

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 28 March 1962, at 4.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the fourth meeting of this Sub-Committee, to consider again the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to dwell on certain arguments put forward by the representatives of the Western Powers to justify their position on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Both at the plenary meetings of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the three Power Sub-Committee set up by the Committee for the purpose of examining the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom continue stubbornly to insist on their old position, demanding the establishment of an international system of control. The objective factors of the present time require a new approach to the solution of this question. Yet our partners in the negotiations -- the United States of America and the United Kingdom -- do not wish to take this into account. Their representatives here, falling into contradiction with the facts, declare that unless there is international control, it would be difficult to verify the implementation by States of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The statements made by Mr. Rusk, Lord Home, Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber at the previous meetings were devoted to attempts to justify this thesis.

In the first place, we must point out most emphatically that this assertion of the Western Powers is groundless and untenable.

Everyone knows, of course, that no international control over nuclear explosions is being exercised and that nowhere in the world is any international system of control in existence. Nevertheless, during the whole of the time since nuclear explosions began (except, perhaps, the very first explosion) the world has not been in a state of ignorance regarding the nuclear weapon tests conducted by the Powers. The fact is that, first in the countries where these weapons are being produced, the appearance of nuclear weapons gave a powerful impetus to the investigation of methods of recording nuclear explosions and to the creation and further development and improvement of various kinds of instruments and apparatus for measuring the parameters and determining the effects produced by nuclear explosions in various environments -- in the atmosphere, under water, underground and at high altitudes. Subsequently, the business of

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developing methods of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions, the business of improving instruments and apparatus for recording these explosions has also been extensively developed in countries not possessing or testing nuclear weapons.

As you see, all the development in this field went on and is going on within the national framework, and this development already many years ago attained so high a level that it enabled nuclear explosions to be recorded by national control systems at enormous distances.

In this connexion it is worth while reminding you, gentlemen, of an event which occurred over twelve years ago. When a nuclear weapon explosion was carried out in the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1949, the world immediately learned about this event not from a communication coming from the Soviet Union, but from a statement by the President of the United States of America, Mr. Truman. He learned of the Soviet nuclear explosion from the reports of the United States service for the detection of nuclear explosions. The same can be said of a series of subsequent nuclear explosions carried out in the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union recorded United States nuclear explosions by its own national system. Significant in this respect was the report of the telegraph agency of the Soviet Union, TASS, which published in 1958 a long list of nuclear explosions carried out in the United States of America in that year, together with the exact time and site of these explosions. Therefore, when the Western representatives say that national systems of detection are inadequate, they realize perfectly well that their assertions do not correspond to the truth and are untenable. Today nobody can deny the fact that it is possible by means of national detection systems to record and, consequently, to identify not only nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, but also underground. I will give you a few examples from recent experience.

It is well known, for instance, that the underground explosion carried out by the United States of America in the state of New Mexico on 10 December 1961 was recorded by the national stations of Sweden, Finland and Japan at distances of many thousands of miles from the site of the explosion. Recently an underground nuclear explosion was carried out in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had not previously carried out underground nuclear explosions. But in order to expose before the eyes of the whole world, and by the hands of the Americans themselves, the baselessness of their assertions that they cannot record and identify an underground explosion by means of their own national detection systems, we decided

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to carry out such an explosion in the territory of the Soviet Union. We made no advance announcement about it. And what happened? The United States Atomic Energy Commission announced this explosion on almost the same day. What does this fact indicate? It indicates that the United States of America possesses such means of detection as enable it to record an underground nuclear explosion even if it is carried out at great depth and at a place many thousands of miles distant from its own territory. What then is now left of the United States assertion that national detection systems are inadequate for exercising control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests? Absolutely nothing.

The United States, by announcing that it had recorded the underground nuclear explosion carried out in the Soviet Union, thereby refuted its own argument about the impossibility of detecting underground explosions by national systems. Thus it has now been proved by the hands of the Americans themselves that national detection systems also unerringly identify underground nuclear explosions. And if the United States of America continues to assert that national control systems are unacceptable to it and insists on international control, then it is now clear to everyone that they are not doing so because national detection systems do not guarantee control over compliance with an agreement, but because national control provides no opportunities for carrying out intelligence and espionage. Indeed, to accept national control would mean missing an opportunity to use control for intelligence purposes. International control is an altogether different matter. It would create favourable opportunities for the activities of foreign intelligence agencies. Therein lies the true reason for the fidelity of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to so-called international control. But we will never agree to opening our territory to the activities of foreign intelligence services.

Knowing beforehand that the Soviet Union will not agree to such control and nevertheless still insisting on it, the Western Powers are simply seeking for a pretext in order to scuttle an agreement on the cessation of tests and to carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere, on which the United States Government has already decided.

Another argument has recently been put forward here by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom for the purpose of attacking the Soviet Union's proposal for the use of national detection systems for exercising control over compliance with an agreement of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The

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representatives of the Western Powers both in the Sub-Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in attempting, on the one hand, to bolster up their own position involving the demand for the establishment of international control, and, on the other hand, to knock the ground from under the Soviet proposal for control based on the use of national detection systems, have gone so far as to engage in manifest distortion of the position of the Soviet Union and the course of the negotiations. They have asserted that in the previous stage of the negotiations, that is, before 28 November 1961, when it submitted its new proposal for consideration by the three Power Conference, the Soviet Union did not fear that international control could be used for intelligence and espionage purposes, and that it is only now that the Soviet Union has begun to have these fears. But that is a manifest untruth, obviously intended for an audience that has not followed in detail the course of the negotiations or are quite uninformed on the subject. This is what really happened.

As early as the beginning of the three Power negotiations in December 1958, that is, over three years ago, I pointed out as the representative of the Soviet Union at that conference that the persistent demands of the Western Powers to send numerous foreign technical personnel into a country was not due to the requirements of control. These demands were obviously being made for other specific purposes, namely, for intelligence purposes.

I shall refer to some of the statements we made in 1958 and 1959 at the three Power Conference in Geneva. Thus, for instance, on 10 December 1958, at the twenty-second meeting (GEN/DNT/FV.22, p.18), I said that the presence of numerous foreign technical personnel in control posts could not be justified by the requirements of control. I pointed out that these foreigners would roam about the country with special objectives, busying themselves with reconnaissance matters.

Again, at the seventy-first meeting on 12 March 1959, that is likewise more than three years ago, I appealed to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom to exclude reconnaissance considerations from our work, in order that these considerations should not prevail at the Conference and cast their shadow over us (GEN/DNT/FV.71, p.11).

During subsequent negotiations, both in 1959 and in 1960, not to speak of 1961, a rather stubborn discussion was carried on between us at the Geneva three-Power Conference, in the course of which we had constantly to expose the persistent

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attempts of the Western Powers -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- to secure the most favourable conditions for the use of the control machinery in the interests of their intelligence services. This is shown by the ceaseless efforts of the Western Powers during these years, aimed at extending the network of control posts, staffing them entirely with foreign specialists, and insisting that the majority of the staff of control posts should consist of foreigners, that the number of inspections should be as large as possible, that inspection teams should be composed entirely of foreigners, that only foreigners should be observers on aircraft carrying out special flights. It was for the same purposes that the Western Powers persisted throughout this period in trying to secure for themselves a predominant, commanding position in the so-called international control organization.

The discussions on such questions as that of the composition and powers of the Control Commission, the question of the composition of the supreme administrative body of the control system etc., were stages in the struggle against this tendency of the Western Powers. In the course of these discussions we pointed out quite frankly to the Western Powers what we perceived, what they were driving at and what their demands stemmed from. We repeatedly told them that their demands were based on the interests of their intelligence services and that they were trying to secure favourable conditions for using the control machinery for espionage purposes. We dare not close our eyes to this; we cannot allow this and will not agree to it.

Thus you see that, as far back as 1958 and 1959, our negotiations reflected the struggle of the Soviet Union against the persistent attempts of the Western Powers to obtain legal possibilities of developing their intelligence and espionage network in the territory of the Soviet Union under the guise of an international control system. But at that time, that is two or three years ago, the Western Powers were still able to delude some people with their demand for international control, since the instruments and apparatus of those days, as well as the methods of recording nuclear explosions, did not reveal with the same indisputable obviousness as they do today their effectiveness in the matter of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions at great distances. At the present time the equipment and methods of detection and identification have made great advances; the effectiveness with which nuclear explosions can be identified in any environment and at enormous distances has considerably increased.

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I will refer to several facts. At the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests in January 1962 I pointed out that recently many geophysical methods of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions, including underground ones, had been considerably improved. The Soviet experts who as far back at 1958 predicted an inevitable increase in the decisive power and range of these methods have turned out to be completely right.

It can be said that the increase has been even more rapid than was previously expected. Seismologists in the Soviet Union have already succeeded in proving that the accuracy with which the epicentres of earthquakes can be located is approximately ten times greater than was estimated by the United States experts.

It is well known that in the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom a number of very promising methods of identifying underground nuclear explosions have been proposed. In a number of countries apparatus for the automatic selection of seismic events of a certain kind are being successfully developed. In this connexion I should like to draw attention to a report by the scientific correspondent of the British newspaper, The Evening News, at the beginning of January 1962. It stated that research carried out by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority with hypersensitive recording apparatus had made it possible to devise a method for detecting underground nuclear explosions by measuring their effect on the earth's magnetic field. The correspondent of The Evening News noted that, in the opinion of British scientists, the practical application of this method will make it impossible for any country to conduct clandestine nuclear tests.

Here is another example. On 25 March, just three days ago, The Sunday Times published an article by the paper's scientific correspondent, Mr. Margerison, on a new method of detecting nuclear explosions worked out by British experts. The article states that a new British method of detecting clandestine underground bomb tests comes into operation this week. This method, which was recently mentioned by the Prime Minister, is said to be the best in the world. The detection station at Eskdalemuir in the Lake District should be able to distinguish with greater certainty than has previously been possible between underground bomb tests and minor earthquakes.

As the article points out, methods of detecting nuclear explosions have been considerably improved in the United Kingdom, as has the construction of seismographs, thus enabling earth tremors resulting from the explosion of nuclear bombs to be



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more clearly distinguished from tremors caused by traffic, industrial operations, minor earth subsidences and the pounding of waves on the shores, i.e. from a background of noise. It is also stated that a new method of calculation based on electronic techniques has been developed, under which a number of seismographs can be used simultaneously, thus providing much more detailed information on the yield, type, direction and force of the explosion.

The new method of interpreting explosions makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between nuclear explosions and an ordinary earthquake. This is one example of the remarkable progress made in devising new methods of detecting nuclear explosions and in improving instruments for recording them.

The examples I have given and the points I have made by no means exhaust the arguments that might be given to demonstrate the real possibility of reciprocal control over compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests through the use of national systems of control.

With the modern development of science, technology and geophysical observations, the Soviet proposal for control over nuclear explosions is practicable and effective. There are no, I emphasize, no scientifically justified objections to the Soviet proposal for reciprocal control through the use of national systems of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

Now the nuclear Powers, and not only the nuclear Powers but also many non-nuclear countries, can reliably control any nuclear explosions, i.e. can detect and identify them by means of their own national systems of detection. The necessity to set up an international control system for this purpose no longer arises.

However, the United States and the United Kingdom, basing themselves on far-fetched, highly artificial, and I would even say improbable situations, continue to insist on international control. They believe that a system of international control would give wide opportunities for developing an espionage and intelligence network in the territory of the Soviet Union. It is precisely this fact which makes them so insistent in their demand for the establishment of international control. But it has now become absolutely obvious that the Western Powers, in rejecting national control and insisting on international control, are guided not by the requirements of control but by the interests of their own intelligence services.

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The fact that United States military circles are extremely interested in carrying out espionage and intelligence work in the territory of the Soviet Union was quite openly mentioned thirteen days ago by such a highly placed official as Mr. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States. Addressing the members of the association of the electronics industry on 15 March this year in Washington, Mr. Gilpatric stated that, for the purpose of striking remote targets in the Soviet Union, it -- that is to say the United States -- must obtain detailed information on the system of enemy targets and determine the degree of certainty with which these targets can be reached. But we shall not give you this information; therefore it is clear to everyone that, in preparing your plans for nuclear bombing, you will try to obtain such information by means of espionage and intelligence activities in the territory of the Soviet Union. But you must understand -- since you are not naive, it must be clear to you that we will never agree to this, and I can only repeat what we have already told you more than once: namely that we have no wish to engage in such activities in the territory of our partners, but we will not allow our own territory to be opened up to the activities of foreign intelligence services, as is desired by Mr. Gilpatric and others.

When we agreed in 1958 to discuss the question of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests together with the establishment of international control, our attitude was based on the view that a speedy agreement on this question -- we proposed that these negotiations should be concluded within a period of two to three weeks -- would be a turning point in the international situation, that such an agreement would steer international relations into the channel of peaceful co-existence and would lead to progress in the field of general and complete disarmament. To our great regret, these hopes were not realized. As a result of the aggressive policy of the Western Powers which belong to the NATO bloc, the settlement of disarmament problems came to a standstill, the international situation became increasingly critical, the arms race was intensified, and the danger of war continued to grow.

In such circumstances the institution of an international control system over the discontinuance of tests, which, as you yourselves know, is not a disarmament measure, would be tantamount to control without disarmament, which we cannot accept. Such a position is all the more justified since, in view of its organization and functions, international control might be widely utilized for intelligence purposes. International control, if divorced from measures of

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disarmament, would therefore seriously affect the security interests of States. For these reasons the Soviet Government informed the United States Government at the end of 1960 that, in its view, the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests together with the establishment of international control should be settled in conjunction with the problem of general and complete disarmament. Negotiations on this question took place during 1961 but without success, since the United States refused to accept this Soviet proposal. Thus, as a result of the obstinacy of the United States, a new deadlock was reached which ruled out all possibility of agreement. In order to break the deadlock in the negotiations, the Soviet Government submitted a new proposal on 28 November 1961 (GEN/DNT/122) providing for a new and different approach to the solution of the problem of nuclear weapon tests.

This new approach makes it possible to settle the problem of the discontinuance of tests, without encountering the difficulties which inevitably arise in any attempt to settle this problem on the basis of international control. The new approach proposed by the Soviet Union accords, both in principle and in substance, with the proposal of President Kennedy of the United States and Prime Minister Macmillan of the United Kingdom, set out in their letter of 3 September 1961 to Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (GEN/DNT/120). In this letter they proposed that control over compliance with an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere should be carried out by the existing detection systems, that is to say, by the national systems, without recourse to other methods of control, that is to say, to international methods of control.

The Soviet Union merely expanded and broadened this proposal of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, extending national control to nuclear tests at high altitudes and under water. This extension by the Soviet Union of the scope of the agreement is fully justified, since nuclear explosions at high altitudes and below water can be equally easily detected by the existing systems of control, that is to say, by national systems. Clearly, the only agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests which is of any real value is one which ends all and every kind of test and leaves no loopholes in this matter. For this reason the Soviet Union thought it essential that the agreement should also cover underground nuclear explosions. Since, however, the United States stubbornly opposed this, the Soviet Union, taking the attitude of

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the United States into account, limited its proposal with regard to underground nuclear explosions to the institution of a moratorium pending the further development of methods of control over such explosions.

The Soviet Government also submitted a draft treaty on this question to the Western Powers. However, this proposal by the Soviet Union also failed to obtain the approval or support of the United States and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the United States Government adopted a provocative attitude: having broken off the three-Power negotiations for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, it decided, shortly before the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began, to resume atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in addition to the underground nuclear explosions it has carried out. These acts by the United States Government show that the United States has deliberately adopted a course of adding to the difficulties and creating impossible conditions for the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. The United States is doing all this so that nothing may prevent it from carrying out tests of nuclear weapons.

In order to confuse the issue, muddy the waters, and lighten the heavy responsibility which the United States has assumed by initiating a new stage in the arms race, certain people in the United States have energetically begun to circulate rumours to the effect that the Soviet Union itself is very eager for the United States to carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere in order to use this fact as justification for the carrying out of a new series of its nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union.

Nothing could be more absurd than these United States fabrications, since, if they were true, what could be simpler for the United States than to decline to carry out its nuclear tests and thereby prevent the Soviet Union from using the United States nuclear explosions as a pretext for carrying out a new series of nuclear weapon tests of its own? But this the United States does not wish to do. Instead, it has decided to resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere and thereby to give a new impetus to the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons. In acting in this way, the United States is revealing itself to the whole world as the instigator of an intensified arms race.

The Western Powers also put forward the following argument to justify their demand for the establishment of international control. International control (inspection) is allegedly essential in those cases where a dispute arises between

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the parties because of the suspicion that one party has carried out a clandestine nuclear explosion in violation of the treaty. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom assert that such a dispute may arise whenever one of the parties, on the basis of data provided by its national detection system, asserts that an event suspected of being a nuclear explosion has taken place in the territory of the other party, while the other party, basing itself on the data provided by its national detection system, denies the allegations made against it. Such a dispute, so the representatives of the Western Powers assert, can be settled only by carrying out an international on-site inspection.

We regard this argument as artificial and far-fetched. The Soviet Union acts on the assumption that, having voluntarily signed an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, the nuclear Powers will strictly observe such an agreement and will not violate it. It is on this understanding that the Soviet Union is conducting the present negotiations with the Western Powers. As was stressed by Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, observance of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, once it has been signed, would involve the honour of States, and a government which committed a violation of the international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests would be discredited.

After all, we do have examples to show that complicated international questions can be settled promptly, given the mutual consent of the parties to the negotiations, and can be settled on the basis of agreements which contain no conditions of any kind concerning international control and verification. I have in mind the treaty concluded two years ago providing for the use of Antarctica for scientific research work and for abstention from all military preparations and the carrying out of nuclear tests on this continent. If the same goodwill had been displayed at our Conference as was shown during the discussions on the treaty on Antarctica, we would today be able to announce to the whole world that an agreement had been concluded which would save mankind for all time from the dangerous consequences of nuclear weapon tests.

So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, if it signs a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, it will comply with this treaty. If the Western Powers also adopt an honest approach to their obligations with regard to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, there will be no danger of a violation of this treaty or of any relevant international agreement on the

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discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; no misunderstandings or doubts will then arise on either side.

But even if one concedes the possibility of one of the parties experiencing some uncertainty or doubt concerning a particular signal received by recording instruments, in such cases the States concerned could resort to consultations during which they could exchange the relevant data obtained from their national detection systems. Such consultations would remove any uncertainties or doubts, if and when they arose.

There is another point on which I would like to say a few words. It is that the United States representatives have devoted their statements almost exclusively to arguments of a technical nature and have tried to give the impression that they were concerned at the technical difficulties of detecting nuclear explosions. In this connexion, they have again begun to discuss the idea of convening a conference of scientific experts who would compare data on the efficiency of existing means of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions. They propose all this with the alleged aim of removing obstacles in the way of agreement.

Some people may form the idea that the basic issue is really of a technical nature, as the Western Powers are trying to assert. The Soviet delegation, however, considers it its duty to remind you that the scientific experts of the three Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, met several times during the Geneva Conference. The United States has used a variety of technical arguments at these meetings simply in order to complicate, confuse and drag out the negotiations ad infinitum. It has clearly been endeavouring to submerge the basic political issue in fruitless technical discussions and thus to discard and brush aside the peoples' demand for an immediate ban on tests of all types of nuclear weapons.

Much has already been said here about the deterioration in the atmosphere of the work of the Conference which has been caused by the decision of the United States Government to resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere at the end of April this year. We are now hearing here sanctimonious protestations by the United States and United Kingdom representatives of their allegedly ardent desire to put an end to all nuclear tests. At the same time, the final preparations for the new nuclear explosions are being carried out in the nuclear testing grounds of the United States and the United Kingdom; the finishing touches, as it were, are being added. In order to instil pessimism and a sense of fatality

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in the opponents of nuclear tests and to stifle their protests, the United States papers are publishing reports that no power on earth will force the United States Government to renounce its decision to resume nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere too. Significant in this respect is the view expressed by a special correspondent of The New York Herald Tribune, Don Cook, who, quoting an official United States source, wrote recently that the United States tests would now be resumed without further delay regardless of pressure from neutralists or propaganda considerations.

We are realists and believe in facts, not in the statements by United States representatives which are designed to distract our attention. And the facts show that the United States is trying to use the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests simply as a screen for its preparations for the resumption of tests and as a screen for the tests themselves. The phrase "talk and test", which means carrying on negotiations and conducting tests, has again begun to appear frequently on the pages of the United States Press. These words most aptly express the United States policy of continuing its military preparations and further improving its nuclear weapons under cover of the negotiations.

Against the background of these facts all the Western Powers' talk of the need for further technical discussions is, purely and simply, a diversionary manoeuvre, an attempt to evade a political solution of the problem of discontinuing tests by substituting futile discussions on the technical aspects of the problem of control.

But, as we have already demonstrated, the basic issue does not lie in the technical difficulties of detecting nuclear explosions. In reality there are no such difficulties. A positive solution of the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests is being obstructed by the policy of the United States and its NATO allies, which, in chasing the mirage of nuclear superiority, wish to secure freedom of action to conduct tests of new types of nuclear weapons. This was frankly stated by Mr. Kennedy, the President of the United States, in his speech on 2 March, when he emphasized that, in order to ensure its superiority over others in the field of nuclear arms, the United States must not confine itself to theory nor must its activities be restricted to laboratories or to underground sites.

It was just this policy of ensuring United States superiority in the field of nuclear arms which was the argument used by President Kennedy to justify the United States Government's decision to resume nuclear tests.

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But this is an extremely dangerous course. If one State decides that it is necessary to conduct a new series of nuclear tests so as to ensure its military superiority or advantage, it must be realized that other States possessing nuclear weapons will follow suit. In this connexion, I would like to recall the following warning given by Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government.

"Everyone should understand that if the United States carries out a new series of test explosions in the atmosphere while it is already carrying out underground explosions, the Soviet Union will be compelled to reply by conducting tests of its own. The United States Government will therefore acquire no military superiority in this way."

The United States and the United Kingdom should understand that their attempts to start a race over nuclear weapons tests in order to gain military superiority for themselves will not bring them the desired results. By resuming nuclear weapons tests, the United States is assuming a heavy responsibility for opening a new and even more dangerous phase of the arms race.

The Soviet Union would not wish to compete with the United States in the production and stockpiling of lethal weapons. We should like to achieve unity of effort in regard to genuine disarmament. The Soviet Union, in striving after this, is prepared to sign forthwith a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests and providing for the use of national detection systems for verifying compliance with the treaty.

Such a solution of the question is in accordance with the interests of all countries, does not give anyone any military advantages and does not impair the security interests of States. Only on such a basis can agreement be reached in present day conditions. All that is needed is the goodwill of our Western partners; the matter rests with them.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I am indeed saddened to hear the statement this afternoon by our colleagues from the Soviet Union. I shall have to reserve my right to study his remarks and in due course set the record straight.

Mr. Chairman, your Government and mine have at all times done their level best to work out an effective and adequate nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union under effective international controls. We have tried to assure our Soviet colleague that we are not interested in any sense in espionage. In



(Mr. Dean, United States)

the drafting of the treaty we have tried to make this abundantly clear by setting up the international headquarters in Vienna, by giving the Soviet Union equal voting rights with the West on the top control commission, and by giving the Soviet Union the right of unanimous selection of the administrator, and so forth. Indeed, there are many carefully worked out safeguards in the treaty so that the treaty organization can do nothing except to carry out its duties on a completely scientific, international civil service basis. There would be little or no possibility for espionage.

But, as I said, I shall read the record and in some detail at a further meeting of this Sub-Committee set the record straight. I am afraid the situation has been placed in a false perspective by our Soviet colleague this afternoon.

At the informal meeting of the Committee on the afternoon of 23 March, Mr. Zorin talked at some length about technical control problems. I am very sorry that, unfortunately, on this highly technical subject, particularly by using interchangeably the words "detection" and "identification", Mr. Zorin only added to the general confusion. This led Mr. Zorin to insist that some advancement in national "detection" methods had at the same time advanced the ability to "identify" by distant instrumentation whether a particular unidentified event occurring on some nation's territory was in fact an earthquake or a man-made explosion. This, I submit, is of course completely and totally inaccurate. Detection and identification are vastly and fundamentally different and must not be confused. Nuclear explosions cannot, I repeat, be identified at great distances. I know of no improvement in the field of identification. I hope we will not allow these serious efforts here to arrive at an effective and adequate test ban treaty to be influenced by the pseudo-scientific jargon of fiction writers in this field.

All this has only added to my general feeling that some members of the Soviet delegation have forgotten some very basic concepts concerning control problems which are fully spelled out in the Geneva experts' report of August 1958, (EXP/NUC/28). I would urge my Soviet colleagues to re-read and re-study the interrelationship, under an international test ban treaty system, between the number of control posts and the number of necessary on-site inspections for the identification of unidentified events.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I shall return to this specific problem of "detection" and "identification" in a few moments. But I should like to suggest now that, in rejecting the Geneva experts' report of 1958, which the Soviet experts signed, the Soviet delegation may have erased from its mind even the contents of that distinguished report. In fact, the impression given both by Mr. Zorin in his remarks today and by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his plenary speech of 23 March (ENDC/8) was that the USSR had been opposed for a long time to international controls for monitoring a ban on nuclear weapon tests.

But let us look at the record itself. No; the record will not support any such contention. Indeed, the Soviet Union is only a very recent convert to the thesis that the recommendations of the Geneva experts of 20 August 1958, which it approved, can be totally disregarded. For example, on 15 June 1960, at the 214th meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, Mr. Tsarapkin said, as the Soviet representative, in referring to the 1958 Geneva experts' report:

"... we are profoundly convinced of the correctness of the conclusions and recommendations made by the scientists of the eight States, and approved by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom." (GEN/DNT/FV.214, page 5)

Similarly, at the two hundred and seventy-fourth meeting on 21 March 1961

Mr. Tsarapkin again declared:

"...the Soviet Union has been and is still opposed to any revision of the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts..." (GEN/DNT/FV.274, page 6)

Indeed, even the aide-memoire of the Soviet Government to the United States of 4 June 1961 (GEN/DNT/111) states:

"The Soviet Union, just as the United States, considers that strict international control must be established over the cessation of tests."

The Soviet note of 5 July 1961 (GEN/DNT/113) to the United States also speaks favourably of the support which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union gave to the recommendations of the 1958 Conference of Experts. In fact, this Soviet note of 5 July 1961 goes on to state that the United States, early in 1959, raised some doubts about the adequacy of part of the treaty control system recommended by the Geneva experts in 1958. On this the Soviet note said:

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"But even if the control system is to some extent inadequate, this can by no means be pleaded as an obstacle to agreement, since, as science and engineering progress, increasingly efficient instruments will be designed, and consequently the control system will be improved." (GEN/DNT/113, page 4)

I have repeated the foregoing quotations at some length to demonstrate exactly what the representatives of the Soviet Government were saying officially right up to the time when the Soviet Union began its unilateral resumption of nuclear weapon tests in August 1961.

Not only did the Soviet Union repeatedly approve the 1958 experts' report but, as late as last July, it admitted that the Geneva control system recommended by the experts, with its inter-related elements of detection and identification, was to some extent inadequate.

Despite this, a mere four months later, on 28 November 1961, the Soviet Government had made a complete about-face by announcing to an astounded and disbelieving world that no international control system was necessary and the controls recommended by the Geneva experts in 1958 could all be supplanted by so-called "national" detection systems, without any international headquarters system to monitor the location of the equipment at the 170 to 180 control posts throughout the world, the selection and training of the scientists, and the evaluation of the reporting of the control stations. The Soviet Union ascribed this about-face to vast advances in instrumentation which allegedly made all this feasible. What precisely these advances are has remained a complete mystery. We await enlightenment.

This statement of 28 November 1961 has remained the Soviet line to this day even though, if there are any of these great new advances in instrumentation, they could have occurred only in the four months between the Soviet note of 5 July 1961, when the Geneva system of 1958 itself was still held by the Soviet Union to be somewhat inadequate, and 28 November 1961, when, in the view of the Soviet Union, national detection systems alone had somehow suddenly become perfect not merely for "detection" but apparently also for the infinitely more difficult and complex problem of identification of the type of event as well.

All of this may make sense to our Soviet colleagues, but I say it is completely bewildering to the rest of us and, I submit, to the world. It stands to reason that a control system as envisaged by the 1958 Geneva experts' report, which, by the admission of the Soviet Union itself, as I have just shown, was

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appropriate and necessary for three years, cannot have become totally obsolete in four months in 1961, especially since not the slightest scientific evidence to refute this report has so far been adduced.

Secretary Rusk, in his statement at the plenary meeting on 23 March (ENDC/PV.8), reviewed the technological situation, and I think there can be no scientific doubt ~~whatsoever~~ that this is a completely accurate picture of the current state of affairs. If it is not, then let us examine the scientific evidence. Let it be laid on the table, let it be brought forward so that all can see and examine it. Let us have the scientific data themselves.

The facts demonstrate that, without an international control system, there just can be no effective monitoring or appropriate international supervision of a nuclear weapon test ban treaty.

The system recommended in 1958 by the Geneva experts would have a specified capacity for detecting the seismic, atmospheric and under-water signals which might be generated by any clandestine nuclear detonations in violation of a test ban treaty. The system recommended in 1959 by the high altitude experts and incorporated in the Western draft treaty of 18 April 1961, would have a similar capacity for the detection of signals generated in outer space.

As we all know, however, the detection of a particular event that cannot be identified as to type is by itself not enough. It only arouses suspicions about what the type of event may or may not have been. The only way to allay suspicions is by knowing what has actually taken place. I submit that this is not a question of honour.

This process of knowing, which we call identification, is entirely dependent on the installation of the international Geneva system round the world, including the system headquarters, the appropriate number of control posts, aircraft sampling flights and on-site inspections.

Different kinds of earthquakes give different kinds of seismic signals, many of which cannot be distinguished from those resulting from man-made explosions. Hence it is not possible to identify any seismic signal as clearly caused by an unnatural or man-made explosion.

The best that can be done by seismic means is to identify some events as actual earthquakes, and hence to rule these out as possible unnatural or man-made explosions. Let me be very clear: you may eliminate certain earthquakes by appropriately located instrumentation, but you simply cannot identify by

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instrumentation alone the remaining events as nuclear explosions. This is a very important and fundamental distinction that must not be overlooked. If it is overlooked, great and vast confusion results and improper conclusions may be drawn.

This leaves, at best, a large fraction of events whose nature is unknown. To achieve even this result requires that strong signals be received at several stations in various directions appropriately located from the epicentre of the disturbance. These signals fade with distance, and consequently the appropriate location of these control stations in both seismic and aseismic areas is very important.

Hence, even in these still relatively few cases where the identification of seismic events as earthquakes can be accomplished merely on the basis of expert interpretation of the seismic signal as recorded by appropriately located seismographs, it is fundamental and indispensable to have recordings made by a properly spaced global network of the type called for in 1958 by the experts' meeting in Geneva, to which the Soviet experts subscribed and to which the Soviet Government gave its approval.

It stands to reason that, in addition to being scientifically essential, an international control system has at least one other unique attribute. Instead of being a system operated by any one nation or group of nations, it is an internationally-based arrangement in which the Soviet Union, the West and the non-associated States would all be represented. Its charter would have been arrived at by international agreement; its procedures would have been internationally approved; its carefully selected and trained scientific staff would come from the broad spectrum of nations. The work of all the control stations would be evaluated at the headquarters in Vienna.

In such circumstances, the data recorded and analysed by such an agency has an international standing which no data collected by national detection systems alone could possibly have. Without an international system, whether we like it or not, we could never eliminate the problem of the possible falsification or suppression of national data. An international system has its objectivity guaranteed, and this means that its findings would not be open to challenge.

On the other hand, the data and findings of non-international systems could easily be challenged by any other State seeking to hide a treaty violation on the ground that the data were not adequate or complete or that the national system

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was inadequate or that its collection of data had not been properly supervised, or for dozens of other reasons. Contradictions between the national data announced by two countries might be brought forward but there would be no means of telling which national data were correct. Thus instead of clarification, the world would have only arguments and polemics about what had happened, with no real chance of inspection within a specified time and based on acceptable evidence as to the probable location of the unidentified event. It is possible that nations would be apt to take sides in this argument according to their political alignments, rather than according to the scientific facts.

Moreover, national detection systems have a fatal flaw in that they make no provision for objective examination of data or for inspection and other procedures to identify suspicious events. Such procedures can operate properly only on a truly international basis.

Inspection and scientific teams must be carefully selected and adequately trained well in advance. It is not enough to bring them together on an ad hoc basis after the unidentified event has occurred, with no experience of working together as a team and no assurance that an ad hoc team would have adequate equipment. Unless sampling flights can take place within a relatively few days after a nuclear explosion above ground has occurred, it may be impossible to collect samples of the radioactive debris to determine what in fact has occurred.

It must also be pointed out that nothing which happened during the recent Soviet test series in 1961 has any bearing on this problem. This is because, as the Soviet Union told us beforehand, its test series largely involved medium and large nuclear detonations in the megaton range in the atmosphere. As we all know, it is just in the larger yields of one-tenth of a megaton and higher that atmospheric explosions are the easiest to detect by a non-international system. We can imagine how very different it would be if we were dealing with unannounced, **secret** detonations in any environment which the violator attempted to hide. We would have major problems even of detection, to say nothing of the more important and essential fact of identification.

At the informal meeting on 23 March, Mr. Zorin came up with a conclusion which can only be called astounding. He said that there had been no testing by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union during the three years of the nuclear test ban negotiations until the Soviet Union began its new series last August. This proved, he claimed, that what the nuclear Powers declared

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publicly could be believed; and this would allegedly be even clearer after a formal treaty with national detection systems alone had been signed. He implied that no controls at all were needed. To drive his point home he added that the West must surely have received hundreds of earthquake signals from within the USSR during these three years of negotiation and yet, he said, the West had never accused the USSR of having conducted an underground nuclear test because we in the United States supposedly knew that none had taken place on the territory of the USSR. I am sorry to differ, but the fact is that although we in the United States knew that the United States itself was not conducting any nuclear tests we did not know at all what was taking place on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, from the way I look at this problem, my conclusions would be exactly the opposite of those of our colleague Mr. Zorin. Yes, indeed, our scientists did record hundreds and hundreds of seismic or acoustic signals during those three years of negotiation, and some of them may have looked as if they could have been caused by a secret underground nuclear detonation, or perhaps by very heavy chemical explosions, or perhaps by earthquakes. But how could we say anything at all? We had no data enabling us to identify one detected signal from another as a nuclear explosion; we had no right whatsoever to seek an on-site inspection; we did not wish to voice suspicions in a way that might interfere with the test ban negotiations. So we had to keep our silence, with our many unconfirmed suspicions, some of which did emerge in the press or in public statements by private individuals. We had no way of combating those statements. We had to hope that we would soon have a treaty with the Geneva control system so that at last the system could monitor just what was indeed going on in the Soviet Union in regard to possible clandestine testing. I submit that nothing could prove more clearly the need for an international control system, for whether the Soviet Union was or was not testing, many people in the United States believed that during this period the Soviet Union was secretly testing, and all we, the Government, could say was that we had no evidence.

I submit that no sophistry will help the Soviet Union out of the totally illogical position in which it now finds itself. All through last spring and summer it made it abundantly clear that it was against a control system that did not have a built-in Soviet veto right over all operations and that did not otherwise tend to hamstring control activities. The Soviet Union demanded such limitations on control on the grounds of a supposed danger that the West might

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misuse the carefully worked out international control system with all its carefully built-in safeguards against espionage. We had hoped that we had met all the fears of the Soviet Union with respect to espionage in these very carefully worked out provisions of the treaty. All through this period however, as I showed at the start of my statement today, the USSR recognized the appropriateness and indeed continued to approve of the control system recommended by the Geneva experts in 1958. It merely said that the Soviet Union would not submit to the full scope of such controls except in connexion with a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Last November, when the test ban talks resumed and when the USSR had completed its series of tests, the Soviet position, lo and behold! was entirely changed. By then, for completely political and not scientific reasons, the Soviet Union not only refused to accept the Geneva control system because general disarmament had not yet been agreed on but even began to claim that the Geneva control system was totally unnecessary. This amounts to piling one invented pretext on top of another, each one intended to make it even more positive that no effectively-controlled international test ban treaty can ever be signed.

On 15 March 1962 the Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, speaking at the second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, said:

"The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed upon will be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process of general and complete disarmament has begun. Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least of all States which have established closed military alignments, are pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we expect others to take us at our word".

I repeat that: "Nor do we expect others to take us at our word."

"The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.2, page 11)

Despite this statement, the Soviet Union is now asking the United States and the United Kingdom to rely solely on the Soviet Union's word regarding possible violations of a test ban treaty. References to so-called "national systems of



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detection" add nothing substantial to a naked verbal pledge. Yet the Soviet Union must know that the West, for its own security, cannot take the risk of relying upon the Soviet word that the USSR will live up to non-internationally supervised test ban pledges. We require the assurance that comes from a technically sound control system of supervision, detection and identification. To deny this is deliberately and intentionally to prevent a sound test ban treaty.

Speaking of reliance on the unverified word of the USSR, I must refer to the situation surrounding the recent moratorium on testing. In order to relieve itself of some of the heavy responsibility which it bears for having unleashed a renewed wave of nuclear testing upon the world in August 1961, the Soviet Union has become very fond of claiming that it was under no obligation to maintain the unofficial and informal moratorium among the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR which was then in existence. Indeed, Foreign Minister Gromyko himself put forward such a view at the eight plenary meeting of this Conference on 23 March (ENDC/PV.8, page 21)

Unfortunately, such assertions do not square with the record as set down in the documents of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The last Soviet Government statement on the moratorium was made on 28 August 1959. After discussing previous statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments on a temporary testing moratorium, the Soviet declaration concluded as follows: "The Council of Ministers of the USSR has resolved not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not resume the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Only in the case of resumption by them of nuclear weapon tests will the Soviet Union be free from this pledge". This Soviet declaration was never rescinded.

The Soviet Government has recently cited President Eisenhower's announcement of 29 December 1959 as an excuse for the Soviet test resumption on 1 September. That announcement said that the United States no longer considered itself bound by the unilateral no-testing moratorium, but held that it was henceforth free to test if it so chose. It can be seen that this announcement could not in any way have altered the voluntary obligation assumed by the USSR on 28 August 1959, because the obligation was based on the actual non-occurrence of United States and United Kingdom nuclear weapon tests. It was not at all based on the existence of United States and United Kingdom pledges regarding this matter.

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In this connexion it is instructive to refer to the statement made on 14 January 1960 by Premier Khrushchev in an address to the Supreme Soviet. Among other things, he then said: "I would like to re-emphasize that the Soviet Government, with a view to safeguarding the most favourable conditions for the working out in the very near future of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons".

Another statement was made at the two hundred and fourteenth meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests by the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin. This statement was made on 15 June 1960, that is, almost six months after President Eisenhower's announcement about the United States position. On that occasion Mr. Tsarapkin warned the United States and the United Kingdom against carrying out nuclear detonations in the guise of research explosions without Soviet approval and without inspection of the devices to be exploded. He added that if the United States or the United Kingdom did conduct such detonations, then

"In that case the Soviet Union will consider itself free from the unilateral obligation it has assumed not to carry out nuclear explosions and will find itself compelled to resume them in order to improve its weapons for the purpose of ensuring the security of the country."

(GEN/DNT/PV.214, page 7)

I submit that nothing could be clearer than that the USSR still felt itself bound by a unilateral moratorium in mid-1960. We can legitimately ask, therefore, whether the USSR made any subsequent announcements before 30 August 1961 to tell the world that it was freeing itself of this obligation. I know of none, so the answer again must be negative.

I say this because Soviet representatives have sometimes tried to make it appear that the handful of relatively small-yield nuclear explosions carried out by France without any aid or technical information from the United States or the United Kingdom in 1960 and 1961 somehow changed this Soviet obligation. Of course it can be noted that the above-cited statement by Mr. Tsarapkin on 15 June 1960 was made after the first French test, and it did not even refer to that test as altering the unilateral Soviet no-testing pledge.

Later on, it is true, Mr. Tsarapkin did take up the subject of French testing explicitly. However, his last words on the matter were given in May 1961 after

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the fourth and most recent French test, and it is worth quoting them here because, again, there was no declaration that the Soviet Union considered itself free from its no-testing obligation.

In fact, Mr. Tsarapkin said at the three hundred and sixth meeting on 18 May 1961:

"If France continues to carry out nuclear weapon tests the Soviet Union will be compelled to resume nuclear tests as well, for we do not want to find ourselves in a position of inequality, without rights and advantages equal to those of the NATO bloc, within which nuclear weapons are being tested and improved." (GEN/DNI/PV.306, page 26)

The fact is that France did not conduct any nuclear tests between 18 May and 30 August last, but even without being able to invoke this transparent pretext, and despite its unilateral moratorium pledge, the USSR did resume its own tests unilaterally by 1 September 1961.

The present attitude of the Soviet Union seems to be guided by a determination that testing shall not cease and that the USSR shall be free to continue the weapons development which it started in 1961 even while we were negotiating here. We hope that the USSR will reflect upon its position before it is too late to stop this cycle of testing.

We are willing to ignore the Soviet test series of last autumn and to sign a realistic, effective international treaty now based on our draft of 18 April 1961 with its proposed amendments which were worked out at the request of the Soviet Union (ENDC/9). We are willing that that treaty should be a complete and comprehensive treaty. We are willing to try to work out with the Soviet Union some basis upon which the number of inspections called for by the treaty would be related to the number of inspections in seismic areas and the number of inspections in non-seismic areas, so that if the Soviet Union agreed with our scientific data the number of on-site inspections in the heart-land of the Soviet Union would be reduced. If, I say, we can work out this international system of control based upon this draft treaty with the amendments we have made in order to make it acceptable to the Soviet Union, we would be prepared to forgo our proposed tests, although we must, of course, be assured that the treaty would contain adequate international controls for both detection and identification based on the so-far unchallenged recommendations contained in the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts' report.

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I submit that our two Governments have done everything possible to satisfy the Soviet Union on this point of espionage. We have changed the treaty several times in several respects in an effort to satisfy them on this point. We have studied this treaty with great care to see if there is anything also which, with safety to the scientific character of the treaty, could be eliminated and we are satisfied that there is no basis for this charge of espionage. We are quite prepared, as I say, to sign this international treaty with its built-in controls, but we cannot be satisfied with anything less than such an internationally controlled treaty, or with any international treaty shorn of its most vital and effective features. We are quite prepared to be as constructive as we can and to be as patient as we can, in negotiating this treaty with the Soviet Union. We cannot expose ourselves, however, to the risk of the kind of clandestine Soviet tests in any environment which occurred last September.

Moreover, with respect to underground tests, we agree with Prime Minister Khrushchev, who stated on 9 September last that important weapons developments could be carried out in that environment.

The time is growing short. We again urge the Soviet Union to negotiate constructively with us upon this international draft treaty, to abandon this newly-found and completely unrealistic idea of national systems of detection, and to adopt a position favouring a sound and effective international control treaty, which truly accords with the wishes and the needs of humanity and of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I would like, in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, to say a few words. I would reserve my position to comment more fully on what the representative of the Soviet Union said earlier this afternoon, but there are one or two immediate comments that I feel I must make.

The representative of the United States, in his opening remarks, said that he was profoundly saddened at the speech we had listened to. I must echo those sentiments. As I listened to this unfolding of the story which the representative of the Soviet Union put before us, it seemed to me to be so unrelated to reality as to be almost a fairy tale. We have had given to us again this afternoon arguments in relation to this matter which, it is true, we have heard many times before but which seem to be wholly unrelated to the facts.

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I had thought when we met with our colleagues from the other delegations one day last week that I detected a somewhat more realistic attitude on the part of the Soviet delegation, but I fear that that idea has been completely eliminated by what we have been forced to listen to this afternoon. I hope very much that the representatives of the other nations in this Conference will study the speeches that have been made this afternoon, particularly that of the representative of the Soviet Union, because I think it does show so clearly the very serious difficulties that we are up against in seeking to make progress in this matter. This is what depresses me most of all.

Indeed, when the representative of the Soviet Union went so far as to say at one stage, referring to the proposed forthcoming series of United States tests, that -- and I quote his words -- "the United States is revealing itself to the whole world as the instigator of an intensified arms race", it did not seem to occur to him in any way that this was a direct result of the actions of his own Government, actions for which the Soviet Union is completely, absolutely responsible. I wondered, when he said it, how many people he thought would really be taken in by this sort of thing. It seems to me to be judging the intelligence of our colleagues in other delegations as very low if one is going to talk in this extravagant way and on a basis which seems to me to have no justification at all. I wondered, as I listened to the representative of the Soviet Union, whether it might not have been more appropriate in this particular regard to have shown for once a little humility -- a little humility for having been responsible for again starting this race, which, once it was started, would obviously be very difficult to stop. The responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless they themselves could now, if they wished -- if they were ready, if they were willing to come to agreement -- stop further tests. They have the opportunity. The Western nations have stood by their treaty proposals. They have not merely stood by them: they have advanced their position to try and take account of some of the objections of the Soviet Union. But what do we meet in response? We meet this entirely negative attitude and we get this torrent -- I hesitate to use a strong word -- of words which seeks to justify the position taken up by the Soviet Union. We heard again the old argument that in fact things had changed so much that there was no longer any need for any international detection or inspection -- the word "inspection" was not used, I

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think, but it was implicit in all that the Soviet representative said. When he talked of weapon tests carried out in the Soviet Union twelve years ago being detected by United States national systems, and when he talked of Tass having published in 1958 a long list of explosions carried out by the United States, what was he seeking to prove? That at that particular time the scientific developments were such that we need not have had an international system? If he was, this seems an extraordinary attitude to adopt, because at that very time his own scientists here in Geneva were agreeing with the scientists of the Western nations that in fact an international system was necessary. This was endorsed by his own Government again and again. It was endorsed when the Soviet Union voted in the United Nations, both in 1959 and in 1960, for a test ban under effective international control. It was endorsed as late as 10 June 1961 when Prime Minister Khrushchev, in a letter to President Kennedy, said "The Soviet Union, just as the United States, considers that strict international control must be established over the cessation of tests".

These are things which the Soviet Union declared at that time; therefore why try to distort the position by going back and producing these old statements which have no bearing on the situation? The fact is that there was agreement among the three Powers concerned up to the very moment when the Soviet Union started its massive series of tests last autumn. Up to that moment there was agreement that an international system was necessary. Even at that moment, so far as I am aware, the Soviet Union did not repudiate the need for international verification. It was only when they came back on 28 November that they brought forward this wholly new proposal, this proposal for which they have produced no justification at all. They have produced no serious justification for the abandonment of these systems, these checks which we have sought to establish and for which there was wide Soviet agreement over such a long period.

We have asked them for this justification. In the plenary meeting of this Conference, my own Secretary of State, Lord Home, told them again only the other day that, if, in fact, they say that international detection is unnecessary in any environment, they should produce their evidence and bring forth their scientists and their instruments, and prove their case. We have asked for this before, and I ask for it again. If they say that international inspection is unnecessary, then I do ask the representative of the Soviet Union to tell us plainly and clearly to our satisfaction, and to the satisfaction of the non-aligned

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nations at this Conference, how any dispute on a question of act can be resolved. To talk merely of consultation means nothing and can give no assurance at all.

If the Soviet Union cannot give a satisfactory answer, and I must say that none has appeared so far, then I really do appeal to them once more to accept the principle of international inspection, to accept this as the only way to establish confidence and to enable a treaty to be signed. It really is not of great benefit to go back over the old sterile arguments, to go back through the sort of ritual dance that has gone on for so long in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

What people want is a move forward. The West has moved forward in its position and has tried to accommodate the Soviet Union. It is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to move forward now. They have all the interest and all the incentive to agree now. After all, it is they, and they alone, who have tested in the last three years, and yet we have told them that if they would agree now there would be no more tests by the West.

This is something which I really do urge the representative of the Soviet Union to think about again. I think the people of the world are entitled to see some move forward on the part of the Soviet Union. It is only the Soviet rejection of principles that they themselves accepted for more than three years, and, indeed, that they themselves accepted until 28 November last, which is preventing agreement today.

Therefore I make this further appeal. Do not let us carry on this long discussion about what has happened in the past. Let us look to the future. Let us come to an agreement quickly and soon.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The statements made here today by the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, came immediately after our own statement in which we presented detailed arguments in support of a solution of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests based on the utilization of national systems of control. We demonstrated on the basis of conclusive data that national systems of control are fully effective and adequate for the purposes of control, that the United States rejects this Soviet proposal for national control, not because this proposal does not ensure control over compliance with the agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, but

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because it interferes with the opportunities of the United States and its allies to undertake intelligence and espionage activities in the territory of the Soviet Union and that it is precisely for this reason that they insist on international control. All these points were demonstrated and analyzed carefully, conscientiously and convincingly. I have no need to repeat all that has been said.

Mr. Godber says we should produce some evidence to confirm our assertions about the effectiveness of a national system of control, but it seems to me that confirmation of the correctness of our assertions can be found in your own laboratories which are studying this matter, just as the United States laboratories are doing. You are asking that we should present evidence and, as I understand it, that a meeting of scientific experts should again be convened. We know the kind of scientists you send here. I do not wish to cast doubt upon their knowledge or competence, but at the same time we are aware that many, if not all of these experts favour the establishment of a very wide network of international control and also, incidentally, support the continuance of nuclear weapon tests. This is particularly true of the scientists employed by the Rand Corporation, who are working in various laboratories of the Pentagon, in the laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission and in the laboratories of some of the largest United States monopolies connected with the supply of armaments -- nuclear and other -- to the United States Government.

Answers to all the questions that were put to us by the United States and United Kingdom representatives, to all their complaints and reproaches, to all their appeals and proposals, are contained in the statement which I made today, as well as in the statements made here during earlier meetings when we discussed the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. So far as I am concerned, I have nothing further to add. You will find there answers to all the questions that interest you.

The epoch, or era, of international control has passed, where the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is concerned, but we are nevertheless not demanding that you should rely on us for control over compliance with the agreement by the Soviet Union, just as we do not wish to rely on the United States for control over compliance with this agreement by the United States, should we succeed in reaching an agreement. We in fact proceed from the opposite premise, namely, that we shall verify United States compliance with the agreement, while



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the United States and the United Kingdom will themselves verify, through their own systems, the Soviet Union's compliance with the agreement. This is an excellent idea. Surely no one could be a more exacting or a stricter controller than the other party to the agreement. You represent the opposite camp. You will watch us while we, with the aid of our own system, will watch you. What can be more effective than this approach to the solution of the problem of control?

International control over the discontinuance of tests will solve nothing; because international control would use the same systems of detection and identification as are now used by states for the registration of nuclear explosions, i.e., national systems. Now that distances are virtually of no consequence and the sensitivity of instruments and equipment is such that it is possible to record, detect and identify nuclear explosions that take place in the territory of other countries -- I emphasize again -- the demand for international control is unwarranted. What we now have to do is not to settle the problem of the discontinuance of tests on the basis of international control, but to agree to settle it on the basis of using national systems of control. I have quoted various examples, but you are not even prepared to take them into account; you let them go in at one ear and out of the other and you close your eyes when, for instance, we point out to you how you recorded our recent underground explosion. You do not wish to take account of the fact that the United States underground explosion of 10 December was recorded in Sweden, Finland and Japan. You do not wish to pay any attention to the progress made in the designing and perfecting of appliances, instruments and equipment, to the increase in their sensitivity and selectivity. You do not wish to take this into account, because you are possessed by a single fixed idea, namely that you must have international control and nothing less, notwithstanding the fact that national control is a fully adequate and effective substitute for your international control. But national control does not involve the difficulties, contradictions and obstacles that inevitably arise when we begin to discuss with you the question of the use of international control.

After some discussion, it was decided that a meeting of the Sub-Committee would be tentatively fixed for 3 p.m. on Thursday, 29 March 1962, and that the English and Russian verbatim records of the present meeting would be distributed to members of the plenary Conference on Thursday, 29 March 1962.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.