

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

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ENGLISH

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 9 April 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I call to order the seventh meeting of the Sub-Committee. Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The statement made by the Soviet representative at the last meeting of this Sub-Committee /ENDC/SC.I/PV.6, page 20/ including his reading into the record of the Soviet Government message of 3 April 1962 to the United Nations Disarmament Commission regarding a nuclear test ban, /ENDC/2C/Rev.1/ was, I submit, another vain attempt to conquer a terrible headache with magic incantations. In this instance the Soviet Union suffers from a terrible headache: that is, from the formidable, indeed almost impossible, task of trying to defend its really indefensible past and present record on negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty.

The magic incantations which will not work are the endless, tiresome and baseless clichés hurled at the West about alleged aggressiveness, promotion of the arms race and conduct of espionage -- all of which, I submit, the Soviet Union knows full well is nonsense.

Since the facts will support neither such charges nor the present unrealistic Soviet position on a nuclear test ban treaty, the facts are now freely discarded by the Soviet Union in favour of whatever inaccuracies serve the Soviet needs of the moment.

The Soviet delegation even tried to give the appearance of introducing a rare note of reasonableness into its harsh words, when it said:

"The Soviet Union, for its part, is ready to examine any proposal which would provide a mutually-acceptable solution to this problem. Admittedly we are still far from agreement, but it does not seem that every avenue has yet been explored, and we believe that we shall ultimately succeed in reaching agreement, if only the United States and its partners do not insist on their groundless demands for international control and inspection".

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.6, page 30)

Undoubtedly all this was intended to cause hopes to rise. One might have thought, perhaps, that Mr. Tsarapkin did have a small quantity of flexibility in his position after all. The interpretation might be possible that the Soviet Union opposed only those aspects of the United States insistence upon international control and inspection which the Soviet Union considered to be

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"unjustified". But, unfortunately for our hopes, Mr. Tsarapkin was all too hasty in dashing this momentary illusion.

Just a few paragraphs later, after describing the Soviet approach to a nuclear test ban treaty, an approach based solely on so-called national means of detection, he added: "In the present circumstances this approach appears not only reasonable, but the only one possible." (ibid, p.31)

It is indeed amazing that after this pronouncement, after having made it perfectly clear, as Mr. Zorin also did at the plenary meeting on 4 April ENDC/PV.157, that the Soviet Union will sign a nuclear test ban treaty only on its own unscientific terms and that those terms, however unreasonable, are not subject to modification, Mr. Tsarapkin still found it possible at the last Subcommittee meeting to accuse the West of posing an ultimatum. Mr. Tsarapkin described this supposed and non-existent Western ultimatum as consisting of a Western threat to resume atmospheric tests unless the Soviet Union accepted all Western nuclear test ban treaty proposals.

I can only wonder how far the facts can be twisted. It is indeed true that we laboured for three years and that we brought forth our draft treaty of 18 April 1961 ENDC/97, with the amendments that we have since proposed in order to meet Soviet suggestions. Indeed, we are quite proud of this treaty and its amendments as a document. But after all, both the United States and the United Kingdom have often said, and I shall repeat it yet again today, that we are not completely wedded to any specific proposal or formula. We have never tried to propose an ultimatum. Our only standard is an arrangement which affords reasonably adequate amounts of technically sound, objective and impartial control, which can of course only mean international control, involving both detection and identification and a realistic number of on-site inspections for unidentified events.

I am quite convinced that one can understand current circumstances in regard to a nuclear test ban only by seeking the broader perspective of recent years. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union all stopped nuclear weapon tests in the autumn of 1958. Thereafter, for some time, we know -- and, because of our completely open society, the Soviet Union also knows -- that the two Western Powers did not conduct any tests. Because of the closed society of the Soviet Union, we cannot know whether or not the Soviet Union abstained from testing during this time, but we do know that it claims that it did not test.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

At various times from 1958 on, one or another of the three Powers issued statements on whether it was unilaterally renouncing tests or on whether it considered itself free to resume tests. We in the West believe, as I explained in a detailed analysis at the fourth meeting of this Sub-Committee, that the Soviet Government was still subject to its own pledge of self-abnegation from testing as late as August 1961, that is, until the Soviet Union unilaterally and without previous warning announced its nuclear test resumption on 30 August 1961.

The Soviet representative here has denied that the Soviet Union was so subject to its pledge, and by his words at the sixth meeting of the Sub-Committee he told us that unilateral pledges, not being signed international agreements, are free to be broken whenever it suits the State making the unilateral pledge. I find this very interesting. I may say, incidentally, that the United States will remember that point of view henceforth when it is urged to indulge in unilateral moratoria on nuclear test bans or any other disarmament measure prior to the conclusion of a formal, signed agreement with adequate international controls.

The fundamental fact is, however, that without regard to pledges and moratoria, there were no tests -- or at least, so far as we are concerned, no known tests -- of nuclear weapons for almost three years. We are all aware that this period is much longer than is required merely for test preparations after one series of nuclear tests before another round of such tests is undertaken. Hence, this period represented something more -- a period in which one very sensitive area of the East-West arms race had apparently quietened down.

This could not have happened if Prime Minister Macmillan, President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev had not decided in 1958, 1959 and 1960 that freedom from tests, which means renunciation of the development of new nuclear weapons, was thoroughly compatible with the national security demands of their respective countries. Each was willing to tolerate the status quo in nuclear weapons of November 1958. And, as my citation at our last meeting from the speech by Premier Khrushchev on 14 January 1960 showed, the Soviet Government, at least, considered that despite the lack of testing the Soviet armed forces had unparalleled and unprecedented military power -- at least that is what they said.

In a situation like this, it is really irrelevant whether the Soviet Union was stronger than the United States in nuclear striking strength, or vice versa. It is irrelevant whether the Soviet Union arrived at its strength by conducting

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more or fewer tests than the United States. The relevant point is that some sort of rough and ready status quo in nuclear weapons had been reached in 1953 and was not being actively challenged.

It was this one area of East-West calm which the Soviet Government, for reasons of its own, deliberately decided to disrupt unilaterally about eight months ago. The Soviet Union was determined to break the status quo and to seek to gain military advantages in this field over the two Western nuclear Powers. The statement of the Soviet Union of 31 August last /GEN/DNT/117/ was in fact utterly frank in announcing a desire to perfect new and more frightful weapons so as to intimidate the West for the military security of the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the Soviet Union, for its part, declared that all of this was being undertaken in order to advance the cause of peace. According to the Soviet Union, since the West was allegedly behaving in an unfriendly and -- even aggressive fashion towards the Soviet Union, increased Soviet strength would, in theory, deter the West from continuing such policies.

Indeed, Mr. Tsarapkin defended Soviet tests in the same terms at our very last meeting by saying that the West had in fact adopted a softer tone since the Soviet nuclear tests and as a direct result of them. Again I find this very interesting.

The world might have ascribed any so-called softer tone or less acute international tension to the Soviet Government's withdrawal of an ultimative deadline at the end of 1961 for Western acceptance of Soviet terms for settling the series of Soviet-instigated and manufactured Berlin crises.

How is one really to reason with a person or a nation that can only see a situation through its own prejudiced eyes? Soviet nuclear tests, we are told, are tests not only for its own military security but also for world peace. That is what the Soviet Union tells us. But what about Western tests? Well, mirabile dictu, Western tests on the other hand, the Soviet Union tells us, are aggressive preparations for war. On the part of the Soviet Union, peace; on our part, war. Soviet scientists who develop and test nuclear arms are, as Mr. Tsarapkin proclaimed at the fifth meeting of this Sub-Committee, men of peace who are working for peace. But what about United States scientists? Well, these horrible creatures, United States scientists in this business, are, Mr. Tsarapkin says, the militaristic tools of predatory and profiteering monopolists. Is this not dreadful?

(Mr. Dean, United States)

No doubt we would understand all this jargon better if we approached it from a Marxist ideological platform instead of from what my Soviet colleague would scorn as a bourgeois desire for facts and scientific objectivity. All this is, of course, anathema to the Soviet mind. But I regret that I must warn my Soviet colleague that I shall never be able to see black as white, white as black, top as bottom, and green as red.

We already know what the response of the Soviet Government would have been if the United States had resumed nuclear tests after a long period of three years without tests. In fact, the Soviet Government and its delegation in Geneva forewarned us several times during the nuclear test ban Conference. We were informed that if we in the West even detonated a nuclear device underground for seismic research purposes, the Soviet Union would immediately resume atmospheric tests. This of course was not an ultimatum -- perish the thought!

It is thus apparent that by the very standard proclaimed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and United States Governments would have been more than justified in responding to the Soviet tests of 1961 with immediate atmospheric nuclear tests of their own. Without regard to which side was ahead or behind during the no-testing period of almost three years, and without regard to which side may be ahead or behind now, the principle announced by the Soviet Government in 1960 and 1961 and again recently in the Soviet reply last week to the Japanese Prime Minister, was that a test series by one nuclear Power was an attempt to improve its relative position over its rivals. In this light, therefore, such testing by one Power put its rivals into an unequal position and justified resumption of tests by these rivals. If this is the case, then so it is now with the position of the United States and the United Kingdom in response to the most recent series of Soviet atmospheric tests.

Nevertheless, in spite of these clear-cut circumstances, the Western Powers have chosen a more responsible and statesmanlike path. They have been determined not to permit the opportunity to pass to attempt once again to bottle up the evil genie of atomic tests which the Soviet Union released upon the world in September last. They have been quite willing to allow the Soviet Union to keep whatever may be its ill-gotten gains in the field of testing if -- but only if -- the Western Powers can really be assured that this time all tests will end once and for all. To achieve this certainty, not only a solemn international treaty

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is needed, but also an adequate international control system which, by its effectiveness and impartiality, will be certain to deter any potential violations of the treaty.

The Western Powers are convinced that only a system of international controls will have the requisite effectiveness. Only such an arrangement, we submit, will give the Western Powers an amount of security equal to the extra security which they would be surrendering by renouncing the projected series of atmospheric tests which, by any standards, they are more than justified in carrying out.

Only in this way will the West be certain that the Soviet Union is not conducting new clandestine nuclear tests to capitalize on and to build upon the new weapons information which the Soviet Union obtained during its 1961 tests. As President Kennedy pointed out in his speech on 2 March last ENDC/137, any such Soviet additional testing in secret, while the United States and the United Kingdom adhered to their no-testing commitments, could have most serious consequences for free-world security.

It is at this point in the debate that we are told by the Soviet Union that it, too, believes in controls over a nuclear test ban. However, it says that so-called national controls are all that are required, because national controls can uncover any type of secret test in any environment, that is, in outer space, in the atmosphere, underwater and underground. The Western delegations, both in this Sub-Committee and in plenary meetings, have patiently and clearly exposed, time and time again, the complete falsity of this claim. There is no need, I submit, to rehearse again the full gamut of reasons showing why this is so.

It should be enough to recall once more that the Soviet Union itself was speaking in favour of international controls until July 1961. Certainly its scientists and its Government subscribed to recommendations for an international control system in August 1958. Now what has happened? Well, the alleged change in the technical situation has most miraculously coincided with this period of resumed Soviet tests; that is, there was no change as of last July, when the Soviet Government unreservedly reconfirmed the validity of the 1958 experts' report EXP/NUC/227, but the alleged change had become complete by November last, after the Soviet Union had resumed its series of tests. The Soviet Union assures us, of course, that there is no connexion between the two events.



(Mr. Dean, United States)

To our regret in the West, the Soviet scientific breakthroughs -- which presumably must have occurred in those four months if they ever did occur -- are not even described to us, and we have been denied all hope of having a chance to question a live Soviet expert on these matters. Instead, well-known and unquestioned scientific facts are distorted to suit Soviet needs to disprove well-established scientific conclusions, and in an undisguised effort to prove patent falsehoods.

Take, for example, the statement of the Soviet Government of 3 April /ENDC/20/Rev.17/. It speaks of the capabilities of national systems "for the detection of nuclear explosions", or "for recording nuclear tests", or "for recording nuclear explosions". It never mentions -- not even once -- the crucial factor of identification of tests, because identification capabilities certainly do not exist under any form of non-international world-wide system for any size nuclear tests underground, underwater or in outer space, or for smaller, but nevertheless important, nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

Mr. Tsarapkin knows full well that the representatives at this Conference now clearly understand that recording or detection is not identification at all. Hence, in the second paragraph of his introductory remarks at our last meeting, before getting to his Government's statement of 3 April, he speaks of using "national means of detection and identification" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.6, page 20), which he calls "adequate". His Government was a little more accurate when it omitted any claims regarding identification. Can it be because the less well-trained audience outside the Geneva Conference would not catch this deliberate confusion of terms?

Both Mr. Tsarapkin and his Government again have tried to misrepresent the United States "Gnome" shot of 10 December 1961. For some inexplicable reason, they claim that this shot was an experiment to test the decoupling or muffling theory. They talk of its having been detonated in a large cavity and then, having set up this straw man, they proceed to knock it down by noting that no seismic waves were actually muffled, because they were recorded abroad.

However, as I said clearly at the sixth meeting of the Sub-Committee /ENDC/SC.I/PV.6, pages 18 et seq.7/, the "Gnome" shot was solely for peaceful uses, to see whether heat could be trapped underground after a nuclear blast for the generation of electricity. Under the decoupling theory, a detonation of 5 kilotons, the size and depth of "Gnome", would have required a large cavity, of about 350,000 cubic metres. "Gnome", however, was detonated in a space of about 20 cubic metres. No muffling was intended, and none was achieved. It was what we call a

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fully-tamped shot in salt rock. As such, this "Gnome" shot bears no relationship to shots in large cavities either in salt rock or in volcanic rock. Only with the latter type of shots could the theoretical calculations of the United States scientists in Technical Working Group 2 in December 1959 be proved or disproved.

/GEN/DNT/TWG.2/Annex IV/

Moreover, as I also pointed out at our last Sub-Committee meeting, the "Gnome" shot could not in any circumstances have been identified as a nuclear explosion merely from an expert interpretation of the seismic recordings alone. If there had not been, as indeed there was, an advance United States announcement of "Gnome's" date and time, it would have appeared on the seismographic records as just another earthquake. Of course, Mr. Tsarapkin said that he would have been suspicious of it in any event because "Gnome's" seismic signals would have been geographically located in an aseismic zone -- that is, New Mexico. But I submit that this again is irrelevant, because obviously no State trying to violate a treaty would conduct a clandestine underground nuclear test outside a seismic area. Therefore no such clues to identification on the basis of aseismicity would be available in a case of clandestine testing as were available for the "Gnome" shot. Indeed, all this only demonstrates further the soundness of the recent United States offer to reduce the possible number of on-site inspections in the heartland of the Soviet Union, which is aseismic -- an offer which the Soviet Union has refused even to discuss or consider.

One last point: The Soviet Union keeps returning to the offer of 3 September 1961 by Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy for an atmospheric test ban, because both then said the following in regard to such a ban:

"... the United States and the United Kingdom are prepared to rely upon existing means of detection, which they believe to be adequate ..."

(GEN/DNT/120)

It is the Soviet claim that this use of the word "adequate" must have been intended by the Western leaders as a judgement that existing systems were scientifically adequate for an atmospheric ban -- I repeat, an atmospheric ban only; no other environments were mentioned. In any case, I must challenge such an interpretation of the word "adequate". My explanation of this at the last meeting was very clear: the word "adequate" in this context could only have meant "sufficient in the circumstances" -- that is, in the circumstances of Soviet acceptance of the 3 September offer before it expired, in accordance with its terms, on 9 September.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

On 3 September 1961 it was our combined judgement that, in spite of the technical gaps in the atmospheric test ban which the lack of international controls would entail, we could tolerate the risks thus created if the Soviet Union accepted the offer immediately. This was because an immediate Soviet acceptance would have restored the status quo ante and would have meant a reversal of the Soviet policy to resume testing; it would have been a sign of Soviet good faith, good will and good political sense. It would probably have presaged early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty with international controls which guaranteed the preservation of the pre-existing nuclear balance. Our risks with existing systems of control would have been temporary and bearable.

The present situation is entirely different. We have had no sign of Soviet good faith -- indeed, quite the contrary; we have every evidence of an avid Soviet desire to continue to improve its nuclear weapons at any price. This could provide a big motivation for the Soviet Union to attempt secret tests, in violation of any treaty, in order to improve its position relative to the West more than it may have done during the 1961 series. The only protection against such a risk would be an effective -- that is, an international -- control system, and the gaps in any non-international system would loom very large indeed to us.

Thus it is that the solution of the problem of arriving at a sound test ban agreement still eludes us, despite all our efforts. The Soviet Union, from which some gesture of accommodation to the West on this subject is long overdue, not merely refuses to budge from its unfair and unreasonable positions, but indeed demands ever more of the West. We can point to all our many past concessions and to the evidence of our continued reasonableness and flexibility, but unfortunately the Soviet Union remains unmoved. We have told the Soviet Union that we are prepared to sign the 18 April 1961 treaty with its amendments (ENDC/9); we have offered to negotiate on that treaty and the amendments. The Soviet Union has accused us of being unyielding, but we in the West are indeed flexible. We are unyielding in one thing only, and that is in our great desire to be able to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty under adequate and effective international controls.

We still hope that the Soviet Union will recognize the harm its adamant and illogical position is doing both to itself and to all the peoples of the world, in whose future it so often professes a great interest. Here would be one practical way in which this alleged Soviet concern for mankind could be demonstrated.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

All that is required is that the Soviet Union return to the agreed negotiating basis of less than one year ago and reinstate all the many agreed treaty texts which existed at that time. Then, at last, we would be well on the way to rapid agreement in this most important sphere of disarmament.

I therefore appeal once again to our Soviet colleagues to meet with us, to consider this objectively, and to sign with us an adequate and effective nuclear test ban treaty with effective international controls.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): You said today, Mr. Dean, that the United States wants to bottle up the evil genie of atomic tests, which, as you put it, the Soviet Union released upon the world in September last [supra, page ....]. But to whom are you addressing this remark, Mr. Dean? For the members of the Committee are not babes or ignoramuses. They have memories; in particular, they remember developments in regard to nuclear weapons, and when and where they occurred. It is you, Mr. Dean - not you personally, but the United States - who released the evil genie of nuclear tests on 16 July 1945, at Trinity, Alamogordo, New Mexico, where you exploded your first atomic bomb. Less than a month later you dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is you who released the evil genie. Please do not slander the Soviet Union and try to transfer the blame from the guilty to the innocent.

In the course of the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the three-Power nuclear Sub-Committee, the Soviet delegation has already produced much evidence to show that the solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests does not hinge on the technical aspects of the problem of control over the discontinuance of such tests, which is the impression the United States and the United Kingdom representatives are trying to create. The solution of this problem is being frustrated by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments, which are obstinately pursuing their policy of continuing the nuclear arms race.

The deal concluded in Bermuda in December 1961 between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments on the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by these countries was completely unjustified and exposes them as opponents of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. This deal provides telling evidence of the aggressive policy of these two leading North Atlantic bloc countries.

(Mr. Tsarokhin, USSR)

The sanctimonious speeches poured out by the United States and the United Kingdom representatives both in the Sub-Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee asserting their Governments' desire to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests are merely a cover of screen designed to lessen the peoples' indignation at the United States decision to resume atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in addition to the underground nuclear explosions which they have already been conducting for some considerable time. The assertions by the United States and the United Kingdom of their wish to conclude an agreement are intended as a means of misleading world public opinion concerning the real aims of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments.

The facts, however, demonstrate that the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom are wholly aimed at frustrating agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and thus obtaining a pretext for carrying out the decision taken at the Bermuda conference to conduct atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in April. Proof that the United States Government considers the present moment appropriate for the resumption of atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and is confident of its success in blocking all possibility of reaching agreement at Geneva on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is to be found in the fact that the United States has already warned the whole world that the vessels and aircraft of all countries should avoid the area of Christmas Island, where the atmospheric nuclear tests are to be resumed, from 15 April onwards. This warning was given by the United States Government on 4 April.

A few qualifying statements to the effect that the tests will perhaps not be conducted if agreement is reached are hardly likely to mislead anyone, since it is apparent to everyone that in reality the United States does not want any agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and has blocked all avenues, all possibilities of agreement. The plan of United States ruling circles is very simple: to conduct a new series of nuclear weapon tests and to try to pass, to transfer the responsibility for this step to the Soviet Union.

In order to frustrate agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and thus to remove the obstacles in the way of continuing such tests, the United States Government and those responsible for United States diplomacy are doing their utmost to invent as many pretexts as possible to justify such action.

(Mr. Tsaraokin, USSR)

But he who tries to prove too much ends up by proving nothing. The United States, for example, states that it intends to carry out a new series of nuclear weapon tests so as not to lag behind the Soviet Union in respect of nuclear arms. But this is a rather strange pretext, the falsity of which is immediately apparent. For quite recently, in November 1961, after the provocative and aggressive policy of the United States compelled the Soviet Union to conduct its own series of nuclear weapon tests, the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, stated that that country possessed many times more nuclear power than any other country in the world and had at its disposal sufficient nuclear weapons of all types to safeguard the security of the United States and, as he put it, of the whole "free world". United States statesmen and military leaders have always asserted that the United States leads the Soviet Union where the power of accumulated nuclear weapons is concerned. Just recently the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. MacNamara, again boasted to the world of the present huge superiority of the United States in strategic nuclear weapons. Yet the United States, despite this superiority, has decided to conduct a new series of nuclear weapon tests both underground and in the atmosphere in a few days' time.

But if it is true that the United States, as its leaders state, considerably surpasses the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear arms, its argument that it is necessary to carry out a new series of nuclear weapon tests so as not to lag behind the Soviet Union in this field is fictitious; it is completely spurious and its sole purpose is to justify the nuclear arms race policy, a policy designed to keep the world in a state of tension and to accustom the peoples to the idea that the world must inevitably be on the brink of war.

Another argument which the United States is using as a pretext for preventing agreement is that, without international control, it cannot be sure that a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests will be observed. In this connexion, the United States and the United Kingdom representatives reiterate at one meeting after another that the United States cannot trust the Soviet Union's word because the Soviet Union allegedly violated the agreement on a moratorium. Mr. Dean has repeated this idea again today for the umpteenth time. We have already repeatedly pointed out that such assertions are completely baseless and that the United States is maliciously distorting the real state of affairs. We have already drawn your attention many times to a document which makes it clear that

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the moratorium was repudiated not by the Soviet Union but by the United States. On 29 December 1959, the United States announced to the whole world through its President at that time, Mr. Eisenhower, that from 1 January 1960 the United States considered itself free of any obligations under the moratorium and intended to test its weapons at any time it thought necessary in order to safeguard the country's security.

You see what conditions the United States laid down for itself? Yet Mr. Dean incessantly attacks the Soviet Union because it presumed to follow exactly the same course as the United States, i.e. because, after that date, it too could not consider itself bound by any obligations in respect of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. I should like to call your attention once again to the following point.

At the time the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, repudiated the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests, was the United States really faced with the problem of not lagging behind the Soviet Union in nuclear arms? For as we know, the United States had by then conducted almost four times as many nuclear weapon tests as the Soviet Union, and the Americans themselves calculated that the total yield of the explosions set off by the United States alone accounted for 72% of the yield of all the nuclear explosions hitherto set off throughout the world. These facts and figures clearly demonstrate that in December 1959 the United States was not faced with the problem of catching up with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear arms. Yet the United States officially stated that it was repudiating the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and considered itself free to resume such tests at any time it chose.

Therefore, when the United States and the United Kingdom representatives now put forward calculations of the total yield of Soviet nuclear explosions as an argument to justify their own tests, they are obviously introducing an irrelevant issue in an attempt to find some grounds for the continuation of the nuclear arms race, which they were unwilling to renounce in Mr. Eisenhower's time in December 1959, and are unwilling to renounce now.

The United States has not only repudiated the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests but has also made extensive preparations to resume nuclear weapon tests. The excavation at a great depth of numerous shafts and cavities for underground nuclear testing has not ceased in the United States for a single day. The United States Congress has increased appropriations for nuclear weapon tests year after year. While negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests have been in progress at Geneva, the United States has continued to threaten the world with a resumption of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In this connexion there is a fact of which I should like to remind both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber, who repeat at every meeting the same old story that it is not the United States but the Soviet Union which has been preparing to resume nuclear weapon tests. On 7 May 1960, a few months after President Eisenhower's statement repudiating the moratorium, the United States Government informed the whole world that the United States intended to carry out the so-called research programme known as Project Vela, under which a series of underground nuclear explosions was to be set off by the United States. An appropriation of \$ 66 million was made in the 1961 United States budget for the execution of this project, a sum nearly seven times greater than United States expenditure for such purposes the previous year. Particular interest in this series of underground tests was shown by the Pentagon as the consumer of nuclear weapons and by the United States Atomic Energy Commission as the producer and supplier of nuclear weapons to the United States Department of the Army. This fact in itself convincingly confirms and underlines the military significance of Project Vela.

On 17 July 1960 the United States Department of Defense, not a United States civilian scientific organization, published detailed information on the conduct of underground nuclear explosions under this programme, which you tried to make us believe was for peaceful purposes. But we know very well what sort of programme for peaceful purposes the Pentagon was in fact directing. It was obvious from announcements by the Pentagon that this series of nuclear explosions was mainly intended to improve nuclear explosive mechanisms - under the pretext, of course, of studying methods of detecting nuclear explosions.

It is no coincidence that, as the Atomic Energy Commission has admitted, numerous shafts and tunnels were prepared for conducting underground nuclear tests in the United States as far back as in 1960.

The precise moment for the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States was merely a matter of its Government selecting the appropriate time. The intensity with which the United States has been preparing to resume nuclear tests is evident from the mere fact that more than twenty-five underground explosions have been set off in the country since 15 September 1961. It is a matter of common knowledge that the preparation of each shaft, of each underground nuclear weapon explosion calls for a huge expenditure both of time and money and involved the employment of experts and a variety of equipment on an enormous scale.



(Mr. Tsaraphin, USSR)

Therefore, when the United States representatives try to accuse the USSR of negotiating dishonestly with the Western Powers since, they allege, it was preparing for nuclear explosions during the negotiations, they are deliberately uttering a gross lie in order to conceal the true facts.

I shall now turn to the question of national control. I do not propose to repeat the arguments which conclusively prove that national systems of detection are completely adequate for controlling an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. These facts have not been refuted by anyone here. We have already quoted the example of the United States "Gnome" shot to show how the theory fabricated by Dr. Teller and his colleagues about the possibility of concealing a nuclear explosion in salt rock has been refuted in practice. What Mr. Dean told us today proved absolutely nothing and merely demonstrated that the United States juggles with science to suit its own political aims. When speaking of the ability of national detection systems to register underground nuclear explosions at distances many thousands of kilometres from the explosion site, we pointed out that an underground nuclear explosion set off in the Soviet Union was registered by the United States. I refer to the explosion set off on 2 February. In an attempt to minimize the significance of this fact, Mr. Dean made the following statement at the fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee:

"As for the Soviet underground explosion of 2 February 1962, we know that it was not a small shot but quite a large one." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.5, page 24)

But the truth is that Mr. Dean and his colleagues at these negotiations were misled by their scientific advisers on this occasion too and were given incorrect information on the yield of the Soviet underground nuclear explosion. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that, contrary to Mr. Dean's assertion, the underground explosion set off in the Soviet Union on 2 February was of low yield. This point is also made in the message dated 2 April 1962 from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Mr. Ikeda, the Prime Minister of Japan. Since this message has a direct bearing on our negotiations, I would ask the Secretariat to issue it as a Committee document<sup>1/</sup>. The fact that the United States detected the Soviet low-yield underground nuclear explosion once again conclusively confirms that the United States possesses a system of detection which registers underground explosions at great distances.

(Mr. Tserapkin, USSR)

The capacity of national systems of detection to verify compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests is confirmed by the statements of many qualified scientists in various countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

I drew attention at the Sub-Committee's fourth meeting to the speed and success with which new methods of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions are being developed in a number of countries, particularly in the United Kingdom. In this connexion I referred to reports by the scientific correspondents of the British newspapers, The Evening News and The Sunday Times. Mr. Godber admittedly did not confirm this information, but neither did he refute it. However, with a persistence worthy of a better cause, he has joined forces with Mr. Dean in making strenuous efforts to prove the inadequacy of national detection systems for the purpose of controlling an agreement and to mislead people who are ill-informed about this problem. He and his United States colleague are putting forward the idea of the need for a meeting of Soviet and Western scientific experts to discuss the ability of existing national detection systems to identify nuclear explosions. Mr. Godber has even asked us whether or not we are willing to agree to such a meeting.

We have already given our views, both in the Sub-Committee and at plenary meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on the idea of holding further technical discussions. We would find it difficult to understand why the United States representatives raise the same question of technical discussions over and over again if we did not know from sad experience the aim the Western Powers are pursuing in our negotiations. We see how their representatives are doing their utmost to find some kind of justification for their refusal to accept our reasonable and realistic proposal to use national systems of detecting nuclear explosions for controlling compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. In this connexion I should like to repeat what I said at the fourth meeting on 28 March:

"..... all the Western Powers' talk of the need for further technical discussions is, purely and simply, a diversionary manoeuvre, an attempt to evade a political solution of the problem of discontinuing tests by substituting futile discussions on the technical aspects of the problem of control". (ENDC/SC.I/PV.4, page 15)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We know from experience that, whenever the United States has lacked arguments to support its political position, it has put forward technical arguments of one kind or another and has pressed for the holding of technical conferences. It has invited to these conferences scientists, who, disregarding the actual scientific facts or basing their attitude on unsupported hypotheses, have tried to support their Government's position with arguments which were later completely disproved in practice.

It is no coincidence that various articles are now appearing in the United States press, asserting, on the basis of references to scientific and technical sources, that the equipment at present available is incapable of detecting underground nuclear tests. For example, The New York Times published a report on 5 March that further research into the question of detecting nuclear explosions carried out under Project Vela "has confirmed the conclusions of United States scientists on the difficulties of detecting clandestine underground explosions of nuclear weapons." It is also significant that, at a meeting of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Dean should again have started saying something which was said a long time ago by United States scientists like Dr. Teller, that well-known advocate of the use of atomic weapons for aggressive purposes, namely, that it is either impossible or very difficult to detect nuclear explosions if they are set off far out in space, for example, beyond the moon or Venus. But I think that Mr. Dean must realize that this is a completely frivolous argument, because it would never occur to anyone to set off nuclear explosions there.

In his statement at the previous meeting Mr. Dean scolded the Soviet Union for refusing to consent to the holding of new technical conferences and made the ludicrous charge that we are seeking "to discredit all scientists of all countries". This idea was echoed in Mr. Dean's statement today. No, Mr. Dean, we are not seeking to do this, nor have we ever set ourselves such a goal. We have no wish to question the sincerity or the professional integrity of all scientists in the United States or of all scientists throughout the world. On the contrary, unlike you, we have a profound belief in the power and efficacy of science, a profound appreciation and respect for scientists of integrity. We know that science has already furnished us with reliable methods of controlling compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, namely, with national methods of detection. We are only categorically opposed to scientific and technical information and discussions being used to disrupt important political negotiations

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

and to handing over the settlement of the question of discontinuing tests to scientific experts who, as we know, will deliberately do everything in their power to justify further competition in nuclear weapon tests and to drive the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests into an impasse.

In this connexion, an article by Dr. Lewis Don Leet, professor of geology at Harvard University, published in the 9 April issue of the United States weekly The National Guardian, is of great interest. Dr. Leet is not only one of the outstanding seismologists of the United States, but has a world-wide reputation. Since 1931, that is for a period of thirty-one years, he has directed the seismic station at Harvard University. In this article Dr. Leet sheds some light on the principles and methods governing the composition of the technical groups set up in the United States to discuss the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and on the sort of reports furnished to the authorities responsible for United States foreign policy by these United States technical experts, who are connected with the Pentagon and the powerful United States monopolies. One only needs to compose these facts to see that all the evidence given has been designed to prove the impossibility of detecting underground nuclear explosions and thus to justify the United States in its refusal to conclude a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

Dr. Leet contends in his article that the position the United States has taken during the negotiations on the prohibition of tests with regard to the question of detecting underground nuclear explosions is scientifically unsound. He states, Mr. Dean, that if all the facts were known -- I repeat, if all the facts were known -- the United States and Soviet participants in the negotiations could reach agreement on the prohibition of tests in a matter of a week.

He maintains that the United States Department of Defence is taking an extremely pessimistic stand on the detection of underground tests. He goes on to say that the United States Department of Defense ignores the opinions of seismologists and misuses technical data in order to bolster up its own political position. He adds that while the Government may well merely be seeking a pretext to ask for inspections in the Soviet Union, it is not entitled to use seismological data to justify its position.

Dr. Leet casts doubt on the scientific soundness of the Berkner report /GEN/DIT/65/, which was and still is the basis for the United States position with regard to the ability of seismology to detect underground nuclear explosions. He

(Mr. Tsaraphin, USSR)

refutes the validity of the conclusions of the Berkner group and of Project Vela. He says that the Berkner group had such meagre data at its disposal that it should not have made any assertions whatsoever. Yet it vouched for the correctness of its conclusions. The Russians took a glance at the material it produced and burst out laughing, and, I must say, with good reason. Any self-respecting seismologist would also burst out laughing.

Dr. Leet states that no professional seismologists took part in the research carried out by the Berkner and Vela groups. The only members of the Berkner group with the slightest knowledge of seismology were electronic engineers who were superficially acquainted with the subject. Failure to employ seismologists working at seismic stations in carrying out such projects is tantamount to revising the system of weights and measures without consulting the Bureau of Standards.

Dr. Leet offered his services in connexion with Project Vela, but his offer was rejected. But when he went to Washington for talks on the subject, he was asked in Government circles: "If your theory is correct, would we require a larger or a smaller number of inspections in the territory of the Soviet Union?". Leet replied that a smaller number would be required. He was then told he would be called upon if needed. Professor Leet is still waiting; no one has called upon him, and no one is interested in him in United States Government circles.

After encountering such an attitude to seismology, to science and genuine seismological experts, Dr. Leet wrote that he had been naive enough to believe that science, in no matter whose hands, was always objective, but that the conclusions of Project Vela were as full of holes as Swiss cheese. Three months before he had not even known that these conclusions would be put to use at Geneva. Now, he asked, is such a thing allowed to happen? This, Mr. Dean, is the answer of one of your own independent scientists to your comment about the United States scientists working for the Pentagon and for the suppliers of nuclear weapons.

I must point out that Dr. Leet's views on the comparative ease with which underground explosions can be detected are shared by scientists from other countries. I might draw your attention to certain other facts mentioned by the National Guardian; for example, the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence - by which I mean the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence - Sir Solly Zuckerman, and the head of the Research Group of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Sir William Penney, met government scientific experts in Washington from 16 to 20 March and submitted evidence to these experts that the British had detected all the recent United States underground tests.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

However, none of this carries any weight with the United States, since it only retains what can be used to support its position in favour of the nuclear arms race and discards everything that does not support this position.

I should again like to point out that other similar facts which I have mentioned earlier but which I did not discuss today demonstrate the groundlessness of the assertions by the United States representatives that compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of tests cannot be verified by means of national systems.

All these facts provide further evidence that, if our Western partners had shown goodwill, an agreement on the discontinuance of tests would long since have been signed. But in this matter the United States Government continues to take a line which bodes no good for the future. It states that unless an agreement is concluded on its terms, on the basis of so-called international control, that is to say, an agreement which would give it the right to have an espionage network in the territory of the USSR under the guise of international control, the United States will not agree to any other basis for control and will start in April to carry out the atmospheric nuclear tests it has planned. Such designs on the part of the United States can obviously only deepen the rift between us and provide further proof that the Western Powers do not wish to display a reasonable and realistic approach to the question of discontinuing tests or to make a start in this important matter.

At the fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee Mr. Dean was so concerned to prove the need for the establishment of international control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests that he did not hesitate to distort the true position of the Soviet Union. For example, he stated:

"..... the Soviet idea that no controls at all are really needed because States will abide by their treaty pledges hardly merits serious attention. If taken literally it would undermine the institution of the United Nations itself, or of any international control arrangement for any disarmament measure, and not merely for a nuclear test ban treaty. It ..... contradicts the sixth of the disarmament principles already agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 September 1961 ....."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.5, page 26)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That comment can one make on these arguments of Mr. Dean's? In the first place, the Soviet Union never has asserted that no controls are needed over an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. On the contrary, we have stated and continue to state that strict control is needed, but control of a type which would exclude any possibility of espionage and intelligence work in the territory of the States parties to the agreement. In present circumstances, when the problem of disarmament is still unsolved, such control can only be national control. Practice and experience have shown that it is perfectly possible to detect all nuclear weapon explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space by means of national detection systems. It is also perfectly possible to detect underground tests. We have already given you relevant information on this subject on more than one occasion. You are familiar with it.

Mr. Dean asserted that the Soviet Union's idea that international control is not needed hardly merits serious attention. I must make it clear that we cannot agree with such a theory. To adopt this way of looking at things might have the effect of nullifying the conclusion of any agreements. But agreements are concluded in order to be observed. This is a rudimentary principle of international law. Judging by his remarks throughout these discussions, Mr. Dean is clearly of a different opinion, but this is his personal opinion. However, the majority of international jurists and legal experts in the civilized world continue to adhere firmly to this rule of international law, namely that treaties are concluded to be observed. It is on this understanding that we are conducting negotiations with the Western Powers. If, as one is led to believe from Mr. Dean's persistent assertions, the United States has an ulterior motive in negotiating with us and intends, after the conclusion of an agreement, to take steps to infringe and evade it -- this is the very sort of situation the United States is continually brandishing before the Soviet Union in the attempt to convince it of the need for some international control -- it had better say so honestly and openly. Then it will be clear that there is no point in our sitting here and wasting time.

In the second place, Mr. Dean's assertion that the Soviet proposal to use national systems of detection contradicts the sixth of the disarmament principles already agreed upon by the USSR and the United States is obviously a fabrication. It is far-fetched and irrelevant. It is obviously meant for people who are not very fully informed about disarmament questions. But everyone familiar with this problem knows that the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is not a disarmament measure.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

If nuclear tests were prohibited now, this fact would not in itself stop the nuclear arms race or reduce armies by a single man; it would not lead to a reduction in nuclear arsenals by a single atomic or hydrogen bomb or to the destruction of weapons of war. It is for this very reason that the problem of verifying compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests should be solved in a different way from that of verifying control over disarmament. Since the discontinuance of tests is not a disarmament measure, control should be of a different nature: in other words, it should not be international control, which should be applied to disarmament measures, but control on a national basis.

I wish to emphasize once again that we in the Soviet Union are in favour of strict international control over disarmament measures; but when it is a matter of discontinuing nuclear tests without an agreement on general and complete disarmament, such control -- I mean international control -- provides extensive opportunities for espionage and intelligence work. This is why we have adopted the position that control measures should be closely co-ordinated with disarmament measures. We consider that the control which we have proposed: namely, control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests by means of national systems of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions, ensures control over compliance with an agreement. Our position, Mr. Dean, does not contradict point 6 of the Agreed Principles.

So far from undermining the institution of the United Nations, the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests on the basis proposed by us would, on the contrary, strengthen this Organization, make for confidence among States and reduce international tension. Such an agreement would do much to promote the success of the Eighteen Nation Committee's work on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

We have still not lost hope that the United States, which we believe is closely following the course of discussion in the Eighteen Nation Committee and in this Sub-Committee and which is familiar with the unanimous demand for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, not only by the non-aligned countries that are members of the Committee but by the peoples of the whole world, will summon up sufficient wisdom and goodwill to take a first step and conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests under which national systems of control would



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

be used to verify compliance with such an agreement. This would be a sound measure and would bring about conditions more favourable to the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Perhaps I might say just a few words in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom. My first comment is that, in view of Mr. Tsarapkin's great reluctance to speak today, I think he has done pretty well. I shudder to think what the length of his speech might have been had he come really prepared to make one to us today.

But I would say to my colleagues here that our duty in the Sub-Committee is not so much to make speeches at one another: it is to negotiate. It is for that reason that I find the attitude persistently adopted by the Soviet delegation here so very depressing. Mr. Tsarapkin said at the beginning of his statement, referring to remarks of the United States representative, that we are not children. Well, listening to some of his arguments today, I wondered if he thought that some of those who were going to read his speech were children. For I found some of his arguments so wholly artificial and so wholly unsatisfactory that they could convince nobody.

No conference can make progress -- certainly cannot succeed -- unless there is some common ground on which to negotiate. That is a simple, basic fact. For three years we had such common ground, and we were therefore able to make progress -- and we did come within sight of a treaty. This common ground was provided by the political decisions of our three Governments that nuclear weapon testing should be discontinued on the basis of a system of international detection and international inspection.

The Soviet representative seems to find great difficulty in his speeches nowadays in distinguishing between detection and inspection. I do not believe he really has great difficulty in distinguishing in his own mind; but it is a pity that he does not distinguish more clearly in what he says, because there is a great deal of difference in the arguments relating to the two. There is a great deal of need to clear our minds on what has been shown in the discussions -- not only here, but in plenary too -- to be the absolutely essential nature of having an adequate international system of identification. Certainly it is very important to have international detection, too, over a very large part of the field, but over the whole field there is no question that international identification and the need to verify is a basic fact.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

The Soviet representative said at our last meeting, and I think he was right in saying so, that the problem before us is basically political and not technical — although, of course, political decisions must be taken in the light of technical considerations.

The trouble is that on 28 November last the Soviet Government itself announced a change of political policy — namely, the abandonment of any form of international verification in the nuclear test field. The reason given was a change in the international situation. But at the very same time the Soviet Government was affirming its willingness to accept international control in the field of disarmament -- and to accept international control in one field which is not disarmament, that is, in connexion with surprise attack measures, to which I referred in a speech in the plenary Conference the other day. This was set out very clearly in the last of the eight points in the memorandum Mr. Gromyko submitted to the United Nations last September ENDC/147. In other words, the Soviet Government was reaffirming political decisions to accept international verification both in and outside the field of disarmament, but, at the same time, in the field of nuclear tests it revoked a decision in the same sense which it had maintained for over three years.

This was a basic change in policy which has never been adequately justified and which involved attempting to change the whole basis on which our discussions were taking place. As all the representatives here know perfectly well, the whole basis of our discussions was the agreed experts' report which laid down clearly the need for international verification. Yet the Soviet Union sought unilaterally to overthrow this whole basis of approach. I can imagine what their attitude would have been had the West sought to do anything like that at an earlier stage, how they would have poured scorn on such a project, how they would have said it was necessary to have international agreement as the basis of our discussions and how wrong it was to overthrow it in the middle of our work. But that is exactly what they did on 28 November, and they have tried time and again since to cover up this fact.

Even this afternoon, at one stage Mr. Tserapkin said that the United States Government stated that "unless an agreement were concluded on its terms" .... etc.; but these were also the Soviet Union's terms until 28 November last; they were our joint conditions for reaching agreement. And I do not think that simply

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

because the Soviet Union chose unilaterally to abandon those conditions the Soviet representative is entitled to accuse us of bad faith or insincerity. I would suggest that they examine their own consciences in this regard; because, until we can get a sound, agreed basis for our discussions, how can we make progress?

This afternoon the Soviet representative has brought up all sorts of stories culled from the Western press -- which is a free press in which many different points of view are put forward -- to try to justify his own position. If he is so sure that the scientific basis has changed, he should be prepared to have this argued out here in this Sub-Committee or by experts meeting again to discuss the matter properly. This is no substitute for a proper discussion of the matter; it is merely a smoke screen to cover up the weakness of his own argument, and I am quite sure he realises that very well indeed. This really will not further our discussions at all, and I am very sorry indeed that the Soviet representative has once again followed this negative course.

I should like to refer for a moment to the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union at our last meeting. On that occasion he quoted from one or two of the speeches made by representatives of the new members of the Disarmament Committee, but I noted that those quotations were related to one aspect only of the nuclear test problem; he quoted only those passages in our colleagues' speeches which appealed for no further testing of any kind; he made no reference to their other suggestions. And as regards the question of having no further tests at all, I was amazed again this afternoon at the quite incredible way in which he dismisses out of hand the fact that his own country broke the three-year self-imposed restriction I admit there was no agreement about this; it was self-imposed by each country. Nevertheless, his country broke it; his country started this race again; and his country and no other must bear the full responsibility for the results of that, because, had his country not restarted, there would have been no question of the West's restarting. His country did this and brought this race into being again.

And it is no good talking as he did today and at our previous meeting, for instance, when he gave us all sorts of figures to show that there had been more tests in the West than in the East. The starting-point for such a discussion must be the simple fact that his Government, like the Western Governments, did agree that there should be no more tests and did therefore accept the position as it was three years ago, however many tests either side had carried out. Both sides had accepted that position, and it is only the recommencement of tests three years later that one can really consider to be the basic reason for our present difficulties, and the responsibility lies very heavily on the Soviet Union.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I do not want to go on making this point, which is abundantly clear to all our colleagues in the Committee as a whole. I am not interested in all these references to the past; I am interested in trying to get agreement for the future -- and that is why I am so depressed at what I have listened to once more today.

At our meeting last Thursday our Soviet colleague, referring to the remarks made by our colleagues from the non-committed countries, made no mention whatever of the suggestions put forward by those representatives to enable us to find a way out of the impasse we have reached. He ignored those suggestions, he brushed them aside. I gather from this that the Soviet Union does not think these suggestions worthy of serious consideration. At our last meeting I took the trouble to pick out these statements and to remind my colleagues in this Sub-Committee of the various suggestions made by the representatives of the non-committed nations. I thought they were very revealing and interesting. I certainly thought then, and I think now, that they are helpful and worthy of a fuller examination than they have so far received from the representative of the Soviet Union.

I should like to ask him again whether he has chosen deliberately to ignore these proposals and thinks there is no value in them. There were the proposals of India, Ethiopia, Burma and Sweden -- I reminded the Sub-Committee of all these at our last meeting -- and there were also the valuable comments of Mexico, Brazil and the United Arab Republic. All these are there in the verbatim record of our last meeting, and all are deserving of our attention. Through all of them runs a thread, one coherent thought -- the absolutely essential need for on-site inspection. Whatever the Soviet Union says, that has been accepted by impartial judges here in our Disarmament Conference as an obvious need for which a case has been made out, and nothing the Soviet Union has said has caused these people to change this view in any way. I would call them in aid of the views expressed by my United States colleague and myself on this score.

I hope, therefore, that further consideration will be given to this basic need for on-site inspection. This is the only way of settling any dispute as to whether any event has occurred or not. This talk of espionage about which we have heard so much -- I am glad we did not hear so much of it today -- has already been shown to be completely false and hollow. I hope we shall not hear any more such

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

charges. I am sure it has been shown to be illogical anyway, because of what I recalled to my colleagues a few moments ago -- that if the Soviet Union is willing to contemplate this in other spheres, including spheres which are not those of general and complete disarmament, there can be no validity in its assertion that there is a dangerous element of espionage here.

To return to the question of the need for a political decision in regard to our discussions, I would say that I entirely agree with that need. But what we require from our Soviet colleague is a positive political decision, not a negative one such as that with which we are now confronted. What does the Soviet decision amount to? What precisely does it mean? Apparently it means that the governments which engage themselves in obligations not to test should do so as an act of faith. Having signed a treaty, Mr. Tsarapkin says, no great Power -- or indeed any Power which is a signatory to that treaty -- would dare to break its obligation. But this really is not in line with what Mr. Gromyko himself has said. He told us in our early discussions at plenary meetings that he will not trust us, the West, in the field of disarmament and that he does not expect us to trust him. Presumably when a political decision to sign a disarmament treaty is taken, it must be based on the creation of some form of confidence. And, as we know, it is accepted by both sides in the disarmament discussions that this confidence can only be created and is to be created by international supervision.

If Mr. Tsarapkin can suggest any other way, we shall be only too glad to consider it. The same applies, of course, to nuclear tests. There is no reason whatsoever why, if the idea of an impartial, international check on the observance of a disarmament treaty is accepted, it should not also be accepted in the case of a nuclear test ban treaty. There is no reason why, if the Soviet Union accepts the idea of international control against surprise attack, it should not also accept such control against nuclear tests.

All our difficulties here, the whole problem of stopping nuclear testing, comes down to this: will all the parties concerned accept some form of international supervision of their obligations not to test? We have been emphasizing this cardinal point for three years. We have said that we are willing to discuss and to negotiate on any proposals if only the Soviet Union will accept adequate international supervision. The General Assembly of the United Nations, by overwhelming majorities, has laid similar emphasis on this point. It is not good enough for

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Mr. Tsaraphin to read out one paragraph, out of its context, from resolution 1648 (XVI) of the last session of the General Assembly. That paragraph did indeed earnestly urge States to refrain from further test explosions, but it urged them to do so pending the conclusion of necessary international binding agreements in regard to tests. It also expressed in its third paragraph, which I do not think Mr. Tsaraphin read out, confidence that the States concerned would reach agreement on the cessation of tests under appropriate international control. That is the point. Mr. Tsaraphin chooses to continue to ignore it. But it is a vitally important point and one which the majority of thinking people, not only here but in the world outside, do not ignore; nor do the majority of the countries represented here at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament ignore it.

So I come back to the fact that if the Soviet Union sincerely desires an immediate end to nuclear testing, let it acknowledge freely here and now that it can have it at once. All we ask is that it should accept what the rest of the world is prepared to accept -- reasonable, impartial international supervision. That is really the basis of what we are asking.

I do not propose to go back over the rather stale and sterile history that Mr. Tsaraphin has given us again and again. It is not in arguing over nuances of past discussions that we are going to solve this problem. It is on looking at these simple basic facts and accepting that there is a genuine need, which is acknowledged by others as well as by us, that we are going to make progress, if we are to make any at all.

In the earlier part of Mr. Tsaraphin's speech this afternoon he said that the "Test had blocked all avenues and all possibilities of agreement (Supra, page )" This seems to me to be a fantastic approach. He knows perfectly well that only one delegation -- his own -- blocked the road when it put forward, on 28 November 1961, this entirely changed basis of discussion. It put that forward in the guise of a new agreement, or basis for a treaty. But it must have known at that time that it was wholly unreasonable in expecting its colleagues in the discussions here to change the whole basis without warning, suddenly to accept at face value the simple claim of the Soviet Union that now, all of a sudden, national stations would solve all our needs and that there was no need for international detection or inspection in any form. This is a wholly unrealistic approach, and one that is not worthy of serious consideration.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I see no necessity to go over all the stale arguments which were produced again today, and so I return to this simple point, that we all declare we want to stop testing. There is an effective way to do it, the basis on which we all agreed to talk and on which we came very near to achieving a treaty only a few months ago. No adequate reason has been given as to why there can be no international verification procedures, and we have had no justification for the fact that in the field of nuclear tests it is wicked and immoral to seek the right for nationals of other countries to enter the territory of the Soviet Union under the most stringent and strict safeguards, in order to ascertain whether there has been any violation. But we have been given no reason why in no circumstances should they be allowed on that territory when at the same time the Soviet Union is ready to receive them not only in the field of general and complete disarmament, as I have recalled, on Mr. Gromyko's showing, but in the field of other matters which are associated with disarmament, but which are certainly not disarmament measures themselves. There is a complete illogicality here for which we see no justification.

Therefore, if the Soviet Union is serious in its desire for a test ban treaty, let it show that seriousness straightaway and let us get down to discussing the details of a treaty, and not merely make long polemical speeches at one another which can achieve nothing towards the ends which I believe the whole world is wanting us to achieve.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I wish to associate myself entirely with the exceptionally cogent remarks which you have just made, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the United Kingdom. During the three years of these negotiations I think that we have tried to confine ourselves to factual statements and late in a sincere endeavour to arrive at an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

I must say that I was astonished at the almost complete distortions of the record in which our Soviet colleague engaged this afternoon. I am indeed very sorry that he has done so. As our Soviet colleague is well aware, President Eisenhower's statement of 29 December 1959 with respect to the moratorium was followed two weeks later, on 14 January 1960, by a statement of Chairman Khrushchev, who repeated that the Soviet Union would abide by its pledge not to resume tests if the United States and the United Kingdom did not do so first. It is also well

(Mr. Dean, United States)

known that the Soviet Union, without any reservations at that time, approved the United States research programme in principle -- at the two hundred and second meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests in May 1960 -- including underground detonations /GEN/DNT/PV.202, page 6/. The only condition was that the Soviet Union could examine the nuclear explosive devices inside and outside. The United States agreed to this without reservation, completely unconditionally: on 22 March 1961 /GEN/DNT/PV.275, page 6/. Naturally, the United States went ahead with its tunnel-digging in anticipation of the implementation of this programme, with the approval of the Soviet Union.

I was happy to see that our Soviet colleague, although he indulged in some Soviet distortions, did agree this afternoon with the validity of this important fact: namely, that the only United States preparations for nuclear tests before the Soviet resumption of tests on 1 September were for underground research shots in our peaceful programme, which we announced to the world and to which, as I have said, the Soviet Union had agreed in principle.

I was also somewhat surprised at the statements made here this afternoon by Mr. Tsaraphin, because he knows very well that, on Dr. Berliner's panel and in Technical Working Group 2 here in Geneva, we had Dr. Frank Press of the California Institute of Technology, Dr. Oliver of Columbia University and Dr. Carl Romney -- three of the outstanding United States seismologists. The mere mention of these names is enough to guarantee their complete acceptability as objective scientists throughout the world. So far as I am aware, apart from the more recent attitude of the Soviet Union that national detection systems are sufficient, there is no fundamental disagreement between international seismologists on the fact that by distant instrumentation, whatever its ability to detect, one cannot identify explosions as having been nuclear in origin.

I am not personally familiar with the National Guardian from which Mr. Tsaraphin quoted, but my information is that it is a small weekly which generally follows the Communist Party line. If I am mistaken and it is an objective scientific publication, I shall be very happy to be corrected.

In the report dated 10 July 1959 to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests by the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions /GEN/DNT/WAT/8/ statements were made, without contradiction, as to the necessity of having far-earth satellites



(Mr. Dean, United States)

and solar satellites. It was said that even such detection systems could not detect nuclear explosions which might be carried out behind the moon or the sun, away from the earth, and that unshielded nuclear explosions in these regions might be detected by the installation of the solar satellites for which we provided in our treaty. Anybody reading that report will find that what I have said is clearly set forth there, without any contradiction.

Mr. Tsarapkin also told us this afternoon that the Soviet underground shot of 2 February 1962 -- the shot that Chairman Khrushchev said the Soviet Union had set off in order to deceive us -- was small. Well, "small" is a relative term. It is true that this Soviet underground shot of 2 February this year was small in relation to the huge megaton shots -- in terms of millions of tons' equivalent of TNT -- of the Soviet atmospheric series. But I am sure that Mr. Tsarapkin must agree that this Soviet underground shot of 2 February was clearly much larger than the atmospheric explosions of the Second World War. Hence, I submit, it could hardly be regarded as small.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, it is our purpose here to try to get some agreement on an effective and adequate nuclear test ban treaty, which we believe should have objective and effective international controls. We are under instructions to report to the Conference in plenary meeting early this week. Counting today's meeting we have had two meetings since the last discussion of the nuclear test ban in the full Conference. Perhaps the Conference could discuss our report, which could consist of the verbatim records of the last two meetings, on Wednesday morning. I put that forward for consideration, and as a proposal which we might make to the Soviet co-Chairman. I do not, of course, mean to shut out any other representative who might wish to speak this afternoon, but I might suggest, subject to anyone else's wishing to speak this afternoon, that the next meeting of our Sub-Committee might be set for Thursday at 3.30 p.m. These are only suggestions, Mr. Chairman, which I put forward for consideration by yourself and my Soviet colleague.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): On this point I should certainly be glad to have the views of the other representatives here. I should also be glad to know whether our Soviet colleague wishes to address us on further substantive points before we proceed to the question of the next meeting.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I listened with deep regret to today's statement by the United Kingdom representative and to the first and second statements by the United States representative.

These statements clearly represent the last stages of a diversionary propaganda manoeuvre before the resumption of atmospheric nuclear weapon tests on Christmas Island. The statements by the United States and United Kingdom representatives contain not a glimmer, not a ray of hope that the United States will refrain from continuing nuclear weapon tests, from resuming atmospheric testing. Undoubtedly, they -- I refer to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom -- are continuing their efforts to lead our negotiations here to a final impasse, to block all and every possibility of reaching agreement, although we can reach agreement.

The Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 opens up wide prospects for such agreement. But, as is clear, the Western Powers do not want this. The responsibility for the consequences will lie wholly with those Powers.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Are there any further comments on the substance before we decide on the next meeting? As there are none, we may consider the proposal put forward by Mr. Dean that we submit our verbatim records to the plenary Conference for consideration at its meeting on Wednesday morning, if the co-Chairmen agree. It is not for us here to decide that, I think, but, on the assumption that we will need to have some such timetable because we were instructed to report back early this week, it seems a not unreasonable suggestion. If that does happen, I understand that the second proposal is that we should meet as a Sub-Committee on Thursday at 3.30 p.m. Are there any comments on this, or do we take it as agreed?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.