

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE  
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWELFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 3 May 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. V.F. SHUSTOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. I will speak as representative of the Soviet Union.

Attentive study of the arguments advanced by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in their statements at the tenth and eleventh meetings of the Sub-Committee, held on 24 and 26 April, leads to the conclusion that the Western Powers are standing pat on their old positions and are trying to interpret the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries according to those positions.

They said in their statements at those meetings of the Sub-Committee that the two sides had not succeeded in reaching agreement on the earlier basis of our talks. While noting that fact, both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber observed that the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28) constituted a new approach to our negotiations.

What is the meaning of these statements of Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber? On the surface it might appear that the representatives of the Western Powers have really come to recognize that no agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests can be reached on the old basis, but that a new approach and another basis are needed.

A detached observer who listened to the statements of the Western representatives might suppose that they were acknowledging the non-aligned countries' proposals as just such a new approach, and were ready to agree on the basis of those proposals. That, however, is unfortunately only an illusion.

Let us consider the gist of the Western Powers' position, as stated by Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber at the tenth and eleventh meetings of the Sub-Committee. I am not going to quote from those statements, but will give the substance of their position in my own words as accurately as I can. It is this.

1. In regard to observation posts, the United States and United Kingdom representatives are still adhering to their old position that an international network of control posts must be set up on the territory of the Soviet Union. They adhere to their old position although they know that there is no possibility of agreement on that basis. That this is so is eloquently proved by the deadlock which the nuclear test ban talks have reached.

(The Chairman, USSR)

In order to improve the situation and lift the talks out of deadlock, the eight non-aligned countries have proposed that, instead of the establishment of an international network of control posts, a national network of observation posts should be used for control. This is dealt with in paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries.

The Soviet Union accepts this principle proposed by the non-aligned countries as a basis for the solution of the problem. The Western Powers, however, still insist on the establishment of an international network of control posts and in reality reject this compromise proposal of the non-aligned countries.

2. In regard to the international control commission and on-site inspections, the Western Powers still insist here, too, on their old position and demand the right of compulsory on-site inspection.

The memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries expressly states that, if the international commission receives an invitation from a country in which a suspicious and significant event has occurred, it may visit that country or the site of the event.

The Soviet Union, for reasons of national security, provided in its proposals of 27 November 1961 (ENDC/11) that the countries concerned should control one another solely by the use of national systems for the detection of nuclear explosions, without having the right to send international inspection teams to the spot. Now, in its desire to achieve agreement, it has consented to accept that proposal of the non-aligned countries as a compromise. The Western representatives not only reject in substance this compromise proposal of the non-aligned countries, but are also trying to make out that the memorandum of the non-aligned countries provides for compulsory on-site inspection by order of the international commission. That, however, is simply a gross violation both of the spirit and of the letter of the non-aligned countries' proposal.

The interpretation by the Western Powers of the non-aligned countries' proposal conflicts with the wording of the memorandum:

"... the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." (ENDC/28, page 2).

That provision is contained in paragraph 4 of the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries; and paragraph 5, which the representatives of the Western Powers are so fond of quoting, says that verification in loco must be carried out

(The Chairman, USSR)

in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph 4 -- that is, on the invitation given in such cases by the party to the treaty.

The inspection question is really not as Mr. Godber tries to make out by persistently asking us the same old question: Is the Soviet Union prepared to observe the principle of international on-site inspection? It is clear from the fact that he asks that question that the United Kingdom representative is still clinging to his old position. Mr. Dean, the United States representative, has taken up precisely the same position when at previous meetings he has said that inspection merely on invitation of the Power whose territory was subject to inspection, on whose territory an unidentified event had taken place, would be entirely meaningless.

It is, of course, not by accident that Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean have seized on this question. The attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom representatives towards this question is completely unfounded and bears no relation to the relevant passage of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States.

Behind the questions about inspection which Mr. Godber has asked us, and the comments which Mr. Dean has made on the subject, it is not hard to detect the old position of the Western Powers concerning on-site inspection.

The very fact that they ask this question plainly reveals the insincerity and deceitfulness of the assertions by the United Kingdom and United States representatives that they accept the proposal of the eight non-aligned countries in the joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis or starting-point for further talks.

If you take the proposal of the eight non-aligned countries as a basis or a starting-point for talks, you obviously cannot go back to your old position based on compulsory inspection without contradicting yourselves.

If you accept the eight non-aligned countries' proposal on inspection, then you must adopt the same basic principle that they have adopted in paragraph 4 of their memorandum. But that paragraph, which I have quoted to you, lays down the conditions for dispatching on-site inspection teams: on-site inspection may take place if and when an invitation is issued by the State on whose territory a suspicious event has occurred. So, if you accept the non-aligned countries' proposal -- and you have notified us officially that you accept the proposals in the memorandum of 16 April -- then in regard to inspection you must start out from that principle.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Actually, however, the Western Powers have taken a different line. They have grossly distorted the intention of the eight non-aligned countries and the meaning of those countries' proposals in asserting that their draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9), which the Soviet Union has rejected as absolutely unacceptable, is the compromise which the eight non-aligned countries propose in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962. Nothing could be further from the truth than that assertion by the representatives of the Western Powers. The representatives of the non-aligned countries have made it perfectly clear in their statements that their joint memorandum contains proposals which embody their attempt to find a new approach to the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

In fact the proposals of the non-aligned States coincide neither with the Soviet proposals nor with those of the Western Powers. They are a middle way, a compromise basis for agreement. The representatives of the non-aligned countries insistently warn the nuclear Powers to abstain from any attempt to insist on their old positions. They have said very plainly that if the old positions are held there can be no agreement and the talks cannot be lifted out of deadlock. But the Western Powers continue deaf to these appeals of the non-aligned countries. Instead of accepting as a basis the proposals of the non-aligned countries as they stand, as they are set out in the memorandum, the Western Powers -- by which I mean, of course, the United States and the United Kingdom -- are falling back to their old positions and are thus making it impossible to lift the talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests out of deadlock and to reach agreement on this question.

We are compelled to point out, with great regret, that our Conference -- that is, this Sub-Committee -- is in the same deadlock as the three-Power Conference that terminated at the end of January at the instance of the Western Powers. The present deadlock is also the work of the Western Powers, which cling to their old attitude towards the control system and inspection. In view of the Western Powers' position, there does not seem to be the slightest prospect of agreement here in the Sub-Committee.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with great interest to what our Soviet colleague has had to say this afternoon. We shall certainly give his statement our most serious attention because we want to explore with him most carefully the eight-Power memorandum, which offers a basis for fruitful negotiations.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

At the last two meetings the United States delegation presented to the Sub-Committee some of its preliminary thoughts concerning the implementation in detail of the eight-nation joint memorandum, which was put forward, most usefully, to facilitate agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. It would appear from the statements which the United Kingdom and Soviet representatives have made at previous meetings and from the statement of the Soviet representative today that much ground remains to be explored and that many questions are still awaiting resolution. In particular, we are most anxious to hear a more detailed exposition of the position which the Soviet delegation is now adopting in regard to the initiation and conduct of on-site inspection and in regard to the view held by the United States delegation that the eight-Power joint memorandum envisages inspections on an obligatory basis. If I understood my Soviet colleague correctly from the simultaneous interpretation, I do not believe he does accept this, but perhaps I am wrong. I put our analysis of this matter into the record of our last Sub-Committee meeting on 26 April (ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, pp 5-8).

Before reverting to further consideration of the very vital problem connected with on-site inspection arrangements, I should like to focus attention today on another aspect of the eight-nation joint memorandum -- namely, the central organization proposed in paragraph 4. This is the body which is to be established to provide essential co-ordination of control operations, to make analyses and assessments of the nature of the geophysical events which show up in the data received by the central organization and to direct such control operations as may be undertaken by the central organization itself rather than by subordinate national or international bodies.

My United Kingdom colleague initiated our discussion of central institutions at the tenth meeting of our Sub-Committee, but Mr. Tsarapkin has not yet covered this particular topic in any detail. The joint memorandum of the eight nations is itself somewhat indefinite in describing the characteristics of the central directing group. It speaks only of an international scientific commission which might be composed, in some part at least, of the nationals of non-aligned countries or which might also have sitting on it persons from other nations, that is, presumably, from the nuclear Powers themselves or from States participating in military alliances.

The joint memorandum does not tell us how large the central body should be, whether the scientists on it should or should not be representatives of their Governments, what voting procedures this commission should use in order to reach

(Mr. Dean, United States)

decisions, what standards it should use, what range of functions the commission should have, what relations would exist between the commission and the governments of the States which become parties to the treaty, or how its activities would be financed. There is not even any recommendation on precisely what commission composition by nationalities would provide the best basis for the commission's success in working efficiently and in developing good co-operative relationships among all the parties.

To go one step further, the eight-nation plan mentions that the commission should have a staff which, we assume, will perform the bulk of the routine work of the central international commission. However, we have no indication of how numerous this staff should be, of its nationality, of its hierarchial structure, if any, or of the scope of the tasks which the commission will be called upon to perform.

I am sure that the eight co-sponsors would tell us that their omissions on all these matters, and on a number of related points which I have not yet mentioned, were quite intentional, that their plan was intended only to convey the concept of a central organ, consisting of a scientific commission and its staff, which would have certain responsibilities in regard to control arrangements. The co-sponsors undoubtedly wished to leave the elaboration of the framework of the central body to negotiations among the three nuclear Powers, and we, for our part, are quite prepared to explore the subject in that way.

In fact, at the last meeting of our Sub-Committee, I quoted from the remarks made on the joint memorandum by Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, at the twenty-fourth plenary meeting. He then said:

"It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break the deadlock in the three-Power talks. This implies that vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the joint memorandum."

(ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

We are now in the process of doing just that. But we must realize that the joint memorandum does not provide us with detailed guidance and that we shall have to try to resolve these problems as best we can on our own initiative. Of course, the nature of the problem will be only partially apparent to us at this moment, because many details about what the central organ may or may not do and about the means which it adopts to perform those functions which are allotted to it will



(Mr. Dean, United States)

depend on what we subsequently decide on other issues. This is especially true both regarding the network of control posts, including national and perhaps, as appropriate, international posts established by agreement, and regarding what we devise in the way of on-site inspection arrangements and their nature. Nevertheless, enough of the picture is already known to us on the basis of past work in this field to make it possible to begin to appraise our problems.

My delegation believes that the international scientific commission should probably be composed of exceptionally able, outstanding scientists who are, at the same time, representatives of their governments. In other words, although we wish to obtain the best scientific judgement on the technical issues which will arise before the commission, we also feel that many of the questions, if not absolutely scientific in character, will have important enough implications for the States which are parties to the treaty to make it desirable to establish a political connexion between the parties to the treaty and the scientists on the commission. For the same reason, we believe that the commission should not be composed exclusively of nationals of non-aligned countries, but should also have as members at least representatives of the governments of the nuclear Powers and, perhaps, of some other governments as well.

It is still too early to go into the details of commission procedure, especially since we do not yet know the full range of commission functions. However, we can already state that we would not think it advisable for the commission generally to take its decisions on the basis of unanimous votes. As regards such decisions as the launching of an on-site inspection, which we feel must be obligatory on the parties in certain circumstances -- although, as I understand it, the United Kingdom representative, has not been able, so far as least, to get any answer on this point from the Soviet representative -- we think it would be particularly important that no one member of the commission would be able to exercise a veto right over the decision. This would not, of course, exclude agreement on arrangements for more than a simple majority vote regarding decisions on some other questions, or even a unanimous vote on some other, but very few, specific matters.

We think the central body is likely to have a great number of responsibilities in connexion with monitoring the implementation of a test ban treaty. The eight-nation plan itself mentions the receipt and processing of data from the field, the reaching of conclusions on assessments of the nature of recorded events, the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

carrying on of consultations with the parties in a number of instances, and active participation in the on-site inspection process. In addition, the central organ may be involved in the creation and staffing of the additional stations which the parties may decide to build to supplement national systems, if deemed more appropriate, as provided by the memorandum, and the international commission would certainly have major duties in the co-ordination of world-wide recording facilities in different countries and in establishing standards and procedures for reporting and recording operations on a global basis.

All this would entail the use of a fairly sizable staff and would make necessary the adoption of a formal organizational scheme for the allocation of staff members to appropriate sections and divisions. Undoubtedly it would also be necessary to appoint one official to represent the commission in managing the staff and in making sure that the staff capably performed its assigned functions.

It may seem to my colleagues that the description which I have given of the institutions that would have to be established under the eight-nation plan resembles in certain respects the central headquarters which was discussed during most of the meetings of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. To a certain extent this is true. Moreover, it is inevitable that this should be the case because the circumstances of control and the technical requirements of any centralized operations are fairly constant.

Merely to speak of a central organ is to involve oneself in a consideration of the creation of a central administrative apparatus which will, quite naturally, take the form of some sort of hierarchy. Indeed, to speak of any form of international commission is to create problems of membership, duties, procedures, and subordination to higher authority. The fact that these problems are not mentioned does not mean that the problems do not exist.

Nevertheless, I do not wish to imply at all that the United States delegation has in mind the establishment of a central headquarters organization which would be the same in all respects as the headquarters scheme which is included in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of 18 April 1961 and, which, in turn, was the product of much negotiation between the Soviet and Western delegations. On the contrary, we believe that the future headquarters might well be a good deal simpler than was planned under the previous organization plan.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

For example, it might well be possible to dispense with a conference of the parties if arrangements were made to have members of the commission appointed either directly by governments, or perhaps by some other body, such as the general conference of the international disarmament organization.

To the extent that national stations were used there would be a reduction in the work to be performed by the staff in the whole field of operations, although, of course, the work load would not change for the international facilities that were created in various countries. Construction problems would also be simplified to a similar degree. There would still be a need for adequate arrangements for on-site inspection teams and their training, and for on-site inspection procedures. However, I presume the procedures for regular aircraft sampling could be undertaken on a national basis, which would by itself considerably reduce the commission's burdens.

All these changes should result in a noticeable reduction of both capital and annual headquarters costs, and should permit more flexibility and a somewhat reduced scale of headquarters activities. The full extent of these changes can become apparent only as we work out other details of the treaty. But there is no doubt that the final product would differ in many ways from past plans for system headquarters.

We would very much appreciate hearing comments from the representative of the Soviet Union on the foregoing problems.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with interest to the two statements we have heard this afternoon. Having had the privilege of being in your company, Mr. Chairman, as recently as at lunch today, I came into this room thinking very hard that I must try to find something nice to say about your speech this afternoon. Well, I listened to your speech and puzzled very hard about what I could say that was nice about it while remaining honest. I decided that the one thing I could say which was really incontrovertible was that your speech was shorter than on the previous occasion.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, speaking seriously now, that I was depressed once more by the statement which you made today. Why was I depressed? I was depressed because you seemed so much more interested in criticizing, vilifying, abusing the Western Powers in regard to their attitude, than in really getting down to negotiation using the eight-Power memorandum as a basis. You talk a lot,

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Mr. Chairman, about using it as a basis, but you do not seem to want to get on with the job. I hope very much that you will come down to serious discussion with us on this matter.

I would refer you to the statements of our United States colleague and to the one which I myself made at our last meeting when we both tried to face up to the problems involved. I would refer you also to the speech to which we have just listened from our United States colleague; he patiently and painstakingly went through some of the problems raised by the memorandum, seeking to explain, to elaborate and to find in them some way in which we can move forward to a common appreciation. But we do not have the same attitude from the Soviet Union in this matter. Your speech, Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting, on 26 April, is on record (ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, pp 19-24); I do not propose to refer to it again, because it was a very depressing one.

Your speech today is still in our ears. You spent so much time again today criticizing the good faith of the Western Powers. You spent so much time criticizing our right to seek to get answers to questions which we have put to you over the last few meetings. You said that we were presenting matters in a way inconsistent with the eight-Power memorandum and -- if the interpretation is correct, and I do not doubt it is -- you said how false and insincere are the United States and the United Kingdom when they say they accept the memorandum. This does not really help us very much, because we are trying to make progress, and I must say to you, Mr. Chairman, that you appear to be obstructing us in that task.

Now you referred to the Western Powers falling back to their old positions. Old positions, indeed. We have moved, and moved, and moved again to try and accommodate the Soviet Union. In the old three-Power negotiations -- and this is all on record and all known -- we sought time and again to find accommodation, until finally, on 28 November 1961, you denied the very basis of these negotiations. If we have moved back to an old position, it is only this: we have moved back to the old position of a willingness to negotiate and a willingness to be flexible -- a position we have retained throughout and which we retain up to this moment. That is borne out, I think, by the speech we have just listened to from our United States colleague. Because what did he do in that speech? He brought before us various problems arising from the memorandum, tried to analyse them, tried to interpret them, and tried to see what problems they raised.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

For, if we are to have an agreement, which certainly the two Western Powers ardently desire, then we have got to analyse, clarify and build up new treaty language based on some of the matters contained in this memorandum. That is what we have got to do, that is what I have tried to do in one or two recent interventions, and that is what our United States colleague was so obviously doing today. The point does not need labouring; it is there on the record: in his speech he patiently evaluated these various problems that confront us.

In the past I have said that this memorandum poses three main principles: the problem of the networks of observation posts, the national systems on which it says these networks could be built; the problem of the international commission; and the problem of on-site inspection. Our United States colleague has this afternoon referred to one aspect of this. But I want to come back once more for a moment to the point to which I myself have reverted so many times in recent days. I make no apology whatever for reverting to it again, because I have had no satisfactory answer, no clear answer. If I got a clear-cut answer one way or another we should at least know where we stood, but I have not had it. This afternoon, you said, Mr. Chairman, if I took down your words correctly, that the question of inspection is put otherwise than as put forward by me. I beg to differ: I think the question of inspection is put precisely as it has been put by me time and time again. I would have thought that what I said at our last meeting on 26 April was abundant evidence of the need for a clear, categorical and concise answer to my question. I am still waiting for it. I have much patience. I am willing to go on putting the question and I hope that some time we shall get a clear answer.

May I refer to the verbatim record of our last meeting? When I had followed the problem through and shown what the position would be if the Soviet Union did not say quite clearly that in the circumstances envisaged in the memorandum it would invite on-site inspection, I said:

"There is an unidentified event and the commission is unable to satisfy itself. It asks to come on the territory. Does the Soviet Union then refuse permission? Because if it does, that is an affront to the nations of the world which have gone to all the trouble and expense of setting up this complicated body only to be told, 'No, the Soviet Union will not accept on-site inspection.'" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, p.17)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I went on to say:

"That is the reason why I have been asking this particular question. It would be very wrong indeed, in my view, for us to go to all this trouble to set up such an organization if one of the parties to the treaty had already determined, in advance, that when the critical moment came it would not co-operate." (ibid.)

I went on to pose my question once more.

That question remains unanswered. The answer is clouded round with a whole host of words, but no clear and concise answer is given. So what can I do but revert to the fears which I expressed earlier, when I reminded our colleagues in the main Conference that in the very week in which the Soviet Union had said that it accepted this document as a basis for negotiations, Chairman Khrushchev himself had made it abundantly clear that he would not accept on-site inspection? I want a clear, concise answer. I think we are entitled to it. I think the eight nations which put forward this document are entitled to it. And I am still going to keep asking for it. Because without that answer how can we have confidence in going forward? I want to build up confidence; I want to get a treaty; I want to get a basis for a treaty which is really effective. But if this memorandum is to help us forward we have got to have the answer to the vital question on this point of on-site inspection.

Our United States colleague has referred this afternoon to some of the other complications that are inherent in this document, and I hope that we can go forward and discuss some of the issues he has raised here, as well as the ones which he and I have raised in our earlier discussions. This is far more effective, really, than calling one another names. Let us talk facts; let us really negotiate. That is what our United States colleague has tried to do in his intervention this afternoon.

I noticed that in your intervention this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, you referred to the Western Powers' falling back to their old positions. "Old positions", indeed. It is interesting to see called an "old position" the position which we brought forward in April 1961 and which we have since tried to amend to take account of Soviet views, because it is a position which has moved a long way from the start of our negotiations on the subject. It is a position which has come to envisage the acceptance of on-site inspection in only a quota -- a quota of, at most, one in four or five -- of the suspicious events occurring on the territory of each party to the treaty in a given period of time. As I reminded my colleagues

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

a few meetings ago, this is a long way from the extreme position set up by the experts in their 1958 report (EXP/NUC/28). We have moved further and further to try to meet the Soviet position.

On 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union chose to refuse to accept any on-site inspection. That is where the difficulty lies. That is the position which has stultified all our efforts, and that is the position for which we have had not a shred of justification over these months. I am not going to labour it -- it is old knowledge now -- but it is a discouraging fact, and I think it is up to our Soviet colleagues, if they seriously want to make progress on this eight-Power memorandum, to show a great deal more willingness to talk frankly about the issues it raises and to help us to build on it, bearing in mind all the time this fundamental principle which I have tried to define in regard to on-site inspection.

In regard to our consideration of the problem, I think it is worth calling attention, just in passing, to what other people think about the principle of international verification and on-site inspection. After all the principle, as I and my United States colleague have tried to define it, so far as I know has not been denied by the sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum at all. I think it is a principle that is widely accepted throughout the rest of the world, outside the communist countries. In this connexion perhaps I could recall the recent correspondence between the Prime Minister of Japan and Chairman Khrushchev. Mr. Ikeda, in his letter to Mr. Khrushchev of 20 April this year, said:

"I regret I cannot concur with you in the view that the development of detection techniques among various nations has rendered unnecessary an international control system."

He went on to develop this point at some length, and then he said:

"Your claim that international control means international spying is absolutely unacceptable to me. Inasmuch as international control is to be exercised equally upon all nations, it is inconceivable that your country alone would unilaterally suffer any disadvantage."

There is the view of the distinguished Prime Minister of another country in regard to this matter. It is not just the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom. This is a generally-accepted view.

I would ask our Soviet colleague to think a good deal more about this and freely to acknowledge that the Western position is one not only of being willing to negotiate on the basis of this document but of actively trying to negotiate on

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

that basis and of being frustrated in seeking to do so by our Soviet colleague here in this Sub-Committee. That is the accurate position that we have reached at the moment, and that position must be apparent to any impartial reader of the verbatim records of our meetings. Is that the reason, I wonder, why our Soviet colleagues have been so anxious that we should not be joined here by representatives of some of the unaligned countries? Is it because they are afraid that their own refusal to try to make progress would become more clear and more apparent? Surely, Mr. Chairman, we can do better than this, and I appeal to you most seriously to come back with fresh instructions at our next meeting, to come back with instructions really to negotiate on this basis. We are willing to, we want to, and we shall be very ready to work with you in building something on the basis, on the foundation, of these proposals that we have before us.

One thing which I think would help us more than anything else is a clear answer to that question I have put so many times. If we could have a clear and affirmative answer to that, it would undoubtedly assist us in our discussions. Of course there are many other aspects to it, and the representative of the United States made clear some of them this afternoon; there are these fundamental points and there are many points of detail. You, Mr. Chairman, who have, I think, sat in on these discussions throughout, must know what a great deal of detailed discussion is necessary to arrive at final treaty language, whatever the political decisions that are taken in regard to a treaty. You know that better than anyone. Therefore do not let us waste any more time. Come here with instructions that will enable you to play a real part with us, and you will find us more than ready to go along with you.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to make a few short remarks, as representative of the Soviet Union, on what the United States and United Kingdom representatives have just said.

The United States representative has said that it is important to know the Soviet Union's present position on inspection. He also said that the Soviet Union representative had not yet dealt in any detail with the nature of the international agency, its composition, the details of its functions, the financing of the control organization, and the like. He said that the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries was indefinite on those matters.



(The Chairman, USSR)

I will reply to Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber together that the Soviet Union's attitude is as follows: we accept the proposals in the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum of 16 April as a basis for agreement; we accept them as they appear in the memorandum.

The matter rests with the Western Powers. All their questions mean that they do not accept the memorandum, they do not accept the non-aligned countries' proposals as they stand. But in order to mask their opposition to the memorandum, they are raising the question of the Sub-Committee's composition and of issuing an invitation to some of the non-aligned countries to participate in the discussion of this question in this Sub-Committee.

We object to dividing the non-aligned countries into some which would participate in the Sub-Committee's debates on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and some which would be excluded from the Sub-Committee. We are in favour of participation by all the non-aligned countries, and not only by those countries but also by all the other States represented in the Eighteen Nation Committee, in the debate on this question. But we already have a body for that purpose: the Eighteen Nation Committee -- or, since France is absent, the Seventeen Nation Committee -- in which all the non-aligned States are represented -- and not they only --, and in which they can participate fully and give their opinions and views. They have already made their positive contribution, which we have appreciated: we accept their proposals.

So, instead of manoeuvring with meaningless proposals for enlarging the Sub-Committee, would it not be better to declare that you accept the proposals which the non-aligned States put forward on 16 April? Then the whole problem can be solved here out of hand.

We have first to agree on the basic principles of the agreement. These are laid down in the non-aligned countries' memorandum. When we have agreed on the basis, we can easily settle the details and particulars.

I emphasize once more that we must first agree on the basic principles of the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and then we will adapt the text of the agreement in all its details to those basic principles which we have agreed among us. That is the only method capable of producing results.

You, however, want to do just the opposite. You want -- and this is apparent in all your questions, all your statements -- to adjust these basic principles which the non-aligned States proposed to us on 16 April as a basis for a compromise

(The Chairman, USSR)

agreement, to tailor them, to your old position. In other words, you want to substitute for the non-aligned countries' basic proposition that the discontinuance of nuclear testing can be supervised with national detection systems, a demand for the establishment of an international network of control posts.

That, however, completely contradicts what the non-aligned countries are proposing. The same applies to inspection. Whereas the eight non-aligned countries' joint memorandum says that the parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt, you are replacing that basic proposition of the non-aligned States with your own old demand for compulsory inspection. Our negotiations will not emerge from deadlock and make progress until the Western Powers accept by deeds as well as words the proposals of the eight non-aligned countries as they appear in the memorandum.

In this memorandum -- its most important passage -- the eight States propose that control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests should be organized with the aid of national observation systems. That is the first point. The second is that the eight non-aligned States propose that inspection should be made by invitation of States parties to the treaty, not at the instance or by order of the international commission. You, however, are insisting on compulsory inspection conducted not by invitation but by order of the international commission.

The proposals of the eight non-aligned countries point a way out of the impasse; but the Western Powers, by their attitude of refusing to accept these proposals as they stand, destroy all possibility of agreement on the basis of the non-aligned countries' proposals. We regret this.

We see in this attitude of the Western Powers conclusive evidence that the United States and the United Kingdom still maintain the position of the nuclear arms race, which requires continuation of nuclear weapon tests. That is why you refuse to come to terms on the basis of the proposals put forward by the eight non-aligned States.

Mr. Godber's quotation from the letter of Mr. Ikeda, the Prime Minister of Japan is unconvincing. I could quote other statements by very distinguished Japanese scientists and experts contradicting Prime Minister Ikeda, who is linked to the United States by a close and quite specific relationship requiring him, as Prime Minister of Japan, fully to support the United States position. Notwithstanding the strong protests and indignation of the Japanese people, the Japanese Government, as Mr. Godber has just shown by his quotation, supports that aspect of the United States position to which he has referred.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The general situation is that the United States and the United Kingdom have decided to apply a formula which has been current for some time, for the last few years, among those who govern the United States, and which is called "T and T". Those letters do not signify the explosive known in chemistry as trinitrotoluol, or TNT, but "Talk and Test", which means to carry on negotiations -- or, more correctly, keep up a flow of talk -- here, and at the same time carry out nuclear weapon tests. That is now perfectly obvious to everyone. The responsibility for the extremely unsatisfactory situation which has arisen in our Sub-Committee, as it did in the previous three-Power conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, rests upon the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I shall be very brief. I realize we are talking against a time-limit today. Mr. Tsarapkin's comment with regard to the Japanese Prime Minister and Japanese scientists rather puzzled me, because I seem to recall an occasion in the nuclear test ban talks when Soviet scientists came here in 1959 and said things which apparently were not approved -- presumably by their Prime Minister -- and they were summarily recalled home. It seems to me that if one is taking the word of a country it is best, whether it be the Soviet Union or Japan, to rely on the words of the Prime Minister. That is a premise which I am sure Mr. Tsarapkin would accept.

But on the substance of Mr. Tsarapkin's comments I would only say that I am deeply sorry that he takes that line. To keep repeating that the United States and the United Kingdom do not want to negotiate on the basis of the joint memorandum is sheer nonsense, as indeed he must realize when he studies our statements. I hope, however, that Mr. Tsarapkin will study them and that he will come back and really negotiate with us at our next meeting so that we can make progress with the joint memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned nations.

May I remind Mr. Tsarapkin that, when the eight neutral nations put forward their joint memorandum, they did not expect it to be accepted as it stood? After all, it was the representative of Ethiopia himself who told us that it should be regarded only as a starting point and not as a blueprint for a treaty or as a substitute for work to be undertaken by the nuclear Powers themselves. Therefore I do say that we are on very good ground in seeking to build on it. I invite the representative of the Soviet Union to help us do just that.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The United Kingdom representative's invitation to help him means nothing at all. It would have meant something if he had invited us to join him in acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum. But he has not done that. The boot is on the other foot. We accept the memorandum, and you refuse it. We accept the main provisions of the memorandum, and with those as basis we could very soon come to terms and reach agreement. When we agree about these basic provisions, drafting will be easy, for we would fit the details to these provisions. You, however, want to fit the eight-nation memorandum to your old position. You will not deceive anyone here, least of all ourselves. If you do not want to agree on the basis of the non-aligned States' proposal, say so; but you will not confuse the issue here. Whatever words you use to wrap it up, one thing is clear, and that is that you do not want to agree on the basis of the proposals in the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum of 16 April.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): With respect to our next meeting, the time might be fixed by the incoming Chairman, if that is agreeable. However, I would like to suggest tentatively that our next meeting take place on Tuesday, 8 May, at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Since there is no objection, our next meeting is fixed for Tuesday, 8 May, at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.