

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE  
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on  
Friday, 11 May 1962, at 4 p.m.

Chairman:

Sir Michael WRIGHT

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. P.W. AGER

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. V.F. SHUSTOV

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the thirteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

I have some remarks to make in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom.

Since the Sub-Committee last met there have been two plenary discussions on nuclear testing. I have been carefully thinking over the various points which emerged in those discussions. I expect that my colleagues have been doing the same. It seemed to me that what emerged perhaps most clearly of all from the plenary discussions was the desire shared and expressed with particular force by representatives of delegations who were sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum, that the negotiations in this Sub-Committee should continue and should succeed. This view was expressed no less emphatically by the representatives of the Western Powers. It was expressed also by the representatives of the Soviet Union and, I believe, by all other communist delegations - but in their case, I thought, with certain reserves. Mr. Zorin's position seemed to be - and I am referring to some of his final remarks which will be found in the verbatim record of the thirty-fourth plenary meeting - that it was worth continuing negotiations only on certain conditions. I may come back to this point in a moment. I would only say now that so far as the United Kingdom is concerned we want to continue negotiations, to pursue active negotiations, for the early conclusion of a treaty. This willingness to negotiate is not either conditioned or limited. We are not willing to negotiate only on a particular basis, or on a limited basis. We are without reserve willing and anxious to continue negotiations. In particular, we are willing to pursue negotiations, we are anxious to pursue them, taking as a basis the eight-Power memorandum.

A further point which emerged clearly from the thirty-fourth plenary meeting was the belief of all the eight neutral countries that it would not be particularly useful now for the nuclear Powers to concentrate on trying to interpret the memorandum, although they said explicitly that parts of the memorandum were vague and that large areas needed filling in. They repeated that the memorandum was not intended as a blue-print still less as the blue-print of a treaty. They asked that we should take it as a starting point for renewed negotiations without excluding other possible suggestions or other possible lines of progress. I repeat, they asked us not to try to interpret but to negotiate, and this the United Kingdom delegation fully accepts.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Now it would be idle to pretend that there are not differences of approach between the two nuclear sides which need to be bridged. What I want to do is to find or build a bridge or, if you like a metaphor better, find some common ground on which we can build. It is going to be difficult but do not let us be deterred by difficulties, let us try. In speaking today I am searching for some common ground, some starting point or starting points. I will do my best to avoid saying anything which may harden positions or may widen differences, while recognizing, of course - it would be dishonest not to do so - that differences exist.

Let me see if I can find something in Mr. Zorin's statements which we can pursue constructively, leaving aside those of his statements - and they were many - which point in another direction and which can lead us nowhere. At the thirty-fourth plenary meeting Mr. Zorin said:

"There are three points, three questions - a system of national control posts, an international commission, and inspection. These are the three main points of principle. In regard to these questions there are perfectly clear answers in the memorandum. Do you or do you not accept these answers as they stand? That is the question which has to be settled." (ENDC/PV.34, page 50)

I would not for my part say that there are clear answers on these three points in the memorandum, but, reduced to the simplest terms of principle, in the words which Mr. Zorin himself used, I can give clear answers which should provide starting points for practical and detailed negotiations.

On the first point - do we accept an international system of control posts? - my answer is "Yes". On the second point - do we accept an international commission? - my answer is "Yes". On the third point - do we accept inspection? - my answer is "Yes". To the three main points of principle as expressed by Mr. Zorin the answer is certainly "Yes"; it is three times "Yes".

But do not let us mislead ourselves or others by pretending that agreement on these three principles can be more than a starting point. Let me take the most difficult question first, namely, inspection. The Soviet position on inspection appears to be inspection by invitation. I am not sure how vague or how precise your position is on the question of inspection by invitation, whether it is that invitation may be extended or that it will be extended. In one of Mr. Zorin's statements at the thirty-fourth meeting he used the words:

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

"... the official statement of the Soviet Government that we agree that it will be possible in individual cases to invite scientists, members of the international commission, to ascertain in loco the nature of the events which are in doubt. Is not that clear ? But it is we who will do this, upon our own invitation and not somebody else." (ibid., page 49)

In that sentence - of course, I am only quoting from the English provisional verbatim record containing the simultaneous interpretation; this is all I have - Mr. Zorin used the words "it will be possible to invite" and the word "will". So I am not sure whether the present Soviet position is one of "may" or one of "will" or "shall". I am not sure whether the Soviet Union is speaking of an obligation to invite or of leaving invitation, shall I say, to individual private enterprise.

On the other hand, the position of the United Kingdom is that there must be an obligation upon the States which sign the treaty to accept international on-site inspection. There are therefore divergencies. But my suggestion is that we should not pursue these now. Let us agree that we accept "inspection"; let us agree that we accept that principle - that is what Mr. Zorin proposed. Let us make that a starting point, however modest. Let us then see what other progress we can make.

I realize that in making this suggestion I may be running partly counter to some of the other remarks made by Mr. Zorin at the thirty-fourth meeting. According to the verbatim record of that meeting, Mr. Zorin said:

"... there can be no fruitful negotiations if we set aside the main questions and deal with matters which arise out of the solution of these main questions. Is there any point in conducting negotiations on these particular individual points of detail when the main questions have not been settled ?" (ENDC/PV.34, page 51)

That is one point of view. But it is not a point of view with which I can agree, and it does seem to me to be a thoroughly negative point of view. If adopted it could not possibly lead us to the progress that we all desire. For my part, and for the United Kingdom, I prefer to accept the point of view of the representative of Mexico, who at the same meeting said:

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

"In spite of the unfortunate deadlock in the discussions of the Sub-Committee on points or questions of principle which the parties consider it essential to settle before examining and agreeing on other important questions also referred to in the memorandum of the eight delegations, we believe it would be very useful for the members of the Sub-Committee to study some of the suggestions contained in the memorandum, which have not yet been considered as carefully as they deserve, and try to reach agreement on them; for agreement on these suggestions could help to settle the questions which are causing the major differences at present." (ibid., p.15)

This seems to me, if I may say so, to be a very sensible and practical point of view, and my delegation is very happy to go along with it. Indeed I may recall that so far as some of the points of controversy in the field of general and complete disarmament are concerned, Mr. Zorin himself would also seem to accept this point of view. I say this because when we were discussing article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty at the twelfth plenary meeting Mr. Zorin said:

"The outcome may be that both we and you will stand by our positions. That is one possible outcome. In that case we will record in our joint statement of views the points on which there is no dispute, on which there is agreement. With regard to the points on which we fail to come to terms, we will indicate that disagreement remains on such and such questions. I believe that this would be a very useful piece of work, because it would then be clear to everyone that on certain questions we had reached agreement and that other questions remained in dispute. And on the second reading, as it were, of the document, during the detailed discussion, or, as you call it, the drafting of the document, we could in fact return to this question and discuss it once again with a view to reaching a final decision." (ENDC/PV.12, pp. 51 and 52)

As I say, this seems to me to be a thoroughly sensible and logical way of proceeding, and to offer the only way out of our present difficulties. For, let me recall again that, important as the question of inspection is, it is only one of the three questions to which Mr. Zorin refers. We have also the other main questions of an international detection system and an international commission, and in our view it should be possible to make progress on these other main questions while putting the question of on-site inspection temporarily on one side.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

We could, for example, discuss our views on the establishment and functioning of an internationally organized detection system without necessarily at this stage, at a first reading, deciding what may be done, or should be done, in the light of the data assembled from such a system. We could also discuss the question of the international commission covered in the second of Mr. Padilla Nervo's questions at the thirty-fourth plenary meeting. We could discuss the composition of the commission; which countries would be asked to designate scientists to membership of it; in what capacity they would be designated; to whom they would be responsible; whether or not they would have political independence; whether or not they should be considered international civil servants with exclusively scientific functions; and whether a scientific, apolitical function was possible with governmental representation. We could discuss all this without prejudice to the second reading.

Thus, notwithstanding our known differences on the application of the principle of inspection, we could still arrive at some meeting of minds on the other main principles underlying the eight-Power memorandum. We could still, therefore, make progress.

I should accordingly like to appeal to our Soviet colleague to co-operate with us in moving forward along these lines; and, in doing so, I should like finally to recall another passage from the speech of the representative of Mexico at the plenary meeting on 9 May. He said that he believed that it became every day more urgent and essential to elaborate an agreement in order to establish the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Even in the event that it should not be possible to do this before the present series of explosions had ended, and before the series that has been announced by the Soviet Union had begun, he said:

"... we must all endeavour to help them fix an agreed date now, before the end of the series of tests by the two parties, so that this year or the beginning of next year may see a definite end to the senseless nuclear competition." (ENDC/PV.34, p. 17)

This passage in Mr. Padilla Nervo's statement has been studied with great attention by my delegation. The suggestions contained in it are of the greatest interest and significance. At the very least we consider them as a spur to greater effort in this Sub-Committee, and we sincerely hope and pray that the Soviet Union will join us in these efforts.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Since the debate on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests at the last three meetings of the Sub-Committee did not advance the negotiations because the Western Powers remained in their old positions, this question was again transferred for discussion to the plenary Disarmament Committee, which devoted two more meetings to it, on 7 and 9 May (ENDC/PV.32 and 34).

The debate on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the Sub-Committee, and afterwards in the plenary Disarmament Committee, clearly revealed two trends in the talks, two approaches to the proposals contained in the eight non-aligned countries' joint memorandum of 16 April (ENDC/28).

One trend is that followed in the talks by the Soviet Union, which desires an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and responded instantly to the appeal made to the nuclear Powers by the eight non-aligned countries. Those non-aligned States appealed to the nuclear Powers, urging them not to cling stubbornly to their own positions, but to leave these and come to an agreement on the basis of the proposals contained in the non-aligned States' memorandum. The Soviet Union demonstrated its good will by answering the appeal of the non-aligned countries; it adopted a positive approach to their memorandum and accepted the proposals contained in it as a basis for agreement. Thus we - the Soviet Union - have moved to a new position, to that proposed by the eight non-aligned States.

The other trend is that followed both in the past and in the present by the Western nuclear Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. They declare formally that they accept the non-aligned States' memorandum as a basis for talks, but in fact they cling to their old positions and reject the basic principles set out in the memorandum.

Everyone knows perfectly well that these cunning manoeuvres of the Western nuclear Powers in the negotiations, their negative attitude towards the non-aligned countries' appeal to the nuclear Powers not to adhere to their old positions, their refusal to accept without any reservations the fundamental principles of the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum as a basis for agreement, make the prospect for agreement hopeless.

The representatives of the non-aligned countries, in their statements in plenary, have quite definitely declared that the success of further negotiations depends on the unreserved acceptance by the nuclear Powers of the basic principles

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contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States. The representatives of the non-aligned countries warn us of the futility of any attempt to solve the problem of halting nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the old positions. Mr. Padilla Nervo, the representative of Mexico, stated at the last meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee:

"We have endeavoured to help the nuclear Powers out of an impasse, and in my opinion our memorandum should not be used to help maintain the original positions." (ENDC/PV.34, p.14)

Other sponsors of the memorandum spoke in the same sense. The representative of Sweden, in his statement at the same meeting of the plenary Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, expressed the hope that the interested parties would soon embark on sincere and businesslike negotiations:

"... with a starting point in the basic principles of the joint memorandum". (ibid., p.21)

He expressed full agreement with the opinion of the representative of Mexico that the nuclear Powers should not use the memorandum to defend their original positions. Reviewing the basic principles of the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum, he emphasized that details of the practical application of those principles must be discussed by the parties concerned and elaborated

"within the general framework" (ibid., p.22)

I lay stress on those words, "within the general framework" - of the principles of the memorandum.

Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, said at the same meeting:

"...as one of the co-sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, my delegation stands firmly by that memorandum. We remain convinced that it contains the seeds of a fruitful settlement." (ibid., p.27)

He appealed to the nuclear Powers to show a spirit of "give-and-take" and devote their efforts to the drafting of a mutually acceptable agreement on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States.

Mr. Lall, the representative of India, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the memorandum, stated most definitely and clearly that the eight delegations which had submitted it continued to believe that an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests could and must be concluded on the basis of the principles contained in the memorandum. Referring to the nuclear Powers, he said:

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"There is a basis here which will lead them to an agreement, if they so desire . . ." (ibid., p.36)

He also said:

"Some weeks ago these countries could say, 'We have no basis for negotiation; we have no basis for agreement'. They cannot say that any more. They have told us that we have provided them with a common basis for negotiation." (ibid., p.34)

Answering the criticism that there were numerous obscurities in the memorandum and that, before it could be accepted as a basis, various gaps must be filled, Mr. Lall said this:

"The memorandum is not that obscure." (ibid., p.35)

He went on later:

"The joint memorandum contains in its infrastructure, built into it, an adequacy of principles to meet the requirements of both sides. If this had not been the case, we would not have put it forward. We ... put this document forward after the greatest care and consideration. I can say for the Government of India that this was a matter over which we exercised a great deal of care ... It is a serious step which eight countries took. We did not take it lightly. Built into the infrastructure of the document are the principles which both sides require. In that light it is not necessary for any country to raise questions of principle as to the memorandum."

"We would request you to see that, if you put an agreement into effect on the basis of this memorandum, then the results which all of you desire ... will follow. There will be a cessation of tests." (ibid., p.36)

What conclusions are to be drawn from these statements by the representatives of the States sponsoring the memorandum?

First, the deadlock in the talks can be broken only by means of the propositions contained in the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum submitted for the Committee's consideration on 16 April this year.

Secondly, the basic principles contained in the memorandum and the propositions which must underlie any future agreement are compromises between the respective positions adopted in the talks by the nuclear Powers; and the measures proposed by the sponsors of the memorandum for control over the agreement to cease nuclear weapon testing are fully adequate and reliable.

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Thirdly, the parties to the talks must give up their old positions and shift to the position indicated in the memorandum, which in the present situation offers the only possibility of breaking the deadlock which the talks on discontinuance of nuclear tests have reached.

It follows from what I have said that the first question on which we must agree in the Sub-Committee is this: are we all ready to undertake to abide by the principles and propositions contained in the eight-nation memorandum?

The Soviet Government, in its statement of 19 April, answers this question in the affirmative. Mr. Zorin, the head of the Soviet delegation at the disarmament talks, speaking at the thirty-fourth meeting on 9 May, said this:

"I want to be frank, so that there may be no illusions, and from what I have said it is perfectly clear that the Soviet Government takes its stand on the memorandum. It accepts the principles of the memorandum as they are stated, and we want the Western Powers also to take their stand on the memorandum and accept the principles contained in this memorandum in regard to the main questions; as they are stated. If the Western Powers agree to this, we are prepared to carry on negotiations with them on the draft treaty itself. If you still try to lead us in a different direction, if you still try to give your own interpretations and demand that we agree with these interpretations, if you insist on your old positions, then we tell you that such negotiations will be useless. We shall not agree to this and there can be no agreement on this basis.

"As a result of today's discussion we should have a clear idea of the prospects for our future negotiations. The Western Powers must adopt, in regard to the main questions, the position set forth in the memorandum as it stands, and then on this basis we can speedily reach agreement on all the specific matters of detail which arise out of the solution of these main questions. This is our position."

(ENDC/PV.34, pp.51-52)

All the delegations of the socialist countries in the Committee also answered this question in the affirmative. Thus thirteen delegations out of the seventeen have firmly declared that they are ready to endeavour, on the basis of the propositions in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries, to

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draft an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. Only two of the delegations speaking at the 34th meeting of the plenary Committee on 9 May, those of the United States and the United Kingdom, declined to give clear answers to this question of whether they were ready to undertake to support the basic propositions of the memorandum.

But on the answer to that question hangs the whole future of our talks. It is clear from the short statements which those delegations made at the thirty-fourth meeting of the Committee that they still maintain their old position on the establishment of international control and inspection, although it has been shown by the debate in the Committee to be quite indefensible.

The statement made by the United Kingdom representative today, as we were obliged regretfully to note, showed that the debate on this question in the Committee during the last two meetings has not essentially changed their position.

I spoke earlier of the two trends in our talks. One is that followed by the Soviet Union: its essence is that the Soviet Union has accepted the proposal of the non-aligned countries and has thus shifted to a new position, that proposed by the non-aligned countries.

The other trend is that followed by the Western Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. The substance of that trend is that they adhere to their old positions and have not really accepted the proposals of the non-aligned countries. This trend of the Western Powers has been expressed, for example, in the questions which they have put to the Soviet delegation in the Committee and the Sub-Committee.

The representatives of the Western Powers said in the Committee that the Soviet delegation, at any rate hitherto, has not yet submitted any details of how it thinks the eight-nation plan could be put into effect. Mr. Dean, the United States representative complained at the thirty-second meeting of the Committee (ENDC/PV.32, p.15) that the Soviet delegation, in agreeing with the non-aligned countries' compromise proposal, had not offered any ideas on the possible number of additional observation posts, where they might be located, how they might supplement the work of the existing posts, how they would be staffed, how the national and international stations might be interrelated, whether international stations would be operated by the international commission or by national authorities, or who would arrange for their construction.

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Later on, Mr. Dean put another series of puzzling questions which, like the earlier ones, show that the United States is still clinging to its old positions. For instance, he complained that it was totally unclear to him whether the international scientific commission was to have any real co-ordinating or supervisory functions over the network of control and recording stations and posts, whether national or not. But Mr. Dean, be it noted, did not himself offer any ideas on that matter.

Those questions of Mr. Dean's, however, make it quite clear that the United States is attempting to steer the whole issue back to its old positions. It is quite clear from the questions put by the United States representative that he wants to set up, in some shape or another, an international network of control posts directed by the international commission and empowered to carry out compulsory on-site inspection.

We consider it premature to ask any questions about particulars or details, although we are in complete agreement with you that it will be necessary to thrash out a number of particular questions relating, for example, to additional observation posts, the composition of the international commission of specialists and its technical staff, the financing of the international commission and its staff, and a number of other questions which we shall inevitably have to decide when drafting the agreement. But before we turn aside to details and particulars, we must have among ourselves a clear, definite, unambiguous and unconditional agreement on the basic principles of the actual agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

The joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States contains the basic principles which those States propose that we, the nuclear Powers, should accept as a compromise basis for agreement. In introducing those proposals, the non-aligned States urgently appealed to the nuclear Powers not to adhere to their positions on matters such as the character of the supervisory system, the international authority or inspection, but to move to the positions indicated by the joint memorandum of the non-aligned States.

All delegations except those of the United States and the United Kingdom recognize that the proposals of the non-aligned States are a compromise solution to the problem. Those proposals, so to speak, constitute a form of agreement with definite limits, a framework. We have to accept this form and fill it in with the necessary and proper particulars and details.

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The non-aligned countries propose the use, for supervision of compliance with the agreement, of existing national networks of observation, extended, if necessary, by additional observation posts established by agreement. If you accept this proposal, let us record that, and we shall then have agreement on one important question.

Next, the non-aligned countries propose that we should agree to constitute an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff. The functions of this commission would be to process the data received from the posts, examine them thoroughly and objectively, and report on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event revealed by the examination; to call for additional information, consult with the parties to the treaty on what further measures of clarification would facilitate assessment of the nature of the event, and inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case and of its assessment of the suspicious event. Do you accept the proposal to set up this international commission of scientists with their staff, entrusted with those tasks, as set forth in the memorandum? If you accept the proposals of the non-aligned countries concerning the commission and its functions, let us record that as well. Then we shall have reached agreement on the general principles relating to one more important question.

Concerning inspection, the memorandum says that the parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt. If you accept this proposal of the non-aligned countries, let us record that. Then a third important question will have been settled between us, and we can start working out the details.

So, having agreed categorically, clearly and definitely on those basic principles of the agreement, you and we will proceed to draft all the necessary details and particulars. That work would advance rapidly, for we would already have an agreed basis for a treaty, the outline of an agreement. Otherwise the talks would become involved in endless disputes and no progress would be made.

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have stated in the Committee that they will study closely the views expressed at the last meeting of the Committee by the representatives of the non-aligned countries. We hope that their study will lead them to renounce their old positions and accept

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the non-aligned States' proposals. Then, founding ourselves on the principles set out in the eight-nation memorandum, we can go ahead with businesslike and practical discussions of the test of an agreement to discontinue tests.

Unfortunately, the statement which Sir Michael Wright, the United Kingdom representative, made today showed that they want to avoid, at any rate at the present stage, settling the basic principles on which the treaty must be built. It implied that controversial questions - presumably meaning the proposals of the eight-nation memorandum relating to inspection, a national network of control posts, and the international commission's composition and functions - should be held over and only secondary matters discussed. In order to make his position sound more convincing he quoted a passage from another context, from another debate: from a statement by Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative in the Eighteen Nation Committee.

But the subject there was altogether different. Mr. Zorin's statement was about the disarmament talks, for which there exist the text of a treaty on general and complete disarmament prepared by the Soviet Union and the outline submitted by the United States. There, to be sure, various comparisons and confrontations could be made; questions could be taken up or postponed pending agreement. Here, however, we have a quite specific proposal for the basis of a compromise agreement, put forward by the eight non-aligned States. The present position is this: either you and we agree to take these proposals as a basis for a treaty, when they will provide us with a frame, a form for the future agreement into which we shall have to fit all the particulars, details and the like; or we shall have nothing, because the proposals contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States represent the only basis on which we can achieve any results. If you do not solve this problem, you will not solve the problem of an agreement on discontinuing tests.

We are very sorry you adopt this attitude; but we will wait patiently. We are sure that, if you want an agreement, you will change this attitude of yours. The sooner you abandon your old attitude and accept the memorandum in full as a basis for agreement, the better.

The success of the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests now depends on you - the United States and the United Kingdom. All that is needed is your assent to the proposal of the non-aligned countries. We, ourselves,

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have given that assent. Everything depends now on the good will of the Western Powers. We await a clear answer from the United States and United Kingdom representatives. It is entirely up to them.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Speaking again as representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to make one or two immediate remarks in response to the intervention we have just heard from our Soviet colleague.

Our Soviet colleague said, if I heard him rightly, that I had proposed putting the main questions on one side and approaching only secondary questions. That, of course, is not true, as our Soviet colleague will see when he reads the text of my remarks in the verbatim record. What I said was something entirely and absolutely different. I said: Mr. Zorin has put to us three questions, three points of principle. To each of those three points I answer "Yes". We therefore have a basic agreement of principle on all those three points - I say "a basic agreement of principle", a point of departure for negotiations. I have not proposed putting aside those three main questions. I have proposed leaving aside the negotiation upon one of them until after we have negotiated further upon the other two. That is what I said, and to avoid something inaccurate getting into the record I wanted to make quite clear what the substance of my intervention was.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Both you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, and our Soviet colleague have quite rightly devoted considerable attention in your interventions today to the statements of the work of our Sub-Committee by the eight sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum.

It seems to me that if we read through the verbatim records, and particularly that of the thirty-fourth plenary meeting on 9 May, we could all agree on several things. First, we could certainly agree that the eight delegations which co-sponsored the joint memorandum are unanimous in wishing the three nuclear powers in this Sub-Committee to continue negotiations on a test ban treaty. In fact, I am afraid we would have to agree that several of them were rather critical of what we have done here so far by way of searching out the possibilities for agreement which may be inherent in the eight-nation plan.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I am sure we also must agree that it is quite apparent to the co-sponsors that serious differences have arisen among us on how to interpret some of the key passages in the joint memorandum, and particularly those involving on-site inspection. Nevertheless, the co-sponsors have adopted the quite understandable position of not believing it wise to come forward with either individual or joint interpretations of the intent of their document. Their advice to us has been and is to see whether we can work out here some mutual accommodation within the framework of the eight-nation plan.

Now the Soviet Union has formally stated that it accepts the eight nation memorandum as a basis of negotiations, but it makes it quite clear that it accepts the memorandum as a basis on the interpretation of that memorandum by the Soviet Union. We in the West have made it quite clear that we have accepted the eight nation memorandum as one basis of negotiation and, quite naturally, we have offered a different interpretation of the memorandum from that of the Soviet Union. I think we must also agree, in all honesty, that neither the Soviet delegation nor, to be perfectly frank, the United Kingdom and the United States delegations can claim that the eight co-sponsors have given an affirmative nod to either of our interpretations - particularly on the key question of on-site inspection.

The United States delegation is still firmly convinced that its analysis of the essential principles expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the joint memorandum, when read together, is correct and that arrangements for obligatory inspection in certain circumstances are provided for by the co-sponsors. The Soviet delegation clings to its interpretation that the eight nation memorandum provides only for invitational inspection entirely at the discretion of the State on whose territory the event has occurred. While reserving our position on this particularly important question and our interpretation, which we believe is correct, we feel as you do, Mr. Chairman, that mere repetition of old arguments on this score will not advance our work at this juncture. This presumably was why the representatives of Mexico and Sweden, in particular urged us to get away from this chief controversial issue, or issues, for the time being - I think this is what they had in mind - and concentrate our attention on some of the other important issues which must be solved.

It could be, as Mr. Padilla Nervo suggested, that if we began to put the details of a test ban agreement along the lines of the eight-nation plan into

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some sort of order, this might facilitate agreement on the chief major issue or issues on which we are now deadlocked. For instance, if we agree about the nature of consultations between the international scientific commission and a party concerning an unclarified event, and if we draw a clear picture of the inter-relationship between party and commission which might then exist, we may begin to see the outline of a possible accord even on the inspection issue itself.

Today I propose very briefly to pursue these suggestions of our eight colleagues that some further exploration would be in order. We have not talked much heretofore about the future control system and I think that this might be worth while.

Paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum speaks clearly of establishing "a system for continuous observation and effective control" (ENDC/28). It offers two alternative ways of constructing such a system. First, it might - and in view of certain comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union this afternoon, I should like to stress that the word is "might", not "could" or "should" - be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions.

The second possibility offered is to use some of the existing posts in conjunction, if necessary, with new posts built by agreement. It is perfectly clear from all of this that there is no suggestion in the eight nation memorandum that the system should consist solely of newly built posts. It is equally clear, however, that even if only existing national stations were to be used they would have to be tied together into some sort of international system. This is emphasized by paragraph 4, which gives the international commission certain duties in regard to processing data received from the agreed system of posts. In other words, arrangements will be necessary to get specified data in specified ways and at specified times from posts in the system to the control commission.

To return to the system itself, however, the question still arises as to which alternative type of system recommended by the joint memorandum would be more suitable - only existing national stations linked to the system or, on the other hand, a mixed system of existing and newly built posts. My delegation obviously has no hesitation in saying that if we were choosing between these two concepts we would certainly prefer the mixed system. Whatever coverage we may now obtain from existing stations, there is no doubt that there are serious gaps in spacing on a world-wide basis, even if only the Northern Hemisphere is considered.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

It is more difficult, however, to know just how many such gaps exist. There is no satisfactory list available to us of existing stations, even in the United States and the Soviet Union, and in many countries there may be only one, or even no, adequate station. Clearly there would be need for an inventory of those existing stations which might be fitted into the future system - an inventory which would include not only their geographical location but also their instrumentation, staffing and so forth.

If we should get hold of these facts, and I would hope that the Soviet Union would co-operate in this, then we would still have to review other factors: How would we improve existing stations designated for use in the control system? Where would we build new stations? Who would man and operate them? What rights of co-ordination, standardization and inspection would the international commission possess vis-à-vis the various stations in the system?

I have put forward these ideas and questions, very briefly, today because it seems to me that this is the best way in which we may go forward to a sensible examination of what can be done with the eight-nation plan. I hope that the Soviet representative will join with us in undertaking such an exploration on this and other important phases of the joint memorandum. We believe that this approach might prove fruitful.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Since no other representative wishes to speak today, it remains to fix the date of our next meeting. Would it meet with the approval of my colleagues if we fixed the next meeting for 3.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 15 May?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.