the position which he has been putting forward.

I do not want to trespass on his patience beyond what is reasonable but I would like to ask him one further very brief question if he would be willing to submit to that. If he feels that he has already answered sufficiently, I will not press it. I see no dissent, so perhaps I may put my further brief question which might possibly tend to reduce the mutual suspicions here.

I do not understand, if Mr. Tsarapkin says that the United States-United Kingdom proposal for a test ban treaty in all elements is put forward, in effect, in the belief that the Soviet Union cannot possibly accept it, how he reconciles that with the fact that, on this question of inspection, over the past months both the United States and the United Kingdom have made radical alterations in their proposals with regard to inspection which have quite clearly been all in the direction of making it easier for the Soviet Union to accept the treaty. I would ask him to consider that and to be reassured as to our motives in putting forward the suggestion for the test ban treaty in all elements, and we for our part would be very happy indeed if he would take up the United States on that treaty and test its willingness to reach agreement.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It may be the fault of the interpretation, but I did not find any question in what you have just said.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): May I just try again? Mr. Tsarapkin is saying that the United States and the United Kingdom know perfectly well that the Soviet Union cannot accept their proposals for a test ban treaty in all elements because of the inspection provisions. I do not see how he reconciles that with the fact that all the modifications which we have made in our position over the past few months have been in the direction obviously of making it easier for the Soviet Union to accept inspection. It does not seem to square with his argument that we do not believe that the Soviet Union could accept those proposals.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Your last comment, Mr. Smithers, only confirms the fact that you are taking part in our negotiations for the first time, and perhaps you are not fully conversant with the changes which have or have not taken place in the position of the United States and the United Kingdom on this question. But I can quite willingly explain to you that there has in fact been no change of principle in the position of the United States and the United Kingdom on this question. Just as the Western Powers insisted on an international control system, they are continuing to do so. Just as they demanded obligatory inspection, they are continuing to do so. A few quantitative changes or modifications are of no importance in this question.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): May I thank Mr. Tsarapkin for his kind patience in replying to my further question.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If I may speak briefly as representative of the United States: Mr. Smithers is with us here today for the first time; I have been here before, and it seems to me that his question was a completely valid one. The Soviet representative has put forward the argument that the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty was presented in the expectation that it would be rejected by the Soviet Union, particularly because of the provisions on

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inspection. But Mr. Tsarapkin, who has been here through all these negotiations, with the exception of his recent brief absence, knows full well that there are very important changes which have been made in the draft treaty which we tabled on 27 August.

We have accepted the idea of national manning and national operation of detection stations including those on the territory of the Soviet Union. We, to be sure, stuck to the essential principle of obligatory on-site inspection against possible clandestine underground tests, but we have, as I said at length today, expressed willingness to consider a reduction in the quota of annual inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union. We have made moves on the composition of the inspection teams, moves which were in the directions which the Soviet representatives have asked for time and time again in the past, and we have made important simplifications in our proposals for an international scientific commission.

So it is apparent that the United States and the United Kingdom have made and are making a very real effort to reduce the difficulties which the Soviet Union appears to find in the question of inspection.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): What you have been talking about, Mr. Chairman, represents a few quantitative modifications, but I was talking about qualitative changes. There have been no qualitative changes in your position.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): As the representative of the United States, may I just say that it seems to me a very difficult task of definition to state when a major quantitative change becomes a qualitative change. Also I find it very difficult to understand how Mr. Tsarapkin can say that there have been no qualitative changes when we have shifted from the principle of internationally manned and operated control stations to nationally manned and operated control stations, which is, it seems to me, beyond dispute, a qualitative change.

Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, perhaps we might set the time for our next meeting. If there are no other suggestions, I would propose that we might meet on Tuesday, 18 September, at 3 o'clock.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): That is the very day of the opening of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does the representative of the Soviet Union believe that our meeting here will in any way cause difficulties on the opening day of the Assembly in New York?

If there is no objection, then, we will meet on Tuesday, 18 September, at 3 p.m.
It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.