

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/SC.1/PV.15

18 May 1962

PRIVATE

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE  
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 18 May 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the fifteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Does anyone wish to speak today?

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have been looking at the record of our last meeting and trying to detect in your statements, Mr. Chairman, some hope, some encouragement for our future negotiations in the Sub-Committee which, after all, could have their effect on the Disarmament Committee as a whole. But the more I look at your comments the more depressed I have to admit to you I become. It really is a somewhat depressing outlook if one takes literally what you have told us. Perhaps I could illustrate what I mean. Speaking of your government's attitude, you said at our fourteenth meeting:

"... We accept the proposals of the non-aligned States and are prepared to agree on this basis." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.14, p.18)

That in itself ought perhaps not to depress one, but this is not the first time that you have made this statement; and indeed, your colleague Mr. Zorin, has made similar statements at plenary meetings of the Conference. But you said, "We are prepared to negotiate ...".

In all frankness, I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to tell us when, at any time since the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) was first submitted, you have ever really shown any disposition in fact to negotiate. Frankly, it seems to me that you have not, because when we have asked you to discuss any of the main principles of the memorandum, or, indeed, any of the detailed problems raised by it, you seem to say every time, "No"; you say, "Accept the memorandum as it stands or we refuse to discuss it further". I think that is a fair paraphrase of what you have said on various occasions. I do not quite understand what you mean by this. Do you mean that we have to accept the memorandum as a sort of sacred document, a document from which there can be no deviation whatsoever? Is it your thought that we must accept the memorandum as constituting in itself treaty language? Is it your thought, then, that we have indeed got to accept the memorandum as a blueprint for a treaty? If so, that is precisely what its sponsors have asked us not to do.

I should be very grateful if you would elucidate your position on this point. Why do I ask for this elucidation? I do so because we, for our part, have accepted the memorandum as a basis for negotiation. We do not go on talking about whether we accept it or not. We have accepted it, and that is that.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

From there we have gone on, as seems logical, reasonable and sensible, to try to negotiate. That is what we have thought we were intended to do; that seemed to be the purpose of our meetings. We have done this, as I must remind you; in the face of a completely -- if I may use the word -- obstinate refusal on your part to co-operate in such discussion. That is what I just do not understand. For what is it you say to us? You say that we persist in turning away from the memorandum. Perhaps I may quote your actual words:

"In actual fact you -- the two Western Powers, the United States and United Kingdom -- are standing out against the whole world. You do not want to accept what has been proposed by the non-aligned States, and accepted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist States. You are standing out against the whole world, and yet you are appealing to the whole world to co-operate with you, to agree to adopt your old position and to reject the memorandum proposed by the non-aligned States." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.14, p.18)

I do not pretend that I repeat those words with your fluency, volume and fire, but they are your actual words. If I cannot put the full vigour behind them, nevertheless the words are yours. These words, I do say to you, Mr. Chairman, are the purest fantasy. We have accepted the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation. We have started to discuss it -- yes, to discuss it in detail. And we have said that we are prepared to negotiate even on language which might be proposed against the background of the memorandum. We have asked you to co-operate with us in this exercise. What happens? You tell us we are running against the opinion of the whole world and that we are appealing to you to reject the memorandum and the proposals of the neutral States. It really does seem rather extraordinary. I just do not understand in any sense this attitude on your part. Repeatedly you tell us that we are insisting on our old demands with regard to international inspection and international detection systems. You tell us that this is preventing us from making any progress. You tell us that we must abandon our old positions and accept the neutral memorandum as it stands. I do not think that is an unfair paraphrase of what you repeatedly say to us.

I, myself, have not been conscious in any way of adhering to any old positions in discussing this eight-nation memorandum, nor have I been conscious of any such inflexibility on the part of my United States colleague. We have, both of us, constantly tried to engage in constructive discussion of the three main principles

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

which we -- reasonably and justifiably, we think -- see in the joint memorandum: the principles of an international system of detection, an international commission and international inspection.

At our thirteenth meeting my colleague, Sir Michael Wright, suggested that so far as the third principle was concerned, that is, the principle of inspection, it might be helpful if we were to put this on one side for the time being, because it appeared to be the most difficult and the one on which the two sides were furthest apart. He suggested then that we might, instead, enter into a discussion of the other two principles which could, without prejudice to the discussion of inspection at a later date, be discussed in isolation, and could offer us perhaps the chance of a good deal of common agreement. That, I would have thought was a very realistic way of trying to make progress where we can. It followed up what I, myself, have said many times in our main Committee, that we should try to find agreement where agreement exists and build on that and generate confidence in that way. I would not have thought that was an unreasonable attitude to adopt.

At our last meeting my United States colleague referred to this proposal, and in particular to the reaction to it of your own delegation, Mr. Chairman. You and your colleague, Mr. Zerin, have constantly said that it would be a waste of time to expend energy on the details of problems before there had been a complete accord on fundamental matters. With reference to this, I think it was Mr. Stelle who said that this approach on the part of the Soviet delegation was narrow and unconstructive and could not really help us forward. He said then that the United States delegation had reached this conclusion for two reasons:

"In the first place, we have been impressed by what some of the eight co-sponsoring delegations have had to say about the way in which understandings on specific items can, perhaps cumulatively, open up avenues to agreement on major items of controversy." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.14, p.10)  
Further on, he said that the:

"... reason why a look at some of the important details might help us is that we shall certainly get nowhere in the immediate future if all we do is confront each other at each meeting of the Sub-Committee with reciprocally unacceptable positions on the fundamental controversial problems." (ibid.)

These are Mr. Stelle's wise words. He uses long words, does he not? I find it difficult to get my tongue around them, but then he is more skilled than I.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

It has been for these reasons that we and our United States colleagues at recent meetings of the Sub-Committee have been giving our views in what I think is a carefully reasoned and uncontroversial tone about the less difficult of the three main principles covered by the eight-nation memorandum: the principles of an international system of detection, an international commission and international inspection.

I want once more to appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, to do the same. I hope I shall not appeal in vain because I am absolutely convinced that this is what the sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum want us to do. I trust and believe that the representative of Mexico was speaking for all his colleagues -- and he said this in the clearest possible terms at our thirty-fourth meeting. Can you, Mr. Chairman, not offer us any comments at all on the contributions that we in the Western delegations have made to the solution of our problems? Can you not do so by discussing in more detail the questions covered in paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 of the joint memorandum? Or are you simply going to reiterate constantly that we must accept the memorandum as it stands as a basis for negotiation? If I might say so, it has now become a somewhat meaningless phrase as used in this context: firstly, because we have accepted it as a basis for negotiation; and, secondly, because having accepted it as a basis we are now trying to negotiate on it. That is all that we are asking you to do. I hope you will agree to follow this example of the Western States and engage in serious negotiation on it.

But, Mr. Chairman, if you insist that we can make no progress on the question of an international detection system or an international commission until we have reached agreement on the question of inspection, then I suppose that we must have more discussion on this latter question -- that of inspection. If that is so, then perhaps it would be helpful if I were to offer to explain our point of view on this particular point. Perhaps I could do so using the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for my remarks, which, I am sure from all you have said about the document, is what you, Mr. Chairman, would like me to do.

Inspection, as I see it, is dealt with in both paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of the eight-nation memorandum. Paragraph 4 states:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

There, I would say, an obligation is placed on all the parties to the treaty, that is, an obligation to give the commission the necessary facts to establish the nature of a suspicious event.

I am sure, Mr. Chairman, you would agree that this is a clear and a firm obligation. There is no getting around it. It is set out simply and clearly. In addition, there is in this paragraph the statement that "the parties ... could invite the commission to visit their territories." As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, you have in the past made great play with this word "could" -- they "could invite". But I want to suggest to you that the sentence in which it is included must be read in the context of the eight-nation memorandum as a whole.

This brings me then to paragraph 5 of the memorandum. The first sentence of paragraph 5 states:

"Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant ... event it would so inform the party ... and ... inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary." (ibid.)

I would take it, Mr. Chairman, that you would not disagree -- I hope that you would not -- that the commission might well deem it necessary to obtain this clarification by asking for an on-site inspection. I am assuming that there is this problem and this doubt and that the commission, within the terms of paragraph 5, would ask for on-site inspection. The commission might very well say that it could not establish the facts without such inspection. Having that in mind, let me read the third sentence of paragraph 5:

"The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ENDC/28, p.2)

Here we see that paragraphs 4 and 5 are directly interconnected. There is the direct reference in paragraph 5 to the obligation in paragraph 4 and, more important, we see that parties to the treaty are obliged -- "obliged", that is the word used -- to give speedy and full co-operation. I ask you to direct your attention particularly to the word "full" because I think that word is very important in this context. We cannot escape the conclusion that if the commission felt that on-site inspection was necessary, which is, as I see it, what is implied, and if we base ourselves on the eight-nation memorandum, which is what you, Mr. Chairman, wish us to do, we must accept that there is clearly written into the memorandum an obligation -- "obligation" is the word -- to accept, or,

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if you will, to invite such inspection. Even if the word is "invite", the operative word is "obligation"; it is an obligation.

So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, if the commission in such circumstances were to ask us to invite inspection I would say quite unequivocally that we would do so. There would be no hesitation and no difficulty about that at all. We would accept our obligation and would forthwith invite the commission to send an inspection team. Indeed, apart from the fact that, if we did not, we should feel we were not extending the full co-operation that we are obliged to extend, we would wish in any case to invite inspection in order to clear our name of any thought that we were doing anything underhand in this regard. That is the way in which we would approach it.

What I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, is what your country would do in such circumstances. Would you also accept the obligation to invite inspection, as it is laid out in paragraphs 4 and 5? It is not invitation at the whim of any party; it is an obligation to invite. Can you say firmly and clearly now that you would do so? Can you say "Yes" or "No" to the question whether the Soviet Union would invite inspection, that is, would accept the obligation that is laid on it under paragraphs 4 and 5 of this document, as I understand them? Would you, in fact, in any such circumstances invite inspection if the international commission thought it necessary in order to establish the facts?

That seems to me to be one of the most important questions that we have to get answered. I said on a previous occasion that I thought we might make progress by dealing with the other of the two principles involved, but as we have no response on these I am trying this afternoon to encourage you along this road of co-operation by suggesting this third point. We have to be quite clear and explicit in our minds as to what is envisaged. The wording of this document was very carefully drawn up, of that I am sure; the eight nations, I am certain, spent a lot of time puzzling it out. We have to give full regard to these words to which I have drawn particular attention today, and which perhaps have not figured sufficiently in our previous consideration of this.

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would just say one word about the comment of your colleague, Mr. Zorin, this morning at the plenary meeting (ENDC/PV.39) in relation to the Sub-Committee. It seemed to me extremely puzzling. I commented on it immediately but I hope we shall have some further explanation in regard to the attitude he adopted there and which, unfortunately, we have seen here -- that is, this negative attitude while at the same time adopting this extraordinary

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

pretence of blaming the West for not being willing to proceed with serious negotiation. The records show without any doubt who is trying to negotiate and who is not. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I do ask you today to help us to get a bit further towards agreement. If you do so, you will earn our warm gratitude.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Although I have been absent from the last two meetings of this Sub-Committee, I feel well acquainted with the discussions that took place here because I have studied with great care the verbatim records and reviewed the general situation regarding a possible agreement on nuclear weapon tests. I had hoped that you would take advantage of my absence to get together and make an agreement, but I fear that matters have not advanced at all since the twelfth meeting -- the last one which I attended -- in spite of the best efforts of the United Kingdom and United States delegations to start serious negotiations.

None of us can say that the need for a treaty is now any less urgent. On the contrary, we are all aware that Premier Khrushchev said in Bulgaria on 16 May that the Soviet Union would soon be resuming nuclear weapon tests again because the Western Powers, by their testing, were allegedly forcing the Soviet Union to follow the same course. Foreign Minister Gromyko is also quoted as saying at Tolbukhin, Bulgaria, on 17 May, when asked if the Soviet Union would resume nuclear testing: "We will resume, certainly."

I suppose that this Soviet attitude is intended to overlook the fact that it was the Soviet Union itself which, in September last, broke the three-year period of no-testing by initiating the greatest single series of nuclear tests yet recorded. Current Western tests are necessary to safeguard Western security in answer to these recent Soviet tests, in the absence of Soviet willingness to conclude a sound nuclear test ban treaty embodying effective international control measures. One might have hoped that the present round of testing could come to an end with some Western tests being conducted to balance off last year's Soviet tests, but the Soviet Union, as a hard bargainer, is apparently intent on getting at least two test series for one.

I shall not berate the Soviet Union for Mr. Khrushchev's latest announcement. I must observe, however, that these developments should certainly cause all of us to redouble our efforts to try to ensure that the termination of the current Western and forthcoming Soviet test series will really mark an end of nuclear tests once and for all.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I mentioned quite frankly at the thirty-second plenary meeting that it was not at all improbable that the refusal of the Soviet delegation to co-operate honestly right now in our efforts to reach a treaty could be explained by a Soviet fear that any progress might have the effect of obstructing the Soviet desire to conduct another series of tests. If this has been the case, now that the Soviet Union has decided to test this factor should cease to play a role. The Soviet Union will shortly have launched its new tests and it should then be able to adopt both a more constructive attitude and a more reasonable position in the work of this Sub-Committee.

Indeed, I tried to make it clear to my Soviet colleagues in my statement at the thirty-second plenary meeting that if the position were to become more constructive and reasonable before the Soviet Union had resumed its own tests, and if some progress were then registered, the United States would not use this in any way to gain for itself any alleged military advantage in regard to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. As the representative of the United Kingdom has already remarked, in this light we were very interested to hear Mr. Padilla Nervo of Mexico suggest at the thirty-fourth plenary meeting that it might be helpful to set a date later this year, or early next year, by which time all testing should halt permanently. There may well be much merit in this thought, although always with the proviso that a satisfactory treaty embodying the necessary control measures had been concluded by that date.

One would hope that, in view of our assurances and of the clear and pressing needs of the hour for accelerated negotiations, the Soviet delegation would show signs of doing its share to advance our work. However, the record of the last meeting -- the fourteenth -- provides no such encouragement. At that time Mr. Tzarapkin said again that, before he would begin to discuss the great bulk of questions which must be settled before we can record an agreement the Western Powers must agree to the gospel of the joint memorandum of 16 April last, co-sponsored by eight of our fellow delegations, as interpreted by the apostles, Zorin and Tzarapkin.

To be sure, the representative of the Soviet Union did not speak in so many words of Western acceptance of the Soviet interpretation. In fact, after denouncing the Western interpretation, he denied that his delegation was interpreting the memorandum at all. Far from it. The Soviet delegation does not interpret -- it just disagrees with the plain terms of the memorandum. For instance, the Soviet representative said at one point:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"The Soviet delegation proposes that the memorandum should be taken just as it is. We accept it just as it is, as drafted. But you are not doing that. Instead of taking the memorandum just as it is, you are starting to interpret it." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.14, p.20)

Later he added:

"Accept the memorandum unreservedly, and the disagreement between us will disappear." (ibid., p.26)

Now this interpretation of my Soviet colleague reminds me of an American song: "With me it's all or nothing -- all for me and nothing for you." As far as my delegation is concerned, the meaning of all this is clear enough. The Soviet delegation seems to be trying to make it appear that its view of the joint memorandum is the only possible view, even though we have shown at meeting after meeting that this is far from the case in regard to such key issues as a network of control posts and obligatory on-site inspection. It is true that if we accepted this Soviet interpretation all divergencies would disappear because that would mean that we had acquiesced in the quite unreasonable Soviet plan for an uninspected test ban which the Soviet Union is currently trying to pass off as the correct version of the eight-nation memorandum. We submit, of course, that the memorandum is nothing of the sort. However, I am afraid that this sort of argument, which is merely our old debate in a new form, will not advance us towards our goal of a treaty.

The real need of the moment is to get down to serious work either on the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of 18 April 1961, as subsequently modified (ENDC/9), or on the eight-nation plan. When we agreed to accept the eight-nation memorandum as one of the bases on which negotiations for a test ban treaty might proceed, for our part we never doubted that its proposals, even though written in general and somewhat incomplete terms, were intended to be a compromise between our two views. This is why we want to explore all facets of that plan to see what kind of total picture we can develop of how a nuclear test ban treaty, based upon that plan -- or at least based upon it in part -- might look. Only when we have done that can we decide whether the end product will be worthy of the full support of both sides. Unfortunately, however, our Soviet colleagues tell us that before an investigation can start of the many factors involved in a test ban agreement under the eight-nation plan the West must adopt the Soviet position on the most crucial and controversial items.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

This situation reminds me of two rival groups of geographical explorers, from two separate countries, who are considering whether they should co-operate in a joint exploration of a newly discovered mountain range. One group urges that the two groups should visit and map all the valleys and the slopes to see what can be learnt about the whole range. However, the other group says it will go along with this co-operation only if it is first given the right to choose the names for all of the major mountain peaks in this range, as well as the right to annex those peaks in the name of its country. Like the less demanding group of mountaineers, the West very much wants to investigate in co-operation with the Soviet Union, all aspects of the problem confronting us. But I submit, it is hardly fair to ask us to pay in advance for this step the impossible price of first granting all of the major Soviet demands, especially when we are convinced from our reading of the memorandum that such demands have nothing in common with the eight-nation proposal as it was submitted.

I know that Mr. Tsarapkin said on 15 May that unless the West adopted the Soviet view on the most vital issues it would not be useful to discuss other problems. For instance, he used the following argument:

"You say that we should debate the membership of the international commission. If you are thinking of an international network of control posts, you will have to have an international commission which will take charge of such a network. It will then be necessary to set up a huge headquarters, and the functions and duties of the commission will be entirely different. If, however, we accept the memorandum as a basis for an agreement providing for a system of observation through national systems, that is quite another matter." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.14, p.20)

Far from giving support to the Soviet case by this argument, Mr. Tsarapkin proved just the opposite, in my opinion. And since it is just as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as it is in our interests to get a sound and effective nuclear test ban treaty, why do we not stop debating the control post system in general and get down to the specifics of the system we are talking about? Then everyone will applaud us. Let us begin to see what problems would be involved in reliance on existing national stations. Then, after we know what we have to cope with in concrete terms, let us discuss how and where this combination of national systems, composed of existing stations, may be inadequate;

(Mr. Dean, United States)

and where, and how much, it might have to be supplemented by the construction of additional stations. Let us consider also who would pay for constructing such new stations, and how they would be staffed and managed. This would give us some idea of the system that might be available for use within the framework of the eight-nation plan. We might even come out with alternative arrangements that could be suggested to governments.

At that point we would then have at least a good basis for going into many aspects that must be settled about the international scientific commission, its composition, staff, functions, relation to the system, relationship to the parties, and so forth. By that time, in the course of this detailed discussion, we would also have some fairly clear ideas of the possibilities for agreement that could be derived from the joint memorandum. We would have dealt with a large number of factors bearing directly on the problem, and governments would be able to see a rather complete picture. Then, on this foundation, we could come to the final stage of choosing from among alternatives, where they existed, and of putting together the final plan, including, necessarily, some understanding on the most controversial issue of obligatory on-site inspection arrangements. We just do not understand why we cannot begin to work along some line like the foregoing.

We note that our Soviet colleague has said that it would not be a fruitful line, but we cannot see how it would cause any harm for any delegation to try it. Sometimes our Soviet colleague uses the word "impasse" to describe the present situation. He may predict another impasse as a result of the suggested Western approach. On the other hand, there is always the chance that our Soviet colleague could be wrong in his pessimistic forecast about a patient exploration of the many aspects of our problem in the context of the eight-nation joint memorandum, and in that event we might all be pleasantly surprised by the results. Therefore I urge the Soviet delegation to permit us to find out what the situation really is, by abandoning its opposition to our suggested approach and getting on with the real job facing us in this Sub-Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to speak now as representative of the Soviet Union.

Our failure to make any progress here in your absence, Mr. Dean, proves that your presence is clearly indispensable for any advance in our negotiations. Frankly, we were hoping that you would bring us some good news from Washington. We were hoping that the United States would show good will and consent to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the compromise proposals in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Those hopes of ours, however, sank lower and lower as Mr. Dean's statement continued. He again spoke of an observation system and of inspection in terms which can only be interpreted to mean that the United States is still maintaining its old position on these questions. A strange impression is created.

The fact that we, the Soviet Union, have moved away from our previous position to a new one by accepting the non-aligned countries' proposals and are insisting that the Western Powers shall also in their turn give up their old position and accept these proposals of the non-aligned countries was criticized by the United States. It tells us that we are demanding that the Western Powers should accept the Soviet Union's present position. But the Soviet Union's present position is not our old position, but the position which the non-aligned States have proposed that we should accept. We have accepted it. When, therefore, we ask you to join us and co-operate with us in coming to an agreement on the basis of the compromise proposals of the non-aligned States, that in no way means that you are bound to accept our position. No, it means that you should, like ourselves, accept the position proposed to us by the non-aligned States in order to lift the talks out of deadlock.

Unhappily neither Mr. Dean's nor Mr. Godber's statement gave us the faintest gleam of hope that our Western colleagues are ready to co-operate with the Soviet Union on the basis of the compromise proposals of the non-aligned States.

At the latest meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at which the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests has been debated, the overwhelming majority of the delegations -- the delegations of all the socialist countries and those of the non-aligned countries -- expressed serious anxiety at the situation which has arisen in the three-Power negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. They said that further talks on this subject could only succeed if the nuclear Powers give up their old positions and refrain from using the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum to defend those positions. That is what the representatives of Mexico, Sweden, India and Burma said at the thirty-fourth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 9 May. The delegations of the non-aligned countries declared unanimously that the old positions afforded no outlet from the deadlock in which the three-Power Sub-Committee found itself, and that agreement could be reached only on the basis of the principles set out in the memorandum.

(The Chairman, USSR)

To clarify this question it is necessary, however briefly, to analyse the positions of the sides, and see which side is clinging to its old positions and which has left its former positions and shifted to new ones.

With a view to ending the deadlock in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the eight non-aligned delegations submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 16 April a memorandum in which they proposed to the nuclear Powers a new solution for the problem of discontinuing tests. In this memorandum they set out a series of principles which they recommended the nuclear Powers to take as a basis for negotiations and for an agreement.

The Soviet Government, desiring to reach an agreement as soon as possible and put an end to nuclear weapon testing, stated that it accepts the propositions of the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiations, and is ready on that basis to proceed to serious talks in order to achieve a suitable agreement, although not everything in these proposals corresponds with our views or with the Soviet Union's position. We agreed, for instance, to the establishment of an international commission and to on-site inspection in the form laid down in the non-aligned countries' proposals. But that is the whole point of a compromise, to agree on positions which do not correspond to the original positions of either side.

What attitude did the United States and the United Kingdom adopt towards the non-aligned countries' memorandum? At first, a completely negative one. For example, they declared themselves ready to discuss the eight-nation memorandum, but on condition that the Soviet Union would accept the Western Powers' proposals for international control and compulsory on-site inspection. Then, when they saw that this attitude did not commend itself to the great majority of the delegations in the Committee, they changed their tactics and started to assert that they were ready to accept the provisions of the memorandum as one of the basis for negotiations. It at once became clear to everyone, however, that this was not a sincere declaration but a ruse; for the Western Powers, having stated that they would take the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a basis, began to assert that the proposals in it about observation posts, the international commission, and visits to the site of events the nature of which was in doubt were practically identical with the corresponding provisions in the United States draft treaty of 18 April 1961

(ENDC/9)

(The Chairman, USSR)

The United States and United Kingdom representatives are actually still standing pat on that position and insisting on an international network of control posts and compulsory on-site inspection. What is the difference between this position and the one which the United States and the United Kingdom adopt in their draft treaty of 18 April 1961? Practically nothing. Both include the establishment of an international network of control posts and the conduct of compulsory on-site inspection. Consequently, when the non-aligned delegations appeal to the nuclear Powers to abandon their old positions and refrain from using the memorandum as a means of defending these, that appeal is addressed directly to the United States and the United Kingdom representatives.

The Soviet Union has left its old position, as set out in its proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11), and has moved to the new position laid down in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries. You, however, have not done that, and unfortunately remain deaf to the appeals by the non-aligned countries to the nuclear Powers not to use the memorandum in defence of their old positions. In your attempts to misrepresent the situation, you make out that this appeal by the non-aligned countries is addressed not to you but to the Soviet Union, although the Soviet Union accepts the memorandum as it is, whereas you, the Western Powers, have not accepted it as it is. You have even gone so far as to assert that your position is practically identical with the position of the non-aligned countries on all these questions. That, however, bears no relation to the facts, but is a gross distortion of the meaning, spirit and letter of the eight non-aligned countries' memorandum. The non-aligned countries propose in their memorandum that national systems of control posts should be used for supervision of compliance with the agreement, and that, if necessary, agreement might be reached on expanding the network of national posts by the establishment of additional new posts.

The non-aligned countries propose the establishment of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff. The functions of this commission would be to process the data received from the national posts, to make a thorough and objective study of such data, to report on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event revealed by that study, and also to call for additional information, to consult the parties to the treaty on further measures of clarification to facilitate assessment of the nature of the event, and to inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case and of its assessment of the suspicious and significant event. Where inspection is concerned, the

(The Chairman, USSR)

memorandum says that the parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt.

We, the Soviet Union, declare that we accept these propositions of the memorandum and are prepared to proceed to draft an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of these propositions.

But what do the Western Powers propose? The United States and United Kingdom representatives state that they accept the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiations, according to the United Kingdom representative, or as one of the bases, according to the United States representative. They have made statements to that effect at recent meetings of the Sub-Committee, but have immediately accompanied those statements by reservations distorting the substance of the basic propositions of the eight-nation memorandum, into which they read their own interpretation and a content which turns out to coincide with the Western Powers' old position.

For example, the Western Powers state that the eight-nation memorandum provides for "obligatory inspection" and the establishment of an "international network of control posts" subordinate to the international commission, which would be empowered to order compulsory on-site inspection.

Thus at the thirteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee on 11 May the United States representative said:

"The United States delegation is still firmly convinced that its analysis of the essential principles expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the joint memorandum, when read together, is correct and that arrangements for obligatory inspection in certain circumstances are provided for by the co-sponsors." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.13, p.17).

A little later at the same meeting he said that the United States delegation believed that its interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum on the question of obligatory inspection was correct. The United Kingdom delegation upholds the same position on obligatory inspection.

Thus on the crucial question of on-site inspection, the United States and the United Kingdom delegations stand fast on their old positions and insist on obligatory inspection. This conflicts with both the spirit and the letter of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States, which makes no provision at all for compulsory on-site inspection. For your information, Mr. Godber, that is in fact admitted even by Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Lest Mr. Godber should reproach me with any inaccuracies or exaggerations, I will quote what the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom said as reported by Mr. Godber himself.

At the twenty-fifth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 20 April, Mr. Godber explained the United Kingdom position on the proposals of the eight non-aligned States and quoted the statement made on that subject by Prime Minister Macmillan in the House of Commons on 19 April. I quote what Mr. Godber said at that meeting:

"When he was asked again to clarify just what the neutrals' proposals were, he [that is to say, Mr. Macmillan] said: [then followed the statement of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as reproduced by Mr. Godber]

"As I understand it, the proposals would not make verification compulsory; it would be only permissive." (ENDC/PV.25, p.9)

Yes, this interpretation is perfectly correct. No other inference can be drawn from the memorandum without grossly contradicting, or more accurately, distorting its spirit and letter.

We understand, of course, that Mr. Godber quoted this statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the non-aligned States' proposals for a specific reason and not for oratorical effect. This was an official statement of the United Kingdom's position on this matter and we should therefore study it carefully and draw the appropriate conclusions for ourselves. Speaking in the House of Commons on 19 April, the Prime Minister defined the United Kingdom position as follows:

"The position now is that if the neutrals' proposals provide for effective measures of international verification and if the Russians, even at this late stage, agree to this, negotiation will become possible." (ibid.)

This statement by the Prime Minister contains two conditions which he considers must be accepted if negotiation on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is to become possible.

These conditions, or to be more exact, these demands are as follows. The first is provision for effective measures of international verification; the Prime Minister explained that by this he means compulsory and obligatory inspection. The second is agreement by the Soviet Union to this demand for compulsory and obligatory inspection. In stating these conditions, the Prime Minister emphasized that unless they were met, he did not think "that a fruitful negotiation can now be embarked on". (ibid.)

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That is still the position of the United Kingdom Government on this question, as can be seen from the statements made in this Committee by the United Kingdom representatives and from the United Kingdom note which was published on 15 May at a Foreign Office press conference in London and which was despatched to the Japanese Government in reply to its note of 4 May. In this United Kingdom Government note the possibility of progress in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union should commit itself to obligatory international inspection.

Although the United Kingdom Government is perfectly well aware that this demand is unacceptable to the other side, it is nevertheless pressing it and refusing to come to an agreement on the terms proposed by the eight non-aligned States in their joint memorandum. This position of the United Kingdom Government shows that it is opposed to agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and supports the nuclear arms race, no matter what Mr. Godber may have said to the contrary in this Committee.

The Western delegations are also guilty of blatantly distorting the contents of the eight-nation memorandum where the system of detection is concerned. For example, Mr. Godber made the following statement at the fourteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee on 15 May:

"... any detection system established in accordance with the joint memorandum must be international." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.14, p.5)

The United States representative said the same thing at the thirteenth meeting. He pointed out that the sponsors of the memorandum offer two alternative methods of organizing a system of detection, which might be based and built upon existing national networks of observation posts and institutions or might be a mixed system combining existing control posts with new posts. He said that even if only existing national stations were to be used, "they would have to be tied together into some sort of international system" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.13, p.18). But that is not what the sponsors of the memorandum propose. As is clearly apparent from the document they have submitted, the eight non-aligned States base themselves on the assumption that at present control over compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests can be fully assured by existing national systems of detection, to which new observation posts can be added by agreement. Paragraph 3 of the memorandum makes no reference to the need to establish an international network of observation posts. It is noteworthy that the word "international" does not appear even once in this paragraph of the memorandum; it is not used in this paragraph even once.

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The Western delegations, basing themselves on their old position that it is necessary to establish an international observation system and to have obligatory inspection, are trying to attribute to the international commission rights and duties going far beyond the functions which are envisaged by the sponsors of the memorandum and to which I have already referred in this statement. For example, at the fourteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Stelle mentioned the question of consultations between the international commission and countries parties to the agreement and spoke of the international commission's right to supervise the work of the international network of detection posts, to send its agents to the spot in order to inspect how the posts were operating, etc. The United States delegation concluded from this that it is necessary to set up a headquarters for the future control organization which, in type and scope of operations, would bear a close resemblance to the international control organization provided for in the United Kingdom-United States draft treaty of 18 April 1961.

The United States and the United Kingdom are thus adhering to their old positions on three major controversial issues: the detection system, inspection and the functions of the international commission.

But they are very well aware that agreement cannot be reached on such a basis. That is why they are trying to give the impression of being willing to conduct constructive negotiations and are proposing that we should defer the question of inspection and should take up matters connected with the establishment, composition and functions of the control commission and with the institution of a system of international posts. In other words, they are proposing that we should discuss detailed and specific points and even irrelevant technical issues.

We consider, however, that such a course will not lead to the desired results nor facilitate the attainment of agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. For example, how can one in fact discuss the functions of the international commission unless the controversial problems of inspection and the detection system have been settled? If one accepts the interpretation of the United States and United Kingdom delegations regarding the obligatory nature of inspection and the establishment of an international system of detection, the functions, rights, powers and scope of the international commission will be of one kind. If, however, one takes the proposals in the joint memorandum as a starting point, the functions and scope of the international commission will be of a different kind.

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Consequently, before we can go on to discuss the composition of the control commission, its functions and the size of its staff, we must first settle the controversial issues which divide the two sides. To start discussing particular points without reaching agreement on the principles would be tantamount to negotiating blindfold. How can one examine particular points connected, say, with the activities of the international commission, as the Western representatives propose, unless we reach firm agreement on what this commission is to do? What the United States and the United Kingdom are proposing, namely, that we should lay aside principles and pass on to a discussion of details, is a course which would be completely unproductive; it would lead us to an impasse and involve us in a quagmire of futile and useless discussions.

Such a situation can be avoided and progress made in the negotiations only if the participants reach a precise and clear-cut agreement, free of all ambiguity, that the basic provisions of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries are accepted as they stand not only by the Soviet Union but also by the Western Powers -- the United States and the United Kingdom. Mr. Godber himself has linked progress in our negotiations with the need to clarify the positions of the two sides. For instance, he made the following observation at the twenty-fifth meeting of the Disarmament Committee:

"Where there is straight dealing, where there is honesty, where there is willingness to show exactly where we stand, we can make progress." (ENDC/PV.25, p.8)

However, if progress is to be made in the negotiations it is not enough to show exactly where the parties stand, as Mr. Godber thinks. If progress is to be made, the positions must be harmonized, and this can be achieved by accepting the eight-nation proposals as a basis for agreement.

The discussion which has taken place in the Sub-Committee since 9 May -- since the discontinuance of tests was debated in the plenary Committee -- show that the United States and United Kingdom have not renounced their old positions on the controversial issues. It is obvious that in these circumstances the discussion of particular questions connected with the future work of the international commission will not advance the negotiations.

(The Chairman, USSR)

In order to end the deadlock in the Sub-Committee's work, we must adhere strictly to the compromise proposals in the eight-nation memorandum. The preliminary question which we must settle is, therefore, whether or not the Western Powers accept the memorandum not in theory, but in practice, as a basis for negotiations. All attempts by the Western Powers to interpret the memorandum on the basis of their old positions or to seek agreement somewhere between the compromise proposed by the non-aligned countries and their old position will not lead to any positive results but will merely complicate and protract the negotiations.

At our last meeting on Tuesday, 15 May, and in his statement today, 18 May, Mr. Godber affected not to understand our proposal that we should agree among ourselves to accept the provisions in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries concerning the use of existing national networks of observation posts and institutions for the purposes of control over compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of tests. We do not in fact see anything in our proposal that would justify Mr. Godber in putting such puzzling questions. We have suggested to you more than once that we should accept the proposals of the non-aligned countries as they stand -- I emphasize -- as they stand. We are repeating this same suggestion now. This applies not only to the proposal that control over the discontinuance of tests should be effected by means of existing national networks of observation posts but also to the question of an international commission and to the conditions for on-site inspection, as all this is set out in the non-aligned countries' memorandum.

If we in this Sub-Committee indicate our complete agreement with the basic proposals of the non-aligned countries and report to the Eighteen-Nation Committee accordingly, there can be no doubt that its members will express their unanimous approval. The Committee will then have a basic directive, in compliance with which it will be able speedily to work out and come to terms on all the detailed points to be included in the text of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The representatives of the Western Powers propose another course -- that this Sub-Committee should again embark upon discussions of "an international detection system", "obligatory inspection" and other old United States-United Kingdom conditions which do not figure anywhere in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States. To adopt this course would lead to the same hopeless deadlock that existed in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests before the non-aligned countries took the initiative of submitting new proposals.

(The Chairman, USSR)

If we were to come to terms on the basic principles contained in the non-aligned countries' memorandum, the way would be open for speedy agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. The reverse is also true; failure to come to terms on these basic principles would doom the negotiations to failure and lead them into deadlock because, unless this question is straightened out, further negotiations cannot produce any positive results and will in fact be a pointless waste of time.

It is true that, at the last meeting, Mr. Godber expressed irritation at our insistent demands that the Western Delegations should settle this issue by accepting the eight-nation proposals as a basis. Mr. Godber described our insistence disappointing, depressing and even deplorable. He said at the last meeting that he was getting tired of listening to Soviet requests that the Western Powers should accept the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a basis for agreement. In that connexion, he went so far as to say that attempts to induce the Western Powers to accept the memorandum as a basis did not constitute serious negotiation. But we do not agree with this opinion of Mr. Godber's. We consider that the eight-nation proposals deserve the most serious attention from us, since agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is now only possible on the basis of these proposals. Therefore, the proposals of the non-aligned States should be the focal point around which our negotiations revolve.

We certainly cannot acquiesce in the attempt being made by the Western delegations, those of the United Kingdom and United States, to involve us again in arguments over an international observation system and obligatory inspection. We cannot understand these tactics which the United States and United Kingdom delegations are employing in the negotiations. They are perfectly well aware of our position: we are prepared to reach agreement on the compromise basis proposed by the non-aligned States, in other words, on the basis of the use of national systems of detection. But in present conditions, when there is no agreement on general and complete disarmament, when the arms race is being accelerated and the military threat is growing, we are categorically opposed, for reasons of national security, to the establishment of an international observation system in the territory of the Soviet Union and to obligatory inspection.

Why then do the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, if they in fact seriously wish to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a mutually acceptable basis, continue to persist in their old positions, which are

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absolutely unacceptable to the other side? Why do they in fact reject the initiative of the non-aligned States, which have submitted compromise proposals on a system of observation and verification? There can be only one answer: the Western Powers do not want agreement on a mutually acceptable, compromise basis.

If the United States and the United Kingdom were to accept the compromise proposals of the non-aligned nations as a basis for agreement, the whole matter would at once be simplified and the numerous problems fabricated by Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean would be eliminated. Thus, if you agreed with the proposal in paragraph 3 of the eight-nation memorandum that a system for observation and effective control might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions supplemented, if necessary, by new posts established by agreement, the following questions raised by you would no longer arise: the international organization of national detection posts, standardized bases for their operations, the establishment of common standards of measurement and reporting, the convening of a new meeting of experts at Geneva to gauge and assess the relative effectiveness of the various posts now existing in different parts of the world, and the installation of standard instruments.

In enumerating these problems, Mr. Godber admitted that a very considerable amount of thought and work would be required for their solution. All these invented problems will, however, be left in the air and will become patently artificial if, instead of creating new difficulties, we roll up our sleeves, get down to the job and begin to draw up our agreement on the basis of national systems, as the non-aligned nations propose. National systems already exist and have been functioning reliably and effectively for quite a considerable number of years in the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and many other countries, and in all continents. There is one simple argument, comprehensible to everyone, in favour of such a solution to the problem of observation: no international system of control with an international network of control posts directed and controlled by an international body has ever existed in the past, nor does it exist at present. No one has so far sent any international inspection teams anywhere. But this has not been the slightest obstacle to the effective observation of nuclear explosions. Such observation has been carried out by national, not international, systems for the detection

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and identification of nuclear explosions. Nor is there any need to set up new systems in this field at the present time. The proposal which the non-aligned nations are making and in which we concur is that without procrastinating or reviving old arguments, we should agree on the arrangements which already exist at the national level and which are effectively fulfilling their purpose of observing nuclear explosions set off by the other side many thousands of kilometres from the observation point. The effectiveness of existing national systems has been convincingly demonstrated to the whole world by the nuclear Powers themselves and not only by them.

Let us take the case which presents the greatest technical difficulty, that of low-yield underground nuclear explosions. The United States and other countries have recorded the Soviet nuclear explosions, including the only low-yield underground nuclear explosion in February this year. The Soviet Union and other countries have recorded the United States nuclear explosions, including the low-yield underground tests. Quite recently the United States announced that its detection posts had recorded the French low-yield underground nuclear explosion which was set off on 1 May in the Sahara and which was kept completely secret from the whole world.

As you see, we all watch each other and record each other's nuclear explosions. We have so far managed without an international organization of national detection posts, without standardized bases for the operations of these posts, without a meeting of our experts to gauge the relative effectiveness of national systems, without any decision on the question of standard instruments etc.

In the light of the facts I have quoted, it becomes quite obvious how artificial and far-fetched are the questions with which Mr. Godber was so prodigal in this Sub-Committee on 15 May. One could, of course, equally well think up dozens of other technical and non-technical points and claim that they are of great importance and that there will be no effective observation unless they are settled. But claims of this kind explode like a soap bubble at the first contact with the real facts I have mentioned.

We do not dispute the fact that some of the questions you have mentioned have a certain importance for national systems. But they have been and will be solved, both in the Soviet Union and in Western countries, at the national level and under national programmes for the development and improvement of observation techniques. This development will continue to be stimulated by the fact that we will observe each other largely from our own territories.

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In conclusion, I again feel compelled to point out that the Soviet Union has accepted the compromise proposals of the non-aligned countries as a basis for negotiations and for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. But that is not enough to bring about an agreement. These proposals of the non-aligned nations must also be accepted, positively and genuinely, by the other side, by the United States and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately the Western Powers are adhering to their old positions on inspection, the observation system and an international organ and do not in fact accept the proposals of the eight non-aligned countries. However, for some reason, no doubt in order to avoid a strongly unfavourable public reaction in their own countries and throughout the world, the United States and the United Kingdom are surrounding their negative position in a mist of obscurity in the hope that, in that obscurity, not everyone will succeed in discerning their, in fact, negative attitude to the compromise proposals of the non-aligned countries.

Since the United States and the United Kingdom refuse to come to terms on the basis of the compromise proposed by the eight non-aligned countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and North and South America, it becomes obvious that there is now no prospect of agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. We deeply regret this and share the concern of the non-aligned countries regarding the consequences of this situation.

We urge the delegations of the Western Powers to give up their attempts to conduct the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of their old positions and to come to terms on the basis of the compromise proposals set forth in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States. The Soviet Union accepts these proposals as a basis for agreement. We strongly appeal to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom also to accept these proposals not in word but in deed and thus to pave the way for an agreement based on the use of national systems of observation, as proposed in paragraph 3 of the memorandum, and on the establishment of a small international commission of scientists with the tasks and functions laid down in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum.

We appeal to the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom to display their readiness to co-operate and come to an agreement with us on the basis proposed by the non-aligned States in their memorandum. Agreement now depends entirely on the Western Powers. We continue to hope that the United

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States and the United Kingdom will come to terms with us on the mutually acceptable basis proposed by the non-aligned countries.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not know that there is any point in making a long statement after what we have just listened to. I think that if ever I had had the honour to have been elected to the United States Senate, something which could not possibly happen to me, the words which would most readily have come to my mind in listening to this last speech was that this was a masterly exhibition of an elaborate filibuster. This, in fact, was all that the speech to which we have just listened boiled down to. It was a parrot-like repetition of "the West must accept the eight-Power memorandum as a basis". We have accepted, we do accept and we will continue to accept this as a basis for negotiation, but we are getting just a little tired of having to repeat that fact at every meeting.

So, in that sense, we want to go ahead and negotiate on it. We have put forward proposals now in relation to all three of the main principles and it is up to our Soviet colleagues to help us to evaluate and develop our ideas in relation to the suggestions which the eight neutral Powers put to us. They did not put this before us as a blueprint of a treaty. They have reminded us of that themselves. They said it is for us to use this and develop a treaty from it. That is exactly what we have been trying to do in the West and that is what we will continue to do.

One slight glimmer of hope that I observed from the words of the Soviet representative was when he talked about setting up a small international commission. If he wants to talk about setting up an international commission, by all means let us talk about it. Let us decide what its basis and its functions shall be. We have already suggested that we should talk about this body. I think this was the first aspect that I chose at a meeting some time ago, thinking that this would be the easiest subject on which we could make progress. Let us go on from there to look at the other two principles involved. I should warmly welcome that. But this repetition which we have listened to again today is getting us nowhere, nor is the fact that our Soviet colleague seeks to draw in all sorts of extraneous matters.

He referred again today to the quotation from my own Prime Minister which I gave at the meeting held on 20 April. On that occasion I quoted what the Prime Minister had said on the previous day in the House of Commons, but of course what

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I did not make clear at the time, because I did not read the whole of the Prime Minister's answer, was that he was then giving his initial reaction based on an article in The Times, not on the actual verbatim document which we had the good fortune to have before us. I thought I had made the position clear because, immediately after I quoted that, I went on to say:

"This is the key to it all. I can understand that our Soviet colleagues could say that they accepted this memorandum as a basis; yet, if they are genuine and if in fact they want to make progress, then, in the words of the draft of the eight Powers, they have to accept this obligation which refers to on-site inspection."

(ENDC/PV.25, p.9)

That is what I said at that time and I clearly set forth the position of the United Kingdom Government on this matter. Of course, what I say here carries with it the authority of the United Kingdom Government and I am surprised that Mr. Tsarapkin should think otherwise. I hope this particular point need not be raised again to obscure our discussions. I merely refer to it again now to show that the point was adequately covered in my intervention at that particular time.

If one takes the wording of the eight-nation memorandum, I would have thought it was abundantly clear from the way in which I showed that paragraphs 4 and 5 are inextricably linked, and the way in which I sought to draw it out and to develop it as a basis for our negotiations, that in fact the provisions in those paragraphs clearly bring out the obligation to which I then referred. Therefore, let us not waste further time on that, any more than on whether in fact we have accepted this as a basis or not. Let us get on and negotiate. Do not let us have any more of these speeches which seem to be designed to fill in time and not to help us forward in these discussions which the eight nations wish us to proceed with.

When our Soviet colleague at one stage this afternoon sought to align himself with the eight nations, this seemed to me to be a piece of quite incredible boldness and wholly inapplicable to the line which he was then taking. The eight nations want us to negotiate; they are not interested in these turgid speeches which take us no further along. I was interested when our Soviet colleague suggested that we should roll up our sleeves and get on with the job. I am all for rolling up our sleeves and getting on with the job, but I suggest that he also

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roll up that series of speeches he has been giving us and get these fresh instructions which I indicated at our last meeting might help him really to negotiate with us, so that we can make the progress which is so badly needed.

This is an appeal which I make to him once more: that he should discuss with us, starting if he likes with the international commission and going on to develop the other points. I do not mind in which order they are taken. I merely want to make progress and to see what we can build out of the proposals of the eight Powers, because it was never intended by them that they should be a treaty in itself -- that, indeed, would be absurd to suggest -- but that we should build on this document to find that common basis which we all require, having in it the three principles to which I and my United States colleague have referred so many times.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if you would be kind enough to tell us what the actual yield was of the Soviet underground shot on 2 February. And since you say that it is quite easy to pick up underground shots in other countries and to determine the yield, I wonder if you will tell us what the Soviet Union picked up on the recent French shot, and what its yield was as recorded on your national detection system. We would be very interested to hear.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): With regard to the Soviet explosion in February, I can tell you that it was of low yield. Where the French nuclear explosion is concerned, I do not have our publication on the subject to hand and cannot, unfortunately, satisfy your curiosity.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): You say your shot on 2 February was of low yield. Was it in excess of approximately 19 to 20 kilotons?

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I cannot tell you the yield, but we would never classify a 19 kiloton explosion as being of low yield. Perhaps by United States standards a 19 kiloton explosion is one of low yield but in the Soviet Union such explosions are not regarded as being of low yield. When we use the term "low yield", we base

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ourselves on specific standards which are also known to your experts. These matters were discussed both at the Conference of Experts in 1958 and later in technical working groups 1 and 2.

Does anyone else wish to speak today? If not, I would like to reply to Mr. Godber.

You have stated today very categorically that you, that is, the United Kingdom Government, accept the proposals contained in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as they stand and that, on this basis, you are ready to go on to the actual working out of agreed proposals and, as I understood, possibly of the text of a treaty. If the situation is really as you, Mr. Godber, have described it, we will be willing to examine any proposals which you might submit for our consideration and which are in accordance with the basic provisions set forth in the memorandum. We could only welcome such proposals by you and await them with interest.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I said that we had accepted, we did accept, and would continue to accept this document as a basis for our discussion: that is what I said; I repeat it now. I have shown my willingness not only to accept it but to seek to build on it with a view to achieving agreement.

If you tell me now that you are happier in going ahead in that way, Mr. Chairman, no one will be more pleased than I. If you will come forward now with your positive proposals, either in the light of the suggestions my United States colleague or I have made, or with some proposals of your own, they will receive our most careful attention.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The next meeting will be on Tuesday, 22 May 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.