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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE  
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 16 October 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.N. SHEVCHENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. P. SMITHERS

Mr. R.C. BELLHAM

Mr. I. SMART

Secretariat:

Mr. H. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the thirty-fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, we have carefully studied the statement which you made in your capacity as representative of the United States at the last meeting, as well as the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. We have once again carefully analysed everything that you have said at the meetings of our Sub-Committee since the recess of the Eighteen Nation Committee and we have come to some rather dismal conclusions as to what the Western Powers are driving at.

Practically all your statements have been excursions into the past, a chewing over of old stuff. You reject everything that has been brought to the fore by actual experience and on which it would be possible for us to reach agreement. And while you still go on insisting on your old demands which have been refuted by actual experience and you are unwilling to abandon your old erroneous approach to the solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, this merely testifies to the reluctance of the Western Powers to negotiate in a serious and businesslike manner and to seek for agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

We cannot assess your policy in any other way than as being aimed at confusing the whole issue, at diverting the discussion from the substance of the problems before us and at concealing the obvious fact that it is precisely the negative attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom which is blocking any possibility of agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Your statement that you are anxious for real negotiations is no more than an empty phrase. In reality you are insisting on such negotiations as would correspond to the interests of the Western Powers, the interests of the NATO military bloc. As for those possibilities which we have already pointed out to you and which really open up the way to agreement, you do not wish to avail yourselves of them. You reject the Soviet proposals and you have virtually rejected the proposals contained in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries (ENDC/28). You do not even wish to reach agreement on the basis of your own proposals for a partial ban on nuclear tests, with the addition, however, of an obligation for States -- an obligation which is perfectly reasonable and meets with the support of the peoples and with understanding

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throughout the world -- to continue negotiations for the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests as well and to refrain from such tests during the negotiations and pending the achievement of an agreement. It is no mere chance that you say almost nothing about this proposal of yours and try with one or other alternative to focus the attention of the Sub-Committee on your old proposals which in fact differ very little from the proposals on which the Western Powers have been insisting since 1958.

In order to adduce at least some arguments or other to justify your reluctance to adopt a new approach to the solution of the problem of putting an end to nuclear weapon tests, you do not hesitate crudely to distort the position of the Soviet Union and the position of the neutral States. Take, for instance, Mr. Stelle's statements at the last two meetings. What did the United States representative tell us in his statements? Crudely distorting the facts, he even went so far as to say that it is the Soviet Union which has up to now sabotaged every possibility for a test ban agreement. It is a universally known fact, however, that throughout the negotiations the United States has frustrated a solution to the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It was precisely the United States which for a number of years openly declared itself opposed even to discussing the question of banning nuclear tests, stating that such tests were required by the United States in order to improve its nuclear weapons. When it was nevertheless compelled by the pressure of the demands of the peoples of the whole world to take its seat at the conference table, the United States continued its policy of evading an agreement which would put an end to nuclear tests. It is appropriate to recall that instead of a ban on nuclear weapon tests for ever, the United States put forward ridiculous proposals for the registration of all nuclear explosions and the suspension of tests for twelve months only. I think that everyone remembers these proposals of the United States.

Here is another fact: in reply to the generous initiative of the Soviet Union which decided in March 1958 unilaterally to stop testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out a series of nuclear explosions, unprecedented in its scale and intensity, in the atmosphere at high altitudes, underground and under water. From April to November 1958 the United States and the United Kingdom carried out about seventy nuclear weapon tests. In some cases two or three nuclear explosions were carried out daily at some United States testing sites.

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If any further proof were needed that the United States and the United Kingdom were only paying lip service to their readiness to negotiate on the cessation of tests, and were really aiming at something quite different, namely whipping up the nuclear arms race, these actions of the United States and the United Kingdom clearly provide such proof.

After the Three Power negotiations had begun in Geneva and a treaty article providing for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests had already been agreed upon in December 1958, the United States, apparently scared by the possibility of an agreement, abruptly turned back and, referring to so-called new "seismic data", began to renounce the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. Since then, using as a pretext references to control over underground tests, the United States has been hampering in every way any progress towards an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The United States and the United Kingdom have turned the question of control over underground nuclear tests into the main stumbling block. They have used this question as their chief means of preventing an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. And you are still continuing to seek for all kinds of arguments in order to prove that without an international system of control and obligatory on-site inspection it is impossible to reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests.

At the last two meetings the United States representative, in justifying the Western Powers' demand for obligatory inspection, referred to certain statements by Soviet scientists, as well as to my own statements on the question of on-site inspection which I had made in the past in the course of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. Moreover, Mr. Stelle tried to make out that in November 1961 a 180 degree change suddenly took place in the position of the Soviet Union and that up to that time the position of the Soviet Union in regard to international control and inspection had been in principle the same as the United States position. But that, Mr. Stelle, is a downright untruth, which is easily exposed by the official statements of the Soviet Union made long before November 1961.

If Mr. Stelle is unaware of the position which the Soviet Union held on the question of control over a nuclear test ban before 1958, I can help him to acquaint himself with the real situation. The Soviet Government has always adhered to the point of view that control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of

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nuclear weapon tests can be carried out without an international system of control. Thus, for instance, in a communication of TASS (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union), dated 1 September 1956, the following was stated:

"The Soviet Government considers that no system of special control over nuclear tests is required, as modern technical means make it possible easily to detect nuclear weapon tests at any point of the globe."

That was said as far back as 1 September 1956. Furthermore, in the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, to the President of the United States, on 22 April 1958, it was pointed out that:

"There are such apparatuses, such appliances and such methods of detection available at the present time as make it possible to register any explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons wherever they may be carried out."

It is quite clear from these statements that the fundamental position of the Soviet Union in regard to control over a nuclear weapon test ban was and is still unchanged. As for the fact that the Soviet Union agreed in 1958 to the convening of a conference of experts, in this regard I must remind Mr. Stelle that the Soviet Government consented to the convening of such a conference with great reluctance and with doubts about its usefulness. For instance, even before the conference of experts was convened, the Soviet Government warned in 1958 that "to refer the question of control over the cessation of tests to technical experts for examination might lead to delay in solving the problem of banning nuclear weapon tests." Nevertheless, being anxious to come to an agreement, the Soviet Union showed its good will and consented to the convening of a conference of experts. In this connexion the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, pointed out in his message to the President of the United States, dated 9 May 1958:

"In spite of our having serious doubts, we are prepared to try this path as well."

The Soviet Government hoped that the Western Powers would treat this constructive position of the Soviet Union with understanding, would assess it in the proper way and do everything possible on their part in order to conclude in as short a period as possible an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. In 1958 when the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to come to an agreement on

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the cessation of tests with international control, we calculated that it would be possible to conclude such an agreement in two or three weeks and that it would be a turning-point in international relations. We hoped that thereafter it would also be possible to achieve progress in disarmament negotiations, that there would be a radical improvement in the relations of the Western Powers with the Soviet Union and that the policy of world co-existence would become the basis of the reciprocal relations among States. Unfortunately, however, matters took a different turn. The Western Powers drove into an impasse both the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. They took the path of endless delays and procrastinations, began to put forward ever new, absolutely unfounded demands, evidently prompted, not by concern for the effectiveness of control, but by the desire to secure the widest possible opportunities for carrying on intelligence activities on the territory of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States.

On the other hand, the international situation not only did not improve but, on the contrary, continued to grow worse; the tension in international relations went on becoming greater and greater. While negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests were going on in Geneva, the Western Powers were daily accelerating the pace of the nuclear arms race, carrying out extensive preparations for war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and fomenting war hysteria on an unprecedented scale.

In reply to the Soviet Union's proposal to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and to settle on this basis the question of the situation in West Berlin, the Western Powers began openly to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Imperialist circles in the West started a provocation against the people of Laos, a provocation that was dangerous to the cause of peace; they crudely interfered in the domestic affairs of the young African State of the Congo, striving to suppress the national liberation movement in that country; aggressive circles in the United States tried to stifle revolutionary Cuba. The United States has raised to the level of State policy the doctrine of a preventive war against the socialist countries. Moreover, we must not omit to mention that NATO generals did not hesitate to talk and they go on talking about the need to ascertain accurately the targets for nuclear strikes on the territory of the Soviet Union.

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In this connexion we may recall, in particular, the well-known statement by the assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. Gilpatric. And quite recently, at the beginning of October, the United States General Maxwell Taylor, who has been appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the United States, has again spoken of the strategy of counter-force which is now being favoured by United States military leaders, and has demanded a more accurate knowledge of enemy targets. They not only talk but act as well, stopping at nothing. Matters have even gone as far so such brigandish and treacherous actions as the incursion of United States espionage aircraft into the air space of the Soviet Union. Of course, in these circumstances the Soviet Union has been compelled to take care to strengthen its defensive capability and to increase its measures to ensure the security of the Soviet State.

Naturally, in such a situation we could not allow the Western Powers to carry out the plans of their intelligence agencies aimed at using international control over the cessation of nuclear tests as a means of intelligence and espionage.

The demand of the Western Powers for the establishment of international control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests has become more and more untenable every day. Experience and practice in recording nuclear explosions bring every day further confirmation of the complete soundness and validity of the view that the already existing national means of detection are completely adequate for the practical purposes of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

As for referring questions of control over the cessation of nuclear tests to technical experts for examination, in this regard also the serious doubts which the Soviet Union had as far back as 1958 have proved completely justified and well founded. At the twenty-ninth meeting of our Sub-Committee on 25 September 1962 (ENDC/SC.I/PV.29, p.21 et seq) I explained in detail how during the whole course of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, references to science have been used by the Western Powers in order to find a justification for refusing to conclude a comprehensive agreement and to leave a loop-hole for the continuation of nuclear weapon tests underground. The Western Powers have resorted to this device whenever they have been looking for a plausible pretext for preventing an agreement. I pointed out that in such cases there would turn up in the hands of the Western side



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precisely those data and conclusions which it needed in order to justify its position, and that the subjects of theoretical research and experimental work would be adapted to discrediting control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, in order radically to frustrate thereby any possibility of agreement on this question, since it is the official position of the United States that it will agree to a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests only if effective international control over compliance with the treaty can be ensured.

To this we must add that from all the statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom one may well come to the conclusion that they themselves do not have a clear idea of what effective international control is. Yet if effective control cannot be ensured, the United States declares that it will not agree to conclude a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

In his last two statements, as well as many times in the past, the United States representative tried to maintain that the position of the Western Powers is based on science, that their demands for control rest on a strictly scientific basis and so on, and that the Soviet position, they allege, distorts the data of science for political reasons. Let us take a look at the facts to see what sort of science it is which the Western delegations are manipulating, to what extent your demands for control rest on a strictly scientific basis and who in fact are distorting science for the benefit of their own military plans and aggressive intentions.

In analysing this question I shall, of course, have to make an excursion into the past in order to show, on the basis of the conclusions of certain United States scientists and your own statements and proposals, the glaring contradiction and inconsistency of your position from the point of view of science and the exceptional liberties which you take in your treatment of science, which discredit science.

The inconsistency and contradiction in the position of the Western Powers in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is particularly striking when we compare the following facts. Referring to science, the Western representatives insist on the establishment of an international system in accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts. Yet those recommendations were unilaterally rejected by the Western Powers themselves only two months after the beginning of the negotiations. That happened on 5 January 1959 when the United States delegation submitted its so-called new seismic data (GEN/DNT/25),

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in which the expert's recommendations were called in question as obsolete. A year later, in January 1960, the United States representative, referring to the recommendations of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts, stated that -- I quote his own words -- "the situation is not as good as was thought in 1958" (GEN/DNT/PV.151, p.18) and that it was necessary -- and I quote his own words -- "to find a new platform of scientific understanding." (ibid.p.17) These statements of yours are recorded in the verbatim records of the Conference. There you have an incontrovertible fact which shows that the United States repudiated the experts' recommendations.

Having thus repudiated those recommendations, the United States proposed officially that the treaty should be limited to banning nuclear weapon tests only in the atmosphere up to an altitude of fifty kilometres. In other words, the United States tried to secure for itself the right to carry out nuclear weapon tests underground, at high altitudes and in outer space. That was a very serious backward step on the part of the United States away from the agreed fundamental principle that all nuclear weapon tests without any exception whatsoever should be banned for ever.

However, under the strong impact of proofs and criticism and of pressure on the part of world public opinion, the United States was unable to persist for long in its negative attitude and was compelled to manoeuvre. It then proposed the so-called "threshold treaty" (GEN/DNT/83), under which big underground nuclear explosions would be banned, but low-yield underground nuclear explosions would not be covered. In resorting to this manoeuvre, the United States pursued a double aim. The first was to make it appear as though the United States was changing its position and to create the impression that it was making a concession and agreeing to the prohibition of underground nuclear explosions as well. But this was an obvious subterfuge on the part of the United States, aimed at lessening to some extent the acuteness of the question and the anxiety of the peoples, lulling their vigilance and damping down the criticism that was being levelled with ever increasing loudness against the United States.

But the main point is that by this manoeuvre, this subterfuge, the United States aimed at retaining for itself the possibility of conducting nuclear weapon tests even after the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests. These are striking examples of the way in which you adapt science in order to achieve your political aims.

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I could also give you other, no less striking facts from the history of our negotiations regarding the arbitrary way in which science is treated as the handmaid of the Pentagon, the United States Atomic Commission and the State Department. I should like to remind you of the so-called Berkner report. The Berkner panel of United States scientists recommended in its conclusions that the Geneva network of seismic control stations should be enlarged; in other words, it was suggested that a denser, more thickly distributed network of stations should be organized. That is what the United States scientists called for, so to speak, in their pursuit of so-called effective control.

It is well known, for example, that in the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts it was recommended that in seismic areas the distance between control posts should be 1,000 kilometres, and in aseismic areas -- 1,700 kilometres. The scientists of the Berkner panel, as a matter of fact, called for a still greater reduction of the distances between the control posts in seismic and aseismic areas.

On the other hand, we are aware of deviations in the position of the Western Powers in a diametrically opposite direction. Thus, for instance, in striving to ensure for themselves as quickly as possible the possibility of sending foreign agents into the territory of the Soviet Union under the guise of experts and inspectors at control posts, the Western Powers proposed that control posts should be established at a distance twice and even three and a half times greater than that recommended by the experts in 1958, that is to say, whereas the distance between the posts, according to the 1958 recommendations of the experts, was laid down at 1,000 kilometres, and the scientists of the Berkner panel called for a reduction of this distance, some time ago the Western Powers proposed that the distance between the control posts should be increased to 3,500 kilometres. Now, where is the science in that? What sort of science is that? How can it be a scientific approach if it changes its direction 180 degrees depending on what is required at a particular moment for the defence of the political position of the Western Powers on the question of putting an end to nuclear weapon tests?

In the conclusions of the Berkner panel submitted to the Geneva three-Power Conference by the United States delegation on 13 July 1959 there was a quite definite statement aimed at discrediting the scientific and technical recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts. This panel of United States scientists came to the conclusion that -- and I quote from the document:

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"... this method of distinguishing earthquakes from explosions was less effective than had been estimated." (GEN/INT/55)

I should like to remind the United States and United Kingdom representatives of some other facts which occurred during the work of Technical Working Group 2. The United States scientists in that group asserted, absolutely without any scientific and technical foundation and merely in order to justify the demand for a greater number of inspections, that only 50 per cent of seismic events equivalent to a 30-ton TNT explosion could be identified, and that almost all seismic events of lesser magnitude should be subject to inspection. Further, in order to confuse the matter completely and to lead the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests into an impasse, the United States experts submitted a scientific and technical programme which provided for the carrying out of a series of underground nuclear explosions. It was quite obvious that these underground nuclear explosions were needed, not in order to improve the methods of detecting nuclear explosions, but for the purpose of developing and improving methods of seismic camouflage or, in other words, methods of concealing underground nuclear explosions, such as muffling and decoupling. From this example the long arm of the opponents of a nuclear test ban is clearly visible. After all, it is no secret that the idea of the seismic camouflaging of underground nuclear weapon explosions was born in the Livermore laboratory which is a centre for developing and creating various types of nuclear weapons, and this laboratory is, of course, very much interested in keeping the possibility of continuing nuclear explosions for the purpose of testing newly created types of nuclear weapons.

There is yet another fact which shows very clearly how the United States is making feverish efforts to keep the possibility of carrying out nuclear explosions under the guise of research into the seismic effect of low-yield explosions. It is well known that for such research purposes nuclear explosions can be replaced by chemical ones. The Americans themselves introduced the concept of a TNT equivalent, using the law of analogy for the purpose of transposing the parameters of an underground chemical explosion to a nuclear explosion. However, the research programme submitted by the United States in 1960 included nuclear explosions and what counted in this, of course, was not the interests of science but the requirements of military circles.

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Further, if you investigate the seismic effects caused, on the one hand, by a natural earthquake and, on the other, by the action of an elastic seismic wave arising in the ground at the time of the explosion, then science and scientific conscientiousness, Mr. Stelle, require that both these phenomena should occur in the same geological environment in a seismic area. Only if this condition is complied with is it possible to compare the spectrum of an earthquake with the spectrum of an explosion with complete scientific reliability. But what actually happened in the United States? Actually, the United States experts planned experimental underground nuclear explosions, not in an active seismic area, as science requires, but in the State of Nevada, where one might have to wait for years for an earthquake, in order to compare the spectrum of an earthquake with the spectrum of an explosion occurring in the same geological structure. Such, in fact, is your "scientific" approach to the matter.

And what emerged in Technical Working Group 2, which met in Geneva in November and December 1959? Here is what is said on this score in the statement of the experts of the Soviet Union:

"... the assertion in the working paper --- it refers of course to the United States working paper --- of 5 January 1959 that all stations were equipped with Benioff short-period vertical seismographs, allegedly as described in the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, is a misrepresentation, as the United States delegation has virtually admitted.

"It is obvious that these other and less efficient instruments could not produce the results which might have been expected if the arrays of seismic instruments recommended by the experts had been used."

(GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9, annex II, p.3)

The statement of the Soviet experts pointed out that:

"It is indeed surprising that the instrumentation was not calibrated at least for the period during which these unique experiments were to be conducted." (ibid.)

Further, on the question of the change in the original magnitudes the statement of the Soviet experts said:

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"The Soviet experts note that the United States specialists have repeatedly modified the primary data submitted by them in support of various conclusions." (ibid., p.4)

And further on it pointed out that:

"... the Soviet scientists tried to approach the material before them with the utmost confidence in its reliability on the assumption that it was the result of careful scientific work. The above-mentioned manipulations of the primary data, the erroneous findings in the documents presented by the United States experts and the fact that the instrumentation used for observing the tests was not in conformity with the 1958 Geneva recommendations have compelled the Soviet scientists to adopt a more cautious attitude towards the quality and objectivity of the figures that were supplied by the Americans." (ibid., p.4)

The statement of the Soviet experts went on to say:

"Because of the incorrect magnitudes in the working paper of 5 January and in other documents of the United States experts, the formulation of the relationship between an explosion's magnitude and yield, given at meetings of the working group, was wrong." (ibid., p.6)

Finally, on the question of the objective readings of the instruments serving as a basis for directing inspection teams to the site, the statement of the Soviet experts pointed out that:

"According to the United States scientists themselves, their criteria would leave under suspicion the overwhelming majority of earthquakes registered by the control system.

"The Soviet experts submit that here their United States colleagues are on the brink of absurdity." (ibid., p.11)

Those are the conclusions which the Soviet scientists were compelled to reach when they encountered at the meetings of Technical Working Group 2 the United States scientists who had brought with them from the United States their scientific calculations, data and so on. There you have your scientific approach to the matter. And you, Mr. Stelle, would do better not to appeal to science here.

Both in the Sub-Committee and in the plenary meetings of the Eighteen Nation Committee we have stated on more than one occasion our attitude to the idea of holding further technical discussions. As long ago as at the seventh meeting of the Sub-Committee on 9 April 1962 I said that it would be incomprehensible to us why the

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United States representative kept on raising one and the same question of technical discussions, if we did not know from sad experience what the Western Powers are driving at in our negotiations. We see that their representatives are trying their utmost to justify their refusal to accept our reasonable and realistic proposal that national means of detecting nuclear explosions should be used for control over the fulfilment of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

In this connexion I should like to repeat what I said at the fourth meeting of the Sub-Committee on 28 March, namely that all the Western Powers' talk of the need for further technical discussions is nothing but a diversionary manoeuvre, an attempt to evade a political solution to the problem of discontinuing tests by substituting futile discussions on the technical aspects of the problem of control. We know from experience that, every time the United States was short of arguments to bolster its political position, it advanced various kinds of considerations of a technical nature and insisted on technical consultations for which it enlisted the services of scientists who, disregarding the real scientific facts or basing their position on unfounded speculations, tried to bolster the positions of their Government with arguments which were subsequently refuted completely both by practice and by scientific theory.

It is no mere chance that the United States press is now publishing articles of various kinds in which it is asserted, on the basis of scientific and technical references, that the existing instruments are incapable of detecting underground nuclear tests. We have also heard Mr. Stelle make similar assertions here on more than one occasion.

But let us return to the reports which have appeared in the press. The New York Times of 5 March contained a report to the effect that a further study of the problem of detecting nuclear explosions carried out under the Vela project had confirmed the conclusions of United States scientists on the difficulty of detecting clandestine underground nuclear weapon tests. It is also noteworthy that at the Sub-Committee's very first meetings, the United States representative began to say what United States scientists like Dr. Teller, the well-known atomic expert, had been saying for a long time, namely that it would be impossible or very difficult to detect nuclear explosions if they were carried out far away in outer space, for example, beyond the moon or even beyond Venus. But I think that everyone must understand that this is a completely frivolous argument. Who would ever take it into his head to carry out nuclear tests at a point in space which it would take a missile some months, or even half a year, to reach?

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In reproaching the Soviet Union for refusing to consent to further technical consultations, the representatives of the Western Powers level against us the absurd accusation that we are trying to discredit all scientists in all countries. No, we have not tried to do this, nor have we any intention of doing so now. We have never had any such purpose. We have no desire to cast doubt on the competence and scientific conscientiousness of all United States scientists or of all scientists throughout the world. On the contrary, unlike you, we believe profoundly in the strength and power of science, and we greatly appreciate and respect conscientious scientists. We know that science has already placed in our hands such reliable methods of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests as the means of detection which States have at their disposal -- I am referring to national means. We are merely opposed categorically to using scientific and technical data and discussions for the purpose of frustrating important political negotiations, and to involving the solution of the question of the cessation of tests in a maze of never-ending and fruitless technical discussions by scientific experts. We know that such experts as those we have encountered from the United States side will deliberately do their utmost to justify a further race in the testing of nuclear weapons and to lead the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests into a blind alley.

In this connexion great interest attaches to an article by Dr. Louis Leet, Professor of Geology at Harvard University, which appeared in the United States weekly National Guardian in the issue dated 9 April, to which I have already referred in the past. Dr. Leet is not only one of the most outstanding seismologists in the United States; he is well known throughout the whole world. And it seems to me that, when I mention the name of this most outstanding United States scientist, you, the representatives of the United States, should treat him with esteem and respect, and not laugh when his name is mentioned, especially as this scientist is renowned and respected far beyond the borders of the United States. Since 1931 -- that is, over a period of thirty-one years -- he has been Director of the Harvard University seismological station. In this article Dr. Leet lifts the curtain a little to show on what principles and how the members of the United States technical panels for discussing the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests were selected, and what reports the United States technicians, who are connected with the Pentagon and with the big United States weapon-manufacturing monopolies, supplied to the United States



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diplomatic services. One has only to compare the facts to see that all the reports were aimed at proving the impossibility of detecting underground nuclear tests, and at justifying thereby the refusal of the United States to conclude a treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

In his article Dr. Leet states that in the test-ban negotiations the United States position on the question of detecting underground nuclear explosions is, from the scientific point of view, a weak one. He said that, if all the facts were known, the United States and Soviet participants in the negotiations would be able to reach agreement on the prohibition of tests in a week or so.

Professor Leet asserts that the United States Defense Department is adopting an extremely pessimistic position on the question of detecting underground tests. I refer once again to the statement by the seismologist Leet to the effect that the United States Defense Department ignores the views of seismological experts. He said that the United States Government is misusing technical data in order to support its political position. Perhaps, he says, the Government is only seeking a pretext for demanding inspection in Russia, but it has no right to refer to seismology by way of justification.

With regard to the Berkner report, which I have mentioned before and which has in fact determined and continues to determine the United States position on the question of the capability of seismology to detect underground nuclear explosions, Dr. Leet questioned the scientific value of this report. He disproved the conclusions of the Berkner panel and the Vela project. About the Berkner panel, Dr. Leet said that the data at their disposal were so scanty that they should not have asserted anything at all, yet they swore their conclusions were correct. The Russians gave one look at their material, and laughed; and to be perfectly honest -- Dr. Leet said -- they were right. Any decent seismologist would have laughed too.

Dr. Leet stated that no professional seismologists took part in the research undertaken by the Berkner panel and the Vela project. The only members of the Berkner panel who were in any way familiar with seismology were some electronic engineers, who had a superficial knowledge of seismology. To carry out a project of that type without employing seismologists working at seismological stations was, said Professor Leet, just like reviewing a system of measurements without consulting the Standards Office.

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Dr. Leet offered his services in discussing the Vela project, but his offer was turned down; and in Washington, which he visited for talks on this question, people in government circles asked him: "If your theory proves to be right, Mr. Leet, shall we require more or fewer inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union?" Leet replied: "Fewer". Then they told him: "We shall call you if we need you." And Professor Leet has been waiting to be called ever since, but no one has called him, no one in United States Government circles is interested in him.

After encountering this approach to seismology, to science and to genuine seismological experts, Professor Leet wrote that he had been so naive as to believe that science, in whoever's hands it was, was always objective. Three months previously he had still been unaware that these conclusions would be used in Geneva. How could such things be tolerated he exclaimed! This is what one of your own independent scientists has to say about United States scientists who are in the service of the Pentagon and the nuclear weapon suppliers.

I must say that Dr. Leet's views on the comparative easiness with which underground explosions can be detected are shared by scientists in other countries. I could, for instance, draw your attention to other facts which were mentioned in the National Guardian, namely that Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence -- I am referring of course to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence -- and Sir William Penney, Director of Research for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, who held a meeting in Washington with government scientific specialists from 16 to 20 March, furnished these specialists with proof that the United Kingdom had detected all the recent United States underground tests. But all this is of no importance for the United States, since it picks out and takes into account only what can serve to support its position in regard to a nuclear arms race, and rejects everything that does not support that position.

I should like to point out once again that the facts which I have cited and similar facts which I have not mentioned today, though they have been mentioned by us on previous occasions, show the groundlessness of the assertions of the United States representatives that it is impossible to exercise control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of tests through national means.

Such are the facts; and do not try, Mr. Stelle and Mr. Smithers, to involve our negotiations once again in endless discussions on so-called scientific and technical problems. That is an old road which has already been tried out; it has completely discredited itself; and along that road we shall not come to an agreement.

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Whatever arguments you adduce and whatever you say here, you cannot deny that both the low-yield underground nuclear explosion carried out in the Soviet Union in February this year and the French underground nuclear explosion were immediately recorded by United States national means of detection, without any international system of control, without any inspection.

As for Mr. Stelle's arguments about the United States underground nuclear explosion known as the Gnome shot, they not only fail to stand up to criticism: they even rebound against yourselves. It is quite possible that you announced in advance the time and place of this explosion; but have you asked yourself the question, Mr. Stelle, for what purpose and why this advance announcement about the Gnome shot was made? Well, I will tell you -- it is true that I have already mentioned this, but I will repeat it once again -- you made this announcement because the Gnome shot was prepared in such a medium and in such conditions that, according to the calculations of your scientific experts, it was bound to produce a signal several times smaller than an unmuffled explosion. This Gnome shot was carried out in the conditions of decoupling. And you thought that on the seismographs of the world this explosion would not produce the signal which was expected. Therefore you announced in advance to the whole world that a nuclear explosion would take place at such and such an hour, such and such a minute and such and such a second, and you were confident that there would be no signal on the seismographs of the world, that you would then be able to triumph, by finding confirmation in this way for your theory of muffling and decoupling.

And if this had in fact occurred, then you would have referred to this fact and asserted that it was impossible to rely on national means of detection. But your calculations were not borne out. And your scientists who had developed this theory found themselves in a very embarrassing position. The Gnome nuclear explosion, only five kilotons in yield, was detected at very great distances from the site of the explosion. Now, to weaken the impression, to weaken the effect produced on world public opinion by the fact that the Gnome nuclear explosion was registered many thousands of miles away from the United States, you point out that this explosion had been announced in advance. But now this argument of yours simply does not work. And I say again that it rebounds against you.

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It is very typical that for four years the United States and United Kingdom representatives in Geneva kept referring to science and maintaining that without a widespread network of international control posts, and without constant and special aircraft flights over the territories of States parties to an agreement to take samples of air for radioactivity tests, it would be impossible to detect and identify nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. They maintained that, without the establishment of observation posts in ships which would go snooping around all the oceans, it was impossible to detect and identify under water nuclear explosions. Referring again to science, they assured everyone that the detection and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes and in outer space was an even more complicated and difficult problem. But what has actually happened? All the nuclear weapon tests which have been carried out up to the present, whether in the United States, the United Kingdom, France or the Soviet Union, have been detected through the use of the existing national means of detection, without the establishment of any international control system or inspection. The adequacy of national means of detection for control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space is now, at last, recognized even by the Western Powers themselves. This fact proves clearly and convincingly that the stubbornness, with which the United States and the United Kingdom have for several years been insisting on international control and inspection with regard to these explosions, has been dictated not by considerations relating to the establishment of effective control over an agreement, but by other aims which have nothing to do with the tasks of control.

It is only as a result of the great perseverance and patience of the Soviet Union, and also of the ever-more insistent demand of the peoples of the whole world that all and every kind of nuclear weapon tests should be prohibited, that the United States is now prepared to agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and at high altitudes, with the use of national means of control over such an agreement. But it still maintains its stubborn attitude with regard to underground nuclear explosions, proposing either that this type of explosion should be excluded from the agreement altogether -- which would mean in point of fact that everything would be left as before, inasmuch as nuclear weapon tests would continue -- or that, in return for United States agreement to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests as well, the Soviet Union should accept the United States demand for the establishment of a network of international control, including compulsory inspections, on the territory of the Soviet Union.

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We should like to hope that further influence by peace-loving forces on the position of the United States, particularly at the current session of the General Assembly, and also a careful and thoughtful analysis of everything that is going on in the world, will induce the United States to realize the need to reach an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests as well, with national control over the fulfilment of such an agreement. With every day that passes, the realities of life are refuting your far-fetched arguments to the effect that national means are inadequate for the purposes of control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Science does not stand still. It is continuously developing and moving forward, and the detection of nuclear explosions through the use of national means alone is becoming increasingly easier and more simple.

A few days ago the California Institute of Technology published a report on the existence in the United States of a device which automatically distinguishes between vibrations of the earth's crust caused by earthquakes, and vibrations caused by nuclear explosions. Scientists believe that an automatic analysis of this type will speed up the detection of nuclear explosions at great distances. According to a report by the Associated Press Agency this device, which is something between a seismograph and an electronic computer, was built for the air force for the purpose of detecting nuclear explosions. A representative of the California Institute of Technology, Dr. Frank Press, who is well known to all of us here, has stated that the device makes it possible to record upheavals of the earth's crust throughout the whole seismic spectrum, and has great accuracy and a wide range of application. The range of application of the device, he emphasized, is limited only by the imagination of research workers. The report from the California Institute of Technology on the existence in the United States of a device capable of recording nuclear explosions with great accuracy over great distances, and of distinguishing them from earthquakes, emphasizes once again the baselessness of the United States position on the problem of prohibiting underground nuclear explosions.

The representatives of the Western Powers, and particularly Mr. Smithers, the United Kingdom representative, are forever asking one and the same question: Does the Soviet Union consider that international inspection on Soviet territory is impossible if there is no agreement on disarmament? And they try to discern contradictions of some kind between the statements made by the Soviet representatives.

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I do not know if the United Kingdom representative listens to what is said in the Sub-Committee, or whether he reads the verbatim records at all. I have considerable doubts whether he does; for at the twenty-eighth meeting on 20 September we gave a thoroughly clear and detailed explanation on this problem. In particular, I should like to repeat one passage from my statement at that meeting. I said that:

"By accepting the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for negotiations, the Soviet Union thereby expressed its readiness to agree to the implementation of those control measures of an international nature which are contained in that document, namely to the establishment of an international commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and to international inspection in the event that a State, party to the treaty, should wish to invite the Commission to visit its territory." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.28, p.17)

It is clear that all this has to be implemented before an agreement on disarmament is reached.

At the same twenty-eighth meeting I showed that there were no divergences between my statement on the question of control and inspection and the statements of the representatives of the Soviet Union in the Disarmament Committee, Mr. Zorin and Mr. Kuznetsov. So do not try to look for them, Mr. Smithers, because your efforts will be in vain. There is no contradiction between our statements.

At a number of meetings the United States representative tried hard to draw us into a discussion on the question whether or not all seismic events could be identified, and he put forward various arguments on that score, even referring, as I have already mentioned, to certain statements by Soviet scientists. But why are you trying to start a discussion on these questions here, Mr. Stelle? After all, the heart of the matter is now quite different. The point is that the Western Powers ~~insist~~ on obligatory inspection, whereas the Soviet Union agrees to the proposal of the non-aligned States that inspection should be carried out at the invitation of the State concerned. That is what now constitutes the radical difference of principle between our positions. And the question of whether or not all seismic events can be identified has nothing to do with it and is merely raised by you in order to contrive purely academic and abstract controversies. In this matter you have one opinion, one approach, while we have a different opinion, a different approach. But that

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should not serve as an obstacle to the reaching of agreement on the basis of the compromise formula proposed by the non-aligned States in regard to inspection.

The trouble is that you do not wish to accept the proposal of the non-aligned States on the questions of inspection and control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Yet you do not venture to say so openly and therefore you resort to subterfuges. You want to becloud the whole issue by trying to make out that the representatives of the Soviet Union themselves put forward different points of view or that the essential difficulties in regard to the question of inspection stem either from a lack of clarity in the position of the Soviet Union or from the different interpretations given to this proposal of the non-aligned countries by the United States delegation, on the one hand, and the Soviet delegation, on the other.

Mr. Stelle has repeatedly tried to prove that the proposals of the non-aligned countries envisage the establishment of an international system of control and provide for obligatory inspection. At the thirty-third meeting Mr. Stelle again asserted:

"... the clear intent of the sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum that ... obligatory on-site inspection is ... essential."

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.33, p.4)

Those are your words, Mr. Stelle, and I emphasize the words "obligatory inspection".

I have already pointed out repeatedly that it is written in black and white in the proposals of the non-aligned States that the parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt. (ENDC/28) It is stated clearly and distinctly that they could invite. Here there is no room for any obscurities or any different interpretations.

This is also stated quite unambiguously by the sponsors of the memorandum themselves. Just recently the representative of India, Mr. Lall, spoke in the First Committee of the General Assembly when the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests was being discussed, and he stated that the memorandum of the non-aligned States was a clear paper which did not need interpretation. He stated further that if the eight-nation memorandum was taken as it stood, it did not provide for so-called obligatory on-site inspection. That is what Mr. Lall said.

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In order that you should have no doubts and in order to facilitate the work of the interpreter, I shall read out what Mr. Lall said in English.

(Continued in English) "... the Eight-Nation Memorandum as it stands" --

I draw your attention, Mr. Stelle, to the words "as it stands" -- "that is" to say without the so-called obligatory on-site inspection ..."

(A/C.I/PV.1246, p.21)

(Continued in Russian) There you have a sentence which fully confirms that you are wrong, Mr. Stelle, when you assert that the eight-nation memorandum provides for obligatory inspection in paragraph 5.

What the Western Powers put forward in their proposals and what is contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States are absolutely incompatible positions; they are in glaring contradiction.

Mr. Stelle asserted that in quoting the memorandum of the non-aligned States, the Soviet representative omitted the words which state that the control system might be built, if necessary, on new posts established by agreement. I did nothing of the sort. At the thirty-first meeting I said that where the memorandum spoke about new posts, it was obviously intended that the additional posts would likewise be national. And we stated that the Soviet Union was not against the construction of new observation posts, should the need for them arise, but that such posts should be built on a national basis, in agreement with the governments and not as an obligation. No matter how you may interpret it, Mr. Stelle, nowhere in the whole memorandum of the non-aligned States, in not a single one of its paragraphs, will you find the words "international system of control". The only instance where the word "international" occurs and is used in that document is where it speaks about the "international commission" and nowhere else.

When the proposals of the non-aligned States speak about the use of existing national posts by agreement, it is implied that these national posts will become the object of some sort of international agreement. But that does not at all mean that national posts will come under international authority or that an international system will be established. The system will remain national, the posts will remain national and no international inspectors and observers will be sent to them, as you propose. The international character becomes apparent only in the sense that each national system will forward the readings of its instruments regarding seismic events



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to the international commission; then the commission will examine all these data, draw its conclusions, inform the party concerned and ask for further particulars. It is only in that sense and in that sense alone that the system will have an international character.

It cannot be regarded as a matter of chance that Mr. Stelle keeps on talking about the Western Powers having only taken into account the eight-nation memorandum. In fact, you haven't the heart to say that you have taken the proposals of the non-aligned States as the basis of your draft, whereas the Soviet Union has accepted everything contained in that memorandum as the basis for negotiations and has clearly and distinctly said so. That is where the difference lies. It is only as a blind and in order to bewilder people who are not conversant with the facts that you say that you take into account the memorandum of the non-aligned States, although in fact you do nothing of the sort. As for the Soviet Union, it really has accepted that document as the basis for negotiations and for an agreement.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom representatives have repeatedly raised the question of espionage and its connexion with the activities of the control system for the discontinuance of tests. In particular, Mr. Smithers has been very insistent on getting a reply from us to the question of why the Soviet Union does not regard tourists and inspection under a treaty on general and complete disarmament as involving an unacceptable risk of espionage, but considers that inspection under the Western proposals regarding the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is an excessive risk. But also in connexion with these questions we have already given the necessary clarifications. If Mr. Smithers cannot make head or tail of them, I shall repeat once again the considerations which have already been put forward by me and by the Soviet delegation in the Disarmament Committee.

First of all, do not insinuate the question of tourists into the negotiations on the cessation of tests. I have already told you that we see no reason why the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should concern itself with tourists. That question has no bearing whatsoever on the cessation of tests or on the question of control for the detection of nuclear explosions. Foreign tourists visit our country with tourist visas. They may visit any areas of the Soviet Union open to tourists. But all this takes place in accordance with the existing laws and

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regulations, and it is certainly not for you, Mr. Smithers, to say whether the visiting of the Soviet Union by tourists is a risk or threat to its security.

Secondly, inspection and control under a treaty on general and complete disarmament, on the one hand, and inspection and control under an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, on the other, are incommensurable. Here you raise a question on different levels. It is one thing to talk about international control over disarmament, that is control in the conditions where States will start to liquidate their military machine and destroy all types of weapons, and the arms race will be halted. It is quite another matter to demand the establishment of international control in the present conditions, when the arms race is continuing; when the Western Powers are openly proclaiming the policy of a preventive war; when certain circles in the West are nursing aggressive plans and there is a certain distrust and suspiciousness in international relations; when the NATO countries are trying to avail themselves of every opportunity to obtain intelligence information about the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In such conditions and circumstances and taking into consideration the fact that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is not actually a disarmament measure, the demand for the establishment of international control is impracticable, and the insistence shown by the Western Powers in this matter can only give rise to legitimate suspicions. And our fears that intelligence and espionage would in fact be carried out under the guise of international control are by no means groundless, as the representatives of the Western Powers try to make out here. We are not alone in voicing such fears. In this connexion I should like to quote an interesting piece of news for your information.

Towards the end of September 1962 a meeting of the Swiss Association of Chemical Industries took place in Zurich. The new chairman of the Association, elected by the assembly of chemical industrialists, Mr. Barrelette, speaking about the demand of the United States and Canada to be given the right of control over the production of certain kinds of medicines prepared in Switzerland, stated, in particular, the following:

"Our country does not wish to allow foreign controllers into our territory. In fact, there is a danger that under the pretext of control for the purpose of safeguarding public health these foreign experts would engage in economic espionage in our factories."

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It is not a question of States, it is not a question of two opposing blocs, one of which is carrying out intensive military preparations and making statements about the possibility of a preventive nuclear war on its part, but the persons concerned are peaceful industrialists who manufacture various pharmaceutical products and so on. Yet even they do not wish to allow foreign agents into their factories, because they fear that those agents may engage in economic espionage. How then should a State behave which is being threatened by others? Just reflect a little and compare these two things. This point shows how justified and right is the position which the Soviet Union holds in this regard.

Do not pretend to be a simpleton, Mr. Smithers. Do not create the impression that you fail to grasp the difference between control over general and complete disarmament and control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests which, as I have already said, is not a disarmament measure.

Yes, I state once again that we are in favour of strict international control and the implementation of measures for general and complete disarmament. But we are against the international system of control which the Western Powers are trying to impose upon us in exchange for their consent to come to an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. And there is no contradiction in our position on this question.

There is another matter on which I should like to dwell. In the course of the discussions here we have already stated on more than one occasion that the Western so-called draft comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests cannot serve as a basis for an agreement, and we expressed the hope that the Western delegations would finally take this fact into account and would not in future divert the attention of the Sub-Committee to useless controversies about these unacceptable proposals. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet delegation did not and does not consider it necessary or appropriate to go into the details of these proposals of yours. And in our statement today we have again shown that there is no need for any system of international control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

We have adduced a whole number of facts which you are not in a position to refute, because to deny these facts would mean going against science, against experience confirmed by practice.

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Nevertheless, you stubbornly continue to insist on the establishment of a wide-spread system of international control. The legitimate question arises: why are you doing all this?

From your so-called draft comprehensive treaty there sticks out the frank intention of the Western Powers to secure for themselves possibilities of engaging without hindrance in espionage on the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This is evident even from a most cursory acquaintance with your draft. As a matter of fact, who would decide the question of whether or not a particular located event relates to the category of events eligible for inspection? Under your draft treaty, that question would be decided in the first place by an international official, the chief Executive Officer, as you call him. It is he who would organize the international inspection teams to be sent into the territory of States. Then at the request of the sides, that is if it was a question of inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union, then at the request of the United States or the United Kingdom this international official would dispatch inspection teams. One would have to be blind not to see that such a procedure, as laid down in your proposals, opens the door to arbitrary actions and creates wide possibilities for the organization of intelligence work and espionage on the territory of the Soviet Union, which would, of course, directly affect the Soviet Union's security interests.

As for Mr. Smithers' assertion that the areas to be inspected would be determined by the readings of scientific instruments, that argument does not stand up to criticism either. Under the Western proposals the Executive Officer, that is, the same international official, would in fact have unlimited possibilities of interpreting the data in the way he thought necessary. And since, according to the United States-United Kingdom draft, inspection would be compulsory, States would be unable to do anything and would have no possibility of protecting themselves against arbitrary decisions by the so-called Executive Officer.

Article VIII, paragraph 4, of the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty, for instance, lays down that:

"Data provided by stations in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State in which the event may be located may not be used to render it ineligible for inspection but may be used to assist in establishing its eligibility for inspection." (ENDC/58, p.8)

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An absurd situation is created. It turns out that data received from stations situated, for instance, in the Soviet Union, in the immediate vicinity of the site of a seismic event must not be taken into account at all, even though they testified to the absence of any grounds for any suspicions or doubts regarding that event. In other words, the Executive Officer may reject precisely the data received from the stations closest to the site of an event and draw conclusions on the basis of other, less reliable data. And you call that a scientific approach? There is certainly not even a grain of science in it. In elaborating this control system, you were guided by considerations aimed at ensuring conditions that would create unhampered legal possibilities for intelligence work and espionage.

I have given some references and adduced some arguments against the provisions contained in your draft comprehensive treaty, not at all for the purpose of starting a discussion on it, but merely in order to show the complete lack of objectivity and unscientific nature of the provisions of your draft comprehensive treaty and their quite obvious design to ensure the possibility of carrying on intelligence work and espionage.

In almost all the articles of your draft comprehensive treaty everything is subordinated to a single aim, namely, to secure inspection at any price and to penetrate by hook or by crook into the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist States.

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom for some reason are obviously keeping silence about the fact that the Western draft provides for the establishment of supervision by an international commission over the work of all the elements of control. And this means that various kinds of international inspectors would continually be moving about the territory of States or stationed permanently at posts or attached to a group of control posts and so on. Needless to say, the United States and the United Kingdom insist on the establishment of posts on an international basis which would wholly or partly be manned by international staff.

As regards your question as to how the control system would be used specifically and in practice by Western intelligence agencies, I must say once again that you have addressed this question to the wrong quarter. It would be better if

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you addressed this question to those persons who are directly concerned with this matter, say, in Washington, and who would be able to give you a more professional reply than anyone else. That is precisely what I had in mind when I told you, Mr. Smithers, that I was unable to give any explanations about how the control system could be used for espionage purposes.

At previous meetings we adduced a whole number of considerations in connexion with your question, why acceptance of the partial treaty submitted by the Western Powers would hinder rather than assist endeavours in regard to achieving a comprehensive agreement. At the thirty-second meeting I gave you, I believe, an exhaustive reply to this question. I can only repeat it. The Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation in the Disarmament Committee and in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests have already pointed out that the Soviet Union, being anxious that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should not be of an illusory nature but should be genuine, cannot leave open the question of underground nuclear tests, nor can it agree to the conclusion of such an agreement as would allow for the possibility of continuing nuclear weapon tests in any environment whatsoever.

Surely it is obvious that if an agreement were concluded which did not impose a ban on underground nuclear explosions, such an agreement might create a false impression among the peoples and give rise to the illusion that the nuclear arms race aimed at improving nuclear weapons and creating new types, had been halted or restricted, whereas nothing of the sort would have been done.

The United States and the United Kingdom insist that a treaty should permit the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests. But such a treaty would mean the continuation of the arms race, the replenishing of the arsenals of States with new types of atomic and hydrogen weapons. We have already pointed out repeatedly that in the matter of the cessation of tests there must be no half-measures; there must not be any gaps, chinks or weak spots in the shape of any exemptions or exceptions. An agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is intended to play the part of a sort of dam, which would block the way to the further improvement and creation of new types of nuclear weapons, would be an obstacle to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would slacken the arms race. If as a result of the negotiations we

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were to conclude an agreement, which would preserve the possibility in the future of conducting nuclear weapon tests -- the question of environment is of no fundamental importance -- then, it goes without saying, those States which are sufficiently advanced from the scientific, technical and economic standpoints, would also be entitled to conduct nuclear tests in order to organize the production of their own nuclear weapons. If an agreement on the cessation of tests were to permit any exceptions whatsoever, if there were to remain in it any loop-holes for the continuation of nuclear tests, then other States would intensify still further their efforts to create their own nuclear weapons. And they could hardly be blamed for doing so.

Let us speak quite frankly. Now, while our negotiations are going on, the hope is being cherished that the nuclear Powers will come to an agreement and conclude such a treaty as would put an end to all nuclear weapon tests for ever; which, of course, would result in restricting the arms race and be a definite obstacle to the spread of this weapon of mass destruction. This is precisely what is being taken into account by other States and serves as a certain restraining factor, holding them back to some extent from speeding up the creation of their own nuclear weapons and, consequently, from conducting tests of their own models of nuclear weapons. But if those States were to see that our negotiations had ended in the conclusion of such an agreement as would allow of the possibility of continuing nuclear tests, we would thereby deal a fatal blow at the hopes I have mentioned and we would give other States an incentive to take the path of creating their own nuclear weapons and joining the nuclear arms race. That is our answer to your question why the Western partial treaty would lead to other States carrying out tests, although they are not doing so now.

As you see, along the path which the Western Powers propose, that is, along the path where the possibility of continuing nuclear tests would remain, it is impossible to find a solution to the problem before the Sub-Committee. Is there a way out? We have indicated that too. It consists in banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. As for underground nuclear weapon tests, it is necessary to continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the cessation of underground tests as well, and while such negotiations

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are being conducted, States should assume an obligation not to conduct nuclear tests underground. That is the point of view of all the non-aligned States. That approach enjoys wide support throughout the world. The Soviet Union also agrees to that approach, and it is only the Western Powers that are holding back and preventing progress in our negotiations.

You tell us that you cannot agree to an "uncontrolled" moratorium on underground nuclear tests, and you keep referring to some sort of deplorable experience which you are supposed to have had with a moratorium. But I have already dealt in detail with that question too and I showed that there was no international agreement on a moratorium. There were only unilateral statements by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to the effect that they would refrain from resuming nuclear weapon tests. The question of unilateral undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapon tests has its own history and logic. This can be traced most clearly from the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers during the Geneva negotiations and especially when we discussed the question of the nuclear weapon tests which France was carrying out at a time when the Soviet Union was conscientiously and unilaterally refraining from conducting any nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Government repeatedly warned that it took the step of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests in the hope and on condition that the Western Powers belonging to the NATO military bloc opposed to the Soviet Union would also refrain from conducting any nuclear weapon tests. Nevertheless, from the very beginning of 1960 the situation changed radically owing to the attitude adopted by the Western Powers in this matter. The moratorium on nuclear weapon tests ceased to exist both formally and in fact. The starting-point of this was the official statement of the United States President, Mr. Eisenhower, of 29 December 1959, in which he said that as from 1 January 1960 the United States would no longer consider itself bound by any moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and would consider itself free to resume them at any time it deemed it appropriate to do so.

In conjunction with this statement intensive preparations for nuclear weapon tests were going on in the United States: American testing sites were being prepared in the Pacific Ocean and on the territory of the United States itself, and many thousands of millions of dollars were appropriated annually in the United States budget for the financing of these measures.



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Those are the facts. And at that time, Mr. Stelle, it was not a question of whether the United States would or would not resume nuclear weapon tests. That question had already been made quite clear by President Eisenhower's statement of 29 December 1959. At that time it was merely a question of the United States choosing the most suitable moment for the resumption of nuclear weapon tests.

That was the real situation.

Mr. Stelle referred to a statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, on 14 January 1960 at the Session of the Supreme Council of the USSR, in which he emphasized that the Soviet Government, "with a view to ensuring the most favourable conditions for completing in the very near future the working out of a treaty on the cessation of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to resume experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, if the Western Powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons". Moreover, this statement of the Head of the Soviet Government was made after the President of the United States had declared its renouncement of the moratorium -- Mr. Stelle drew our attention to this. And Mr. Stelle took this to be confirmation by the Soviet Union of its decision not to resume nuclear tests in the new circumstances. But in what new circumstances? In the circumstances where the United States had already declared that it was free to resume nuclear weapon tests.

But Mr. Stelle overlooks a very essential clause in the statement of the Head of the Soviet Government. It stated quite clearly that the Soviet Union would not resume nuclear weapon tests unless the Western Powers started testing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union acted in that way in order to restrain the Western Powers from following that path which is so dangerous to the cause of peace.

And how did the Western Powers reply to this? Less than a month after this statement of the Head of the Soviet Government, France, the ally of the United States and the United Kingdom in the NATO military bloc, carried out a new weapon explosion in the Sahara on 13 February 1960.

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In connexion with this first explosion of a French atomic bomb, Tass published a statement on 14 February 1960. It contained the following passage, and I quote:

"If nuclear explosions continue, then, of course, the Soviet Government cannot disregard this fact and cannot fail to draw the appropriate conclusions in order to safeguard the security of its country."

After France exploded another nuclear bomb on 1 April 1960 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, stated in reply to a question put to him by the correspondent of Le Monde that the Soviet Union still adhered to the positions which we had stated at the time of the first experimental explosion by France and which I have just quoted.

These French nuclear explosions were followed by other nuclear explosions.

In connexion with the French experimental explosion which took place on 27 December 1960 another statement was published by Tass on 31 December 1960, in which the following was stated -- and I quote:

"The Soviet Government has already warned the Government of France that if the Western Powers continue nuclear explosions, the Soviet Government, like other peace-loving States, cannot fail to draw the appropriate conclusions in order to safeguard its security. It goes without saying that if the allies of France in NATO -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- not only take no steps to induce France to stop testing nuclear weapons, but in fact tacitly approve such actions, this may render it much more difficult to reach agreement in settling the most important problem of today, namely the problem of general and complete disarmament. The blame for this will fall entirely on the Governments of the Western Powers."

Nevertheless, this warning by the Soviet Government was again ignored by the Western Powers. On 25 April 1961 France carried out yet another nuclear weapon test in the Sahara. In this connexion, on 15 May 1961, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, I made a statement in which I said, in particular:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"... France, a member of a military alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom, is systematically conducting test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons, despite a General Assembly resolution and protests from many States. These actions by France cannot be justified, especially while negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests for all time are proceeding in Geneva. The Soviet side has repeatedly pointed out that these acts by the French Government cannot fail to render more complicated the conclusion in Geneva of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

"The continuance of nuclear weapon tests by France places the Soviet Union in a situation which may compel it to resume atomic and hydrogen bomb tests.

"The Soviet Government again draws the attention of the participants in the Conference -- the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom -- to the fact that France, their NATO ally, is continuing to carry out nuclear weapon tests, while the Soviet Union is not. There can hardly be any doubt that the United States and the United Kingdom would resolutely protest against such tests if they were carried out, not by France, but by one of the Soviet Union's allies, for example, Czechoslovakia.

"The Soviet Government considers itself in duty bound to point out that if any member of the association of Western Powers continues in future to carry out nuclear weapon tests, agreement on the cessation of such tests will become impossible. It goes without saying that the responsibility for this will rest with the Western Powers." (GEN/DNT/PV.305, p.12)

As you see, there was no lack of warnings to the Western Powers on the part of the Soviet Union in respect of the French nuclear explosions. Moreover, the warnings were given in good time and very clearly.

What did the United States representatives say at that time? I should like to remind you of the statement made by Mr. Stelle on 21 November 1960 at the Geneva Three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Here is what he said:

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"We need to make no justification for the resumption of testing. The President of the United States last December stated clearly that the United States did not consider itself bound any longer by a moratorium on testing and would be free to resume testing at any time we believe it to be in our national interest, subject only to a prior announcement."

(GEN/DNT/PV.268, p.24)

Thus the Western Powers not only rejected the moratorium but they also started to carry out nuclear weapon tests, and at that time they did this through their NATO ally, France. In answer to strong protests by the Soviet Union against French nuclear explosions and against this two-faced policy of the Western Powers in regard to the moratorium, the United States representative, Mr. Dean, at the three-hundred and sixth meeting of the Geneva Three-Power Conference, said:

"Surely my Soviet colleague must realize that the French Government, acting for itself and by itself, has felt it necessary, as a non-nuclear Power, to undertake its nuclear weapon tests..." (GEN/DNT/PV.306, p.30)

Mr. Dean went on to say:

"The Republic of France is a sovereign State, it governs itself and the United States has no way to control what is done by the Republic of France." (ibid)

The United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, also replied in practically the same sense. He said:

"But until security can be found by other means it is difficult to deny the right of countries to assure their own security as best they can."

(GEN/DNT/PV.305, p.16)

These statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom speak for themselves. Not only did they find no words of condemnation for such actions by the French Government, but, on the contrary they justified the carrying out of nuclear explosions by France. They said quite frankly that by creating its own nuclear weapons France or any other country could best assure its own security.

At the three-hundred and fifth meeting the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, made an even more outspoken and noteworthy statement. He said:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"May I repeat in a most friendly, serious and emphatic way that so far as my delegation is concerned we consider it inevitable that unless our three countries represented at this table can reach agreement on a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests with sufficient control in it to give confidence to the rest of the world that its security is not being jeopardized then we must expect not one country but more and more countries to undertake nuclear weapon tests. We all of us agree, I think, that this is a very grave danger to the future of the world. That is the position of my Government and my delegation." (GEN/DNT/PV.305, p.21)

There is no particular need for me to comment on this statement by Sir Michael Wright, because it speaks for itself as eloquently as the other statements. The meaning of this statement by the United Kingdom representative is that the United Kingdom Government considers that until a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is concluded between the nuclear Powers, one must take into account the fact that not only one country — evidently by this "one country" Sir Michael Wright meant France — but an ever greater number of other countries will carry out nuclear weapon tests. In this connexion I can say only one thing. What is happening now is the very thing that the Western Powers themselves planned, predicted and brought about, namely, there is no treaty and nuclear tests continue.

After all I have said regarding the statements and actions of the Western Powers in regard to nuclear weapon tests, one must have really tremendous abilities in casuistry and hypocrisy in order to turn the facts inside out and try to switch all the blame from the guilty on to the innocent and to accuse the Soviet Union of some sort of breach of the short period in which there were no nuclear tests in the world and which was terminated by the Western Powers themselves, namely the period which lasted from November 1958 to 13 February 1960 when France started testing nuclear weapons.

What did you expect of the Soviet Union in such circumstances? The Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, stated that the Soviet Union would not resume nuclear tests unless the Western Powers began testing atomic and hydrogen weapons. But the Western Powers paid no heed to our warning. Starting from February 1960, the Western Powers resumed nuclear tests. It is a matter of indifference to us which

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of the Western Powers, members of NATO, was the first to get off at the start and to resume nuclear tests. Would you expect the Soviet Union in those circumstances to sit with folded hands and not take the necessary steps to ensure its security? That is a rather peculiar way of reasoning on your part.

The assertion by Mr. Smithers and Mr. Stelle that the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions would be uncontrolled does not stand up to criticism. You know very well that national means of detection now record underground nuclear weapon explosions, including even low-yield explosions. We have already adduced a good many examples in this connexion, and I have also spoken on the subject at today's meeting. If we show our readiness to agree to the conclusion of a partial treaty with a moratorium on underground nuclear tests, then we are making a big concession to you. Yet on this question you continue to be stubborn and do not want to take into account the real state of affairs. It is not by chance that you pass over in silence the considerations we have put forward to the effect that there is now a possibility of settling the question of a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions on the basis of an international agreement having legal force under international law.

In connexion with two questions, however, the Western delegations show exceptional doggedness and, I would say, consistency. They show this, first, in trying to secure by hook or by crook the possibility of sending foreign agents into the Soviet Union under the guise of foreign controllers and inspectors and, secondly, in using any device or means to thwart an agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests for ever and to keep their hands free in regard to nuclear weapon tests, at least underground.

They try to achieve the first aim by constantly putting forward demands for the establishment on the territory of the Soviet Union of an international system of control, including the carrying out of obligatory inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union at the request of the Western Powers.

They try to achieve the second aim by refusing to accept a national form of control over underground nuclear explosions, as proposed by the non-aligned States and as agreed to by the Soviet Union. Instead, they propose to exclude underground nuclear explosions from the treaty altogether, that is to preserve the possibility of continuing nuclear tests and, consequently, to ensure in that way fully legal possibilities for the further improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons and the creation of new models.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Smithers referred to the statement made by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, in the United Nations General Assembly that a principal object of the draft partial treaty of the Western Powers was to save the world from radioactive fall-out. Mr. Smithers added:

"All it [the Soviet Union] has to do is to agree to our partial treaty."

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.32, p.15)

I can give you an answer to that, Mr. Smithers. No State in the world has made as many efforts, as the Soviet Union is doing, in order to put an end to the nuclear arms race, to ban all nuclear tests and to make it possible for the peoples of the world to breathe a pure air uncontaminated by radioactive fall-out. Precisely because that is what we desire, the Soviet Union proposes that agreement should be reached on the banning of all nuclear tests without exception, that is to say, that such conditions should be created as would bar the way to the resumption of tests in any environment whatsoever, including underground tests. In other words, we are trying to bring about a situation in which no one would ever carry out nuclear weapon tests. Without such an agreement, as we have already pointed out, a partial treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests would not last very long.

If you really want to save the peoples from the harmful effects of radioactive fall-out, and if you are not pursuing merely propaganda purposes in your statements, you can easily achieve that aim. The way to it is open. Let us sign an agreement on the immediate cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and let us give an undertaking to refrain from carrying out underground tests while negotiations continue for a definitive ban on underground experimental nuclear explosions as well. But you reject that way and thus you are preventing an agreement being reached. Therefore, your talk about being concerned about the health and lives of human beings is utterly false and hypocritical.

You talk a lot about the harmful effects of radioactive fall-out, but at the same time through your nuclear explosions you have created a new zone of radioactivity around the earth, the effects of which on the health of mankind it is even hard to foresee. The falsity of your appeals for an agreement is obvious in view of the fact that at the same time you insist on continuing nuclear tests leading to the creation of new and still more deadly and destructive types of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Your statements that the Western Powers are striving to solve the question of banning nuclear weapon tests look particularly hypocritical in the light of the actual facts. Everybody knows that the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament began to the ominous accompaniment of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere in the area of the Pacific Ocean. You rejected the insistent appeals of the non-aligned States supported by the Soviet Union and by all peace-loving States that, during the negotiations in the Committee, States should refrain from experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs. The United States not only paid no heed to these appeals, but constantly increased the tempo of nuclear weapon tests. A few days ago the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced that the United States intended to carry out a new series of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere in the Pacific Ocean. In connexion with this the test zone in the Pacific Ocean around Johnston Island is being enlarged by hundreds of miles. At testing sites in Nevada alone, the United States has carried out since September 1961 fifty-four underground explosions, as may be calculated from the reports published by you. In all, from September 1961 up to the present time, according to American published data, the United States has carried out about eighty nuclear explosions; and the end of the series of United States nuclear explosions is not yet in sight. Those are the genuine facts. They show more eloquently than any words, the real intentions of the Western Powers. And you do not hesitate even to threaten to use nuclear weapons and to unleash a world war with the use of these weapons of mass destruction, a war which would lead to the death of millions and millions of people. Quite recently, literally just a few days ago, we again heard the monstrous statement by the United States Secretary of State for Defense, Mr. McNamara, who threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. It is not surprising that in carrying out such a policy the Western Powers are strenuously hindering the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

We hope that the United Nations General Assembly, which is now considering the question of the cessation of tests, will be able to bring pressure to bear on the Western Powers and that you will change your old negative attitude, which at present



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is the main obstacle in the way to a solution of the problem of banning all nuclear weapon tests for all time. Only after that shall we be able to reach an agreement on a mutually-acceptable basis. We have the possibility of reaching such an agreement. Such an agreement can be reached, I repeat once again, either on the basis of the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) or on the basis of the proposals contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28) of 16 April 1962, or on the basis of your own draft partial treaty (ENDC/59), but with the addition of an undertaking not to carry out underground nuclear tests while we are conducting negotiations and until we reach agreement on this question as well.

I apologise for the fact that my statement has taken up a good deal of time, but I think that you will find much that will be useful in it, and perhaps it will help you to reconsider your negative attitude.

The CHAIRMAN (United States): I will speak, rather more briefly, in my capacity as representative of the United States. The representative of the Soviet Union in a portion of his statement today introduced the vocabulary and accents of the "cold war" into our deliberations by references to Berlin, Laos, the Congo, Cuba, U-2 aircraft and alleged aggressive plans by certain circles in the West. I am not going to follow him down this road of the "cold war" by referring to Berlin, Laos, the Congo, Cuba, Korea or Hungary, because that could not help our work. Fortunately, in the remaining two hours and twenty-five minutes of his statement our Soviet colleague at least addressed himself to the problem we are here to solve — a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests. Much of his statement was the repetition of distortions of the history of these negotiations which we have heard from Soviet representatives, and from our Soviet colleague, before. I shall of course want to read his statement in the verbatim record and, if there is anything that merits reply, I shall make a reply at a future meeting. However, there are a few things that had better be said this afternoon — or, perhaps I should say, this evening.

The Soviet representative attempted, by a curious sort of logic, to deny that the Soviet Union had in November 1961 reversed itself and had abandoned the

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scientific basis which had grown out of the experts' report — which had been accepted by the Soviet Government and which called for on-site inspection based on scientific evidence and information — and to say that the Soviet Union's position had all along been completely consistent on that score. He quoted a Tass statement of 1 September 1956 that no special control system was necessary for policing a nuclear test ban agreement. He quoted a letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Eisenhower of April 1958, saying something of the same nature, and he quoted a letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Eisenhower of May 1958, which said that the Soviet Union agreed to take part in the meeting of experts that summer with doubts as to its utility. He seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union agreed to the experts' meeting only as a political manoeuvre to try to get an agreement rapidly.

But the experts did meet — Western experts and Eastern experts, men of scientific standing and reputation on both sides — and they reached an agreement with regard to elements of a control system. They agreed that on-site inspection would be required to identify certain unidentified events, and the Soviet Government endorsed that agreement of the experts. Until November 1961, Soviet scientists and Soviet representatives admitted the principle that on-site inspection was required scientifically, to identify certain unidentified events.

Dr. Fedorov, who was the head of the Soviet delegation at the Conference of Experts and who for many months was our colleague in the political Conference, said on 4 December 1959:

"What we can say on this subject is that on-site inspections of unidentified events that could be suspected of being nuclear explosions are very important. It is an essential element of the control system that such on-site inspections should be provided for. We all agree on that." (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/PV.2, p.11)

So the Soviet Union did radically reverse its stand in November 1961, obviously for purely political reasons, and took up the line, which we now hear from the Soviet representative, that distant instrumentation is adequate to identify all events.

That is not the only time, of course, that the Soviet Union has, for political reasons, overridden its scientists. We can recall the meetings of Western and Soviet scientists in 1960 to try to work out a joint research programme for

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improving the seismic arc, so that the control system could be simplified; and, although there were certain disagreements, there were certain agreements between the scientists. We all know that, on political instructions, our Soviet colleague himself had to override his own scientists and repudiate their statements.

Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the United States Gnome explosion in what I must confess seem to me to be nonsensical terms. He attempted to demonstrate that somehow or other the United States had contrived a shot which would not yield seismic signals and that to prove this it therefore gave the time and place of the shot to other nations. But Mr. Tsarapkin well knows that the Gnome shot was not a decoupling experiment; it was a tamped experiment. The reason why we gave the time and place of the shot in advance was because, in an effort to improve the seismic arc, we had embarked on a programme of assisting seismic stations throughout the world with equipment, and naturally we wanted to record as widely as possible such signals as could be picked up by the stations we had assisted and by other stations. If there were any doubt in Mr. Tsarapkin's mind as to what the Gnome shot was, it is unfortunate that the Soviet Union did not accept the invitation of the United States to be present at that shot and to see all the conditions under which it was conducted.

Mr. Tsarapkin mentioned a press statement made over the weekend on a new research device which has been developed at the California Institute of Technology. This is a research tool. Of course a good deal of further work is necessary to find out what its research potential is. I was interested in Mr. Tsarapkin's reference — a very friendly reference which I was glad to hear — to the distinguished seismologist who has been largely responsible for working on this development, Dr. Frank Press. I was particularly happy to hear Mr. Tsarapkin refer in respectful terms to Dr. Press's standing as a seismologist, because in the quotation from another United States scientist which we have now heard six or seven times from our Soviet colleague, and which he used again today, there was a statement that no seismologist of standing took part in the Berkner panel. It just happens that Dr. Frank Press was one of the members of the Berkner panel along with other eminent seismologists. But I was also interested in Mr. Tsarapkin's reference to this new research tool at the California Institute of Technology because this was developed under the Vela programme. Mr. Tsarapkin likes to refer

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to the Pentagon as blocking an agreement on a nuclear test ban, but the Vela programme, which is directed towards research to simplify the control system so as to enhance the possibility of an agreement with the Soviet Union on a test ban treaty, is under the direction of the United States Department of Defense. The helpful results of this research programme, which is continuing, have in part been made public and available, specifically in the Defense Department's announcement of 7 July of this year. The Defense Department and all other agencies of the United States Government are working to carry out United States policy: we are attempting to achieve a sound and mutually agreeable nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. Tsarapkin revived many of the old technical arguments of 1958, 1959 and 1960, when our scientists met together. In those days, even though the subjects of their deliberations included data which had been evaluated after the 1958 experts' report (EXP/NUC/28) — which seemed to indicate that there were greater difficulties in the problem of detection and identification than the 1958 experts had thought — Soviet scientists at least met Western scientists and discussed problems in scientific terms. But now, given the Soviet Government's reversal of its scientists in the fall of 1961, the Soviet Union is no longer willing to have its scientists talk to our scientists, even though we brought United Kingdom and United States scientists to Geneva to talk with all other delegations to the Eighteen Nation Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union is unwilling to have its scientists talk to our scientists, even when the bases for discussion now are somewhat more promising, on technical developments which have grown out of the active research programme undertaken by the United Kingdom and the United States to improve seismology and to enhance the possibilities of agreement. We hope it will not be long before the Soviet Union ceases to repudiate and override its scientists, gets together with us on the technical facts and moves forward towards a sound and effective agreement for a nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): I wish to consider with great care the lengthy speech made by the Soviet representative and not to reply to it in substance today. However, there are just a few points that I should like to make, as well as one correction for the record, which I am bound to make in case the view attributed to me should be in any way misused. This is the relatively small point

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

in connexion with tourism. The Soviet representative did say today:

"It is certainly not for you, Mr. Smithers, to say whether the visiting of the Soviet Union by tourists is a threat or risk to its security." (supra, p. 26).

Our Soviet colleague is essentially a very modest man, and he suggested that I did not read his speeches. I assure him that I do, and I did read with care his speech at our twenty-eighth meeting, which is to be found on page 20 of the English text. It was he who said that tourism was some kind of security risk and explained why it was so; it was not I who said so. I should like that to be quite clear, for I think that tourism in the Soviet Union or in any other country is an excellent thing, and I should not like to be quoted as saying anything which might justify its restriction. Indeed, I hope myself to go again to the Soviet Union as a tourist on numerous occasions.

There is one further point that I should like to make with regard to the remarks of the Soviet representative today. When speaking of the Western draft partial treaty (ENDC/59), the Soviet representative interjected in his remarks that the question of the element in which a test took place was secondary. So far as I could get his words, they were: "This is a secondary question, the environment". In the United Kingdom we do not think that this is secondary at all. We think it to be a matter of the very greatest importance, because it is this question of environment which differentiates the tests which cause fall-out, and which are a menace to the health of people, from those which do not. The plain fact is that we could have an agreement today on the cessation of those tests which cause fall-out but for the argument which we heard advanced once more by the Soviet Union as to its objections to a test ban treaty which omits underground tests — an argument, as I listened to it, so flimsy that I am sure it could not convince any logical man.

Finally, I want to direct a few remarks to the character and purpose of the speech to which we have just listened. In successive interventions in these negotiations the representative of the United States and myself have tried to direct our minds to the essence of the problem: to the differences which divide us from the Soviet Union and to the means of overcoming those differences. This has been our strictly practical approach to what we wish to be a successful negotiation. We have sought to understand the position of the Soviet Union and to examine the

(Mr. Snithers, United Kingdom)

considerations which lie beneath it, so that we may carry these negotiations in the direction of an agreement which takes account of the views and interests of both sides. The representative of the Soviet Union has made brief and somewhat insubstantial interventions at recent meetings but promised us today a considered reply to the case which we have been putting forward. I listened to every syllable of his speech today, for nearly two-and-a-half hours, and I listened with an eagerness to detect any point in that lengthy speech at which he sought not to make it more difficult for the West to agree to the Soviet view of the case but more easy. I listened eagerly to see if he would seek for common ground on which we could reach agreement, or if he would put forward arguments which we could reasonably be expected to respond to in a positive manner. Like my United States colleague, I wondered — and my catalogue is slightly different — what Berlin, Laos, Cuba, preventive war, NATO generals, attacks on United States scientists, big corporations and monopolies and their "evils", and pharmaceutical manufacturers in Switzerland really had to do with forwarding these negotiations. I think it is about time we had from the representative of the Soviet Union a speech which, in his concluding words today, contained "much that will be useful". In his concluding words he said that his speech today contained "much that will be useful". I listened to the speech precisely for the purpose of detecting something that would be useful, and I shall read it again with that particularly in mind, and I shall seek to take up at a future meeting anything which on careful examination I find might be useful in bringing us closer to agreement. It would be helpful if the representative of the Soviet Union, who is a courteous and generous colleague, would, outside of the Sub-Committee, let me know what in particular in his speech he thought would be useful in helping to these negotiations, or indeed if he could give me some pointers now, for it was a very long speech. I shall then do what I can to try to find the constructive elements in the speech to which we have listened this afternoon and I shall make in due course a constructive reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First I shall reply briefly to the representative of the United States. For some reason he deemed it appropriate to cast the reproach that the Soviet representative is having recourse to the vocabulary of the "cold war". That we

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

really do not follow the same logic in our reasoning, I quite agree. For this reason I now understand why you fail to grasp the logic in our statements, as you have already told us several times.

What we are talking about — and I have mentioned this in my statements — is how the Western Powers in their policy and by their actions are forcing and intensifying the tension in the international situation, are intensifying military preparations and threatening the Soviet Union with war, while their military leaders — I gave an example and quoted the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara — speak about the need to determine accurately the targets to be bombarded in the Soviet Union. This has often been referred to by Mr. Gilpatric whom I have already quoted here I don't know how many times. He talks about this in one statement after another. There have also been statements by some of the highest responsible leaders of your State, who have spoken about a preventive war against the Soviet Union. Surely those are actions of the "cold war"? But when I point out these facts of American life, the United States representative accuses me of using the vocabulary of the "cold war". What astonishing logic indeed!

Now a few words on the comments made by Mr. Smithers.

Certainly, I made a long speech today. I do not dispute that. But you have made pretty long speeches as well. I have had to reply to the same time to the lengthy speeches of two representatives — both the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom. Behind all these long-winded speeches, both yours and mine, gentlemen, there is a struggle. A very clear logic, as it were, is concealed behind all these long-winded speeches.

To put it briefly, a struggle is going on in regard to an agreement to stop all nuclear weapon tests without exception. That is what the struggle is about; that is what we are striving for; and that is why we criticize you for your reluctance to come to such an agreement. After all, very little is needed; after all, you see, very little is needed in order to reach agreement on this question. In particular, we will take up even your partial treaty. Only let us supplement it with a moratorium, as you call it. All right, let it be a moratorium. But this will be an agreement. So far it has not been our practice to record this moratorium in the form of an international agreement, subscribed to by the representatives of States and so on.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

This agreement will have an altogether different weight, an altogether different meaning. You say that a moratorium would be a risk for you. Let us assume that that is even so. But let us take this risk, get one another's signatures and see what happens. We believe that this treaty would be carried out. It would be better to take this risk, although we do not believe it to be one, with positive hopes than to have no agreement and to continue nuclear explosions and increase them. That is the issue, Mr. Smithers.

I think that, perhaps, although this is simplified but highly significant logic, it will be easy for you to understand.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): I did not wish by any means to reproach the Soviet representative with making a long speech. I was very glad he made a long speech and I listened to every word of it. I am willing to listen for hours and hours in the hope of hearing anything that may help in forwarding these negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Speaking in my capacity as representative of the United States, I wish to say that I may differ with my Soviet colleague on the definition of the vocabulary of the "cold war", but, with my United Kingdom colleague, I fail to see how references to Berlin, Laos and the Congo, and distorted statements implying that United States officials have ever called for a preventive war, forward our work. There are numerous aggressive statements, rocket-rattling statements, by the highest Soviet officials that could be quoted, and to use my Soviet colleague's phrase, could be referred to as the "facts of life" of the Soviet Union, but bringing them into our negotiations does not forward our work.

Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, perhaps we should set the date and time for our next meeting. Should we meet on Thursday, 18 October, at 3 p.m.?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.