

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 29 May 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. V.F. SHUSTOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the eighteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Of the eighteen meetings held by this Sub-Committee since the beginning of this Conference, the first eight were devoted to a repetition of the debates recorded previously, during most of the last year of the meetings of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. On these occasions the Western delegations urged the Soviet Union to return to the agreed basis of the negotiations for an adequate and effective nuclear test ban treaty, or, in other words, to the universally agreed scientific assessment of the test ban control situation represented by the report, issued on 20 August 1958, of both the Eastern and the Western experts who had been meeting at that time in Geneva (EXP/NUC/28). The Western delegations also recalled the progress that once appeared to have been made in translating this scientific foundation into a practical and binding political treaty with an effective system of international control that was agreeable to both sides.

All of this progress, which reflected innumerable compromises hammered out in the course of several years of negotiation, was incorporated in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9-GEN/DNT/110), which itself has subsequently been amended several times, both before and during this present Conference, in an attempt to meet the points advanced from time to time by the Soviet Union. Indeed it was felt, at least on our side, that with the agreement on our part to have the treaty be comprehensive by covering all tests in all environments we had met, on a practical basis, all of the Soviet requirements for an agreement. So it came as a great shock to the Western delegations when the Soviet Union on 28 November 1961 denounced all those control arrangements that had been very carefully agreed and that had been embodied in the draft treaty. I am referring to the many articles and sections of the draft treaty on which an accord had already been registered.

For its part, the Soviet delegation -- and I must say I very much regret this -- has attempted to defend its no-control-whatsoever position of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11-GEN/DNT/122) by claiming that, no matter how objective we made our treaty

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language, and no matter how carefully we drafted our provisions on the selection of the scientists and on the protection to be given the host country with respect to on-site inspections, to international controls, or to an international control system, this would somehow create the danger of Western espionage on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Further, the Soviet Union said -- although it has never given us any scientific information to support these statements, has never referred us to any scientific journals or scientific articles, and has never brought scientists here to support its statements -- that scientific advances since 1958 had reached the point where so-called existing national control networks, without any international commission or any international control posts and without any interrelation of national control posts, could furnish completely adequate verification -- that is, both detection and identification -- of any nuclear test ban treaty.

The Western Powers strongly disputed the latter contention, for which, as I have said, the Soviet Union has adduced no scientific proof whatsoever; they have never been willing to give us this scientific proof or to have their experts meet ours. Indeed, the Western Powers also spent considerable time in demonstrating that the proposed international control machinery, which they envisaged, had been surrounded with so many safeguards as a result of past compromises hammered out with the Soviet Union since 1958 that this international control system really had no potential whatsoever for permitting Western intelligence operations inside the Soviet Union.

Into this arena of controversy between the Soviet Union and the Western delegations came the eight new members of the Disarmament Conference on 16 April last with their joint memorandum (ENDC/28), which offered some suggestions intended to bring the two nuclear sides closer together on the basis of a compromise. The co-sponsors have told us that they were not proposing a complete blueprint of a nuclear test ban treaty, but merely a number of new thoughts directed towards providing the negotiators with a new impetus or with some new ideas towards concluding a nuclear test ban treaty.

Since the ninth meeting of the Sub-Committee, we three delegations have focused almost all of our statements and arguments on the joint memorandum. On 19 April the Soviet Government did indeed declare that it accepted that document as the basis for future negotiations on a test ban treaty (ENDC/SC.1/PV.9, pp.7-14), and it has never ceased to reiterate this position.

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The United States and United Kingdom delegations, however, remain unimpressed with this Soviet declaration on the joint memorandum because, in their view, the completely arbitrary manner in which the Soviet delegation has interpreted the eight-nation plan, while denying that it was doing any interpreting at all, has distorted the plan out of all possible recognition, so that now, under the Soviet version, it accords neither with the plain language of the plan nor indeed with the quite apparent wishes of its sponsors.

The Western representatives, at the same time, have agreed to use the joint memorandum as one of the possible bases for reaching agreement on a test ban. They consider it as a fresh starting point from which to launch an exploration of the opportunities for compromise arrangements which, when carefully worked out with the Soviet delegation, could be surveyed with care to see whether the end product merited signature as a sound and effective treaty for banning nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, asserts that the Western position is not truly based on the joint memorandum, but is virtually identical with the Western draft treaty submitted on 18 April 1961. The Soviet Union continues to accuse the United Kingdom and the United States of refusing to consider any genuine compromise settlement of this very difficult question. The Western Powers, however, while quite willing to use the eight-nation joint memorandum as a new point of departure, and while studying that memorandum very carefully for this purpose, believe that the Soviet Union has not budged in any significant or detectable point from its scheme of 28 November 1961 for a mere paper-pledge treaty without any international verification measures. Thus, unfortunately, each side questions the sincerity with which the other side has really taken up the eight-nation plan. This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs which deserves more careful examination.

The true essence of the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 was that no international control activities should take place regularly and systematically within the Soviet Union. There were not to be any regularly spaced international control posts, as envisaged by the Geneva experts of 1958, which would in part be manned by reliable and objective non-citizens of the Soviet Union. There were not to be any Soviet obligations vis-à-vis an international control commission, on which the Soviet bloc States were to have had large representation but which they alone could not have dominated, at least from the point of view of taking positive decisions.

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Finally, there was to be no on-site inspection of unidentified events by international inspectors who would have an unquestioned right to visit defined areas of Soviet territory an agreed number of times per year.

In an endeavour to explain this 180 degree turnabout of Soviet policy from what it had officially been even as late as July or August 1961, the Soviet Government argued that national control systems alone were fully adequate, from a technical point of view, to do the job of detection and identification. However, it is abundantly clear that this was more of a pretext than anything else, advanced in an effort to justify Soviet opposition to effective international control, as I have just described it. After all, we know that the 1958 Geneva experts, after having reviewed all of the capabilities of national systems and all of their past accomplishments in detecting atmospheric nuclear tests, then rejected reliance upon such national systems and recommended, instead, the creation of a new international system with international control posts to monitor the various environments.

It is quite striking, I submit, that the present Soviet position, which supposedly implements the terms of the eight-nation plan, bears a very marked resemblance -- a very marked resemblance indeed -- to the Soviet stand of 28 November last. Certainly, in all essential respects there has been no change whatsoever.

In connexion with detection stations or control posts, the Soviet position in regard to the joint memorandum is that national systems are to do the job completely. To the extent that any new stations might be built, as mentioned by the memorandum, Mr. Tsarapkin has stated that these would merely be new national stations incorporated into existing national networks and under full national direction. Indeed, the Soviet representative has tried to make it appear that this aspect of the Soviet position was wholly adopted by the eight co-sponsors. For instance, on 25 May he said:

"The non-aligned States based their proposal on the fact that existing national detection systems have been built up with due regard to scientific and technical requirements. With good reason they emphasized in their memorandum that:

'The existing networks already include in their scientific endeavours the detection and identification of man-made explosions.'"

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.17, p.28)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I think that our Soviet colleague has failed to note that the sentence which he cited from the joint memorandum speaks of the "scientific endeavours" of existing stations, and not of actual scientific accomplishments. That national stations have been trying -- I repeat, trying -- both to detect and to identify geophysical events which might be man-made nuclear explosions is undoubtedly true. But whether these national networks have adequately succeeded in their endeavours both to detect and to identify events is open to much doubt, and that, I submit, is precisely why the co-sponsors advanced the suggestion that new stations might be built to supplement the existing ones in the future "agreed system".

This is a far cry from the Soviet interpretation of relying almost exclusively on existing stations. Here I must note that Mr. Tsarapkin has specifically rejected any idea that new stations might be built to fill gaps in existing networks. The problem of spacing is very important from the standpoint of detecting tests both in the atmosphere, underground and in the lower reaches of outer space, but he refuses to admit that technical questions of spacing should play any role whatsoever in deciding on new stations. By doing this he has attempted to undercut the logical basis for at any time building even one new station, anywhere.

But this is not all. The Soviet delegation also insists that existing national networks should not in any way be tied together into one operating system, even though the joint memorandum clearly calls for the establishment of one "agreed system" -- in the singular -- to function on a global basis. According to our Soviet colleagues, there are to be no international arrangements for unified data reporting procedures, methods or times. There is to be no standardized instrumentation, even though the possibility of equipping posts with new instruments is specifically raised by the eight-nation plan.

Indeed, national networks, says Mr. Tsarapkin, are not to be used to report natural phenomena occurring in their own countries, but only in other nations. Apparently, also, the Soviet version of the joint memorandum does not even require national networks to report all data collated, but merely those data which each national network, in its own subjective judgement, considers related to suspicious events. What that is supposed to mean in this context, how one national network can decide this, and indeed why one network should decide this unilaterally or subjectively when an international commission will exist to do just such work, has not been explained by Soviet representatives. I therefore do not believe that our

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conclusion is open to challenge that the Soviet position on posts for recording geophysical data is, in substance, unchanged from the recent past. The same is true in only slightly lesser degree regarding the international scientific commission envisaged by the eight-nation memorandum.

As I said a few minutes ago, the essence of the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 on an international commission was that there should not be any Soviet obligations towards it. Of course, the initial Soviet position at the time was that there should be no commission at all. But this was not the essential factor. After all, since the commission was to be a body located outside Soviet territory, its home activities could not be said to create any espionage risk for the Soviet Union. It was only that the easiest way to ensure that the commission would have no rights concerning any events occurring within the Soviet Union was to create no commission at all. However, it could hardly bother the Soviet Government very much, I submit, if a completely powerless body, that is, a body without any authority whatsoever with respect to what happened on Soviet territory, were to be set up in some other country.

This is precisely what has happened to the international scientific commission proposed by the eight new members in the interpretation put forward by the Soviet delegation. According to this, the commission will have no function whatsoever vis-à-vis the detection posts or national networks. The commission must wait patiently for any data which the national networks may of their own volition choose to send it, and it must then try to analyse such data, which may or may not have been collected on a uniform scientific basis.

According to the Soviet version, if the international commission finds itself perplexed about the nature of certain geophysical events -- that is, about whether a nuclear explosion may be involved -- it can supposedly do no more than ask or appeal to the government of the party concerned to talk things over with it to see whether uncertainties about the suspicious events cannot be removed. In the Soviet view, the international commission certainly is not to have any right to conduct an on-site inspection at the spot where a suspicious event seems to have occurred. According to Mr. Tsarapkin, at most, some party on whose territory a suspicious event has occurred may, on occasions of its own choosing, decide for its own reasons to invite a few members of the commission to pay what would amount to a purely

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social visit to some innocuous site. Thereafter, the commission would be expected to trumpet to the world for the benefit of the party which issued the invitation that no treaty violation had taken place. In other words, under the Soviet version the international commission would be a tool of any party seeking to improve its reputation and not an impartial international commission at all.

Therefore, I do not see how there can be any possible doubt that the Soviet position regarding on-site inspection is fundamentally unchanged from 28 November 1961. Under the Soviet version the Soviet Union is to be under no obligation to open up even a small corner of its territory to international inspection. At the most -- and this as a great concession -- the Soviet Union may from time to time invite an inspection. That is, "You may come if we issue you an engraved invitation. But you must not ring our bell yourself for you will not be admitted." This is hardly reassuring, since it is all too evident that if any party to the treaty were actually trying to violate it by conducting a clandestine nuclear explosion, it would never choose that occasion to invite an on-site inspection to take place in the suspicious area.

I submit that the eight States have worked out a logical and comprehensive scheme for an international commission with an internationally operating "agreed system" of monitoring stations with the right to call for necessary on-site inspections on the territory of parties. Therefore, it is no wonder that when the Western Powers discuss the terms of the eight-nation memorandum their ideas and comments, based upon the language of the memorandum, differ vastly from the distorted Soviet version which I have just set forth. If Mr. Tsarapkin complains of this, it must be because he objects to having everyone see that there is such a wide gulf between the eight-nation plan, as it is written down for all to see, and the upside-down Soviet version of that clear plan. Hence, Mr. Tsarapkin tries to deny that his delegation has interpreted the eight-nation memorandum at all, and then he accuses the Western delegations of the very practice of which he himself is guilty.

When the Western delegations state that they recognize that the joint memorandum was an attempt at a compromise solution, they know full well that any treaty based on that memorandum cannot be the same in all respects as previous Western proposals. Whereas in the past we talked only of the control post system

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recommended by the 1958 Geneva experts, we now recognize that national networks would play a genuine role under the scheme of supervision envisaged by the joint memorandum. We know that the memorandum leaves open the possibility that some of the new stations, at least, could be operated under national rather than international auspices, but that this is left for final agreement among the parties.

We see that the part anticipated for the international scientific commission is by no means as large, authoritative or comprehensive as was contemplated for the control commission discussed during the test ban Conference. The international commission would have a reduced, but by no means non-existent, role in the operations of the "agreed system" mentioned by the memorandum; it would nevertheless have to play an efficient part.

The eight-nation plan differs in important ways from previous Western plans regarding on-site inspections. Under the eight-nation memorandum, before an inspection could take place there would be an obligation for the commission to consult about the situation with the party concerned. Moreover, even though the United States and the United Kingdom clearly believe that, taken together, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the joint memorandum definitely establish a party's legal obligation to invite the commission to make an on-site inspection when the commission considers this essential, we must note that it would be the commission, which, according to the memorandum, might be composed mainly of scientists from non-aligned countries, that would decide when to call for such inspections. Under previous Western proposals it was always the other nuclear side that was to have an unquestioned right to initiate an inspection.

This, then, is the situation of the test ban negotiations in this Sub-Committee as seen by the United States delegation. For the last month we have been hampered in our efforts to examine all aspects of the joint memorandum honestly, carefully and thoroughly by the uncompromising Soviet attitude that no exploration of the eight-nation plan and no negotiation based on it are possible unless and until the two Western delegations first accept the distorted Soviet misinterpretation of the basic terms of that memorandum. We have, of course, declined to do that and will continue so to decline; our understanding of the memorandum will continue to be drawn from its plain terms.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We have appealed on many occasions to our Soviet colleagues to abandon their line of adhering rigidly to their position of 28 November 1961 under the guise of following a revised policy. If the Soviet Union is not yet ready to adopt the proposals of the eight co-sponsors, as really laid out in the memorandum, in regard to on-site inspection, then let us get down to some other important aspect of the memorandum and return to inspection at a later time, when we may have chalked up agreements in elaborating other parts of a test ban treaty within the framework suggested by the joint memorandum.

We ask our Soviet colleagues to join with us in genuine negotiations. We ask them to work with us in an effort to discover paths of mutual accommodation on difficult issues. However, we will not violate the dictates of commonsense and of sound scientific knowledge and experience. The eight-nation plan, we submit, neither asks nor expects us to indulge in any such folly, and I am very sure the Soviet Union does not expect us to accept its unilateral scheme of 28 November last, by whatever name it may be called. The way to a reasonable agreement is open if the Soviet Union can bring itself to abandon its clichés, its outworn slogans and its outmoded concepts. As in the past, the fate of our negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty rests on decisions that only the Soviet Government can take, and I appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as Soviet representative, to ask your Government to take such decisions.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I was unable to be at the Sub-Committee's last meeting, but I have studied with interest the verbatim record of that meeting and have observed, Mr. Chairman, that you did me the honour of referring to me on a number of occasions. I would like to come back to one or two of those references during the course of my remarks today. But first I would like to follow on the very interesting and illuminating speech we have just heard from the United States representative. He has given us some form of an assessment of the present position. Perhaps I can add an assessment of my own which I think ties in fairly closely with what he has just been saying to us. I am sure he will not mind if there is some element of repetition because good words repeated are even better.

In an attempt to be absolutely fair to our Soviet colleague -- sometimes I detect that he thinks I am not being wholly fair to him; that is certainly not the

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impression that I would wish to give -- I shall first present the Soviet position as I understand it and as it has been set forth by our Soviet colleague here.

The position as you, Mr. Chairman, have stated it to us is, as I understand it, that your Government accepts the eight-nation memorandum as it stands and that in your view it represents a compromise between the position of the Soviet Union as it was at the beginning of this Conference and the position of the West. Further, as I understand it, the Soviet Union maintains that we in the West do not accept the memorandum as it is but that we are adhering to our old positions.

Well, let us have a look at that thesis. The Soviet Union maintains that it accepts the memorandum as it stands. What precisely do you mean when you say this, Mr. Chairman? As far as I can see you mean that the Soviet Union accepts the memorandum according to your interpretation of it. Now you have told us time and again that in your view the memorandum does not provide for any obligation on the part of the parties to a nuclear test ban treaty to accept on-site inspection. You have told us further that the memorandum does not provide for the establishment of an internationally organized detection system. You brush on one side the arguments which we have presented that the memorandum should be looked at as a whole.

On the one hand, you are not prepared to accept our suggestion that paragraph 5 of the memorandum, with its reference to the obligation on parties to give speedy and full co-operation to the international commission, is aimed at obtaining the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event.

On the other hand, you have not really accepted -- or, so far as I can see, dealt with -- the responsibility of the commission as envisaged in the memorandum to process data received from an agreed system of observation posts, to report to the parties to the treaty, or to consult with the parties with particular reference to the possibility of initiating -- yes, and carrying out -- on-site inspection.

Now, Mr. Chairman, when you speak of accepting the memorandum as it stands, I feel bound to ask whether you have really thought what this means and whether you have really tried to understand the intentions of the sponsors in submitting it. It was notable, I would submit, that when my colleague, Sir Michael Wright, asked you at the last meeting whether you thought that the assumption of the sponsors of the memorandum that suspicious and significant events would take place was justified, whether in fact the Soviet Union agreed that we must provide for suspicious events, your reply was:

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"... I ... therefore cannot give you an answer. If by 'suspicious and significant events' you mean clandestine nuclear explosions, it seems to me that, after the signing of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, there will be no such events in practice."

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.17, p. 32)

Those were your words, Mr. Chairman. With the greatest respect, this does seem to me an evasion of the question that was put to you, and it does seem to me that it cannot be taken to mean that you accept the eight-nation memorandum as it stands.

Again, when my colleague, Sir Michael Wright, asked:

"If the commission decided that it could not make an accurate assessment of the facts without on-site inspection, and if it were to ask the country concerned whether it would accept on-site inspection to establish the truth or falsity of a certain alleged fact -- to establish the facts of an event -- would that State be giving full co-operation if it refused the request of the commission?" (ibid., p. 34)

you, Mr. Chairman, replied that you did not know exactly what was meant by "full co-operation". You said that if we understood from the memorandum that full co-operation meant that the interested State would be under compulsion to accept inspection, this was something that was contrary to the spirit of the memorandum. Once more, I cannot see that this constitutes accepting the memorandum as it stands. It means, surely, that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept only an interpretation of the memorandum which accords with its own interests. Very well, then; so much for the Soviet claim to accept the memorandum.

Perhaps I could now look at the Soviet claim that the memorandum is, in fact, itself a compromise. You have said, Mr. Chairman, that the memorandum is a compromise, firstly, because it includes the idea of inspection -- the memorandum says that parties to the treaty "could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt" -- and secondly because it speaks of an international commission; and you lay stress on the fact that the memorandum refers to this commission as "consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries". You suggest, as I understand it, that these two proposals in the eight-nation memorandum -- the mention of inspection and the mention of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists -- make it a compromise proposal.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

You have stated that the Soviet proposal of 28 November did not contain these ideas and the fact that the Soviet Government has now accepted these ideas means, therefore, that the Soviet Government has made a considerable move and is prepared to compromise: that is what I understand to be your position.

Perhaps we could look at the question of compromise in the context of the nuclear test ban negotiations as a whole. I have never been able to understand why the Soviet Government should think that it is justifiable to ask the West to compromise between the position represented by the Western draft treaty of April 1961, with all the modifications we put forward to that draft treaty even after that date, and the position which was suddenly, unilaterally and arbitrarily adopted by the Soviet Government on 28 November last year. The Western draft treaty, with the modifications proposed to it, constituted, I would submit, a real compromise in itself. It contained provisions on the really vital issues -- the issues of on-site inspection and an international detection system -- which were already a real compromise between the proposals put forward in the experts' report of 1958 and the position adopted by the Soviet Union during the three years of negotiation based on those proposals right up to the autumn of 1961.

We had compromised; we had compromised, for example, between the idea of inspecting every unidentified event and inspecting very few -- which was what the Soviet Union, up to the autumn of 1961, was demanding and declaring itself willing to accept. We had compromised on the number of detection posts which might be established in the Soviet Union. Then the Soviet Union suddenly told us it could accept no international detection posts whatsoever on Soviet territory. It told us that it could accept no international inspection on Soviet territory. And now -- now -- the Soviet Union asks us to accept a compromise between our compromise position and this new and entirely negative position which the Soviet Union adopted on 28 November last year. I really do think it is necessary, and only fair, to point this out. Because when the Soviet Union, with its own interpretation of the eight-nations memorandum, claims that this is a compromise, it is claiming a compromise not between two original positions but between a Western position which already constituted a compromise and a Soviet position which constitutes a complete departure from the whole basis of the nuclear test negotiation as it existed for over three years.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Well, there it is. I want to bring that out clearly, but I think it is also necessary to point out that the Soviet interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum does not in itself constitute a compromise between the Soviet position of 28 November last and the position maintained by the two Western Governments, for the real essentials of the Soviet proposal of 28 November were that any agreement on a nuclear test ban should be based on detection by national systems only and that in such an agreement there would be no obligation on the signatory States to accept on-site inspection.

What, then, is the position of the Soviet Union today? As I understand it, it remains precisely the same. You, Mr. Chairman, say that detection should be by national systems only: you say that the eight-nation memorandum must be interpreted in this way. Secondly, you say that there should be no obligation to accept on-site inspection: you say that the eight-nation memorandum must be interpreted in this way. You argue that the fact that the Soviet Union now accepts the concept of an international commission and the fact that it accepts the idea of inspection invited by host countries, indicate that the Soviet Union has made a great move forward. But, so far as the international commission is concerned, you apparently do not accept that the commission should have any co-ordinating, organizing or supervisory functions. As I understand it, the Soviet Union thinks that the international commission should in fact be little more than a mere cipher.

This does not seem to me to be any striking or imaginative advance. As for inspection, as my colleague, Sir Michael Wright, pointed out at our last meeting, we in the West cannot really feel that a moral obligation to accept inspection gives us the necessary safeguard in respect of the observance of undertakings under a test ban treaty. I do not like doing so, but I must remind our Soviet colleague that we have all seen where moral obligations not to test ended last year.

Moreover, if a party to the treaty refused to accept a request from the international commission for on-site inspection, the legal responsibility for abrogating the treaty would fall on innocent parties. This would undoubtedly lead to incurring a degree of odium. And the guilty party, meanwhile, could perfectly well claim that it was innocent and the innocent party would be in no position -- no position at all -- to prove its case.

This, then, is the Soviet position as it stands at the moment, and I do not think I am being unfair in presenting it in this way.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

On the other hand, what is the position of the West? As far as the West is concerned, we have stated our position on a number of occasions. Perhaps I can summarize it also. As far as the question of inspection is concerned, we continue to think that the parties to the treaty should be obliged to accept on-site inspection if the international commission is unable to determine the nature of a detected event without on-site inspection: in other words, a "suspicious and significant event", in the words of the memorandum. We ourselves -- both the United States and the United Kingdom, I think -- are prepared to accept this obligation. We think that in a matter of such enormous importance it is only reasonable that this obligation should exist. For reasons that I have explained before, we do not think that a moral obligation is sufficient: we think there should be a legal obligation. We think that any State refusing to accept on-site inspection in the light of a request from an impartial international commission should itself carry the burden of breaking the treaty. It should not be enabled to put this burden on to innocent parties.

Moreover, we think that under an international treaty dealing with the banning of tests it is only right that the data on which decisions about the occurrence of suspicious and significant events are based should be collected and processed according to agreed international standards. This is the only way in which to avoid acrimonious dispute, leading to the breakdown of the treaty in circumstances in which the blame would not be clearly ascribed to the guilty party. Moreover, we think that our attitude towards these vitally important questions of inspection and an internationally organized detection system is clearly supported by the eight-Power memorandum itself. We are not trying to read into this memorandum meanings which do not exist. We merely read the memorandum as a whole and, if I may say so, we endeavour to exercise an element of commonsense in reading it. I am not going to repeat now the arguments on these points which I and my United States colleague have stated on many occasions, but I do submit that if paragraphs 4 and 5 are read together there can surely be no doubt that the sponsors of the memorandum had in mind a legal obligation on the part of the parties to the treaty to invite the commission to visit their territories if the commission judged this to be necessary in order to assess the nature of a detected event. I just cannot see, otherwise, what the obligation to give full co-operation to the commission can mean.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Similarly, I do not understand what the reference to establishing "by agreement a system of detection" can mean if it does not mean an international system. Of course there is reference to building upon already existing national networks, but the main emphasis -- and I do ask our Soviet colleague to face this -- is on the creation of a system; and a system, in this sense, can only mean an international system.

So I come back once more to the proposal which we have put forward (Ibid.p.4), that we should for the time being put on one side the question of inspection and turn first to the other main questions raised by the eight-nation memorandum. We in the Western delegations are not being inflexible. We do not stand fast on our old positions; we do not insist on compulsory inspection, or on an international network of detection posts, in the precise form proposed in our treaty of 18 April 1961. We think that on the question of inspection there may be room for manoeuvre, but we think that this is probably the most difficult question that divides us at the present time and that if we were first to examine questions of the capabilities of existing detection systems and the way in which these might be co-ordinated -- "built up", in the words of the memorandum -- into an international system, and if we then went forward and considered the way in which an international commission might be established and might function as a truly impartial international and authoritative body, then we might be in a better position to consider some possible compromise on the question of inspection. We might be able to see more clearly whether some system of quotas might not be perfectly adequate in order to give us the security required. We might be able to see whether safeguards could not be devised to give assurance to the Soviet Union that on-site inspection would not endanger its national security.

So I make one further appeal to our Soviet colleague. I ask him to give serious thought to this suggestion and to help us really to make progress in these negotiations. I would remind our Soviet colleague that the sponsors of the memorandum have not asked us to accept it as it stands. They have not asked us to accept it without reservation, as you, Mr. Chairman, on occasion have suggested that we should. Indeed how could we, without clarifying exactly what is meant? They have asked us to accept it as an incentive to further negotiation and this means -- and I say it once more -- that we should get down to discussing the possibilities suggested by it and should try to build on these possibilities. I have said that so many times, but I say it once again to our Soviet colleague.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

There are the three main aspects. Let him choose which of these three he likes, and let us start serious negotiations in relation to it. That is what we ask. I do not think it is an unreasonable thing to ask, and I have an idea that our colleagues of the eight uncommitted nations would be most happy if we were in fact to do that.

I said at the beginning of my remarks that I wished very briefly to refer to your statement at our last meeting, Mr. Chairman, when, as I said, you did me the honour of referring to me on a number of occasions — once or twice a trifle unkindly, I thought; but then I am a liberal-minded man, I am always ready to understand the feelings of my colleagues and I did not take umbrage at the words you used. But I was a little surprised when you said, after quoting me:

"I am already accustomed to these methods employed by Mr. Godber when, in order to achieve his purpose, he does not stop at distorting the position of his partner in the negotiations." (ibid., p.20).

This was rather rough, I thought. Nevertheless, let us take this at its face value. A little later on you said:

"I have to repeat these facts each time in order not to give the United Kingdom representative the opportunity of misleading readers of the verbatim records." (ibid., p.21)

What an extraordinary suggestion, Mr. Chairman! Did you really think I could possibly contemplate trying to lead the readers of these verbatim records into error? You misjudge me, Mr. Chairman, I assure you. Nothing would be further from my thoughts. What I was trying to do was not to lead anybody into error but to lead our Soviet colleague into serious negotiation. That, I would have thought, was a much more worth-while thing, and that is what I have tried consistently to do. So, if our Soviet colleague wants to test our sincerity, all he has to do is to co-operate in genuine negotiation on any one of these three major items to which we have referred so many times.

Again, I see in the verbatim record, Mr. Chairman, that you went on to say this:

"Another untruth of Mr. Godber's consists in the following:" - Very harsh words indeed! - "the Soviet Government's proposals of 28 November do not provide for any inspection, whereas the proposals of the non-aligned countries provide for visits to the country or site where the suspicious event occurred at the invitation of the State in whose territory this

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event was recorded. The Soviet Union has accepted also this proposal of the non-aligned countries. This means that on this question, too, it has moved away from its old position, which did not permit any inspection, and adopted a new position permitting inspection by invitation." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.17,p.21)

Brave words, Mr. Chairman, but what do they mean? Seeking to find out what similar words which you had used meant, I asked you questions at the previous meeting, that is, the sixteenth meeting. I put to you, true, a theoretical or hypothetical point when I asked: if the Soviet Union genuinely is interested in inviting inspection, would it give us some idea -- supposing it was thinking in terms of a quota -- of the number of occasions when, if asked by the commission or by another part to invite inspection, it would agree to extend such an invitation. On that occasion you said:

"I think that the argument between you on this score is both premature and groundless." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.16, p.33)

I took you up on that word "groundless", but apparently it stuck in your mind, because you used it again at the seventeenth meeting. You said, again referring to me, in regard to inspection that I saw only the negative side of it, and you went on to say:

"He considers that this proposal gives absolutely no assurance of compliance with the provisions regarding inspection and that a State will never invite inspection of its country. This argument of Mr. Godber's, however, is a groundless and extreme conclusion and we cannot agree with it." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.17,p.24)

I was intrigued that on two successive occasions you used the word "groundless" in relation to something I had said. Perhaps one of those comments was groundless, but I submit that it was illogical to tell me that both were groundless. What in fact were you saying, Mr. Chairman? On the one occasion you were saying that it was groundless to suggest to you that you might give some concrete example of the number of times, the extent to which you would accept inspection. On the other occasion you said it was groundless for me to assume from your answers that you would never invite inspection. I do not think that both positions are tenable. When you used the same word in relation to both of them, it rather stuck in my mind that this was a very odd situation. Is it in fact that there is an element of discomfort in your mind in relation to this particular measure? I was not seeking to cause you discomfort; I was seeking to get an assurance from you that you really meant what you said in relation to inviting inspection, that you were

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really genuine and sincere in relation to it. If I was unwarranted on the first occasion in assuming that perhaps you were not serious about inviting inspection, surely I was not speaking groundlessly on the other occasion when I invited you to state the number of times a year you envisaged it would be necessary to invite inspection, within the terms of the memorandum, "to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event."

This is an aspect on which, although my United States colleague and I have followed it up many times, we have never yet had a clear answer. I hope you will not think my question once again today is unwarranted. I would have thought it was fairly justified, because on this so much depends. But, as I have said, I have no desire to embarrass you in any way in this regard; I only want to get negotiations going. So if you are genuine, as you have said, and as you protested most hotly in your reference at the last meeting to my own comments, then I invite you to show us your sincerity, and no one will be more pleased than I. Let us get down to discussion of just what the composition of the international commission shall be, what its duties shall be, what its functions shall be -- or, if you like, let us get down to discussing what we are going to build upon the already existing national detection networks, how we are going to bring this into a system, a single system, which will be effective and which will be co-ordinated by the international commission.

I should like to get down to serious negotiations on one or other of those matters or on the inspection issue if you are ready and willing to discuss it. This is not, I hope, speaking groundlessly; it is just a reasonable and honest desire to make progress.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union I wish to make a few comments. We have carefully studied the record of the last meeting of the Sub-Committee and are compelled to note that no change has taken place in the position of the Western delegations. We are compelled to note the existence of the same situation after hearing today's statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. Today both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber -- at the previous meeting Sir Michael Wright spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom -- have tried in their statements to make black white and white black by alleging that the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States provides for both compulsory inspection and the establishment of an international detection system. We have already repeatedly pointed out the utter groundlessness of the attempts by the

(The Chairman, USSR)

United States and the United Kingdom representatives to interpret the provisions of the memorandum in justification of their old positions. Their attempts are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the memorandum. If it were true that the sponsors of the memorandum had based it on compulsory inspection and the need to set up an international detection system, which is how the Western representatives are trying to depict the matter, this document - i.e. the memorandum by the non-aligned States -- would be devoid of significance and, of course, could not be regarded as a basis for a compromise settlement of the question. The value of this document lies in the very fact that it does not accept the Western Powers' point of view as expressed in the draft treaty of 18 April and as they are trying to portray it at the present time. The memorandum also does not accept the Soviet point of view as expressed in the proposals of the Soviet Government of 28 November 1961. Nevertheless, it to some extent takes into account the positions of both sides. Therein lies the compromise nature of the document submitted for our consideration by the eight non-aligned States participating in the Committee on Disarmament.

But you, the representatives of the Western Powers, are attempting to adapt the memorandum to your own point of view and are thus making it impossible to reach agreement on the basis of this document. The joint memorandum provides that control over the discontinuance of nuclear tests should be carried out by means of national networks of observation posts. It suggests that, in order to collect and process data received from the national posts, it will be sufficient to constitute an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists. It provides, finally, that the question of inviting the commission to clarify in loco the circumstances giving rise to a particular suspicious event should be decided by the States themselves. There can be no varying interpretations of these provisions of the memorandum; everything is laid down so clearly and so unambiguously that no question of or argument about interpretation should arise. We do not accept your attempts to represent the whole matter as though in this case two points of view and two interpretations of the memorandum had clashed -- the Western Powers' interpretation on the one hand and the Soviet representative's interpretation on the other. There is no question of it being necessary to interpret the provisions of the memorandum which I have enumerated; everything is said clearly, plainly and precisely in the memorandum itself.

(The Chairman, USSR)

We consider that, on the basis of those selfsame proposals and taking into account the opportunities that actually exist, we ought to negotiate further and we ought to agree. We consider that, on the basis of these proposals by the non-aligned States, it is possible to achieve an immediate settlement of the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests in the interests of all peoples.

But how are the Western Powers behaving with regard to the non-aligned States' proposals? The Western Powers, in acting contrary to these proposals, continue to adhere to their old positions. They still demand the establishment of a wide-spread system of international control, and they still insist on obligatory on-site inspection. They persist in their demands, well aware that the Soviet Union cannot accept them, well aware that these demands are unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The Western Powers know perfectly well that, by this persistence, they are completely obstructing and blocking any possibility whatever of agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Nevertheless, they continue to persist in their demands, and one wonders why they are doing this.

There is only one answer to this question: the United States and its allies in the NATO military bloc are against the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Therefore they do everything possible, on the one hand to prevent agreement on the discontinuance of testing, and on the other hand to whip up the nuclear arms race and accelerate the tempo of nuclear rivalry. This policy of the Western Powers is most eloquently attested by current events, including the conduct by the United States of an extensive series of nuclear weapon tests under ground, in the atmosphere, under water, and at high altitudes, the decisions taken by the Athens session of NATO with regard to supplying the NATO allies of the United States with nuclear weapons, the carrying out by France of nuclear explosions in Africa, and the inclusion of West Germany in the nuclear arms race. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the recent trip by Mr. Balke, the West German Minister for Atomic Affairs, to the United States where, according to the Western press, he discussed serious matters. In the United States Balke visited atomic laboratories at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge and a number of other, more secret centres. It is believed that his programme ended with talks with members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, and it has been reported that the Americans agreed to sell certain atomic equipment to West Germany.

(The Chairman, USSR)

A secret agreement was also concluded for the training of West German atomic energy specialists in the United States and for the supply to West Germany of materials to be used in various technological processes. Experts maintain that, with certain modifications which West German specialists are in a position to carry out, this equipment supplied by the United States can easily be converted and the manufacture of nuclear weapons in West Germany begun.

Another noteworthy occurrence is the recent publication in the NATO organ Revue militaire générale of an article by Mr. Strauss, the West German Minister of Defence, in which he categorically demands that the West German Bundeswehr should immediately be given atomic weapons for war against the Soviet Union. A book by the atom maniac Teller, recently published in the United States and entitled The Legacy of Hiroshima, also throws light on the United States position on this question. In this book Teller justifies the unleashing of nuclear war by the United States against the Soviet Union in order to achieve the United States' political ends. We shall be told, as we have often been told in the past, that the United States President, and only the President, determines United States policy and that no heed should be paid to statements by other persons in this respect. But here I would supplement what I have just said by a reference to recent declarations by leading United States statesmen, including the President himself, men occupying the highest positions in the country, to the effect that the United States Government might in certain circumstances take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union,

When one takes into account all these recent facts, the real reasons for the United States refusal to come to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests become obvious to everyone. Against the background of these openly militarist events, the obstinate reluctance of the United States to renounce its old unacceptable demands concerning compulsory inspections and the establishment of an international control system can be easily explained. The Western Powers' refusal in practice to accept the compromise proposals set forth in the memorandum by the non-aligned countries has surprised the neutralist, non-aligned States and opened their eyes to the fact that the United States is stubbornly opposing an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

(The Chairman, USSR)

This attitude on the part of the Western Powers to the proposals by the eight non-aligned States has surprised everyone all the more in that the proposals represent a serious attempt to lead the negotiations out of the present impasse. Today Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have again tried to replace the vital matter of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the non-aligned States' proposals with arguments about how they should be interpreted. When the Western Powers, which really reject the memorandum, have recourse to such tactics, they calculate that they will thereby be able to mislead the world by representing the matter as if they have accepted the memorandum, but are having an argument, so they say, not with the sponsors of the memorandum - the non-aligned States - but with the Soviet Union concerning the interpretation of the memorandum and the provisions contained in it. In a previous answer I have already disclosed the purpose of this procedure by the Western Powers. On this occasion I should also like to emphasize the particular fact that those Powers are trying to maintain that their interpretation of the memorandum is correct while the Soviet Union's interpretation is not. The purpose of such utterly unfounded assertions on the part of the Western Powers is to mislead world public opinion. Those Powers are attempting by means of this manoeuvre to conceal the fact that here the root of the matter is not the interpretation of the non-aligned States' proposals but their virtual rejection by the Western Powers.

I must repeat once more that the question of interpreting the proposals of the non-aligned States does not exist. This question has been created artificially by the Western Powers as a smoke-screen and as camouflage for their negative attitude to the proposals. These proposals - providing for the use of national systems, for the establishment of a small international commission of scientific experts, possibly from non-aligned countries, and for inspection at the invitation of the country concerned - are clear to us. No rhetorical or juridical tricks by Mr. Godber or Mr. Dean can obscure - let alone distort - the substance of the matter as set down in the proposals contained in the memorandum.

During the previous negotiations, which went on for more than three years, the Western Powers had recourse more than once to the tactics of starting arguments on technical questions so as to lead the negotiations into an impasse and to prevent an agreement on the discontinuance of tests. The effectiveness of these tactics have such purely negative purposes has been proved in practice. For the Western Powers these tactics are a convenient screen and camouflage for their policy of refusing to agree on the discontinuance for all time of any kind of nuclear weapon

tests. This time, too, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are having recourse to these same tactics of starting technical controversies in which they invent various technical pretexts and arguments to drive these negotiations as well into an impasse and thus avoid an agreement on the basis of the compromise proposals of the eight non-aligned States.

Today Mr. Dean has confirmed for us that the United States delegation will continue to adhere to its old position and to refuse to accept the proposals of the non-aligned States regarding the use of national systems for control and regarding inspection by invitation. Today's statements by Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have shown us yet again that the United States and the United Kingdom are persisting in their old attitude, which is incompatible with the compromise proposals of the non-aligned States.

The Soviet Government has reacted favourably to the proposals of those States. It has accepted their proposal to use national observation systems for control over the discontinuance of tests. It agrees to the organization of new posts, if necessary, provided such posts are an integral and constituent part of national systems. It approves of the establishment of an international commission as proposed in the memorandum, and likewise approves of the functions of the international commission as set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5. Finally the Soviet Government supports the proposal regarding inspection by invitation.

Thus there is a very broad and, in addition, uncomplicated basis for an agreement between us. But the United States and the United Kingdom representatives are attempting to confuse the issue and complicate the discussions. All this happens simply because the United States and United Kingdom representatives envisage and demand what is virtually an agreement of the type drafted by them and submitted on 18 April 1961, but rejected by the Soviet Union as absolutely unacceptable. The proposals in the memorandum by the non-aligned States make it possible considerably to simplify and facilitate the negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement itself.

An agreement on the discontinuance of tests under present day conditions should consist of a minimum of provisions, with a view to rapid implementation without needless difficulty and expense. The proposals of the non-aligned States are fully in line with this aim.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Our basic attitude is that national systems existing at the present time should continue to operate as they do now, and the only international responsibility which we are called upon to discharge here is to agree on the establishment of an international commission as a centre to which national systems will forward data about any suspicious event. The task of the commission will be carefully to analyse these data and to make its assessment of the nature of the suspicious event. The commission will be able to do this since it will consist of highly qualified scientists. However, the Western Powers maintain their old position and demand the establishment of a broad international system of observation and control. This attitude on the part of the Western Powers has thus far led to nothing and, of course, will lead to nothing in the future.

On 19 April 1962 the Soviet Government stated its willingness to study the proposals set out in the memorandum of the non-aligned States as a basis for further negotiations. When the Soviet Government stated this, it drew the attention of the whole world to the following:

"The next few days must show the turn events are to take -- whether towards an agreement to end nuclear weapon tests or towards further nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This depends entirely on the governments of the United States and its allies. The Western Powers now have an opportunity to demonstrate in practice that they will not obstruct the settlement of the urgent problem of ending tests. The peoples of the world will never forgive them if this opportunity is missed". (ENDC/32, p.5)

In this statement, the Soviet Government appealed to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to listen to the voice of reason and to take the course of reaching agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests for all time. Already nearly one-and-a-half months have passed since then. That is, of course, more than enough time in which to have reached agreement on the basis of these proposals of the non-aligned countries, but, alas, this has not come about.

The Western Powers have not hearkened to the appeal of the Soviet Government. Their attitude is one of scorn to the initiative of the non-aligned States which submitted compromise proposals. The United States and the United Kingdom, as can be seen from their attitude in the Sub-Committee and in the Committee, do not want an agreement on the basis of the proposals contained in the memorandum by the non-aligned States, but prefer to keep the negotiations at deadlock. The responsibility for the situation which has arisen rests with the Western Powers and primarily, of course, with the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): It was a source of great regret to our Government, and a source of great amazement to our delegation, that at the plenary meeting this morning the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union attacked my Government's policies on the basis of non-existent statements, alleged to have been made by officials of the United States, that we believe in a nuclear preventive war or a "first strike" -- which we do not; that we should have tried to bolster his case by citing a book written by Professor Teller, who is himself a strong opponent of a nuclear preventive war or a "first strike"; and that he should have referred, in this connexion, to an article written and first published several years ago by the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Why it was published a second time by a private military publication in France, not a NATO publication as alleged by Mr. Zorin, I do not know, but the ideas in that article do not seem objectionable. Mr. Strauss wrote only of defence measures for the territory of the Federal Republic. He did not ask for German possession of nuclear weapons, which he acknowledged to be a British and American responsibility. He asked only that the Federal German Army be equipped with devices that could fire nuclear weapons so that, if an invasion should come from the East, tactical nuclear weapons could then be turned over to the army by the United States and United Kingdom, as to all NATO armies, to help ward off the aggression.

Let me go back to The Saturday Evening Post article by Stewart Alsop. On 27 March of this year, about two weeks after we convened our Disarmament Conference here on 14 March, the Press Secretary of the President of the United States had this to say with respect to certain statements in the article in The Saturday Evening Post written by Stewart Alsop:

"The quotation given in the Alsop article must be read in the total context.

"The President's statement represents no change in American policy. It has always been clear that in such a context as a massive conventional attack on Europe by the Soviet Union, which would put Europe in danger of being over-run, the West would have to prevent such an event by all available means,

"This has been United States policy since the late nineteen-forties and it represents no change. The real change, as Mr. Alsop points out elsewhere in the article, is in the strengthening of our defensive alternatives to nuclear warfare."

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The President himself, three days later, in a Press Conference on 30 March, was asked about this matter. He said -- and I am quoting from the sixth column of page 2 of the New York Times International Edition of Friday, 30 March 1962:

"Yes. I think Mr. Salinger's statements made it clear that this was intended to be merely a restatement of a traditional position where if a vital area, and I think that Mr. Salinger used Western Europe, were being over-run by conventional forces, that the United States would take means -- available means -- to defend Western Europe.

"It was not intended to suggest, as Mr. Salinger said, that this meant that the United States would take aggressive action on its own part or would launch an attack.

"A so-called pre-emptive attack on its own part is not our policy nor the policy of previous Administrations.

"The article read in context makes it clear that we are talking about if there was an attack of overwhelming proportions by conventional forces in an area such as Europe, we would meet our treaty commitments."

I submit that it has been said on any number of occasions that the United States does not believe in a preventive nuclear war. We do not believe in a pre-emptive attack. We do not believe in a first strike. I do not know how I can make that any more explicit than by citing the two statements that I have just cited from the President's Press Secretary and from the President.

At this late date in our Conference, it somewhat staggers the imagination to conceive why the Soviet Union should go back and take statements in a book published some time early in January -- which again, as I say, does not mention either a pre-emptive war or a first strike; why the Soviet Union should take an article that appeared in the Saturday Evening Post in March, two weeks after our Conference started; why the Soviet Union should take old statements made by the Federal German Defence Minister, which have since been radically changed and which are merely a republication; and why the Soviet Union should suddenly seize upon matters that happened long prior to the time we commenced to meet here on 14 March as ostensible reasons for changing its agreement of last Friday to a Conference declaration against war propaganda. Moreover, what has all this to do with Soviet refusals to enter into real negotiations on a properly safeguarded nuclear test ban treaty under adequate and effective control within the framework of the joint memorandum?

(Mr. Dean, United States)

You said, Mr. Chairman, that the United States rejected the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiations. We do not. We expressly accept the eight-nation memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations. I shall not repeat what I have said, but let me call to your attention the eight-nation memorandum itself, since you say I am incorrectly interpreting it. The eight States say that:

"They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis." (ENDC/28, p.1)

If it is established "by agreement", it must be "by agreement" between the parties to the treaty, so that it would become an international agreement. The memorandum continues:

"Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement. (ibid.)

How are you going to designate "certain of the existing posts"? Well, the memorandum says "by agreement"; or "if more appropriate" new posts can be established. How? Again, "by agreement". It goes on to say:

"Improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation." (ibid.)

Who is going to furnish the posts "with more advanced instrumentation"? Or who is going to decide what is "more advanced instrumentation"?

I submit that you have to take everything that the memorandum says. It seems to me that it is only reasonable to believe that since the sponsors have used the word "agreement" three times in paragraph 3 -- and since the commission is also to be set up by agreement -- they must mean that this international commission, which will depend for its data on "a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis", will actually be the body to establish, by agreement between the parties to the treaty, where these posts should be and what kind of advanced instrumentation, mentioned by the memorandum, they should have.

They say in paragraph 4:

"Furthermore, the feasibility of constituting by agreement an international commission ... " (ibid.)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Again, they are going to set up this international commission by agreement between the parties. It certainly cannot be done on a unilateral basis by any one of the nations parties to the treaty. They go on to say:

"This commission" -- they are referring to the international commission -- "should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data." (ibid.)

Now, again, they are going to examine the data received from the agreed system of observation posts. If a report is to be made on the basis of objective examination of all the available data, then to be objective the report must be prepared by an international commission rather than by the existing national network of any one nation.

The memorandum goes on to say:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event." (ibid.)

Let me refer to the last sentence of paragraph 5, which reads:

"The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ibid.)

Who is to make the assessment? The international commission is to make it on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data. How do they get the available data? The parties to the treaty would accept the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts. It is clear from paragraph 4 that an on-site inspection is considered to be a way to get the facts, and, therefore, an inspection would accord with the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts.

Again, paragraph 5 says:

"Should the commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary."
(ibid.)

Who is to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event? It is the international commission. And if the international commission cannot reach a conclusion, it informs the party on whose territory the event occurred of the points on which urgent clarification seems necessary. Again, it is not the party on whose territory the event occur which would make the objective determination. It could not, because it would be examining and judging its own acts. It is not the country where the station exists that is going to determine the points on which urgent clarification seems necessary: it is the international commission. Further on in paragraph 5 we read:

"The party and the commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment." (ibid.)

Going on to the third sentence of paragraph 5, which I believe refers to the sentence in paragraph 4 which states that "All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event", we read:

"The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ibid.)

I am not interpolating the word "obligation" into this eight-nation memorandum; I am reading from the memorandum. In fact, everything I have said here I have read precisely from this memorandum. Mr. Tsarapkin says that we reject it, but I must point out that the United States does not reject it, and I do not think the United Kingdom rejects it. We accept it as a basis for negotiation. I am reading from the text and I am not adding words to it.

Therefore, the party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4, that is, the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of a suspicious and significant event, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment. Again we find that it is the international commission that makes the assessment. Paragraph 5 continues:

"After full examination of the facts" -- which I take it, includes verification in loco by the international commission -- "taking into account any additional data furnished to it the international commission would inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case and of its assessment of the concerned event." (ibid.)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I do not see how it could be clearer that there is to be an international commission, and that the designation of existing posts and the setting up of new posts, as well as the furnishing of all posts with more advanced instrumentation, is to be a matter involving both the commission and the parties, who must agree on what is done. It is the commission that is to determine the nature of events and to assess them, and it is the scientists of the commission who are going to carry out on-site inspections. Finally, it is the party to the treaty on whose territory the suspicious event has occurred which has both to furnish the commission with the necessary information and to invite the commission to its territory in fulfilment of its obligation under paragraphs 4 and 5.

You have said, Mr. Chairman, that we have antagonized the eight nations which sponsored this memorandum, but if there are any of the eight -- and I have said this several times -- that reject this interpretation, I would like to be informed of it. I have every reason to believe that the manner in which we interpret this memorandum is in accordance with the views of the eight nations themselves, and not one of the eight representatives has ever said to me -- and these verbatim records are available to them -- that he rejects our interpretation of this memorandum.

I submit that the United Kingdom and the United States are prepared to negotiate on the basis of this memorandum. We do accept it as one of the bases for negotiation. We are prepared to go forward on it, and I submit that if you read this memorandum in its plain terms, it has to mean what I have just stated. I do not wish to prolong this discussion but I must stress that the United States is prepared to negotiate hard and in earnest on a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests in all environments, and if that treaty were to be accepted and signed by the essential parties, you would find that the United States would stop all nuclear tests from the date the treaty came into force. We would then ban all further nuclear tests in all environments. I do not see how I can state the position of my Government in any clearer or more precise terms. I cannot see what we gain by going outside and dragging in what some individual may have said, when you are dealing here with the responsible representative of a responsible Government and when I tell you on the record what the policy of my government is.

We have freedom of the Press and freedom of speech in my country and any citizen is entitled to express his own views as to what he thinks the policy of the United States Government should be. But, as I have said to you several times, it is the President of the United States and the Senate of the United States

(Mr. Dean, United States)

which determine the foreign policy of the United States, and while they, in arriving at what is to be the policy of the United States, might take into consideration individual views of the citizens, it is the President and the Congress of the United States who determine foreign policy and not the individual citizens.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): There is little I need to add to the very cogent remarks we have just listened to from our United States colleague. I just want to make one or two comments arising out of your speech today, Mr. Chairman.

Once again you have spurned the offer of negotiation; once again you have ignored the solid, sound, factual arguments which the Western representatives have brought forward as reasons for entering into serious negotiation. Today, however, you have gone a little further, I think; you have indulged in some quite extraordinary propagandist statements that do not stand up to examination for one moment. I think what struck me most was your statement -- as I understood it in the interpretation -- that the United States and their NATO allies are against any agreement on nuclear tests; and you went on to refer to the carrying out by the United States of a great series of tests at the present moment, as a justification for that statement. What an extraordinary assertion, Mr. Chairman. You know, just as I know, just as our United States colleague knows, and just as every representative at this Conference knows, that the responsibility for the starting of tests again rests with one nation and one nation alone -- your own. No statement such as you made this afternoon can in any sense take away that heavy responsibility which rests on the shoulders of your government. Therefore it is a waste of time, as well as a red herring drawn across our discussions, to make statements of that kind.

I listened very carefully to your arguments to find something on which we could build. At one moment, in referring to the memorandum, you said that all was crystal clear in the memorandum. Well, if it is so crystal clear let us go ahead and negotiate on it. You said the proposals were a serious attempt to lead the negotiations out of an impasse. Yes, they were. We want the memorandum to lead us out of an impasse. We have proposed to you one way after another in which we could indulge in serious negotiation on it, and all you give us in return is the sort of speech to which we have listened this afternoon. It is small wonder if we are somewhat discouraged by this response. I will not use further extravagant words to categorize the speech that you have made to us. I have

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already indicated this afternoon that in my view there is no particular merit in using strong language about one another. What I want to do is to get into negotiation. So, Mr. Chairman, suppose you forget all this stuff you have been talking about this afternoon which has no bearing on our subject; suppose you face up to the points that the Western representatives in all good faith have put to you; and suppose you agree to get into serious negotiation on some of these matters we have been talking about; that is the way, not only to make progress here, but to earn the gratitude and support of the non-aligned countries and of the world outside.

There is only one delegation preventing us from getting into serious negotiation, and that is your own. I suggest that you now do enter into serious negotiation with us. You will find us very ready to follow up all these three major points, to discuss them in detail, to thrash out with you precisely what we believe can be built out of this memorandum -- that is what we want to do and that is what I suggest it would be in the interests of us all to do.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have a few comments in connexion with the statements by the United States and United Kingdom representatives. Mr. Godber has just repeated yet again:

"There is only one delegation preventing us from getting into serious negotiation, and that is your own. I suggest that you now do enter into serious negotiation with us." (supra, p.34)

We have already heard these meaningless expressions many times, and of course they have nothing to do with the matter in hand. If you are really interested in serious negotiations and are not concerned with effect or merely getting something into the record, you should accept the proposals of the non-aligned countries as they are, i.e. accept their proposal that the control system be based on existing national systems, accept their proposal to set up an international commission, limited in size and composed of scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, and, finally accept their proposal that the matter of inspection be settled on the basis of invitation by the State on whose territory the prospective inspection will be carried out.

When you accept all these three proposals, serious negotiation can really begin, everything will be simplified, many of the technicalities which you thought up and with which you inundated us at this table will disappear, everything will become clear, everything will fall into place, and we shall speedily reach agreement. Until you genuinely accept these proposals of the non-aligned States, all your

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claims that you accept them are mere deception, since you attribute to them what they do not contain. The eight-Power proposals are before us embodied in a document called a memorandum. If this document did not exist, the situation would be quite different: you could make these assertions, and they would be difficult to refute. But, with the text of the memorandum in front of us, Mr. Dean -- whatever he may say here -- cannot deny that, for purposes of control, national observation systems furnishing data to the commission should be used. The commission would process these data and draw its conclusions. When does the question of sending an inspection team arise? It only arises when there is an invitation by a State. There is no doubt whatever about this -- this provision is specifically included in the memorandum.

You said that the system should be scientific: the memorandum deals with this, too. Paragraph 3 states:

"They [the non-aligned States] believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions ... The existing networks already include in their scientific endeavours the detection and identification of man-made explosions." (ENDC/28, p.1)

Thus the eight-nation proposals that for purposes of control national systems be used also take into account the existing situation in the scientific field, and so on.

When you say, for example, that according to the memorandum the commission should set up posts, and concern itself with their equipment and the selection of their instrumentation and so forth, you are obviously forcing the meaning of the text and trying to attribute to the memorandum what is not there. You are going beyond the scope of the memorandum. Why are you continually doing this? Because you are still sticking to your old point of view and endeavouring to impose an agreement modelled on the draft submitted by you on 18 April of last year.

Mr. Dean, the United States representative, has stated that the United States is willing to agree to the prohibition and the discontinuance of all kinds of nuclear weapon tests immediately an agreement satisfactory to the United States has been signed. But such a statement by Mr. Dean does not dismay even the most violent and the most irreconcilable opponent of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Why is this so? Because when the United States representative says that the United States is willing to discontinue nuclear weapon tests immediately

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an agreement has been signed, he at the same time puts forward conditions for an agreement which he knows are unacceptable to the other side: on this basis there is no danger that an agreement will ever be reached. You realize this and so you can afford to tell the whole world that you are willing to discontinue nuclear weapon tests as soon as an agreement has been reached. But there never will be an agreement on the basis you propose. Therefore, everyone -- both in the United States and other NATO countries -- who is opposed to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is quite calm, and all your statements, Mr. Dean, do not frighten or alarm them in any way. Statements like this by the Western Powers' representatives should not, indeed, mislead anyone.

Turning now to the United States representative's comments on my statement today, you tried to refute that statement by alleging that we refer to data two years old, and so on and so forth. But let me tell you that the statement by Mr. Strauss, the West German Minister of Defence, to the effect that the Bundeswehr should immediately be given nuclear weapons for war against the Soviet Union, only appeared in the press on 25 May of this year. As you see, Mr. Dean, only three days ago, not two years. For all I know Mr. Strauss may have made similar statements two years ago or even five years ago, but this only shows his consistently stubborn line regarding demands that nuclear weapons be given to the West German armed forces, which are led by former Hitlerite generals and which seventeen to twenty years ago were fighting against the Soviet Union and the United States. Now they are demanding nuclear weapons and demanding them insistently and unequivocally. But the serious thing is that the logical trend of this matter is such that German revanchists are getting ever closer to the realization of their aim of obtaining nuclear weapons. Now they are closer to it than they have ever been. When we quoted the article by Mr. Strauss, we had in mind something only three days old, not two years.

You then said that Teller's book The Legacy of Hiroshima is an old book. Nothing of the sort -- it appeared very recently. In it Teller supports the nuclear arms race and tries to justify the unleashing of a nuclear war by the United States to achieve its own political ends.

Finally, in his interview with Alsop, published recently in the United States, the United States President apparently had in mind some fictitious aggression by the Soviet Union -- the Soviet Union being portrayed as starting a war. Such arguments cannot justify those who themselves threaten to unleash a nuclear war.

Arguments about who would start the war sound unconvincing. Those who are preparing for war can, without any particular difficulty, confuse the issue and make themselves out to be the victims of aggression. There are many such cases in history. What concerns us now is the statement that the United States Government might in certain circumstances take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The appropriate conclusions must be drawn from this. This statement fits very well with the Western Powers' attitude at this Conference, the attitude which has again led these negotiations into an impasse. We see no new development, no faint prospect of a change in the Western Powers' position. As long as the Western Powers maintain that position, there can of course be no question of an agreement.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): There is little that one can add to this discussion. We seem to make little impact upon you, Mr. Chairman, much as we try to draw you into serious negotiation. I am not going to be drawn aside by these red herrings. I am just going to make another proposal.

Paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum talks of establishing, by agreement, a system to be "based and built upon already existing national networks", on "certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose", and so on. It so clearly envisages the need to evaluate what the existing systems are. Therefore I am going to say to you, Mr. Chairman, "Let us try and make progress on this, whatever you have said today, or on other days, which has led us nowhere. Let us once more see exactly what these existing national systems extend to and what is needed to build upon them -- to use the words of the memorandum. Let us get together a meeting of scientists -- our own, if you like, with the neutrals; the neutrals have offered to help in this sense, as was made quite clear in one of our meetings. Let us get together a meeting and see precisely what is needed to evaluate these existing systems and to build upon them."

I am not interested in these polemical arguments: I am interested in making progress. So, with the greatest good will, ignoring the provocations of your statements, I am just making another practical suggestion. Let us get together here a meeting of scientists -- neutral scientists and scientists from both sides -- and see exactly how they evaluate the position and what they say is necessary to build upon the existing national networks. That is precisely within the terms of the memorandum. If you are genuine in accepting the memorandum, that should not be too difficult a thing for you to accept also. Perhaps that proposal might lead us into more fruitful discussion than some of the comments you have just made to us.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am only amazed at the stubbornness, the wonderful stubbornness with which the Western Powers maintain their position. They have no desire at all to accept the proposals submitted by the representatives of the non-aligned States as a basis for agreement. They do not want to admit this, but want to divert us into negotiations on technical matters and to draw us into discussing various isolated points of detail. But what will be the use of us getting bogged down in all sorts of technical arguments and in analysing various technical aspects of the problem of detection without agreeing as to what should be the basis of discussion? We have enough material for sterile arguments to last us for years or even decades. In this matter you are deliberately pursuing a subversive policy. You are trying to lead the negotiations into an impasse by referring to our failure to agree on technical questions. But we will not accept this. No, gentlemen: if you really want an agreement, let us agree on the basis of the proposals submitted in the memorandum by the eight non-aligned States. We have declared that we accept them, but we will not agree to the negotiations being led into an impasse of technical controversy and fruitless discussion. We have already had sufficient experience in this respect during more than three years of negotiation.

We propose that, instead of engaging in these unnecessary technical disputes, we proceed to draft an agreement on the basis of the non-aligned States' proposals. If you accept these proposals let us prepare an agreement on that basis. But if you do not accept them, all your appeals to study technical matters are attempts to produce a deadlock. You propose that we examine the characteristics of existing national systems. What is the point of this? So far we have not studied existing national systems, yet those systems have coped excellently with recording United States explosions, and the Americans for their part have coped excellently with recording Soviet ones. No one has studied national systems, but explosions are successfully recorded nonetheless. Why must we now investigate what national systems comprise unless it is intended to get our negotiations into a worse deadlock which nobody will ever be able to break? We shall not agree to this course.

The question is much simpler than you are alleging. Accept the proposals of the non-aligned countries as they are; existing national systems will then continue to operate as they have done up to now, and we shall only have to agree on setting up the international commission to process the data received from national systems for clarification of suspicious cases and assessment. That is all. The matter is very simple, but you are deliberately complicating and confusing the issue, raising a mass of technical points and attempting to involve us in technical details.

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No, there is now no need for any of this. I repeat once again that the matter is much simpler. If you want an agreement, accept the proposals of the non-aligned countries and then we shall speedily agree on that basis. But if you do not want an agreement, you can of course concoct, devise and invent not dozens but even hundreds of technical questions and technical points. On the equipment and criteria alone one could drag out the argument for years, during which time the patterns of equipment and the criteria forming the subject of the dispute would become out of date. Methods would become obsolete and be replaced by new ones. We should then start to argue about new instruments, new criteria, new methods and so on ad infinitum. In present-day conditions the only correct, sensible and prudent way out of the situation is to accept the advice given us by the non-aligned countries and to agree on the basis they offer. We should heed that advice. We in the Soviet Union accept the proposals of the non-aligned countries. The matter is in your hands. But you do not want to accept the proposals, you persist in your old attitude and thus keep our negotiations in an impasse. You bear the responsibility for this, and the whole world is witness to it.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): That seems a rather odd response to a very reasonable request. But I want to be quite clear that you are absolutely opposed, Mr. Chairman, to a meeting of scientists with the help of the neutral nations, that you reject the help of the neutral nations in convening this meeting of scientists to follow up exactly what these nations themselves suggest in paragraph 3. I understand that to be your position. I am sorry that it is so, because it seems to me a pity. We want to build something on the basis of the neutrals' memorandum. We want, in the terms of paragraph 2, to see to it that these areas are "explored and extended". We want to build on it, but I understand you reject it. I think that is a pity.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I can only repeat once again that this is an attempt to divert us from the preparation of an agreement and to drag the negotiations into a labyrinth of futile and endless technical controversy.

We are now confronted with the political task of drafting an agreement with the minimum of difficulties and on the simplest possible terms. All this can be achieved on the basis of the memorandum by the non-aligned States. This you do not want; the responsibility rests with you. We are willing to come to a speedy agreement on the basis of the proposals contained in the memorandum.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Very well; then let us negotiate politically. Let us get into serious negotiation on the basis of these three principles which we have discussed so long. We are ready. We are just waiting for you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First, the principles to which you refer are not those contained in the memorandum. The memorandum enunciates the principle that control over implementation of an agreement should be organized on the basis of national systems. There is no question of an international system, yet that is precisely the question that you are raising.

Secondly, the international commission would carry out the precise functions listed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum. Yet you start talking about an international commission with functions far exceeding those proposed in the memorandum. You have in mind an international commission with functions approximately those assigned to the control commission in your draft treaty submitted on 18 April 1961.

Thirdly, the question of inspection. When you quote paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum, you read into them things that are not there. You say it is to be assumed that compulsory inspections are intended. Nothing of the sort: the eight-nation memorandum states perfectly clearly that States shall co-operate in furnishing facts. Textually, it reads:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event." (ENDC/28, p.2)

This, then, is the obligation -- "to furnish the Commission with the facts". Of what do these facts consist? Of data provided by apparatus and instruments, etc. Paragraph 4 goes on to state:

"Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories..."

So you see, the obligation only concerns furnishing the commission with the facts, and pursuant to this obligation States could issue an invitation. This is optional -- a State is under an obligation to furnish facts, but as far as inspection is concerned, this is subject to the State issuing an invitation to that effect. This is clearly stated, and I do not understand how one can interpret the paragraph otherwise.

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What does paragraph 5 say? Where paragraph 5 speaks of inspection, it contains a direct reference to paragraph 4. We should be guided by paragraph 4 and nothing else -- that is clear. So when you speak of three principles, Mr. Godber, you have in mind other principles than those in the memorandum by the non-aligned countries. If on the other hand you come to accept the principles laid down in the eight-Power memorandum, we are willing to make an agreement with you.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not wish to prolong this. A little while ago you said all was crystal clear in the memorandum. Now you give us your interpretation of it. It is quite clear that if we could only get together and try and build on what we believe the neutrals proposed we could at any rate evaluate how close we could get. I do not accept the interpretation you have just given because you have not given sufficient weight to the second half of paragraph 5. But I believe that if we got down to serious negotiation we could at least see how close we could get to one another.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I was not offering an interpretation, but reading word for word what appears in the memorandum. That is not an interpretation. There is in any case nothing to interpret here. The matter is clear. Perhaps you call even reading the paragraph an interpretation -- all right -- but the memorandum clearly speaks of inspection by invitation. Neither paragraph 4 nor paragraph 5 has any other meaning or significance.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I would only say that there is a great deal more meaning than the representative of the Soviet Union gives it.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I submit that the memorandum is equally crystal clear that the commission has to be international, that re-equipping of control posts with new instrumentation is to be considered by the international commission, and that spacing must be a factor in deciding on the building of new stations. You also consistently ignore the sentence before the last sentence in paragraph 4, and you ignore the third sentence in paragraph 5 which refers to the obligation set down in this penultimate sentence of paragraph 4. This obligation clearly includes inspection. It means an obligation on the part of the government

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of the territory where the event occurs to allow the commission to come in when the commission deems this essential to get the necessary facts, in order to make their inspection and assessment.

The obligation on the part of the country to allow the commission to come in if the commission wants to come in seems crystal clear, but you persist in what seems to me an obdurate and ill-advised attempt to interpret the memorandum in a manner which is quite alien, I am sure, to the intentions of the eight non-aligned States. You do this by conveniently leaving out certain words and sentences, after which you say that you do not interpret. Well, on that basis one cannot negotiate.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I agree, negotiations cannot be conducted in the way you conduct them, Mr. Dean. From what you have just said it is clear that you continue to distort the meaning and content of the memorandum, and read non-existent things into it. The memorandum states quite definitely that the commission can visit a country when it receives an invitation to do so. This is clear to anyone. But you interpret the matter differently; you refer to paragraph 5, but paragraph 5 refers us to paragraph 4, and you cannot ignore paragraph 4 when discussing inspection. You ought to have a look what is said on this subject in paragraph 4 and be guided thereby. This you refuse to do and therein lie our differences. Paragraph 5 obliges us to refer to paragraph 4 and see what appears there. Can one really negotiate when you refuse to be referred from paragraph 5 to paragraph 4 in order to clarify the circumstances of inspection? If you declare that you accept the memorandum and then refuse to follow the text, it really is impossible to negotiate.

With regard to your assertions that the memorandum entitles the commission to establish posts, determine their spacing and install their equipment, etc., I really wonder where you found all this. Once one accepts the national systems, none of these questions arise. The national systems are to be taken as they now are and as they now operate. Then, if necessary, we can agree on any general or individual measures, but that is the matter for the future. Our task now is to set up machinery for an agreement, and that machinery consists of the national systems, an international commission with functions as laid down in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum, and inspection by invitation. That is all that we have to do, and it

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is a simple task. But unfortunately you still hold fast to your old positions, and we cannot do anything with you. Neither we nor the non-aligned countries can persuade you to support the proposals contained in the memorandum.

If no one else wishes to speak, I propose that the Sub-Committee meet on Friday, 1 June, at 3.30 p.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.