

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 28 November 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.I. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGET

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.E. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D. PARK

Deputy Special Representative of
the Acting Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EESTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the forty-fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): This morning, at the eighty-fourth plenary meeting, Mr. Edberg of Sweden made an interesting proposal upon which I have already commented and about which I expect, after further study, to have more to say.

Nevertheless, I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the United States and the United Kingdom have presented two complete and well thought out draft test ban treaties (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) to the Conference. As I will make clear in my statement today, many details of control and the organization of an adequate control system have been thoroughly considered by the United States and the United Kingdom and have been drafted in complete treaty language in our comprehensive test ban treaty draft (ENDC/58). The Soviet Union can, by accepting this proposal today, end all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. The details have been thoroughly and objectively worked out and are, we believe, adequate to ensure effective and fair controls over the cessation of all nuclear tests. There is, therefore, really no need for delay, under these circumstances, in the conclusion of an adequate and effective nuclear test ban agreement. It can be done speedily and effectively under the detailed proposal we have made.

Now I should like to turn to my statement for today.

Recent events have of course had much to do with the atmosphere of this resumed session of our Conference. As President Kennedy noted in a statement to the Conference, the test ban is perhaps the issue on which we are nearest to agreement. The time is certainly right for a test ban settlement. We enter upon these resumed negotiations with the feeling that there is a new note of urgency in settling our differences over a test ban -- because if we do not reach a settlement soon we may find that it will be too late to do so. I can affirm at the outset of these resumed negotiations that my delegation has been instructed to do everything possible to reach an adequate and effective treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time under adequate and effective international control. My delegation has been charged by the United States Government to seek such an agreement as a primary goal of our efforts in this Conference. We are prepared to work towards a workable agreement which will be a solution to the outstanding problems satisfactory to both sides.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

This means, of course, that we must solve the basic problem of our differences over the adequate control for a cessation of underground tests.

Delegations will recall that on 27 August last my Government, in conjunction with the Government of the United Kingdom, made two significant offers and placed two very important treaty texts before the Conference which incorporated these offers in precise treaty language. The first of those treaty texts (ENDC/58) is based in part on the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) and contains within it many of the suggestions which the eight Powers incorporated in that memorandum.

The comprehensive treaty draft of 27 August last was, of course, a revision of the treaty which we had previously tabled on 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9). For example, it incorporated the use of existing national networks of observation posts, together with such additional stations as might be necessary to constitute the world-wide control system for a nuclear test ban. Under the Western treaty draft these stations would operate under the co-ordination and supervision of the international commission. They would, however, be nationally manned, with all operating personnel nationals of the States in which they were located to the extent to which each State so desired.

We have accepted as well the suggestion of the eight nations for the use of an international commission whose membership is to be made up in large part of States not aligned with either NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries -- that is, States which would be chosen jointly by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

We have also included in our treaty arrangements for obligatory on-site inspections wherever necessary. These inspections will be scientifically necessary under circumstances where it is not possible, through distant instrumentation, to identify the precise nature of the origin of a seismic event. On the basis of the best available scientific information, this will happen in a significant number of places each year in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In order to ensure that the international commission is able to make the fullest possible assessment of the facts in any given situation concerning a seismic event, the United States and the United Kingdom treaty draft provides for a quota of obligatory on-site inspections which represents only a small fraction of the actual number of events which will be eligible for on-site inspection. In the eight-nation memorandum there was no such quota. This quota would, in our estimation, serve as an adequate deterrent to any State which might be tempted to violate the treaty by conducting clandestine underground nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

On 27 August the United States and the United Kingdom presented also a partial nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/59). That draft treaty incorporated the suggestion originally made here at our Conference by the delegations of Brazil and the United Arab Republic for a partial treaty, and the suggestion of Mexico for a cut-off date for testing. I believe we have made it clear that such a treaty would be at best only a first step, an interim arrangement, leading to our comprehensive goal. But it would nevertheless be an important measure which would end immediately those tests on the control for which we could now all agree. This partial test ban treaty would end nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in response to suggestions advanced by all the eight more recent members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at one time or another during its first and second sessions.

What has been the reaction of the Soviet Union to these offers? How has it responded or failed to respond to these most recent constructive, forward moves by the United States and the United Kingdom?

Let us look for a few moments at the positions advanced by the Soviet Union at the nuclear Sub-Committee meetings held during the recess of our Conference. With respect to a comprehensive test ban treaty the Soviet Union, unfortunately, has apparently returned to the position it held before 19 April 1962, when it claimed to have accepted the suggestions of the eight nations. In effect, the Soviet Union has lately been saying to the West: "We do not care by what means you reach accommodation with us. We in the Soviet Union are extremely reasonable, but that accommodation can only be on the basis of our position of 28 November 1961. If you accept our position of 28 November hook, line and sinker, then you will find the Soviet Union to be very reasonable." This position, it will be recalled, provides for no international control whatsoever and is the most retrograde position the Soviet Union has ever taken on a nuclear test ban treaty.

With respect to a partial test ban treaty, the Soviet Union has said that it will agree to it only if the West will accept a simultaneous, uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests in conjunction with such a ban. The Soviet Union has said that it does not care whether such a moratorium is written or unwritten, but that it must be an unverified, uncontrolled moratorium covering all tests in the underground environment for the indefinite future. It is clear that what the Soviet Union has presented to the West, of course, is no choice at all. In effect, the Soviet Union is saying with respect to the Western comprehensive proposal to ban all tests for ever: "Yes, my friends, we are very reasonable: we

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stand firmly on our 28 November position". And what the Soviet Union tells the West with respect to the partial ban proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, the acceptance of which would prevent any further radioactive debris in the atmosphere, is exactly the same thing -- that, again, the West will find the Soviet Union very reasonable and that it stands firmly on its 28 November position.

These negative and unconstructive manoeuvres by the Soviet Union have left little room for negotiation, even given the great good will -- as well as the tremendous amount of money which each of us has spent on improvement in scientific techniques for detecting underground events -- which has been shown and will continue to be shown by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Let us look behind the Soviet position, if we may, at some of the reasons advanced in support of the Soviet Union's refusal to accept or to negotiate upon the recent offers made by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first place, the Soviet position on a comprehensive test ban treaty has been that national systems are completely adequate to ensure the detection, location and identification of all -- I repeat, all -- significant underground nuclear weapon tests. With the greatest respect, the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained that that is not the case. This is a dispute over the existence of facts, and a dispute over the extent of our present scientific knowledge. We have the Soviet statements which clearly indicate that the Soviet Government believes a certain factual situation to exist with respect to the capabilities of a certain type of detection system. United States and United Kingdom scientists have found the facts to be contrary to those which the Soviet Union continues to maintain. There is but one simple answer to this: let both sides present their scientific evidence here at the Conference and then let us discuss it.

In the last century there was a well-known country philosopher in the United States named Josh Billings. Josh used to say that it was not ignorance that caused all the trouble: it was "the things that men know that ain't so". A reasonable man ought to be able to reach a solution to a problem which is so clearly one of deciding on the basis of scientific evidence what the facts of the case actually are.

Delegations will recall that we have continually asked the Soviet Union to present its scientific evidence in this case, but thus far we have seen little or nothing from the Soviet Union to justify this point of view. The reply of our Soviet colleagues here to this question repeatedly asked by the Western delegations

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has been, to say the least, evasive. For my part, I cannot understand why it is that our Soviet colleagues wish to keep the light of their scientific colleagues under a bushel. Why not bring them here and let us hear what they have to say?

The best evidence and the best scientists available to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom tell us that on-site inspections are absolutely necessary to identify the precise character of an unidentified seismic event. Let me point out here that the Western delegations have always been open-minded in regard to the subject of on-site inspection on a scientific basis which, after all, is only the means to an end and not an end in itself. For us, this is a scientific question and not a political one, and we have turned to science for its solution. If our best evidence as given to us by our best scientists can be shown to be incomplete, we are certainly willing to listen to Soviet scientists. But we do not believe that the Soviet version of the present scientific state of affairs is correct, or otherwise we would have been given the Soviet scientific evidence long ago and the control and inspection problem would have been completely settled.

The United States policy in this regard has always been and continues to be that we ask no more detection and identification capability than is required to give adequate assurance that the test ban agreement is being observed by all parties. The changes we made in our draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/5) are ample evidence of this and we stand on this position, which we deem to be a very reasonable one.

The second position taken by the Soviet Union with respect to obligatory on-site inspection is that the Western Powers desire to have such inspection exclusively for purposes of espionage. But I submit that the West has consistently made it clear, in its concrete proposals, that this is not the case. Indeed, if the Western proposals were implemented today no reasonable man could, I believe, reach the conclusion that the West desired on-site inspections for any purpose other than to verify a test ban agreement. The West has, I submit, approached the limits of human ingenuity in devising the means to reassure our Soviet colleagues that inspections could not be used as vehicles for espionage. I think it is clear to all that under the Western draft treaty (ENDC/58) inspection could take place only in response to recorded seismic signals the origin of which might remain unidentified. That is a completely random factor, since in nature those signals can occur only when earthquakes take place.

The United States and the United Kingdom have no way to influence the occurrence of such signals. Moreover, the United States and the United Kingdom would have no

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assurance that any area which might be of interest to them for military security reasons would ever be eligible for an inspection. They would never know in advance from which area seismic signals might originate. Any espionage activity which relied on such a series of coincidences to produce the possibilities for collecting intelligence would have to wait from 2 to 10,000 years for even a chance to have a brief look at all of the Soviet Union under the most favourable circumstances. But those most favourable circumstances would themselves, of course, not exist.

The Western Proposal would also limit the area to be inspected to no more -- I repeat, no more -- than a few hundred kilometres surrounding the scientifically determined epicentre of the unidentified seismic event. In addition, most events would take place, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union, in the very small portion of the country which was seismic. That would include, at most, 15 per cent of Soviet territory located generally in remote and economically less-developed portions of the Soviet Union. We have discussed these data with our Soviet colleagues and are prepared to go over them with them again in some detail. Even then, not every unidentified underground event would be inspected. The United States and the United Kingdom have adopted a Soviet proposal first made in April 1959. In line with this they have proposed that unidentified events should be looked at only on the basis of a quota system. That quota system would mean that while there would be the possibility of looking at any unidentified event -- that is, any such event might be chosen to be the subject of an inspection -- in actual fact only a small percentage of events would be inspected in any one year, and then always within the maximum of the quota. Such a system of random selection would act as an effective deterrent to clandestine underground tests in violation of a treaty, but at the same time it would ensure that States were not subjected to an unduly large number of inspections.

In addition to all these safeguards and limiting factors incorporated in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty, specific proposals have been made with respect to the staffing of on-site inspection teams which should reassure completely any State which might question the impartiality and fairness with which inspections would be conducted. With respect to the membership of on-site inspection teams, the recent United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) provides only that there should be no self-inspection. Thus there would be no United States inspectors permitted to examine events on United States territory and, similarly, no Soviet inspectors to examine events in the Soviet Union. There is also no requirement that

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United States or United Kingdom inspectors should look at unidentified events in the Soviet Union. We would hope, of course, that United States and other Western nationals who were competent in the necessary scientific skills would be included in inspection teams, based upon their scientific ability, but I should like to point out that an examination of the Western draft treaty will show that this is not a requirement of our proposal.

The persistence of Soviet charges of espionage in connexion with the Western proposals is in effect equivalent to a Soviet allegation that all possible representatives of non-aligned States who might serve on inspection teams would be in fact, or would become, espionage agents for the West. That is so patently ridiculous as to defy understanding.

Finally, in order to ensure that the inspection teams would operate fully within the letter of their mandate the United States and the United Kingdom have proposed that certain arrangements with regard both to the means of access of the teams to the inspection area and to the functioning of the teams should be put into effect to safeguard the security of the host country. In the case of inspections in the Soviet Union we have stated that we are quite prepared to see the inspection teams taken from the Soviet border to the inspection area on a Soviet aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots over Soviet flight routes. The Soviet Union could provide for any special arrangements on the flight which it might think desirable to ensure that its national security was not jeopardized in any way during the flight over Soviet territory. That does not mean, of course, that the team should be delayed in reaching the inspection area; and, of course, the team would have to be assured that the area to which it was sent was actually the one designated as containing the epicentre of an unidentified event.

The United States and the United Kingdom have also stated that inspection teams could be accompanied by any number of Soviet observers in the Soviet Union to ensure that the teams acted strictly in accordance with the legitimate requirements of their task. The team could be watched, if the Soviet Union so desired, so that no one could have the slightest doubt that the team members engaged only in activities connected with their duty to examine the inspection area to determine the nature of the origin of the particular unidentified seismic event in question.

We have, I believe, done all we possibly can to ensure that inspection teams would be fair and impartial, that they would not jeopardize any State's national security, and that no State could feel in any way that the admission of an inspection team carried

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with it any danger of espionage. Frankly, I cannot think of anything else which we might offer the Soviet Union to ensure that there could be no espionage danger with respect to an on-site inspection. The safeguards we have already offered should go far beyond what might be required to assure any reasonable person that inspection teams will not act or operate in a manner detrimental to the interest of the host State. If there is anything else which the Soviet Union believes is necessary, we are certainly prepared to examine it. Additional Soviet suggestions for safeguards on the operations of on-site inspection teams should not prove to be a difficult task to work out through negotiations if such safeguards can be worked out on a reasonable basis, and if this is what really stands in the way of Soviet acceptance of the few necessary obligatory on-site inspections by the international commission.

Thus far the Soviet Union has failed to indicate to us precisely what elements in the Western proposals which I have outlined might, in its view, constitute a danger to its national security. It is easy to repeat generalities about espionage dangers; but the repetition of such generalities does not really bring us any closer either to an understanding of the problem, or to an early agreement.

Real negotiations on the outstanding issues which remain to be solved require some time to give and take on both sides. This means in the first instance that the Soviet Union will have to indicate where it believes give and take are necessary. In the absence of constructive Soviet comment on this portion of our proposal, we can only conclude that the Soviet Union is putting forward any and all objections to hide its true motives. That is hardly conducive to serious negotiations for an effective, adequate, and workable test ban at the present time.

I cannot emphasize often enough that the Western draft treaties which we put before this Conference on 27 August 1962, are, in our view, sound, adequate and effective documents. We spent a great deal of time with our scientists in working them out; we did not put in anything which we did not think was necessary; we examined them with the utmost care in order to see whether we could eliminate anything. But let me assure the Committee they were not put forward on a "take it or leave it" basis. Rather, those draft treaties were presented as the best possible incorporation into treaty language of the proposals and principles which the West believes are fundamentally necessary in any test ban treaty in the absence of clear and controlling scientific evidence to the contrary. In the changed international climate in which we find ourselves, it should not be too difficult for any Governments sincerely committed to the goal of a nuclear test ban to negotiate a sound and effective and therefore acceptable agreement.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The West has presented a number of very sound proposals, but thus far we have heard very little from our Soviet colleagues about the ways which might be found to break out of the present impasse in our negotiations. In this, and in our future meetings, we shall look forward with great interest to what the Soviet Union has to tell us about the ways in which it believes our deadlock can be broken, because the ball is clearly now in their court.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):
Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, I shall say a few words as the representative of the Soviet Union.

At the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 26 November we were officially seized of the resolutions adopted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations both on the question of disarmament and on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII), the draft of which was submitted by the non-aligned States, is of the greatest importance for the work of our Sub-Committee. In the first place, this resolution condemns all nuclear weapon tests, I emphasize, condemns all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests; secondly, it asks that all nuclear weapon tests, I emphasize, all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, should cease not later than 1 January 1963; thirdly, it endorses the memorandum of 16 April 1962 of the eight non-aligned States and calls upon the parties concerned to take it as a basis for negotiation, as a basis for an agreement.

In the course of the debate on this resolution in the General Assembly the insistent demand of the peoples of the world that all nuclear weapon tests without exception should cease not later than 1 January 1963 resounded with greater force than ever. The resolution indicates to our Sub-Committee the direction in which we must move in order to eliminate the threat to mankind with which the continuation of the nuclear arms race and of nuclear weapon tests is fraught.

One of the characteristic features of the result of the debate on this question in the General Assembly is the fact that despite very strong pressure on the part of the Western Powers in favour of their idea of a so-called partial treaty which would leave open the possibility of continuing nuclear weapon tests underground, the General Assembly rejected this idea and in the resolution that was adopted it categorically insists on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests without any exception whatsoever. This idea is expressed with the utmost clearness in resolution A,

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the sponsors of which, as I have already said, were the non-aligned States. Moreover, even the Western Powers, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, having submitted their own draft resolution and encountered vigorous objections on the part of the overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations, were compelled to delete from their draft the paragraph providing for the cessation of tests in three environments only, namely in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. The Western Powers thereby recognized that there was no chance whatsoever of acceptance by the General Assembly of their point of view regarding a partial agreement. I think that there is no need to explain at length why a proposal which allows for the possibility of conducting tests in any particular environment meets with such determined opposition on the part of members of the United Nations.

Many representatives of non-aligned States spoke of this in the General Assembly in a vivid and convincing way. Everyone realizes quite well that if the slightest possibility of conducting nuclear weapon tests is retained, the situation will not be changed in the least; everything will remain as before, and, as in the past, nuclear tests will continue and new types of weapons of mass destruction will be devised and improved. This will inevitably have the result that other States will join in the nuclear weapons race and the danger of nuclear war will be increased.

The fact that the negotiations in Geneva have been protracted to an intolerable extent is causing anxiety to peoples and States. It is no accident, of course, that the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations expressed themselves in favour of putting an end to all nuclear weapon tests. A firm date was set - 1 January 1963 - after which no nuclear weapon tests should be conducted anywhere or by anyone.

As a result of the debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests we now have a more solid basis for achieving a mutually acceptable agreement. At the very beginning of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee the non-aligned members made great efforts to find a compromise basis in order to break the deadlock in the negotiations between the nuclear Powers. The result of their efforts was the well-known eight-nation memorandum submitted on 16 April 1962. Now that the memorandum has been endorsed by the General Assembly as a basis for negotiation for an agreement, one may say that this document has received world-wide support. Not a single representative in the General Assembly spoke against this memorandum. On the contrary, all speakers

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stressed its positive significance as the sole compromise basis for the elaboration of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

By endorsing the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States, the General Assembly recommends us to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, using national means of detection of nuclear explosions for the purpose of control over the fulfilment of such an agreement. By endorsing the memorandum of the non-aligned States, the General Assembly rejected the Western Powers' demand for compulsory inspection.

In summing up, we may say that never before have we had before us so clear a perspective in regard to what we - the members of the three-Nation Sub-Committee - ought to do. Are we in a position to do it? Yes, we are. All that is needed is goodwill on both sides.

When we listened to the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, at the first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee after the recess on 26 November, it seemed to us at first that a ray of hope for an agreement had appeared. Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber began their statements with assurances that they were prepared to dedicate themselves with a new sense of urgency and responsibility to the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Mr. Dean even depicted himself as a resolute opponent of allowing our discussions to become a game of empty charades. After these words the Soviet delegation was in a state of optimistic expectation, hoping that there would be a serious change in the position of our Western partners, which would make it possible at last to remove the obstructions which up to now have blocked the path to our goal, namely, the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.

However, what we had occasion to hear when the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom passed from general phrases to the substance of the matter showed that the representatives of the Western Powers were not only not making any forward move but, on the contrary, were beginning to move backwards. The States Members of the United Nations, the overwhelming majority of peoples of the world, demand the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, but the United States and the United Kingdom still insist that they should remain free to carry out such tests. At the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have again been boosting the so-called draft partial treaty submitted by them last August which would leave underground nuclear weapon tests outside the scope of prohibition. They go on trying to impose a partial treaty

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upon us, despite the fact that the General Assembly rejected this idea in the most definite manner. This position of the Western Powers must be confronted with the fact that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom intends to cease underground nuclear weapon tests. On the contrary, it is well known that new plans for underground nuclear explosions at the Nevada testing site are being prepared in the United States. Apparently the United States and the United Kingdom intend to ignore the General Assembly's resolution on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests as from 1 January 1963, and to deal thereby a mortal blow to the existing possibilities of reaching an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom must take into consideration the grave responsibility they will assume if they unleash another dangerous chain of events.

The Western Powers now have wide opportunities to solve the question in a constructive way. One such opportunity is to take the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries as a basis for negotiation, accepting that document as a basis without reservation, without any attempt to adapt it to the present position of the Western Powers.

There is another way - it would be possible straight away to sign an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and to stipulate in the agreement the obligation of States to continue negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests and meanwhile to refrain from carrying out any tests in that environment while the negotiations are proceeding and until an agreement has been reached. This way is a direct and honest one which would place no one in a disadvantageous position and would enable us by means of negotiation to remove the existing differences on the question of underground nuclear weapon tests and to arrive at an agreement which would satisfy all parties.

The question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests constitutes one of the most burning and urgent international problems. One may say that this question has long been more than ripe, but so far it has remained unsolved only because of lack of goodwill on the part of our Western partners.

We appeal to the representative of the Western Powers to adopt a realistic attitude, to give up trying to block an agreement, to give up trying to impose their own terms of a treaty based on an international system of control and compulsory inspection, and to show good will and to come to an agreement on one of the bases which I have listed, namely, either on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum or on

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the basis of an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapon tests in three environments, provided that negotiations on the prohibition of underground weapon tests as well are continued and that an undertaking is given to refrain from conducting such tests during the negotiations.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I listened, Sir, with interest to your comments as, of course, I did to those of the United States representative. I noted the United States representative's reference at the beginning of his speech to the interesting speech we heard this morning from the representative of Sweden. I think he is very right in saying that we shall all wish to consider that proposal and study it in order to see whether it contains anything of interest. I may be wrong, Mr. Chairman, but, although I listened with care to your remarks, I did not notice that you referred to that particularly important speech by the Swedish representative at all. If I am wrong, I apologize. But I was certainly surprised that there was no reference to it. I think that all of us, from whichever side we approach this problem, ought to look at any proposals that are put forward to see whether they can help us to solve our problems.

In the same way I was a little surprised that I did not hear any reference in your speech, Sir, to the problem of the "black boxes" which I understood was a matter of interest to the Soviet Union, and to which I referred earlier. Although we do not see in the "black box" the solution to all our problems, at least we were willing to discuss it, if our Soviet colleagues wished. However, I have no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that on future occasions you will consider this particular problem.

We have to examine every idea placed before us in an endeavour to overcome the impasse in which our negotiations now stand. In this connexion I was interested in the quotation given to us by the United States representative. I think it was from a graduate of Cornell University, a Mr. Josh Billings, who said, if I have the quotation right: "It ain't ignorance that causes trouble: its the things people know that ain't so." There is a lot in that. I wonder if Mr. Billings was responsible for that other little couplet which I am sure is well-known to both the United States and the Soviet representatives and which goes as follows:

"As I was walking up the stair, I met a man who wasn't there;

He wasn't there again today, I do so wish he'd go away."

It seems to me that this is comparable to some of the arguments which we hear in relation to the problems of espionage and the other stories which we are so accustomed to hearing from our Soviet colleague.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I recall that at this particular moment of time we are, as near as possible, exactly one year from the date when the Soviet Union introduced its last proposal in relation to nuclear tests. We always refer to it as the 28 November proposal. Today is 28 November, but actually in refreshing my mind on it I see that in this document the date is recorded as 27 November. I refer to document ENDC/11. I have been re-reading that document to see whether there was anything in it which I had overlooked, because, as it is the latest Soviet position, we ought to acquaint ourselves all the time with what is in it. In these discussions we are constantly urging the Soviet representative to come up with something new. When it is considered just how far the West has moved forward since that particular Soviet proposal was made, then I think it is difficult for the Soviet representative not to admit that the West is very, very much more flexible in these matters than the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the fact, as I have reminded the Soviet representative on so many occasions, that this particular proposal was a step backward and not forward.

However, on re-reading document ENDC/11 I was interested to note that on page 5 of the official copy there is one passage which is heavily underlined. I presume, therefore, that the Soviet Union attaches particular importance to it. The passage reads:

"With this end in view, the Soviet Government submits for examination by the Governments of the Western Powers the following proposal: to conclude immediately an appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, that is, in these environments where the implementation of control is not fraught with any serious technical difficulties."

That is rather like what the Western Powers are suggesting to the Soviet Union today. Our draft partial treaty (ENDC/59) covers in fact exactly those points. It is true that at a later stage of that document, only two or three paragraphs later on, and in far less specific terms, the Soviet Union says:

"In regard to underground nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that States should undertake not to conduct such tests until agreement is reached on a system of control ..." (ENDC/11, p.5)

That statement is in far less positive language than the emphatic declaration of opinion which appears at the top of page 5, and I would say to the Soviet representative that the very least he can do now is to agree to what the Soviet Union

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itself -- just a year ago yesterday -- felt was of such supreme importance, namely, to agree to abandon all further tests in these three environments. I very much hope that the Soviet representative has not altogether turned aside from that. I draw to his attention the fact that in this Soviet Union document of a year ago far more importance is attached to banning tests in these three environments than is attached to what one should do in relation to underground tests. If, in fact, that was the view of the Soviet Union a year ago, then I would have thought that we could quickly conclude this partial agreement.

To turn from that, but still considering how we can make progress, either in relation to a partial agreement or to a wider one, I have been thinking about the suggestions put forward by the Swedish representative this morning. I do not wish to give a full considered view on those suggestions at this moment, but the more I think about it the clearer it becomes to me that the Western draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) is obviously on the lines on which we can and should get a final treaty banning all nuclear tests. Of that I think there is no question. I believe that we have brought forward in that document, in a simple straightforward way, requirements which ought to be possible of agreement. We have always indicated that it is there, ready for negotiation, and that it is not placed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I think that is the position between the United States and ourselves on this.

But having said that, and bearing in mind resolution 1762A (XVII) passed very recently by the General Assembly, I notice that the Swedish representative drew special attention to operative paragraph 6 of that particular resolution. In operative paragraph 6, the General Assembly:

"Recommends that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission" (ENDC/63, p.3)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Those are the words of paragraph 6 of the resolution which was passed in New York only a few short weeks ago, and that is the particular paragraph to which the Swedish representative drew attention in his speech this morning. He then said quite clearly:

"... a provisional arrangement under a temporary ban on underground tests, as asked for in paragraph 6 of the thirty-seven Power resolution, would in no way prejudice the final shape of a test ban agreement." (ENDC/PV.84, p.22)

I take it that in his speech what he was looking at was simply an attempt to find a way to implement paragraph 6 of the thirty-seven-power resolution as an interim measure pending the conclusion of the final treaty, which I still say should be on the basis of the draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/50) submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August 1962. If we are looking for a means of finding a way to do this, then this proposal of his is an interesting one.

I do not look on this proposal as being a proposal for an unqualified moratorium -- not at all. I would certainly not support that in any form whatsoever. If I understand him aright, he is proposing that there should be this interim arrangement, in line with paragraph 6 of the resolution, to which he has specifically referred and which in fact, as I have pointed out, says that an interim agreement shall include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification by an international scientific commission.

If this is what he is seeking, and if we can make progress on the lines of some interim arrangement which does provide adequate and effective detection and identification while we thrash out the actual details of a permanent treaty, this is something which is certainly of interest and deserving of our attention. It is in that context that I refer to these proposals that were made this morning by the Swedish representative, and it is in that context that I asked this morning a particular question. I indicated then that I did not expect the Soviet representative to answer it at that moment but I think it does require an answer if we are to build anything on this idea of our Swedish colleagues. That question -- if I may refresh the mind of our Soviet colleague here -- related to the suggestion made by Mr. Edberg in his speech, when he talked about this group of eminent scientists which could be entrusted with the task of deciding whether an inspection was necessary, and went on to infer that his understanding was that the Soviet Union "does not object to the opening up of such a possibility." (ENDC/PV.84, p.21)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The question that I asked this morning was: in these circumstances would the Soviet Union in fact accept inspection on every occasion when this group of scientists declared that inspection was necessary? That is a simple question.

In a different context, Mr. Chairman, I think that on Monday, speaking in the plenary meeting, you did indicate that it was important to accept a matter in principle before one went on to discuss details. (EMDC/FV.83, p.22) What I am suggesting to you, Sir, is that you should accept in principle, and tell us quite categorically and frankly, that if we were to consider this Swedish proposal at all your country would in fact accept this decision of these scientists that an inspection was necessary and that you would invite inspection on each and every such occasion when those scientists in fact so declared. I think you will agree that this is a point of principle. By your own definition -- you said that we should accept a principle before discussing details -- it is perhaps fair that you should give us that clear answer. I hope that in answering this question you will not merely refer me to what Mr. Kuznetsov said on 17 August, for that statement was in fact capable of various interpretations. What we want is a simple and clear statement of the Soviet Union's point of view in regard to this. It would materially help us forward in our work if we were quite clear about what the Soviet Union meant in this regard,

That is an immediate comment with regard to the Swedish proposals. Of course they go into various other aspects, and, as I say, I think it would not be courteous to our Swedish friends to attempt to give a full analysis of what the Swedish representative said within two or three hours of his making his statement. However, with regard to his thoughts about an international scientific commission -- this interim body that he was thinking about -- I refreshed my mind again with the eight-Power memorandum (EMDC/28) and I found that what he proposed was very much in line with the first part of paragraph 4 of that memorandum. I also looked again at our own draft comprehensive treaty (EMDC/50) to see the references there to the international scientific commission, and again there is a great deal of common ground. This shows that in framing these proposals our Swedish colleague has given thought to suggestions that have come from various sources. As I say, we wish to consider very carefully what he has proposed in this regard. I think it is our duty to consider any proposals that come from other delegations, because in our Sub-Committee here -- I am sure you will agree with this, Mr. Chairman -- we do tend to become wrapped up in our own individual thoughts, particularly after two and a half months.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Anybody who reads the reports of the Sub-Committee will admit that our views could do with a little new thought brought into them. Of course, I think that the Western thoughts are very good ones, but possibly you, Mr. Chairman, think the same about those of the Soviet Union.

Anyhow I wanted it to be quite clear that, as far as a permanent solution is concerned, I am still convinced that the United States-United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty does provide the real basis for an effective and lasting treaty. However, I am not opposed to any idea of trying to find some means of implementing paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII), provided it clearly embodies the undertaking in the last phrase of that paragraph, which says that this interim agreement should

"include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission"

(ENDC/63, p.3)

In so far as any interim arrangement does that, then I am very willing to look at it and to see how it can help us to achieve results. This as you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have reminded us, is a matter which was passed overwhelmingly by the General Assembly.

Your references to the Western partial treaty having been withdrawn from the United States-United Kingdom resolution are of course very much beside the point. They have no relation because the reason why it was withdrawn was that there was this direct reference in this paragraph to a partial treaty, and there was no need to reiterate the reference to a partial treaty -- so please do not let us have debating points of that sort. What really matters is that we are prepared to look with a fresh mind at any new suggestions which come forward. That is why I have made these initial personal comments on the proposal tabled this morning.

Therefore I do ask you, Mr. Chairman, to give further thought to this matter and to see whether you cannot come forward with some new proposals. As I have indicated to you, it is appropriate that you should do so on the anniversary of the proposals which you made which ran away from us. On this occasion perhaps you could make some new proposals which would come towards us, and that would, I am sure, give great joy to my United States colleague just as it would to me.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, I intend to make a brief remark in connexion with the statement of the United Kingdom representative.

He expressed surprise at my not having said anything, either at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee or at today's meeting of our Sub-Committee, about the latest Swedish proposal which was put forward today by the representative of Sweden in the Committee. In reply I can say that we shall, of course, study the Swedish proposal very carefully. But I should like to draw your attention to the fact that as far back as seven months ago, on 19 April, we stated that we accepted the eight-nation memorandum, of which Sweden is a co-sponsor. If a study of the Swedish proposal shows that it accords with the proposals contained in the memorandum of the non-aligned States of 16 April, then I think I shall not be mistaken in saying that we shall welcome it.

As regards the Soviet proposal for automatic stations, or as you prefer to call it, the proposal for "black boxes", I made no reference to it today because it is now for you, that is the Western Powers, to speak. We put forward our proposal regarding the use of automatic stations in order to go the farthest possible towards meeting the Western Powers and to facilitate agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. On the basis of that proposal we shall be able to reach agreement quickly if the Western Powers do not try to bring it to naught by demanding an international system of control and compulsory inspection.

In conclusion, I should like to say that we shall study very carefully the statement made today by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, in the hope of finding in it something that might make the way easier for us to reach agreement.

Does anyone else wish to speak today? If not, shall we pass on to setting the date of our next meeting? According to a tentative exchange of views between us, it seems that we have agreed to hold our next meeting on Tuesday, 4 December at 10.30 a.m.

It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.